The Revolt in Arabia

Hurgronje

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By C. Snouck Hurgronje

The Holy War, Made in Germany

Mohammedanism

The Revolt in Arabia

The Revolt in Arabia

By

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With a Foreword by

Richard J. H. Gottheil

Columbia University, New York

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FOREWORD

ALL those interested in Mohammedan affairs were much surprised to learn, through a despatch from Cairo on June 22, 1916, that the Emir of Mecca had revolted from Turkish overlordship. Much speculation was indulged in regarding the causes for such an uprising and its probable or possible outcome; for there are few parts of the habitable globe about which the ordinary student of international affairs knows so little as he does about Arabia. Life there has remained in much of its mediæval primitiveness; and even scholars who are specially concerned about Mohammedanism, and about the several hundred millions of its devotees, are little better situated in

receiving accurate information of that which is occurring in the "Holy Land" of Arabia.

No one living knows its history better than does Professor Snouck Hurgronje of the University of Leiden. To his vast knowledge upon all subjects connected with Mohammedanism and gained from an extensive reading of its literature, he has added personal observation during the year that he spent in Mecca and Jiddah. He has been able to get an insight into the various questions involved in its tangled history at the present day, and to learn at first hand of the parties which are rivals for leadership there. In the Dutch newspaper *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, July 14, 1916, Professor Snouck Hurgronje gave a lucid explanation of the situation created as he saw it, by the proclamation of the Emir. The following pages contain a translation

of these articles. I have added, as an appendix, the official proclamation of the Shereef to the whole Moslem world as it appeared translated into English in *The Near East* for August 25, 1916.

Since these articles were published in Holland we have heard very little as to what is happening in and around Mecca. News has come that an attempt at administrative reconstruction has been made at Jiddah; that the new Shereef has appointed a special agent at Cairo in the person of Omar Bey al-Faruki; and that the new government has decided to publish a weekly paper called *Elkiblah*, which is to be edited by Fuad Effendi Khatib of Gordon College, Assuan. What is of greater importance is the alleged assistance offered to the Emir Husain by the Emir Abd al-Aziz ibn Sa'ud, the head of the Wahhabites in the Nejd—the district east of Medinah—and by the Zaidite Im-

am Yahyah in the Yemen against the Turkish troops stationed there.

RICHARD GOTTHEIL.

Dec. 23, 1916.
Columbia University.

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I

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA

HOW the public insists upon making a snap judgment on the significance of passing events is shown by the haste with which speculations are given out, speculations that are purely hypothetical because the truth of the reports that reach us can, as yet, be verified only approximately.

According to a Reuter despatch, the Great Shereef of Mecca has revolted against Turkish authority and, at the head of his Arabs, has succeeded in forcing the capitulation of the garrisons of

Mecca, Jidda, Ta'if, and Medina, and has seriously hampered the movements of Turkish troops, menacing to him, by the destruction of a section of the railroad from Medina to the north. Wolff's Bureau, on the other hand, spreads a report of the "Milli Agency"—the Turkish National Agency—that a troop of Arabs, to whom robbery was no unaccustomed calling, had been persuaded by their captain, he being instigated by English marines, to bombard Mecca, that the Turkish troops had, however, speedily restored order, and that the raiders themselves, when it was proven that their leader had been seduced by English money to act thus basely, had delivered the miscreant to the Turkish authorities.

If the German–Turkish statement be correct, the occurrence was insignificant and not deserving attention. If Reuter

be right in the main point, then it is well worth while to consider what may be the possible consequences of the Arab movement.

In either case, to comprehend the matter rightly, the political significance of the Shereefate of Mecca should be understood and the reading public should have a clearer idea of what the title "Grand Shereef of Mecca" covers than is possessed by the majority.

Mecca, the birth-place of the Prophet Mohammed, was not the centre from which he extended his sovereignty over a great part of Arabia. The capital of the realm founded by him was Medina, situated a ten-day caravan journey to the north. Moreover, when, about twenty years after his first appearance as Allah's messenger, Mohammed conquered Mecca, he did not think of transferring the seat of government thither. He had his own

good reasons for this, which we can pass over here. Still weightier were the reasons that influenced his successors in the administration of the theocracy of Islam from such a step. Mecca was far too remote from the then existing centres of civilisation to be a convenient vantage point for the world conquest considered by Islam as its appointed task, and as a capital from which to administer the empire which the first Caliphs were able to establish by force of arms. Even Medina seemed unsuited for the purpose, permanently. Then, when the Persian Empire, Syria, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain were subjected to Islam, Arabia, regarded politically, became a remote territory with a steadily decreasing significance.

The residence of the Caliphs was removed first to Damascus, later to Bagdad, where they remained established for five centuries—down to 1250 A.D.

Still the Arabian peninsula, arid though it is in the main, retained its prestige in the Moslem world, not only as the fatherland of the conquerors, but also as the Holy Land of Islam. Mecca might be ill adapted for a political capital, but it was, in the eyes of the faithful, the earth's centre, where the first human pair had walked, where Abraham had founded the first House of God, the Kaba, where every normal Mohammedan was bound to go once in his life to take part in the religious festival annually celebrated there.

While Mecca had already long been a religious centre for the heathen Arabians, after Mohammed's death Medina was classed with it as a spot where the foundations of Moslem theocracy were laid, where the Prophet had built his first mosque, and where he was buried. The lieutenants of the Caliphs in West Arabia

(the Hijaz), with Medina as the first, Mecca as the second, capital, thus had the chief sanctuaries of Islam entrusted to their care, and they were bound to provide for the preservation of order at the enormous international gatherings for which the two holy cities had furnished a stage every year since Mohammed's death.

Truly, the task was no easy one. The inhabitants of Mecca and Medina were, usually, at odds, and unanimous only in obstinacy and insubordination. The nomads of the intervening district continued to be, under Islam, the anarchists that they had been from time immemorial. Only a very strong hand could bridle the disorders native to the Holy Land. And a strong hand had always been lacking.

Very soon after its rise, the great empire of Islam fell asunder and the continuous contests between the state and statelets

into which it dissolved made the central authority of the Caliph a mere fiction, incapable of efficient exercise of power. Even the states, prominent from their position and thus better situated to maintain order in the Holy Land, as it was their interest to do, could not spare the military force essential for the governor of the Hijaz (West Arabia). Thus the holiest, the least productive, and most difficult-to-rule portion of the Moslem Empire was practically given over to confusion as its natural vital element, and the more vigorous Mohammedan countries limited themselves to the protection of the pilgrim caravans which set out from their realms for Arabia, and of such of their own subjects as had settled there.

Out of the chaos in West Arabia, resulting from the disintegration of the Islamic Empire, was born the Shereefate

of Mecca. From the extraordinarily numerous posterity of Mohammed, issue of the union of his daughter Fatima with his nephew Ali, many remained settled in Arabia as owners of date gardens, as robber knights at the head of Bedouin clans, or as speculators in the gradually increasing superstitious adoration of the Mohammedans for the Prophet's blood. Outside of Arabia, the descendants of Ali participated in political revolutions on greater or lesser scale, or had their hands filled by the governors of the Moslem lands. Their short-sighted avarice and their common lack of political talent, however, hindered them from carrying any important project to completion. Any success which they achieved was always transient. The universal condition of things in Arabia afforded the opportunity of turning a portion of the Holy Province into a personal domain.

In about 1000 A.D., the heads of certain families among the descendants of Ali began to make themselves powerful in the Hijaz and held their ground. From 1200 A.D. to the present time, one line of these children of Ali, that of Katada, has succeeded in maintaining supremacy in Mecca.

The names *sharif*—anglicized as *shereef*—that is "The Noble," and *sayyid* signifying "Seigneur" or "Lord," have become, little by little, titles of nobility throughout the entire Mohammedan world, especially among the posterity of the Prophet. The head of the reigning family in Mecca is "The Shereef of Mecca" *par excellence*, and the people call him *Sayyidana*, that is "Our Master" (or Our Lord). How far the realm of these Shereefs was extended beyond Mecca depended, as long as the petty dynasties existed, entirely on the chances of

circumstance; the more that confusion reigned in the surrounding Mohammedan realms and the greater the energy manifested by the ruling head of the family, the greater the portion of the Hijaz that came under his authority. The reverse was equally true. The defects of the most respected race of Islam were, to a great extent, the peculiar characteristics of the Mecca branch. They were incapable of carrying out any great undertaking.

The pilgrims, except when escorted by an imposing military force, were pitilessly stripped of their every possession by the Shereef and his satellites. Like the Bedouins through whose territory the *hajjis* or pilgrims had to pass, who counted all money and property as God-given booty, the Shereefs considered themselves justified in making Allah's guests at Mecca submit to every

kind of bleeding, and the latter had no remedy.

Further, there were among the members of the noble race one quarrel after another about their heritage, so that it was almost the normal state of affairs for one head of two rival branches of the family to fill the Shereefate while the other besieged Mecca or rendered the roads thither unsafe. The stable population of Mecca were sacrificed to this struggle for mastery; the blessings of peace were an unknown luxury to them.

When the Hijaz was still actually governed from the political centre of Islam, Medina was the appointed capital. For an independent local principality, such as the Shereefate, Mecca had the advantage of not being so accessible to the military forces of powers that might trouble themselves about the Hijaz. Only occasionally could the Shereefs of

Mecca control Medina at the same time, as the intervening distance was too great for the transportation facilities of the country. The alpine city Ta'if, two or three days' journey east of Mecca, where many people from Mecca resorted for the summer, and the port Jidda, one to two days' journey to the west, ordinarily fell under the Shereef. Several smaller ports were also included under his rule. The connection with the interior, mainly inhabited by nomadic tribes, varied according to the personal relations of the Shereef with the head of the Bedouin clan.

The Shereefate of Mecca differed from most of the states and principalities into which the great Islam Empire was divided, because it had not been developed gradually from a governorship to a condition of greater independence, but was born, spontaneously, during a period of confusion.

At Bagdad, as well as in other neighbouring capitals, people had accepted the change as a *fait accompli*. The Shereefate was neither expressly recognised nor expressly objected to as unlawful. Its century-long existence attained, moreover, a sort of virtual legitimacy through its acceptance by many Moslem tribes, who were represented in the Holy City by the annual deputations of pilgrims. These visitors were constantly exposed to ill treatment on the part of the Shereef. Yet, in spite of that, they held to a belief that domination over the Holy City belonged rightfully to a branch of the Holy Family. The fact was simply accepted as irrefutable.

The chief Islam powers have always attached a certain reservation to their tacit recognition of the Shereefs of Mecca which the latter have found themselves

forced to accept. He was never an independent ruler and, in the long run, had to recognise the suzerainty of the protecting states.

II

THE SHEREEFATE OF MECCA—*Continued*

IT was to these accidents of origin that the Shereefate of Mecca owed its peculiar standing. Its status was not a little enhanced by the unique significance of the city of Mecca for the Mohammedan world at large. From the tenth century, no one of the foremost Islam princes possessed the machinery to keep West Arabia under an administration even approximately orderly. On two points they were alike determined—first, to have their names introduced into the official prayers at the official ceremonies of Mecca, each desiring to take precedence of the others; second, that their deputies at the annual festivals should take rank

in accordance with their pretensions. In the prayers, the name of the Caliph was given first place, without question, even after his power had become a phantom. The descendants of the Prophet, wielding authority at Mecca from about the year 1000 to 1200 A.D., managed the required homage with a certain impartiality. At their command, there were prayers, now for the official Caliph at Bagdad and again for the heretical opposition Caliph in Egypt, according to the puissance manifested or the bribes offered by the one or the other. The Shereef family, ruling at Mecca from about 1200 A.D. to the present time, were soon freed from the difficulty of choice when an end was made of the Fatimide Caliphate in Egypt and when the Mongol storm swept away that of Bagdad in 1258. In the centuries following these events, the Sultans alone were mentioned in the prayers. And it

was thus, in the prayers, that there was the first formal expression of the relation between the Shereefate and the chief power of Islam.

Egypt long held an uncontested position so that it is correct to speak of a protectorate exercised by her Sultans over the territory of West Arabia from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries. The Hijaz (West Arabia) was dependent on the Nile-land for the importation of foodstuffs and other necessities. The Mameluke Sultans permitted the continuance of the Shereefate and did not interfere in the endless petty wars of succession fought by the claimants to the office. When it became necessary, it cost the Sultans little exertion to turn the scale in some of these contests with the help of a detachment of regular troops, and to enforce obedience. It was always an unequal strife between

the trained soldiers of a great Moslem power and the Shereef's little force, consisting as it did, of a few hundred slaves, the same number of mercenaries, and the timely aid of a few Bedouin clans. Domestic dissension, moreover, always assured the punitory leader of the coöperation of one party within the disturbed territory.

When Egypt was conquered in 1517 by Sultan Selim, Turkey, automatically, took over the protectorate of the Holy Land. The Turkish Sultans styled themselves, with unassuming pride, "the servants" of both holy cities. At the same time, their garrison in Mecca was an outward and visible sign that they did not intend to share the service with anyone. From that epoch on, their names immediately preceded that of the Grand Shereef in the official prayers. Later, the significance of the honour was en-

hanced by the addition of the title of *Caliph* assumed by the Turkish Sultans as sign and seal of their unrivalled power in Islam.

The Osmans made as little effort to reform the hopelessly muddled administration of the holy cities as their predecessors in the Protectorate had done. By that date, the Shereefate had obtained for more than three centuries, and no Mohammedan thought of questioning either the legality or the desirability of the institution.

The administration methods of the Osmans were as little adapted for permanent centralization as those of the earlier Mohammedan empire had been. The provinces speedily assumed the character of feudal holdings, each possessing a large measure of independence. The Pashas of Cairo, of Damascus, of Bagdad, vied with each other for the first rank

at Mecca. From this rivalry the Shereefate profited, just as the suzerains of the Holy Land had reaped advantage from the family disputes of the Shereefs. In the eighteenth century, the Shereefs were not troubled by the pressure of a heavy hand from without, but they were forced to depend on themselves, and their inadequate equipment was a source of danger to them when an unexpected opponent threatened to destroy their power.

The Wahhabis of Central Arabia, roused by a puritanic zeal to protest against what they declared was the dishonour of Islam, launched out on a campaign of reform. This "holy war," directed, primarily, against the Turkish domination, succeeded in exciting a religious fervour throughout a great part of Arabia, similar to that awakened by Mohammed twelve centuries earlier, and, at the turn of the eighteenth into the nineteenth

centuries, these Wahhabis succeeded in obtaining the mastery of the Holy Cities and in forcing the Shereefs to recognise their authority. With infinite difficulty the Pasha of Egypt, Mohammed Ali, later the first Khedive, succeeded in fulfilling the mission entrusted to him by the Sultan of Turkey and in reconquering the Holy Land in his turn.

The then Shereef was punished for his inefficiency in repelling the Wahhabis from his realm, by banishment, together with several members of his family, while the head of another branch of his kinsfolk was appointed to his vacated post. At this crisis, too, there was no talk of abolition of the Shereefate.

With the expulsion of the Wahhabis from the Hijaz in 1813, begins the latest historical phase of the Shereefate. The Protectorate exercised by the first Khed-

ive of Egypt down to 1840, partly in coöperation with, partly in opposition to, Turkish authority, was completely effective and so, as the Sultan was regularly represented in the Holy Land by a governor sent from Constantinople, the good old tumultuous times did not return for this free dynasty.

The understanding between the Shereefs and their protectors at Stamboul were, however, never cordial; the aspirations and interests of the two parties were too far asunder for that. The Sultans of Turkey considered the Shereefate as a necessary evil that prevented them from making the Hijaz into an ordinary *wilayet* or province. They stationed there military and civil officials similar to those in other *wilayets*, but the functions of these subordinates were hampered by the unrestricted power of the Shereef. After the Wahhabi war, this ruler was selected

by the suzerain and the rival kinsmen could no longer oust an incumbent of the hereditary office by force of arms. They were obliged to resort to the weapons of intrigue with the Sultan and the Sublime Porte. Still, even with this appearance of stable administration, it was not until 1880 that the Shereef finally relinquished as fruitless all armed resistance to the Sultan's deputies. The theory had been that the Sultan was to be obeyed, but that his servants in the Hijaz were unfaithful and could not be accepted. At Constantinople, meanwhile, certain members of the Shereef's family were kept in a kind of honourable captivity, partly as hostages for the good faith of the reigning Shereef, partly to relieve him from the burden of having rivals in his vicinity, and also it was a convenience to have those rivals in readiness in case the Shereef proved untrustworthy.

The Turkish governors of the Hijaz had no easy task. An energetic Shereef would always be on the alert to reduce the governor's authority to the smallest measure. A weak Shereef might be submissive, but then he was powerless to control the ill-disposed elements in his family and make them innocuous, and often he would be sacrificed to the wiles of the opposition. Coöperation between the two authorities for the maintenance of peace was not dreamed of. The roads from Mecca to Medina, to Jidda, to Ta'if, were in a chronic state of insecurity, and it was not seldom that the rapacious Bedouins rejoiced in the secret support of the Shereef.

The Shereef Aun, incumbent of the dignity from 1882 to 1905, was of the energetic type, but he was, at the same time, an avaricious tyrant, whose actions suggest Cæsar's mad ambition. One

governor after another had to yield, and had to sit in his shadow. Ahmed Ratab alone succeeded in holding on from 1892 to Aun's death in 1905, by shutting his eyes to the Shereef's ill deeds and contenting himself with a share in the profits that accrued from the malfeasance in office. Aun's brother, Abdullah, then living in Constantinople, was appointed his successor but died before he began his journey to his native land. Then the Sultan appointed Shereef Ali, a nephew of Aun, as "Amir of Mecca." Such was the title given to these princes by the Turkish chancery, out of respect for a possible sensitiveness on the subject.

Both Shereef Ali and the governor, Ahmed Ratib, succumbed when the great Turkish Revolution broke out in 1908. Ratib had to submit to financial extortions and to exile, while the deposed Shereef settled down in Cairo. His cousin

Husein, son of Aun's brother Ali, took his place as Shereef. It soon became apparent that this Husein intended to profit by the turn of events to retrieve the reputation and status of the Shereefate.

It is well known that Arabia has contributed her share to the many difficulties with which the Young-Turk Government has had to battle from its inception. Thus the latter found it advisable to let the Shereef, appointed as he was by the new *régime*, to go his own gait and Husein made ample use of his freedom.

During the Turco-Italian War, Turkish occupation was in a disturbed condition, especially in the southern part of Arabia and the Turkish Government asked Shereef Husein for help in relieving the besieged Turkish garrison of Obha in the rebellious Asir territory. With an old-time Shereef-army, composed of slaves, mercenaries, and Bedouins, Husein un-

dertook a campaign which did, possibly, help secure the safe retreat of the beleaguered Turkish garrison of Obha, but which also, undoubtedly, tempered the Shereef's sense of dependence on Turkish authority.

The same National Turkish News Agency (Milli Agency) contradicted by Reuter in regard to the revolt in Arabia, which it had reported as "a quickly suppressed uprising of roving robber bands in the pay of England"—telegraphed later that Shereef Husein was deposed and that Shereef Ali, appointed in his stead, had already set out for Mecca. Here the natural queries arise whether, by the "roving robber leader" of the first Milli report, was meant Shereef Husein himself, and whether the proposed journey of Shereef Ali will pass without incident. Whether the newly

appointed Shereef, that is the man with whose aid the Turkish Government is to try to suppress, once for all, "robber raiding," is the same who was replaced by Husein, some time ago, is not made clear in the Milli-despatch, but it is very probable that it is. In that case, Shereef Ali must have left Cairo before the war and betaken himself to Constantinople.

Here we have a repetition of the old game of playing off one Shereef against another, just as it was played in the past. And the outcome will depend on which of the two can gather the greater force of "robber raiders" under his standard: Ali, supported by the Turks and their friends, or Husein, aided by their opponents.

Assuredly either alternative proves the significance that a serious revolt against Turkish authority would have under present circumstances.

III

SHEREEF AND CALIPH

ASSUMING that the "robber raiders" of the Turkish-German despatch and the Shereef of Mecca, referred to in the Reuter telegram are one and the same person, and that, accordingly, Shereef Husein, Emir of Mecca, has raised his standard against the Turkish domination, then the question arises, "What does the Shereef mean by his opposition?"

Various writers on Islam have commented on the impropriety, according to Mohammedan law itself, of the assumption of the title of "Caliph" by the Sultan of Turkey. It was, indeed, for more than nine centuries, regarded by

the Moslem world as obligatory for the Caliphs to be able to trace their descent from the Arabic line of Koreish, the line from which Mohammed sprang. The pretensions advanced by the Sultans since the sixteenth century have never been generally approved. That they did not excite any vehement open opposition was partly owing to the imposing puissance of the Turkish Empire at the moment when the Sultans decorated themselves with the name, and partly to the circumstance that the usurped dignity had no practical sequence. The Caliph added no patch of ground to the territory that the Sultan had conquered with the sword, and spiritual authority has never been ascribed to the Caliph by the Moslem congregations. With the assumption of the highest appellation that could be worn by a Moslem regent after Mohammed, these Sultans simply announced

to all Moslem princes that none of them would be allowed to consider themselves his equal.

Such Moslems as were under Turkish authority were not affected by the Caliphate of their Sultan. The relation of subjects to their rulers in Mohammedan realms not subordinated to Turkey were even less affected; and least of all did the matter signify to those followers of Islam ruled by non-Mohammedans. These are numerous and have steadily increased during the last centuries. An effective Caliphate, however explained, presupposes the political unity of all the faithful.

The Caliph is the very personification of such unity and is, primarily, the leader of Islam's armies against the foes of the Faith, or he bears a name bereft of all significance. In international life there is no room for mediæval structures, and

Turkey can live in peace with other states, especially with those possessing Mohammedan subjects, only if Caliphate pretensions be honestly put aside, even though the title be maintained as a formal one. This was well understood by Turkish statesmen of later times, and they either banished the Caliphate idea in all their international discussions, or they permitted their European colleagues, who mistakenly regarded the Caliph as a sort of pope—a prince of the Church—to continue to entertain this false conception as it was harmless.

Unlettered Mohammedans, who, ignorant of the modern point of view, went on assigning an important place to the Caliphate legend in their framework of the political system, were, however, often presented with panislamic visions in order to retain, fictitiously, at least, what had long vanished from real life. And

these visions were often big with ambition.

How completely at odds the Caliphate idea is with modern international relations appeared when the Turkish Government, seduced by its alliance with Germany, brought it to the fore, anew. The first outward and visible sign of the renaissance of the Caliphate was the declaration of the "Holy War," accompanied by an appeal to all the Mohammedans in the world to participate therein, irrespective of the political authority they were bound to obey. Next came a series of official and officious publications, all based on the hypothesis that the Turkish Sultan-Caliph is the man who, under all circumstances, controls the political policy of the Mohammedans.

Taking all these points into consideration, it becomes hardly needful to reply to the question as to how the Shereef of

Mecca might, perhaps, try to become a rival of the Sultan Mehmed Reshad as a pretender to the Caliphate.

A Caliphate, no matter who holds the dignity, is wholly incompatible with modern political conditions. And this will be as true after the present war as it was before. Only as an empty title can it be tolerated at all.

For the rest, it can be seen, from what we have already written about the history and the current condition of the Shereefate, that any lofty aspirations would be especially ill adapted for local principalities. The idea of a Caliphate of the Shereefs of Mecca has been ventilated, more than once, by this or that European writer on Islam, but, in the Moslem world, it has never been broached, and no one of the Shereefs from the House of Katada—rulers in Mecca and in varying portions of West

Arabia ever since the year 1200 A.D.—ever thought of such a thing. It is improbable that even foreign influence could prevail on a Shereef of Mecca to attempt to gamble for the Caliphate. They all know too well how little chance of success there would be in such an attempt, and they feel themselves limited by tradition and by their resources to the Hijaz.

Perhaps it is not superfluous to controvert another error into which many fall,—the opinion, namely, that the wresting of the Hijaz from Turkish domination would, automatically, end the Turkish Caliphate, since the Caliph bases his claim to the title partly on his protection of the Holy Cities. This opinion is supported by neither Mohammedan law nor by Mohammedan history. Mecca and Medina have known periods when, for instance, they were in the hands of

the unbelieving Karmathians, when again they submitted to the heretical Fatimide-Caliphs, when all relations with the seat of the Caliphate were suspended, when the Wahhabis drove the Turks from the Holy Land; on none of these occasions did it occur to a single Moslem to question the right of the Caliph to his dignity. The Caliphate and the Holy Land have, more than once, existed independently of each other.

Quite apart from high political aspirations, there are reasons enough which might have excited Husein to renounce obedience to the Turk. It is well known that the relations between Sultan-Caliph and the Shereef have been perfunctory and never cordial. The Shereefs have invariably felt the protectorate as an oppressive bond, and the Turks have never been able to appeal to the population in the name of the blessings that

they, the conquerors, have bestowed on the land. They have given nothing and have never been in a position even to assure the safety of the roads leading to the Holy Cities during the few weeks of the pilgrimage. In Arabia as little as elsewhere have the Turks tried to affiliate with the people. They are unpopular in the highest degree.

The Committee of Union and Progress, in whose hands Turkey has been since 1908, has by no means made itself idolised by the Meccanese and their hereditary princes. Visitors to Stamboul from Mecca, since 1908, came away scandalized at the methods and ideals of Young Turkey. All Mecca subsists on the pilgrimages, and the interest of all is centred on the gains accruing to them from the *hajji* (pilgrim), just as that of an agricultural people is intent upon the prospects of the harvest. The Committee that

inscribed Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity on their standards and then proceeded to adopt despotic methods in administration, equivalent to those of Abdul Hamid, is regarded at Mecca as the cause of Turkey's participation in the war of which the palpable result for the Holy Cities was the absence of pilgrims and the restriction of the importation of foodstuffs. Even the people of West Arabia, who had heartily accepted Turkish sovereignty as such, now curse the present Turkish *régime*. No wonder that they were ready to appeal to a power that was foe to Turkey's ally, Germany! The latest Reuter telegram, according to which trade at Jidda, is again on a normal basis, indicates in its information one of the main causes of the Anti-Turkish movement.

In the Great War, the Shereefate of Mecca cannot possibly take part. The

forces at its disposal are nothing more than a bodyguard, a few mercenaries, and the contribution made by some Bedouin tribes, difficult to hold together, undisciplined, untrained. The population of the holy cities furnishes no elements for the formation of a military force, and in that population, Shereef Ali, whom the Turks now wish to use, will assuredly find some adherents. Arabia is still, as it was of yore, hopelessly divided by conflicting interests and by century-long feuds. It is not ready for great undertakings. But, for the moment, a revolt in West Arabia against Turkey, under the lead of the Great Shereef and aided by England, can cause serious trouble to the Turkish Government, and all the more, because it is at Mecca, familiar to, and cherished by, the entire Mohammedan world. Such a campaign, well prepared and ably conducted, would

be a master-stroke in opposition to the attempt, made by Young Turkey under German protection, to excite the mediæval fanaticism of Islam against other religious sects and to use it as an incentive to strife.

However that may be, those who abominate playing with the fire of religious hate, a measure to which the Young Turks, in the main non-religious, have allowed themselves, to be persuaded, have no reason to regret the Arabian uprising. All that can tend to making an end of the unworthy noisy talk of "Caliphate" and "Holy War" may be regarded as commanding respect.

NOTE

The following translation of the Proclamation appeared in *The Near East:*

Since writing his monograph, Professor Hurgronje has had reason to doubt his surmise as to the identity of the new Grand Shereef sent by the Turkish government to Medina. Probably it is not the Ali who succeeded to his uncle Aun and settled in Egypt after his demission.

The proclamation is added as interesting in connection with Professor Hurgronje's own articles. He would have preferred to give the Turkish proclamation as well as this, had this been possible.

APPENDIX

PROCLAMATION OF THE SHEREEF OF MECCA

"In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate."

This is our general proclamation to all our Moslem brothers.

"O God, judge between us and our people in truth; Thou art the Judge."

The world knoweth that the first of all Moslem princes and rulers to acknowledge the Turkish Government were the Emirs of Mecca the Blessed. This they did to bind together and make strong the brotherhood of Islam, for they saw the Sultans of the House of Osman (may the dust of their tombs be blessed, and may they dwell in Paradise!), how they were upright, and how they carried out all the commandments and ordinances of the Faith and of the Prophet (prayers be upon him!) perfectly. Therefore they were obedient to them at all times.

For a token of this, remember how in A.H. 1322 I with my Arabs helped them against

the Arabs, to save Ebhah from those who were besieging it, and to preserve the name of the Government in honour; and remember how again in the next year I helped them with my armies, which I entrusted to one of my sons; for in truth we were one with the Government until the Committee of Union and Progress rose up, and strengthened itself, and laid its hands on power. Consider how since then ruin has overtaken the State, and its possessions have been torn from it, and its place in the world has been lost, until now it has been drawn into this last and most fatal war.

All this they have done, being led away by shameful appetites, which are not for me to set forth, but which are public and a cause for sorrow to the Moslems of the whole world, who have seen this greatest and most noble Moslem Power broken in pieces and led down to ruin and utter destruction. Our lament is also for so many of its subjects, Moslems and others alike, whose lives have been sacrificed without any fault of their own. Some have been treacherously put to death, others cruelly driven from their homes, as though the calamities of war were not enough.

Of these calamities the heaviest share has fallen upon the Holy Land. The poor, and even families of substance, have been made to sell their doors and windows, yea, even the wooden frames of their houses, for bread, after they had lost their furniture and all their goods. Not even so was the lust of the Union and Progress fulfilled. They laid bare all the measure of their wicked design, and broke the only bond that endured between them and the true followers of Islam. They departed from their obedience to the precepts of the Book.

With the connivance of the Grand Vizier of the Ottoman Empire, the Sheikh-el-Islam, the Ulema, the Ministers, and the Notables, one of their papers called the *Ijtihad* published in Constantinople unworthy things about the Prophet (The Prayer and Peace of God be upon him!) and spoke evil of him (God forbid!). Then the Union and Progress rejected God's word, "A man shall have twice a woman's share," and made them equal. They went further and removed one of the five corner-stones of the Faith, even the Fast in Ramadan, by causing the soldiers in garrison in Mecca,

Medina, and Damascus to break their fast for new and foolish reasons, taking no account of the ordinance of God saying, "Those of you who are sick or on a journey. . . ." Yea, they went further. They made weak the person of the Sultan, and robbed him of his honour, forbidding him to choose for himself the chief of his personal Cabinet. Other like things did they to sap the foundation of the Khalifate.

For this it had been clearly our part and our necessary duty to separate ourselves from them and renounce them and their obedience. Yet we would not believe their wickedness, and tried to think that they were the imaginings of evil-doers to make a division between us and the Government. We bore with them until it was apparent to all men that the rulers of Turkey were Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha, and Tallaat Bey, who were doing whatsoever they pleased. They made their guilt manifest when they wrote to the Judge of the Sacred Court in Mecca traducing the verses in the Surah of the Cow, and laying upon him to reject the evidence of believers outside the Court and to consider only the deeds and contracts engrossed

within the Court. They also showed their guilt when they hanged in one day twenty-one of the most honourable and enlightened of the Moslems, among them Emir Omar el Jazairi, Emir Arif el Shahabi, Shefik Bey Moayyad, Shukri Bey el Asli, Abdel Wahab, Tewfik el Bassat, Abdel Hamid el Zahrawi, Abdel Ghani el Areisi, and their learned comrades. To destroy so many, even of cattle, at one time would be hard for men void of all natural affection or mercy. And if we suppose they had some excuse for this evil deed, by what right did they carry away to strange countries the innocent and most miserable families of those ill-fated men? Children, old men, and delicate women bereft of their natural protectors were subjected in exile to all foul usage and even to tortures, as though the woes they had already suffered were not chastisement enough. Did not God say: "No punishment shall be inflicted on anyone for the sins of another? . . ." Let us suppose they found for themselves some reason for ill-treating the harmless families of their victims; why then did they rob them of their properties and possessions, which alone remained to keep them from

death by famine? And if we suppose that they had also some excuse for this evil deed, how shall we find pardon for them for their shattering of the tomb of our most righteous and upright Lord and Brother, El Sayed el Shereef Abdel Kader el Jezairi el Hassani, whose bones they have polluted and whose dust they have scattered abroad?

We leave the judgment of these misdeeds, which we have touched upon so briefly, to the world in general and to Moslems in particular. What stronger proof can we desire of the faithlessness of their inmost hearts to the Religion, and of their feelings towards the Arabs, than their bombardment of that ancient House, which God has chosen for His House, saying, "Keep my House pure for all who come to it,"—a House so venerated by all Moslems? From their fort of Jyad, when the revolt began, they shelled it. The first shot struck a yard and a-half above the Black Stone. The second fell three yards short of it, so that the flame leapt up and took hold upon the Kiswa. Which, when they saw, the thousands and thousands of Moslems first raised a lamentable cry, running to and fro, and then shouted

in fierce anger and rushed to save it. They had to burst open the door and mount upon the roof before they could quench the flames. Yet a third shell fell upon the Tomb of Abraham, and other shells fell in and about the precincts, which they made a target for their guns, killing every day three or four who were at prayer within the Mosque, till they prevented the people coming near to worship. This will show how they despised His House and denied it the honour given it by believers.

We leave all this to the Moslem world for judgment.

Yes, we can leave the judgment to the Moslem world; but we may not leave our religion and our existence as a people to be a plaything of the Unionists. God (Blessed be He!) has made open for us the attainment of freedom and independence, and has shown us a way of victory to cut off the hand of the oppressors, and to cast out their garrison from our midst. We have attained independence, an independence of the rest of the Ottoman Empire, which is still groaning under the tyranny of our enemy. Our independence is complete, absolute, not to be laid hands on by any foreign influence or aggression, and

our aim is the preservation of Islam and the uplifting of its standard in the world. We fortify ourselves on the noble religion which is our only guide and advocate in the principles of administration and justice. We are ready to accept all things in harmony with the Faith and all that leads to the Mountain of Islam, and in particular to uplift the mind and the spirit of all classes of the people in so far as we have strength and ability.

This is what we have done according to the dictates of our religion, and on our part we trust that our brethren in all parts of the world will each do his duty also, as is incumbent upon him, that the bonds of brotherhood in Islam may be confirmed.

We beseech the Lord of Lords, for the sake of the Prophet of Him who giveth all things, to grant us prosperity and to direct us in the right way for the welfare of the faith and of the faithful.

We depend upon God the All-Powerful, whose defence is sufficient for us.

Shereef and Emir of Mecca,

HUSEIN.

25 Shaaban, 1334.

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