TURKEY IN ASIA

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920
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DEC. 10 1920

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.
It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, ante-bellum conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PRO�HERO,

*General Editor and formerly*

*Director of the Historical Section.*

January 1920.
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GENERAL SKETCH

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

1072-92 Zenith of power of Seljukian Empire.
1280-88 Ertegun leader of immigrant Turks.
c. 1245 Mongol invasion of Asia Minor.
1288-1326 Osman I.
1300 Assumption of title Sultan by Osman.
1386 Conquest of Karamania.
1514 Annexation of Diarbeik and Kurdistan.
1516 Occupation of Syria.
1517 Subjugation of Egypt and Hejaz.
1535 Capture of Erivan, Van, Mosul, and Baghdad.
1670 Conquest of the Yemen.
c. 1600-33 Independence of Druses in the Lebanon.
1630 Expulsion of Turks from the Yemen.
1638 Recapture of Baghdad by Murad IV.
1728-47 Independent rule of Ahmed Pasha at Baghdad.
c. 1746 Rise of the Wahhabis.
c. 1768 Ali Bey independent ruler of Egypt. Sheikh Taha
    established at Damascus over Syria.
1773 Defeat of Ali Bey by the Turks.
1792 Wahhabi aggressions in Arabia.
c. 1798-1840 Independent rule of Beshir in the Lebanon.
c. 1800-04 Ahmed Jezzar supreme in Acre.
1802 Wahhabis capture Mecca and Medina.
1808-39 Reign of Mahmoud II.
1811 Destruction of the Mamelukes by Mehemet Ali.
1818 Defeat of the Wahhabis by Mehemet Ali.
1826 Destruction of the Janissaries by Mahmoud II.
1831 Revolt of Mehemet Ali. Invasion of Syria.
1840 Expulsion of Ibrahim Pasha from Syria.
1841 Rebellion of the Druses. Direct Ottoman Government
    installed in the Lebanon.
Firman of the Sultan granting Pashalik of Egypt to
    Mehemet Ali and his descendants.
1845 and 1860 Massacres in the Lebanon.
1861 First Charter of the Lebanon.
1864 New Statute of the Lebanon.
1869 Opening of Suez Canal.
1871 Expedition of Midhat Pasha to the Persian Gulf.
1872 Turkish occupation of part of highland Yemen.
1876-1909 Reign of Abdul Hamid.
1881 Establishment of Turkish post between Baghdad and Damascus.
1888 Profession by Ibn Rashid of allegiance to the Porte.
1891 Rebellion against the Turks in the Yemen.
1894-95 Armenian massacres.
1902 Recovery of Riyadh by the Saud dynasty.
1903 Appointment of British Political Agent at Koweit.
1904 Rebellion in the Yemen.
1908 Advent of Young Turks to power.
1909 Hejaz railway completed to Medina.
1909 Armenian massacres.
1910 Rebellion in the Yemen.
1913 Expulsion of Turks from Hasa and Eastern Arabia by Ibn Saud.

DEFINITION

Turkey in Asia means the Asiatic dominions of the Ottoman or Osmanli Turks, who are a minority only of the Turks in Asia, are not of pure extraction, and are associated with a popular majority not Turkish at all. The north-western third of their dominions is the only part which is generally Turkish in feeling. The southern half, almost entirely Arab, identifies itself very imperfectly with Osmanli tradition and hope.

ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The original Turks, the embryo of the future Osmanli nation, were a very small body of migrant tribesmen, settled by the Seljukian Turks of Konia, in the thirteenth century, around Yeni-Shehr, in the north-western corner of Asia Minor. There the ground had been prepared for them by two empires, the Byzantine and the Seljukian, both, as it chanced, already moribund. The first of these empires, having spread Levantine civilisation over the ancient Bithynia and settled there many Turkish elements which had served in its wars, left this remnant of its Asian subjects to lapse into a feudal society. The second empire, itself Turkish, having given Turki colour and Moslem sympathy to almost all the rest of Asia Minor, failed to establish permanent central control. The vigorous Turki nucleus, settled under Ertoghrul after
the middle of the thirteenth century at Yeni-Shehr, showed remarkable capacity for political expansion; and, by a process at once agglutinative and assimilative, it rapidly caused a new national unity to coalesce about itself. This it led, on the one hand, into South-Eastern Europe, where the elements composing that unity found themselves at home; on the other, into Continental Asia Minor, where, with little difficulty, it could absorb disintegrated societies abandoned to local Emirs by the dying Seljuks. In less than two centuries, despite certain set-backs, the new Turkish nation, now called Osmanli or Ottoman, after Osman or Othman, its first Sultan (for Erteogrul, out of respect for his Seljuk overlord, never assumed the title), had taken up both the vacant Imperial heritages, north and south, and had reconstituted the Roman Empire of the East.

The proper limits of this Empire were attained by the close of the fifteenth century. But in the process of its growth the new Imperial people had developed militarism to a point at which it took control of the State, and compelled the conquest of alien territories. In Asia two hundred years of warfare resulted in failure in both Caucasia and Persia; but, in the demoralised and incoherent Arab lands, easy conquests more than doubled the area of the Ottoman Empire in less than a century. Assimilation of the Arabs, however, proved as difficult as their conquest had been easy. The Osmanli Turks had to deal with an incompatibel alien population just as they were beginning to feel certain evil consequences of their own military success; for this had excited in them religious fanaticism, fear of which was beginning to link the Christian world against them, and had carried them into a wider area than their centralised system had the capacity to administer. Decay at the heart of the Empire soon began to affect the limbs, and the most lately acquired provinces were the first to suffer. Conquered in the sixteenth century, the Arab lands had lapsed again to virtual independence of an anarchic sort before the seventeenth was over; and, indeed, over most of the
Asiatic part of his Empire the Ottoman Sultan had come by then to exercise little better than an otiose suzerainty.

Relation of the Provinces to the Porte

(1) Independent States

A little more than half-way through the eighteenth century the situation was this. Irak was being ruled by Ahmed Pasha, independent prince of Baghdad. Egypt and all southern and central Syria obeyed (if anyone) Ali Bey, independent Prince of Cairo, and his agent, Sheikh Taha, at Damascus. North Syria was disputed by Turcoman and Kurdish Beys. In Hejaz the Emirs of Mecca were no longer dependent. Yemen had been lost for more than a century to the Imams of the Qasim House, reigning at Sana. By the end of the century things had become even worse from the Ottoman point of view. A number of new chiefs had seized power in Syria, notably Ahmed Jezzar of Acre and Beshir, the Shehab Emir, in the Lebanon. In Aleppo the local Janissaries disputed control with the Turcomans; and throughout the northern borderland Zeitunli Armenians and Kurds did as they pleased. The nineteenth century opened with Wahhabis raiding up to Damascus on the one side and Kerbela on the other. There had come to be no reality of Ottoman Empire in any Arab-speaking land, and it was not so much from the Turks as from the local chieftains that the armies of Mehemet Ali had to capture Syria and Cilicia thirty years later. When the son of the Viceroy of Egypt crossed the Sinai Desert in 1831 he could have pleaded with much truth that he was going forth to reconquer for the Osmanli Sultan provinces which had virtually been lost to him for nearly two centuries.

(2) Power of Dere Beys

A change, however, had begun to operate in the north about ten years before that date, a change destined to
make the Ottoman Empire in Asia an evil reality, but a reality for the first time. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the power of local families, generically called Dere Beys, "valley lords," grew till almost the whole peninsula of Asia Minor was parcelled out among them. Some of these Beys were descended from former Emirs of the post-Seljuk age; some were tribal chiefs of Turcoman, Kurdish, and other immigrant elements; most were sprung from tax-farmers originally licensed by the Porte. Good examples of these three classes, in their order, were the Menteshe family in Caria; the Chobanoghlus of Yuzgad in Cappadocia, whose Turcoman power extended right across the peninsula from sea to sea, and was acknowledged by nomad groups even in the Aleppo district; and the Karamanoghlus of Manisa, Aidin, and Bergama, who had begun as Imperial commissaries for the collection of revenue and the administration of crown lands in Sarukhan. Whatever their origin, the Dere Beys had attained practical independence of Constantinople. Their broad domains spared nothing to the Imperial treasury, except on rare occasions when some energetic Beylerbey of Anadol appeared with an army on their confines. Their vassals and serfs rendered military service only to their chiefs, who ignored Imperial requisitions (as, for example, did the Karamanoghlus, when bidden in 1807 to send their contingent to an army intended to deliver Egypt from the British). In some of the larger cities, such as Sivas, Smyrna and Aleppo, the control of the local Dere Bey clashed with that of the resident Janissaries; but the Imperial Government was no better off for their disputes.

Centralisation of Government

(1) Anatolia

At last, in 1808, a Sultan was put by the Janissaries on the throne of Turkey who not only resolved to become master in his own house—some of his immediate
predecessors had sworn to be that—but had the courage and capacity to set about it by eliminating both Janissaries and Dere Beys. He had to wait, however, some ten years, a first attempt to suppress the king-makers in Stambul failing ignominiously soon after the receipt of his crown. His second effort was made in the provinces—at Sivas in 1818—and it attained enough success to foreshadow what was to happen eight years later in the capital itself when Mahmud massacred the Janissaries. From that date to the end of his days Mahmud II never remitted his drastic purpose to destroy in Asia the decentralising work of the two centuries before him. Using his new army for the purpose he had most at heart, while he commissioned mere vassals like Milosh and Ali Pasha to win or lose with local levies in Europe, he broke eventually the power of both Janissaries and Dere Beys from the Bosphorus to the Taurus. One never hears again, after 1840, of any member of the once great feudal families of Asia Minor lording it over Imperial representatives. By that date honourable detention, exile, prison, poison, or the bowstring, had completed their work and left an anarchy which was almost peace. The constructive sequel, the substitution of direct administration, direct collection of revenue, direct contribution of men to military service, imperial application of common Imperial law, had to be achieved by Mahmud’s successor. Achieved it was, for better or worse, under Abdul Mejid; and, before the Crimean War broke out, Asia Minor had become what it was in 1914—a group of provinces depending directly on the capital, looking to it for all the government they got, and wholly identified with its policy and fortunes.

(2) Syria and Arabia—Mehemet Ali and Ibrahim

The history of the Arab-speaking provinces did not follow the same course. Mahmud II was never free to deal with them as he dealt with Asia Minor. By the
time he had got to work in the eastern part of the latter region, Ibrahim Pasha, acting for his father, Mehemet Ali, had occupied Syria. The Egyptian forces remained there for ten years, and in that period did some of the work that Mahmud's army had done in Asia Minor, but without the same fixed policy, without system, and therefore but partially. If a district submitted to Ibrahim and kept quiet it was left alone; if it revolted, as did Kerak, or Safed, or Nablus, it was dealt with most drastically. In the event, the result of the Egyptian occupation of Syria was that the main towns and their immediate districts were cleared of the contumacious elements which had so long defied the Porte. There was to be no more question of semi-independent pashas in Acre or Damascus or Aleppo. Furthermore, in some turbulent districts, such as the Lebanon, the leading chiefs were so far broken that the Turks, when they returned after 1841, had no great difficulty in establishing a measure of control. The Lebanese Emirs, for instance, never really found their feet again; and Beshir had no single successor wielding anything like his power in the "Mountain." But outside these restricted areas the country was left to itself. No attempt was made by Ibrahim to unify it; and in consequence one may still find at this day, up and down the length of Syria, many more survivals of native feudal chieftainships and local autonomies than in Asia Minor. It was not only in the mountain fastnesses of Jebel Ansarie, or northern Lebanon, nor only on the edges of the eastern desert, but in the Orontes valley, Commagene, and even Palestine, that powerful beys survived, with feudal power over considerable areas.

Mahmud II dying in 1839, and Ibrahim Pasha not withdrawing from Syria till 1841, the task of making Ottoman Imperial rule a reality in the Arab-speaking countries devolved altogether on Abdul Mejid. He was not the man to carry through such a business in an area much less easy to reconcile than Asia Minor; still less so was Abdul Aziz, his successor, who started
with an added handicap through the action of the Powers in the matter of the Lebanon. Restive during all Abdul Mejid's reign, by reason partly of certain legacies of Emir Beshir, partly of attempts by the Turks to establish direct government, but mostly of their insidious policy of dividing Maronite against Druse in the interest of their rule, the "Mountain" blazed up towards the close of Abdul Mejid's days, and gave his successor the fruits of the Damascus massacre to digest. The final constitution, giving autonomy to the Lebanon in 1864, made uniform incorporation of Syria in the Ottoman Empire thenceforth impossible, and constituted a permanent encouragement to other local autonomies to maintain their particularism.

Certain steps, however, were taken, in fact, by the Porte during these two reigns, which enabled Syria to pass to Abdul Hamid as a pacified, though far from Ottomanised land. Military operations about 1845 broke up the contumacy of the Giaur Dagh Kurds, and were completed by an application of the ancient Oriental measure of transplantation. Considerable bodies of Kurds were forced to come down from their hills and take up lands in the Marash and Aintab districts and on both sides of the Euphrates above Birejik. A year later 12,000 men were sent into the Lebanon, and forty chiefs were arrested and removed. In 1864 the whole of Syria was redistributed into vilayets and their sub-divisions; the Governors-General in Aleppo, Damascus, and Beirut were made to depend as directly on Stambul as did the valis of Asia Minor, and were given Imperial forces wherewith to preserve order and maintain themselves. Some efforts were also made to obtain control of the eastern desert through the relations of the Bedouin sheikhs and their followers with the towns, and by the establishment of armed posts along the borders of the cultivated country and at certain points on through desert routes, e.g., at the oasis of Tadmor. But, nevertheless, no small part of Syria remained much as it had been before the
Egyptians invaded it—Jebel Ansarie, for example, on the west, and Jebel Druz on the east, the region of Kurd Dagh in the north, the Orontes valley between Hamah and Antioch in the centre, and all below Hebron and east of the Dead Sea in the south. Thus no part of Syria was unified and Ottomanised as was Asia Minor.

** Asiatic Policy of Abdul Hamid**

Abdul Hamid was to do something more. Whatever the faults and failures of his imperial policy, he had a policy, and it was what Mahmud's had been. He proposed to exercise real empire over all territories coloured on his map as Ottoman, and first and foremost in Asia, for which, as the better soil for Ottoman seed, he, like Mahmud, cared more than for Europe. Asia Minor had long been sufficiently consolidated, and had only to be made to look for its salvation to him and his household officers rather than to the bureaucrats of his predecessor. By the abasement of the latter in Stamboul this change came about as a matter of course. Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, and Syria offered more scope. Too late to touch the Lebanon, Abdul Hamid devoted his attention to Jebel Ansarie and the Bedouin fringes. In the mountain regions administrative centres were established, whether the mountaineers liked it or no. On the desert edge a similar policy was supplemented by extensive colonisation. Muhajirs (refugees) of sturdy and truculent character, principally Circassian and Turcoman, were planted down all the length of the Trans-Jordan lands, except in Jebel Druz, where the ancient enmity of Druze and Arab was expected to be sufficient guarantee of Ottoman supremacy. Encouragement and compulsion were offered to the Bedouins round the head of the Syrian Desert and in the Trans-Jordan lands to induce them to renounce nomad life for agricultural settlement. In the south of Palestine an urban administrative centre was formed at the miserable hamlet of Bir-es-Seba (Beersheba); and a Court was constituted there to settle
tribal disputes. Everywhere new public offices and new mosques rose as symbols of the Imperial authority and the pious fatherhood of the Sultan. In the latter part of the reign the construction of railways and roads was encouraged; and, in particular, the Hejaz railway was pushed southward east of the Jordan not only to consolidate Ottoman power in Syria as far as Maan, but also to knit Western Arabia to the Empire and to provide communication with the capital not dependent on someone else's control of the sea.

(1) Arabia after 1841

When, after 1841, the Nile Valley had passed de jure out of the Sultan's direct control (as, de facto, it had long passed), the Ottoman Caliph saw the necessity of strengthening his hold on Western Arabia and its Holy Cities, which tend always to become dependent economically and socially on Egypt. In Hejaz, in the forties, after the withdrawal of the Egyptians, who left the local prestige of the Meccan Emirate at a very low ebb, the Porte hastened to assume direct control and impose its garrisons on the Holy Cities; and no sooner was the Suez Canal open to traffic than it took occasion, not only to strengthen those forces, but also to send an army down to Yemen sufficient to terminate the unsatisfactory provisorium which had obtained there since 1849. On the invitation of the Sana citizens themselves, Mukhtar Pasha marched up to the capital; and by 1872 all Yemen, except the highland regions of Amran, Khamir, and Saadah, was brought under Ottoman control. Even the Jauf and Mareb back-country, and the slopes towards Aden, were visited by Turkish columns. The forces in Yemen could communicate with those in Asir through the Tihamah, where the power of the Sherifs of Abu Arish had been broken, and that of Idrisi had yet to be; and with the Asir force communicating directly with that in Taif, the South Arabian army formed a guard on the flank of Mecca.
Ottoman hold on Hejaz was strengthened further in the 'eighties by the ascendancy which Othman Pasha secured over Emir Aun er-Rafik. The Porte nominated and removed Emirs of Mecca at will; and, till about 1911, when the present ruler of Hejaz had been three years in his position, it continued to dominate the Holy Cities, with some assistance from the Hejaz railway, completed to Medina in 1908. Though highland Yemen and, indeed, some part of the lowlands (e.g., the Zebid district), proved so recalcitrant that the Porte had to maintain a strong force by dint of annual drafts, which tried severely both its resources and the patience of the population from which the recruits were drawn, its grip held good even through serious rebellions like those of 1891, 1904, and 1910. Its prestige was acknowledged in the Hadramaut, and was imposed even on Central Arabia, about 1890, by the conclusion of an informal alliance with the Rashid dynasty of Hail, to whose help in Qasim Ottoman columns were to be despatched more than once, both from north and west, in the latter part of Abdul Hamid's reign. A beginning of penetration along the Gulf shore and inwards had been made under Abdul Aziz, when Midhat marched in 1871 from Basra through Koweit into Hasa, and occupied both that province and the capital of Katr for the Porte, thus obtaining command of the inlets of supply to Central Arabia. Having Hail under their influence, the Turks seemed in a fair way to dominate Nejd, since in the 'nineties the Rashids had control also of Riyadh. But the restoration of the Saud dynasty there in 1902, and the consequent strengthening of British influence in Nejd, set them back again. Their hopes declined still lower when the Indian Government came to an understanding with Sheikh Mubarak of Koweit; and they received a mortal blow in 1913, when Ibn Saud, descending on Hasa, chased the Turkish garrisons out of that province, and ultimately out of Katr too, freeing the north-western Gulf ports. A last effort by the Turks to retain a vestige of influence
by inducing Ibn Saud to acknowledge their nominal suzerainty over the territories he had already won led to negotiations lasting from 1906 to 1914, and collapsed with the outbreak of war.

(2) Irak

In Irak and its borderlands Imperial Ottoman control never attained, even under Abdul Hamid, so satisfactory a position as in Syria. The urban centres from Baghdad to Basra were administered as directly from the capital and held as adequately as any Syrian cities; and the ways of communication not only between them, but also with the north and west of the Empire, were improved and policed sufficiently to make central control effective. For example, just before the close of the reign, a regular posting service was established from Aleppo down the Euphrates Valley to Baghdad, the tribesmen on both sides of the route having been cajoled or coerced into abstention from interference with the highway. But up to the last the Porte laboured under certain irremovable disadvantages, which limited its absolute discretion. Chief of these were (1) the proximity of British warships on the south, insistently solicitous about the waterway up the Shatt and the protection of the Sheikh of Koweiit and Mohammedah; (2) the proximity of the Persian border with its semi-independent, warlike mountaineers on the east, of the North Arabian and Syrian deserts on the west, and of the Mesopotamian steppes on the north; (3) the natural difficulties of the interfluvial marshes; (4) the Shah majority among the Moslem population. Thanks to these various circumstances, the Porte had control neither of the outfall of its own chief waterway nor of one of the banks for a long way above the mouth. Tribal elements on the eastern fringe could not be controlled effectually; and the Tigris bank below Kut was never safe from attack. Though the Muntefiik Arabs were induced to
settle and take to agriculture in greater proportion than previously, the Saadun family continued to exercise an almost independent power in the western back-country of the Shatt, while the character of the country on both sides of the Lower Euphrates exposed its towns, from Hilla to Kerbela, to ever-present danger of raids from one flank or the other. The last-named city, with its companion Shiah sanctuaries of Nejef and Kufa, were consistent irritants to a Sunni government. The Shatt el-Hai Arabs and those of the Lower Mesopotamian steppes alike were consistently contumacious; and the high road from Tellujah to Baghdad was not secure. The upshot of the matter is that, outside the larger towns, there was little or no Ottoman feeling in Iraak; the Sultan’s writ ran only at the bayonet’s point; Turks were regarded as hardly less alien than Europeans, and by a majority of the population detested on religious grounds more than the local Christians.

(3) Bedouin and Kurdish Problems

On the Mesopotamian steppes there is a Bedouin problem in the south and a Kurdish problem in the north. It cannot be said that, before Abdul Hamid’s time, either was faced by the Ottoman Government, or that Abdul Hamid himself solved one or the other. But his administration made efforts which so far succeeded that the de facto rulers of the steppe country, Faris and Ferhan, the two rival chiefs of the Jebel Shammar, recognised the Sultan’s nominal authority, and each accepted at his hands the title of Pasha. Though the Turks never took here the extreme course whereby, after Abdul Hamid’s fall, they removed Saadun from the Muntefik country to die at Aleppo, they employed freely such means of coercion as were ready to their hand in their command of Bedouin markets and of the possessions of chiefs in the towns and settled lands. These measures, however, were less effective on the richer northern downs, where Ibrahim of the Milli
had formed a league of independence, to which not only Kurds from Birejik to Jezireh-ibn-Omar, but also Arabs adhered. Down to the end of his reign Abdul Hamid did no better than save his face by a pre-tence that the Milli chief held sway under a grant from himself, and that the former's armed riders were troopers of the Hamidie Horse.

Nevertheless, it was among the Kurds as a whole that Abdul Hamid scored his most conspicuous success in comparison with his predecessors. By enticing or compelling Kurdish chiefs to visit Constantinople, by dealing drastically with the persons, families, and property of open rebels like Bedr Khan, by subsidies and honours to those who had not rebelled, by enrolling tribal warriors in the Hamidie Horse and giving them the uniform and training of Ottoman cavalry, by planting Ottoman administrators under the protection of detachments of regular troops wherever possible at a tribal centre or market, and finally by granting them the fields of Christians to ravage and the persons of Christian women to violate—by such means the Sultan tried to make the Kurds, from Erzerum to Khanikin, identify themselves with the Ottoman tradition and hope. Every European traveller who penetrated the wilder districts of Kurdistan, such as Bashkale or Rowanduz, found one or another of the Kurdish Beys he had been warned to reckon with, superseded by a Turkish Kaimakam who was often installed in the ancestral house of the vanished Bey himself. The policy of Ottomanisation was carried on patiently and remorselessly. The Armenian massacres of 1894–95 were part of it—a supreme concession to conciliate the Kurds and at the same time to commit them. There were no Kurds not affected, not even the Zaza Kurds of Dersim, the hardest of all to Ottomanise by Abdul Hamid's methods; for, being Shiah, they had no respect for the Caliph, and being at one with the Armenians in their midst they were not to be bribed with Christian flesh and blood. Armed posts on their
borders and a guarded road through the heart of their mountains were the only weapons that could be used. After Abdul Hamid's fall the Young Turks ventured to take a step further, not without success, by sending a punitive expedition to Dersim districts which had not yet seen Ottoman arms; even as, on the other flank of the Kurdish area, they succeeded at last in dealing, once and for all, with Ibrahim of the Milli.

Fruits of this Kurd policy were evident both in the Balkan War and during the conflict of Turkey with the Entente Powers. Several Kurdish units, among them one in which sons of Ibrahim served, distinguished themselves in Rumelia. After a little unsteadiness in the first year of the recent war, the Northern Kurds ranged themselves definitely against the Russian Caucasus force, partly because it contained Armenians; and, after the Russian Revolution had weakened the Russian power of offensive, they were regarded by the Turks as a sufficient containing force. In the Rowanduz and Kermanshah districts also Kurds sturdily opposed and harassed Russian columns, although they took little hostile action against our own Mesopotamian forces.

**NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AMONG THE ARABS**

With the Arab-speaking peoples, on the other hand, such progress towards Ottomanisation as was made under Abdul Hamid was not maintained after his fall, but has been counterbalanced by a serious movement towards anti-Ottoman nationalism. Seeds of this were sown long ago, but they would not have sprouted generally had it not been for the Young Turks and the Pan-Ottoman policy of 1909. In Syria, where lives an educated native class relatively as numerous and absolutely as far advanced as that in the Turk-speaking area, nationalism rapidly grew and flourished. Beirut was the earliest centre of it, but it soon gained the other towns. The country districts, never assimilated by their Turkish masters, remained
less affected. The Turks, aware of the existence and activity of "Young Arab" committees, began vigorous measures for their suppression in 1914. These redoubled in violence after the outbreak of the war. Leading Syrians were haled before courts-martial, and exiled or hanged, but this did not arrest the nationalist propaganda either in the Arab countries themselves or on foreign soils. The effect of Ahmed Jemal Pasha's "reign of terror" was to deprive Syria of almost all possible leaders of revolt, but to increase in the people the spirit of revolt. It crowned seven years of Ottomanising efforts by making Ottomanism impossible among Arabs.

Lower Irak received some seed of Arab nationalism, before the rest of the Eastern Arabs, from the hand of Seyyid Talib of Basra; but his movement had not time to spread far before the war brought a British invading force into the country. Nor, indeed, was there much favourable soil to which the plant could be transferred. Baghdad, where Arabs are well educated and progressive but a minority, formed nationalist committees; but in the rest of Irak, where the population is either predominantly Shia or predominantly nomad, or both, particularism is even more the rule than in Syria. The Bedouin element does not desire any government; the Shiahs do not desire a Sunni government; no one, except, perhaps, some Kurds, wants to be ruled by Turks; but all desire to be ruled by Moslems.

**Different Groups in Asia Minor**

The Christian elements in Asia Minor have now imbibed ideas of nationalism which are inconsistent with the Ottoman ideal. The Greeks, not only of the islands, but of the western and southern littorals and the colonies of the Mæander basin, regard themselves as citizens "unredeemed" of the Hellenic Kingdom; and the Greeks of the Black Sea coast, and certain inland districts of Pontus, Cappadocia, and Phrygia,
are learning to look on themselves in a similar light. As for the Armenians, everywhere present in smaller or larger groups, but nowhere a majority except in the Commagenian Taurus, all look now for their own kingdom, having found to their cost how vain was the hope of decentralised autonomy with which they greeted the advent of the Young Turks to power. It remains to be seen whether the establishment of a Zionist home in Palestine will detach the Jews also from the allegiance which, more whole-heartedly than any other non-Moslem race, they have given to the Turks. Other comparatively small separatist groups—Circassian, Laz, Kizilbash—may detach themselves eventually, but about these it is too soon to guess.
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LONDON:
PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

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