HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 57

D 6
.G7
no. 57
Copy 2

MOHAMMEDAN HISTORY

(1) THE RISE OF ISLAM AND THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

(2) THE RISE OF THE TURKS AND THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

(3) ISLAM IN INDIA AND AFRICA.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
1800

Class D6
Book .G7

153

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 57

Gt. Brit.

MOHAMMEDAN HISTORY

207
1407

(1) THE RISE OF ISLAM AND THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT.

(2) THE RISE OF THE TURKS AND THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT.

(3) ISLAM IN INDIA AND AFRICA.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

2d set

D6
.G7
Copy 2

THE RISE OF ISLAM

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Chronological Summary	3
1. Place, Date, and Circumstances of its Rise	4
2. The Call to Medina and its Consequences	7
3. Theological, Moral, and Political Character of the System	11
4. Progress after the Prophet's Death	13
5. Origin of the Divisions	14
6. The Expansion of Islam	18
7. Islam in Africa	25
8. Relations with Subject Peoples	28
9. Mohammedan Law	29
10. Political Conditions	33
11. Sufism	37
Authorities	63

D. of D.
DEC 10 1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

A. D.	
622	The *Hijrah* (the Prophet's flight to Medina).
623	Battle of Badr.
626	Siege of Medina.
629	The Prophet takes Mecca.
632	Death of the Prophet.
633	Moslem invasion of Persia.
634	Battle of Yarmuk.
635	Fall of Damascus. Moslem defeat of the Persians.
637	Fall of Jerusalem. Fall of Mada'in. Occupation of Mesopotamia.
638	Foundation of Kufah and Basra.
640	Khuzistan seized.
641	Moslem advance into Africa. Fall of Alexandria.
642	Battle of Nahawand. Fall of Tripoli.
643	Fall of Rayy.
658	First attacks on Sind.
666	Islamic force reaches Balkh.
669	Formation of province of Ifrikiyyah.
670	Expedition over the Oxus.
681	Invasion of northern Africa.
682	Death of Husain.
690	Byzantine imperial forces attack Carthage.
693	Caliphs begin to appoint Governors of Armenia.
705	Conquest of Transoxiana.
711	Moslems reach Farghanah.
712	Fall of Carmona, Seville, and Merida.
715	Invasion of Kashgar.
720	Invasion of Gaul. Battle of Toulouse.
732	Invasion of Gaul. Battle of Tours.
740	Moslems expelled from Provence.
753–5	Power of Moslems in northern Spain began to decline.
759	Moslems expelled from Narbonne.
808	Foundation of Fez.
827	Invasion of Sicily.
851	Commencement of systematic conquest of Armenia.
869–70	Malta seized by Moslems.

A. D.

878 Fall of Syracuse.
914 Foundation of Mahdiyah.
936 Fall of the Eastern Caliphate.
969 Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt begins.
1001–26 Invasion of western Punjab.
1045 Foundation of Zirid Dynasty.
1057–85 Recovery of Spanish territories from Moslems.
1061 Robert Guiscard in Sicily.
1064 Fall of Ani (capital of Armenia).
1091 Roger Guiscard completes recovery of Sicily. He recovers Malta.
1203 Northern India under Moslem rulers.
1212 Alfonso VIII of Castile defeats Moslems at Las Navas da Tolosa.
1250 Emperor Frederick II deports Moslems from Malta and Sicily.
1492 Final expulsion of Moslems from Spain.
1517 The Caliphate passes to the Ottoman Sultans.
1519–20 Morocco seized by Sa'dian Sherif.
1550 Fez captured by Mohammed al-Mahdi.
1552 Extinction of the Ziyanid Amirate by the Turks.
1574 Turks capture Tunis.
1590–3 Foundation of Sudanese State with capital at Timbuktu.
1603 Death of the Sherif al-Mansur.
1659 Last Sa'dian Sherif killed.
1667 Mulay Rashid reunites the Sa'dian Empire.

THE RISE OF ISLAM

§ 1. *Place, Date, and Circumstances of its Rise*

Islam, or the Mohammedan religion, has now lasted for a period of 1,335 lunar years, the unit of its calendar being a group of twelve lunations, without accommodation to the seasons. Its official commencement synchronizes with the year 622 A. D., when its founder

accepted an invitation from the people of Yathrib, ever since known as al-Medinah, 'the City' (of the Prophet), to undertake the government of the place—an event historically known as the *Hijrah*, i. e. emigration or flight. According to tradition, the Prophet had been promulgating his opinions publicly for some ten years; and for some three years previous to this communicating them privately in his native town, Mecca. If this be correct, the commencement of the system should be dated about the year 610. The name *Islam*, of which *Moslem* or *Muslim* is the participle, signifies in Arabic 'surrender', and (according to the Koran) was given by the patriarch Abraham to his community, the sense being surrender of the 'face', i. e. probably the person, to Allah (God). The community is sometimes called the *Hanifs*, a name which is also traced to Abraham; this has been thought to belong to a community at Harran (which existed so late as the eleventh century) called the Sabis, a word applied, according to the tradition, to the early Moslems by their neighbours. The recorded practices of this obscure sect exhibit agreement in some notable details with those of Islam.

Since Mecca has no trustworthy chronicles of its own, and has never aroused the attention of the outside world, except in connexion with the Prophet Mohammed and his system, a certain vagueness attaches to the circumstances wherein his mission arose. In Arabia there appears at the time to have been no considerable native state, but numerous settlements of tribes, while the Roman and Persian Empires had spheres of influence. Mecca appears to have been the settlement of a group of tribes in possession of a sanctuary, whither visitors brought goods which the Meccans, aided by their sacred character, conveyed to various regions. The sanctuary, thus bringing

them comparative immunity from war, enabled them also to accumulate wealth. With regard to their religion, the Koran assumes that the citizens of Mecca were polytheists, idolaters, and addicted to various practices—some of them undoubtedly immoral—of which the Prophet disapproved. It further assumes that the existence of the Jewish and Christian religious systems was known in Mecca, but that few if any there had any acquaintance with those systems. That the Prophet himself was a native, not a foreigner, appears not only from the statements of the Koran, but from the part played in his life by numerous relatives, some of whom were adherents, others opponents, while some belonged to neither group. The names whereby he designated his office correspond with the Jewish *Prophet* and the Christian *Apostle*. The Arabic word for the former is identical with the Hebrew, but clearer in meaning, owing to the preservation of the family of words to which it belongs; it signifies *bearer of a message*, and is thus synonymous with Apostle, for which an Arabic word, also belonging to a well-known family, is employed. The message, or rather series of messages, which he claimed to deliver, came from the Supreme Being. These, singly or collectively, are the *Koran* or *Qur'an* ('reading').

Mohammed's notion of a prophet, then, was that of a channel whereby the Divine Being communicates his commands to mankind; hence, in the Koran it is the Deity who speaks, often addressing to the Prophet a command to say something to his fellows. Since the unity of God is the dominant doctrine of the system, His messenger acts as His representative before the whole world; and this most important inference was accordingly drawn by Mohammed. The Government of Mecca, of whose constitution our knowledge is hazy, appears to have recognized that

Mohammed's claim involved dictatorship within the community; but the principle whereby responsibility attached to the tribe rather than to the individual prevented that Government from forcibly suppressing him so long as he was countenanced by the powerful tribe to which he belonged, while the justice of his claim was recognized by too few members of that tribe to permit of their endeavouring to enforce it on the group of tribes who shared the territory of Mecca. This enables us to some extent to understand the curious circumstance that in the Meccan period his followers, who from the point of view of civic standing were less favourably situated than he, suffered persecutions from which he himself was immune. These caused what is called the first migration—the flight of various early adherents of his system to Christian Abyssinia, with whose ruler Mohammed appears to have maintained friendly relations, though he did not put himself under that potentate's protection.

§ 2. *The Call to Medina and its Consequences*

The circumstances which led to the Prophet's receiving an invitation from the people of Yathrib to undertake the government of their city are incompletely known, but seem to be illustrated by cases in early Hellenic history, in which prophets were summoned to cure a community of the civic disease known as *stasis*, or chronic civil war. The territory called by the name Yathrib, which appears to be of Egyptian origin, was shared by two Arabian tribes which had long been involved in internecine war. With them there lived certain Jewish communities, of whose origin and history their brethren have no independent record; it is uncertain whether they were Judaized Arabs, or Israelites who had adopted Arabia as their

country, learned the Arabic language, and accommodated themselves in a variety of ways to the customs of the land. They appear to have been drawn into the tribal wars, but their importance for the commencement of Islam lies chiefly in the fact that they probably familiarized their neighbours with the notion of prophetic revelation, rendering Mohammed's claims more intelligible to them than to other pagans in Arabia. The acquaintance of the people of Yathrib with Mohammed and his system is said, doubtless with truth, to have had its beginning in pilgrimages made by natives of the place to the shrine at Mecca called the *Ka'bah* or *House of Allah.* These pilgrims on their return home propagated the system, which was presently taught more authoritatively by an agent sent thither by Mohammed. Owing to the success of their efforts in attracting adherents, both the Prophet and his Meccan followers were assured of a welcome at Medina; and, after the migration of the latter, the Prophet himself took the historic journey from which Islam dates its era. It would appear that his arrival was at first welcome to all elements of the population, including the Jews; for the Jewish system was at that time reproduced with slight modifications in that of the Arabian Prophet, which, even in its ultimate shape, closely resembles Judaism.

From the date of the migration, Mohammed's career can be more clearly traced, since from this time the chief events of the years are kept distinct. Internal dissensions arose in Yathrib (Medina) shortly after his arrival, though not on the old lines of cleavage. His relations with the Jewish tribes became more and more strained; and, whether as the consequence or the cause of this, he resolved to make advances towards the older paganism, especially by enjoining believers to turn, in prayer, towards the Meccan sanctuary, and by making

the pilgrimage thither part of his system; where he adopted Jewish institutions, he altered them, and he eventually freed himself from the neighbourhood of the Israelites by forcible means. He also had trouble with disaffected pagans, especially with chiefs jealous of the power which he had acquired; but in these cases he displayed patience and leniency. He sought to enter into friendly relations with neighbouring tribes, but seems to have made his chief object the subjugation of Mecca, towards whose Government he assumed an attitude of open hostility. An attack organized by him on a Meccan trading caravan led, in the year 2 A. H. (A.D. 624), to his first considerable battle, that of Badr. The Meccan forces are said to have been twice as numerous as those of the Moslems, but the discipline of the latter and the tactics of their commander were greatly superior; and, though the caravan originally aimed at escaped, Mohammed won a decisive victory. Attempts were made by the Meccans to avenge this defeat, culminating, in the year 5 A. H., in the siege of Medina by a hostile confederation. Owing to a variety of causes, among which the Prophet's skill as a captain and a negotiator seems to have been the chief, this attempt resulted in failure; and from that time, while the cause of Islam was progressing in Arabia partly by persuasion and partly by force of arms, the more enterprising and intelligent among the Meccans were deserting to the Prophet at Medina. For some time this migration had been a duty for converts, and Medina was growing into a vast camp. In the year 8 A.H. Mecca itself was taken by the Prophet, who seems at first to have had some idea of making it the seat of government. From this he was dissuaded, but he retained it in its rank of religious centre, thereby securing for his system an element of permanence; for, however far the political

centre shifted, the religious centre has remained unaffected by the change.

From what we know of the history and antiquities of Arabia it appears that the taking of Mecca was speedily followed by the imposition of Islam on the entire country, partly by successful wars, partly by peaceful negotiation; but, even before Mecca was captured, the Prophet had come to think of his mission as addressed to the whole world, and is said to have dispatched to all the potentates known to him a summons to accept Islam if they wished to be safe. The records of these embassies are not altogether trustworthy; it seems clear, however, that the summons was courteously received in Egypt, but in Persia with contumely; tradition makes the Byzantine Emperor treat the summons with respect, though on consideration it was rejected.

The process whereby Mohammed, once installed in authority in Medina, became ruler of all Arabia is not difficult to follow; there are parallel cases, not in Oriental history alone, of men gifted with political and strategic ability rising after a small initial success to be heads of empires. Mohammed appears to have been especially felicitous in his assessment of ability and character, both in the case of adherents and in that of enemies; he seems to have made no mistakes in the choice of agents and the assignment of offices. He also possessed the gift of inspiring his adherents with loyalty. The process whereby he obtained his first following is far less intelligible. From the beginning he claimed to work a miracle, but this was of a peculiar kind. It lay in the production of the rhymed discourses which he called *Koran* (*Qur'an*). He claimed that this was the first instruction which his countrymen had ever received, and that he himself, before he began to receive it,

had been illiterate. He also declared that the matter which he delivered was previously unknown to him, but that its correctness could be certified by an appeal to those who were in possession of 'the Book', i. e. Jews and Christians. Thirdly, he challenged his contemporaries to produce any composition which could rival his revelations. No other miracle seems to have played an important part in his career. It is perhaps surprising that during his lifetime the Koran was thought of much as we think of the sermons of a great preacher—as something living and continuous, not the limited contents of a volume. Little care was therefore at first taken to secure its preservation.

§ 3. *Theological, Moral, and Political Character of the System*

The system introduced by Mohammed seems to have differed very widely in theology from those which had previously dominated Central Arabia, since it substituted a rigid form of spiritual monotheism for a polytheism which apparently combined fetish-worship and star-worship. It also laid emphasis on the resurrection of the dead, future judgement, and future happiness and misery—doctrines which the earlier Meccans are represented as ridiculing. Of the practices which it introduced, viz. (1) prayer (involving certain ritual formalities), (2) fasting (i.e. abstention from all food, solid and liquid, from sunrise to sunset throughout the ninth month of the lunar year), (3) pilgrimage (i.e. a visit to Mecca once at least in a lifetime, with the observation of certain practices and the participation in certain rites), and (4) alms (i.e. the enforced contribution of a proportion of a man's annual produce or earnings for the benefit of the poor of the community), only the third would seem to have been taken over, with some slight modifications—and these perhaps of interpre-

tation and nomenclature rather than of procedure—from the pagan system; there may have been something analogous to the second, of which the origin is obscure, whereas the first and the fourth were decidedly innovations. These practices, together with the creed of two propositions, form the 'five pillars of Islam'.

Moral reforms of considerable importance are to be found in the abolition of infanticide, with which the pre-Islamic Arabs are charged, and the prohibition of spirituous liquor and the form of gambling which seems to have been in vogue. Some hold that the relations between the sexes were also regulated somewhat more strictly than had previously been the practice; but the Koran makes no limitation to the permissible number of concubines, and only limits the number of wives to four. Other moral reforms seem to have been recommendations rather than enactments. Thus, whereas neither the institution of slavery nor that of the blood-feud was abolished, the manumission of slaves was recommended as a pious act, constituting atonement for certain offences; and attempts were made to mitigate the evils of the blood-feud. Notice should be taken of the licence to conceal religious opinions when danger is incurred by their open profession.

The Prophet's chief political innovation was the recognition of tolerated religions. Whereas paganism was to be exterminated, communities which had as the basis of their system a sacred book revealed by some recognized prophet were to be disarmed and compelled to pay tribute to the Islamic Government, but otherwise to be safe from interference. They were to enjoy the protection of the armed Moslem community, even, according to some, in the performance of acts which Islam forbade its adherents to commit. Thus property in wine and swine is recognized in the

case of Christians, but not in that of Moslems, whose system prohibits both. Normally the Christian or the Jewish community was to be represented by its religious head, who was responsible to the Moslem Government for the payment of the tribute; interference, however, with the affairs of these protected communities could not in practice be avoided. An inference afterwards drawn by Islamic jurists, that only the testimony of Moslems can be received in Moslem courts, has proved disastrous. Its supposed ground is the charge which the Koran brings, perhaps rather against Jews than Christians, of corrupting the text of their sacred books. If, it is argued, they cannot be trusted to report God's words correctly, still less can they be trusted in the case of men.

§ 4. *Progress after the Prophet's Death*

At the Prophet's death there were still some Christian and Jewish communities in Arabia; but it was decided by his second successor that no religion save Islam was to be tolerated in the peninsula, and they were expelled. The Prophet's death was followed by numerous revolts among the Arab tribes, who disliked the five daily prayers, and still more the exaction of the tax called alms; but there appears to have been no recrudescence of pagan cults, though some of the revolts were headed by persons who claimed to be prophets similar to Mohammed. Historians naturally express surprise at the shallowness of the sentiments which the pagan deities of Arabia seem to have inspired. It might have been expected that their worship would in places have been maintained in private after it had been publicly inhibited, whereas it appears that after a very few years nothing more was remembered about them than what happened to be recorded in the Koran. As conquest pro-

ceeded, the Prophet's programme of subjugating the world and exterminating all but believers in prophetic books underwent certain modifications. It was not found possible for many centuries to deprive the Byzantine Empire and various European, Asiatic, and African states of their independence; room had to be made for the Magians or Mazdians in the system of tolerated religions; and it was found impossible to exterminate the paganism of India when Islam made progress in that quarter.

§ 5. *Origin of the Divisions*

The Prophet's death was not at once followed by a war of succession, but the fact that he had left no son and given no authoritative instructions for the appointment of a successor was destined ultimately to occasion serious trouble. The notion of a community being ruled by instruction from the Divine Being communicated through an appointed channel would seem to require the constant presence of a Prophet. At his death Mohammed left one living daughter, Fatimah, with her two infant sons. Her husband, Ali, son of Abu Talib, was the cousin of the Prophet, had been one of his earliest adherents, and had displayed conspicuous bravery in the field; he was, however, set aside in favour of the Prophet's most constant companion, Abu Bakr, father of the Prophet's young wife, A'ishah. Abu Bakr, who died after a short reign, appointed as his successor Omar, who seems to have been intellectually the most capable of the Prophet's companions; and after Omar's assassination the choice of the Moslems fell on Othman, who had married two of the Prophet's daughters and been given honourable commissions by the Prophet. Othman was presently put to death by armed rebels, who installed Ali in his place. Ali immediately found himself involved in civil

wars with parties who claimed to avenge his predecessor's death, and even with the party by which he had been enthroned; and by one of this party he was assassinated after a brief and turbulent reign. One of his rivals, the son of Mohammed's most capable opponent at Mecca, then established the first of the hereditary Islamic dynasties. The hereditary principle once established, it was natural that the Moslem world should desire a dynasty which represented the line of their Prophet rather than that of his foremost adversary. Consequently claimants belonging to the Prophet's line were constantly coming forward, the most celebrated of whom in the first Islamic century was his grandson Husain, son of Ali. Husain's death in the field in the year 61 A.H. (A.D. 683) is regarded as the greatest catastrophe that ever befell Islam.

The introduction of the hereditary principle was attended by a difficulty. According to the law of inheritance embodied in the text of the Koran, in default of a son the parents of the deceased or their representatives inherit; a daughter only gets an appointed share. Hence Fatimah (on the supposition that a prophet can have heirs, which is often denied) would not be heiress; on the other hand, her husband was excluded because his father, though the Prophet's uncle, was never a believer, and there is a maxim that unbeliever does not inherit from believer. The legal heir was in this case the Prophet's believing uncle, Abbas, who appears to have opposed the Prophet, though not very vigorously, until the latter's success was assured, when Abbas became a believer. This then is the process of reasoning whereby the claim of the Abbasids, who ousted the first hereditary dynasty, is established; but some of their supporters maintained that the sovereignty had been transmitted to this family by the representative of the first Mahdi, Mohammed, son of Ali

and 'the Hanafite woman' (another wife than Fatimah), to whom it had been transmitted by Ali, who had received it from the Prophet. This represents an endeavour to secure for the Abbasids the rights of the family of Ali. The adherents of the cause of Fatimah would naturally disallow this claim as much as the other, holding that the sovereignty belongs to one of her descendants.

The claim of the Ottoman Sultan to the succession of the Prophet is derived from that of the Abbasids, whose dynasty lasted in theory from A. D. 750, when they overthrew the first hereditary dynasty (the Umayyads), to 1517, when Egypt was conquered by the Sultan Selim I, to whom the last of the Abbasids is supposed to have transmitted his claim. Of those who acknowledge the rights of the Abbasids, many deny that claims can be thus transmitted, holding that they are inherent in the Prophet's tribe, Quraish, according to a principle inferred by jurists of the fourth Islamic century from the facts of history up to that time. Those who maintain that they belong to the Prophet's descendants through his daughter are called the *Shiah* (party of the Prophet's house). They made many disastrous attempts to assert their claims and stirred up revolts against the Sunni Caliphs. Their supreme religious chiefs were the Imams, descended from Ali, each of whom transmitted his authority to his successor. In course of time disputes arose as to the succession. One sect, the Ismailis, recognized only seven Imams, the last of whom disappeared about A. D. 770; while another (to which the majority of Shiahs belong) recognized twelve, of whom the last disappeared and remains hidden from mortal sight, but will appear again as the promised Mahdi. Shiah dynasties were established in Tabaristan (864–928), in North-west Africa (the Idrisids, 791–922),

in North Africa and Egypt (the Fatimids, 969–1171); and in 1502, under the founder of the Safavid dynasty, the Shiah faith became the national religion of Persia.

The name *Sunni*, whereby the adherents of the Abbasids and so of the Ottoman Sultan are generally, though not exclusively, designated, is derived from the word *sunnah*, 'practice' or 'law', and has the following history. The profession of faith which marks the adherent of Islam consists of two sentences, of which the first attests that Allah is the only God, the second that Mohammed is His channel of communication with mankind. Those communications in the Prophet's time took the form of revelations, either conveyed to his mind and then delivered by him to an audience, or uttered by him in trance and taken down by authorized reporters. The second article of the creed implies acceptance of these revelations as divine injunctions. Where, therefore, they abrogated an existing practice, that practice had to be abandoned, but other practices were maintained; hence some of the most characteristic institutions of Islam, e.g. circumcision, were taken on from the earliest usage of Arabia without being prescribed or confirmed by the Koran. No sufficient supplement to the occasional legislation of the Koran was provided to meet the rapid development of the Moslem community into an empire; and, since that work repeatedly enjoins obedience to the Prophet as well as to God, endeavours were made to obtain such a supplement from what could be remembered of the Prophet's sayings and doings. Simultaneously there arose a theory that the Prophet had secretly communicated to Ali and his family the necessary supplement, which in the opinion of some went far beyond jurisprudence.

The collection of traditions for this purpose appears

to have begun shortly after the Prophet's death, the chief seat of the study being Medina. In the second Islamic century codes were elaborated, largely on the basis of this supposed practice of the Prophet; in the fourth century four of these systems obtained official recognition, and a *Sunni* might follow any one of the four. Of these, that which bears the name of Abu Hanifah, or the Hanafi system, is officially recognized by the Ottoman Empire, which, however, has largely restricted its application. The codes used by the Shiah communities differ only in minor points.

§ 6. *The Expansion of Islam*

The expansion of Islam began in the continent of Asia, and proceeded simultaneously in the directions of Syria and Persia. The long struggle between the Byzantine and Persian Empires weakened the forces opposed to Islam. The fate of the Byzantine Empire in Palestine and Syria was settled by the battle of Yarmuk (A.D. 634), followed by the taking of Damascus in the next year. Homs was taken in 635; Hamah, Laodicea, and Kinnisrin in the following year; and Aleppo and Antioch shortly afterwards. The conquest of Palestine was settled by the battle of Ajnadain in 636, after which Jerusalem capitulated, while the other important towns were either taken or surrendered; the last to hold out was Caesarea, which was taken by storm in 638.

Persian Empire.—The conquest of the countries which formed the Persian Empire began in 633, when the province called Arabian Irak was invaded by a Moslem force under Khalid, and the important city of Hirah seized. This was followed in the same year by the capture of Anbar on the eastern bank of the Euphrates; but the invasion did not proceed with

uninterrupted success. The fate of the Persian Empire was determined, towards the end of 635, by the battle of Kadisiyyah, which resulted in a complete defeat of the Persian army by the Moslems, under the leadership of Sa'd Ibn Abi Wakkas. In 637 the royal city, Mada'in, fell; and in the same year Mesopotamia was occupied as far as Tekrit and Mosul. In 638 the new Moslem cities, Kufah and Basra, were founded and peopled with Arabian immigrants. In the following years the chief cities of Khuzistan were taken, Sus falling in 640. The resistance of the Persian king was finally crushed at the battle of Nahawand, in 642, followed by the fall of Rayy in 643. The provinces of Fars, Kirman, Mukran, Sijistan, Khorasan, and Azerbaijan were then successfully invaded and annexed to the Empire of the Caliphs.

Africa.—The Moslem advance into Africa began in 641, when 'Amr Ibn al-'As invaded Egypt by the route of al-'Arish. He took Alexandria in this year, and founded the city of Fustat, which in the fourth Islamic century was superseded by the neighbouring Cairo. The attempt of the Byzantines to recover Alexandria was defeated in a campaign which led to the retaking of that city by the Moslems in 646. This year should perhaps be regarded as the date of the commencement of the Moslem possession of Egypt.

The conqueror of Egypt advanced along the coast as far as Barca, while one of his officers raided the Fezzan. In 642 he took Tripoli. Under the third Caliph, in 647, preparations were made on a larger scale for the invasion of Africa, where an independent state had recently been set up by the *patricius* Gregory with Suffetula or Sbeitla for capital. Gregory was defeated by the Moslem general Abdallah ben Abi Sarh, and fell in battle; but the Moslems resolved temporarily to evacuate the province; they did not

return till 665, under the Umayyad of the Caliph Mu'awiyah. After various raids a province (Ifrikiyyah) was constituted in 669, with Ukbah Ibn Nafi as governor. A new city, Kairawan, was founded as its capital. The province extended southwards as far as Jerid, but was subject to continual raiding from the west. In 681 Ukbah planned an expedition westward on a considerable scale, with the view of gaining for Islam the whole of northern Africa; he proceeded victoriously as far as Ceuta, whence he marched southward to the Sus, and eventually reached the Atlantic. Conversions on a great scale appear to have been effected among the Berber tribes who occupied these regions, but at the death of Ukbah on the return journey in 683, little in the way of permanent subjection of the Maghrib had been achieved. Owing to the civil wars which were raging in the East, even the province of Ifrikiyyah had for a time to be abandoned. In 697, however, the occupation was resumed and further conquest begun. The last attempt made by the Byzantine Empire to recover its African possessions was in 698, when a descent was made on Carthage, which had just been conquered by the Moslems; but the place could not be permanently held owing to the arrival of a Moslem fleet. The conquest of the Maghrib was consummated by Musa ben Nusair, who was sent as governor to Kairawan in 705. He took and garrisoned Tangier, and advanced southward as far as Sijilmasa. There was, however, no considerable immigration of Arabs at this time. Small garrisons were left in various places of importance, and missionaries were dispatched to various tribes to instruct them in the doctrines and practices of Islam.[1]

Spain and France.—It was from Africa that Moslem

[1] For an account of the later developments, see § 7 below, and *Islam in Africa*, Part (3) of this book.

conquest extended to the European continent, though isolated raids had previously been made on various islands in the Mediterranean, especially on Sicily, Cyprus, and Rhodes. The invasion of Spain was commenced in 711 by Tarik, governor of Tangier, whose name is preserved in the Arabic Jebel Tarik ('mountain of Tarik'), whence the name Gibraltar is derived. An exploring party had been sent out two years before under Tarif, whose name is thought to survive in Tarifa. The advance of Tarik was exceedingly rapid; and he successively occupied Toledo (at that time the political capital), Granada, Malaga, and Elvira. Tarik was followed in 712 by the governor of Ifrikiyyah, Musa ben Nusair, who took Carmona, Seville, and Merida. A great part of the population adopted Islam, and the invaders soon reached the Pyrenees.

In A. D. 720 that mountain barrier was crossed, but a Moslem army was defeated under the walls of Toulouse. In 732 Abd al-Rahman, governor of Spain, made a fresh incursion into Gaul, burned Bordeaux, plundered Poitiers, and threatened Tours. But in the battle of Tours, fought in October 732, the Moslems sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of Charles Martel; and, though raids in Gaul continued for a time, the land beyond the Pyrenees was not destined to remain in their hands; they were expelled from Provence in 740, and from Narbonne in 759.

Meanwhile, the expulsion of the Moslems from northern Spain had begun; between 753 and 755 they had been driven south to a line stretching from Coimbra on the west to Pamplona on the east. A further stretch of territory was regained by Fernando I, King of Castile and Leon, in the years 1057 to 1064, and by Alfonso VI, King of Leon, Castile,

Galicia, and Navarre, in 1080–5. The Moslem domination in Spain received its most serious blow in 1212, when the Almohad Caliph's forces were utterly routed at the battle of Las Navas da Tolosa by Alfonso VIII of Castile, aided by other Christian princes of the peninsula. But it was not till 1492 that the capture of Granada by Ferdinand and Isabella finally emancipated the whole peninsula from the dominion of Islam.

Mediterranean.—Sicily was repeatedly raided by the Moslems of Africa, and in 827 was invaded by a considerable force sent by the Aghlabite (African Islamic) ruler of Kairawan. The conquest of the island was carried out by stages, and the fall of Syracuse in 878 brought the greater part of it into Moslem possession. In 1061 its reconquest was commenced by the Norman, Robert Guiscard, and was completed by his brother Roger, who by 1091 had obtained possession of all the Moslem strongholds.

Malta was taken by an Aghlabite fleet in 869 and 870; but it was recovered for Christendom by Roger Guiscard in 1091. In 1250 the Moslems who remained in these islands were deported to Apulia by the Emperor Frederick II.

The eastern shore of the Mediterranean passed out of Mohammedan hands after the Crusaders had conquered Jerusalem in 1099 and established a Christian kingdom in Palestine; but, when Saladin won the battle of Hittin in 1187, the collapse of the Christian power was so complete that three years later only Tyre, Tripoli, and Antioch remained in Christian hands. The Crusaders made a great effort to recover the Holy Land, but the treaty of 1192 left in their hands little territory beyond the sea-board from Acre to Jaffa. During the next fifty years, in spite of fluctuations, the Latin power increased. They ex-

tended their possessions farther inland, and Jerusalem was once more in Christian hands for a few years; but, after Baibars became Sultan of Egypt in 1260, he waged a series of successful campaigns against the Latins, and by the capture of Acre in 1291 brought the whole of Syria once again under Mohammedan rule.

Asia Minor.—Whereas the invasion of Europe from the south-west reached its limit in the eighth century, and from that time slowly receded, Islam continued to advance in other directions. In 693 the Caliphs began to appoint governors of Armenia, but the systematic conquest of the country did not begin till 851. In the following century Islam made great strides, partly through the raids of the governors of Azerbaijan, partly through the diplomatic methods employed by the Caliphs in their dealing with the Armenian princes. The capital of the Armenian kingdom, Ani, was taken in 1064 by the Seljuk Sultan, Alp Arslan; and the rest of Armenia was presently embodied in the empire of the Seljuks.[1]

Central Asia.—An Islamic force reached Balkh in 666; in 670 an expedition was sent across the Oxus, and remained for two years in the region of which Bokhara was the chief city. The methodical conquest of Transoxiana began in 705, and a systematic attempt was made to convert the inhabitants; by 711 the Moslem conquerors had advanced to Farghanah, the present Khanate of Khokand, and the Jaxartes was crossed. From that time Islam advanced fitfully in those parts, as also north of Azerbaijan, conversions at certain periods taking place on a large scale.

As the power of the Abbasid Caliphate declined in the ninth century, Transoxiana became independent, first under a Persian dynasty, the Sāmānids (874–999), and afterwards under a succession of Turkish rulers,

[1] Cf. *Armenia*, No. 62 of this series.

the Ilik Khans (932–1165), the Ghaznavids (962–1186), the Seljuks (1037–1194), and the Khwārizm Shāhs (1150–1231), who were finally swept away by the Mongol invasion.

India.—Attacks on Sind began in the year 658, and in the eighth century this country was temporarily occupied by the Moslems. The invasion of India did not achieve success till the time of Mahmud of Ghazni, who in seventeen invasions between the years 1001 and 1026 subdued the western districts of the Punjab. When, in the latter half of the twelfth century, his dynasty was overthrown by the Ghoris, further conquest was contemplated, and by 1203 the whole north of India from the delta of the Indus to the delta of the Ganges was under Mohammedan rulers.[1] Under successive dynasties of the Sultans of Delhi, Mohammedan rule advanced as far south as the Deccan, and under the Moghul emperors attained its greatest extension.

East Indian Islands.—Islam is said to have been introduced into Java by missionaries in the fifteenth century; and its adherents, by the sixteenth century, had become sufficiently powerful to seize the reins of government both here and in the north and some other parts of the neighbouring island of Sumatra. The progress of Islam through the other islands of the Malay Archipelago was slow, and the early history of the movement is obscure; opposition to the political domination of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century reacted in favour of the rising Mohammedan power, but even to the present day Islam is chiefly confined to the more civilized races of the Archipelago and has made but little way among the lower races.

China.—Though there is a considerable Moslem

[1] For later developments, see *Islam in India*, Part (3) of this book.

population in China, there appears at no time to have been an independent Moslem state in that country. According to the Arab historians, when in 715 Kashgar was invaded by a Moslem conqueror, the Chinese Emperor sent a deputation to obtain some information about the new religion, and in 755 the Abbasid Caliph is said to have sent a force to aid the Chinese Government against a rebel. The members of this force are thought to have formed the nucleus of the Moslem colony, which received considerable accessions to its numbers after the Mongol conquests of the thirteenth century had opened up communications between China and western Asia. After the expulsion of the Mongol dynasty from China in the latter part of the fourteenth century, the Mohammedans, cut off from communication with their co-religionists in other countries, tended to become merged into the mass of the native population, through their marriages with Chinese women and their adoption of Chinese habits and manners. There have been several Mohammedan revolts against the Chinese Government, the first in the province of Kansu in 1648; these revolts, as well as the Panthay risings in Yunnan from 1855 to 1873 and the Tungan rebellion in Shen-si and Kansu in 1864–77 and 1895–6, were suppressed by means of wholesale massacres.

§ 7. *Islam in Africa*

After the spread of Islam along the northern coast of Africa, it continued to make progress towards the south, but the stages are only recorded in exceptional cases. It appears, indeed, that the successive founders of dynasties carried Islam, either by persuasion or by force of arms, farther and farther into the interior; this is recorded, for instance, of Idris, the founder of the Idrisid dynasty. In the first two centuries of the

Hijrah the doctrines of the Kharijites, who confined the Caliphate to no particular family or tribe, won considerable favour among the African Moslems; and one of the subdivisions of that sect, called the Ibadis or Abadis, is still represented in some places. A dynasty which claimed descent from Ali, known as the Idrisid, was established near the end of the eighth century, and founded Fez in 808; another, which also claimed descent from Ali, founded Mahdiyah in 914, and in 969 got possession of Egypt, where it established a Caliphate called the Fatimid, which lasted some two centuries. By transferring its capital from Mahdiyah to Cairo it soon lost touch with the more westerly parts of northern Africa, and the history of the country from that time onwards was exceedingly troubled. In 1045 the deputy of the Fatimids at the former seat of their power declared himself independent, and founded a dynasty known as the Zirid; and the Fatimid ruler, in order to punish this proceeding, organized a fresh immigration of Arab tribes into northern Africa, who not only brought devastation on the country by their invasion, but, owing to their inability to remain constant to any sovereign, became a permanent source of disorder.

In the eleventh century an empire was founded by a religious enthusiast, with Morocco for its capital, which presently obtained control over Islamic Africa with the exception of Egypt, and even embraced Islamic Spain; but after a century it was displaced by another, also founded by an enthusiast, who took the title 'Mahdi'. This empire also had its head-quarters in Morocco. In the middle of the thirteenth century it was overthrown, and three states took its place—the Marinid, with Fez or Morocco, the Ziyanid, with Tlemsen, and the Hafsid, with Tunis, as their respective capitals. The history of northern

Africa to the end of the fifteenth century is mainly concerned with the struggles, resulting from wars of succession, between these three states and their subdivisions.

Early in the sixteenth century the Ottoman Turks began to extend their authority along the coast of North Africa, and the three provinces of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli were annexed to the Turkish Empire in 1519, 1568, and 1551 respectively. Thus the territories that had belonged to the Ziyanids and the Hafsids came under Turkish rule; but Morocco passed from the hands of the Marinids into those of the Sherifs, who claimed descent from Ali, and have remained in power down to recent times.[1]

Although religious reformers play a prominent part in the history of all Islamic countries, it is in Africa that they have had most political importance. Thus, whereas in the eastern Caliphate the successive hegemonies were established by military adventurers, in Africa the series of empires, those of the Ubaidids, Almoravids, Almohads, and afterwards the Sherifian, were founded by religious enthusiasts. The persons who, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, aim at founding empires are called Murabits, i. e. hermits, who win popular admiration by rigidity of doctrine and asceticism in practice. The reason for this phenomenon appears to lie mainly in the character of the population; but an additional reason is to be found in the struggle with Christian Powers, who were steadily regaining territory and menacing Islam in Africa, while particular Moslem sovereigns were allying themselves with Christian potentates in order to defeat their rivals, and employing Christian regiments in their armies. At times,

[1] For the later expansion of Islam in Africa, see below, Part (3) of this book.

too, Islamic states accepted the humiliation of being tributary to Christian kings. These fundamental violations of Islamic law formed a permanent source of discontent, which provided a following for any enthusiast who aspired to remove them.

§ 8. *Relations with Subject Peoples*

The Prophet is said to have introduced in the year 8 A. H. the principle whereby certain religious communities, whose systems were based on a sacred book, were to enjoy toleration on consideration of paying tribute[1]; they were, however, to be disarmed, and to accept a position of inferiority to the Moslems. The form taken by the tribute was theoretically a poll-tax; as, however, the collection of this was ordinarily left to the responsible heads of the communities, and the persons who paid it were largely engaged in agriculture, the distinction between this tribute and the land-tax had a tendency to be obscured, and the name, which properly signifies land-tax, was from an early period applied to the poll-tax. Though in many cases the amount to be levied was fixed by an original contract, it was often increased by the caprice of individual governors; and the condition of the subject populations was in most states subject to alternations of mildness and severity. A code supposed to go back to the second Caliph, Omar, enjoined a variety of hard and humiliating conditions, which seem rarely to have been enforced for any considerable period, though the historians often record occasions on which they were restored by Moslem rulers in response to popular clamour. The difficulty of enforcing them lay in the fact that the civil service, as it might be called, was at all times very largely recruited from persons who belonged to the Christian, Jewish, or Sabian religions;

[1] Cf. above, p. 12.

the medical profession also was very largely in their hands; and the influence which these professional men could bring to bear on the Caliphs and Sultans was too strong to be overcome by the spasmodic efforts of fanatics. Examples of Moslem rulers who compelled all their subjects to adopt Islam are rare, though some are afforded by the history of Egypt and Africa.

§ 9. *Mohammedan Law*

The great difference between Mohammedan and European law lies in the fact that the former recognizes no distinction between canon law and the law of the State. The sources of law are the Koran, the Tradition, Consensus, and Analogical Deduction. On the basis of these, codes were compiled in the second and third Islamic centuries, dealing with ritual and with civil and criminal jurisprudence; three of these systems—those of Shafi'i, Malik, and Abu Hanifah—have become the law of different Islamic communities.[1] In Sunni countries the jurists can give opinions on cases which do not appear to be provided for, but theoretically no one is competent to alter the law. The codes adopted by heretical communities, such as those of the Ithna'shari Shiahs (of Persia and India), the Zaidis (of Yemen), and the Abadis (of Oman and some places in Africa), differ very slightly in content from the Sunni codes, and the theory held about them is the same. This principle has doubtless interfered, more than any other feature, with the progress of Islam.

The influence of the *'ulamā* ('the learned' both in law and theology) has therefore been as a rule conservative or reactionary, since the existence of their profession depends on the maintenance of the ancient

[1] See above, p. 18.

system; they have ordinarily protested against the theory that all subjects of a Moslem Empire are equal, and have exercised their influence in favour of maintaining the *jihad* against non-Moslem states. The modern sect of Ahmadis, whose head-quarters are at Qadian in the Punjab, claim that their leading tenet is the duty of loyalty to the Government of which a Moslem happens to be a subject, and that the *jihad* is to be interpreted as war against the evil propensities of one's own nature. It would not be easy to find the former principle maintained in authoritative text-books of earlier times, wherein a Moslem is usually advised to migrate from *dar al-harb*, 'the hostile region' (*partes infidelium*), to Islamic territory; and this seems to be the leading maxim of the modern Senussi sect.[1] For the spiritual interpretation of the *jihad* there is some ancient authority.

The fact that the law is independent of the sovereign has at times somewhat limited the arbitrariness of a ruler. Cases occur in the chronicles wherein autocrats have submitted to trial before the tribunals or expressed approval of disobedience to their orders, when it could be shown that such orders contravened the sacred law; but such cases are likely to have been rare.

The judicial system of the Mohammedan State has generally laid down a clear distinction between the functions of (*a*) the *qadi* (cadi), and (*b*) the *mufti*.

(*a*) The *qadi* is a magistrate appointed to administer the law and pronounce sentence in cases brought before him, both criminal and civil; he is a Government official, appointed by the ruler and dismissible at will; and, as such, his decisions are often given in accordance with the custom of the country or the will of the ruler.

(*b*) The *mufti* is a jurist, who gives formal legal

[1] See *Italian Libya*, No. 127 of this series.

opinions on questions submitted to him by a magistrate or by a private individual; on the basis of such an opinion the magistrate may decide a case, or the individual may regulate his personal life. His position is much like that of a Legal Remembrancer, and in Constantinople he exercises a function similar to the highest office of the Supreme Court in the United States of America—the power of defending the Constitution. The mufti has often been like a canonist, interested only in legal speculation and living aloof from administrative details; but in other instances he regularly assists the qadi, by means of his expert knowledge of law. Under the Abbasid Empire muftis were sometimes received into the service of the State; and under the Turkish Government they were organized into a separate department, and, particularly after the conquest of Constantinople, occupied positions of great importance and influence.

Mohammed II bestowed upon the mufti of the capital the title of *Sheikh ul-Islam*, which in later times became his ordinary designation. He had the right to appoint and promote all the other muftis of the empire, and in later times he appointed the qadis also; his department included the *Fatwā-khānah*, a bureau for the promulgation of formal legal decisions, either on matters of State, such as the declaration of war or peace, the validity of a proposed legislative enactment, &c., or on matters of personal law, concerning private individuals. He had no tribunal of his own, nor any temporal authority, and took no active part in affairs; his importance arose from his being the head of the legislature and the authoritative exponent of the law, which, being of divine origin and based upon the revealed Word of God, the Koran, demanded the obedience even of the Sultan himself. Accordingly, at times the Sheikh ul-Islam has resisted the authority

of the Sultan, and has even issued a *fatwa* deposing the Sultan, as was done in the case of Selim III (1808), Abdul Aziz (1876), and Abdul Hamid II (1909).

The Sheikh ul-Islam and the Grand Vizier took rank as the two highest functionaries of the Empire, and were the only officials who were invested by the Sultan in person; but, just as he was appointed by the Sultan, so the Sheikh ul-Islam might be degraded from his high office and sent into exile. In spite of the deference paid to his opinion, he is nevertheless a functionary of the Turkish Government, dependent for his appointment and continuance in office on the goodwill of the Sultan. It would appear, therefore, that unnecessary recognition was given to the authority of the Sultan when (*a*) the Austrian Government in 1909 agreed that the president of the Curia of the 'ulamā, who control Moslem ecclesiastical affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, should, after having been appointed by the King-Emperor, receive a diploma of investiture from the Sheikh ul-Islam in Constantinople; and when (*b*) the Italian Government, in the Treaty of Lausanne (1912), agreed that the chief qadi of Libya should be nominated by the Sheikh ul-Islam at Constantinople. In both cases the misunderstanding appears to have arisen through the attribution of spiritual authority to the Sheikh ul-Islam or to the Sultan as Khalifah, through a false analogy with spiritual functions in Christendom.

The civil authority has often found itself strong enough to disregard the religious authority of the Moslem legists; and from an early period there has been in operation a customary law (*'urf*, *'āda*), which finds no sanction in the canon law; while the authoritative works of Mohammedan law represent in many respects an academic code of law, parts of which have been obsolete for centuries. There has thus arisen in several

Mohammedan countries a system of civil law different from the canon law, while pressure from outside, exerted by the European Powers, has produced many reforms of legal practice in Mohammedan countries. This has led to the decline of the power of the mufti; e. g. in the Turkish dominions there are civil tribunals which administer justice according to the Ottoman Civil Code (*Mejelle*), and are independent of the judicial organization under the Sheikh ul-Islam's department; and since the revolution of 1909 the authority of the Sheikh ul-Islam has been still further diminished. Of course, in Mohammedan countries that have come under European rule, the application of the Moslem canon law has suffered still further limitations.

§ 10. *Political Conditions*

The form of Mohammedan states has rarely got beyond that of an autocracy, though we hear occasionally of experiments in other forms of government; thus from 1460 to 1510 African Tripoli was governed by a council of notables, who, it is supposed, were elected, with a sheikh as their president. Such experiments have, however, been uncommon; and, when Islamic states have enjoyed internal tranquillity and good government, it has been due to the rise to power of a competent despot, usually the founder of a dynasty. The political philosopher of Islam, Ibn Khaldun, suggested 120 years as the normal duration of a dynasty, as he supposed that by the third generation the qualities which had secured the domination of the founder would be exhausted; and this figure, which was deduced from the data furnished by eight centuries of Islam, suits the facts reasonably well. The greater stability of the Ottoman Empire is due to special causes.

That the whole Islamic world should be under the rule of one person, the successor or substitute for the Prophet

(the meaning of the word *Khalifah*), is probably agreed; the second of these successors is said to have been the inventor of the alternative title, *Amir al-mu'minin* ('Prince of the Believers'). Another name used by jurists for the holder of this office is *Imam* ('sovereign'). Though the ruling Caliphs, from the time of the fourth Caliph, if not from that of the first, had rivals who aspired to dispossess them, it would seem that the simultaneous existence of two Caliphs in different parts of the territory covered by Islam first occurred in 789, when Idris Ibn Abdallah, a descendant of Ali, established himself in north-west Africa with the above-mentioned titles, while Eastern Islam recognized the Abbasid ruler of Baghdad. Though the latter, Harun al-Rashid, got rid of his rival by poison, the dynasty continued for a time. In 932 these titles were also assumed by the Umayyad ruler of Spain; and since then there have always been several sovereigns claiming these names simultaneously in different regions.

Till the middle of the third Islamic century the Khalifah was also *de facto* autocrat. In the middle of that century the institution of a foreign body-guard in Baghdad or Samara, which for a time was the metropolis of the Eastern Caliphate, rendered it possible for the commander of the guard to depose and institute Caliphs at pleasure; but the definite fall of the Eastern Caliphate dates from 936, when the Caliph of the time delegated his powers, with the title 'Prince of Princes' to an official, who, in consequence of this delegation, became *de jure* as well as *de facto* autocrat. Owing to the division of the lands of the Caliphate at that time into numerous states, some nominally, others actually independent of the authority in Baghdad, the autocrat of that city was not recognized in all the provinces which professed to pay homage to the Caliph. Within each province the *de facto* ruler was autocrat; and the

title 'Sultan', which for the first four centuries of Islam was used for the Caliph in the sense of 'the Government', was towards the end of the fourth taken by provincial rulers. The right of the Caliph to appoint Sultans was maintained even when he had lost all his other rights, as was the case with the Abbasids of Egypt. And, since the astutest of the Mamluk Sultans thought it worth while to keep up the office for this purpose, it must be supposed that there were classes of Moslems whom the title impressed, even when its owner was absolutely in the power of the Sultan to whom he was supposed to have delegated his authority.

The rights most usually associated with the title 'Caliph', and indicating that his authority was recognized, were those of the *khutbah* (i. e. being mentioned in the prayer of the Friday sermon) and the *sikkah* (i. e. having his name inscribed on coins). So early as the third century of Islam it would appear that both rights were either usurped by, or conferred upon, provincial governors as well. This is symptomatic of the decline of the power of the Abbasid Caliph, which coincides with the moment when he ceased to occupy the pulpit himself.

For a right understanding of the term *khalifah* as used in the Mohammedan world, it is important to avoid misleading analogies drawn from the Holy Roman Empire, in which the Emperor claimed to be the head of a secular organization, the origin of which went back to a period anterior to Christianity, and which was based upon a political theory independent of religious dogma; it was accordingly possible in Christendom to draw a clear distinction between the temporal and the spiritual power. But in the Mohammedan system, the Caliph was the successor of Mohammed in all his functions, imperial and religious

(except that of the prophetic mission, which ceased with the life of 'the seal of the prophets'); and the Koran, the Word of God, was held to be the basis, not only of the dogmas of the faith, but also of the principles of civil administration and statecraft.

In Moslem theory, therefore, the Christian distinction between the spheres of temporal and religious power does not arise; though, in historic fact, the one or the other aspect might receive more or less emphasis at different periods. Thus we find that the early Caliphs always led the prayers in the mosque; and even the founder of the Umayyad dynasty, Mu'awiyah, was in the habit of preaching in the mosque and leading the Friday prayer. He exercised his authority both in religious and in temporal matters; but, under the later and more scandalous Umayyads, religion was apt to be thrust into the background. The Abbasids took advantage of the religious reaction against the godlessness of the Umayyads to displace this dynasty, and accordingly emphasized the hieratic character of the dignity. In proportion as their imperial power declined, this hieratic character of the Caliph as Imam received increasing emphasis; and titles such as 'Khalifah of God' (which occurs even in the earliest period of Islam) and 'shadow of God on earth' came more commonly into use.

According to the theory of the Mohammedan jurists (such as al-Māwardī, *ob.* 1058), the Khalifah must possess the following qualities: (i) a blameless character, (ii) a sufficient knowledge of law to give a legal decision in difficult cases in regard to which a logical deduction has to be drawn from existing statute law, (iii) knowledge of rhetoric, (iv) soundness of hearing, sight, and speech, (v) sufficient intelligence for the conduct of State business, (vi) courage for waging holy war, and (vii) descent from the tribe of the Quraish. His duties

are defined as: the defence of the faith, the decision of legal disputes, the preservation of public safety, the punishment of wrongdoers, the defence of the frontiers, war against those who refuse to accept Islam or to submit to Moslem rule, the collection and administration of taxes, the payment of salaries, the appointment of competent officials, and personal attention to the details of government. These principles, of course, represent only an ideal; and in practice most of these functions were delegated to officials who by theory were supposed to derive their authority from the Khalifah.

§ 11. *Sufism*

This is a name for Islamic mysticism and asceticism, which at times have kept within modest limits, but often have been pursued to extravagance. It is clear that, whereas the early conquests of Islam led to the accumulation of wealth and the desire for luxury, there were persons who disapproved of such indulgence, and endeavoured to impart to the new religion a more spiritual character; and such persons distinguished themselves either by excessive abstinence and devotion, or by efficiency as preachers and reformers. The fact that celibacy rarely if ever formed part of the equipment of a Moslem saint rendered complete renunciation of property on the part of the ascetics difficult, if not impossible; and, while the term 'Sufi' seems properly to have denoted the conspicuous devotee and revivalist preacher, such persons were not always easily distinguished from the official students and expounders of the sacred code. Constant meditation on the text of the Koran, accompanied in many cases by ascetic practices, led to the development of a theology which bears little resemblance to the ostensible message of that work; and the

robe of Sufism was not unfrequently used to cover schemes which aimed at the subversion of established authority in favour of some ambitious adventurer, or at something like complete abrogation of the Islamic system. In the third Islamic century the Sufis are thought of chiefly as the authors of impressive sayings; in the fourth they also attract attention as wonder-workers; they claim that command over nature is to be acquired by the practice of particular forms of abstinence or other religious exercises. There are references in the literature of this century to societies formed by, or called after, some particular saint, and these at times have political importance; doubtless they must have had some form of organization, though details are not apparently recorded.

At what time the Sufic doctrine became associated with Pantheism, i. e. identification of God with nature and of subject with object, cannot be stated with precision; if the documents which we possess are correctly dated, this system had reached its extreme development in the fourth Islamic (our eleventh) century. Owing to the danger of association with heretical doctrine, neophytes were only admitted to the mysteries step by step, and to the extent to which their loyalty could be trusted; it is therefore natural that we should be in the dark as to the extent of the organizations and the nature of many of their doctrines.

Of Sufic Orders we hear little prior to the latter half of the sixth Islamic century, when fame was acquired in Baghdad by Abd al-Qadir of Jilan, whose Order is usually regarded as the model for the others. He himself appears to have been a revivalist preacher. After his time the theory of an Order implies the use of a definite ritual in addition to the ceremonies which the Islamic law prescribes; and such Orders usually possess oratories, meeting-houses, and hostels, erected

and endowed by the liberality of the pious. Where they have succeeded in attracting many adherents in wide areas, the needs of administration have rendered some sort of hierarchy of officials necessary. Since membership of an Order is usually conferred only after a period of probation, there is a closer relation between members of the same Order than exists between ordinary Moslems; hence there is a possibility of utilizing these organizations for political schemes. In the case of the most recent of notable Orders, that of the Senussis, this has been accomplished; and attempts were made at such utilization prior to the existence of this confraternity. Normally it would appear that adherents are occupied with devotion, and are persons whose religious needs are not adequately supplied by the ceremonial prescribed in the law-books.

THE PAN-ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
Chronological Summary	41
1. Historical Basis of the Movement	41
2. The Pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II	44
3. Theory of the Movement current in the East	47
4. Pan-Islamism as a Religious Revival	50
5. Pan-Islamism and the Young Turks	54
Authorities	64

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

1838–96. Jamal al-Din.
1870 (*c.*). League for uniting Islam formed in Bokhara.
1878 (*c.*). Abdul Hamid adopts the principles of Pan-Islamism.
1881–2. First use of the phrase ' Pan-Islamism ' in the West.
1884. *The Firmest Handle,* started by Jamal al-Din at Paris. Mohammed Abdo's articles published.
1891 (?)–6. Jamal al-Din at Constantinople.
1897. The Sherif of Mecca supports the doctrine.
1898. The German Emperor's visit to Constantinople and Syria.
1902. Death of Abdul Rahman Kawakibi.
1903. Pan-Islamic Society founded in London.
1904. Ata Bey Hasani's declaration.
1908. Young Turk Revolution.
1910–11. Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress at Salonika.
1911. The Tripolitan War. The Young Turks definitely adopt Pan-Islamism.
1911–14. Growth of Pan-Islamic ideas in Constantinople.
1914 (?). Publication of *The New Nation.*

§ 1. *Historical Basis of the Movement*

It is evident that the original success of Islam was due to the close co-operation which the Prophet secured among his followers, and their readiness to set above all other obligations that which their religious brotherhood imposed upon them. Forcible measures were at times adopted by the Prophet for the suppression of older associations and alliances; and in some Islamic institutions there are signs of a desire to render the system irreconcilable with others, the dis-

tinction of non-Moslems from Moslems by their dress having often been enforced by Mohammedan rulers. During the Prophet's lifetime there were some dissensions among his followers, but these were checked by his authority. For a quarter of a century after his death the Moslems all recognized one head, at least in public; but since the murder of his third successor in A. D. 656 there has always been division, which, since the fall of the Umayyads in 750, has been sufficiently serious to break up the community into separate states. While the religious area of Islam continued to widen, its political divisions increased; and by the year 325 A. H. (A. D. 937) the Islamic world consisted of a score or more of independent states, whose mutual struggles led to frequent re-grouping. The theory that Islam could have only one legitimate successor or representative of the Prophet still held, but the title was claimed for more than one person simultaneously. Recognition of the claim was often merely formal, and in no way affected the independence of the sovereign who chose to make it.

The reunion of the Islamic world has naturally been the dream of many Moslem potentates, notably of the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (A. D. 1512–20), whose conquests, added to those of his predecessors, brought this dream to partial realization; still, large areas both to the east and to the west were inhabited by Islamic peoples forming states which were completely independent of the Ottoman Sultan. Moreover, whereas during its first expansion Islam had forced its adherents to adopt the language of the Koran, Arabic, though retained as the ecclesiastical language, proved in many places otherwise unable to displace the national speech; and the retention of these national languages, though written in varieties of the Arabic script, placed a barrier in the way of any such fusion

of the Moslems into a nation as had taken place in the earliest centuries of the system.

Since the Peace of Carlowitz, at the end of the seventeenth century, the Ottoman Empire has ceased to be a menace to Europe; in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries great expanses of territory largely inhabited by Moslems, some of which had at one time belonged to the Ottoman Empire, came under the rule of Great Britain, Russia, Holland, and France. In the nineteenth century Turkey not only lost some of her European possessions and some of her territory in Asia, but was subjected to European influence at the capital; and no other Islamic state was so strong as Turkey. Meanwhile the growth of the means of communication and the establishment of printing-presses and schools, largely through Christian missionary effort, in most Islamic countries aroused greater interest in, and spread more accurate knowledge of, contemporary events than had been possible before. It became evident that the Islamic communities were becoming more and more dependent politically on the European Governments, adherents of the Christian Faith. These Governments, though they tolerated the Moslem religion, prohibited much which it enjoins; and its founder had by no means contemplated toleration for it, but domination over the world.

Now, though the Moslem communities are divided by race, language, and sect, and though even such terrible dangers as the Crusades and the Mongol invasion were unable to produce co-operation between them, they have a bond in the possession of one Sacred Book—the Koran—in the common name Moslem, and in the history of the period when they were united and swept all before them. This bond is sufficient to make them take pride in each other's successes and sympathize in each other's misfortunes. And the pious at least

among them everywhere look back with regret to the time when the Islamic sovereign could aspire to be the ruler of the world. It is natural that some should assume that disunion is the cause of their political weakness, and hold that, if unity could be restored, Islam would again become politically formidable.

§ 2. *The Pan-Islamism of Sultan Abdul Hamid II*

The notion of uniting the Islamic communities for the purpose of resisting European aggression and ultimately ousting European rulers from Asia and Africa is expressed in Arabic and Turkish by a phrase meaning 'Islamic union'. Pan-Islamism, a translation of this phrase, first appeared in English (it would seem) in an article published in *The Times* of January 19, 1882, agreeing in most points with, though apparently independent of, one by M. G. Charmes which had appeared a few months before in the *Revue des deux Mondes*,[1] where the word occurs for perhaps the first time in French. The French writer traces the movement to a league originally founded about 1870 in Bokhara, of which Khudayar Khan, ex-ruler of Khokand,[2] served as emissary in Arabia; he preached to various Arab, Kurd, and Indian sheikhs and Mullahs the necessity of a Holy War against Russia and England. Owing to the humiliating conditions imposed on Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin, the league desired to place at the head of the Islamic confederation, not the Ottoman Sultan, but rather the Sherif of Mecca, Husain, who was appointed in 1877 and assassinated in 1880.

The notion, however, that the religious headship of Islam might be politically utilized was adopted by

[1] 1881, vol. xlvii, p. 924.

[2] His fortunes are traced down to the year 1875 by Schuyler, G., *Turkistan*, 2 vols. (London, 1876).

Abdul Hamid II, who had not, like his predecessor at the time of the Crimean War, received support from any Christian Power against Russia. The persons supposed to have impressed him with this idea are Si Mohammed Zafir, a Marabout of Tripoli who had foretold his accession, this Marabout's cousin, Sheikh Asad, and a certain Abu'l-Huda Effendi; they persuaded him that his predecessors had been mistaken in cultivating the friendship of European Christian Governments, and that his true course was to attempt to reunite Islam against Christendom. It is asserted that he sent agents and emissaries to different parts of the Islamic world with this object; and we possess detailed accounts of some of these operations. Brahim as-Senusi was sent to the Sultan of Morocco with presents and an invitation to join in the *jihad*; with the aid of the British consul at Tangier he obtained an audience, but only an evasive answer, and one which could not be presented, because the Sultan of Morocco, being unable to set his seal to the document without claiming superiority or acknowledging inferiority to the Sultan of Turkey by the place where he set it, disregarded that formality, and an unsealed letter was valueless.[1] Hamzah, the brother of Sheikh Zafir, was sent in 1882 on a mission to Tripoli, which also failed.[2] Since these missions were from their nature secret, it is natural that they should only be known by hearsay.

It appears that throughout his long reign Abdul Hamid II adhered to the policy of figuring as the head of Islam; and the official French account of the Islamic Orders in North Africa asserts that some of these

[1] See Le Chatelier, A., *Les Confrèries Musulmanes du Hedjaz*, (Paris, 1887), pp. 114 sqq.

[2] An account of it is given in Charmes, G., *La Tunisie et la Tripolitaine* (Paris, 1883).

organizations were employed by the Sultan for the propagation of the Pan-Islamic idea, especially the Rifa'i Order, of which Abu'l-Huda was the head, and the Madani Order, of which the Sheikh Zafir was the head.[1] These organizations were (1897) aided by the Sherif of Mecca, who appointed as guides to the pilgrims persons willing to circulate the doctrine. Abdul Hamid's Turkish biographer observes that his construction of the Hejaz railway was undertaken with the idea of conciliating the Moslems throughout the world; the same motive is found in various pointless acts of aggression, though some suppose the Sultan's action in these matters to have been intended to impress his own subjects rather than those of other Governments. To the end of his reign he was in the habit of sending embassies to Moslem communities outside Turkey, such as those in China and Afghanistan.

It is clear that his policy of uniting Islam differed widely from that of his predecessor Selim I, whose idea was to annex to his empire by force of arms all Islamic states that were outside it; the number of Moslems who in Selim's time were subject to non-Moslem rulers was still insignificant. It is not probable that Abdul Hamid ever contemplated leading a confederation of Moslem states to war against Christendom; his endeavours to enter into friendly relations with European Powers, especially with Germany, render this unlikely. Still, by representing himself as the natural champion of Moslems who were subject to Christian Governments, he hoped to render himself formidable to those Governments; and, as Germany had far fewer such subjects than Great Britain, France, or Russia, his policy was regarded as helpful to Germany. Within his empire, however, his claim

[1] Depont, O., and Coppolani, X., *Les Confrèries Religieuses Musulmanes*, pp. 261 sqq. (Algiers, 1897).

to be Pontiff of Islam was disputed in many quarters; and, outside it, India appears to be the country where it gained most adherents.

§ 3. *Theory of the Movement current in the East*

Oriental writers hold that the inventor of Pan-Islamism—i. e. the person who thought that by the restoration of unity among the Moslem communities European aggression might be stopped, and lost territory ultimately regained—was a certain Sayyid Jamal al-Din, who lived 1838–96. He is known as 'the Afghan'; but according to the most recent account of him[1] he was born in a village of Persia, near Hamadan, was educated at Nejef, and resided for some years in Afghanistan, whence he took the name *Afghani*. He was with Dost Mohammed when he took Herat in 1863. In the civil war which broke out shortly afterwards he was in the employ of Azim Khan. But after this prince's defeat by Shir Ali in 1869 he thought it unsafe to remain in Afghanistan, and proceeded to India, where the British Government would not permit him to stay; and it would seem that his belief that his master's downfall had been engineered by Great Britain made him a bitter enemy of this empire. He travelled and taught in Egypt and Constantinople, whence he was expelled in 1871 on the ground of unorthodoxy. Returning to Egypt, he was granted a small monthly allowance by Riyad Pasha, but was expelled in 1879 for starting an anti-British propaganda. He then went to Hyderabad, but, owing to the outbreak of trouble in Egypt, was compelled by the British Government to reside in Calcutta until the Arabi revolt was over, so that he might be under observation.

[1] Sykes, Sir P. M., *History of Persia*, 2 vols. (London, 1915), ii, 501. What follows is taken from the Sayyid's biography in Zaidan, G., *Mashahir al-Sharq*, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1903).

Jamal al-Din subsequently took up his abode in Paris, where in 1884 he started an Arabic journal called *The Firmest Handle*, containing violent attacks on England as the European Power which had under its sway the largest number of Moslems and was, according to him, the implacable and treacherous enemy of Islam; her political programme was, he asserted, to deprive all Moslems of their independence, seize their possessions, and generally humiliate them. After a time the publication of this journal was stopped; but it had attracted the attention of the Shah Nasiru'd Din, who invited Jamal al-Din to Persia, and made him Minister of War. Presently he suspected the intentions of the Shah and left Persia to travel in Europe; but, meeting the Shah at Munich in 1889, he accepted an invitation to return to Teheran, whence, owing to his endeavour to spread revolutionary ideas, he was expelled in 1890. He then came to London, where, according to his biographer, he tried to influence the Government to obtain the deposition of the Shah—notwithstanding his disapproval of European, and especially British, interference with Islamic concerns.

While in England he received an invitation to Constantinople, which he accepted; and there he lived in the enjoyment of the Sultan's favour till his death in 1896. During these years he is said [1] to have made an attempt to induce the Persian Shiahs to recognize the Caliphate of Abdul Hamid. Hundreds of letters were written by him and by his colleague, Ruhi Effendi, to persons of eminence and learning, whose acquaintance Jamal al-Din had made during his stay in Persia, urging that, if the Persians would acknowledge the Turkish Sultan's claim to the sovereignty of Islam,

[1] Hecquard, Ch., *La Turquie sous Abd al-Hamid II* (Brussels, 1901), pp. 123 sqq., is the authority for this statement; he appears to be well informed.

Turkey and Persia united would be able to defy European aggression. The negotiations showed signs of leading to a successful result, when they were betrayed or somehow came to the knowledge of the Persian Government; and the execution of Ruhi Effendi presently resulted.

The most celebrated of Jamal al-Din's assistants was the Sheikh Mohammed Abdo, afterwards a Mufti in Egypt, and friendly to the British occupation. The ideas which made up the Pan-Islamism of his master are expressed by him in two papers, first published in *The Firmest Handle* (1884), and reprinted in the Mufti's biography.[1] He shows that the political subordination of any Islamic community to non-Moslems is a violation of the Islamic religion, which enjoins on its followers not only to shake off all foreign yokes, but also to defy all Powers that are not Islamic. He attributes the actual subjection of the great majority of Moslems to non-Moslem Governments to the neglect by Moslem rulers of their duties and to the private quarrels of these potentates, who invoked the help of outsiders to settle them; these outsiders ultimately becoming masters of the situation. These princes and governors, who thus sacrificed the interests of Islam to their petty interests, 'had become chains on the necks of those lions (the Islamic warriors), keeping them from their prey, nay, making them the food of foxes'. Still there was no occasion to despair. Between Adrianople and Peshawar there was a continuous chain of Moslem states, all united in their belief in the Koran, numbering not less than 50,000,000, distinguished above all other races for their bravery; could they not unite in self-defence, and by co-operation divert from themselves the torrents that were rushing upon them from all sides? The writer concluded by expressing the hope

[1] Two volumes (Cairo, 1324 A. H.), ii, pp. 279 sqq.

that the call to such union and co-operation would come in the first place from the most exalted of the Islamic potentates.

In a second paper he urged that the two essentials for success in a nation were unity and imperialism. The desire for conquest in a people was like that for food in the frame of the individual; but unity was essential before conquest could be contemplated. These principles were not only taught by experience, but were inculcated in the Koran. It was, however, necessary to arouse the Moslems, who appeared to have forgotten them; and in the sanctuary to which every true Moslem goes on pilgrimage there was a centre where joint effort could be made the subject of deliberation and practical plans devised.

As has been seen, the idea of utilizing Mecca for this purpose had been anticipated (see § 2, p. 46), and the organization of the religious orders was already being turned to account. Abdul Rahman Kawakibi, whom some name with Jamal al-Din among the chief promoters of Pan-Islamism, but who appears to have been no friend of Abdul Hamid, proposed holding a Pan-Islamic Congress in Mecca, for which apparently the Sultan's consent could not be obtained. He died in the year 1902.

§ 4. *Pan-Islamism as a Religious Revival*

Whereas Jamal al-Din's expedients for restoring the political dominance of Islam were decidedly drastic, his followers wished to prepare the way by founding Islamic colleges, newspapers, and societies. In 1903 a Pan-Islamic society was founded in London, of which the objects were thus enumerated:

'1. To promote the religious, social, moral, and intellectual advancement of the Mussulman world.

2. To afford a centre of social reunion to Moslems from all parts of the world.

3. To promote brotherly feelings between Moslems and facilitate intercourse between them.

4. To remove misconceptions prevailing among non-Moslems regarding Islam and the Mussulmans.

5. To render legitimate assistance to the best of its ability to any Mussulman requiring it in any part of the world.

6. To provide facilities for conducting religious ceremonies in non-Moslem countries, and to found centres of Moslem thought.

7. To found branches of the Central Pan-Islamic Society in different parts of the world, hold debates and lectures, and read and publish papers likely to further the interests of Islam.

8. To collect subscriptions from all parts of the world in order to build a Mosque in London and endow it.'

It was suggested by the Egyptian translator of this document that four more objects should be added:

'9. To support the Ottoman Caliphate.

10. To carry on propaganda in this sense till all Islamic potentates and authorities are agreed about it.

11. In return for this, to obtain the support of the Ottoman Caliph for the Islamic communities, and his intervention with the European Governments in control of such communities for the redress of their grievances.

12. To call the attention of the Islamic Governments to cases wherein their measures violated Islamic law, when such measures affected the whole community and gave Islam a bad name.'

The London society presently changed its name from Pan-Islamic to Islamic, and seems to have conducted its operations on a modest scale. Other societies, schools, and newspapers were started. One Egyptian of eminence declared, in the year 1904,[1] that Pan-Islamism by no means signified anything like a crusade or union of the Islamic Powers under

[1] Ata Bey Hasani. His papers were collected under the title *Al-Nahdah al-Sharqiyyah* (Cairo, 1906), p. 84.

one banner for the purpose of fighting Europe ; what it did mean was not, however, apparently very different, *viz.* the establishment of a bond of unity and friendship between the Moslems of the world, to help each other morally, materially, and politically, and to group themselves round the Ottoman Caliphate as representing the greatest Moslem Power. Should such a bond be realized, it would be difficult for the European to continue to appropriate Moslem lands and the produce of Moslem toil.

One English convert to Islam tries harder than many others to avoid the consequence that, if Pan-Islamism is to effect its object, it must enter the service of the Ottoman Empire ; but the result is obscure :

'Instead of being a danger to Europe or civilization, Pan-Islamism is a movement that should have the support of every lover of peace and civilization. If the world at large is ever to see that higher and truer civilization of which it is capable, the Powers must abandon that lust of conquest which is but a drag on all true progress ; they must cease to look on the interest of each as a claim to which the interests of all others must yield, and combine to seek the benefit of all. The more nearly that ideal is reached, the more important will it be that Islam should be prepared to take its fitting place in the grand scheme of regeneration. That it should do so it must follow now and for ever the ideas that are the mainspring of Pan-Islamism.'[1]

This seems to confuse Jamal al-Din's programme with that of a reformed Islam, which is at times associated, but appears to have no essential connexion, with it. As in other religions, so in Islam, the earnest adherents are as much attached to what divides the sects as to what unites them ; it seems impossible to loosen the tie of the sect without loosening the bond of the religion.

[1] Browne, Hajji A., *Bonaparte in Egypt* (London, 1907), p. 324.

Since Pan-Islamism, after being discussed for close on thirty years, by 1908 had produced no result, Oriental writers of authority began to declare that it had no existence. One of them defined it as 'a phantasm abstracted from the Moslem profession of religious fraternity, and magnified by the European imagination'. Another declared that the notion of a Pan-Islamic movement was an invention of European politicians, whose purpose was to excite animosity against the Moslems and so justify fresh attempts against such independence as any of them still possessed; and, though the Oriental press greatly exaggerated the alarm which the word excited in Europe, there is no doubt that much was attributed to Pan-Islamism that was not really connected with it. Inquiries addressed to missionaries in various Islamic countries, including one from the German Emperor, failed to elicit evidence of any considerable organization with a practical scheme of operations. The division of the Islamic world between the European Governments proceeded apace; and, though the Italian invasion of the Tripolitaine, the arrangement of Moroccan affairs in the interest of France, and the division of Persia into British and Russian spheres of influence, seriously wounded Islamic susceptibilities throughout the world, the co-operation between the Moslems of different countries on these occasions scarcely went beyond the sending of subscriptions, the occasional enlistment of recruits, and the holding of indignation meetings where such were permitted. This was used by Moslem writers as evidence that Pan-Islamism was not organized; that the strength of the sentiment which it represented had been greatly overrated; and that the spirit of aggression was confined to European Christianity, and could not with justice be attributed to the Islam of Asia and Africa. It was pointed out that,

centuries ago, the far more terrible menaces of the Crusades and the Mongol invasion had failed to produce co-operation among the Moslem communities, some of which aided the common enemy; and that it was not to be expected that the milder prospects which European aggression held out would have the power to produce it. Further, the fact, established by statistics though not readily acknowledged, that Islam spreads faster in Asiatic and African countries protected by European Governments than in independent states is calculated to discourage the efforts of intelligent Moslems in the direction of realizing Jamal al-Din's plans. Reformers complain that their efforts to elevate Islam are thwarted mainly by Moslems.

§ 5. *Pan-Islamism and the Young Turks*

The proclamation of the Turkish Constitution in 1908 was at first regarded as unfavourable to Pan-Islamism. Since that Constitution gave equal rights to all religions and sects, it was supposed that no Sultan in the future would be able to proclaim a Pan-Islamic crusade, and that the fanatical tribes of Asia and Africa would be slow to accept the counsels of a Sultan at the head of a free, self-governing, civilized people. Further, of the two persons who had been most prominent in effecting the reform, whereas Niyazi states that, before the Constitution could be launched, the Turks had with difficulty been induced to abandon their rights as conquerors, Enver Bey (since Pasha) was quoted for the declaration that the new constitution would have nothing to do with Pan-Islamism.[1] The views of the Young Turk party were thus expressed by one of their organs:

[1] Jessup, H. H., *Fifty-three Years in Syria* (2 vols., New York, 1910), ii. 791.

'We Ottomans belong to a race sufficiently intelligent and practical to understand that the pursuit of the Pan-Islamic designs of the visionaries would be contrary to our dearest interests.'[1]

It was pointed out that the Young Turks had expressed little sympathy with Egyptian nationalism, which had a Pan-Islamic bias. And indeed the fact that the proclamation of the Constitution involved the arming of the non-Moslem subjects of the Porte seemed to preclude it from favouring Pan-Islamic projects.

The course of events led to a change in that matter. Equality between members of all cults is without doubt an infraction of Koranic law, and very shortly after the proclamation we hear of a *Mohammedan Confraternity Society* at Constantinople, ostensibly for the restoration of the sacred law; it was joined by great numbers in the capital, and soon had ramifications in all the provinces. Nor does there appear to be any doubt that, by the year 1911, the Committee of Union and Progress had definitely adopted the Pan-Islamic programme,[2] and was employing agents in various countries with the object of exciting the Moslem subjects of non-Moslem rulers to look to the Sultan of Turkey as their legitimate sovereign.

The Times of December 27, 1911, stated that the following decisions were among those arrived at by the Salonika Congress (1911) of the Committee of Union and Progress:—

Measures of Pan-Islamism

'A Congress of delegates, summoned from all the Moslem countries of the world, ought to meet annually in Constanti-

[1] Knight, E. F., *The Awakening of Turkey* (London, 1909), p. 64. See also *The Pan-Turanian Movement*, Part (2) of this book.

[2] That is, in foreign policy.

nople, to discuss questions of interest to the Moslem world. Branches of the Committee should be formed in all Moslem countries, especially in Russia and in Persia. The Mohammedans of Russia ought to be persuaded to make revolutionary propaganda among Russian soldiers. As many Tartars as possible should be induced to become members of the seven branches of the Committee which already exist in Russia. Efforts should be made to bring about an understanding between Persia and Turkey, with the ultimate object of effecting a political and economical union between the two countries. The Turks in Bulgaria and in Bosnia and Herzegovina, who should be advised not to emigrate, should be organized in such a way that they would be in touch with the Committee of Union and Progress. Large numbers of Turkish boys from Bulgaria ought to be educated in Turkey, and subsequently sent back as masters to the Bulgarian schools. Schools must be opened with the object of pushing the Turkish language among the Pomaks (Moslem Bulgarians), in the hope of making them forget the Bulgarian language. Turkish teachers should be also sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and attempts made to persuade the Turks in these provinces not to favour the Serbian aspirations and to learn German rather than Serbian in the schools.'

The *Times* correspondent had, indeed, little sympathy with the Young Turks; but M. René Pinon, who is one of the most competent and most impartial judges of Eastern affairs, in his treatise on *Europe and Young Turkey*,[1] published in the autumn of 1911, has a paragraph which is in agreement with the statements of *The Times* :—

'The Young Turks have undertaken the noble task of restoring Ottoman patriotism, but the notion of country correlative to that of nation has had hitherto no existence in the Empire. Among the Turks, who have never known any other than religious patriotism, the awakening of national patriotism could only result in an outburst of Pan-Islamism. If this word is of Western invention, the idea is Eastern and Moslem.

[1] *L'Europe et la Jeune Turquie* (Paris, 1911), p. 134.

The Moslem is a brother, the Christian an enemy, the Sultan the master. This was the naïve conception of politics in the breast of the good Turkish peasant. A long series of years must pass before it can be modified. The Young Turks, then, will do well to watch carefully the Pan-Islamic intrigues which certain subordinate agents would like to conduct. At the Congress of Salonika in 1911 there was a talk of sending Turkish emissaries to the Indian and Caucasian Moslems; it is certain that an active anti-French propaganda is carried on among the Algerians established in Syria, and that agents have been sent into Algeria. Permanent relations have been established between certain Young Turkish clubs and the Young Egyptian societies. Our officials, who after so many efforts have secured the peace and safety of the Sahara, find the traces of Turkish intrigues in the Sahara, and as far as the oases of Kwar and Bilma. Under pretence of a dispute about frontiers, the Turks have occupied part of Azerbaijan, the importance of which has always been considerable from the point of view of communications between Persia, Armenia, and the Caucasus. On this subject a Turkish journal made the statement: "We have the right to interest ourselves in Persian affairs because Persia is a Moslem power."'

This last assertion was repeatedly made in Turkey by authorized persons after M. Pinon wrote, and especially in connexion with the Russian complication.

That the Committee of Union and Progress could be earnest in its Pan-Islamic policy has been denied on various grounds. In the first place it has been pointed out that the leaders of that Committee are, without exception, Freemasons; and such religious fanaticism conflicts with the principles of the Masonic Society. Secondly, it has been observed that the Pan-Islamic policy has been discouraged in regions where it might endanger Turkish authority. Thus in Syria the Turks have to face the movement of Pan-Arabism, which supports the fusion of all Arabic-speaking countries into an independent political unit; and, since such a state would be likely to have for its head an Islamic

religious leader, it is to the interest of the Turks in Syria to emphasize the undenominational character of the Ottoman Constitution, which an Arabian state could not easily share.

It has also been urged that the endeavour of the Young Turks to make Turkish the national language of the Ottoman Empire, even at the expense of Arabic, is an anti-Islamic measure; to which it has been replied that the ostensible Turkification of the Empire was a temporary measure meant to impress the Turkish or Tartar subjects of Russia, and to win them over to the interests of Turkey.

Another view that has been taken is that the experiences of the Tripolitan War convinced the rulers of Turkey that the Pan-Islamic bond was much stronger than they had believed it to be, since both the resistance of the Arabs of Tripoli to the Italian invasion and the contributions which flowed in from Islamic societies throughout the world to aid Turkey in this war exceeded all expectation. This indicated the possibility of utilizing the Pan-Islamic feeling for a variety of purposes, such as obtaining money for the ostensible defence of Islam, silencing the anti-Turkish agitators in the Arabic-speaking provinces, and conciliating the Turkish and Tartar subjects of Russia. Hence the Young Turks subsidized the Pan-Islamic press of Egypt and Constantinople.

The history of Turkey from 1911 to the outbreak of the War appears to show a gradual increase of Pan-Islamism among the members of the Turkish Government. The exile Sherif Pasha asserted that there was a great Pan-Islamic league, called *Jam'iyyet Hairiyyeh Hamiyeh*, which was identical with the Committee of Union and Progress; 'the last meeting was attended by five Indians.'[1] Declarations that any real tolera-

[1] *Mecheroutiette* (Paris), December 1913, p. 58.

tion by Islam of other religions and any progress of the Moslem world in the direction of European civilization were impossible are quoted by a collaborator of Sherif Pasha from the writings of a member of both these bodies, the Sheikh Abdul Haqq of Baghdad;[1] and apparently the Comtist Ahmad Riza, first President of the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies, came round to the view that the Moslem religion was the only force capable of uniting the different elements of the Ottoman Empire, and that the theory of such a double personality as that with which the Turkish Constitution invested the Sultan could not be maintained. It was the duty (he held) of all Moslems to labour to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Islam was a great international family; it was the Caliph's business to facilitate the relations of its members, and rally the believers under his priestly banner. The question whether this 'unification of the Islamic Empire under the spiritual power of the Sultan' would be a danger to Christian states would depend on the attitude which the latter adopted towards it; he hoped that the Moslem attitude would continue to be purely defensive, but, if attacked, they would exchange it for another.[2]

This view, *viz.* that the unification of the various elements which constitute the Ottoman Empire can only be on the religious basis of Islam, and that consequently, if the Turkish Government is to survive, it must be Pan-Islamic, is argued by other writers representative of thought in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, in a political treatise published in Constantinople a few months before the War broke out, it is urged that, whereas in Europe nationality takes precedence of religion, in the East religion takes precedence of nationality; an

[1] *Ibid.*, August 1912, pp. 12 sqq.

[2] Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 17, from Ahmed Riza, *La crise de l'Orient* (Paris).

Afghan, Turk, or Tunisian is a Moslem first, then a member of a particular nation or tribe; and this difference between East and West is too deeply rooted to be left out of consideration. This author's ideal was therefore a confederation of the Moslem peoples, with Turkey occupying therein the place occupied by Prussia in the German Confederation. In Turkey itself he would grant no political rights to others than Moslems, and no full rights to others than Turks.[1]

Evidence was adduced by Sherif Pasha to show that, during the Italian War, Pan-Islamic opinions and publications were encouraged by the Ottoman Government, and the rights of Christians accorded them by the Constitution in various ways infringed.

Shortly before the beginning of the war there appeared in Constantinople a book bearing the title *The New Nation*, representing the views of the advanced section of the Committee of Union and Progress. Its author argued that by abandoning the *jihad*—i. e. by failing to enlist in the Ottoman army for the purpose of fighting the infidels and reconquering the provinces which they had wrested from the believers—all Moslems, with the exception of such as could show some excuse from the Koran, had incurred the reproach of apostasy, which Islam punishes with death. They could only recover their title to be regarded as Moslems if they contributed half their goods to the Islamic Government for the purpose of such a religious campaign, and enlisted with the view of taking part therein. This, he asserted, represented the policy of the Party of Union and Progress, which regarded the essence of Islam as consisting not in its ceremonies but solely in the *jihad*. The mere fact of Moslems being regarded by Christian rulers as loyal subjects indicated that

[1] Jalal Nuri, *Ta'rikh Istiqbal* (3 vols. Constantinople, 1332 A. H.), i, pp. 154 sqq.

such Moslems were apostates. This epithet might with justice be applied to all Moslems within the Ottoman Empire who did not join the forces of the Turkish commanders, and all outside it who did not hasten to help the Caliph. Examples of such apostates were to be found in the Albanians who had rebelled, and in the Egyptians, Indians, natives of Bokhara, Tartars, inhabitants of Fez, Tunis, and Algiers, and the people of Hejaz and Nejd, who sent no subscriptions to the Sultan. It is true that the view of Islam taken by this writer differs widely from that held in orthodox circles, since he rejects as unimportant everything but the duty of supporting the Ottoman Caliph and his army.[1] Apparently the party which he represents is aware that the conditions of modern warfare put those who adhere to the beliefs and observances of old-fashioned Islam at a disadvantage, while religious enthusiasm is a valuable asset, and hopes in this way to profit by the enthusiasm while eliminating the disadvantage.

Although Pan-Islamism has had, as we have seen, little positive effect, it appears to have done something to keep the Ottoman Empire together prior to the war; and, although the notion of an independent Arabic state seems to have been in circulation from the time of Midhat Pasha's government of Syria (1879–1880), it is asserted that the leading men in Syria and Mesopotamia refrained from taking any step against the Ottoman Government for fear of weakening the only powerful Islamic Empire that remained, their dread of European aggression being shared by their Christian fellow-subjects. From this loyal attitude they were driven by the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress, which was resolved

[1] Long extracts in an Arabic translation are given in the *Manar* (Cairo, 1332 A. H.), xvii, pp. 539 sqq.

on the Turkification of the whole Empire; for they held that Islam was too intimately bound up with the Arabs and the Arabic language to be able to survive the effects of this policy. The entry of Turkey into the war was signalized by violent persecution of the Arabs in Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Hejaz,[1] which however diminished when the Sherif of Mecca declared his independence. Nevertheless, the hostility of the Arabs to the Turks has been increased to a degree which renders reconciliation of the former to the rule of the latter unthinkable; whence the chance of a Pan-Islamic combination against Europe seems to have been reduced to zero. And indeed, however the war may end, it is not easy to see how this particular result can be altered.

[1] The statements in this paragraph are taken from an article in the *Manar*, 1918 (1335 A. H.), xx, pp. 33 sqq.

AUTHORITIES

(1) The Rise of Islam

The chief original authorities are the biography of the Prophet by Mohammed, son of Ishaq (*ob.* 151 A. H.), abridged by Ibn Hisham, and the Chronicle of Tabari (*ob.* 310 A. H.).

Arnold, T. W. *The Preaching of Islam.* London, 1913.

Caetani, L. *Annali dell' Islam.* Milan, 1905, &c.

Dozy, R. P. A. *Spanish Islam.* Translated by F. G. Stokes. London, 1913.

Goldziher, I. *Mohammedanische Studien.* Halle, 1890.

Heidborn, A. *Droit public et administratif de l'Empire Ottoman.* Vienna, 1908.

Hunter, W. W. *The Indian Empire.* London, 1892.

Hurgronje, C. Snouck. *Mohammedanism.* New York, 1916.

Ibn Khaldun. *Les Prolégomènes, traduits par M. de Slane.* Paris, 1863.

Kremer, A. von. *Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islams.* Leipzig, 1868.

Macdonald, D. B. *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence, and Constitutional Theory.* London, 1903.

Margoliouth, D. S. *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam.* London, 1905.

—— *Mohammedanism.* London, 1911.

—— Articles on Mohammed in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (11th ed.), and in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.*

Mawardi. *El-akham es-soulthaniya. Traité de droit public musulman. Traduit par L. Ostorog.* Paris, 1900–6.

Mercier, E. *Histoire de l'Afrique septentrionale.* 3 vols., Paris, 1888–91.

Nallino, C. A. *Appunti sulla natura del Califfato in genere e sul presunto Califfato ottomano.* Rome, 1917.

Ohsson, I. de Mouradja d'. *Tableau générale de l'Empire Ottoman.* Paris, 1788.

Ollone, H. M. G. d', Viscount. *Recherches sur les Musulmans chinois.* Paris, 1911.

(2) Pan-Islamism

The movement since 1897 has been carefully followed in the Arabic monthly *Manar*, edited by Mohammed Rashid Rida, Cairo, where the chief articles are translated or summarized. The literature consists in articles and speeches with allusions in books of travel or contemporary history; reference to the more important of these is given in notes above. Attention may be called to the article *Le Panislamisme et le Panturquisme* (unsigned) in the *Revue du Monde Musulman*, March 1913, xxii. 179–220.

THE RISE OF THE TURKS
AND
THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

THE RISE OF THE TURKS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Chronological Summary 67
1. The Tú-Küeh 67
2. The Northern and Western Turks . . . 68
3. The Uighurs 69
4. The Seljuks 70
5. The Ottoman Turks 71
Note on the Words 'Tartar' and 'Mongol' . 72
AUTHORITIES 106

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

B. C.
1400. First mention of Hsiung-nu.
c. 250. Great Wall of China built.
A. D.
c. 430. Settlement of the Tú-Küeh.
567. Turkish Embassy to the Emperor Justin II.
582. Division of Tú-Küeh into northern and western Turks.
630. Northern Turks conquered by Chinese.
659. Western Turks conquered by Chinese.
c. 680. Northern Turks regain their independence.
c. 714. Transoxiana becomes Mohammedan.
c. 750. Northern Turks conquered by Uighurs.
c. 1000. Uighurs converted to Islam.
c. 1050. The Seljuk leader Toghrul restores and seizes the temporal power of the Caliphate.
1071. Alp Arslan defeats the Emperor Romanus at Manzikert.
1092. Death of Malik Shah. Seljuk Empire falls into eastern and western divisions.
1219. Mongols under Jenghiz Khan overrun eastern Seljuk principalities.
1227. Ertoghrul settles near Erzerum.
1243. Defeat of the western Seljuks at Kuzadag.
1300–26. Osman reigns as an independent monarch.
1326. Orkhan captures Brusa.
1328–38. Orkhan captures Nicaea and Nicomedia.

THE RISE OF THE TURKS

1. The Tú-Küeh

In general usage the word 'Turk' denotes the Turkish element of the Ottoman Empire. With greater accuracy, however, all who talk one of the dialects of the Turkish language may be called Turks. The Turkish-speaking peoples extend, at present, roughly from the Great Wall of China on the east to the limits of Turkey in Europe in the west, to northern Persia in the south, and the neighbourhood of the Arctic in the north.

Chinese annals from 1400 B.C. to 200 B.C. make frequent mention of the Hsiung-nu, vigorous and

barbarian nomads who wandered over the area north of the Chinese frontier. In the third century B. C. the Great Wall of China was built as a protection against the incursions of these warriors. In the first half of the fifth century A. D. a subdivision of the Hsiung-nu called Turks (in Chinese Tú-Küeh) moved eastwards and settled down in the service of another tribe, known as the Juan-juan (avares). The Turks soon revolted against their masters, and, with a remarkable rapidity, spread their conquests to the northern boundaries of Persia. It is interesting to notice the progress in civilization attained by the Turks between the earliest mention of the Hsiung-nu, who knew neither of writing nor of agriculture, and the sixth-century Turks, who had a script, a system of ranks, and emblems of royal authority for taxation or the levying of troops. The Turks were, in the main, warriors. A Chinese pilgrim who was entertained by the Khan of the western Turks in A. D. 630 and has left a description of the organization of the Khan's head-quarters, makes it clear that the Turks lived in camps, built no cities, and would not settle in any that they conquered. But the Turkish embassy to the Emperor Justin II in 567 had in view the opening up of the silk trade, and it would therefore appear that the Turks must have paid some attention to commerce. As in their later history, they were a means of communication between forms of civilization greater than their own; through them Nestorian Christianity and Zoroastrianism passed to China, and Chinese Buddhism was kept in contact with India.

2. The Northern and Western Turks[1]

In 582 the people divided into two communities, known as the northern and the western Turks. The inscriptions discovered during the last century on the Yenisei and Orkhon rivers, in the neighbourhood of Lake

[1] These early 'western Turks' should be kept distinct from the Seljuks and Osmanlis who became 'western Turks' as opposed to the Turks of Transoxiana and Kashgar.

Baikal, give a first-hand account of the northern Turks; while a great deal is known of the other branch from Chinese, Greek, Arabic, and Armenian sources.

The western Turks were, after a period of civil war, annexed by the Chinese in 659; but neither Turks nor Chinese held their territory strongly, and Transoxiana was conquered for Mohammedanism at the beginning of the eighth century. The direct consequence of this was the gradual conversion to Islam of the whole Turkish stock. The negative character of the Turkish paganism, the absence of a hierarchy and a priestly code, as well as the coincidence of the good points of Mohammedanism with the particular excellences of the Turkish temperament—'energy, obedience, and fighting spirit'—facilitated such a conversion.

The northern Turks were conquered and enslaved by the Chinese in A.D. 630. They recovered their independence fifty years later; but about A.D. 750 a coalition of three Turkish tribes, chief of whom were the Uighurs, occupied all their country.

3. The Uighurs

The Uighurs attained a very high level of culture, and recent archaeological research has brought to light a vast amount of Uighur literature and art from which we learn that Christianity, Buddhism, and Manichaeism were all practised in their kingdom, the utmost tolerance being observed. The Uighurs were certainly the most civilized of all the northern neighbours of China; their kingdom was temporarily destroyed in 847 by the Khirgiz, a northern Turkish tribe, but recovered under its greatest ruler, Bogra Khan. During the latter's reign, at the end of the tenth century, the people were converted to Islam. Up to the fifteenth century small Uighur principalities and states are found, while the Uighurs were extensively employed in Mohammedan chancelleries, playing much the same rôle in the government offices of Turkistan as the

Hindus under the Delhi Moghuls and the Bengalis under the British in India.

The Uighur language bears the closest resemblance to the Turkish of the Orkhon inscriptions, and continued to be employed as a literary medium at any rate down to the twelfth century. But prior to the conversion of the Uighurs to Mohammedanism their language had been widely used for the translation of Buddhist, Christian, and Manichaean works which have only been brought to light in recent years.

4. The Seljuks

Of greater importance to history than the Uighur Kingdom is the rise of the Seljuks. The latter were the ruling family of a branch of the group of tribes known as Ghuzz (Οὔζοι). They migrated first from the Khirgiz Steppes to Bokhara, where they embraced Islam in its orthodox form. They then moved westwards at the invitation of the weak Abbasid Caliphate; and in the middle of the eleventh century the Seljuk leader, Toghrul, expelled the Persian Viziers, and restored the temporal power of the Caliphate, only to take it for himself. Alp Arslan, the successor of Toghrul, conquered Egypt from the schismatic Fatimite Caliphs, and defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanus at Manzikert (1071). The empire of his son, Malik Shah, was bounded on the east only by China. The contrast between these two warrior princes and their minister, Nizam ul-Mulk, a statesman of great learning, who founded numerous universities and is said to have been a friend of Omar Khayyam, marks the transition (never perhaps completely accomplished) between the wandering militant Turkish tribes and a settled non-Christian State. After Malik Shah's death in 1092 the unwieldy empire fell into eastern and western divisions. The eastern principalities were swept away by the hordes of Jenghiz Khan (1219), though the Turkish conquests of the latter kept their Turkish speech and customs. Numerous minor Turkish dynasties rose and fell. In an unpublished Persian MS. of the thirteenth

century the following curious account of the Turk occurs:

It is common knowledge that all races and classes while they remain among their own people and in their own country are honoured and respected; but when they go abroad they become miserable and abject. The Turks, on the contrary, while they remain among their own people are merely a tribe among many tribes, and enjoy no particular power or status. But when they leave their own country and come to a Mohammedan country (the more remote they are from their own homes and relatives, the more highly they are valued and appreciated) they become Amirs and Generalissimos. Now from the days of Adam down to the present day no slave bought at a price has ever become King except among the Turks; and among the sayings of Afrasyab, who was King of the Turks, and was extraordinarily wise and learned, was his dictum that the Turk is like a pearl in its shell at the bottom of the sea, which only becomes valuable when it leaves the sea and adorns the diadems of kings and the ears of brides.

The western Seljuk power grew at the expense of the Byzantine Empire. Konia became its capital; and, but for the pressure of the Mongols, it is possible that Byzantium would have fallen to the Seljuks rather than the Osmanlis. The hordes of Jenghiz Khan did not touch Konia; but, even before the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate, the Mongols came into touch with the Seljuks. The Seljuk Sultan was defeated at Kuzadag in 1243.

5. The Ottoman Turks

It was during the subsequent struggles between Seljuks and Mongols that the Ottoman Turks first came into prominence. 'Viewed from Europe, they appear like the matador in the bull-fight, appointed to slay an animal maddened and weakened by the attacks of numerous foes. Viewed from Asia, they are merely another instance of the sudden rise of a small clan to eminence and empire.'[1] Tradition makes Khorasan the home of Suleiman, the founder of the family. His son Ertoghrul settled first at Erzerum, and then moved westwards in order to serve under the Seljuks of Konia. His service against the Mongols proved

[1] "Odysseus" [Sir C. Eliot], *Turkey in Europe*, p. 84.

valuable enough to secure him the fief of Eskishehir. Suleiman's grandson Osman (whence 'Osmanli' and 'Ottoman') proclaimed himself independent of the Seljuks; and his son Orkhan took Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia from the Byzantine Empire. On the complete break-up of the western Seljuk Empire in the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman chiefs were lords of the province of Khudavendigyar, the modern official Turkish name for the vilayet of Brusa. Thence they spread their conquests over Turkey in Europe and Asia.

Note on the Words 'Tartar' and 'Mongol'

The word 'Tartar', or 'Tatar', is probably derived from the Chinese word 'Ta-ta', or 'Ta-tse', which first appears in the Christian era and corresponds more or less to the Greek term 'barbaros'; it was applied by the Chinese to the nomads beyond their northern frontiers much in the same way as the Turks were in the habit of classing all Europeans under the general name of Franks. The name 'Tartar' is now only used by and applied to the Turks of the Volga and Caucasus, the descendants of those Tartars who for several centuries ruled over central and southern Russia.

The names 'Mongol' and 'Moghul' have of course a common origin; and the Mongolians have survived as a race since the days of Jenghiz Khan. In the fifteenth century Russian Turkestan was known to Mohammedan writers as Moghulistan; and the famous Emperors of Delhi, the descendants of Tamerlane, were known as the Great Moghuls, though they were in reality not Moghuls, but Turks. The Ghaznavid dynasty of the tenth to the twelfth centuries, which preceded them in northern India, were, however, avowedly Turks, while the Slave dynasty which ruled over northern India from 1206 to 1290 was founded by a Turkish slave named Kutb-al-Din. The reason why the Delhi Emperors called themselves Moghuls rather than Turks was probably not unconnected with their desire to claim descent from the great Jenghiz Khan as well as from Tamerlane.

THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
1. Origin of the Name 'Pan-Turanian'	75
2. Pan-Turanianism as Pan-Turkism	77
3. Turkish Nationality in the Ottoman Empire	77
4. The Beginnings of Turkish Nationalism	79
5. The Effects of the Balkan Wars	81
6. The Policy of the Committee of Union and Progress	82
7. Turkish Aims in the European War	84
8. Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism	86
9. Prospects of Turkish Irredentism Abroad	89
(*a*) The Tatars of Kazan	89
(*b*) The Tatars of Crimea	91
(*c*) The Tatars of Western Siberia	91
(*d*) The Tatars of the Caucasus	91
(*e*) The Turkish-speaking Populations in Persia	92
(*f*) The Turkish-speaking Populations in Afghanistan	93
(*g*) The Turks of Central Asia	94
(*h*) The Yakuts	96
10. Prospects of Turkification in the Ottoman Empire	96
11. Conclusions	98

APPENDIX

I. Statistical Table of Turkish-speaking Populations	100
II. The Kurds	101
III. Anti-Islamic Tendencies in the Pan-Turanian Movement	104
AUTHORITIES	106

THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

1. Origin of the Name 'Pan-Turanian'

Turan is a Persian word. In Persian mediaeval poetry it means the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, in contrast to the settled country of Iran or Persia. The 'people of Turan' are the nomads (of many different languages and races) who constantly overran Persia from the north-east, till the Russians pacified Central Asia half a century ago.

Nineteenth-century philologists in Europe appropriated the name *Turanian* for the languages of north-eastern Europe and Asia which are 'agglutinative' in structure, in contrast to the Indo-European family. It was really a negative term—a provisional label for an unexplored mass. 'Turanian' research was first taken up seriously by the Magyars, who speak one of these agglutinative languages (of the Ugro-Finnic group) and have always felt themselves isolated among the Latin, Slavonic, and Teutonic peoples of Europe. A mediaeval Hungarian monk once made a pilgrimage eastward to discover his lost kinsmen, and lighted upon the Bashkirs of the Ural region; and during the European War Magyar professors are said to have conducted a propaganda among Russian prisoners of war belonging to easterly Finnish tribes, to prove to them that the Magyars are their brethren and Buda-Pest their cultural home. Magyar Pan-Turanianism has followed in the wake of Russian Pan-Slavism. The Hungarian savant, Vambéry, was led by this Turanian idea to prosecute research among the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, but the Magyars addressed themselves chiefly to the Osmanlis. When the Magyar struggle for independence in 1848 was crushed by the combined Austro-Russian armies, many leading Magyar refugees found an asylum at Constantinople. In 1867 these exiles returned to Hungary and became a power in

the newly-constituted Dual Monarchy. During the Balkan upheavals of 1875–8 the Magyars were strongly pro-Ottoman; and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo-Turkish War.

This Magyar-Ottoman *rapprochement* was not really racial but political. It rested not on a common consciousness of 'Turanianism' but on a common hostility to certain Slavonic States. The same political motives led people in Bulgaria to accept the Turanian label when the Bulgarian Government intervened against Serbia and Russia in the European War. Yet the Bulgars rank to-day among Slavonic peoples. The original founders of the Bulgarian State, thirteen centuries ago, were certainly 'Turanian' nomads from the steppes; but they left only slight traces on the Slavs whom they subdued.

Thus Pan-Turanianism, in its origin, is at once artificial and European. The Osmanlis did not extract it for themselves from Persian literature (though they study Persian as we study the Greek and Latin classics); it was offered to them from Europe, and they have not been the wooers but the wooed. The Osmanli has no genuine sentiment for the Bulgar or the Magyar, who are both ex-subjects of his, like the Serb and the Greek. If supposed self-interest induces the Bulgar and Magyar to fight his battles, subscribe to his loans, give his young men technical instruction, and supply him with machinery, he will take full advantage of their services. But he feels no more kinship with them than with the other Christian nations of Europe;[1] and his principal object in the European war was to rid the Ottoman Empire of external European influences, whether these are 'Central' or 'Entente', 'Turanian' or 'Teutonic'.

[1] This is true even of the Turkish doctrinaire Pan-Turanians, as may be seen from the following quotation from 'Tekin Alp': 'It is a matter of congratulation that the *rapprochement* between Magyars and Turks is being so well received here. . . . Yet the Turk's national idea cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but a Utopian dream.'

2. Pan-Turanianism as Pan-Turkism

A trained philologist may be conscious of some unity of structure in all Turanian languages as contrasted with the Indo-European family; but to the uninitiated Osmanli there is no visible relation between his own language, which belongs to the Turkish group, and Magyar, which is Ugro-Finnic. On the other hand, the relation of the various Turkish dialects to one another is obvious to any one. It can be seen on the map in the names of rivers, mountains, and towns. The Turkish-speaking peoples stretch from Turkey in Europe through Anatolia, Transcaucasia, northern Persia, and Afghanistan, to Russian Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, and, in a more broken chain, round the northern shores of the Black Sea, through Bulgaria, the Dobruja, Crimea, the Volga provinces and Siberia, to the neighbourhood of the Arctic Ocean. They cover an even more extensive though less compact area than the Slavs; and the different Turkish dialects are as readily intelligible to all Turks as the different Slavonic languages are to any speaker of one of them. It was therefore only natural that, as soon as the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they should become conscious at the same time of their affinities with other Turkish-speaking peoples, just as the national revival of the separate Slavonic populations produced a common sense of Pan-Slavism among them.

Pan-Turanianism, then, in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement originating among the Ottoman Turks, is part and parcel of Ottoman Turkish nationalism, and can only be understood in relation to it.

3. Turkish Nationality in the Ottoman Empire

The consciousness of nationality, like the word 'Pan-Turanian', has come to the Osmanlis from Europe. The Ottoman Empire began as the very opposite of a national State. It is not called after any people who

inhabit it, but after the prince who founded it—Osman. It is true that Osman and his tribe were Turks, but they were only one out of a dozen Turkish states in Anatolia, and their Turkish neighbours were their most formidable rivals and enemies. They built up their power by conquests in Europe. Their best taxpayers were Christian subjects, their standing army Christian converts, their most loyal supporters apostate Albanians and Slavs, who changed their religion but kept their language. Till a century ago the Turkish nationality contributed practically nothing to the Ottoman State except the literary and official language of the governing classes; and that was so diluted with Persian and Arabic that it had little left in common with the vulgar Turkish of the Anatolian peasantry. The bulk of Anatolia was a comparatively late acquisition of the Empire. It was a neglected region, to a large extent practically independent, under local feudal chiefs.

During the last century, however, Anatolia has taken the place of the Balkan Peninsula as the 'home country' of the Ottoman Empire; for, while the Balkan provinces have been breaking away, the Asiatic provinces have been brought more and more under central control. The same Sultan who lost Greece broke the power of the feudal aristocracy in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The process of disintegration in Europe reached its climax in the Balkan War of 1912–13; the process of centralization in Asia Minor has been completed by the Committee of Union and Progress since the Treaty of Bucarest, and especially since Turkey's entry into the European War.

The most significant change has been in the composition of the Ottoman army. The Janissaries, a hereditary professional army descended from forced Christian converts of all races, were destroyed in 1826. The modern Turkish army is organized on the nineteenth-century European basis of conscription from the civil population. Down to 1908 the conscripts were nominally drawn from the whole Moslem population of the Empire; and since the Revolution Christians and Jews have been made liable as well. But the

Government never got hold of the nomads and mountaineers; the settled Arab population was not good military material nor easily mobilized on the most threatened frontiers, which till the recent war were those in Europe. Both before and after 1908 the Moslem Turkish-speaking Anatolian peasantry have been the staple of the Ottoman conscript army, affording its most amenable recruits and its toughest soldiers; and the Anatolian upper classes have more and more supplied the centralized Empire with its officers and officials. Thus, when the conscious Turkish national movement began, the Ottoman State was already resting on a practical foundation of Turkish nationality.

4. The Beginnings of Turkish Nationalism

The cultivation of national consciousness by the Ottoman Turks was partly an imitation of older nationalist movements in Europe and partly the spontaneous product of similar conditions. Like most European nationalisms (Czech nationalism for instance), it started by being cultural rather than political. The first nationalist society was founded at Salonika in 1909, in the comparatively free atmosphere that prevailed during the first three years after the Young Turk Revolution. The founder of this society was a provincial notable—one Ziya Bey, of Diarbekir, who had come up to attend a Congress of the Committee of Union and Progress. Diarbekir is a Turkish enclave in Kurdish and Armenian territory; and it is characteristic of nationalist movements that their most fanatical leaders come from the debatable borderlands.

Ziya Bey's group started a campaign to purge the literary Ottoman language of its Arabic and Persian borrowings, and replace these by old Turkish words which had never been admitted into Ottoman literature. This might seem a fantastic aim, for it is only through the adoption of foreign words, idioms, and rhythms that Turkish has been given literary form at all. Yet submerged languages in Europe have been revived under circumstances of almost equal difficulty, and

this 'Pure Turkish' movement claims to have had complete success. The Turkish writers of the traditional school were routed; and the use of Arabic was even attacked in the ecclesiastical field. The Nationalists wished to translate the Koran, Friday Sermon, and Khutbah (Prayer for the Caliph) into Turkish, and to remove the Arabic texts from the walls of Turkish mosques; but they had to drop this part of their programme, which was far in advance of ordinary Turkish opinion.[1]

This phase of Turkish Nationalism lasted from 1909 to the Balkan War of 1912–13. It was a doctrinaire imitation of the linguistic Nationalism of Europe, so far unpolitical in character. Our chief information about it comes from *Türkismus und Pantürkismus*, by 'Tekin Alp',[2] a pseudonym which is believed to cover the name of Albert Cohen, a Salonika Jew.[3] This work illustrates the artificial origins of the movement and its prospects of success. The Salonika Jews are inseparable from the Committee of Union and Progress; and one of their number would hardly have taken up Pan-Turanianism so strongly unless he thought it had found favour in the eyes of the Committee of Union and Progress leaders. Cohen evidently feels it politic to identify himself with the Nationalism of the ruling race in Turkey, as the Jews in Hungary have identified themselves with Magyarization. But his book has to be used with caution; for, though it was written after the Committee of Union and Progress had taken up the Pan-Turanian idea, it is impossible to tell how much (if any) of its contents represents the Committee of Union and Progress policy. On the whole it is safer to take 'Tekin Alp' as representing the doctrinaire school of Ziya Bey, and to judge the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress solely on the evidence of their political actions since the Balkan War.

[1] See Appendix III.

[2] Published as Part II of *Deutsche Orientbücherei* (edited by E. Jäckh) by Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1915.

[3] Salonikan by residence only and not by origin, to judge by his forename. His residence in Macedonia is proved by allusions in the book itself, where he actually calls himself a Macedonian.

5. The Effects of the Balkan Wars

The Balkan Wars made Pan-Turanianism practical politics. The shock of this disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks. A number of societies, with local branches in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, were founded to promote education, physical culture, emancipation of women, and other really constructive aims; and from this time onwards the Government lent its support. The Ministry of Evkaf (or Religious Endowments) has made grants out of its enormous funds for the multiplication of national schools; there has been a scheme for reforming the Medressehs—the reactionary Moslem ecclesiastical seminaries; and, during the recent war, the Government challenged the whole existing ecclesiastical order by sweeping legal reforms which will bring much of the former domain of the Sheriat (Sacred Law) under the civil jurisdiction. The Sheikh ul-Islam resigned over this, but he was and remained an active 'Unionist'; and the *fait accompli* was accepted by his successor. It is possible that both were acting in collusion with the Government, calculating that this formal protest would be a safety-valve for discontent among the humbler members of the ecclesiastical body.[1]

All these activities were inspirations from Europe, like the crusade for a pure Turkish language, but they were of a much sounder kind. The Osmanlis seem to have been impressed by the example of the Balkan states, which had built up their strength by internal reforms till they were able to beat Turkey in war. Unfortunately they also borrowed from them another idea—irredentism.

'Observers,' Tekin Alp writes, 'who like myself are Macedonians and like myself had ample opportunity of gaining an

[1] See *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel*, by Harry Stürmer, ex-correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (Lausanne. English translation, *Two Years of War in Constantinople*. London, 1917). The incident is referred to in Chapter VIII.

intimate knowledge of the irredentist propaganda of the Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs, are able to judge the significance of this national ideal, and how sweet and inspiring it is to go through the greatest dangers for such a cause.'

He proceeds to sketch the life-history of several young Macedonian Christians, who, before the Balkan War, had sacrificed everything to work for their national unification. This may, of course, simply represent 'Tekin Alp's' personal philosophy, but it is probably true that the Balkan War did influence such public opinion as exists in Turkey in this direction. During the century ending in the years 1912–13 the centre of gravity of Turkey had actually shifted from Europe to Anatolia. After 1913 there was a corresponding change in the national consciousness. The Turkish nation abandoned the tradition of being a dominant race in Europe, resolved to develop its own latent possibilities in Anatolia, and conceived the ambition of making up for lost alien subjects by attracting to itself the scattered branches of the Turkish race outside the Ottoman frontiers.

6. The Policy of the Committee of Union and Progress

Irredentism gave a new significance to the linguistic reforms of the Ziya Bey group; for the Ottoman literary language, relieved of its special Arabic and Persian borrowings and reinforced by an eclectic pure-Turkish vocabulary, might become a *lingua franca* for all who spoke the various living Turkish dialects. The Pan-Turanian movement was thus advancing on to purely political ground, and at that point it was taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Committee of Union and Progress were not Nationalists to begin with, chiefly because they ignored the nationality problems of the Ottoman Empire. Their primary aim was to maintain the integrity of the Empire, especially in Europe; and in this they agreed with Abdul Hamid and all previous rulers of Turkey. They only differed as to the means, for, while Abdul

Hamid believed in despotism at home and a balance of jealousy among the European Powers, the Committee of Union and Progress held that Turkey's best safeguard was internal strength, and the best source of strength political liberty. Their ideas of liberty were drawn from the French Revolution. 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity' would be proclaimed; all inhabitants of the Empire would rally to the State as free Ottoman citizens, just as Picards and Marseillais and Alsatians rallied to the French Republic after 1789; and the question of Nationality would solve itself.

This actually happened during the first six weeks after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. Men of all creeds and races embraced each other in the streets. But then they drew apart again and considered how they might turn the new regime to their own advantage. The Balkan nationalities rejected the offer of a liberal Turkey altogether, and determined to take the first opportunity of completing their own unity and independence at Turkey's expense. Others, like the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Constantinopolitan and Anatolian Greeks, recognized that secession was impossible, but strove just then to defend their national individuality within the Ottoman State. The Arabs formed the main opposition in the new Parliament; the Armenians also wished for decentralization, though they co-operated in Parliament with the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress found that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralization and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends. After the Balkan War they incorporated Turkification in their programme, but it is important to examine precisely what place they gave it.

7. Turkish Aims in the European War

It has been shown above that the Turkish version of Pan-Turanianism contains two general ideas: (*a*) to purify and strengthen the Turkish nationality within the Ottoman Empire, and (*b*) to link up the Ottoman Turks with the other Turks in the world. These objects were first pursued in the cultural sphere by a private group of 'Intellectuals', and promoted by peaceful propaganda. After 1913 they took on a political form and were incorporated in the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress. But, while for Ziya Bey's followers Pan-Turanianism was an end in itself, for the Committee of Union and Progress it was only an instrument. They would not give up movements like Pan-Islamism, that conflict with it, if these movements could still serve their turn; and they would not persist in it indefinitely in circumstances where it does not pay, for instance in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

The contrast between academic Pan-Turanianism and the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress [1] can be summed up as follows:

(*a*) The first aim of the Ziya Bey group was to purge the Turkish language and culture from foreign (i. e. chiefly Arabic) influences. They were ready to violate some of the strongest prejudices of Islam for the sake of carrying this aim to its logical conclusion.

The first aim of the Committee of Union and Progress is to purge the Turkish State from foreign (i. e. chiefly European) influences: extra-territoriality of foreign subjects, foreign control of Ottoman finance, railways, raw materials, and education. The doctrinaires dared to defy Islam; the Committee of Union and Progress are far too prudent to do so, but they have defied Europe. When the Concert of Europe broke down, they intervened in the war and

[1] Of course some Committee of Union and Progress leaders have taken up Pan-Turanianism in its academic form.

denounced the Capitulations. And in 1916 they passed a 'language ordinance' making the use of Turkish compulsory, after a year's delay, for banks, newspapers, trams, railways, steamship companies, book-keeping of private firms, and all business of a remotely public or legal character.[1]

(*b*) The doctrinaires proposed to strengthen the Turkish nationality in Anatolia by education and social reform. The Committee of Union and Progress's method has been to exterminate the non-Turkish nationalities scattered through the country—first the Armenians and latterly the Greeks—and to give their lands and houses to 'Muhajirs' (Moslem refugees from the provinces lost in 1912–13, partly Turks, but partly Slavs from the Balkan peninsula and Greek-speaking Moslems from Crete). Another motive for the atrocities was to make the war popular among the Turkish population by sating it with Armenian plunder—a purely temporary and opportunist aim; and they were also an appeal to that reactionary spirit of Moslem fanaticism against which the doctrinaires have declared war.

(*c*) 'Tekin Alp' seeks to change the political ideal of the Ottoman Turk from Imperialism to Irredentism—from ruling over alien Christian nationalities in Europe to 'liberating' kindred Turkish populations in Russia and central Asia.

For the Committee of Union and Progress it is rather a quantitative problem. In the Balkan War they lost territory, population, and military prestige on their European frontiers. In the European War they hoped to compensate or even outbalance these losses by corresponding gains in Asia and Africa; and here we have a fourth motive for the Armenian massacres, for the Armenians are an alien *bloc* separating the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia from the Tatars of northern Persia and Russian Transcaucasia.

[1] The stringency of the original draft was afterwards somewhat relaxed in the passage of the Bill through the Senate.

8. Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism

The opportunism of the Committee of Union and Progress appears most clearly in their attempt to drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness, though the two creeds are diametrically opposed to one another. The Committee of Union and Progress are devotees to neither, but exploit them both.

Pan-Islamism is not really a religious doctrine. If it were, it would not be so incompatible with Pan-Turanianism as it is. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism are rival political programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad.

Most of the religious revivalism in Islam during the nineteenth century has been definitely anti-Ottoman. The Wahhabis of Nejd and the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan both regarded the Turks as little better than Franks and infidels; the Senussi retired to the Libyan desert to escape the contamination of Stambul. It is noteworthy that the supporters of all these movements were (*a*) Arabs, (*b*) uncivilized, and (*c*) independent, by force of arms, of either Ottoman or European control. The Ottoman doctrine of Pan-Islamism appealed, on the other hand, to settled, civilized Moslem populations under the government of European Powers like Britain, France, and Russia.[1] These populations had seen enough of European institutions to wish for them themselves. They aspired to become self-governing nations playing an independent part in international politics, and they admired Turkey because they believed her to be a Moslem State which already realized their ideal. They were not sufficiently well-informed to see through Turkey's European masquerade to the weakness and corruption underneath; they only saw in Turkey a model of what they hoped to become themselves, an existing guarantee for the political future of the peoples of Islam. For Islam is theoretically a political as well as a religious society.

The possibilities of political propaganda on these

[1] See above, pp. 54–62 of this book.

lines were perceived by Abdul Hamid, and he exploited them cleverly. The Ottoman strategic railway from Damascus to Medina, largely built out of the contributions of the Faithful in foreign countries, is a good example of his diplomacy; and this diplomacy has been continued by the Committee of Union and Progress. In Tripoli, for instance, before the Italian conquest, the Ottoman Government was regarded by the natives as an irksome foreign oppression, but Enver Pasha succeeded in winning over native sympathies. The Libyan Arab now looks on the Turk as his natural ally against the European invader; and even the Senussi has made common cause with him during the recent war. In Asia the Committee of Union and Progress have posed as the liberators of Moslem States caught in British or Russian toils. They sent a mission to the late Amir of Afghanistan which seriously embarrassed him in his neutrality. In the districts of Western Persia which they invaded they persuaded the Persian Nationalists to give them armed support. They have suggested a triple alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, based on the idea of political independence for Islamic States. The 'Holy War' proclaimed in the name of the Caliph by the Sheikh ul-Islam [1] in October 1914 has turned out a fiasco, but that is because Turkey has suffered military defeat. The presupposition of the Pan-Islamic policy is Ottoman military prestige. If Turkish armies had marched victoriously into Tiflis, Cairo, and Teheran, and if the Allies had never driven them out of Baghdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo, nor occupied Constantinople, Pan-Islamism might have produced far-reaching military and political effects; even now it is by no means bankrupt.

But this Pan-Islamic propaganda would be ruined at once by a logical following out of the Pan-Turanian idea. If the Ottoman Empire assumes the rôle of a Turkish National State instead of that of an Islamic Great Power, and if the party that brings about this

[1] The same who afterwards resigned over the question of legal reforms.

change regards Turkish Nationalism and Islam as ultimately irreconcilable, the moral links between Turkey and the Moslem populations of other States are thereby broken. There is no more salvation for non-Turkish Moslems in Turkey than in Britain or Russia or France; and the Committee of Union and Progress have no more claim on them than their established Governments. The Committee of Union and Progress realize this very well, and have avoided committing themselves openly to the Pan-Turanian creed where it is in flagrant contradiction to the Pan-Islamic. There have been anti-Islamic and anti-Arab declarations by Pan-Turanian writers, and acts of tyranny and repression by Committee of Union and Progress officials in the Arab provinces, which have produced resentment and driven Arab military forces to join the Allies. Nevertheless it would be difficult to convict the Committee of Union and Progress, as a party or a government, of a Pan-Turanian programme which would discredit their Pan-Islamic professions.

The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress is to exploit both movements at once, and of the two Pan-Islamism is the more useful to them abroad; but at the same time it is clear that they set more store by Pan-Turanianism at home. Their object being to convert the Ottoman Empire into a highly organized militaristic State on the German pattern, they naturally find a more appropriate basis in common language than in common religion; and the following passage occurs in a resolution passed at the Committee of Union and Progress Congress of October 1911:

'The character of the Empire must be Mohammedan, and respect must be secured for Mohammedan institutions and traditions. Other nationalities must be denied the right of organization, for decentralization and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. The nationalities are a negligible quantity. They can keep their religion but not their language. The propagation of the Turkish language is a sovereign means of con-

firming the Mohammedan supremacy and assimilating the other elements.'

This illustrates how the Committee of Union and Progress try to combine the two ideas in their internal policy, and shows on which of the two they lay more stress. The suggestion that the subject nationalities 'may keep their religion but not their native language', is a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the early Ottoman conquerors, who allowed the Albanian and Bosnian nobility to keep not only their language but their estates when once they had accepted the Mohammedan religion.

9. Prospects of Turkish Irredentism Abroad

On the other hand, in estimating the possibilities of Pan-Turanian propaganda among Turkish populations outside the Ottoman Empire, it may be assumed that no Ottoman Government will pursue a policy in any way prejudicial to the Pan-Islamic idea. It may also be assumed now that, if the political reunion of the scattered branches of the Turkish race becomes a practical possibility (which it is not at present), this will come about not through Ottoman military victories, but through the internal disruption of Russia. This disruption of Russia was frankly hoped for by 'Tekin Alp'—in fact it was the presupposition of his irredentist programme—but, writing before the Russian Revolution, he only looked forward to its being achieved from outside by Turkey and the Central Powers.

The following are the chief groups of Turkish-speaking population outside Turkey which come into consideration:

(*a*) *The Tatars of Kazan* (*about* $1\frac{1}{2}$ *millions*) [1]

These live along the middle course of the Volga, between Nizhni Novgorod and Samara. They are an almost isolated enclave, surrounded by Great Russians

[1] Including the Tatars of Astrakhan, along the lower Volga.

on the west and Finnish tribes[1] on the north and south. They are also intermingled with Russians in Kazan itself. They have been under Russian government more than three hundred years; and the barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully here than anywhere else in the world. The Kazan Tatars are prosperous and educated. The other Turkish-speaking groups in Russia incline rather to follow their lead, and in the last few years their printing-presses have spread their influence widely through the Mohammedan world. The success or failure of Pan-Turanianism as an Ottoman-Turk irredentist movement largely depends on the attitude which the Kazan Tatars adopt towards it; and this in turn depends upon the political evolution of Russia.

The Kazan Tatars sent Red Crescent workers and relief funds to Turkey during the Balkan War, but geography and material interests bind them to Russia; and they have a conservative temperament which would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for three centuries. They naturally objected to the Tsarist regime, and in particular to its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Before the Revolution their point of view was roughly that of the Cadets.[2] But they agreed neither with the anti-nationality policy for which the Cadets came to stand, nor with the extreme separatism of the Finns and Ukrainians, which would leave them isolated from the Tatars of the Crimea and the Caucasus. They would almost certainly have declared for national autonomy within a federal Russian Republic; for, if Russia could have been successfully reorganized on this basis, they had a brilliant future before them as the possible leaders of the Turkish-speaking element in a democratic state con-

[1] Nominally Christian, virtually still pagan, without a culture of their own, and capable of being assimilated by Tatars or Russians —whichever have the final ascendancy in this region.

[2] That is, in internal policy. In foreign policy they were violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, which the Cadets desired.

taining a considerable majority of the Turkish-speaking populations of the world (about 16 millions out of about 27 millions altogether, whereas there are probably less than 8 million Turks in the Ottoman Empire).

(*b*) *The Tatars of Crimea* (*under* 200,000)

and

(*c*) *The Tatars of Western Siberia* (*about* 50,000)[1]

Both these are likely to follow the lead of Kazan

(*d*) *The Tatars* (*Azerbaijanis*) *of the Caucasus* (*over* 2,000,000)

These have also felt the influence of Kazan. On the other hand, they have been under Russian government for less than a century, they live close to the Ottoman frontier, they have virtually adopted Ottoman-Turkish as their literary (i. e. newspaper) language; and they have a strong interest in common with the Anatolian Turks in their fear and hatred of the Armenians. In 1905 there was a racial war between the Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the whole the Armenians had the best of it.

When Enver launched his disastrous invasion of the Caucasus in the winter of 1914–15, the Committee of Union and Progress sent out propagandists to follow the army, and drew up a scheme for partitioning the Caucasus and part of Turkish Armenia into autonomous Tatar, Georgian, and Armenian national States under Ottoman suzerainty. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Ottoman Armenians to co-operate with them in this scheme. But the Ottoman armies never reached the Tatar districts of the Caucasus; and the only Russian subjects who sided with them were the Adjars, a Moslem tribe of Lazo-Georgian nationality in the district of Batum.

Since the Russian Revolution the idea of national

[1] There are also in Western Siberia about 100,000 semi-Tatarized Ugro-Finns.

autonomy for the Caucasus and Ottoman Armenia has been revived, on the basis, firstly, of federalism under Russia instead of Turkey, and subsequently of complete independence. But the delimitation of national frontiers affords room for endless disputes; and it is noticeable that, whereas formerly the Tatars and Georgians tended to combine against the more vigorous and progressive Armenians, there is now a Georgian-Armenian *rapprochement*, while relations between Georgians and Tatars are strained because both are claiming the Adjars of the Batum district and the Lazes of the Ottoman Vilayet of Trebizond—the Georgians on the ground of race, the Tatars on that of religion. This, however, may only be a passing phase; and in the land question, which in the Caucasus is as important as the demarcation of national boundaries, the old grouping of Georgian and Tatar *versus* Armenian has appeared again.

The Tatars of the Caucasus are backward in civilization, and are hampered by their sectarian division into Shiahs and Sunnis. If there had been a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national claims, they would have remained loyal to Russia; in which case Baku would probably have ultimately superseded Kazan as a political centre for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older culture, but Baku, with its oil-fields, has a greater industrial future; and, while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its middle point. Kazan and Crimea, Anatolia and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asiatic *bloc* (*via* the Trans-Caspian Railway), are ranged in a circle round Baku, and are in easy communication with it. But the prospects of Baku depend upon the future of Russia.

(e) *The Turkish-speaking Populations in Persia*

The migrations from Central Asia, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries A. D., which carried

Turkish-speaking tribes to Kazan, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, also deposited them in the provinces of Persia north of the Central Desert, especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan.

These Turkish-speakers in Persia have at present no Turkish national consciousness. They are Shiahs, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Tekin Alp admits that they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers; and, as a matter of fact, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre of the Persian Nationalist movement.

Tekin Alp wishes to give the Azerbaijanis a 'Turkish soul', and tries to prove that this would strengthen Persia internally. It would really split Persian Nationalism, and drive the Persians proper into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress has shown no signs of committing such a blunder. Their policy during the war was to support Persian Nationalism in Persia, and to inflame it against the Anglo-Russian regime. They were playing for a strong united Persia, freed from Anglo-Russian control, which would then make an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and fall under Ottoman hegemony.

Apart from this, the Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and they overran it for a few weeks in the winter of 1914–15, as an incident in their Caucasus offensive. The Tatars of the Caucasus, who also belonged to Persia before the Russian annexation, are only separated from the Azerbaijanis by an artificial frontier, and are closely connected with them in economic and other ways.

(*f*) *The Turkish-speaking Population in Afghanistan*

The provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus are inhabited by a predominantly Turkish population. They were formerly independent Turkish (Uzbeg) khanates like Khiva and Bokhara. They were only annexed by Afghanistan in 1850–59.

The situation is the same as in Persia. Pan-Turanian doctrinaires might like to rouse these Uzbegs to a sense of Turkish nationality; the Committee of Union and Progress would prefer to draw the State of Afghanistan into the Ottoman political orbit.

(g) *The Turks of Central Asia (about* 13 *millions,* 12 *millions of whom are under Russia)*

Turkish-speaking Central Asia is one of the largest continuous language areas in the world—larger than the Great-Russian area and almost as large as the English or the Spanish-speaking area in America. It is bounded roughly by the Volga and Caspian on the west, the Trans-Siberian Railway on the north, the Altai Mountains on the east, the Kwen-Lun and the Pamirs on the south. The whole of it except the Tarim basin ('Chinese' or 'Eastern' Turkestan) has hitherto belonged to Russia.[1] The continuity of its Turkish-speaking population is only broken by some Cossack settlements in the north, and by the Persian-speaking Tajik peasantry and townspeople along the Oxus and upper Syr Darya.

Within this area there are great economic and cultural contrasts. The Bashkirs in the Ural district are in transition from nomadism to agriculture. The Khirgiz, south of them, are still nomads, scattered over vast steppes. The Turcomans of the Trans-Caspian province (such as have survived the Russian conquest) are not only nomads but are still predatory when they have the chance.[2] South-eastward, on the other hand, along the rivers, there is a fairly dense agricultural population. In Ferghana, Samarkand, and Tashkend, the Russians have accomplished a great deal of irrigation during the last fifty years, and have successfully fostered the

[1] The people of the Tarim basin rebelled against China in the sixties of last century, and maintained their independence for several years. During the last half-century they have been held down by force by Chinese garrisons.

[2] In the case of the Turcomans, civilization has produced degeneration. The Russian conquest overtook them in a more primitive stage than most other Turkish stocks in Central Asia.

cultivation of cotton. In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, where European organization has not yet come to the rescue, agriculture is fighting a losing battle against wind and sand.

To set against these differences, there are powerful factors that make for unity—the common language, a common religion (for all these populations are devout Sunnis), and the common government and better communications that the Russian conquest has brought. The provinces along the Oxus and Syr Darya, for example, which are the heart of Turkestan, are now linked up directly with Kazan by the Russian railway from Orenburg to Tashkend across the Khirgiz Steppe, and with Baku by the Trans-Caspian Railway and the steamship service across the Caspian Sea.

The problem of Turkish Nationalism in Central Asia was infinitely remote before the Russian Revolution; the Revolution and the consequent disruption of Russia have made it imminent.

We have little direct information concerning the effect which the Revolution has had here. There is said to have been a rising in the autonomous khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, to extort a constitution from the Khans. Religious outbreaks are a more serious probability. Before the Russian conquest Central Asia was a hotbed of Sunni fanaticism. Khiva and Bokhara, which have never been brought directly under Russian administration, are likely to be fanatical still; and a spark struck here might set the whole region ablaze. Russia having fallen to pieces, Central Asia will probably break away. It is linked with Russia by Tashkend and Trans-Caspian Railways, but otherwise isolated from it by a difficult belt of steppe and desert.

The disruption of Russia thus opens greater opportunities for Ottoman Irredentism in Central Asia than in any other Turkish-speaking area. In Central Asia, Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not conflict with each other. The whole population is Turkish; the whole population is Sunni; and the present possessor is not an ancient Moslem State, but a recent Christian conqueror. If Russia vanishes as a power

from Central Asia, it might still be open to Ottoman diplomacy to work for a Turkish-Islamic State in Central Asia, which would then be added as a fourth member to the projected Islamic alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

(*h*) *The Yakuts* (*about* 250,000)

The Yakuts are a Turkish-speaking tribe thinly scattered over an immense area in the basin of the River Lena, extending to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. They are quite outside the range of any Pan-Turkish movement, for, in the first place, they are either pagans or nominal Christians, not Moslems; and, secondly, they are separated from the other branches of the Turkish race by a broad belt of non-Turkish populations—pagan Tungus and Buddhist Mongols.

10. Prospects of Turkification in the Ottoman Empire

A survey of the Turkish-speaking world outside Turkey seems to show that Ottoman Irredentism has become a serious possibility through the break-up of Russia. It remains to examine the other aim of Pan-Turanianism—the Turkification of the non-Turkish nationalities inside Ottoman Asiatic territory, which now seems likely to be confined to Anatolia.

The Turkish language possesses great vitality. Wherever Turkish-speaking peoples go, they impress themselves on the landscape; Turkish names of mountains, rivers, and villages (monotonous and unimaginative though they are) tend to drive out the ancient nomenclature; and the conquered populations begin to use Turkish as their household language, even though they do not intermarry with the Turks, and though they adhere jealously to their ancestral culture and religion. This process was taking place peacefully in Anatolia before the war. Among the Armenians in the Cilician Highlands it was practically complete. Their vernacular language had become Turkish instead of

Armenian; and the dialect of the Greek enclaves in the Kaisaria district was in a curious stage of transition from Greek to Turkish. The first translations of the Bible which the American missionaries found it advisable to make were into the Turkish language, written in Greek and Armenian characters; and that was early in the nineteenth century. Even without the racial war of extermination which the Committee of Union and Progress waged in Anatolia and Armenia from the spring of 1915—first against the Armenians and then against the Greeks—the Turkish language would before long have become the universal vernacular speech of the Anatolian peninsula, from the Aegean to the Euphrates.

But the recent massacres and deportations have swept away not only non-Turkish languages, but non-Turkish cultures. The Turkish-speaking or semi-Turkish-speaking Greeks and Armenians of Anatolia, with their religion, literature, education, industry, and economic efficiency, have been to a large extent removed; and their places have been taken by Muhajirs—Moslem emigrants from the lost Ottoman provinces in Europe, who are perhaps on a higher level than the native Turks of Anatolia, but are also brutalized by hardships and made fanatical by their exile. The Muhajirs are quite incapable of compensating for the lost Greeks and Armenians as a factor of civilization; and as (in Anatolia at any rate, whatever may happen in Armenia east of the Euphrates) there seems little prospect of repatriation for the Armenians still surviving in the Syrian and Mesopotamian exile-camps, the country will presumably have to start after the war from the low-water mark of Turkish barbarism.

The native Anatolian Turk, diluted with the Rumelian Muhajir, will be the material on which the Turkish national movement will have to work. What are its prospects? If the Ottoman State is confined to Anatolia, the constructive side of nationalism—represented in the Pan-Turanian movement by figures like Halidé Edib Hanum—may come to the fore.

A Turkish National State in Anatolia may go through the same course of development which the Balkan nationalities have gone through since their liberation from the Ottoman Empire. There is no reason to suppose that the Anatolian Turk is ultimately less capable of civilization than the Balkan peoples. There is very little in him of the real Turkish blood from Central Asia; the strongest strain in his race is the aboriginal Anatolian peasantry, which turned Turk *en masse* after the Seljuks had overrun the country in the eleventh century A. D. The ancient Anatolian was able to assimilate the civilization of Greece and Rome; why should his descendants not assimilate that of Modern Europe? Only the process will be slow, for the Turk now is much more backward than the Greek and the Serb a century ago; and Islam does not assist the growth of a nation, as the Orthodox Church has done in the Balkans.

11. Conclusions

(*a*) The Ottoman Turk has no 'Pan-Turanian' sense of kinship with any nation in Europe. The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress towards Europe has been quite unsentimental; it has aimed at the maximum of European assistance to Turkey combined with the minimum of European control.

(*b*) The power of the Ottoman Empire rests *de facto* upon the Turkish population in Anatolia; and there is a very obvious linguistic kinship between all the Turkish-speaking populations in the world. It is therefore natural that a Turkish national consciousness should arise among the Osmanlis, and that this should be accompanied by a 'Pan-Turkish' consciousness as well.

(*c*) Nationalism was stimulated among the Osmanlis by the shock of the Balkan War, but it is important to distinguish between the doctrinaire nationalists and the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee

of Union and Progress always think in terms of the Ottoman State rather than of the Turkish nationality.

(*d*) Above all, the Committee of Union and Progress are not likely to sacrifice their Pan-Islamic policy either to Turkish Nationalism at home or to Turkish Irredentism abroad, except in so far as the disruption of Russia opens opportunities for the latter in the Turkish-speaking provinces of the Russian Empire.

(*g*) If the Ottoman Empire ceases to be a Great Power, there may be a genuine Turkish national revival in Anatolia.

APPENDIX

I

STATISTICAL TABLE OF TURKISH-SPEAKING POPULATIONS[1]

Yakuts	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatars	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars[2]	50,000[2]	
Crimean Tatars	200,000	
Total in Western Russia and Siberia		2,000,000
Tatars in the Caucasus		2,000,000
Bashkirs and Chuvashes	2,400,000	
Khirgiz	4,692,000	
Turcomans	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asiatic provinces (mostly sedentary)	2,772,000	
Tatars of Altai	?	
Sedentary Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	1,000,000	
Nomadic Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan	1,000,000 +	
Total in Central Asiatic Area		13,000,000 ±
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Anatolia)		8,000,000 –
Persia, Afghanistan, and lost Ottoman provinces in Europe		2,000,000 ±
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±
Turks in the Russian Empire	16,000,000 +	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire	8,000,000 –	
Turks under other Governments	3,000,000 ±	
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±

[1] Statistics can only be given in round numbers. Russia is the only country inhabited by Turks where there has been an official census, and even in Russia the last (and first) census was in 1897. The figures here given for Russia consist of estimates made in 1911 on the basis of the census of 1897. The rest of the figures are more conjectural still.

[2] Not including about 100,000 semi-Tatarized aliens (mostly Ugro-Finn

ADDENDUM. In 1909 the Moslem Ecclesiastical Court of Orenburg, an official body which, under the old regime, exercised authority over the Moslems of the Russian Empire, excluding the Caucasus, Crimea, and Central Asiatic provinces, and which, among other duties, kept a record of births and deaths, estimated the number of Moslems under its jurisdiction at 5,283,618. This is more than a million in excess of the figures given above for the Kazan, Astrakhan, and West Siberian Tatars, Chuvashes, and Bashkirs combined. The difference is probably accounted for by the inclusion of certain sections of the Khirgiz, whose territory is reckoned administratively as part of European Russia.

II

THE KURDS

From the Pan-Turanian point of view the Kurds have considerable importance as a negative factor. They are an Iranian people, speaking dialects of Persian, and their original home is in the mountain ranges which separate the plateau of Persia from the basin of Mesopotamia. South-eastward they are adjoined by kindred mountain populations—the Lurs and Bakhtiaris—and their expansion has been principally in the opposite, or north-westerly, direction.

This expansion has been closely connected with the Turkish migrations. When the Turks made their way from Central Asia into Northern Persia, in the eleventh century A. D., they did not dislodge the Kurds, who had occupied the western ramparts of the Persian plateau for about 3,000 years. They avoided the Kurdish mountains, and turned northwards into Azerbaijan, up the valley of the Araxes, and so into Armenia and Anatolia by a route that left Kurdistan untouched. Anatolia was their goal and Armenia their high road, with the result that, after migrations which went on intermittently for five centuries, Anatolia had become the seat of a new Turkish nation, while Armenia was left depopulated and half desolate. This was the Kurds' opportunity. Kurdish tribes drifted into the vacuum which the Turks had made, and they have gradually spread over the lake country of Urmia and Van, and the upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, till they have come almost within sight of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

From the point of view of 'Pan-Turanian' geography, they have thus possessed themselves of a strategical position. Stretching in a broad arc from a point north of Aleppo to a point east of Baghdad, they form an almost continuous buffer between the Turkish-speaking populations of Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and the Arab world on the other. And what is still more important, they combine with the Armenians, and with certain indigenous mountain tribes of Armenia now classed as Kurds,[1] to cut off the Anatolian (Ottoman) Turks from all the Turks farther east. During the Armenian massacres of 1915, a Turkish gendarme said to a Danish Red Cross Nurse :[2] 'First we kill the Arme-

[1] Chiefly in the Dersim highlands, between the two branches of the upper Euphrates.

[2] They were travelling from Erzerum to Sivas, along the ancient route of the Turkish migrations. (See Blue Book, Misc. 31 (1916), p. 253.)

nians, then the Greeks, and then the Kurds'; and so far as the Pan-Turanian idea was a motive for the treatment of the Armenians by the Committee of Union and Progress, the gendarme was stating the logical consequences of his superiors' policy.

On the other hand, under the old regime, before the Ottoman Empire began to be either a centralized or a nationalistic state, the Kurds were the most faithful and favoured supporters of the Ottoman Government; and their expansion towards the north and west was in great part due to Ottoman encouragement.

When the Osmanlis conquered Armenia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, their main concern was to establish a bulwark against Persia, and the Kurdish tribes served excellently for the purpose. Notwithstanding their Persian dialect, the Kurds have not, and never had, a vestige of Persian national feeling. Their social consciousness is limited by the tribe, the sole object of the tribal policy is to evade external control, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Persian Government, which was near and powerful, seemed a more immediate menace to tribal independence than the distant Ottoman Government at Constantinople. The Ottoman Government was content with a nominal suzerainty over the Kurdish chiefs, and in return the Kurds guarded the Ottoman Empire's Persian frontiers—playing the same rôle here as the Bosniaks and Albanians in the Balkans.

Friction between the Kurds and the Ottoman Government began in the early nineteenth century, when Sultan Mahmud reduced the semi-independent Kurdish chiefs in Armenia and Kurdistan, and set up the beginnings of an official Ottoman administration in their place.[1] This centralizing policy was reversed about 1890 by Abdul Hamid, who hoped to keep his various subjects in subjection by playing them off against each other and weakening them all. Abdul Hamid gave the Kurds rifles, and their chiefs the title of commanders of Hamidié gendarmerie, and let them loose on the Armenians; but Ottoman policy was reversed again in 1908 by the Committee of Union and Progress, who hoped to regenerate the Empire by unity and internal strength. The Committee of Union and Progress attempted to call the Kurds to order, and they had a notable success in subduing the practically independent Milli Confederation built up by Ibrahim Pasha. But they could

[1] This was the Sultan who destroyed Ali Pasha of Janina and lost Greece; and it is notable that the Committee of Union and Progress, in pursuing the same policy from 1908 to 1913, were also successful against the Kurds (breaking up the power of Ibrahim Pasha), but failed to reduce Albania and lost Macedonia.

not call in the arms which Abdul Hamid had given out, though they improved the situation by allowing the Christian population to bear arms too.

As soon, however, as they intervened in the European War, the Committee of Union and Progress went back deliberately to Abdul Hamid's policy. They distributed more arms to the Kurdish tribes, encouraged them to take part in the invasion of Azerbaijan, and incited them against the Christians. From April, 1915, onwards, the massacres of Armenian convoys in course of deportation were generally carried out by Kurdish bands, reinforced by released criminals and Ottoman gendarmes. But not all the Kurds took the Government's side. In Cilicia, for instance,[1] the Kurds deplored the treatment of the Armenians, as did the rest of the Moslem population ; and in the Dersim highlands the Kurdish or pseudo-Kurdish tribes have given shelter to Armenian refugees from Kharput and elsewhere.

The Kurdish sense of independence has been galled by the Ottoman conscription, and the percentage of Kurd deserters has notoriously been higher than that of Armenians, not to speak of Turks. Many of the Dersimli tribes refused altogether to supply recruits, and the Ottoman military authorities have failed to send punitive expeditions against them.

Russian influence among the Kurds dated from the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, for, except in the Erivan district, there were practically no Kurds in the Caucasus provinces under direct Russian sovereignty. The occupation of Azerbaijan increased Russia's political prestige among the Kurds, and roughly coincided with the fall of Abdul Hamid and the substitution of a regime in Turkey hostile to Kurdish privileges. The Russian Government, as a power making for disorder from outside, was more congenial to many Kurds than the Committee of Union and Progress in its first genuine enthusiasm for order and good government.

During the War the partisanship of the Kurds varied with the military situation. They were pro-Turk when the Turks were on the offensive in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus ; they turned pro-Russian in the Ottoman territories which the Russians subsequently occupied. The Russian military authorities treated these Ottoman Kurds with extraordinary favour, left them their arms, and connived at their raids, not only upon returned Armenian refugees, but even upon the Russian line of communications. The Kurds were naturally a more congenial element than the Armenians to the Tsarist Government; but the Armenians complained that even after the Revolution

[1] Misc. No. 31 (1916), p. 498.

the Russian military authorities continued their pro-Kurdish policy.

But the future of the Kurds lies less in Armenia (under whatever regime Armenia may come) than in Northern Mesopotamia, which is certainly on the eve of economic development. So long as it lay fallow, the steppe-country between Aleppo and Mosul was an Arab domain—though the Kurds drove their flocks thither for the winter, and Ibrahim Pasha, the last great Kurdish chieftain, made his head-quarters at Viranshehr, on the edge of the plain.[1] But agriculture is now following the Baghdad Railway from Aleppo towards the east; and, where Kurd and Bedawi have taken to the land, the Kurd has shown himself so far to be the better man. If therefore the agricultural development of the country proceeds gradually, and if the local population is not swamped by reservoirs of manpower from abroad, northern Mesopotamia seems destined to become Kurdish land; and here, freed from their tribal tradition and their nomadic habits, the Kurds will be more susceptible to the influences of civilization.

III

ANTI-ISLAMIC TENDENCIES IN THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

There are several distinct degrees of opposition to Islam in the Pan-Turanian movement:

(*a*) Ziya Bey's group first came into conflict with Islam over the language question. They probably thought of translating the Koran, &c., into Turkish because they knew that the translation of the Bible and the Christian liturgy into English and German at the Protestant Reformation had been the foundation of the modern English and German national literatures. The idea is not intrinsically contrary to the Mohammedan religion; but it is distinctly contrary to Islamic prejudice, and has therefore not been taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

(*b*) The opposition of the Moslem ecclesiastics to the translation of the Koran into Turkish led the Turkish Nationalists into an attack on Islam as an ecclesiastical institution. This secularist movement, too, is partly an imitation of Europe, as 'Tekin Alp's' use of the word 'clericals' shows; but it also embodies

[1] And the Yezidis of Jebel Sinjar, though probably not Kurds by race, had already adopted the Kurdish language.

sound and necessary reforms like the secularization of Education and the Law; and steps in this direction have been taken by the Committee of Union and Progress themselves. The chief difference on this head between the Committee of Union and Progress and the doctrinaires is that, while the latter trumpet their 'anti-clericalism', the Committee of Union and Progress try to carry secularization through with as little friction as possible, and without ever admitting that their measures are anti-Islamic.

(c) The Nationalists have also started a 'pre-Islamic' movement, and starting a cult of the pagan Turanian conquerors, like Jenghis Khan and Hulaku (both of whom, incidentally, were Mongols and not Turks). Members of the 'Turk Gyuju ('Turkish Power') Society—an association for the promotion of physical culture, probably modelled on the Slavonic 'Sokols' —have to take 'Turanian' club-names in place of Moslem (e.g. 'Oghuz' for 'Mohammed'); and a corps of Turkish boy-scouts has been instituted, who likewise take 'Turanian' scout-names, cheer for the 'khakan of the Turks' instead of the 'Padishah', and carry flags with the Turkish wolf on them, though the representation of living creatures in art is condemned by good Moslems. But there is no evidence that the 'Back to Paganism' movement has any influence over the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress.

AUTHORITIES

(i) The Rise of the Turks

Cahun, L. *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie: Turcs et Mongols des Origines à 1405.* Paris, 1896.

Chavannes, E. *Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Turcs) occidentaux.* St. Petersburg, 1903.

Czaplicka, M. A. *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day.* (With full bibliography.) Oxford, 1918.

Eliot, Sir C. ['Odysseus']. *Turkey in Europe.* London, 1900.

Gibbons, H. A. *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1403.* Oxford, 1916.

Minns, E. H. *Scythians and Greeks.* Cambridge, 1913.

Parker, E. H. *A Thousand Years of Tartars.* London, 1895.

Radloff, V. V. *Ethnographische Uebersicht der Türkenstämme Sibiriens und der Mongolei.* Leipzig, 1883.

Stein, Sir M. A. *Sand-buried Ruins of Khotan.* London, 1903.

—— *Ancient Khotan.* Detailed report of archaeological explorations in Chinese Turkestan. Oxford, 1907.

—— *Explorations in Central Asia, 1906–8. Geogr. Journal,* July–Sept. 1909.

—— *Ruins of Desert Cathay*: personal narrative of explorations in Central Asia and Westernmost China. London, 1912.

Vambéry, A. V. *Das Türkenvolk in seinen ethnologischen und ethnographischen Beziehungen.* Leipzig, 1885.

(ii) Pan-Turanianism

Alp, Tekin, *pseud.* i.e. Albert Cohen. *Türkismus und Pantürkismus* (Part II of *Deutsche Orientbücherei*). Weimar, 1915.

CAHUN, L. *Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie : Turcs et Mongols des Origines à 1405.* Paris, 1896.

CZAPLICKA, M. A. *The Turks of Central Asia in History and at the Present Day.* Oxford, 1918.

VAMBÉRY, A. V. *Der Ursprung der Magyaren.* Leipzig, 1882.

—— *Das Türkenvolk in seinen ethnologischen und ethnographischen Beziehungen.* Leipzig, 1885.

Articles in the *Times*, January 3, 5, and 7, 1918.

Article in the *Quarterly Review*, April, 1918. (No. 455.)

Articles in the *Round Table*, December 1917 (No. 29) and June 1918 (No. 31).

A special map of 'The Turanian-speaking Peoples' was issued (1918) by the Admiralty War Staff, I. D., in connexion with this series.

ISLAM IN INDIA

ISLAM IN AFRICA

ISLAM IN INDIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Chronological Summary 113

I. Political History

Early Mohammedan Dynasties 113
The Moghul (Mughal) Empire 114
Relations with English 115

II. Mohammedan India under the British Crown

(a) Native States 116
(b) British India 117
Rebel Camp at Sattana 118
Mohammedan Attitude towards British Rule . 118
The Mohammedans and the National Congress 119
All-India Moslem League 120
Mohammedans in Official Positions . . 121
Partition of Bengal 122
Influence of Decline of Mohammedan Powers 122
Moslem League and National Congress . . 122
Feeling during the War 123

III. Ethnology of the Indian Mohammedans

General Backward Condition 124
Main Ethnological Types 124
Mussulmans of Foreign Origin 125
Arabs 125
Turks 126
Persians 126
Abyssinians, &c. 127
Afghans or Pathans 127

IV. Religious Sects

Sunnis and Shiahs 128
Wahhabis 128
Ahmadis 129
Ahl-i-Koran 129
Moslems and Hindus 129

V. Education

Mohammedan Learning 130
English Education 131

AUTHORITIES 132

ISLAM IN INDIA

Chronological Summary

712 A.D. Sind invaded by Mohammed ibn Kāsim.
1000–26. Raids of Mahmud of Ghazni into India.
1175–1206. Mohammed Ghori.
1206–1526. Sultans of Delhi.
1398–9. Invasion of Timur.
1526. Battle of Panipat. Moghul Empire founded.
1723–40. Independence of the Deccan, Haidarabad, Oudh, Bengal, and Rohilkhand.
1799. Storming of Seringapatam; end of Mohammedan domination in S. India.
1856. Oudh annexed by East India Company.
1857. Indian Mutiny.
1858. Self-governing Mohammedan states enlarged under British Crown.
1877. National Mohammedan Association founded.
1885. First Indian National Congress.
1906. First meeting of All-India Moslem League.
1909. Indian Councils Act.

I. Political History

Early Mohammedan Dynasties.—The introduction of Islam into India dates from the invasion of Sind in 712 by Mohammed ibn Kāsim. This led to a permanent occupation of the valley of the Indus about Multan, but the rest of India was unaffected, and it was not until the close of the tenth century that a fresh invasion began with the raids of Mahmud of Ghazni (1000–26); he overran a large part of Hindustan, but the province of Lahore was the only part of the country permanently occupied by his troops. The conquest of the rest of India dates from the campaigns of Mohammed Ghori and his generals (1175–1203); on his return to Ghazni he committed the charge of the military operations to Kutb-ud-din Aibeg, who became the first of the Sultans

of Delhi. When Mohammed Ghori died in 1206, the greater part of India north of the Vindhyas had been subjugated by his Turkish officers, some of whom now became practically independent sovereigns. But the Sultans of Delhi claimed a suzerainty, which they were sometimes able to enforce, over the Moslem states. Thirty-four sultans reigned in Delhi from 1206 to 1526 —the Slave Kings, 1206–90; the Khaljis, 1290–1320; the Taghlaqs, 1320–1413; the Sayyids, 1414–51; the Lodis, 1451–1526. During this period the Mohammedan conquests were extended farther to the east and the south, in spite of frequent internal conflicts and revolutions, and the disasters caused by the inroads of Mongol hordes at intervals from 1223 to 1305, and by the invasion of Timur in 1398–9. Outlying provinces took advantage of the weakness of the suzerain power, and a number of independent kingdoms arose, which were ultimately absorbed in the Moghul Empire, e. g. Bengal (1338–1576), Jaunpur (1394–1500), Gujarat (1396–1572), and Malwa (1401–1530) in the north, and Khandesh (1370–1599) and Gulbarga (1347–1526) in the Deccan.

The (Mogul) Mughal Empire.—The invasion of Babur and his defeat of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat in 1526 laid the foundations of the Moghul Empire, but his son, Humayun, was driven from his throne for fifteen years, and the Afghan Sher Shah established the Sur dynasty, which ruled in Delhi from 1540 to 1555. Humayun regained his kingdom in 1555, but died the following year. His son, Akbar, was engaged in warfare during the greater part of his long reign (1556–1605); he brought under his authority the Mohammedan kingdoms of Gujarat, Bengal, Kashmir, and part of the Deccan, and, after breaking down the opposition of the Rajputs, reconciled them to his rule by adopting towards his Hindu subjects the wise policy of conciliation. His son, Jahangir (1605–27), and his grandson, Shah Jahan (1627–58), kept intact the Indian dominions of Akbar; and Aurangzeb (1658–1707) brought the Moghul Empire to its greatest expansion by the

conquest of the last of the independent kingdoms of the Deccan, Bijapur (1489–1686) and Golkonda (1512–1687). Aurangzeb thus subjected the whole of India as far south as Tanjore to his rule; but his intolerant policy towards the Hindus alienated the Rajputs, and the last twenty years of his life were spent in a vain attempt to crush the rising power of the Marathas. Under his successors, the Moghul Empire rapidly declined; the Marathas encroached upon one district after another, and during the reign of Mohammed Shah (1719–48) a general revolt of the provinces began, which resulted in the independence of the Deccan from 1723 under the Nizam of Haidarabad, of Oudh under Sa'adat Khan about the same period, of Bengal under Alivardi Khan in 1740, and of Rohilkhand under the Rohillas, an Afghan clan. Further, the invasion of Nadir Shah of Persia in 1738 struck a blow at the very centre of the Empire from which it never recovered; his successor to the throne of Persia, Ahmad Shah Durrani, invaded the Panjab and occupied Delhi in 1756–7, and though he joined with other Mohammedan forces in overthrowing the Marathas in the third battle of Panipat in 1761, the ruin of the Moghul Empire was complete.

Relations with English.—Shah Alam (1759–1806), in an endeavour to assert his authority in Bengal, came into conflict with the English (1760–1), and having fallen under the power of Shuja ud-Daulah, the Nawab Wazir of Oudh, shared his defeat in the battle of Buxar (1764). In the following year he granted to the East India Company the Diwani or financial administration of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in return for an annual subsidy of 2,600,000 rupees, and under the protection of the British kept his court in Allahabad until 1771, when he was persuaded to return to Delhi; he was blinded by one of his officers in 1788, and became a puppet in the hands of the Marathas, until General Lake's victory over them in 1803 set him free, and left him with a nominal sovereignty over the city of Delhi and the surrounding district, and a monthly pension of 90,000 rupees.

In the south Haidar Ali had made himself master of Mysore in 1761, and was succeeded by his son, Tipu Sultan (1782–99), whose death at the storming of Seringapatam marked the disappearance of Mohammedan domination from southern India. The kingdom of Oudh lasted longer; the Nawab Wazir, Ghazi-uddin Haidar, assumed the title of king in 1819; the gross mismanagement of the country led the East India Company to annex it in 1856.

In Delhi, Shah Alam's son, Mohammed Akbar (1806–37), and his grandson, Bahadur Shah (1837–57), retained the empty titles of their ancestors, as pensioners of the East India Company; but Bahadur Shah's complicity in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857 caused him to be banished to Rangoon, where he died in 1862.

None of the self-governing Native states under Mohammedan rulers joined in the attempt to drive the English out of India, and the more important of these states, e. g. Haidarabad, Bhopal, and Rampur, rendered substantial assistance, without which the condition of the English would have been still more precarious than it was. After the government was assumed by the Crown, in 1858, these states either had their territories enlarged by grants of land, or received other rewards for their loyalty.

II. Mohammedan India under the British Crown

(*a*) *Native States.*—Nearly two-fifths of the total area of British India is administered by native chiefs. Of these Native states (693 in number) the following are governed by Mohammedans, under the suzerainty and protection of the British Crown. The largest is Haidarabad, with an area of 82,698 square miles, and a population of 13,374,676, of whom about one-tenth is Mussulman; this is the only Mohammedan state in direct political relations with the Government of India; the others communicate either with an Agent to the Governor-General or with one of the Provincial Governments.

Agency or Province.	*State.*	*Area in sq. m.*	*Population.*	*No. of Musalmans.*
Baluchistan	Kalat	73,278	359,086	345,906
	Las-Bela	7,132	61,205	59,386
Bombay Presidency	Khairpur	6,050	223,788	182,827
	Junagarh	3,284	434,222	88,130
	Palanpur	1,766	226,250	25,158
	Cambay	350	72,656	9,715
	Janjira	324	88,747	14,769
	Radhanpur	1,150	65,567	8,320
	Balasinor	189	40,563	4,578
	Sachin	42	18,903	2,278
	Savanur	70	17,909	5,448
Paying tribute to the Gaikwar of Baroda	Dabha	12	—	—
	Punadra	11	—	—
	Ramas	6	—	—
Central India Agency	Bhopal	6,902	730,383	81,996
	Jaora	568	75,951	13,686
	Basni	122	20,121	2,349
	Korwai	111	18,456	2,309
	Basoda	40	4,630	737
	Muhammadgarh	29	2,863	422
	Pathari	22	3,866	390
Madras Presidency	Banganapalle	255	39,355	8,054
Panjab	Bahawalpur	15,918	780,641	654,247
	Malerkotla	167	71,144	25,942
	Loharu	222	18,597	2,401
	Patawdi	52	19,543	3,338
Rajputana Agency	Tonk	2,600	303,181	40,432
United Provinces	Rampur	892	531,217	244,604

(*b*) *British India.*—After the suppression of the Sepoy Mutiny (1858), the Moslems (especially in northern India) found themselves exposed to grave suspicions on the part of the British Government. Though large numbers of Hindus had taken part in this insurrection, its ostensible aim had been the restoration of the Moghul Empire, and it had consequently enlisted the sympathies of many Mohammedans. The estates of those who were convicted of complicity with the mutineers were confiscated, and thus a number of families of the old Mohammedan aristocracy were ruined. The members of these aristocratic families for the most part held aloof from the service of the British Government and sullenly watched the Hindus crowd into those numerous administrative and judicial posts which the Mohammedan aristocracy were by tradition and training peculiarly fitted to fill. A few of these

families migrated into Mohammedan countries; for the common soldiery there was the fanatic settlement at Sattana, over the north-west frontier.

Rebel Camp at Sattana.—This originated in the Jihad stirred up among the Pathan tribes, especially the Yusufzais and the Barakzais, by the Wahhabi preacher, Sayyid Ahmad, of Bareli, who, after a successful missionary progress through Bengal, crossed the north-west frontier and in 1826 commenced a Jihad against the Sikhs, who were the rulers of the Panjab. Constant accessions to the Mujahidin of Sattana were received from India, and especially from Bengal, where they had an active organization. After the annexation of the Panjab in 1849, the British had to bear the brunt of their fanatical incursions, and sent against them as many as twenty separate expeditions between 1850 and 1863 (cf. below, p. 129).

Mohammedan Attitude towards British Rule.—Besides the mutineers who swelled the numbers of the Sattana camp, there were those Mohammedans whose consciences would not permit them to remain in a country the government of which was not Mohammedan. For Moslem opinion at this period was much exercised to decide whether India under British rule was to be regarded as *Dar ul-harb* ('the land of war') or *Dar ul-Islam* ('the land of Islam'), and whether a Jihad against the Christian rulers was obligatory on the Mussulmans. Except among the more fanatical, the opinion began to prevail that, inasmuch as the British Government left the Mohammedans free to practise the observances of their faith and made no attempt to restrict their religious freedom, they might live under its rule as loyal subjects. But their power and wealth had been steadily declining during the British period, largely through their failure to adjust themselves to the changed conditions of administration, and to avail themselves of the opportunites of acquiring education on Western lines. Up to the early part of the nineteenth century the Mohammedans had enjoyed the greater part of State patronage, as collec-

tors of revenue, military and police officers, and judges, but as the old order changed these posts came to be filled by English and Hindu officials; when in 1837 Persian ceased to be the official language, and English or the provincial vernaculars took its place, a considerable number of subordinate offices passed out of the hands of the Mohammedans, and the abolition (by Act xi of 1864) of the posts of qadis (kadis, or Moslem law officers) closed to a large number of learned men what had previously been an honourable means of livelihood. (Act xii of 1880 gave power to the provincial governments to appoint a qadi in any particular locality if the Mohammedans of the place so desired.) Though the more far-sighted members of the community recognized that the altered conditions of the country called for a change in the methods of Mohammedan education, and urged their co-religionists to study Western sciences and learn English, their efforts for some time bore little fruit and met with much opposition.

The Mohammedans and the National Congress.—In 1877 Mr. Syed Ameer Ali founded in Calcutta the National Mohammedan Association, which was afterwards, when branches had been established in other cities of India, styled the Central National Mohammedan Association; in 1882 this association endeavoured to organize a national conference of Mohammedans, but the project fell through on account of the strong opposition of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan. In 1885 the first meeting of the Indian National Congress was held in Bombay; while the third meeting was being held in Madras, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan delivered in Lucknow on December 28, 1887, the first of a series of political lectures with the object of inducing the Mohammedans to hold aloof from the National Congress and similar political movements. He also endeavoured to organize the Mohammedan opposition by the formation of a society entitled 'The United Indian Patriotic Association', to which more than fifty Anjumans in various parts of the country became affiliated; but its

activity was short-lived, mainly through lack of funds to continue its propaganda. But, though his efforts were successful in persuading the main body of his co-religionists to refuse their support to the National Congress, each yearly gathering continued to be attended by a small number of Mohammedans, especially from the cities of Bombay, Calcutta, and Lucknow; and on two occasions the president of the Congress was a Mohammedan, at the third (Madras, 1887) the Hon. Mr. Badruddin Tyabji (afterwards Judge of the High Court, Bombay), and at the twelfth (Calcutta, 1896) Rahmat Ullah Mohammed Sayani. The latter in his presidential address enumerated and discussed the objections of the Mohammedans to joining the Indian National Congress. They were mainly that the success of the aims of the Congress would imply that a preponderating share in the administration of the country would pass into the hands of Hindus, and that the Mohammedans would be reduced to an inferior position; that the movement was disloyal to the British Government; that Western methods of government, and especially that of selecting officers for administrative appointments on the basis of educational qualifications, &c., were not suited to India, and would be detrimental to the Mohammedans, as owing to their backwardness in education they could not readily adapt themselves to such methods. The main body of the Mohammedans continued to hold aloof from the Indian National Congress, and from 1886 held on the same dates a separate gathering of their own, entitled the Mohammedan Educational Conference, the main object of which was to impress upon the Mohammedans the importance of modern methods of education.

All-India Moslem League.—But after the powerful personality of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was withdrawn, some of the younger generation came to the conclusion that Mohammedan interests suffered in consequence of their abstention from political life, and they founded an organization entitled the All-India Moslem

League, the first meeting of which was held at Dacca in December 1906. In October of the same year a deputation of influential Mohammedans, headed by His Highness the Agha Khan, had presented a memorial to the then Viceroy, Lord Minto, and had urged that special consideration should be given to the Mohammedans in the proposed enlargement of the Legislative Councils, and in the bestowal of posts in the higher branches of the public services. This deputation gave the impulse to the formation of the All-India Moslem League, which rapidly extended its organization by the establishment of provincial leagues affiliated to the central body, together with a branch in London, and held a general meeting every year in some city with a large Mohammedan population.

Mohammedans in Official Positions.—In 1907 Nawab Imad ul-Mulk Syed Husain Bilgrami was made a member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India, and was the first Indian to become a member of that body. In 1909 Mr. Syed Ameer Ali (formerly a judge of the High Court, Calcutta) was appointed a Privy Councillor, and, as a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, sits in the final court of appeal for Indian cases. In 1910 [Sir] Syed Ali Imam was made Legal Member of the Council of the Governor-General of India; he was the second Indian to hold that office. These appointments were made in pursuance of a policy of associating Indians more closely with the direction of affairs of State, a policy which led to the passing of the Indian Councils Act of 1909. This Act and the regulations and rules under it increased the size of the Legislative Councils, and arranged for the inclusion of elected members (previously all the members had been nominated), and gave to these Councils greater liberty of discussion and interrogation than they had before enjoyed. The Mohammedans claimed to be represented as a separate community; and special regulations were framed for securing the election of Mohammedan members, in accordance with the relative importance and numerical strength of the

Mohammedans in different provinces. There was, however, a feeling among the Mohammedans that due consideration had not been paid to their claims.

Partition of Bengal.—There were other circumstances which contributed to this feeling of dissatisfaction. In 1905 the Partition of Bengal into two separate provinces had caused the Mohammedans to become a majority in Eastern Bengal; and they were beginning to take a more prominent part in the affairs of that province, when in December 1911 this partition was reversed. Through the readjustment of the boundaries of Bengal the large Mohammedan population of Eastern Bengal again became a minority in respect to the Hindus, and lost that opportunity of self-development which had been opened to them in 1905.

Influence of decline of Mohammedan Powers.—Further, the declining fortunes of such independent Mohammedan states as Morocco, Persia, and Turkey excited much sympathy in India; and this state of feeling was intensified by the successive disasters of the Turks in their wars with Italy (1911–12) and the Balkan States (1912–13). Sums of money, considerable in relation to the general poverty of the community, were collected on behalf of the Turks; and a medical mission was fitted out and sent to Turkey under the charge of Indian doctors. The growing sympathy with Mohammedans in the Turkish Empire prompted the foundation, in May 1913, of the Anjuman-i-Khuddām-i-Ka'ba, the objects of which were stated to be the maintenance of the respect due to the Ka'ba and the defence of it against non-Moslem aggressors; the designation of this society was undoubtedly suggested by the title of the Sultan of Turkey, as protector of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina—Khādim ul-Haramain—and indicated the pro-Turkish sympathies of the founders.

Moslem League and National Congress.—In January 1913 the council of the All-India Moslem League altered its constitution, and included among its objects the attainment of a system of self-government in India.

From this date, the Moslem League began to draw nearer to the Indian National Congress; and the younger generation of Mohammedan politicians definitely abandoned the separatist policy of the older school and advocated co-operation with the Hindus in political activities. In December 1913 a Mohammedan, Nawab Syed Mohammed, was elected president of the National Congress.

Feeling during the War.—The declaration of war in 1914 between Great Britain and Turkey evoked many expressions of loyalty towards the British Government on the part of the Mohammedan native princes, the Anjumans, and other organized bodies; but the pro-Turkish journalists still came under suspicion, and towards the end of the year four prominent Mohammedan newspapers were suppressed.

In 1916 the Sherif of Mecca revolted against Turkey, and Mohammedan feeling, among those who had pro-Turkish sympathies, was much disturbed by what was correctly recognized to be a serious blow to Turkish authority in Arabia; the action of the Sherif was strongly condemned by several prominent members of the Moslem League. Meanwhile, the younger leaders of the Moslem League tended towards co-operation with the extreme Hindu politicians; and in November 1916 representatives of the Indian National Congress and the Moslem League met and decided to accept the Home Rule programme. But the whole of educated Mohammedan opinion did not follow the Moslem League in its agreement with the National Congress, e. g. the Mohammedans of the Panjab broke away from the main organization, and there was also considerable expression of disapproval in the United Provinces.

III. Ethnology of the Indian Mohammedans

General Backward Condition.—The general mass of the Mohammedan population of India has been but little touched by the political movements of the latter part of the nineteenth and of the present century. Of the various religious communities in India, the Mohammedan on the whole exhibits the greatest degree of illiteracy, with the exception of the animistic tribes; only 69 men and 4 women per thousand are able to read and write. This backward condition of the Mohammedans generally is largely due to the low level of education in the parts of the country (e. g. the north-west of India and Eastern Bengal) where they are chiefly to be found. Accordingly, in reference to the main body of the Mohammedan population, racial and tribal characteristics tend to assume greater importance.

Main Ethnological Types.—Within this Mohammedan population of over 66,000,000 there is a great ethnological diversity. One broad distinction may be drawn between the descendants of foreign Moslem immigrants on the one hand and of the indigenous converts on the other. Among the latter, the physical types that are most numerously represented are (1) the Indo-Aryan type, occupying the Panjab, Rajputana, and Kashmir, to which belong the Rajput and Jat Mussulmans; (2) the Aryo-Dravidian type, found in the United Provinces and Bihar; and (3) the Mongolo-Dravidian type, represented by the majority of the Mohammedans of Eastern Bengal. Though by far the larger proportion of the indigenous Mohammedan population owes its origin to the lower Hindu castes or to *pariahs*, still there are few of the higher castes that have not at one time or another contributed converts to Islam. Brahmans were forcibly converted during the Mohammedan conquest, or in periods of intolerance under some settled Mohammedan government; other Brahmans embraced Islam through the persuasion of Moslem missionaries, or to gain some social or financial advantage. From

the warrior castes Islam has received large accessions from the earliest days of its entrance into India; Rajput Mussulmans are found in large numbers in the Panjab, and to a less extent in the United Provinces and Rajputana. From the lower castes among the Hindus there has been a constant stream of accessions during the whole Mohammedan period, as well as from the aborigines of the country who stood outside the pale of Hinduism. In the case of the various Mongoloid or Mongolo-Dravidian tribes of Eastern Bengal, there was probably a mass movement towards Islam; adherence to the new faith raised them out of the despised condition to which the higher Hindu castes consigned them.

Mussulmans of Foreign Origin.—The Mussulmans of foreign origin are numerically fewer than the descendants of native converts, but their influence in the history of Mohammedan civilization in India has been vastly more important; the various conquerors, Arabs, Turks, Pathans, and Moghuls, brought into the country large bodies of foreign troops, whose services they rewarded by grants of land; when their power was established, their courts attracted into India military adventurers, poets, scholars, and theologians, most of whom remained and settled in the country; this movement of immigration went on during the whole period of Mohammedan ascendancy, and has not ceased even under British rule.

Arabs.—Of these foreign immigrants, the first to enter India were the Arabs, who invaded Sind in 712; the trade in spices, gems, &c., early attracted Arab merchants to the west coast of southern India, and the Mapillas are descended from the Hindu women they married. Thus from the earliest period of the Mohammedan occupation to modern times there has been an immigration of Arabs into India; their numbers have been small, but their influence has been profound and widespread. There was a Sayyid dynasty in Delhi from 1413 to 1451, and one in Bengal from 1493 to 1537; a dynasty of Arab origin ruled

over the kingdom of Khandesh from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century; in the second decade of the eighteenth century two Sayyids of 'Barha for seven years enjoyed the position of king-makers, and set whomsoever they chose on the throne of Delhi. As administrators, generals, men of letters, teachers, and saints, the Sayyids in India have played an important part in the history of Mohammedan culture.

Numerically, however, the Arabs form the smallest group of Indian Mohammedans of foreign origin.

Turks.—Another important group, likewise not numerous, is made up of the descendants of the Turki invaders, to whom the establishment of Mohammedan rule in India is really due; Mahmud of Ghazni was a Turk, as also were the generals of Mohammed Ghori, who founded dynasties in Delhi and elsewhere, and Babur, the founder of the so-called Moghul empire; the founders of the Adil Shahi, Kutb Shahi, and Barid Shahi dynasties were all Turkish officers, who had succeeded in raising themselves above the mass of soldiers of fortune and mercenaries whose history is more obscure. Timur settled a number of families of Karlugh Turks in what is now the Hazara district of the North-west Frontier Province, on his return from his invasion of India in 1399, and their descendants are found there to the present day. A group of Kizilbash migrated from Kabul to the Panjab as recently as 1842, and their descendants have received grants of land and are permanently settled in the country.

Persians.—Among the smaller groups of immigrants, the Persians have exercised considerable influence on Mohammedan culture in India. Saints, religious teachers, poets, and men of letters, as well as soldiers and statesmen, have brought into India the refinement and subtlety of the Persian genius. Traders from the Persian Gulf settled in the cities of Gujarat as early as the ninth century. Political troubles have driven Persians at various periods to take refuge in India, e. g. during the devastations of the Mongols in the thirteenth century, in the eighteenth century when the

Afghans brought the Safavid dynasty to an end in 1722, and again when Nadir Shah seized the throne in 1736. Naturally, many Persians were attracted to the Shiah kingdoms in India, and Persian mercenaries still come as recruits to the Persian regiment of the Nawab of Cambay.

Abyssinians, &c.—A small number of Abyssinians or Somalis, known as Habashi or Sidi, settled in western India; mention of them as soldiers and sailors is found as early as the thirteenth century. The Sidis were admirals of the Moghul fleet, and a dynasty of Habashi kings ruled over Bengal from 1486 to 1490; the present chiefs of Janjira and Sachin are also of Habashi origin.

Afghans or Pathans.—The largest group of foreign stock is that of the Afghans or Pathans, who are found in greatest number in the north-west, but also as far east as Bengal and as far south as the Deccan. The terms Afghan and Pathan are used indifferently by the natives of India to designate this large section of the Mohammedan population, but it is a matter of dispute whether the original Afghan and Pathan stocks were the same, or whether a purely Indian origin must not be assigned to the Pathans. There has been a constant stream of immigration from Afghanistan into India, from the end of the twelfth century up to modern times. Most of the Mohammedan conquerors of India have entered the country through Afghanistan, and have brought in their armies large numbers of Afghan soldiers, who received grants of land as military fiefs and settled in the country. Of the Afghan tribes found in India the most widely distributed are the Yusufzai, of whom a body of 1,200 accompanied Babur in his final invasion of India, and settled in the plains of Hindustan and the Panjab. Migrations on a large scale into the fertile plains of India have also taken place at various times, e. g. during the period of the Lodi (1451–1526) and Sur (1540–55) sultans of Delhi. The Prangi and Sur tribes from which these dynasties sprang, and their neighbours, the Niyazi,

appear to have migrated almost bodily from Afghanistan into India. The great bulk of the Baluchis has similarly migrated across the border into India; there are about ten times as many of them in India as in the whole of Baluchistan.

IV. Religious Sects

Sunnis and Shiahs.—The majority of the Indian Moslems are Sunnis, and owing to the high level of theological learning maintained by the 'ulamā for centuries, and the close relations kept up with centres of religious life and thought in other parts of the Moslem world, there has always been a large body of orthodox opinion and practice among the Indian Sunnis, and these have not differed materially from similar manifestations in other Moslem lands. The Shiahs have always been in a numerical minority in India; under the rule of the Shiah sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda, and later under that of the kings of Oudh, the Nawabs of Murshidabad, and such of the Nawabs of Rampur as became Shiah, they enjoyed the favour of the ruling power; but under Sunni rule they were often exposed to persecution. The Shiahs in India form less than 10 per cent. of the total Moslem population, and are mainly of Persian or Turki descent, with the exception of the converts of Hindu origin, belonging especially to the Ismaili sections of the Bohoras and Khojahs.

Wahhabis.—Among the modern sectarian developments, the most important are the Wahhabi, the Ahmadi, and the Ahl-i-Koran. The Wahhabi movement was introduced into India about 1820 by Sayyid Ahmad and Shariat Ullah, who initiated entirely independent movements; the latter worked in Bengal and confined himself to peaceful propagandist methods, but Sayyid Ahmad made his way to the Panjab (which was then under Sikh rule) and stirred up a Mohammedan insurrection against the Sikhs on the Peshawar frontier. After his death in 1831, his followers established themselves at Sattana on the north-west frontier,

and there formed a centre (cf. p. 118) which later was swelled by the mutineers who after 1857 were unwilling to live under the restored British Government. Their numbers were constantly increased from various parts of Bengal and northern India, until this rebel camp was broken up by the campaign of 1863; but the organization has continued to exist up to the present day, and has shown signs of reviving activity during the recent war.

Ahmadis.—Unlike the Wahhabi movement, which is distinguished by its hostility to Christian influences and its zeal for Jihad, or war against unbelievers, the Ahmadi sect strongly condemns Jihad and all deeds of violence committed in the name of religion. It was founded about 1880 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (of Qadian, in the Panjab), who claimed to be the promised Mahdi and Messiah, and to inaugurate a period of peace and righteousness. Since the death of the founder in 1908, the sect, which at that time did not exceed 19,000, has split into two rival parties, and appears to be declining in numbers.

Ahl-i-Koran.—The sect of the Ahl-i-Koran, though insignificant in numbers, is remarkable for the boldness with which it rejects all traditional theology and accepts the Koran alone as authoritative in matters of faith and practice; a new form of prayer has been devised and other innovations have been introduced.

Moslems and Hindus.—Owing to the fact that the Moslems in India have lived for centuries in close contact with Hindus, and are themselves to a large extent descended from Hindu converts, many Hindu characteristics are to be found in the religious life, especially of the uneducated classes. The process of conversion was often incomplete, and the converts, ill-instructed in their new faith, carried with them many of their old beliefs and practices. Such survivals from Hinduism are more marked in villages and country districts, remote from the influence of the 'ulamā; here the Mussulmans still continue to worship the tutelary gods of the village, join in Hindu festivals,

and employ Brahmans in their marriage ceremonies. This close association with Hindus has also led to the formation of some mixed sects, which attempt to bring about a reconciliation between Hindus and Mohammedans, e. g. the Pirzadas, the Husaini Brahmans, the Lalbegis, &c. A like syncretism shows itself in the teaching of Kabir, the founder of the Kabir-panthis, and of Nanak, the founder of the Sikh religion. In some instances the incompleteness of the process of conversion has rendered possible the return to Hinduism of the descendants of the converts. The Arya Samaj has recently been very active in the work of reconversion; and one of the societies affiliated to it, called the Rajput Suddhi Sabha, has for its special object the reconversion of Mohammedan Rajputs to Hinduism. The process is facilitated by the fact that intermarriage between such Mohammedan Rajputs and Hindus has been common, and the tribal bond with Hindu sections of the tribe has always been stronger than any difference of religion.

V. Education

Mohammedan Learning.—During the Mohammedan period, the condition of learning was apt to vary with the goodwill of the sovereign, but from the earliest period of Mohammedan rule scholars received generous patronage from the State, and several emperors and sultans founded and endowed *madrasas*, or theological colleges. The largest of these *madrasas* were naturally to be found in the chief centres of government, and the students trained in them became teachers in the maktabs and mosque-schools that existed in most Mohammedan villages up to modern times. The decay of the Mohammedan rule and the consequent loss of patronage led to a decline in Moslem learning. Warren Hastings attempted to arrest this decline by establishing a *madrasa* in Calcutta in 1781; but, with the disappearance of Persian as the official language and the substitution of English in the higher courts, and the vernacular language of the various provinces in

the lower courts, the older type of education no longer fitted persons for employment in Government service.

English Education.—In 1835 Lord William Bentinck, then Governor-General of India, established the policy of promoting education in the English language. While this policy was warmly supported by the Hindus, the Mohammedans held almost entirely aloof from the English schools and colleges, preferring a system of learning in harmony with their own faith, and thinking that English education induced a spirit of disbelief in religion. From time to time the Government of India proposed measures for dealing with the backward condition of education among the Mohammedans, and laid down the lines of policy to be pursued in Resolutions of 1871, 1885, 1888, 1894, and 1913. Liberal grants-in-aid have been given to colleges, such as Aligarh, and other educational establishments, and scholarships granted to Mohammedan students. The total number of Mohammedan pupils under instruction in all classes of educational institutions in 1912 was 1,562,000. Though the general level of literacy among the Indian Mohammedans is very low, there has been in recent years a remarkable increase in the number of those who have entered schools and colleges for an English education.

AUTHORITIES

No comprehensive work has been written on Islam in India, but much information is to be found in the official publications of the Government of India, especially Census Reports, Gazetteers, and the publications of the Ethnographic Survey. The following books may be mentioned as dealing with certain portions of the subject-matter :

CHIROL, SIR VALENTINE. *Indian Unrest* (chap. ix). London, 1910.

ELLIOT, SIR H. M. *The History of India as told by its own Historians.* London, 1867–77.

Encyclopaedia of Islam. London, 1913, &c.

HUNTER, SIR W. W. *The Indian Musalmans.* London, 1871.

JAFFUR SHURREEF. *Qanoon-e-Islam, or the Customs of the Moosulmans of India.* London, 1832 ; reprinted, Madras, 1895.

LANE-POOLE, S. *Mediaeval India under Mohammedan Rule.* London, 1903.

MRS. MEER HASSAN ALI. *Observations on the Mussulmauns of India.* 2nd ed., Oxford, 1917.

ISLAM IN AFRICA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY 137

INTRODUCTORY 138

I. KINGDOMS OF GHĀNA AND SONGHAY. THE ALMORAVID MOVEMENT

Early Spread of Islam in the Sudan . . 139
The Berbers 139
Rise of the Almoravid Movement . . . 139
Abdallah ibn Yāsīn 139
Invasion of North Africa and Spain . . 139
Invasion of the Ghāna Kingdom . . . 139
The Mandingo Kingdom of Melle . . . 140
Mansa Musa conquers the Songhay Kingdom and takes Timbuctoo 140
The Mandingo at Timbuctoo 140
Conversion of King of Jenne 140
Conversion, Expansion, and Extinction of the Songhay Kingdom 140

II. THE HAUSSA KINGDOMS. FURTHER NORTHERN INFLUENCES

Increase in Importance of the Haussa States . 141
Character and Language of the Haussas . . 141
The Haussa Traders 141
Spread of Islam from Egypt 142
Conversion of King of Kanem . . . 142
Bornu 142
Darfur 142
Wadai and Baghirmi 142
Slow Progress of Islam 143

III. NINETEENTH-CENTURY REVIVAL IN THE SUDAN:

(*a*) *Militant Activities* 143
The Wahhabi Reformation: Danfodio . . 143
Danfodio's Successors 144
Domination of the Fulbes 144
Haj Omar 145
The Upper Senegal and the Niger Districts . 145
Ahmadu succeeds Haj Omar . . . 145
Subjugation of Ahmadu's Kingdom . . 146
Samory in Senegambia 146

PAGE

(b) *Missionary Activities* 146
Importance of the Moslem Orders . . . 146
The Tijaniyyah Order 147
The Kadiriyyah Order 147
The Senussi Order 147
The Rahmaniyyah Order 147
The Bakkayiyyah Order 148
The Amirghaniyyah Order 148
Influence of the Orders 148

IV. Eastern Africa, Nubia, and Abyssinia . . 148
Advance of Mohammedan Arabs in Nubia . 149
Decline of the Nubian Christian Kingdom . 149
Resistance of Abyssinia to Mohammedanism . 149
Mohammed Grāñ 150
Advance of Mohammedanism after 1632 . . 150
Reaction under Theodore 150
Reigns of John and Menelik 150

V. East African Coast and Uganda
Foundation of Magadoxo by Arabs . . 151
Advent of the Portuguese 151
Restricted Arab Influence 152
Arab Traders in Uganda 152
Decline of Mohammedanism in Uganda . . 152
The Mahdi Mohammed Ahmad . . . 152

VI. Effects of European Occupation on the Spread of Islam
Christian Missionary Societies . . . 152
Opposition of Pagan Tribes 153
European Rule established from 1886 onwards . 153
Suppression of Slave-trade favours Islam . 153
Peaceful Conditions favour Islam . . . 153
Appointment of Mohammedan Officials . . 154
Mohammedans as Teachers 154
Mohammedans as Soldiers 154
Attractions of Mohammedanism for the Pagan Population 154

AUTHORITIES 156

ISLAM IN AFRICA

Chronological Summary

Tenth century. Mohammedan Arabs build a mosque at Soba, the Christian capital of Nubia.
1009. King of Songhay converted to Islam.
1042. Abdallah ibn Yāsīn leads the militant Almoravid movement.
1076. Ghāna becomes Mohammedan.
1090–1147. Almoravids masters of Spain.
1200. Foundation of Mohammedan kingdom of Melle.
c. 1200. Islam spreads over the kingdom of Kanem.
Thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Infiltration of Mohammedans into Abyssinia.
1311–31. Mansa Musa, King of Melle, conquers the Songhay kingdom, and captures Timbuctoo. Timbuctoo a centre of Moslem influence.
1352. The King of Dongola becomes a Mohammedan.
Fifteenth century. Kadiriyyah Order introduced into West Africa.
1492. Death of Ssonni Ali, the greatest King of Songhay, after it had broken away from Melle.
1499–1530. Christian kingdom of Nubia, already weakened by internal dissensions and Arab and Negro attacks, falls before the Fung Empire.
Sixteenth century. Portuguese conquests in East Africa. Check to Arab and Mohammedan expansion.
1528–43. Mohammed Grāñ, a Somali chief, ravages Abyssinia.
c. 1550. Bakkayiyyah Order founded in Timbuctoo.
1568–1608. First Mohammedan King of Baghirmi.
c. 1600. Islam becomes the State religion of Darfur.
1612. Abd al-Kasim, the first Mohammedan King of Wadai, heads a national rising against the Tunjar Arabs.
1632. Expulsion of the Portuguese from Abyssinia, followed by confusion and anarchy.
Seventeenth, eighteenth, and first half of nineteenth centuries. Gradual increase of Moslem influence in Abyssinia.
c. 1700. Final collapse of the kingdom of Songhay before the Moors.
1750–1800. Conversion of the greater part of the Baghirmi population to Islam.

1781. Tijaniyyah Order founded in Algeria. Spreads rapidly in Tunis, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, and thence to the hinterland of Sierra Leone.
c. 1800. Rahmaniyyah Order founded by a Moroccan.
1800–50. Spread of Islam in Uganda by Arab traders.
1802. Revolt of Danfodio.
1802–16. Danfodio conquers the whole of Haussaland and founds a fanatically Mohammedan Fulbe kingdom.
1827–33. Haj Omar in Mecca.
1835. Sanusiyyah and Amirghaniyyah Orders founded.
1841. Haj Omar heads another anti-pagan Fulbe expedition against the Upper Niger and the Senegal.
1855–68. Christian reaction in Abyssinia under Theodore II.
1857. Haj Omar's westward progress into Senegambia checked by the French.
1865. Death of Haj Omar. He is succeeded by his son, Ahmadu.
1876. Introduction of Christian missions into Uganda checks the spread of Islam.
1880. Edict of King John of Abyssinia compelling Mohammedans to become Christians or leave the country. Schemes for religious uniformity ineffective owing to war.
1881. Samory (a Mandingo) establishes himself on the Upper Niger.
1881–85. The Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmad, attempts to found an Empire, with Omdurman as its capital.
1889–1913. Reign of Menelik II in Abyssinia.
1891. Subjugation of Ahmadu's kingdom by the French.
1898. Defeat of Khalifa Abdullah, successor to Mohammed Ahmad, at Omdurman by the British. Defeat of Samory by the French.
1901–4. British Somaliland expeditions against Mohammed ibn Abdallah, the 'Mad Mullah'.

Introductory

No attempt is made here to include the history of Egypt and those parts of North Africa which were once provinces of the Roman Empire; but a brief sketch is given of the progress of Islam southward through the Sahara into the Sudan and the tribes of the West Coast, and then on the East Coast and into those parts of the Eastern Sudan where Mohammedan influences coming southward from Egypt met those coming eastward through the Sudan.

I. Kingdoms of Ghāna and Songhay. The Almoravid Movement

The early history of the spread of Islam among the negroes of the Sudan is obscure ; but there seems to be little doubt that it was the Berbers who first introduced this faith into the lands watered by the Senegal and the Niger. Here they met with two negro kingdoms of some importance, Ghāna and Songhay, said to have been founded, respectively, about A. D. 300 and about A. D. 600. Sporadic conversions appear to have occurred so early as the tenth century ; but the Berbers of the Sahara did not show themselves very zealous Mohammedans until the rise in their midst of the Almoravid movement, which originated in the first half of the eleventh century among the Lamtūna clan, a branch of one of the Berber tribes of the Sahara. The Lamtūna had led a nomadic life between southern Morocco and the banks of the Senegal and the Niger, until the Marabout Abdallah ibn Yāsīn settled among them as a religious reformer, stirring up religious zeal and rebuking them for their lax observance of the ordinances of their faith. By 1042 he found himself strong enough to place himself at the head of his followers (the so-called Almoravids), and to attack the neighbouring tribes and force upon them the acceptance of Islam. The success that attended his expeditions served as a powerful appeal to the tribes of the Sahara, and his death in 1059 did not check the movement he had initiated. Many heathen tribes of Berbers came to swell the numbers of their Moslem fellow-countrymen, and adopted their religion. The Almoravids poured out of the Sudan over North Africa, and later made themselves masters of Spain (1090–1147). This Almoravid movement reacted on the pagan tribes of the Western Sudan. In 1076 the Berbers, who had been spreading Islam in the kingdom of Ghāna for some time, drove out the reigning dynasty (which was probably Fulbe), and this ancient kingdom became entirely Mohammedan ; at the beginning of the thirteenth

century, it lost its independence and was conquered by the Mandingo. On the ruins of Ghāna rose the kingdom of Melle, whose Mandingo chiefs became Mohammedans about 1200. The most important King of Melle was Mansa Musa (1311–31), who conquered the Songhay kingdom and took the prosperous town of Timbuctoo (which had been founded on the bank of the Niger towards the end of the eleventh century). This town was not only a great trading centre, but exercised a wide influence as a seat of Moslem learning and piety; and students and divines flocked there in large numbers. The Mandingo who ruled there until 1433 were described by Leo Africanus as being the most civilized, intellectual, and respected of all the negroes; and modern travellers have praised them for their industry, cleverness, and trustworthiness. These Mandingo have been among the most active missionaries of Islam, and many tribes in the Western Sudan owe their conversion to them.

Another town on the bank of the Niger, south-west of Timbuctoo, and like it an important trading centre, was Jenne (founded about the middle of the eleventh century); it was the centre of a flourishing cotton industry and a powerful rival of Melle. The first King of Jenne to become a Mohammedan was Kunburu in the thirteenth century; he is said to have collected together all the 'ulamā in his kingdom to the number of 4,200, and to have publicly declared himself in their presence a Moslem, his example being followed by the inhabitants of the city; he had his palace pulled down, and in its place built a great mosque, which stood up to 1830.

Of the introduction of Islam into the kingdom of Songhay we have only the record that the fifteenth king of the Zā dynasty was converted about the year 1009. The centre of this kingdom lay within the great curve of the Niger, south of Timbuctoo; but after it broke away from the authority of the King of Melle, it grew in power—especially under the energetic rule of Ssonni Ali (who died in 1492)—until its territory included all the country on the Upper Niger and the

Senegal and extended as far as the sea-coast on the west and far into the desert. The kingdom of Songhay came into conflict with Morocco, and finally succumbed to the invasion of the Moors at the end of the sixteenth century.

II. The Haussa Kingdoms. Further Northern Influences

With the destruction of the kingdom of Songhay the Haussa states rose into increasing political importance; and the central point of the civilization of the Western Sudan shifted from the Upper Niger, where influences from the north were most rapidly felt, eastward to the country contained in the angle of the Central Niger and its tributary, the Benue, i. e. the modern Northern Nigeria. The Haussa states and their dependencies were situated in a country settled by agricultural negroes, with a remarkable aptitude for commerce; the main sources of their wealth were their manufactures, especially the making and dyeing of textile fabrics, which they distributed far and wide. The Haussas are an energetic and intelligent people; and their numerous trading caravans have gained for them an immense influence among the various peoples with whom they have come into contact; their language has become the language of commerce for the Western Sudan; and wherever the Haussa traders go—and they are found from the coast of Guinea to Cairo—they carry the faith of Islam with them, and by their devout behaviour and superior culture impress the heathen inhabitants. But of their own adoption of the faith, and of the rise of the various Haussa states (such as Kano, Katsena, &c.), historical evidence is almost entirely wanting, because the Fulbe,[1] who conquered them at the beginning of the nineteenth century, destroyed most of their historical records.

[1] Fulbe is the name by which these people call themselves; upwards of a hundred variants are applied to them by their neighbours, the commonest of which are Fulah and Fulani.

Certain other streams of influence came into the Central Sudan from the north and the north-east. It was from Egypt that Islam spread into Kanem—a kingdom which, shortly after its adoption of Islam, rose to be a state of considerable importance, and extended its sway over the tribes of the Eastern Sudan to the borders of Egypt and Nubia; the first Mohammedan King of Kanem is said to have reigned towards the close of the eleventh century; his successors entered into friendly relations with the rulers of the Hafsid dynasty in Tunis, and thus facilitated the infiltration of Moslem influence from that state. At the close of the fourteenth century, the capital was moved to the territory of Bornu west of Lake Chad, and the kingdom of Kanem was henceforth known as Bornu. In the sixteenth century, this kingdom was the predominant power in the Central Sudan. In the fourteenth century the Tunjar Arabs, migrating either south from Tunis or west from Nubia, made their way through Bornu and Wadai to Darfur; but it was some time before Islam became the State religion in Darfur, under King Suleiman, who began to reign in 1596; and it was not until the sixteenth century that Islam gained a footing in the other kingdoms lying between Kordofan and Lake Chad, such as Wadai and Baghirmi. The first Mohammedan King of Wadai was Abd al-Kasim, who, in 1612, headed a native rising against the supremacy of the Tunjar Arabs; under his rule the power of Wadai gradually increased. The nucleus of this kingdom is formed by the mountainous country on the east, inhabited by a tribe of great tenacity and military prowess, whose origin was probably Ethiopian, though it has experienced considerable infusion of negro blood. This mountain people still form the ruling class, and derive their wealth from agriculture and a flourishing system of cattle-breeding. In the south of the kingdom are districts still inhabited by heathen tribes of pure negro blood. The people of Baghirmi were fetish-worshippers when Islam was brought into their country by the Fulbe; in the sixteenth century they came under the authority of

immigrants from the east, who gradually adopted the religion of the Baghirmians; the first Mohammedan king reigned from 1568 to 1608; but it was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that the mass of the people of Baghirmi were converted to Islam; and many of the negro tribes are still fetish-worshippers.

The Mohammedan history of the Western and Central Sudan during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries shows that the progress of Islam was slow; and the survival of considerable groups of fetish-worshippers in the midst of territories which for centuries had been under Mohammedan rule seems to indicate that the influence of Islam was for long confined to the towns, and only by degrees made its way among the pagan population. In spite of the propagandist activities of races such as the Mandingo, Haussa, and Fulbe, the progress of Mohammedanism was checked by the savage internecine wars which caused one Mohammedan state to work the destruction of another. As these Mohammedan kingdoms declined with the wholesale massacres characteristic of warfare in the Sudan, fetishism regained much of the ground it had lost; the heathen districts which suffered from the merciless slave-raids that were a considerable source of wealth to the Mohammedans could hardly be expected to welcome the extension of Mohammedan rule. In cases where the heathen tribes possessed some political organization of their own, they sometimes, indeed, gained strength and a more coherent political consciousness as the result of the united efforts they made to resist the militant propaganda of their Mohammedan neighbours.

III. Nineteenth-century Revival in the Sudan

(a) *Militant Activities*

The nineteenth century witnessed a remarkable expansion of Islam in the Sudan. The first impulse in this direction came from the Wahhabi reformation, which profoundly stirred the whole Mohammedan world.

Towards the end of the eighteenth century Othman Danfodio, a Fulbe sheikh, made the pilgrimage to Mecca, whence he returned full of zeal for the reformation and propagation of Islam. Influenced by the doctrines of the Wahhabis, he denounced the practice of prayers for the dead and the honour paid to departed saints, and deprecated the excessive veneration of the Prophet himself; at the same time he attacked the two prevailing sins of the Sudan, drunkenness and immorality. Up to his time the Fulbe had consisted of a number of small scattered clans leading a pastoral life; they had early embraced Islam, and had hitherto been content to form colonies of shepherds and planters in different parts of the Sudan, and were generally a peaceful and industrious people. Danfodio united into one powerful organization these separate communities, scattered throughout the various Haussa states. An attempt in 1802 by the King of Gober—a kingdom which was still pagan and which had gained ascendancy over the northernmost of the Haussa states—to check the growing power of the Fulbe in his dominions caused Danfodio to raise the standard of revolt. He soon found himself at the head of a powerful army, which attacked not only the pagan tribes, forcing upon them the faith of the Prophet, but also the Moslem Haussa states. These fell one after another; and the whole of Haussaland came under the rule of Danfodio before his death in 1816. His grave in Sokoto is still an object of reverence to a large number of pilgrims. He divided his newly-conquered empire between his brother, Abd Allahi, to whom he gave the western provinces on the Central Niger, and his son, Mohammed Bello, who succeeded to the sovereignty of the eastern provinces, with Sokoto as their capital. In this town the chief Fulbe power was centred. Adamawa, founded in 1837 on the ruins of several pagan kingdoms, marked the limit of Fulbe conquests to the south-east; and the town of Ilorin, in the Yoruba country, founded in the lifetime of Danfodio, was the bulwark of their empire in the south-west.

Mohammed Bello met with a formidable rival in Mohammed al-Kanemi, who stirred up the people of Bornu to shake off the yoke of the Fulbe, so that they succeeded in regaining their independence. But, with varying fortunes, the dominant power remained in the hands of the Fulbe, who showed themselves cruel and fanatical propagandists of Islam, until British administration was established in Nigeria in 1900.

An independent Fulbe movement was originated in the country about the Senegal and the Upper Niger by Haj Omar, whose family came from the earliest settlements of the Fulbe people on the Senegal. Haj Omar was born in 1797 near Podor on the Lower Senegal, and appears to have been a man of considerable endowments and personal influence, and of a commanding presence. He was the son of a Marabout, and had received a careful religious education; he was already famed for his piety and learning when, in 1827, he set out on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and was there initiated into the Tijaniyyah Order. He did not return to his own country until 1833, when he commenced an active propaganda of the teaching of that order, fiercely attacking his co-religionists for their ignorance and lukewarmness. He traversed the Central Sudan, winning many adherents and receiving honour as a new prophet, until, about 1841, he reached Futah-Jallon, where he armed his followers and commenced a series of expeditions against those tribes that still remained pagan about the Upper Niger and the Senegal. After devastating these districts, he found himself in contact with the French, who under General Faidherbe defeated him in 1857 and checked his progress westward into Senegambia; he also suffered a severe defeat at the hands of the Tuaregs, who had driven out his garrison from Timbuctoo and resisted his attempt to retake this town in 1863. Nevertheless, he succeeded in uniting the territory on the Upper Senegal and the Niger into a great kingdom. On his death in 1865 he left this kingdom to his son Ahmadu, who chose Segu-Sikoro as his capital, and thus lived among the Bambara

negroes, the chief among the tribes subject to him. But Ahmadu succeeded in holding together the various provinces of his father's kingdom for a few years only. Internal conflicts and the advance of the French, under whose protection he had to place the valley of the Upper Niger as far as Timbuctoo in 1881, led to the break-up of his power; Segu was conquered by the French in 1890, and a year later Ahmadu's kingdom was completely subjugated.

But, before the French could establish their supremacy in the Western Sudan, they had to crush the rising power of another military adventurer, Samory, a Mandingo, who was born about 1846. Samory established himself south of Senegambia, in the upper basin of the Niger. His conquests were marked by wholesale massacres and devastation, and he reached the height of his power about 1881, shortly after which he came into conflict with the French, who took him prisoner in 1898 after a series of harassing campaigns. He died in captivity in 1900.

Mention should also here be made of the attempt of Rabeh Zubair, a former slave of Zubair Pasha, to create a Central African Empire about Lake Chad, about the years 1896 to 1902. He was finally crushed, and killed, by the French in 1902.

(*b*) *Missionary Activities*

Side by side with these militant Mohammedan movements and the creation of these short-lived kingdoms in the Sudan, the revival of Islam in the nineteenth century found further expression in a missionary activity, marked by considerable zeal and success, on the part of the religious orders. As many as eighty-eight religious orders are in existence in the Mohammedan world; and those which are represented in North Africa exercise an enormous influence, from Egypt to Morocco; in Algeria more than half the Moslem inhabitants are connected with one or other of them. In the Sudan, the most powerful of the

Orders are the Tijaniyyah, the Kadiriyyah, and the Sanusiyyah or Senussi. The Tijaniyyah Order originated in Algeria in 1781 and spread rapidly in Tunis, the Sahara, and the Western Sudan, and later as far south as the hinterland of Sierra Leone. The members of this Order have been largely militant in their methods, and Haj Omar was a member of it. Since French authority has been established in the Western Sudan, the Order has had to confine its activity to peaceful methods, but still exercises a widespread influence through its mosques and schools.

The Kadiriyyah Order, in accordance with the spirit of its founder, Abd al-Kadir al-Jilani (who died in 1166 A.D.)—one of the most popular saints of Islam—has always adopted peaceful and tolerant methods. Established in the twelfth century, it was introduced into western Africa in the fifteenth century by emigrants from Tuat, one of the oases in the west of the Sahara. These emigrants made Walata the first centre of their organization; but later on their descendants were driven away from this town and took refuge in Timbuctoo, farther to the east. In the beginning of the nineteenth century the spiritual revival that was so profoundly influencing the Mohammedan world stirred up the Kadiriyyah of the Sahara and the Western Sudan to renewed life and energy; and, before long, small colonies of persons affiliated to the Order were to be found scattered throughout the Western Sudan from the Senegal to the mouth of the Niger. Up to the middle of the nineteenth century most of the schools in the Sudan were founded and conducted by teachers trained under the auspices of the Kadiriyyah; and their organization provided for a regular and continuous system of propaganda among the heathen tribes.

Enormous influence has also been exercised by the Senussi Order.[1]

Besides these three great Orders, others may be mentioned. The Rahmaniyyah Order, founded by

[1] For the Senussi, see *Italian Libya*, No. 127 of this series.

a Moroccan towards the end of the eighteenth century, which has great influence in the Western Sudan; the Bakkayiyyah Order, founded in the middle of the sixteenth century, having its centre in Timbuctoo; the Amirghaniyyah, which takes its name from a certain Mohammed Othman al-Amir Ghani, who in 1835 was sent from Mecca on a proselytizing mission to the Nile valley and Kordofan; and several others.

The initiates of these religious Orders exercise considerable political influence, and have sometimes (notably in the case of the Tijaniyyah) succeeded in establishing independent Mohammedan states; they are often welcomed in the midst of a pagan population as public scribes, legists, writers of amulets, and schoolmasters. They thus acquire in quite a peaceful manner influence over the fetish-worshippers among whom they settle, and form centres of Islamic influence from which the knowledge of their faith expands in a continually widening circle. These religious Orders constitute the best-organized religious bodies in the Moslem community, and have attracted to themselves those Mohammedans who view with dismay the growing extension of European influence and domination in countries that had hitherto formed part of the Moslem world. Through them can operate most successfully those Pan-Islamic movements which are hostile to European civilization and represent a conservative reaction; hence the great increase in the number of the adherents of these Orders in recent years, and the necessity of their being closely watched by European Governments ruling over Mohammedan populations.

IV. Eastern Africa, Nubia, and Abyssinia

In this part of the continent, the expansion of Islam has in the main had a history unconnected with that of the territories already mentioned. Before the arrival of Islam there were in existence here two ancient Christian kingdoms: Nubia, which was converted to

Christianity about the middle of the sixth century, and Abyssinia, which had accepted Christianity two centuries earlier. The Nubians resisted the progress of Arab rule up the Nile, and succeeded in maintaining their independence for several centuries, in spite of the frequent expeditions sent against them from Egypt. But Mohammedan Arabs gradually formed settlements in Nubian territory, and by the tenth century had so increased in number and wealth that they were able to ask permission to build a mosque in Soba, the capital of the Christian kingdom, a few miles above the modern Khartum. In the thirteenth, and especially from the the beginning of the fourteenth century, there began a general process of interpenetration through the migration into Nubia of Arabs, especially of the Juhaina tribe, who intermarried with the women of the land and gradually succeeded in breaking up the power of the Nubian princes. In 1352 the mass of the Nubians were still Christian, but the King of Dongola, their chief city, was a Mohammedan, and it is probable that Islam had made considerable progress there; even so late as the early part of the fifteenth century, however, the repeated expeditions of the Mamluk Sultans of Egypt had not succeeded in pushing their conquests south of the first cataract, near which was their last fortified station. The Christian Nubian kingdom appears to have come to an end partly through internal dissensions and partly through the attacks of Arab and negro tribes on its borders, and finally by the establishment of the powerful Fung Empire between 1499 and 1530.

Abyssinia has more successfully resisted the inroads of Islam. The foundation of an Arab dynasty at the end of the twelfth century alienated some of the coast lands of the Red Sea from Abyssinia, and in the course of the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries a considerable number of Mohammedans penetrated into the Christian kingdom, some of them entering into the State service in various capacities. By the beginning of the sixteenth century there were Mohammedan

tributary states in the low-lying country that had formed the northern boundary of Abyssinia, from the Red Sea westward to Sennar, and on the south and the south-east of the kingdom. Between 1528 and 1543 Abyssinia suffered from the invasions of the Galla chief, Mohammed Grāñ, who ravaged the country again and again, and penetrated up to its northern frontiers. Grāñ was defeated and killed in 1543, and with the help of the Portuguese the Abyssinians preserved their country from coming under Mohammedan rule. Islam had, however, gained a footing which the troublous condition of affairs during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries enabled it to retain. After the expulsion of the Portuguese, about 1632, the condition of Abyssinia became one of terrible confusion and anarchy, taking advantage of which some tribes of the Galla race thrust their way right into the very centre of the country, where their settlements remain to the present day. Before the end of the seventeenth century, one-third of the population of Abyssinia was said to be Moslem, and their faith made continuous though slow progress during the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries, by which time the Moslems had in their hands all the commerce as well as all the petty trade of the country, enjoyed vast possessions, were masters of large towns and central markets, and had a firm hold upon the mass of the people. But under King Theodore II (1855–68) a reaction set in; this was strengthened during the national struggle against the aggressions of Egypt, especially between 1864 and 1882. In 1880 King John promulgated an edict compelling the Mohammedans either to embrace Christianity or to leave the country; he is said to have compelled about 50,000 Mohammedans to be baptized; but their conversion was often nominal only; and King John was soon too much occupied in fighting at once with the Italians and the followers of the Mahdi to make his schemes for religious uniformity effective. Under his successor, Menelik, Christianity again became

powerful as the State religion; but there is still a considerable Moslem population in Abyssinia, and Islam is still a force to be reckoned with in the country. The Galla state of Jimma has remained one of the strongholds of Islam, as its ruler, Aba Ja'far, by his timely submission to Menelik, managed to keep his kingdom, the inhabitants of which are nearly all Mohammedans. The capital of Jimma is one of the most important markets in Abyssinia. The majority of the Galla tribes throughout Abyssinia are also Mohammedan—especially the powerful Wollo Gallas, north-east of Lake Tsana.

V. East African Coast and Uganda

Along the coast of East Africa, owing to its proximity to Arabia, there have been settlements of Arabs from an early period; but the facts recorded as to their establishment are very meagre. In the Mohammedan period, the Arabs, about 908, founded Magadaxo (Mogadishu), which afterwards rose to such power as to assume lordship over all the Arabs of the east coast; and a Persian expedition, about 975, founded the town of Kilwa, farther south. The coming of the Portuguese in the sixteenth century dealt a severe blow to Arab domination in this part of Africa; but, even after the decline of Portuguese influence and the restoration of Arab rule under the Sayyids of Oman (from whom the independent sultanate of Zanzibar became separated in 1856), the influence of Islam does not appear to have extended far inland, or to have affected the tribes of the interior, with the exception of the Galla and the Somali, until the beginning of the present century.

Harrar has been a centre of Mohammedan influence and propaganda in Somaliland for several centuries, but since 1887 it has been under Abyssinian rule. The opposition to the extension of Christian authority was carried on by Mohammed ibn Abdallah, a mullah of the neighbouring district of Ogaden, commonly known as the Mad Mullah. He declared himself to be the Mahdi in 1900, and in his raids came into conflict not only with the Abyssinians but also with

the authorities of British Somaliland. A number of expeditions were sent against him by the British from 1901 to 1904, when it was decided to abandon further operations. An arrangement was made according to which Mohammed ibn Abdallah established himself under Italian surveillance.

The Arabs along the coast of East Africa have been given up wholly to the pursuits of commerce or to slave-hunting, and made little effort to spread their faith. A notable exception, however, is the propagandist activity of the Arab traders who were admitted into Uganda in the first half of the nineteenth century; they probably recognized that the sturdy independence of the Baganda made slave-raiding among them impossible, so they sought to gain their confidence by winning them over to their own faith. They met with some success, and many of the Baganda became Mohammedans; but the introduction of Christian missions in 1876, the rapid increase in the numbers of the Christian converts, and the subsequent establishment of a British protectorate in 1894, led to a decline of Mohammedan influence. A number of Mohammedans, however, still hold important positions in Uganda; and it is even stated that there is a possibility of the eastern province becoming Moslem.

To complete the survey of Islam in East Africa reference should be made to the attempt of the Mahdi Mohammed Ahmad, between 1881 and 1885, to overthrow Egyptian domination in the Sudan and establish an empire with its capital at Omdurman; this came to an end after the battle of Omdurman in 1898 and the death of the Mahdi's successor, the Khalifa Abdullah, in the following year.

VI. Effects of European Occupation on the Spread of Islam

In its movement to the south during the nineteenth century, Islam was met by two formidable obstacles. The first of these was the activity of the wealthy and

active Christian missionary societies, which, starting from the coast, both on the east and the west, gradually made their way inland, and increased the number of their stations as European authority became more widely and firmly established. The second was the opposition offered by the pagan tribes. The cruel and devastating campaigns of Mohammedan leaders, such as Haj Omar and Samory, caused the faith of Islam to be bitterly hated by the heathen tribes whose country they overran, and stiffened the resistance offered by such pagan negroes as the Bambāra, who have maintained their independence, though (dwelling between the Upper Senegal and the Upper Niger) they have been hemmed in by a Mohammedan population for centuries. The heathen state of Galim (to the south of Adamawa) has similarly been strengthened by the addition of numerous pagan refugees. The terror of Mohammedan aggression and slave-raiding was removed from these heathen tribes when, by a series of agreements between England, France, Germany, and Italy, from 1886 onwards, the bulk of that part of Africa which has any Mohammedan population came under European rule.

But the changed conditions of life and political administration operated in an unexpected manner to the advantage of the faith of Islam. The suppression of the slave-trade has removed one of the great obstacles to the spread of Islam in pagan Africa, because it was to the interest of the Arab and other Mohammedan slave-dealers not to narrow the field of their operations by admitting their possible victims into the brotherhood of Islam. The advent of peace to countries formerly harassed by wars of extermination or the raids of slave-hunters, and the establishment of ordered methods of government and administration, have enabled Mohammedan merchants, the members of religious Orders, and other propagandists to move freely about the country and to penetrate among pagan tribes which had hitherto kept all Mohammedan influences rigidly at bay. During the period of disorder before European occupation, the Moslems were for the most part congregated

in large walled towns; but under the new conditions of security they are able to reside permanently in scattered villages and near the scene of their agricultural labours, and Mohammedan influences have thus become more widely extended over the country. That most active propagandist of Islam, the trader—whether Arab, Fulbe, Haussa, or Mandingo—whose very profession brings him into close and immediate contact with those he would convert, avails himself of the increased facilities of communication offered by roads and railways.

The new administrations required literate and intelligent natives as officials, and these could as a rule be found only among the Mohammedan section of the population; thousands of such posts were created and given to Mohammedan officials, who have used their influence to bring over whole villages to Islam. An instance may be taken from German East Africa. Here the district of West Usambara was said in 1891 to be still closed to Islam; and the feeling of both chiefs and people was hostile to the Mohammedans, who were hated and feared as slave-dealers. But, when an ordered administration was established, the first native officials appointed were almost entirely Mohammedan; they impressed upon the chiefs and other notables who came in touch with them that it was the correct thing for those who moved in official circles to be Mohammedans, and thereby achieved the conversion of some of the greater chiefs, who afterwards exercised a similar influence on chiefs of an inferior degree. Similarly, the teachers in Government schools are largely Mohammedan, and are able to influence their heathen pupils to the advantage of their own faith. The preference often given to Mohammedan soldiers among the troops enlisted by European officers reacts upon the non-Moslem soldiers; and the pagan recruits often adopt Islam in order to escape ridicule and gain in self-respect, being made to feel that the acceptance of Islam is a sign of an elevation to a higher civilization.

The pagans are not slow to recognize that the be-

lievers in Islam are everywhere respected by European governors, officials, and merchants. Brought suddenly into contact with European culture, they have received an impulse to advance in the path of civilization; but being unable to bridge over the gulf that separates them from their foreign rulers, they find in Islam a culture corresponding to their needs and capable of understanding their aspirations. The Mohammedans are not so far removed from them in race, appearance, dress, or manners as to make admission into the brotherhood of Islam impossible for them; and so soon as the pagan negro, however obscure or degraded, shows himself willing to accept the teachings of the Prophet, he is at once admitted as an equal; conversion implies no violent break with his family or his social institutions; for the habits and manner of life in the new community are similar in many respects to those he has been accustomed to; but a new meaning and dignity are added to life, and the convert finds himself at once a member of an influential, if not of a dominant, caste.

AUTHORITIES

ARNOLD, T. W. The Preaching of Islam. London, 1913.
BECKER, C. H. 'Zur Geschichte des östlichen Sudan.'
—— 'Materialien zur Kenntnis des Islam in Deutsch-Ostafrika.' (*Der Islam*, vols. i and ii.) Strassburg, 1910, 1911.
BLYDEN, E. W. *Christianity, Islam, and the Negro Race.* London, 1888.
BONET-MAURY, G. *L'Islamisme et le Christianisme en Afrique.* Paris, 1906.
LE CHATELIER, A. *L'Islam dans l'Afrique occidentale.* Paris, 1899.
DEPONT, O., and COPPOLANI, O. *Les Confréries religieuses musulmanes.* Algiers, 1897.
KLAMROTH, M. *Der Islam in Deutschostafrika.* Berlin, 1912.
MASSAJA, G. *I miei trentacinque anni di missione nell' Alta Etiopia.* Rome, 1885–93.
MERENSKY, A. 'Mohammedanismus und Christentum im Kampfe um die Negerländer Afrikas.' (*Allgemeine Missions-Zeitschrift*, vol. xxi.) Gütersloh, 1894.
MEYER, P. C. 'Erforschungsgeschichte und Staatenbildungen des Westsudan.' (*Ergänzungsheft* No. 121 to *Petermanns Mitteilungen.*) Gotha, 1897.
RINN, L. *Marabouts et Khouan.* Algiers, 1884.
WESTERMANN, D. 'Islam in the West and Central Sudan.' (*The International Review of Missions*, vol. i), Edinburgh, 1912.
Encyclopaedia of Islam.

MAPS

A small map, on the scale of 1:30,000,000, showing the extension of Mohammedanism in India, is to be obtained from Bartholomew (Edinburgh).

A sketch map of 'Islam in Africa', on the scale of 1:28,500,000, is given in the International Review of Missions for October, 1912, and has been reproduced (with consent) by the War Office (G.S.G.S., No. 2908) in connexion with this series.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE.
To be purchased through any Bookseller, or directly from
H. M STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :—
IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C. 2, and
28 ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1;
37 PETER STREET, MANCHESTER;
1 ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF;
23 FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH;
or from E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116 GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

1920.

Price 3/- net.