

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE  
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 34

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
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






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
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
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### Editorial Note.

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IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

*General Editor and formerly*

*Director of the Historical Section.*

*January 1920.*

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## I. POLITICAL HISTORY

### CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 1808 Abdication of Charles IV. Accession of Ferdinand VII  
(March 17-19).  
Proclamation of Joseph Bonaparte as King (June 6).
- 1810 Insurrection in Spanish Colonies.
- 1812 Constitution proclaimed (March 18).
- 1814 Restoration of Ferdinand VII (March 22).
- 1820 Revolt of the Army. Re-establishment of Constitution of  
1812.
- 1823 Independence of Spanish North and South American  
(mainland) Colonies recognised by Great Britain and  
United States.
- 1833 Ferdinand VII revokes the Pragmatic Sanction of Philip V.  
Death of Ferdinand VII. Queen Maria Cristina becomes  
Regent for her daughter, Isabel II.
- 1833-40 First Carlist War.
- 1834 Constitution granted.
- 1835 Secularisation of Church property. Massacre of friars.
- 1837 Military revolt. New Constitution framed.
- 1840 Expulsion of the Regent.
- 1841 Regency of Espartero.
- 1843 Expulsion of Espartero. Isabel II attains majority.
- 1854 Revolt of Army.
- 1858 Ministry of O'Donnell.
- 1859-60 War with Morocco.
- 1861 Spanish intervention in Mexico.
- 1865-66 War with Chile and Peru.
- 1868 Revolution: Expulsion of Isabel II.
- 1870 Accession of Don Amadeo.
- 1872-76 Second Carlist War.
- 1873 Abdication of Don Amadeo. Establishment of Republic.  
Revolt in Cuba.
- 1874 Accession of Alfonso XII.
- 1876 Suppression of Carlists. New Constitution.

- 1878 Pacification of Cuba.
- 1879 Alfonso XII marries Archduchess Maria Cristina.
- 1880 Morocco Conference.
- 1885 Death of Alfonso XII.
- 1886 Birth of Alfonso XIII.
- 1895 Revolt of Cuba and the Philippines.
- 1898 War with United States. Loss of Colonies.
- 1902 Alfonso XIII attains majority.
- 1904 Franco-Spanish Declaration regarding Morocco.
- 1905 Secret Franco-Spanish treaty.
- 1906 Act of Algeciras.  
Marriage of Alfonso XIII to Princess Victoria Eugénie of Battenberg.
- 1909 Spanish expedition to Melilla.
- 1910 Treaty between Spain and Morocco.
- 1911 Spain occupies Larache and El Kasr.
- 1912 Convention of Madrid.

§ i. *Coup d'Etat of 1808.*—The recent history of Spain began in May, 1808, when the royal family surrendered all its rights to the Emperor Napoleon at Bayonne. The situation created by this abdication was without exact parallel in European history. The Government of Spain was an absolute monarchy in the fullest sense of the term. No great political, judicial, or even social institution had any effective power to modify the authority of the Sovereign. Even the Church, though it had much influence, was, in fact, subordinate to the Crown. The Inquisition itself was a creature of the royal will, and did not deny that it could be suppressed by the power which had given it existence. So necessary was the direct participation of the King in all acts of State, that the mere current business of administration was liable to be brought to a standstill by his insanity or prolonged illness.

It follows that the abdication of the royal house, whether it was voluntary or not, destroyed all lawful authority. There was only one way in which this disaster could have been averted. If the King had formally named the person, or body of persons, who were to act for him in case he were disqualified, an alternative would have been provided. But it was not quite certain who was King in May 1808. Charles IV

had, indeed, abdicated in March; and his son Ferdinand had been recognised as his successor. Yet the father had undeniably acted under constraint, and he subsequently revoked his resignation as invalid because it was extorted by fear. Ferdinand's right was therefore open to dispute.

When, on his arrival at Bayonne, he found that he was not recognised as King by Napoleon, he did, indeed, find means to direct the partly judicial and partly administrative body known as the Council of Castile to summon the Cortes in his name. But the elderly lawyers who composed the Council made no response to his directions. They were overawed by the presence of a French garrison in Madrid, and feared to expose Ferdinand to the anger of Napoleon, whose prisoner he was. They were not, however, altogether disinterested, for they saw that a meeting of the Cortes must of necessity throw them into the background; and, in common with other officials, they feared that a Cortes would not stop short at providing a substitute for the King, and then allowing the administration to work as before.

§ ii. *Constitutional difficulties.*—These facts must be borne in mind if we are to understand the subsequent course of Spanish history. The Spaniards of that generation who refused to believe that all sovereignty resided in the person of the King (*el Rey neto y absoluto*) were few. Yet all of them, whether they knew it or not, were forced to act on a theory of national sovereignty, and, since they were not disposed to be handed over to Napoleon, to assume a national right to decide their destiny for themselves. They rose against Napoleon on behalf of Ferdinand VII, but their risings were popular movements. Though loyal in intention, they constituted a revolution in fact.

The first risings were local, and were directed by local committees composed of churchmen and persons of social standing, who commanded much popular support. The pressing need for a general direction of the national resistance, and (what was of hardly

less consequence) the necessity of a common authority capable of representing the nation to the British Government, led to the meeting of the "Junta Central," made up of delegates from the provincial committees. This body had, and could have, no formal authority. It could but serve as a provisional substitute for a more regular government.

To many Spaniards, and to the British Government, it seemed that the right course was to summon the Cortes; but the difficulties in the way were hard to overcome. Spain had possessed many different Cortes in the Middle Ages. It had never possessed a real national Cortes. A body so called had met some six or eight times in the eighteenth century, but only for formal purposes. It had never legislated, nor had it ever had any real life. Another must be created; and the Junta Central had neither the political capacity nor the good-will to create it. The members of that body had as great a distrust of a Cortes as had the Council of Castile; and they had an equally lively desire to keep power in their own hands.

§ iii. *The Cortes of 1810.*—Through delays, evasions, intrigues, and repeated military disasters, the Junta Central brought itself to ruin and the country to the verge of conquest by the French. A Cortes rose, as it were, out of the dissolution of all order, and met at Cadiz in 1810. It consisted of delegates chosen by districts and by a process of double election. Many of these electoral districts being occupied by the French, a free choice was impossible. The Cortes, therefore, itself elected representatives for these districts from among the native refugees in Cadiz. Though this body was thoroughly unrepresentative, it was a great fact in Spanish history that what claimed to be a representation of the whole people had met without the permission of the King, that it did actually govern for a time, and that it strove to provide for the better government of Spain.

It was inevitable that the well-meaning but inexperienced men who formed the Cortes should fail.

Those of them whose instincts were conservative could do little but strive to oppose all change. Those who felt quite honestly, and, as the future was to prove, not irrationally, that the better government could not be obtained save by imposing restrictions on the royal authority, were driven to adopt a purely revolutionary course. They knew well that Ferdinand, in whose name they acted, could not be expected to resign the unlimited authority of his ancestors. But they not unnaturally hoped that, if they framed a Constitution which should be designed to impose severe restrictions on him, he might be forced to submit. They could not have taken a course more exactly calculated to cause deep offence to the majority of their countrymen. The Cortes assembled in Cadiz, a seaport very open to foreign influences, and a town in which the extreme parties had the support of a mob. The conservative elements, which indeed gave no proof of political capacity, were coerced. A Constitution, which avowedly aimed at reducing the crown to a nullity, was framed, and, so far as lay in the power of the Cortes, was forced on the country.

§ iv. *Liberation and Accession of Ferdinand VII.*—The case was complicated by the fact that the Cortes, partly under the influence of Liberal sentiment, but largely because financial needs drove it to secularise Church land, alienated the clergy. Its spirit and its acts were equally repugnant to the generals of the regular army, and to most of the leaders of the irregular bands or *guerrilleros*. So long as French armies were on the soil of Spain they submitted; but they considered their adherence as a mere formality, and were resolved to support the King if he decided to abolish the Constitution on his return.

Ferdinand was liberated by Napoleon in March 1814. In May he revoked the Constitution, and imprisoned the Liberal leaders. There can be no question that he acted with the hearty approval of nearly all the generals, most of the *guerrillero* chiefs, the whole of the Church, and the overwhelming

majority of the nation. But, when he declared that whatever had been done by the Cortes was to be considered as null, and that everything in Spain was to return to what it had been before 1808, he no less unquestionably ignored facts which it was not in his power to annul.

§ v. *Political Parties*.—Great as its errors had been, the Cortes had achieved much which could not be undone. Two parties had been formed during the parliamentary conflicts at Cadiz—the *Liberales* and the *Serviles*. The *Serviles*, whose name, like our own “Tory,” was originally given as a taunt, and then adopted in defiance, are sufficiently defined by the title. The Liberals included many, perhaps even most, of the educated men in the Maritime Provinces, the most active parts of the country, some of the generals, several of the *guerrillero* leaders, and, in particular, the most capable of them all, Francesco Espoz y Mina, who is commonly known by his maternal name, Mina. They were not all thorough adherents of the Constitution of 1812 (“*doceanistas*”); but all were desirous of a reform of government in a constitutional direction. Many of the army officers had been converted to Liberal sentiments by the undeniable superiority of the French armies. They had fought wholeheartedly for their country; but they had learnt by a bitter experience that the old monarchical government had left them so ill-trained and so ill-provided that they were inevitably inferior to their enemy. Most of those who had been prisoners in France—and they were numbered by the thousand—had been influenced by French ideas. When Ferdinand was again placed on the throne, his claim to rule as his ancestors had ruled was disputed by men who were prepared to constrain him by arms if he refused to be persuaded by appeals or by arguments.

These innovators were not as yet numerous. The great mass of the nation desired no change, but was rather indifferent than actively hostile to reform. If Ferdinand VII had followed the example set by his cousin, Louis XVIII, his subjects would have accepted a Con-

stitution granted by him, and so framed as to be in better harmony with the sentiments of the people than that of 1812. But the King was resolved to make no concession; and for a time the majority of his subjects acquiesced in his decision. Then, and all through his reign, he had the active support of the Church. The higher orders and well-endowed religious houses had, indeed, in many cases submitted to Joseph Bonaparte, through fear of losing their great possessions. But the true religious leaders of the people were the poverty-stricken parish clergy and the friars, who had been the mainstay of the national resistance. They were bigoted, ignorant, fanatical, and hostile to all change, even when it was imposed by necessity and was consistent with the essential principles of the State. It was certain that their influence would not be exercised for Liberal ends.

§ vi. *The Influence of the Guerrilleros.*—Much of the fighting during the national resistance had been done by partisan bands—the *guerrilleros*. Though some of them were little above the level of brigands, they had in the main been honourable. The criminal element of smugglers and downright vagabonds had, as a rule, been summarily suppressed by leaders of a higher type. Yet, by the very nature of the case, these bands had accustomed large numbers of Spaniards to a life of adventure. Their members were unsettled and disqualified for civil pursuits; even the best of the bands were compelled to support themselves by levying contributions by violence. Every band had its corresponding *junta* (i.e., committee), which assessed and collected the contributions, took charge of the wounded, and saw to the conveyance of the arms provided by the Cortes or by the British Government. The *guerrilleros* performed inestimable services to their country by hampering the French armies, compelling them to employ large forces in keeping open the lines of communication or in protecting foraging parties. But, from the moment when they came into existence, Spain was menaced by organised anarchy.

§ vii. *Revolt of the Colonies.*—The highest statesmanship and the best administrative capacity would have been taxed to restore order in Spain. The material condition of the country was deplorable. It was disorganised through and through, and poverty-stricken. More than 200,000 houses had been destroyed; the finances were ruined; and a national debt of £76,000,000 had been incurred. The internal misery was not all. The colonies on the mainland of North and South America had broken into revolt in 1810, when it was known that the French armies had invaded Andalusia. Even under normal conditions it would have been impossible for Spain to find the means to coerce territories stretching from California and Texas to Tierra del Fuego. The task was still more beyond her strength when she herself was impoverished, disordered, and paralysed. Yet the Cortes had endeavoured to subdue the colonists, and King Ferdinand persisted in the attempt.

§ viii. *Revolts and Rebellions, 1815-68.*—In this matter none of the Spanish parties was wiser than another. The lack of political and administrative capacity was common to *Liberales* and *Serviles*. All were equally disposed to impose their will by violence. The result was that, for sixty years, periods of anarchy were frequent. Between 1815 and 1874 we can count forty major convulsions and innumerable minor outbreaks. A catalogue of these events is here given with such brief notice of their pretexts and their meaning as may be needed to make them intelligible:—

(1) In 1815 the *guerrillero* leaders, Mina and Porlier, revolted in the north in support of the Constitution of 1812, and were suppressed. Porlier was put to death and Mina fled to France. (2) In 1817 General Luis de Lacy, a Spaniard of Irish origin, made a similar effort in Catalonia; it was put down, and he was executed. (3) In 1819 a conspiracy was detected and suppressed in Valencia. (4) In 1820 an army, collected near Cadiz for service in South America, revolted under army officers. The example

was generally followed; and King Ferdinand was forced to submit to the Constitution of 1812. This was the first military *pronunciamiento*, and was an event of great importance in Spanish history. It showed that the old order could not rely even on the soldiers. Undue haste and a lack of political sense on the part of the leaders, Quiroga and Riego (a former prisoner in France), caused them to proclaim the Constitution of 1812, which, as many of the Liberals had begun to see, was unworkable. (5) The period 1820-23 was one of increasing disorder, mob violence, and confusion. The Conservative elements formed the "Apostolic" Party, out of which grew the society of "The Destroying Angel." These three years saw the first of the mutual massacres which characterised Spanish conflicts, and went far to plunge the country into barbarism. (6) In 1823 France, supported by the Congress of Verona, sent an army to free Ferdinand. It was largely joined by the *Apostólicos*, and the Liberals were suppressed. England and the United States recognised the independence of the Spanish colonies on the mainland of America. French troops remained in Spain at the expense of the Spaniards to support Ferdinand. (7) Two risings took place in 1825. The one was a Liberal movement; the other an outbreak of discontent among the *Apostólicos* themselves. The insurgents took the name of the *Agraviados* (the "aggrieved"). Their grounds of complaint were that the Inquisition had not been restored, and that the King was not sufficiently severe in the measures he took against the Liberals. Both risings were savagely suppressed. Sporadic disturbances continued, and increased in violence after the fall of the older line of the Bourbon family in France—an event which encouraged the Liberals.

(8) The years 1830-33 witnessed violent disputes as to the right of succession to the Crown. By ancient usage women could succeed to the Crown of Castile and Leon; but in Aragon a woman could not succeed, although she could convey the Crown to a husband or son.

Philip V had introduced a modified Salic law, by which all males of the Royal House born in Spain took precedence of females. In 1789 Charles IV, who was born in Naples, assembled a Cortes to revoke the *Pragmática* of his grandfather. The Revocation was not formally promulgated; but, by the ancient constitutional usage of Spain, would be valid if promulgated at any later period. Ferdinand VII had been four times married, but had only had children by his fourth wife, Maria Cristina of Naples. Under her influence, though not without hesitation, he decided to promulgate the Revocation of 1789, in order to secure the succession to the two daughters who were the offspring of the marriage. The elder of these daughters was formally proclaimed heiress on June 20, 1833; and an oath of allegiance to her was taken by a Cortes summoned for the purpose. (9) Ferdinand died in September of the same year; and the Infanta was proclaimed Queen by the style of Isabel II. The Regency, with full powers, had been left to her mother. The restoration of the old law of succession had been perfectly constitutional, and by the co-operation of a Cortes had been rendered juridically correct. But the Clerical Party was resolved to resist. It believed that the King's brother, Don Carlos, would be more likely to govern in a way satisfactory to it than the Regent, who was compelled by her position to seek the support of the Liberals. A general revolt would have broken out before the death of Ferdinand VII if Don Carlos had not steadily refused to take the field as a rebel against his brother.

(10) For seven years (1833-40) Spain was now plunged into a civil war, conducted with great ferocity. Little military or political capacity was shown on either side. The Carlists had the support of the best fighting men in Spain, the mountaineers of the Basque provinces, Upper Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia. Some of their chiefs were vigorous *guerrillero* leaders. Their cause was lost through the incapacity of its political leaders, and

the exhaustion produced by seven years of war. On the Liberal, or Cristino, side, as it was named after Ferdinand's widow, no ability was shown. The Regent would have preferred to maintain an absolute government in her daughter's name, but she failed to secure the necessary support of the Liberals. The Royalists who supported her, and who took the name of *Moderados*, were in favour of some show at least of parliamentary government. Maria Cristina endeavoured to evade real surrender by making a pretence of concessions; but the revolt of her own guards at the palace of La Granja in 1837 forced her to accept what on paper at least looked like a real Constitution. (11) When the Carlists collapsed two results had been secured. There was no longer any possibility of a restoration of the old autocratic government; and the curse of military predominance, military intrigue and *pronunciamientos* had been imposed on the country. In 1840 the Queen Mother was driven into exile. The Regency was entrusted to Baldomero Espartero, the least unsuccessful of the Cristino generals—a man of personal courage, but of a slothful temperament varied by fits of violent energy, and destitute of governing ability. He frittered away his great popularity with the army, offended the civil elements of his own party, and in 1843 was driven out of Spain by a military revolt organized by the *Moderado* generals.

(12) For eleven years (1843-54) the country was comparatively quiet and prosperous. But the mass of the population was torpid, and the work of government was very ill done. Public life was abandoned to palace intrigue and barrack-yard conspiracy. Queen Isabel, who was most unhappily married, discredited the monarchy still further by the scandals of her private life. Peculation and waste were rampant in the administration. In 1854 the *pronunciamiento* at Vicálvaro initiated another period of disorder and military licence. The Queen Mother, who had returned to Spain in 1843, and had engaged in shameless

financial intrigues in connection with railway development, was driven out. Espartero reappeared, only to demonstrate his incapacity once more. The real power fell to General Leopold O'Donnell (Conde de la Bisbal), an Irishman by descent. (13) In 1856 Espartero was driven from power again; and Spanish politics took the form of a personal rivalry between O'Donnell and Narvaez, the *Moderado* leader, varied by palace intrigues. O'Donnell, during the period 1858-63, maintained the ministry known as the Union Liberal, which was, in fact, a coalition kept together more or less by its chief, who controlled the army. His government was not good, but it was better than a continuance of anarchy. A fairly successful war with Morocco in 1859 gave O'Donnell a certain prestige, but he soon exhausted his popularity. (14) The years 1863-68 completed the ruin of the monarchy in Spain. O'Donnell fell because he had tired everybody and was surrounded by intriguers. Increasing financial difficulties, endless erratic changes of ministry, *pronunciamientos*, and military mutinies characterized Spanish politics in the years 1863-68.

§ ix. *Revolution of 1868: Expulsion of Queen Isabel.*—The Queen's government had ended by offending everyone and forfeiting all respect. In 1868 it was repudiated by the nation in a convulsion of disgust. The revolution of September did not by any means end the troubles and confusion of Spain, but it marked an epoch. For the first time the Spaniards revolted, not against the abuses of the royal government, but against that government itself. Isabel was driven into exile; and it was universally recognised that she must never again be allowed to exercise any power in Spain. The leaders of the revolution were even resolved to have done with the "spurious race of Bourbon." The abusive term had a definite meaning on which it would be superfluous to insist.

During the period of more than half a century thus summarized Spain had lived in a perpetual welter of disorder and instability. So long a period of con-

fusion could not but do infinite harm to the national character. It accustomed men to look to adventure and intrigue as means of promoting their fortunes; it ruined all education; while the predominance of intriguers and military conspirators in public life had driven men of moderate temperament and honourable principles to hold aloof from politics. The ferocity with which all parties alike had treated one another had had a barbarizing effect. The standard of family loyalty and personal honour is high in Spain. If their foundations had not been so firmly laid as they were in the instincts of the Spanish people, the country would have been ruined beyond redemption. Foreigners who have suffered from the dishonesty of Spanish governments have usually been ready to affirm that in business, and in all personal relations, the Spaniards are distinguished by probity. Yet all the disorders which have been indicated above could not fail to breed a certain measure of moral and intellectual lawlessness.

§ x. *The Civil Administration and the Army.*—In 1868 Spain was faced with the menace of anarchy and even of disruption. A substitute had to be found for a government which had completely collapsed. Disruption was only averted by the action of the central civil administration and by the army. The influence of the latter was by far the more important of the two. Both, despite their manifold deficiencies, were organized bodies capable of combined action and of being directed from a centre; they had, therefore, decisive advantages amidst the divisions and rivalries that prevailed. The centralized administration could at least carry on the business of government; and the army could give coercive power to the administration. The two together could act in union and could act everywhere.

The local and municipal institutions of Spain had formerly declined, because the royal power was called in to adjust constant local conflicts and to protect particular classes. During and after the reign of Ferdinand VII the civil administration had been

remodelled on Napoleonic lines, and, in spite of deficiencies due to the growth of faction and intrigue and the corruption of officials, it had the advantage of being centralized.

With regard to the army, its ranks were filled from the country population, which had few political ideas and was amenable to discipline. Mutinies were rare; and the influence of the army, as a political instrument, was directed by the officers, who were the instigators of the political or pseudo-political movements called *pronunciamientos*, largely traceable to the personal ambitions of the military classes. It would not be wholly just to say that the corps of officers was destitute of principle. It had shown its resolution to uphold the monarchy and to sanction at least the semblance of constitutional government. But it had claimed and exercised the right to dictate both to the monarchy and to the Cortes, and also to enforce attention to its grievances by threats of revolt. The predominance of men who had no political competence and who were influenced by professional and selfish motives was an undoubted evil; but the alternative was anarchy. The army was the one element in Spain which had the power to keep order. It was the real body politic.

§ xi. *Constitutional Crisis*.—When, in September 1868, Queen Isabel II was driven into exile, the army chiefs were called on to perform a task for which they were signally unfit. The two army leaders, General Serrano and General Prim, were both products of the *pronunciamientos*. Of the two, Prim, the son of a Catalonian butcher who had come to the front in the Carlist War of 1833-40, was the more important. The most hopeful solution of the political problem seemed to be the accession of some other member of the royal house with a parliamentary title from a Constituent Cortes. The ex-Queen Isabel's sister, the Duchess of Montpensier, was an obvious candidate for the throne: but, apart from other obstacles, the accession of her husband, a son of Louis Philippe, would have been

most unwelcome to Napoleon III. Moreover, the Montpensiers were not generally popular. The alternative of a Republic would have been even more unwelcome to Napoleon, and the idea was hateful to the army and the officers; for the Republicans had proclaimed their intention of abolishing conscription, a step which would have entailed the instant dissolution of the army.

§ xii. *The Constituent Cortes of 1869.*—The existing Cortes was dissolved and another was “made” by the Cabinet already in office. This “making” of the Cortes was not a peculiarity of Spain in the nineteenth century; but the practice was carried further there than in any other country. Generally speaking, the people had little interest in any save local concerns, and voted as they were told, partly from fear that their arrears of taxes would be strictly exacted if they did not, partly in the hope of favours, partly under sheer terrorism from Government agents, police, and hired ruffians, but also under the direction of local potentates (called in Spanish slang “*Caciques*”<sup>1</sup>). In times of exceptional excitement, it is true, large towns did occasionally return a member in defiance of Government pressure; but there has never been a clear case of the defeat of the politicians actually in office by a hostile vote in the country. It came, however, to be the custom to permit the return of a reasonable number of opposition members for the sake of appearances. The Constituent Cortes of 1869 was in these respects not different from others, and its life was no better than its origin. While it was immersed in ineffective debates under the contemptuous superintendence of Prim, the civil administration carried on the government. Prim also controlled the army, and used the police to keep order, crushing several attempts at revolt promoted by Carlists and other agitators.

Meanwhile, the main business of the *de facto* Government was to find a King. The Spanish Crown had been

<sup>1</sup> *Vide infra*, pp. 38-39.

offered to, and declined by, quite a number of princes, before the King of Italy, after the downfall of Napoleon III at Sedan, consented to allow his son, Amadeo of Savoy, to accept it. Prim then declared that it was time "to send the lunatics back to their cells"; in other words, to dissolve the Constituent Cortes. He calculated that Don Amadeo would be his puppet, as, indeed, might well have been the case; but on December 27, 1870, three days before the arrival of the new King, the general was assassinated.

The "reign" of Don Amadeo was a wretched adventure. He had no support outside of the army; and the army, after the death of Prim, began to go to pieces. The Republicans could not be expected to welcome a King; those Monarchists who were not Carlists desired a Bourbon restoration. But Queen Isabel's son, Alfonso, was still a boy; and the utmost the Constitutional Monarchists could do was to abstain from supporting Don Amadeo. The Church was actively hostile to a Savoyard dynasty. Its enmity was formidable; for, apart from its spiritual and social influence, it possessed a powerful military and political weapon in the population of the Basque provinces.

§ xiii. *The Basque Provinces.*—The three Basque provinces (*Provincias Vascongadas*) Bizcaya, Alava, and Guipuzcoa, had always formed a State within the State. The Basques of these provinces possessed peculiar privileges (*fueros*), the right of self-taxation and exclusion from the Spanish Customs. The King had no authority over them save as Lord of Biscay (*Señor de Bizcaya*). Their local administration—the only good one in Spain—was in the hands of the small landowners and parish priests. Their rights had been ostensibly diminished and even in theory abolished after the first Carlist War; but in practice they retained a large measure of autonomy and the wish to recover what they had lost. Religion had a strong hold on them. The old social order of squire and priest still endured, and at the call of the Church was ready to spring to arms against the Government—an

example which would be promptly followed by the hill-men of Navarre, Upper Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia, possibly even in Santander, Asturias, and Galicia. In the latent hostility of these northern provinces lay the reserve power of the Church. In it also lay the necessity for the maintenance of a dominant army.

The realities of the situation were clearly shown between 1871 and 1875. The first warning of the evanescent nature of the power of the new King was the refusal of some of the army officers to swear allegiance. Prim's successors, who lacked his vigour and ruthlessness, were powerless to enforce the oath. The Carlists, the Republicans, and the supporters of Don Alfonso were able to take advantage of this breach in the unity of the army; but it was by its own internal weakness that the government of Don Amadeo crumbled to pieces. Serrano, at the head of the Coalition Ministry, attempted to put in force the Constitution of 1869. The Carlists and Republicans combined to drive him from office. Don Matteo Práxedes Sagasta tried to form a Cabinet. The Cortes, summoned in April, was dissolved, and a general election followed. The new Cortes proved no more stable than the old; and Ruiz Zorilla succeeded Sagasta. While Ministries and Cortes were thus appearing and disappearing, the Republican Party was preparing its way to power by promising the abolition of the "tribute of blood," and thereby creating disaffection in the army. The Church was thrown into violent hostility to the Government by the proposal to leave the clerical stipends unpaid, and to throw the burden of providing for the support of the Church on the town councils and villages.

§ xiv. *Second Carlist War.*—The Church, with the tacit approval of the Pope, who had broken off relations with the Revolutionary Government, threw itself on to the Carlist side. The dissensions within the exiled branch of the Royal Family had either been smoothed down or removed by the deaths, in rapid succession, of

several of its members. In May, 1872, the second Don Carlos, a grandson of the first, took the field. The more moderate of his supporters would have preferred that he should wait and make constitutional concessions; but the militant element in the party was opposed to such a course, and constitutional concessions would not have been acceptable to the Church.

Don Carlos was defeated by General Moriones at Oroquieta (May 4); but the fruits of this victory were thrown away by Serrano, who made a pacification with the Carlist leaders, engaging that officers who had joined the rising should be reinstated. The Carlist agitation continued, and was accompanied by a revival of ferocities.

While the Carlists were keeping the north of Spain in confusion, Don Amadeo's government was becoming feebler and feebler. An attempt to murder him and his wife on July 18, 1872, gained him some transient popularity; but the adventure was doomed. Its end was characteristic. The Ministry desired to give an important command to General Hidalgo, who had been the ringleader in a mutiny at the artillery barracks at Madrid in 1866, in which many of his brother officers had been killed. When they heard of the proposed promotion of Hidalgo, the artillery officers resigned their commissions. Don Amadeo, acting on the advice of his ministers, dissolved the corps of artillery officers and abdicated in February 1873.

§ xv. *Establishment of a Republic.*—The dissolution of the corps of artillery officers was the signal for an outbreak of anarchy all over Spain. The Cortes, which contained a mere handful of Republicans, nevertheless voted the establishment of a Republic; and a new Constitution was promulgated. But the Cortes, which had been elected under the coercion of the *Partido de la Porra* (Party of the Cudgel), carried no weight; and many Spaniards who had hitherto stood aloof from the Carlists now turned to them as the only hope for order and unity, for the forces of disintegration were

strong in the south and south-east, where the "Canton-  
alists," who stood for local autonomies, were in the  
ascendant. In spite of the exertions of the *Caciques*,  
supported by the Civic Guard, the payment of taxes, in  
particular of the *consumos* (*octroi*), ceased. The  
Cantonists had control of the naval arsenal at  
Cartagena and of the squadron; and their threat to  
bombard the coast towns was only thwarted by the  
British Mediterranean Squadron, which, assisted by  
two German men-of-war, seized the insurgent ships.

On land the Government was threatened with a  
partial dissolution of the army, owing to the promise  
of the abolition of conscription; but a small force of  
troops, partly composed of officers, who, having been  
deserted by their men, were serving as private soldiers,  
was sent, under command of Don Manuel Pavia, to  
restore order in the south. All the anti-anarchic and  
patriotic forces rallied to Pavia; and it was only the  
hesitation of the transient and embarrassed Ministers  
at Madrid that prevented them from making an end  
of the Cantonists.

The prospect of a renewal of disorder was removed  
by the prorogation of the Cortes and the accession to  
power of Don Emilio Castelar. Castelar had had a  
large share in the provocation of the crisis with which  
he was confronted, but he now saw that only an army  
could preserve the unity of the nation, and by levying  
a double conscription he proceeded to make one. This  
abandonment of the Republican promise to abolish  
conscription ruined the only chance of the Republic;  
but it preserved the State. The Cortes, when they re-  
assembled, prepared for the overthrow of Castelar, but  
were themselves overthrown by Pavia and the military  
party (January 2, 1874); and the government was  
taken in hand by the only body of men who were capable  
of governing. The army had triumphed; it had vindi-  
cated its character as the only true body politic in  
Spain. The choice had been, not between a military  
and a civil government, but between military rule and  
anarchy; and to avoid anarchy all patriotic Spaniards

willingly gave their adhesion to the army. Pavia appealed to all shades of politicians to form a government. But military government was a necessity, and Serrano was recalled as a figure-head.

§ xvi. *Suppression of the Carlists.*—The suppression of the Cantonalist disorders was accomplished by the capture of Cartagena; the overthrow of the Carlists presented a more difficult task. Profiting by the collapse of regular government and the Cantonalist disturbances, the Carlists had, by the spring of 1873, made themselves masters of all the country north of the Ebro. Beyond this, however, they could not go; and they were much hampered by factions in the court of Don Carlos and by party differences, while the Basque provinces were far more interested in the recovery of their own liberties than in that of the throne of Don Carlos. From the military point of view their great weakness was the lack of a seaport; and they now renewed the attack on Bilbao, which had failed in the former war. Serrano failed to relieve the town; and General la Concha, after forcing the Carlists to retreat, was defeated and killed. But there was no real doubt as to the eventual defeat of the Carlists.

§ xvii. *Restoration of the Bourbon Dynasty.*—Don Alfonso was now of age, and the abdication of his mother had left him sole constitutional claimant to the throne. The Alfonsist Party, led by Don Antonio Cánovas, would have preferred a forcible suppression of the Carlists and a restoration by a free Cortes. But the army leaders saw no reason for prolonging the interregnum and decided on the course which would divide Spain least. Don Alfonso had already issued a satisfactory proclamation; and in December 1874 he was raised to the throne by the action of the military party. Government was first established on a firm basis; and the Carlist provinces were then systematically conquered and put on the same legal footing as the rest of Spain.

§ xviii. *Military Ascendancy.*—The events of the

period from September 1868 to December 1874 set the seal on the ascendancy of the army. Since 1874 no Spanish Ministry has ever dared to take any step repugnant to the army. Consequently, there has never been any need to "bring the troops into the street"; and in that sense the *pronunciamiento* of 1874 was the last of the *pronunciamientos*. All parties or political groups have submitted to the control of the army. In 1907, for instance, the army chiefs, indignant at the prevalence of anti-militarist propaganda, forced the Liberal Ministry to pass the "Law of Jurisdictions," which subjected all persons accused of insulting the army or agitating against discipline to trial by court-martial. This powerful weapon is generally used with mildness, but, when occasion arises, as in the case of Ferrer in 1909, extreme penalties are exacted.

From the moment of the establishment of comparative political stability in Spain, the main interest of Spanish history for a foreign observer lies not in changes of government, which have been numerous, but in the character of the government, the changes noticeable in popular feeling, the loss of the remains of the Spanish Colonial Empire, and the relations of Spain with European Powers and with North-Western Africa.

§ xix. *Character of the Spanish Government.*—For a time there was an alternation in office of Conservative and Liberal. Cánovas, the Conservative leader, was the author of the present Constitution, which was modified in a democratic sense by his Liberal rival, Sagasta. Cánovas was murdered by an anarchist in 1897; his death broke up the Conservative group, and Sagasta became the dominant figure in Spanish politics until his death in 1903. Sagasta's death broke up the Liberal group; and since 1903 there has been a great lack of stability in Spanish government.

With this instability there has been a drift towards a definitely progressive order which promises well for the future, and the country has passed through crises which in earlier times would have produced violent

internal convulsions. The death of Alfonso XII in 1885 was the first of these crises. Alfonso left two daughters by his second wife, Maria Cristina of Habsburg-Lorraine; and the Queen was with child. The two civil party leaders and the army chiefs took effectual measures to vindicate the Queen's right to the Regency and to suppress disorder. The birth of a son—the present King of Spain—confirmed her authority. A further crisis arose with the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, and was met in a similar way by the co-operation of the party-leaders with the army chiefs.

Since 1874 the Spanish Government has, on the whole, deserved well of the country; it has fulfilled the monetary obligations of the State and restored credit; material prosperity has advanced, though Spain has not been provided with sufficient internal communications; such disorders as have occurred have been neither enduring nor extensive.

§ xx. *Material Prosperity and Social Changes.*—The cessation of civil wars has brought a considerable increase in material prosperity, which in turn has reduced the risk of renewed internal strife. In the Basque provinces, once so turbulent, the development of the iron-mining industry has wrought a complete change. Foreign capital has given employment not only to natives but to large numbers of immigrants from other parts of Spain. The unity of Biscay has been broken into; and the old social order—with the predominance of the Señor and the Cura—has been dissolved. The ideals and aspirations common to all industrialized districts have replaced the aristocratic and martial order of the still mediæval Biscay of two generations ago. A revival of Carlism is no longer possible.

These new ideals have brought their own troubles, and socialism has produced violent disorders and revolt in this and other parts of Spain. Much of the discontent which has prevailed in recent years has, however, been an indirect consequence of the Colonial

disasters and of the African policy of the Government.

§ xxi. *Revolts of the Colonies.*—The colonies had always been a drain on the resources of Spain, even when they seemed most profitable to her. But before the year 1810 they had been loyal; and few troops were sent to them from the mother-country. After the revolt of all her possessions on the mainland of America, north and south (1810 to 1820), the case was altered. "The Indies" became a bottomless pit into which the poor resources of Spain and the lives of tens of thousands of Spaniards were uselessly poured. Service in them became hateful. Dread lest they should be sent to South America, to perish by the diseases which were incomparably more fatal than the arms of the insurgents, had driven the soldiers to support the *pronunciamiento* at San Juan in 1820. The loss of the mainland colonies was really a great relief to Spain. The obstinacy of King Ferdinand VII, who thought that his royal dignity forbade him to recognize the independence of his former subjects, left Spanish shipping, and even the coasts, open to the attacks of privateers sailing with Colombian and other commissions. After his death, the independence of the Spanish-American Republics was recognized, and more or less friendly relations were established.

What still remained to Spain, that is to say, the Greater Antilles and the Philippines, would have formed a fine colonial empire, had they been treated as colonies. But they were looked on rather as dominions. The Philippines were left in the hands of religious orders, whose members took the place of parish clergy, and were both ignorant and fanatical. To them were added garrisons under officers who acted on the belief that they were sent to make their fortunes. The source of the wealth accumulated by well-known Captains-General in the Philippines was notorious.

The case of Cuba and Porto Rico was little better. Many Spaniards, when driven from the mainland, had brought their capital and industry to Cuba; and

the island appeared to flourish. It is to be noted that the trade of Cuba, which is about one-fourth larger than Ireland, has been equal to the whole commerce of Mexico, which is four times as large as France. It has been proved over and over again that Spaniards can work the land in Cuba. Since the island has become independent, a steady stream of Spanish emigrants has flowed to it; and they have shown that they can not only flourish, but drive by their competition the less industrious and less intelligent negro off the land. But certain influences always opposed the colonization so long as Cuba belonged to Spain. All those who were interested in the unlawful slave-trade resisted the establishment of white settlers. The administration, civil and military, was always corrupt; and Cuba was victimized by a commercial tyranny. Spain was never able to supply her own colonies. The goods sent out were commonly of foreign origin. All that Spain could do was to attempt to force the colonists to receive these goods through her, with all the addition to cost which followed from double brokerages and trans-shipments. Cuba, for instance, was forbidden to import wheat except from Spain, which does not produce enough for home consumption. Wheat was therefore bought in Russia, trans-shipped from foreign vessels in Spanish ports, and re-exported under the Spanish flag at a greatly enhanced price. The actual profit to Spain was enjoyed by middlemen and traders. Manufactured goods were made in Spain by foreign capital, and for the ultimate benefit of foreigners, and were exported as Spanish. But the persons immediately concerned in this traffic found their advantage in it. They were influential at home, and were represented in Cuba by crowds of agents who lived in the towns and were formed into bands known as volunteers, whose real function was not to maintain, but to overawe and control the Government. The disasters which culminated in the loss of Spain's colonial possessions can be traced largely to these men.

A mere list of the disorders, revolts, and ferocious

wars in the island of Cuba would be almost as long as the record of Spain's internal conflicts. During the last thirty years of the connection there were three so-called wars. One, which synchronised with the Revolution of 1868, lasted ten years, and was waged by the burning of plantations, obscure skirmishes in bush and forest, and murder. It was terminated by Martinez Campos after the restoration of Alfonso XII. The promises he made were broken; and another revolt, commonly called "the little war," broke out in the eastern part of the island. It ended with a victory for the mother-country. Then came the final series of convulsions, attended by even more than the usual barbarities, which finally provoked the intervention of the United States, and led to the total loss of all that remained of Spain's colonial empire. The desperate attempt of the mother-country to retain her hold on her ill-used possessions has now become a matter of ancient history. But the consequences which the defeat involved for Spain are part of the contemporary history of the country.

The immediate effect of the loss of the Greater Antilles and the Philippines was advantageous. Much capital was brought back to Spain, and a great stimulus was given to home industry. There was for a time a welcome prospect that the Spaniards were at last about to apply themselves to the hitherto neglected task of developing their own country; and something has undoubtedly been done, though far less than might have been achieved. The manufacturing industry of Catalonia did, indeed, suffer very severely by the loss of the protected colonial markets. In 1897, the year before the war with the United States, the goods exported amounted in bulk to 5,414 tons, of the value of 25,000,000 pesetas (£1,000,000 at par). In 1906 exports had fallen in bulk to 195 tons, and in value to 926,000 pesetas. And at the latter date the exchange was heavily against Spain. Such attempts as were made to replace the loss of the colonial markets by developing exports to the Levant and to South America

were not successful. Yet the exports of Catalonia at the best of times amounted only to 15 per cent. of the total output. The deficiency might have been more than made good by the increased demand which would have followed a revival of prosperity at home. For a time there was a great appearance of activity. Much was begun in the way of developing the great mineral resources of Spain; and a stimulus seemed to have been given to industry outside of Catalonia. Yet, though something was won permanently, these hopes were in the main disappointed. Even in the mining industry, where Spain has so many advantages, the advance during the years before the Great War was trifling when compared with the possibilities of development.

In 1888 the number of mines for which concessions had been granted was 16,987. The number actually worked was 2,278—and many of them in a superficial way. In 1909 the number of concessions had grown to 26,003; but the number of mines which were actually worked had fallen to 1,741. The amount produced, whether of coal, iron, or copper, had, indeed, increased. The output of coal had risen from 2,514,000 tons to 3,664,000 between 1900 and 1909. But iron was nearly stationary, with 8,786,000 tons in 1909, as compared with 8,675,000 tons in 1900. The output of copper in 1900 was 2,714,000 tons, and it had grown only to 2,955,000 tons in 1909. It was in vain that the Government imposed undeveloped-mine taxes on holders of concessions who made no use of them. These measures of coercion produced little effect. They have commonly been treated in the spirit of the old Spanish and Spanish-American formula, which said that the King's laws were to be *obedecidas y no cumplidas*—that is to say, put on the statute-book and never applied. The desire to make much money quickly and without work of their own has led holders of concessions to demand excessive prices. Spaniards who possess capital (and the number of them is larger than is generally supposed) are reluctant to invest their fortunes at home. They prefer to keep them in foreign banks, where they are

known to be safe. The development of native resources is left to foreign capitalists; and these are deterred by many difficulties peculiar to the country.

§ xxii. *The Present Reign.*—Though the hopes entertained after 1898 have been largely disappointed, there can be no doubt that Spain has advanced in material prosperity during the last twenty years. The loss of the two West Indian islands and the Philippines put a stop to a heavy drain on the population and the resources of the mother-country. If too little has been done to develop the agriculture and the mining wealth of Spain, there has at least been no extensive outbreak of internal disorder. The riots and excesses of 1909, which were provoked by the decision of the national Government to intervene in Morocco, were confined to Catalonia, and lasted but for a very short time. The admirable example set by the Regent had done not a little to restore respect for the monarchy. Her son, Alfonso XIII, who attained his majority in 1902, has been careful to observe the limits imposed on a Constitutional Sovereign. His marriage to the Princess Victoria Eugénie of Battenberg in 1906 was acceptable to his subjects, because it connected him with the Constitutional monarchy of Great Britain, and seemed to show a determination to depart from the former close connection with the clerical and absolutist Bourbon and Habsburg family circle. The general conviction of the Spaniards, that the King had acted by the advice of Pope Leo XIII, whether it was well-founded or not, was at least evidence as to what they wished to be true. They wished to remain monarchical in political loyalty and Catholic in religion; but they were no less desirous of being freed from absolutism, and of being reconciled to the world outside the bounds of Roman Catholicism. The personal courage shown by the King when an attempt was made to murder him and his bride on their marriage-day, together with the proof of confidence which they gave by driving through Madrid, without a military escort, immediately after-

wards, touched popular sentiment. Many Spaniards who were hostile to their government were yet prepared to allow that Don Alfonso XIII was *simpático y valiente*, likeable and brave. On the surface, at least, there appeared to be signs that Spain had at last attained to a condition of stability and was about to enter on a period of true prosperity.

## II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

### (1) RELIGIOUS

THE power of the Church in Spain is very great, so great indeed that, in the unlikely event of a conflict between the two, it might even outweigh that of the army. The Spaniards are, generally speaking, tenacious of old customs; and the practices of the Roman Catholic Church, its forms, formulas, and ceremonies, are closely interwoven with the daily life of the people. There is no doubt an increase of indifference among the men, who, it is generally acknowledged, go less frequently to church than they used to do, and habitually speak ill of the clergy; but they are neither anti-clerical nor inclined to dispense with the services of the churches. The women are the mainstay of the Church, and could not live without its rites; and the men recognise and approve of this. Among the moneyed and governing classes and the army officers, even where there is no personal devotion, there is a general conviction that the Church helps to preserve the spirit of obedience and discipline. Politicians of all shades usually take care to affirm that they are good Catholics; and there is no doubt that the faith of many Spaniards is deep-seated and sincere.

In spite of the fact that the Faith is largely held, and that there is little active hostility to it, the Church in Spain regards itself as under a grievance. In 1834 the financial difficulties of the Government, and the envy and ill-feeling which prevailed against certain classes of the clergy, brought about the confiscation and secularisation of the material property of the Church. The wealth of the Church had been concentrated in a

few hands. The Archbishops, Bishops, Chapters of Cathedrals, Collegiate Churches, and Monastic Orders enjoyed by far the larger portion of it. The Benedictines and their offshoots, especially the Cistercians, were very wealthy. The monks were unpopular landlords. They worked their estates with small permanent staffs and large gangs of labourers, hired and dismissed in spring and autumn. Married people were generally forbidden to live on their estates. The monks were often possessed of feudal superiorities and rights of "higher and lower justice." The Friars, "Preaching" and "Begging," Dominicans and Franciscans, as well as others who were not claustrate and were drawn from all classes, were less disliked, though they, too, were often rich. The most general cause of the unpopularity of the Religious Orders was the fact that all land that passed into their hands went into mortmain, and never came on the market, and that the price of the remnant which could be held by laymen was consequently enhanced. The comforts and immunities of religious life, moreover, naturally provoked much envy; and various attempts to secularise Church lands had met with considerable support.

In the later days of the old monarchy the Pope had been persuaded to sanction the financial expedient of secularising certain monastic lands, but always with the proviso that the expropriated Orders should be compensated. But the great attacks on Church property began in 1808. In that year, Napoleon ordered a confiscation of one-third; and in the following year Joseph Bonaparte ordered a general confiscation. In face of the national resistance to the invaders, neither order could be executed. The Cortes, to meet the expenses of Government, carried out a partial and irregular confiscation; but after the return of Ferdinand VII a general restoration was decreed. It was, however, found impossible to carry it out; many monastic houses had already been ruined, and many tenants of the secular clergy had been emancipated. The process was repeated in 1820. The great spolia-

tion (*el grande latrocinio*) took place during the period 1833-34. During these years 76,734 lots of house and landed property belonging to the regulars, and 69,539 lots belonging to the secular clergy, were sold by the Government, a sum estimated at £35,000,000 being realised. This was far below the value of the property; but the needs of the Government had driven it to what were really forced sales. There had also been much favouritism and collusion; and much good land had changed hands at four or five years' purchase. Ridiculous prices had also been obtained for house property. After 1844, what remained unsold was restored to the Church. This remnant has been still further diminished at later dates; and only a few fragments now remain in the hands of the Church.

This wholesale confiscation has never been forgiven. But while it is manifestly true that the Archbishop of Toledo, for example, to-day has a stipend of 30,000 pesetas (£1,200), subject to a deduction of 20 per cent. since the war with the United States, in comparison with the £60,000 a year of his predecessors drawn from land or feudal incidents, it must be remembered that the parish clergy were worse off then than they are to-day. They were dependent on the tithe and what they could obtain from their parishioners as fees. The tithe had in part been granted to the King by the Pope. Much had been alienated by the Bishops; and the laymen who held the tithe, subject to the obligation to support the parish priests, paid them sums of £3 to £6 a year.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The dates of the successive steps of the great spoliation show that the process was prolonged. In 1834 the Liberal Government suppressed the monastic houses which openly gave help to Don Carlos. At the same time, all houses of less than twelve members were closed, and their property was taken. In 1835 the Jesuits were expelled. In 1836 all Orders of Regulars other than the missionary, teaching, and nursing Orders were suppressed as illegal, and their property was confiscated. In 1837 the tithe was abolished, and the property of the secular clergy was taken. The Government undertook to provide in future for the maintenance of the clergy and the repair of the churches.

The confiscation of the Church-lands had naturally led to a suspension of relations with the Papacy. After the fall of Espartero's Regency, and the declaration of the majority of Isabel II, the *Moderados*, who were then in office under the leadership of General Narvaez, were anxious for a reconciliation. Some of the Conservatives were in favour of a complete restoration of all that had been taken. No such wholesale return of what the Church had lost was possible. Narvaez and his colleagues could only give back such part as had not already been sold (1845). They would willingly have arranged a Concordat; but the demands of the Papacy were excessive, and negotiations were broken off. Narvaez retaliated by confiscating certain revenues which the Papacy received from Spain.

A Concordat was at last made in 1851, and is still the basis of the relations of the Spanish Government and the Curia. But, though it has never been formally denounced by the Spanish Government, it has been suspended on several occasions in times of revolution, and has been much modified. On the face of it, the Concordat of 1851 seemed to restore the Church to the position it had held before 1833. The Pope did, indeed, recognise the validity of the sales effected before the signing of the Concordat. But the Church of Rome was recognised as the only lawful form of worship. Education was placed under clerical control. Public authorities were bound to aid the Bishops in suppressing pernicious books and doctrines. The Church was to enjoy full ecclesiastical freedom as defined by the Canon Law. The right of the Church to the endowments which still remained was affirmed. The State bound itself to support the secular clergy. The Church was to be fully authorised to acquire and hold property both real and personal.

But no diplomatic document could be truly valid when one of the two parties to it was itself in so unstable a condition as the Spanish Government of the middle years of the nineteenth century. In less than ten years the Concordat had been grossly violated. It

had never been accepted as final by the Liberal or "Progressive" parties. After the military revolution of 1854, the enemies of the Church came into power, and acted as if the Concordat had never been made. When Spain settled down again under the Ministry of O'Donnell (1858-63), the so-called *Union Liberal*, which was in fact a Moderate-Conservative coalition under military leadership, a new settlement had to be made with the Papacy. It was arranged in 1859. The Holy See was then threatened by the steady advance of the movement which aimed at the unification of Italy. It could no longer put its demands as high as they had been in 1851. The Pope not only recognised sales which had already been effected by force, but agreed that all the remaining property of the Church should be handed over to the State in return for 3 per cent. bonds. The bargain was a good one for the State, for the land remained and could be sold; the bonds were already depreciated, and suffered much loss of value amid the general disasters of Spanish finance.

The budget of the Church, as fixed at the time of the Concordat (1851), was £1,250,000. If the stipends of the parish clergy were small (as low as £22 a year in country parishes), they were better than the portions which had been given formerly. The settlement of 1859 has not been more loyally carried out than the first Concordat. During the revolutionary period (1868-74), the payment of clerical stipends was for a time suspended. This suspension did much to produce the reaction which led to the re-establishment of the monarchy. The anger it aroused was not wholly due to the religious or clerical sentiments of the people. The budget of the Church was assessed on a particular tax. When the payments to the Church were suspended, the tax was not taken off. The parishioners, therefore, found that they were still called on to pay money to the Government for the support of the Church, and also to provide by voluntary contributions for their parish clergy. They resented this double demand as grossly unjust. State payments to the clergy were resumed after the

Restoration. Yet, if the Spanish Government had had to deal only with the secular clergy, the Concordat of 1851, as modified in 1859, would probably have provided a good working compromise. After the restoration of Alfonso XII there was a renewal of disputes with the Papacy. When Cánovas was seeking support he had made promises which he did not find it convenient, or even possible, to fulfil. He had undertaken to pay arrears, to increase the budget of the Church, to give it full control of education, to suppress all other forms of worship, and, in short, to put it in actual possession of all it could claim under the Concordat of 1851. He avoided compliance by slipping out of office, and leaving a substitute to repudiate his promises. The Church was disappointed; but the mass of the secular clergy were content with what they could get, and there was no wish, even among Conservatives, for clerical domination.

The real difficulty, as between the Spanish Government and the Curia, has always arisen from conflicts concerning the position of the monastic Orders. It has been seen that they had been (with certain exceptions) declared illegal in 1836. Yet in 1904 there were in Spain 2,656 houses of women occupied by 46,030 nuns and sisters, and 597 houses of men, whose members numbered 10,630. Both included small minorities of foreigners, 1,357 women and 838 men. The point at issue has always been whether the Concordat recognised the claim of the Church to exist in all its parts by its own right, or whether no "congregation" could lawfully exist save with a special authorisation of the Government. It is to be observed that 2,274 of the houses of women and 509 of the houses of men were duly registered. Special new laws have been proposed and not passed, or passed and not applied. Negotiations with the Curia have been begun and suspended, and the matter has never been settled.

A foreign observer cannot at once understand why the question has been raised at all. Fifty thousand Religious in a Roman Catholic country of 19,000,000

inhabitants does not appear to be an excessive number; and the large majority of these Orders are devoted to beneficent and charitable purposes, which were always declared to be lawful. Only 717 of the houses of women, and 75 of those of men are classed as "contemplative." Four-fifths of the total number of Religious are women. On the face of it there would appear to be no reason to suppose that these Religious, who are in the majority of cases engaged in teaching, nursing, or charity, can constitute a danger to the lay community. And it must be conceded that there is an element of make-believe in much of the denunciation of the "congregations." The real reason why the Orders are assailed is because they afford the most plausible excuse for an attack on the whole Church and the dynasty.

*The Use the Church makes of its Resources.*—It is obvious that Religious Orders which possess no confessed endowments must depend on the voluntary offerings of the faithful. It is no less obvious that, being independent bodies, they can make what use they please of the money given them. Now it is commonly asserted that the collections made by the Religious Orders are very great, and that, by means of them, the Church is once more in possession of no less than a third of the total wealth of the nation. It no longer holds great stretches of land in mortmain, but it has investments of all kinds which give it a dominating control of the national industries. And it is asserted that the resources obtained in this way are employed in the general interest of the Church all over the world. When clerical writers point to the poverty of the secular clergy as a proof of the poverty of the Church, they are constantly told that the budget, out of which stipends are paid and buildings kept in repair, is by far the smaller part of the wealth that the Church commands. It is manifestly impossible, except for the few who are fully informed of the financial affairs of the Church, to know how far these estimates of its means are based on facts. There can, however, be no doubt that the

Church has invested largely in the railways, and in other forms of industry, manufacturing and agricultural. The influence which the clergy can always exercise in every family is reinforced by the means it possesses of advancing or hindering the fortunes of the men in business.

And these means of influence are in the hands of the Orders. The Episcopate in Spain is chiefly recruited from them, and not from the parish clergy. In the upper classes the women look far more to the Regulars for religious guidance than to the Seculars. With all these ways of persuading or applying pressure at their disposal, it is but natural that the Orders, acting with the co-operation of the Bishops, should have defeated all attempts to limit their numbers or control their growth. In 1902 they obtained a Royal Decree which explicitly permitted the formation of new communities on the sole condition that they were approved by the Bishop, and duly reported to the Governor of the Province.

The reactionary attitude of the Orders, especially in educational matters, has earned them the hatred of the urban working classes; but there is also a large economic element in this hatred. These Orders engage in industrial work; and their competition is considered unfair, because they can undersell all competitors. No wages are paid to their members, who are entitled only to their food and lodging on a thrifty scale. It is true that their agents who tout for business do not scruple to quote this fact as the reason why they can work cheaper than other tradesmen. From the point of view of the working classes their activity is hateful, because it tends to keep down wages which are already very low. During the riots in which the house of the Escolapios in Barcelona was destroyed, a religious establishment of women which supported itself by needlework was invaded, gutted, and set on fire by a mob of sempstresses and female factory hands. Spaniards of the working classes, while quite ready to profess sympathy for the parish clergy who are as poor

as themselves, are the bitterest enemies of the monastic Orders. The sentiment is not wholly modern. In 1834 the first steps taken to secularise Church property were accompanied by massacres of hundreds of friars both in Barcelona and Madrid. The immediate pretext then was that the Religious were suspected of having caused an epidemic of cholera by poisoning the wells, for the purpose of destroying the Liberals. Such a monstrous fable would not have been believed if there had not been a predisposition to think evil of the Orders. It is but just to add that the friars had set the example by preaching that the cholera was a judgment of God on the Liberals for their opposition to Don Carlos and the Church.

## (2) POLITICAL

The Government of Spain is, by law, a Constitutional Monarchy. The existing Constitution dates from June 30, 1876, and is of a liberal or even democratic character. It guarantees the personal freedom of all Spaniards from arbitrary arrest, and provides that no tax shall be imposed, and no law passed, without the consent of Parliament (the Cortes). The Cortes is divided into two Chambers—a Senate (*Senado*) and a House of Representatives (*Congreso*).

The Senate is composed of:—

(a.) Senators by their own right and for life (*Vitalicios*) who are: all sons of the King or of the Heir-Apparent who have attained their majority; Grandees of Spain, not being subjects of a foreign sovereign,<sup>1</sup> who can prove the possession of an income of 60,000 pesetas (£2,400); the Captains-General of the army and the fleet; the Patriarch of the Indies, and the Archbishops; the Presidents of the Council of State, of the Supreme Court, of the Court of Accounts, and of the councils of the army and the navy. All who are Senators *ex officio* must have held office for two years.

<sup>1</sup> There are several grandees of Spain who are not Spaniards. The Duke of Wellington is one.

(b.) Senators named by the King, from classes specified in Article 22 of the Constitution.

(c.) Senators who are elected. They must be chosen from these same classes. Twelve classes in all are named, and they consist of public servants of high rank, or of men of means, if they possess titles without *grandeza* or have held municipal office. They number in all 187, and form one-half of the House. They are chosen by the Archbishoprics (9), or by academies, universities (of which there are 10), and economic societies (21); all others are elected by provincial delegates, delegates of the municipalities, and the largest tax-payers. They are eligible for re-election.

The Congress is composed of one deputy for every 50,000 inhabitants. The deputies are chosen for five years, the legal life of a Cortes. The electoral body is composed of all men over twenty-five years of age, who possess civil rights and have been resident in the constituency for two years. The exercise of the power to vote is in theory compulsory.<sup>1</sup>

A long list of authorities, all Spaniards, writers of note and public men who have held high office, could be quoted to support the assertion that this Constitution has frequently been disregarded. The fact that the Government often suspends the constitutional guarantees, and that accused persons are sometimes tried and condemned by courts-martial for such offences as riot, or what would be treason-felony in Great Britain, is enough to show that the theory of government does not always coincide with its practice in Spain.

The authorities referred to above are no less unanimous in asserting that the real Government of Spain is what is known in the political slang of the country as *El Caciquismo*, the rule of *Caciques*. This word, taken from the vocabulary of Spanish-

<sup>1</sup> For a summary of the Spanish Constitution see W. F. Dodd's *Modern Constitutions* (1909), II, 198-216.

American Indians, is the equivalent of the American "boss." It is by no means easy to say what enables a particular man to become a *Cacique*.<sup>1</sup> There may even be no general rule. Landowners, agents of landowners, lawyers, mere bullies who can rely on the support of politicians at Madrid, are *Caciques*. They have local influence, and some of them are said to use it well. But the prevailing quality of *El Caciquismo* is bad. It covers the country like a net. It confers or refuses favours, grants or denies office, gives or withholds the use of irrigation canals, grants time or applies pressure for the payment of taxes, employs ruffians to beat and kill. The Congresses it returns are composed of its agents, and contain hardly any representatives of the industry and property of the kingdom. And it could readily be suppressed if the people, or even a determined minority of them, would act against it. The Spaniards, however, who denounce it most eloquently can suggest no remedy.

Yet it may well be that this passive attitude is in a way justifiable. *Caciquismo* will not disappear till there has been a great moral and intellectual reform in Spain. Constitutional Government has been a farce, as the best-informed Spaniards are the first to affirm, because it is neither understood nor liked by the vast majority of the people. The *Congresos* chosen in such conditions consist of nominees of Ministers or of *Caciques*. They are bound by no common principles. A majority soon dissolves under the influence of personal rivalry or self-seeking. Laws are never properly discussed, and even the budget is rarely debated. Though there has been some improvement, the public administration still suffers from the application of the rule that to the victors belong the spoils. Parliamentary activity has never been more than an agitation on the surface. Spaniards who see its faults

<sup>1</sup> For a full treatment of this subject by many competent hands see *Oligarquía y Caciquismo como la forma actual del Gobierno en España*, published by the Section of Historic Sciences of the Madrid Athenæum, 1902.

quite well have been known to maintain that, without the control exercised by the army, the Church, and the public offices, a Parliamentary election in which the voters were left free would simply produce anarchy, because the various parts of the country are not united enough in interest, sentiment, and opinion to allow of the formation of a working majority. The experiment which has just been made does not appear to have shown that they were wrong.

Factions can, indeed, exist in such conditions as these; they can even abound. What is not possible is the existence of a united party which can count on some measure of support in all parts of Spain, and such a measure of support in the country as a whole as would enable it to rely on its own strength, and, therefore, to pursue an independent and consistent course.

There have, however, been certain general characteristics which make it possible to classify all these diverse and wavering bodies under heads which do really correspond to differences of principle. Before the Carlist War of 1833-40, a real distinction could be made between those Spaniards who strove to bring about a change in the essential character of their Government and those who wished to maintain the old order. Liberals or Progressives were for change; *Serviles* or Apostolics strove for preservation. The Carlist conflicts introduced a new division between those who accepted Isabel II and her descendants as heads of the State and those who adhered to the rule of succession established by Philip V. They are known as the Dynastic and Anti-Dynastic parties. Since the Revolution of 1868, the Anti-Dynastic parties have been reinforced by the Republicans. The Carlists are in reality a clerical party; their chiefs have resigned themselves to accept Constitutional principles. There is little or no political difference between them and the Dynastic parties; but they do not agree as to the power they are disposed to allow to the Church.

Some of the Republicans would be prepared to accept a Constitutional Monarchy; but they aim at the

destruction of the Monarchy in their own country because they are afraid that it will never be honestly constitutional, as in Great Britain, Italy, or Belgium; also on the ground that it is guided by clerical influence. The Socialists, who have arisen but recently, are hostile to the whole existing order of the State, political and social. Carlists, Republicans, and Socialists are all more or less divided among themselves.

The Dynastic parties have been Conservative or Liberal in name, but they have in practice been little more than rival "connections" held together—when they have acted in concert—by leaders whose influence was personal. Both have always been at the mercy of the army.

An account of Spanish parties would be incomplete without some mention of the Regionalists. The two bodies known by this name would be much more accurately described as Catalans and Basques. These are the two industrial and manufacturing peoples in Spain. They have old traditions of local government, and languages of their own.<sup>1</sup> Both suffer from the delays, corruption, and perpetual interference of the bureaucracy at Madrid. They profess to be striving for a measure of local self-government which will give them power to control their own affairs. Their complaints are well founded, and their claim has an appearance of justice. But both suffer from a weakness in their position which will make it difficult for them to obtain what they desire. Catalonia and Biscay alike flourish, because a rigid, even an exaggerated, system of protection gives them the monopoly of the home market. Under a real system of "regionalism" the other provinces of Spain from Galicia and Asturias

<sup>1</sup> Everybody knows that the Basque is a separate language. But foreigners sometimes assume that Catalan is a mere dialect. This is a mistake. Catalan is a true language, akin to the Southern French. It has been used for government and literature. It is the speech of daily life in Catalonia, Valencia, and the Balearic Isles, with local modifications.

down to Andalusia, which are agricultural and pastoral, would certainly refuse to remain tributary to Catalonia and Bizcaya. Moreover, their demands are presented in ways which provoke anger. The Basques do not so much as profess to be Spaniards. The Catalans are fond of asserting that they are a "Latin" people, who belong to Europe; whereas the Castilians—i.e., all the inhabitants of the central tablelands which form five-sevenths of the peninsula—and the Andalusians are, according to the Catalans, semi-African and "gypsified" (*Agitanados*).

### (3) SOCIAL

The lack of trustworthy statistics renders the task of giving a satisfactory account of the conditions of the working classes in Spain one of extreme difficulty. The facts are known only in a general way. Such information as we do possess points to the conclusion that about one-quarter of the population is engaged in agriculture, while only seventy-five in the thousand are employed in other forms of productive industry, including mining. One-third of the latter classes are to be found in the provinces of Barcelona and Bizcaya—that is to say in parts of Catalonia and the Basque provinces. The war has stimulated employment in some districts, in the manufacturing regions of Catalonia for instance, and in the iron-producing parts of Bizcaya. There has been an increase in wages, but it has been accompanied by a more than proportionate rise in the cost of living. Outside the favoured districts there has been acute distress.

The poverty of Spain is due, firstly, to natural causes; secondly, to bad administration and obstinate adherence to a faulty economic policy. Don Lucas Mallada, in his work on "The Evils of our Country" (*Los males de la Patria*), has calculated that 10 per cent. of Spain is bare rock; 35 per cent. is naturally unproductive soil, lying at a great height or destitute of water; 45 per cent. is fairly good land, lying where the communications are difficult, and ill-watered because it

has to rely on the rainfall, which is very erratic throughout the interior of Spain. The remaining 10 per cent. is good soil advantageously situated. The drawbacks due to bad communications could have been modified by better management; even the lack of navigable rivers might have been to some extent made good. Very little has been done to remedy these drawbacks.

The true sources of the country's wealth are its agriculture and pasture (*industria agropecuaria*). They are precisely those sources which have been the most neglected. Agriculture has suffered chiefly from systems of land tenure which have militated against good cultivation. Among them the most injurious have been the excessive sub-divisions of the soil, due to divisions, not of ownership of land, but of rights held under heritable or perpetuable leases.<sup>1</sup> The cultivation of the land is left to men who are too poor, as well as too ignorant, to do it justice. Even where large estates (*latifundia*) are in the power of the owner, as in Andalusia, things are no better. The proprietor is an absentee who leaves the management to agents and middlemen. The land is worked by gangs brought from outside. In these conditions the agriculture of Spain is inevitably bad. Except near the French frontier, and in one belt of the Mediterranean coast, it is given up to antiquated routine. The total production is far below what it might be. Eleven bushels of wheat to the acre is the average, and the total output of the 4,000,000 hectares devoted to foodstuffs is not sufficient to feed the population; the 31,000,000 quintals grown in a good year fall about 2,000,000 short of what is needed. Where little is produced by hard labour with poor instruments, the poverty must needs be great. The results are seen in the wholesale emigration to North and South America. The conditions are worst in the south of Spain, and, perhaps, worst of all in the province of Jaen. The

<sup>1</sup> See, for a summary of these rights, Don Fermin Caballero, *Fomento de la Población Rural*, and Don F. de Cardenas, *Ensayo sobre la Historia de la Propiedad Territorial en España*.

labourers (*braceros*) are huddled in squalid outhouses, are paid very ill (about 1s. 3d. a day), and are fed on inferior bread mixed in salads with vinegar, a little oil, and vegetables. Agrarian outrage is naturally more common here than elsewhere; it was in Andalusia that the outbreak of Agrarian Socialism, known as the "Black Hand," took place.

The condition of the industrial workmen is scarcely better. Wages are low; and the protective customs' barrier drawn round the country has naturally raised the price of living. The *consumos* (*octroi* duties) levied in all the towns on most of the necessaries of life have had the same effect. In the year 1902 the *consumos* amounted to 194·25 pesetas per head for the inhabitants of Madrid. Whereas the cost of living increased by 216 per cent. between 1827 and 1902, the rise in wages was on the average only  $18\frac{2}{11}$  per cent. The average in 1827 was 2·75 pesetas a day. In 1868 it was 3 pesetas, and in 1902 it was 3·25 pesetas. Since that year the prices of food and rents have increased, and there has been no proportionate increase in wages.

It is inevitable that discontent should be rife, and even that it should take the form of violence. Only the facts that the industrial population concentrated in cities is relatively small, and that the agricultural population is thin, much scattered, and deeply divided into small communities with few or no connections outside their own borders, have saved Spain from convulsions as great as those which have shattered Russia. Bitterness of feeling has been intensified by the common belief that the monied classes habitually escape paying their fair share of the public burdens by the use of influence or bribery.

A Government so embarrassed as the Spanish has always been is unable to do much for the working classes, even when it has the wish. The desire has been shown both by legislation and by the foundation of the "Institute of Social Reform," which dates from 1903. The Institute replaced an older commission. Legisla-

tion in favour of the working classes may be said to have been one of the results of the Revolution of 1868. In 1870 a law was passed to grant freedom of association to workmen. In 1900, and again in 1903, other laws were passed to secure compensation for accidents to workmen, and to give protection to women and children. It is, however, generally acknowledged that the employers have always been able to evade the application of these laws. Some employers, both in Catalonia and the Basque provinces, have shown a desire to help their workmen by founding savings banks, pension funds, and hospitals; but these well-meant efforts also have had small effect, and have too often been short-lived.

The rise of Socialism has stimulated the Church to make efforts to improve the lot of the working classes. Christian Socialism has had eloquent advocates in Spain. These clerical efforts have been more effective in the country districts than in the towns, where they are much distrusted. The workmen dread them as being merely levers for schemes to increase the power of the Church, while they are too poor to be able to do much for themselves; and the mutual distrust which makes co-operation so difficult among Spaniards, and the tendency of every Spanish association to dissolve into sections, have prevented any appreciable amelioration of labour conditions.<sup>1</sup>

#### (4) PUBLIC EDUCATION

Very little has been done by Government in the interests of education. Not only are the schools insufficient in number, but the training is usually superficial. This is largely due to the action of the Church, which has used its great influence and resources to oppose Liberal reform, and to subject education to ecclesiastical influences. Among the poorer classes, the members of the Escolapios, a teaching Order founded in the seventeenth century, are the main

<sup>1</sup> See Angel Marvaud, *La Question sociale en Espagne*.

directors of education. They give gratuitous education to the poor, but also take paying pupils. The money which they receive for the latter is applied equally to the education of the poor, the teaching for both classes of pupils being identical. The Jesuits are the chief teachers of the upper classes. The quality of the teaching is much criticised; it is superficial, and certainly aims at excluding modern criticism and modern science. Both Orders are detested by the Liberal parties and by the workmen in the towns. During the riots in Barcelona in 1909, the Jesuit College and the huge boarding school of the Escolapios were assailed. The former was successfully defended by the staff and pupils, but the latter was burnt to the ground.

Schools opened by English, American, and Swiss Protestant Missions in certain parts of Spain are, in spite of the strong Roman Catholicism of the Spaniards, much frequented by children of the working, and latterly also of the professional, classes, simply because they are known to give a better education than the native establishments. Increasing numbers of Spaniards go to England, France, and to a greater extent to Switzerland, to complete their education.

*Universities.*—The number of universities in Spain is sufficient, and they are well placed to serve the needs of the country. They are at Barcelona, Madrid, Oviedo, Salamanca, Santiago, Saragossa, Seville, Valencia, Valladolid. The list was at one time much longer; but several universities were suppressed, either in 1808 or in the time of change which followed the death of King Ferdinand VII. The existing bodies are all of long standing, the oldest, Salamanca, dating from about 1220, and the youngest, Seville, from 1504. In its present form Madrid dates only from 1836, but it was formed in that year by the incorporation of a college founded in the capital in 1770 with the University of Alcalá de Henares, which was created by Cardinal Ximenez in 1499. The University of Barcelona, which dates from 1450, was exiled to Cervera

by Philip V as part of the punishment he inflicted on the city for its obstinate adherence to his Habsburg competitor. But it was restored to Barcelona in 1836.

The Spanish universities have suffered from two causes. Their affairs were most corruptly mismanaged during the decadence of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were impoverished, and became almost entirely devoted to scholastic philosophy. It was a great misfortune for them that the indispensable work of reform and revival was done in a revolutionary epoch, and by men who were not only themselves not scholars, but could think of nothing better to do than to attempt to introduce a slavish imitation of the University of France. The so-called "Decree of Secularisation," issued on September 17, 1845, by the playwright and politician Antonio Gil y Zarate, who was then Director of Public Instruction, aimed avowedly at establishing a "University of Spain." It was in reality a decree of centralisation which struck at the independence of all the universities, and subjected them to the control of politicians in Madrid.

#### (5) FINANCES

The finances of Spain have always been embarrassed. No real improvement has been made during the whole of the recent history of the country. From the year 1808 down to the eve of the Great War, the rule has been that the expenditure has exceeded the revenue. Surpluses have indeed been shown; but the appearance of solvency has been obtained by manipulation of the accounts. In 1913 the Minister of Finance professed that there would be a surplus of 22,000,000 pesetas. But he secured this figure by not including "supplementary" and "extraordinary" expenditure.

It would, perhaps, be unfair to go back to the Peninsular War and the Carlist struggle; but from 1850, when the Government of Isabel II was fairly established, onwards, expenditure steadily ran beyond revenue. From 1850 to 1882 the average deficit was

80,000,000 pesetas. From 1882 to 1890 it was 88,000,000. Between 1891 and 1894 it sank to 49,000,000, and between 1894 and 1897 to 16,000,000. The insurrection in Cuba, and the war with the United States, threw the country back, and the deficits again increased. In 1912, though the Minister of Finance claimed a surplus of 16,000,000 pesetas, there was in reality a deficit of 70,920,000. Trade and revenue have indeed increased; but expenditure has increased at a still greater rate. In 1890 it amounted to 849,840,000 pesetas; in 1913 it had reached 1,142,730,000. The increase in 23 years was, therefore, 292,890,000 pesetas.

During the ten years preceding 1913 the trade of Spain increased by only 155,000,000 pesetas. It follows that the growth of the national debt has been constant. In spite of partial bankruptcies, dignified by the name of "conversions," "consolidations," and "taxes on interest of debt," the debt grew from 3,390,000,000 pesetas in 1868 to 9,830,663,206 in 1913. At the close of the nineteenth century, the interest on the debt absorbed one-half of the revenue. In 1913 it still took 400,000,000 pesetas out of a total estimated expenditure of 1,142,000,000.

*Sources of Revenue.*—On paper it would appear that the Spanish Government taps, or even drains, every kind of supply. The land tax (in 1913) produced 123,000,000 pesetas in the country, and 64,000,000 in the towns. Licences for industry and trade, 42,000,000; customs, 177,000,000; the tobacco monopoly, 155,000,000; income tax (*utilidades*), 147,000,000; death duties, 68,000,000; stamps, 90,000,000; mines, 10,000,000; poll tax (*cedulas*), 7,000,000; sugar, 41,000,000; alcohol, 16,000,000; the public lottery, 41,000,000; the octroi (*consumos*), 45,000,000; tax on transport, 28,000,000; matches, 13,000,000; explosives, 3,000,000; gas and electricity, 12,000,000. It is not positively certain that official statistics give an exact account of what is actually received; but it is beyond dispute that they do not show what would be paid if all taxable property bore

its just burden and the incidence of the taxes were fairly divided. The whole community is banded in a league to defraud the Government, which is itself, by common consent, "a thief."

Spanish Ministers cannot and do not even pretend to deny that concealments (*ocultaciones*) of taxable property are very common. In 1902 the Minister of Agriculture did not hesitate to assert in the Senate that land to the amount of 500,000 hectares (about 1,250,000 acres) in the province of Albacete had not been declared for the tax; 400,000 in Ciudad Real; 600,000 in Córdoba; 750,000 in Granada; and similar amounts in other provinces. In the province of Madrid the concealments have been declared to reach one-half the total taxable property.

In the case of land, discovery is comparatively easy when the Government is driven by need to be strict. The concealments of movable property, which are easier, are certainly not less frequent. Hardly a year passes in which frauds in the customs are not discovered and some collector is not found to have emigrated. It will, of course, be understood that everybody does not escape. The fortunate persons are those who are *Caciques*, or are in league with *Caciques*. The taxpayer who has no friends pays more than his proper proportion. It has been calculated that, whereas if the land tax were fairly assessed the average charge would be 2 pesetas per hectare, some owners pay from 75 to 100 per hectare, while others escape altogether.

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
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