

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 127

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



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



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
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EDITORIAL NOTE

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense ; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

*General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.*

January 1920.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL	
(1) Position and Frontiers	1
(2) Surface, Coast, and Water-supply	3
(3) Climate	6
(4) Sanitary Conditions	7
(5) Race and Language	7
(6) Population	9
II. POLITICAL HISTORY	
Chronological Summary	10
(1) Earlier History, to 1881	11
The Arab Invasions	11
The Barbary Pirates	12
A Turkish Vilayet	14
(2) Rise of the Senussi Confraternity	15
(3) Italy and North Africa	18
III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS	
(1) Religious	
(a) Mohammedan	31
(b) Jewish	37
(c) Christian	37
(2) Political	38
(3) Educational	
(a) Moslem	38
(b) Foreign	39
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS	40
IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	
(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION	
(1) Internal	
(a) Roads	41
(b) Rivers	41
(c) Railways	41
(d) Telegraphs	42
(2) External	
(a) Ports	42
(b) Shipping	44
(c) Cable and Wireless Communications	45

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[No. 127

	PAGE
(B) INDUSTRY	
(1) Labour	45
(2) Agriculture	
(a) Products of Commercial Value	45
(b) Methods of Cultivation	47
(c) Land Tenure	47
(3) Fisheries	48
(4) Minerals	49
(5) Manufactures	49
(C) COMMERCE	
(1) Domestic	
(a) Inland Towns and Oases	49
(b) Foreign Interests	50
(2) Foreign	
(a) Imports and Exports	
(i) By Sea	51
(ii) By Land	53
(b) Customs	53
(D) FINANCE	
(1) Revenue and Expenditure	54
(2) Currency	54
(3) Banking	54
(E) GENERAL REMARKS	55

APPENDIX

I. Preamble of Convention between France, Italy, and Tunisia, 1896	57
II. Extracts from Anglo-French Declaration, 1899	57
III. Royal Decree, 1911	58
IV. Explanatory Circular, 1911	58
V. Turkish Reply, 1911	59
VI. Agreement preliminary to Peace, 1912	60
VII. Extracts from Treaty of Peace, 1912	62
VIII. Italo-French Declaration, 1912	63
IX. Anglo-Italian Agreement, 1916	63
X. Tripartite Agreement between the British, French, and Italian Governments, 1917	65
XI. Extracts from British Agreement with Idris es- Senussi, 1917	65
XII. Extracts from Agreement signed by Sayyid Idris and the Italian Delegates, 1917	65

AUTHORITIES	67
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MAPS	69
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I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) POSITION AND FRONTIERS

LIBYA is a convenient name for the Italian possession on the north coast of Africa, between Tunis and Egypt. It extends southward to include Fezzan and Kufra, and is bordered by the French Sahara on the south-west, and by Egypt to the south-east and east.

The area of the province of Libya is uncertain, owing to the indefiniteness of its frontiers, but is estimated at 406,000 square miles. The extreme length from east to west is 940 miles; the breadth from north to south is 650 miles.

The boundary runs in an irregular line approximately south-west from Ras Ajir on the Mediterranean coast to Ghadames, and then crosses the Hammada el-Homra to a point a little south-west of Ghat (Rhat); thence it passes south-eastwards to the intersection of the tropic of Cancer with longitude 16° east. The eastern boundary follows the meridian of 24° east from the undefined southern limit as far north as the 30th parallel north latitude, and then turns in a north-easterly direction towards the Mediterranean coast, which it reaches in the neighbourhood of Sollum (El-Sellum). These boundaries are for the most part still undetermined.

(a) *Eastern Frontier*

The Turks recently claimed for Cyrenaica (the north-eastern extension of Tripoli) the territory west of longitude $27^{\circ} 54'$ east; the Egyptian Government the territory east of longitude $25^{\circ} 12'$, drawing a line from Ras el-Melh in a south-south-west direction, so as to include both the bay of Sollum and the oasis of Jaghbub

(Jarabub, El-Geghabuk). On October 19, 1911, the Italian Government, in deference to a protest of the British Government, withdrew their blockade of the Cyrenaic coast to the west of longitude $25^{\circ} 11'$ east, and on December 21, 1911, the British Foreign Office issued a statement that in 1904 both the Ottoman and the Italian Governments had been informed that the Egyptian frontier was to the west of Sollum, as an explanation of the fact that in the previous November the Egyptian Government had occupied that town.

The only official statement about the oasis of Jaghbub was made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons on November 9, 1911, to the effect that the Egyptian Government regarded Jaghbub as belonging to Egypt, and that both the Porte and the Italian Government were aware of this claim. Notwithstanding this statement, *The Times* on December 20, 1911, published a map including it in Libya.

By an agreement dated July 31, 1916, the British and Italian Governments deferred for the time being the consideration of the problem of the Libyo-Egyptian frontier.

(b) *Western Frontier*

In 1900 Italy arrived at an understanding with France that the latter Power would claim no territory east of the hinterland of Tripolitania, as defined by the Anglo-French Agreement of 1899.¹

In 1906 France made an agreement with Turkey that the Turks were to evacuate Janet, which they had recently occupied, and were not to advance west of Ghadames and Ghat, and that the French were not to pass east of longitude 6° east (of Paris, i.e. about $8^{\circ} 20'$ east of Greenwich).

In 1910-11 a Turko-French commission delimited the frontiers from the coast to Ghadames, and a second commission was on the point of completing this work at the moment when Italy declared war against Turkey.

¹ See Appendix II and foot-note.

(2) SURFACE, COAST, AND WATER-SUPPLY

Libya may conveniently be divided into four regions, as follows :

1. Tripoli (Tripolitania), on the north-west, which extends from Tunis to the great Syrtis (Sirte) desert. It consists of two zones ; a level coastal plain, dotted with fertile and well-populated oases ; and behind this plain a range of comparatively fertile hills, known as the Jebel.

2. Cyrenaica, on the north-east from the Syrtis to Egypt, which is a high limestone plateau intersected by deep wadis.

3. Fezzan, on the south-west, which is an arid desert, mostly of a rocky and mountainous character, but containing tracts of sand, and deep wadis in which oases occur.

4. The Libyan Desert, on the south-east, which is a level sandy desert of extreme aridity, containing very few oases.

1. *Tripoli* falls into two geographical divisions : the Jefara or plains, and the Jebel or hills. The coastal plains are edged by a line of dunes, behind which the land is low, and consists largely of *sebkha* (salt marsh) interspersed with oases. East of Tripoli town the dunes have increased to such an extent as to fill up the *sebkha* and bury most of the oases. At Misurata (Misrata) the coast turns south, and from this point to the Syrtis the dunes form a mere spit of land between the sea and the great salt marsh known as the *Sebkha Tawerga* (Taurgia). The oases which lie behind these dunes are the richest and most valuable land in Libya.

The Jefara plains are level, sandy steppes, broken here and there by hills and containing a number of oases. These, however, are of little importance. Apart from these oases, the plains are arid and barren until the foot of the Jebel is reached, where the fanlike deltas of the wadis descending from the hills produce a luxuriant vegetation.

The Jebel itself is a limestone plateau whose edge, running east-north-east and west-south-west, is cut by

wadis into the appearance of a mountain chain with summits of 2,000 ft. and over. Southward it falls away in high rolling steppes, drained by a series of great wadis debouching into the Sebkhah Tawerga. The beds of these wadis carry a few oases of minor importance.

The value of the soil depends entirely upon the water-supply, and hence cultivation is in general limited to the floors of the wadis and to the oases. The plains can at best only be grazed. Unsuccessful efforts have been made to open flowing wells, but the water is sometimes sub-artesian and rises nearly to the surface. In the oases near the foot of the Jebel the underground waters overflow sufficiently to be obtained naturally by wells or to irrigate the crops. The wells are shallowest and most productive near the coast.

Along the northern front of the plateau the rain falls in violent storms, but the resulting water soon sinks into the permeable soils, where it may subsequently become available for crops.

2. *Cyrenaica* consists, like Tripoli, of a coastal plain and an inland plateau, but in Cyrenaica the coastal district is a mere fringe to the plateau which constitutes the main bulk of the country.

The coastal plain is widest near Ben Ghazi, south of which town it is 30 miles across, but northwards it narrows very rapidly, soon shrinking to half a mile, and often being altogether absent. Except in the west, round Ben Ghazi, the coastal plain supplies little fresh water, and it is not very fertile. It consists largely of dunes, *sebkhah*, and beds of saline clay forming the bottom of dried lagoons.

The edge of the plateau forms an abrupt escarpment serrated by wadis, known as the Jebel el-Akhdar, with an average height of 1,000 ft. in the west and 2,000 ft. in the centre. Farther east, in Marmarica, the escarpment is known as Jebel el-Akabar and is lower.

The plateau lying behind this escarpment has a maximum elevation (in the eastern centre) of 2,500 ft.

Here it is composed of rolling downs. Elsewhere the downs are intersected by deep water-worn gorges, often containing luxuriant vegetation and sometimes even waterfalls, although for the most part the water-supply is bad. Southward the plateau gradually slopes away till it merges in the sands of the Libyan Desert.

The soil is generally light and scanty, but has a high degree of natural fertility, and would repay cultivation if a sufficient water-supply were assured. This is, however, lacking, as owing to the extremely porous quality of the rocks the rainfall readily percolates so deeply underground that most of the wells run dry in dry seasons.

3. *Fezzan*, the name of which is somewhat vaguely used, is here taken as including the Hammada el-Homra, the Jebel Soda, the oases of Jofra and Sella, and the Murzuk and Brak (Brach) districts.

The northern part of this region is a mountainous desert, known as the Hammada el-Homra or Red Desert, which is exceedingly arid and affords a very serious obstacle to communications. Westward it extends across the Tunisian frontier south of Ghadames; eastward it is prolonged south of Jofra by the Jebel Soda or Black Mountains.

The southern part of Fezzan is a low-lying basin consisting in part of *hammada* (mountainous desert) and in part of *edeyen* (sand-dune desert), intersected and drained by three wadis running eastward. These contain numerous oases, some of which, e.g. Murzuk, the chief town of the region, are of considerable importance.

On the extreme west of this region are two important Saharan trading cities, Ghadames in the north and Ghat in the south.

4. *The Libyan Desert*. This territory is a vast tract of sand, almost entirely devoid of relief, variety, or water. It contains various oases along its northern margin, among which are Sella and Aujila; in the south is one group of oases collectively known as Kufra, and important as the head-quarters of the Senussi.

(3) CLIMATE

There are two seasons: the hot or dry season from May to October; and the cold or rainy season from November to April. Rain never falls during the dry season, but in May and June the air still contains a good deal of moisture, and heavy dews keep the vegetation fresh. These cease about the end of June, when all vegetation outside the limit of the oases dies till the early rains begin in October, increasing by degrees to the maximum in November, December, and January.

Temperature. Though Libya is an extremely hot country, the effect of its high temperature on health is discounted by the fact that the atmosphere is dry during the hottest season.

In Fezzan, and to a less extent on the Tripolitan Jebel, the nights are cold, and frost is not unknown. In the hottest weather at Murzuk the thermometer generally drops to 59° F. (15° C.) at night; during the cold weather it never rises above 75° F. (24° C.), and often goes down to freezing-point. This cold weather lasts from the middle of December to the end of January. On the high plateau west of Ghat the nights are cold even in summer.

The mean temperature varies, approximately, inversely as the rainfall, i. e. it is higher in the east than in the west, and higher inland than on the coast, while the Jebel has a lower temperature than the plains at its foot.

Rainfall. The total mean rainfall is practically equal to that of the drier parts of Italy, but differs in being concentrated over a few months of the year, when it often causes floods. It is more abundant in the western regions and near the sea. Cyrenaica has a markedly lower rainfall than Tripoli. In the Jebel the rainfall is naturally high, and it is also probably higher on the Cyrenaican plateau than at the seaports, such as Ben Ghazi, Derna, and Tobruk.

(4) SANITARY CONDITIONS

The climate of Libya is not unhealthy. During the hot weather the dryness of the air is favourable to health, and the prevalent diseases are due rather to the insanitary habits of the natives and absence in the past of sanitary control than to natural conditions.

The chief diseases to be guarded against are malaria, which is widespread in all the oases and in the neighbourhood of the *sebkha* or salt marshes; dysentery; syphilis; ophthalmia, which, in one form or another, is practically universal among the natives; leprosy, and tuberculosis.

March to May and October to December are the most healthy months. Prolonged stay on the marshy and malarial coast should be avoided, and all movements and severe labour arranged to take place as far as possible in the early morning or evening.

Contaminated water is a great source of danger, but since the Italian occupation deep wells have been sunk in the large towns and in the chief villages of the Tripolitan Jebel, and here the water is both drawn and stored under proper sanitary conditions.

The water brought down by the wadis in the rainy season is quite unsafe for drinking purposes, and is likely to cause dysentery.

(5) RACE AND LANGUAGE

The population of Libya embraces two main elements: Berbers (Hamitic) and Arabs (Semitic).

The Berbers represent the aboriginal stock of northern Africa, which calls itself Imaziren or Imosharh. Their primitive stock and language are most completely preserved by the Tuaregs, but the universal sway of Mohammedanism naturally tends to spread the Arabic language.

The Arabs completely overran the coastal regions, but never penetrated far inland. In the western part there is a great admixture of Berber blood, but the

Arab stock becomes progressively purer towards the east. In language, manner of life, and character the Berbers differ widely from the Arabs. They are for the most part sedentary agriculturists, whereas the Arabs, except in the coast-towns, are generally nomadic. Again, the small tribes into which the Berbers are subdivided are united not so much by blood, like the Arabs, as by the occupation of one group of villages; the larger tribes being rather confederations of such groups than closely organized units.

The majority of Arabs are nomadic and pastoral. Each tribe has its own territory, beyond which it must not graze its flocks, and the oases in which the nomads sow and reap their crops and gather dates are strictly apportioned to the several tribes, and even to the sub-tribes.

The Tuaregs are nomad Berbers of the Sahara. In type they are tall and slight, of fair complexion, with black curly hair, and black or blue eyes. They are inclined to be predatory and intractable.

The Tebus, like the Tuaregs, are nomad Hamites of the desert. They live chiefly in the Libyan Desert, and have permanent settlements in certain of the oases.

The population of the oases is very mixed. Inter-marriage between Arabs, Berbers, and negroes has been so common that a fairly homogeneous type, uniting certain characteristics of each of these races, has established itself. In general this population is physically poor and unhealthy.

In the Arab-Berber population there are certain distinctive elements:

(i) The *Sherif* (plural *Shurfa*) tribes, or descendants of the Prophet, who in Tripoli are principally found at Wadan (Weddan) in the oasis of Jofra, in the Msellata region, and on the coast near Tripoli and Khoms (Homs).

(ii) The *Marabut* (plural *Marabtin*) tribes, who trace their descent from individual saints (see p. 32). These tribes often possess great religious and therefore political influence, which is, generally speaking, hostile to European ideas and rule. In Cyrenaica, however, the Mara-

butts are merely landless groups of families, economically dependent on the *saadi* (owners of the soil).

(iii) The *Kologhli*, or descendants of the Janissaries settled in Tripoli.

Jews are numerous and important in the coastal towns, while negroes, brought from the south as slaves, have exercised a considerable influence on the blood of the oases and coast-towns, besides having their own quarters in every considerable Libyan centre of population.

(6) POPULATION

According to the census of August 3, 1911, the native population numbered 523,176; the civil European population, mostly Italians and Maltese, was estimated at 5,000-6,000.

The distribution of the population is primarily governed by the water-supply, and hence the greatest concentration is to be found in the rich coastal oasis of Tripoli, where the water is abundant and good. Tripoli has a population of 68,000, and of the other coastal oases Ajilat has 7,000, Zanzur nearly 5,000, and Khoms (Homs) 3,000.

The Jefara has a very low population, consisting of nomads and a few sedentaries at the chief oases. The Jebel, on the other hand, has a tolerably dense Berber population, living in countless scattered villages; a village may contain 500 to 700 souls, but is generally much smaller. Farther south the population is much more scanty, and is mostly concentrated at the oases.

In Cyrenaica, Ben Ghazi has 32,000 inhabitants; Derna, 6,000; no other coastal town has a population of any size. Inland there are hardly any permanent settlements, except the town of Merj (3,000).

Farther south, in the Libyan Desert, there are no nomads except a sprinkling of Tebus. The oases are also somewhat scantily populated; the densest is Aujila (4,000). The whole of Kufra contains probably not more than 5,000 people.

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- 8th century B.C. Phoenician colonies in Tripolitania.
 631 B.C. Cyrene founded by Greeks.
 321 B.C. Cyrenaica part of kingdom of Egypt.
 67 B.C. Cyrenaica a Roman province.
 46 B.C. Tripoli a Roman province.
 5th century A. D. Vandals overrun north Africa.
 533 A. D. Libya recovered for the Byzantine Empire.
 642 First Arab invasion of Libya.
 11th century. Second Arab invasion of Libya.
 14th–19th centuries. Tripoli centre of Barbary pirates.
 1510 Tripoli captured by Spain.
 1518 Corsair Khair ed-Din Governor of north Africa under Ottoman sovereignty.
 1539–51. Tripoli held by Knights of St. John at Malta.
 1578 Tripolitania and Cyrenaica become a Turkish province.
 1714 Karamanli dynasty founded in Tripoli.
 1816–31 Expeditions of Great Powers against pirates.
 1835 Last Karamanli deposed ; Libya becomes a Turkish vilayet.
 1843(*circa*) Beginning of Senussi Confraternity ; Mohammed ben 'Ali first Grand Sheikh.
 1859–1902 Mohammed el-Mahdi Grand Sheikh.
 1869 Tripoli and Ben Ghazi separate vilayets.
 1881 French occupation of Tunis.
 1899 Anglo-French Convention delimiting southern Libya.
 1901 Franco-Italian Agreement as to Tripoli.
 1902 Ahmed esh-Sherif, Grand Sheikh of Senussi.
 1903 Italian monopoly of concessions in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.
 1911 Italian landing in Tripoli and Cyrenaica.
 1912 Treaty of Lausanne. Organization of Italian Libya.
 1914–15 Italians driven back to coast towns.
 1916 Senussi attack on Egypt defeated.
 1917 Sulaiman el-Baruni appointed Turkish Governor-General of African vilayets.
 1917 Agreements between Senussi and British and Italian Governments.

(1) *Earlier History, to 1881*

THE region of northern Africa which the Italians call 'Libia', extending from Tunis on the west to Egypt on the east, has, ever since the invasion of the Arabs in the seventh century A. D., been a derelict country. For its glories we must go back to the times of the Greeks and Romans. The indigenous race, the Berbers, who still form the bulk of the population, have never risen to any high stage of civilization. In historical times the Phoenicians were the first foreigners to settle in what is now Italian Libya; and they founded, perhaps in the eighth century B. C., Oea (the modern Tripoli) and Leptis Magna (Khoms), which later formed part of the empire of Carthage. In the eastern part of the district the Greeks in 631 B. C. founded the famous city of Cyrene, from which the name of Cyrenaica is derived. Barca (Merj) and Ben Ghazi were colonized from it. In 321 B. C. Cyrenaica became part of the Egyptian kingdom of the Ptolemies, under whom there began a considerable immigration of the Jews. In this region, which became a Roman province in 67 B. C., Greek civilization continued to maintain itself against romanizing influences. The Tripoli region, which became a Roman province in 46 B. C., was more completely romanized, though the Berber villages were organized under their own chiefs and retained their native customs and language. By the fourth century A. D. Christianity had become the prevalent religion. The Roman power was overthrown by the Vandals; but Tripoli, with the rest of north Africa, was in 533 A. D. recovered for the Byzantine Empire under Justinian. About 590 A. D. it was detached from Africa and added to the 'diocese' of Egypt. Meanwhile the country had been greatly depopulated by religious persecutions of the Berber Arians and general misrule.

The Arab Invasions. The Arab invasions, beginning from Egypt in 642 A. D., led to the capture of Carthage in 697, and the spread of the Moslem Empire over the

whole region. The latinized and hellenized populations of the coast towns migrated to Sicily and Spain; and thus the Roman civilization disappeared from the whole country. The Berbers held out a little longer, but about the beginning of the eighth century made their peace with the Arabs and embraced Islam *en masse*. They, however, about 740 joined with one accord the heretical sect of the Kharejites—their descendants the Abadites or Ibadites are strong in the Jebel Nefusa to this day—and revolted, thus producing a series of practically independent states. The Arab invasions in the eleventh century were on a far larger scale, and resulted in that permanent intermingling of the Berber and Arab races which has persisted to the present day. During the succeeding centuries Tripoli was sometimes under the sway of Morocco or Egypt, more often the prey of a succession of local adventurers; for some time it enjoyed a certain degree of local self-government under the Hafsids of Tunis.

The Barbary Pirates. From the fourteenth century onwards many of the Berber coast towns—Tripoli among them—deprived of all access to the surrounding country by their fierce Arab neighbours, were driven by sheer stress of poverty to organize a regular system of piracy, which for nearly five centuries continued to be a standing menace to merchant traffic. The Christian Powers made various attempts to establish settlements on the African coast; and Tripoli was in 1510 captured by Spain and in 1539 handed over, together with Malta, to the keeping of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. But in 1518 the famous corsair, Khair ed-Din (the brother of Barbarossa), who had been successful in driving out the Christians, offered the sovereignty over Barbary to the Sultan, and was made Turkish Governor of northern Africa, with a force of Janissaries to support him. In 1551 his successors drove the Knights of St. John out of Tripoli, and made it henceforward the head-quarters of their piratical expeditions. By 1578 the sovereignty of the Ottoman

Empire over northern Africa, from Egypt to Algeria, was complete; and Tripolitania together with Cyrenaica became a Turkish province. The Pasha, however, was soon replaced by a Dey elected by the Janissaries of the Turkish garrison, and this ruler's dependence on the Sultan became little more than nominal. The practice of piracy was continued, and led to many punitive expeditions undertaken by outraged Christian Powers, especially England and France. In 1714 an Arab chief, Ahmed Karamanli, in the absence of the Pasha, murdered 300 Turkish officials and native chiefs, and succeeded by bribes in obtaining from the Sultan recognition as hereditary Dey and Pasha and in founding the Karamanli dynasty, which ruled over Tripoli and the neighbouring coast towns until 1835. There was, however, no change either in the outer or in the inner state of the province. Piracy was practised as assiduously as ever and, as before, resulted in punitive expeditions.

At last, in 1815, the crying scandal of the Barbary pirates was seriously taken up by the European Powers at the Congress of Vienna; and the task of liberating the Christian slaves in their possession and of suppressing all piratical acts for the future was entrusted to England. In 1816 Lord Exmouth, commanding a British fleet and supported by a Dutch squadron, succeeded in releasing all the Christian captives at Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, but he failed to suppress piracy. In 1818 the Great Powers again met at Aix-la-Chapelle and once more decided that Barbary piracy must cease to exist. In 1819 a formidable Anglo-French squadron made known to the three pirate governors the decision of the Powers. The Beys of Tunis and Tripoli at once submitted; the Dey of Algiers remained defiant, till his power was overthrown by the French conquest of Algeria in 1830. The Bey of Tripoli's submission was merely nominal, and he soon found himself again involved in quarrels with various European States. In 1825 a Sardinian squadron burned his fleet. In 1826 a French squadron liber-

ated three Papal ships which his corsairs had captured, and at the same time levied a heavy indemnity. In 1830 the French Admiral Rosamel compelled him to pledge himself to abandon piracy and the enslavement of Christian subjects. In 1831 the British Admiral Dundas imposed on him a fine of 200,000 piastres in payment for losses which he had occasioned to British subjects.

A Turkish Vilayet. Troubles with foreigners had for their consequence troubles at home. A civil war broke out, which in 1835 served as a pretext for intervention by the Turks, who, alarmed by the French conquest of Algeria, and resolved to keep a tighter hold for the future on what still remained of the Ottoman dominions in Africa, landed an army of 6,000 men at Tripoli, deposed 'Ali Karamanli, and proclaimed the whole region to be under the direct government of the Sublime Porte. Nejib Pasha, the commander of the expedition, was appointed Vali or governor of the whole vilayet, which was divided into the five sanjaks of Tripoli, Jebel Gharian, Murzuk, Khoms, and Ben Ghazi. Fezzan, however, was not resubjugated till 1842, after the assassination of its independent ruler 'Abd el-Jalil; and serious revolts, instigated by the famous Ghuma or Rhuma, sheikh of the M'hamid Arabs, broke out in 1842, 1844, and 1855 in the Jebel district. To prevent a return to the old days of the independent Pashalik, the Ottoman Government at first changed its Valis at short intervals. In 1869 Ben Ghazi (or Barca) was separated from Tripoli and made into an independent vilayet. In 1872 it was reunited, only to be again separated in 1879. In course of time the country settled down under its Turkish governors and Turkish garrisons; and though in 1881, after the French occupation of Tunis, the Porte increased its garrisons to some 9,000 or 10,000 men, the inhabitants, Berbers and Arabs alike, regarded their Turkish rulers with favour as the protectors of Islam against possible Christian aggression.

(2) *Rise of the Senussi Confraternity*

Meanwhile there was spreading from Cyrenaica a great religious movement, which was destined some 70 years later to become the centre of Moslem resistance to the Italian occupation of Libya. About 1843 Mohammed ben 'Ali es-Senussi, the first Grand Sheikh of the new Senussiya Confraternity, founded his first convent (*zawiya* El-Beida) in the Jebel el-Akhdar near Derna, and was so successful in his missionary efforts that the whole country within range of Ben Ghazi and Derna was soon covered with his *zawiyas*. About the same time his fervent disciple, the Sultan of Wadai, contributed largely to the spread of his doctrines in the far south. The Grand Sheikh's long visit to Mecca (1846-55) served to strengthen his hold over his followers both in Libya and Arabia. In 1855 he returned to the *zawiya* El-Beida, but after a few months' stay withdrew—probably to avoid Turkish pressure, as the growth of his Confraternity was regarded with great suspicion by the Ottoman Khalif—to the more remote oasis of Jaghbub (Jarabub), where he died in 1859 and was buried. The extraordinary success of Mohammed's Confraternity, compared with that of other modern Moslem foundations, seems to have been mainly due to his choice of a locality for his chief activity where he could, without fear of interference from existing temporal powers, realize the true Moslem ideal of a theocratic state, knowing no distinction between religious and secular power, wherein the strict Moslem life, carried out in accordance with the rules of his own *tarika* (way of life), could be practised without let or hindrance from Turk or infidel.

His son and successor, Mohammed el-Mahdi (1844-1902), a man of high and vigorous character, who, when he grew to manhood, enjoyed all his father's reputation for holiness and wisdom, made it his chief work to enlarge and consolidate the Senussi Empire; and until the last few years of his life his efforts were attended with equal success. Under his sway the

zawiyas of his order extended from Morocco to Damascus, to Constantinople and even to India; and in the Hejaz of Arabia his followers were numerous.

In most of these countries the Senussiya occupied a position in no respect more powerful than that of many other Moslem Confraternities. But within a line drawn from Tripolitania through Ghadames and Ghat to the north-west corner of Lake Chad, then east to Wadai and from Wadai north to Kufra and on through the oases of Siwa and Jaghbub to Derna in Cyrenaica, Mohammed el-Mahdi soon became the most powerful sheikh, having all the authority of a territorial sovereign. The stronghold of the Order was Cyrenaica and the eastern oases. Within these wide limits the oases on the caravan routes between north and west were occupied by his followers; trade, especially in slaves, with Ben Ghazi and Tripoli was encouraged; and law and order were maintained among the wild Bedouin of the desert. Like his father, again, he refused to allow himself to be drawn into any political complications, which might have damaged his prestige within his own dominions. Thus in 1872 he resisted the overtures of Prussian agents; in 1877 he declined to send troops on the Ottoman Sultan's behalf in the Russo-Turkish War; in 1881 he remained unmoved by Italian presents and flattery; in 1882 he refused support to Arabi Pasha's insurrection in Egypt; in 1883 he denounced the conduct of the Dongolese Mahdi in the Eastern Sudan; and, rather than raise the question of Turkish sovereignty, which had in 1889 been accentuated by a visit of the Pasha of Ben Ghazi at the head of some troops to Jaghbub, he withdrew in 1895 from that oasis to Jof in the still more remote oasis of Kufra.

El-Mahdi's retirement to Kufra was soon disturbed by two events: the French were advancing from the Congo and threatening Wadai; and in 1898 the new Sultan of Wadai, unlike his predecessors, was showing considerable hostility to the Senussiya. To meet these difficulties, El-Mahdi in 1899 again shifted his head-

quarters still farther south to Guro in Wadai, whence he tried to organize measures of defence against the French, proclaiming a *jihad* against them in 1901. His lieutenants, however, soon suffered a severe defeat at their hands; and a few months later, on May 30, 1902, the second Grand Sheikh died at Guro.

His two sons Idris and Riza being boys of 14 and 13, El-Mahdi was succeeded by his nephew and son-in-law, Ahmed esh-Sherif, born in 1872, as the third Grand Sheikh. To be out of reach of the French, the new sheikh retired to Kufra, and for ten years, though sensual and luxurious in his habits and far weaker in character, he steadily pursued the peaceful policy of his predecessors, like them carefully avoiding all foreign complications and taking no part in the resistance offered by his followers to the French advance in Borku and Wadai (1906-10). The first danger to threaten him came from the 'Young Turks', who were proposing a survey of landed property and compulsory service in the army for the whole empire. In 1908 they sent two envoys to Kufra to persuade the Grand Sheikh to allow Kufra and Jaghbub to be placed under the Ottoman flag; on that occasion, however, Ahmed managed to elude their request. Two years later he changed his mind and invited the Vali of Ben Ghazi to send a Turkish *kaimakam* (governor) to Kufra—probably as a protection against further Christian aggressions, which had already restricted his sphere of real influence to the comparatively narrow limits of the Libyan Desert, whereas for his grandfather and uncle the whole Sahara had been free and open to their propaganda, unfettered by the British on the east or by the French on the south and west, and undisturbed by the Turks, whose rule practically did not extend beyond the coast towns and a handful of military posts in the interior. Whether the Grand Senussi Sheikh and his followers would have permanently submitted to any further peaceful penetration on the part of the Young Turks, themselves suspected of being half-infidels, may well be open to doubt;

but, before the question was raised, Turks and Senussi alike found themselves face to face with the more pressing danger of the Italian invasion.

(3) *Italy and North Africa*

The ambition of Italy to hold possessions in northern Africa goes back to a period several years before the Italians became a united nation. So long ago as 1838 the patriot Mazzini is credited with the words: 'North Africa belongs to Italy'; and in 1866, when the opening of the Suez Canal was about to revolutionize the position of the Mediterranean Sea in the political geography of Europe, Bismarck, wishing, as events proved, to detach Italy from its sister Latin State, wrote to Mazzini: 'Italy and France cannot be associated for their common benefit in the Mediterranean: . . . The Empire of the Mediterranean must be the constant preoccupation of Italy, the fundamental thought of the Florentine Cabinet.' But, quite apart from ambitions for the future, the Italians had even at that time many permanent interests on various coasts of the great inland sea. In Tunis alone 50,000 Italians, mostly Sicilians, lived and prospered, so that the Regency was regarded almost as an appanage of Sicily. In Egypt the Italians were as numerous as the French, having schools, hospitals, and newspapers of their own. To Morocco and Tripoli Italian missions, both official and private, were often sent, and resulted in successful enterprises, like the well-known arms factory at Fez conducted by officers and non-commissioned officers of the Italian Army. Through the old influence of the Venetians the Italian language was still spoken on the Austrian, Turkish, and Greek coasts of the Adriatic; and in the Levant the *lingua franca* spoken in all the seaports was nothing but corrupt Italian. Thus, though the Liberal statesmen then at the head of the Italian Government, whose aims were only concentrated on the internal development of the new kingdom, would have nothing to do with a policy of colonial adventure, the idea was widely prevalent in

Italian political circles that, whenever the anticipated dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire took place, Tunis and Tripoli would fall to Italy's share.

In 1878 Italy came away from the Congress of Berlin empty-handed, and deeply mortified at the results. Bismarck, backed by the Russian and Austrian plenipotentiaries, had indeed suggested to the Italian plenipotentiary the occupation of Tunis; and, when he refused, made the same offer to the French plenipotentiary, who accepted it as compensation for the occupation of Cyprus by England and that of Bosnia by Austria. The French occupation of Tunis was, however, deferred for three years; and, though in 1880 M. de Freycinet suggested to the Italian Government an Italian occupation of Tripoli to counterbalance a possible French occupation of Tunis, yet, when the latter was carried out in 1881 without protest either from Great Britain or from Germany, Italian indignation knew no bounds. The result was that Italy, looking round for allies, found a refuge, as Bismarck wished her to do, in the Triple Alliance side by side with Germany and her old enemy Austria (May 20, 1882). The new alliance secured her against Austrian or French aggression on the mainland; and a renewal of her old friendship with England in 1882-5 secured the *status quo* in the Mediterranean as regards naval affairs.

When, in 1887, the Triple Alliance was renewed, new clauses were added regulating the relations of Italy and Austria in the Balkan Peninsula; and the most important of these provided that, if the *status quo* in the Balkans were disturbed by a third party so that one of the contracting parties gained any advantage over the other, the other should be at liberty to seek for compensation elsewhere, even outside the Balkan Peninsula—a provision which induced Italy in 1908 to acquiesce in the Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Austria in 1911 to acquiesce in the Italian annexation of Libya.

Meanwhile relations with France were unsatisfactory, and led to an eleven years' tariff war, 1887-98. For the greater part of this period Crispi was at the

head of affairs, dreaming of a great Italian Empire, which was to start from the new colony of Eritrea in East Africa, absorb Abyssinia and the Upper Nile, and so work round to the Tripolitanian hinterland and thence northwards to the Mediterranean coast. During his temporary fall from power, the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1891, defining the frontiers of the Egyptian Sudan, put an effective bar to his policy of encirclement; and in 1896 the disaster of Adowa in Abyssinia forced him once more from office and delayed any further Italian colonial expansion for fifteen years.

Rudini, who succeeded Crispi, gave up his predecessor's policy of colonial adventure, and at the end of the year formally recognized¹—for the first time—the French occupation of Tunis. Two years later, the united efforts of the Francophil Foreign Minister, Visconti-Venosta, and the Italophil French Ambassador, Barrère, succeeded in concluding a commercial treaty, which at last put an end to the disastrous tariff war between the two countries; and, though in 1899 the Anglo-French Convention,² defining the limits of the British and French spheres of influence in the more remote interior of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, roused some irritation in Italy, the tension was speedily relieved in 1900 by Visconti-Venosta procuring a further understanding with the French Government that France would claim no territory to the east of this territory, and also by a definite agreement in 1901 that France would give Italy a free hand in Tripoli on condition that Italy would renounce all claims to interfere in Morocco. Shortly afterwards Great Britain announced her acquiescence in the Italo-French Agreement; and it was generally thought that Italy would attempt an immediate occupation of Tripolitania. She, however, contented herself for the moment with a policy of 'economic penetration', procuring from the Porte in 1903 a monopoly of all commercial concessions in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

In 1911, the activity of France in Morocco, followed

¹ See Appendix I.

² Ibid. II.

by the 'Agadir incident' and Germany's diplomatic defeat in the ensuing negotiations, roused a wave of excitement throughout Italy. Popular feeling called for an immediate occupation of Libya to counter-balance French successes in Morocco, and forced an unwilling Government to avail itself at once of its liberty of action under the old bargain with France and England of the years 1901-2. The Italian Government tried to safeguard itself by communicating the design both to the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. France gave her hearty consent; Germany and Austria, though they did not—in view of the international situation—interpose their veto, yet, being hand in glove with the Young Turks, counselled half-measures, such as a demand for additional economic privileges. But the Italian Government found it impossible to resist the popular demand, and, notwithstanding its well-founded fears of the hostility of Austria and of once more raising the Eastern Question in an acute form, decided in August 1911 on immediate action.

On September 5 the Italian Government addressed a note to the Porte demanding the full recognition of its economic privileges in Libya, and threatening energetic measures if all the obstacles put in its way by the Young Turks for the last three years were not removed. The Porte, relying on German and Austrian support, at once declared its readiness to negotiate. But, when the Italian Government further demanded full liberty to plant Italian colonies in Libya, the Porte made no reply, and even dispatched a steamer to Tripoli carrying munitions of war. On September 27, the day of the arrival of the steamer at Tripoli, the Italian Foreign Minister telegraphed an ultimatum. The Porte returned a temporizing answer. On September 29 Italy declared war.

The Italian Government, knowing that its expeditionary force was not ready, seems to have hoped that a naval demonstration would suffice to effect the desired object. On September 29 and 30 Italian destroyers sank two Turkish torpedo-boats at Prevesa

in Albania—an action which brought down Austria's veto upon all further operations in the Adriatic or Ionian Seas. A squadron of the Italian fleet appeared off Tripoli on October 1, and, after a perfunctory bombardment, which was preceded by the withdrawal of the Turkish garrison, landed 2,000 sailors who occupied the city on October 5, while a second squadron occupied Tobruk in eastern Cyrenaica on the same day. But not till October 11 did the first transports appear at Tripoli. The week's interval made all the difference between a practically unopposed occupation of Tripolitania, where the Arabs, by no means well disposed towards their Turkish masters, seem to have been quite ready to surrender, and a long, tedious, and costly war. The Turks made good use of these days of grace to appeal to the religious fanaticism of the natives, to distribute arms, and to organize a formidable resistance. Meanwhile, 34,000 Italian troops had arrived, and in the course of a week occupied with little difficulty the coast towns of Khoms in Tripolitania and of Ben Ghazi and Derna in Cyrenaica. All went well till October 23. On that day the Turko-Arab forces attacked the Italian lines in front of Tripoli, while the Arabs of the city and the suburbs suddenly rose and attacked the Italians from the rear. Though the Italian forces were never in any real danger of defeat, the losses were heavy; and subsequent military operations were not energetically pushed.

From that time onwards the campaign resolved itself into an occasionally active defence of the coast towns originally seized—with only one or two additions—and the occupation of their immediate environs. The Home Government was more occupied with diplomatic difficulties, caused partly by the Royal Decree of November 5¹ (announcing the annexation of the Turkish provinces and declaring Italian sovereignty over the whole region), than with the military prosecution of the war; and, when peace came, it was due not to any crushing defeat of the Turkish forces in Libya

¹ See Appendix III.

but to the threatened outbreak of the First Balkan War, which forced the Turks to sign the Treaty of Lausanne on October 18, 1912.

The final solution of the difficulty was, from a legal point of view, exceedingly unsatisfactory. The public document¹ known as the Treaty of Lausanne makes no mention either of the Italian annexation of the two provinces or of Italian sovereignty over them, but only of the Turkish evacuation of the two provinces and of the Italian evacuation of the Dodekanese on the coast of Asia Minor so soon as the Turkish evacuation of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica should have been completed. But, in addition to the public document, the two Powers three days earlier signed another agreement,² whereby the Sultan was on the one side bound, without indeed waiving his claim of sovereignty, to concede to the two provinces full and complete autonomy and a promise of new laws and regulations, but was at the same time allowed to nominate a permanent representative, holding office for five years, for the protection of Ottoman interests, and also a Kadi—with power to nominate local Naïbs or deputies—to administer the sacred Mussulman law among the Mussulmans of the two provinces; while the King of Italy, on the other side, though he was allowed in the preamble to recite the law of February 25, 1912, subjecting Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to his full and complete sovereignty, was bound to give to the inhabitants the fullest liberty to practise the Mussulman religion, and to acquiesce (1) in the continued mention of the name of the Ottoman Sultan as Khalifa in the public prayers, (2) in the permanent presence of the Sultan's representative to protect all Ottoman interests, and (3) in the Sultan's nomination of the Kadi, or Chief Judge, for the administration of the sacred Mussulman law.

The practical results of the Treaty of Lausanne were but little more satisfactory than the legal. Tripolitania, it is true, was immediately evacuated by Neshat Pasha

¹ See Appendix VII.

² Ibid. VI.

and his Turkish regulars, now reduced to 2,500 men, while the native garrisons in the interior melted away, most of them joining the Turko-Arab forces in Cyrenaica. But in Cyrenaica the peace was merely nominal. There Enver Bey, the Turkish commander, prepared to continue the war, and succeeded in inducing the Grand Senussi Sheik to announce that he would consider no terms of peace until the last Italian had left Cyrenaica.

Meanwhile, in Tripolitania the majority of the native chiefs sent in their submission. First the great coast zone of the Jefara, then, after the defeat and flight of Sulaiman el-Baruni, the powerful Berber chief of the Jebel Nefusa, the whole of the Jebel region, were successfully pacified. Still farther south, Mizda, Sokna and the Fezzan were occupied; and the Italians entered Murzuk, the chief town of the whole region, on January 3, 1914. The oasis of Ghat was occupied at the end of the summer. They now felt their position in Tripolitania secure, and hurried on their work of peaceful organization in the newly-won province, which they had begun as soon as they had occupied the city of Tripoli. They improved the harbours, made roads, laid down railways and telegraphs, founded schools and hospitals, organized the civil and military establishments, and, exchanging their attitude of exaggerated distrust for one of complete confidence, enrolled large numbers of natives as soldiers, gendarmes, and police—a measure which was destined to work disaster when the Great War broke out.

In Cyrenaica the Turkish officer Aziz Bey, on Enver Bey's departure, had taken over the command, and, assured of the active co-operation of the Grand Senussi and his followers, and helped with money and munitions by the Egyptian Nationalists, had organized a formidable force in a strong position some ten miles south of Derna. For some months the Italians tried negotiations with the Turkish commander, but about April 1913, when all their persuasions had proved useless, they opened a new campaign. After some successes in the western zone, on May 16 at Sidi Gharba, nine miles south of Derna, they received

a severe check, which served to inspire the Arab defence and even to incite to new revolts tribes that had previously submitted. From this time onwards the Italians changed their policy; they made no attempt to advance, but waited till the Turko-Senussi forces had collected in some definite camp, and then dispersed them by means of strong mobile columns transported from place to place by sea. This policy was attended with some measure of success, so that by the end of 1913 the Italians considered themselves masters of the whole coast from Ghemines, south of Ben Ghazi, for 400 miles as far as Tobruk on the east, and of a belt of the hinterland some 25 miles wide.

In 1914, before the outbreak of the Great War, the Arabs remained quiet in Tripolitania and Fezzan, though there is some evidence that the Grand Senussi was sending his agents far and wide among them preaching a holy war. In Cyrenaica the Italians, making but little progress, tried a policy of blockade, hoping thereby to starve the enemy into submission.

With the outbreak of the Great War in August 1914, the difficulties of the occupation increased. Encouraged by his long and successful resistance against the Italians in Cyrenaica, and instigated by the Turkish officers and advisers around him, Sayyid Ahmed seems to have dreamt that at last the moment had come when he could drive the Italians not only out of Cyrenaica, but from Tripolitania as well, and thus realize the ambitious scheme, suggested to him by Enver Pasha two years earlier, of making himself full temporal sovereign of all the vast domain in Libya over which he had hitherto exercised only spiritual control.

Trouble first showed itself in Fezzan, long a stronghold of the Senussiya. A native rising took place, followed by a mutiny of the native levies, who formed half of the Italian garrison. The Italians thereupon evacuated the whole region. On their disappearance, Mohammed el-Abid, the ablest of the Grand Senussi's brothers, installed himself at Murzuk as the Senussi governor of Fezzan, and at once set about organizing rebellion farther north.

In the early months of 1915 the Senussi propaganda, supported by Turkish and German agents, spread like wildfire through the length and breadth of Tripolitania. The Italians increased their garrison by 6,500 fresh troops, but failed to stem the rising tide. The Declaration of War against Austria on May 23 acted as a signal for a general rising. The Italians began to abandon their inland posts, and by the middle of July the evacuation was complete; only the coast towns of Tripoli and Khoms remained in their possession. In Cyrenaica the Italians were confined more strictly than ever to the coast; and Sayyid Ahmed established his head-quarters at the frontier port of Sollum, which was abandoned by the small Egyptian garrison.

The month of August marked the highest point of the Senussi success. The disappearance of the Italians from the whole of the interior of Tripolitania, practically without a struggle, was not unnaturally regarded by the natives as a miracle wrought by the Grand Senussi Sheikh himself. In May Sayyid Ahmed went to Jaghbub, and from that sacred spot made an attempt to organize his newly-acquired dominions through his brothers and cousins. He placed his two cousins, Idris and Riza, in charge of Cyrenaica, and, intoxicated by his success, began to entertain still wider schemes—nothing less than the conquest of Egypt from the British. Accordingly Ahmed and his counsellors hatched a plan to attack the Egyptian frontier from three points, from Sollum on the coast, from the oasis of Siwa in the centre, and from Darfur on the south, where Ali Dinar, the disaffected and ambitious Sultan, was to be the aggressor. The plan miscarried from the first. The northern force of some 3,000 Arabs invaded Egypt in December, but failed to provoke a rising among the Senussi adepts in Egypt. This force was repeatedly and easily defeated in that month and again in January and February 1916. The attack from Siwa did not materialize at all. Ali Dinar made no move until February 1916, and was totally defeated in the following May.

From the time of his failure on the Egyptian frontier

things went ill with Sayyid Ahmed. Rival chieftains in Tripolitania, who were eager supporters of the Senussi Sheikh in the days of his prosperity, turned against him and played for their own hands. In the western Jebel and in eastern Tripolitania his representatives were driven out by local chiefs. In Cyrenaica, as Ahmed's prestige declined, the influence of Idris, who had refused to have anything to do with the Egyptian adventure, increased; and, as the eldest son of the second Grand Senussi Sheikh, he showed a tendency to assert his own hereditary claims and rapidly gained a political ascendancy over the disciples of the Confraternity in Cyrenaica and Egypt. Ahmed himself, after his defeat, retired to Siwa, whence he tried several times to open negotiations with the Egyptian Government, but in vain, as he refused to make peace with the Italians. Meanwhile Tripolitania, now that the Senussi power was broken, lapsed into its old state of anarchy.

In July 1916 the British and Italian Governments came to an agreement¹ in regard to the Senussi. They bound themselves (1) to make no terms with the Senussi without a mutual understanding; (2) to recognize Idris as the spiritual head of the Confraternity; (3) to allow military operations in each other's territory; (4) to share the patrol of the coast; (5) to interchange information; and (6) to defer the question of the Libyan-Egyptian frontier to a future occasion. In March 1917 the French Government, as equally interested, was included as a third party to the agreement.² In August and September, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, negotiations were opened with Idris, the British and Italian envoys being instructed to offer as conditions that he should be recognized as the spiritual, but not as the temporal, chief of the Senussi, and that he should make peace with both the British and the Italians, or with neither. These negotiations failed, but the armistice between Idris and the Italians continued, until the negotiations

¹ Appendix IX.

² Appendix X.

were resumed in January 1917 and carried to a successful issue in the following April.

In Tripolitania, except for the reoccupation of the coast town of Zuara by the Italians in August 1916, nothing of importance occurred, until Sulaiman el-Baruni (the notorious Pan-Islamist) landed at Misurata on September 25, accompanied by some Turkish and German officers and bringing a *firman* appointing him Governor-General of the 'Turkish' vilayets of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. His avowed object was finally to expel all the Italians still remaining in Tripolitania and thus to win back the whole province for the Ottoman Empire. A second *firman* two months later, conferring upon Sayyid Ahmed, whose pride had been considerably mortified by the arrival of the new Turkish Governor, the grandiose title of Viceroy of Africa, was an even plainer indication of Ottoman policy. At Misurata El-Baruni was joined by Ramadan Shtewi and in December by Nuri Pasha. With their help he soon succeeded in organizing a force of some 6,000-7,000 men, with which all through the year 1917 he constantly threatened to attack the Italian garrison at Tripoli, although on four occasions the Italians defeated him with great loss.

In January 1917 Sayyid Ahmed, after various wanderings among the oases of the Libyan Desert, was reported to be at Siwa at the head of a small armed force. There he was surprised by the British, and his force was defeated and dispersed. Next month he was at Aujila, threatening his cousin with an unwelcome visit at Jedabia at a time when Idris was carrying on negotiations with the British and Italian envoys, which had been reopened in the previous January. These resulted on April 14 (as already indicated) in two separate agreements, one with the British, the other with the Italian Government. In the former,¹ Idris, besides an arrangement about prisoners of war, agreed to prevent any armed Senussi from remaining in the oases of Siwa and Jaghbub, to remove from Jaghbub

¹ Appendix XI.

and Cyrenaica all persons who might endanger good relations with the British Government, and to observe the British regulations for trade between Egypt and the west. In return the British Government agreed to open a trade route between Egypt and the west on condition that Sollum should be the only market, and that the market should at once be closed if any supplies should reach the enemy. The agreement with Italy took the form of two temporary arrangements only, as the persistent assertion of Italian sovereignty over Cyrenaica and the deep-felt hostility of Idris stood in the way of any more satisfactory agreement. One of these provided for the cessation of hostilities; freedom of trade between the Italian zone (Ben Ghazi, Derna, and Tobruk) and the Senussi zone; the restoration to the Senussi of their *zawiyas*, except those in military occupation; the removal of Turkish and other officers, soldiers, and agents from the Senussi zone, the Italians giving them safe conduct to their own countries, and other matters of minor importance.¹ By the other, Idris undertook to break up all camps of armed Arabs in Cyrenaica and to secure the gradual disarmament of the Arab tribes within a year after the signing of the document.

Though these agreements rendered Idris's position secure as regards the British and Italians, they compromised him deeply in the eyes of his Senussi followers and tended to repair the fallen prestige of Ahmed, who once more proclaimed his unalterable determination never to make peace with the Italians. Turkish and German agents made the most of the friction between the two cousins, aiming at reinforcing the pro-Turkish element in Cyrenaica. Ahmed, requested by Idris to retire from Cyrenaica to the far-distant Kufra or at least to Sirte, decided definitely to throw in his lot with the pro-Turkish party and joined Nuri Pasha, who had been acting as El-Baruni's chief military adviser, in Tripolitania. About the same time news came that the pro-Turkish party in Fezzan, which in July had induced Ahmed's brother, Mohammed el-Abid, to fall

¹ Appendix XI.

in with their schemes for an attack upon the Tunisian frontier posts near Ghadames, had for some unknown reason turned against him and expelled him from Fezzan.

Thus at the beginning of 1918 the pro-Turkish party seemed to be gaining the upper hand in all parts of Libya. Ahmed and Ramadan Shtewi, it was reported, were threatening to march against Idris from the west; and Idris himself was begging his old enemies, the Italians, for a large supply of arms and ammunition to enable him properly to arm his own supporters in Cyrenaica against the threatened invasion.

The attack, however, failed to materialize. The old differences between Ahmed and Ramadan Shtewi were irreconcilable; and in disgust, it was said, at Ahmed's vacillation, Nuri left Tripolitania for Constantinople and a few weeks later was succeeded in the command of the Turkish troops by Ishak Pasha, who soon made himself unpopular with the natives by his severe and drastic methods.

In April the arrival by submarine at Misurata of Prince Osman Fuad, the grandson of Sultan Murad V, who had reigned for a few months at Constantinople in 1876, marked a further step in the Turko-German policy of recovering the whole region for the Ottoman Empire. He was to be the civil governor of the recovered districts, and he at once made various attempts to reconcile the quarrels of the Arab chiefs, which had for more than two years made any further progress towards expelling the Italians impossible; but his abilities proved quite unequal to the task. In August Ahmed mysteriously disappeared in an Austrian submarine, and shortly afterwards his arrival at Constantinople was announced. There he was given a theatrical reception and was selected to invest the Sultan with the sword of Sultan Othman. The signing of the Armistice in November found the military and political situation practically unchanged.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) RELIGIOUS

(a) *Mohammedan*

THE prevalent religion is Mohammedanism. All the Arabs and arabized Berbers, and most of the Berbers outside a few limited districts, belong to the Malekite branch of the orthodox Sunnites who accept the *Sunna* or body of customary law, as opposed to the heterodox Shiites, who reject it. The Sunnites themselves are divided into four branches, known as the Hanifites, the Malekites, the Shafi'ites, and the Hanbalites, so called after their respective founders. The Turks, it is to be observed, are Hanifites; and, though they are regarded as equally orthodox, this difference of Moslem practice constituted a sort of bar between them and their Libyan subjects, even before the Young Turks came into power with their modern European notions, which made them in the eyes of Moslem fanatics little better than infidels. The pure Berbers of the Nalut and Yefren districts of the Tripolitanian Jebel and of Zuara are, like the Berber inhabitants of the neighbouring island of Jerba (Tunisia), heterodox Abadites, a remnant of the old Kharejite Shiites, whose doctrines the Berbers almost *en masse* embraced in the eighth century, when they rose against their new Arab masters. The Abadites are the Puritans of Islam; they consider the Khalifate to be merely a human institution, and recognise as their Khalifa the Imam of Muscat in Arabia instead of the Sultan of Turkey; looking upon the Koran as the sole foundation of true religion, and refusing to acknowledge the validity of the *Sunna*. In times past they were much persecuted by their Sunnite neighbours and are still regarded with suspicion.

The orthodox formalism of the Sunnites has, however, for many centuries ceased to be a driving force in the Moslem world, and this for two reasons—the dead hand of the customary law and the secularization of the Khalifa in the person of the worldly Sultans reigning in Damascus, Baghdad, or Constantinople. The key to the great religious movements which at one time and another have been concerned (as in Morocco) with the rise and fall of dynasties, with Mahdism, with tribal migrations, and with the formation of native kingdoms, like those of Haj Omar and Samory, which barred the French advance in West Africa during the nineteenth century, is to be found in the spread of Sufism, or personal mysticism, which was first opposed by, and afterwards reconciled with, Sunnism. The two combined have been the chief source of Mohammedan missionary enterprise.

In northern Africa, as elsewhere, Sufism has taken two shapes: it is represented either by the personal mysticism of the pious individual, who may or may not gather followers around him; or by the organized mysticism of the Confraternities, whose members bind themselves together under solemn vows to practise the *tarikah* or way of life laid down for them by their pious founders.

(1) Mystics of the first kind are known as *marabouts* (anchorites or hermits)—called in Arabic *sufi* (i. e. 'intelligent'), in India *fakir* (i. e. 'poor'), in Persia *dervish* (i. e. 'threshold' to the door of piety). The *marabouts* rose to prominence first in Morocco, where some of them, being men of political ambition as well as conspicuous for their piety, and claiming, moreover, Sherifian descent (i. e. descent from Fatima, the daughter of Mohammed), became founders of dynasties; and from the fourteenth century onwards they came as pilgrims to Tripolitania, where by their ascetic practices or their virtues or their magical rites they gained great respect and veneration among the Berbers. Their tombs became places of pilgrimage; and round these tombs would gather

scattered fractions of tribes, whether Berber or Arab, and pious or unfortunate individuals, who gave themselves out to be descendants of their own particular saints and in course of time formed new tribal organizations, which commanded the respect of their neighbours for their supposed superior sanctity. So wide has been this practice that at the present time the *Marabut* tribes are estimated to form one-fourth of the population of Tripolitania, being very numerous also in Cyrenaica, Fezzan, and elsewhere. Some of these *Marabut* tribes claim Sherifian descent, like the Fuwatir at Zliten, the Aulad Bu Sif at Mizda, the Mzauga in Tarhuna, and the Aulad Jarbwa at Zawiya, and are therefore regarded with still greater respect.

(2) Confraternities¹ came into existence when the pious individual succeeded not only in transmitting to his followers his own halo of sanctity—this the *marabuts* had done already—but in persuading them faithfully to practise his own *tarika* (way of life) in perpetuity. Though these Confraternities differ widely from one another in many respects, there are a few characteristics common to them all.

(a) The *waraka* (*baraka*) or divine benediction or favour, which *ex hypothesi* the founder must have possessed in a peculiar degree, and which is assumed to be transmitted to his successors. Hence the importance of

(b) The *silsila*, or spiritual genealogy or mystical chain, whereby the doctrines of the various Confraternities are traced back to the Prophet himself; in many cases the *silsila* is supplemented by a claim of Sherifian descent for the founder.

(c) The *tarika*, the organized 'way' of life, which binds the initiated disciples to a fixed rule of obedience, and, if seriously adopted, embraces all the activities of man so completely as barely to leave room for any other allegiance. This is the most essential characteristic of all the religious Confraternities.

(d) The *wird*, or initiation, which is imposed on the

¹ See also *Islam in Africa*, No. 57 of this series.

novices, whereby, in the course of some simple ceremony, the collection of doctrines, practices, and prayers peculiar to the Confraternity, over and above the ordinary practices and prayers enjoined upon all Moslems, is imparted to them. These special prayers are called *dhikr*, 'remembering' (i. e. of God), and consist of a few simple phrases, such as 'I ask pardon of God' or 'I testify that there is no god but God'—statements familiar indeed to every Moslem, but arranged in a peculiar order, repeated a regular number of times, and accompanied by conventional postures and gestures.

(e) Intellectual instruction is regarded as one of the necessary functions of every Confraternity, even though it may be quite elementary. The teaching is not confined to its own peculiar tenets, but includes instruction in the Koran and the elements of Mohammedan law.

(f) Every Confraternity possesses a definite financial organization, and some of them have in course of time become exceedingly wealthy corporations. The primary source of income is the gifts of the faithful—either in the form of the *ziyara* or gift made to the sheikh or other dignitary when a disciple visits him for some religious purpose, or of the *sadaka*, or offering, made by a disciple in proportion to his means on regular or special occasions. Many of the Confraternities, or rather the convents in which the members are housed, possess in addition considerable landed property, known as *wakuf*, given or bequeathed to them by the faithful.

(g) Most Confraternities have local centres in the shape of convents, which in northern Africa are known as *zawiyas* ('retreats'). These *zawiyas*, occupied by the most devout members of the Order, fulfil various functions; they serve as a hostelry, a place of refuge, a court of arbitration between individuals or tribes, a school for children, or for more advanced students. Not uncommonly they adjoin the tomb of some distinguished saint; and special importance attaches to the mother-*zawiya* of the Confraternity, where in many cases the founder is buried. The *zawiyas* generally

stand in the centre of the lands belonging to them, which are cultivated not only by the brethren but by the forced labour (*tiuza*) of the neighbouring population and, at any rate in Cyrenaica and the Libyan oases, by numerous slaves.

(h) The organization of the various Confraternities is much the same. At the head of the whole Order stands the sheikh, who wields practically despotic authority, and who resides, as a rule, in the mother-*zawiya*. Sometimes there is a second in command or *khalifa*, but the most widespread officials of the second rank are the *mokaddems*, who act as directors of the local *zawiyas*, execute the orders of the sheikh, and organize missionary work. The official responsible for the property of the *zawiya* is called the *wakil* or steward. Finally come the brethren in general, for whom several names are used. The commonest name in northern Africa is *akh* or *khwan* (plural *ikhwan*); another name is *khoddam* (servitors), a third *fakir* (plural *fokra*). When the brethren return to their own tribes and act as instructors they are called *tolba* (aspirants to knowledge). The brethren, as is the case with some of the Roman Catholic Orders, are divided into two classes—an inner circle of disciples, who occupy the *zawiyas*, and an outer circle of more or less pious Moslems, who follow the ordinary vocations of life. It is said that at the present time the great majority of adult male Moslems are members of one or more Confraternities, merchants especially joining them for the sake of the protection that the more powerful Confraternities can give them on their travels.

It is a remarkable fact that, excepting the great Wahhabite movement in Arabia (1735–1816), the startling missionary revival, which for more than a century has shown itself in all countries where Islam has any chance of progressing, has in all cases proceeded from one or other of the religious Confraternities; and its main cause has been the menacing advance of Christian Europeans into Moslem countries, especially in Africa.

At the present day the number of existing Confrater-

nities is variously estimated at 40, 80, or 100, most of which can be grouped around four of the oldest and greatest, the Kadriya (founded c. A. D. 1130), the Khilwatiya (c. 1350), the Shadiliya (c. 1235), and the Naqshabandiya (c. 1350); but in Libya—according to Italian opinion—only four are of any great importance: (1) the Isawiya and (2) the Salamiya, which are offshoots of the Kadriya; and (3) the Madaniya and (4) Senussiya, of which the former is certainly, and the latter has been said to be, affiliated to the Shadiliya.

The *Isawiya* Confraternity (founded in Morocco c. 1570) is the most widely spread in Tripolitania, but it has no central organization and but few *zawiyas*, such *zawiyas* as there are being under sheikhs entirely independent of one another. On their religious side the Isawiya have no doctrines peculiar to themselves, but are remarkable for their practices, which include chewing and swallowing live snakes, laceration with swords, walking over fire, &c.—practices which they believe to contribute to the absorption of the human individual into the divine nature.

The *Salamiya* (founded at Zliten about 1795) are most influential in the Tripolitanian Jebel and the Syrtic region, where they have numerous *zawiyas* as well as five in and round Ben Ghazi in Cyrenaica. They too are given to violent manifestations of ecstasy, but they are more remarkable for their profitable business connexions with the peoples of the eastern Sudan, which enable them to secure protection for the merchants using the caravan routes across the desert. To gain their protection, merchants join the Order, and in return not only enrich it with their gifts, but act as its missionaries among the Sudanese.

The *Madaniya* (founded at Misurata c. 1825), though they profess the most admirable moral doctrines, have been held suspect by the Italians for their Panislamic ideals and their consistent, though passive, resistance to all Western influence and all foreign temporal authority, whether Turkish or European. They possess many *zawiyas* both in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica,

and send their missions southwards to Fezzan and Ghat, and even as far as Wadai and Bornu.

The *Senussiya*, though it has been in existence only for about 80 years, has in northern Africa, compared with the other Confraternities, attained an extraordinary success. Its history and organization, being inseparable from those of the country as a whole, have been described above, pp. 15-18.

By one of the stipulations preliminary to the Treaty of Lausanne the Italian Government guaranteed complete liberty for the practice of the Moslem religion and the recognition of the Sultan of Turkey as supreme Khalifa (cf. above, p. 23). Provision was also made for the administration of the *Sheriyat* or sacred Moslem law and for the upkeep of *vakuf* or pious Moslem foundations.

(b) Jewish

The Jewish religion is followed by some 20,000 Jews, of whom three-fourths live in Tripoli, and the rest mostly in the coast towns and the Tripolitanian Jebel. They are mostly descendants of the Jews who settled in these regions in Roman times. They include also a number of Spanish Jews from Salonika, Smyrna, and Constantinople, where their forefathers had taken refuge from Christian persecution. In pre-Italian times they lived in ghettos. They avoid mixture with the other races, and, though nominally despised by the Arabs, they are in reality looked up to in their capacity of business men, and their advice about business matters is frequently sought.

(c) Christian

The Christian religion is confined to foreigners. Roman Catholics form the great majority and are mostly Italians and Maltese. There are also a few Greek Orthodox, English Protestants, and Egyptian Copts.

(2) POLITICAL

Though a military governor always remained supreme both in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the Italians, during their brief effective occupation of the former province, elaborated a complicated system of civil administration, which ceased when they evacuated the territory.

Under this system the governor was assisted by three high officials: (1) a secretary-general for civil and political affairs, who dealt with political affairs in the zones declared to be under civil government; (2) a chief of the office for politico-military affairs, who dealt with political affairs in districts not declared to be under civil government; and (3) a chief of the general staff, who was concerned with purely military matters.

The scheme drawn up for the civil administration of Libya was chiefly modelled on the previous system of the Turkish Government, which had divided the vilayet of Tripoli into 4 sanjaks and 15 kazas, and the independent sanjak of Cyrenaica into 5 kazas. But both systems are now only of historical interest.

From the early days of their occupation the Italians began the policy of enlisting native soldiers so far as possible, and in Cyrenaica and Fezzan in 1913 they employed them with considerable effect. In 1914 the Italian garrison was composed in Tripolitania of 379 officers, 5,321 Italian and 8,053 native troops, and in Cyrenaica of 313 officers, 4,811 Italian and 5,607 native troops. The Italian reverses of 1914-15 were mainly due to the mutinies of the native troops.

(3) EDUCATIONAL

(a) *Moslem*

Before the Italian occupation, except for a few foreign schools, there was no system of public education. Such education as there was was religious. In the mosques children were taught to commit to memory passages from the Koran, but very few were taught

to read or write. Only the numerous *zawiyas* belonging to the different religious Confraternities provided means for more advanced instruction in the Moslem sciences, which include, besides the Koran, knowledge of Moslem traditions, customs, and commentaries, and, above all, a knowledge of Moslem law. Even in the *zawiyas*, however, most of the schools seem to have had little more to offer than the schools attached to the mosques. But the Senussi *zawiya* in the oasis of Jaghbub, under the charge of the second Grand Sheikh's brother, Mohammed esh-Sherif (1846-96), developed into a veritable Moslem university, rivalling El-Azhar at Cairo, and attended by thousands of students; and it is to the better class of *zawiyas*, whether in Libya or elsewhere, that the educated Moslems of northern Africa owe the religious and literary education which many of them undoubtedly possess. But in no respect more than in education does Islam show its independence of national and territorial limits; the serious Moslem student is seldom content with attending a single university or sitting at the feet of one professor only. He travels from place to place—from Morocco to Arabia—to listen to the lectures of the professors of highest reputation.

(b) *Foreign*

The French seem to have been the first in the field, and had in 1901 schools in Tripoli and Ben Ghazi under the care of the Catholic Mission, attended by 260 boys and 470 girls. The Italians, as soon as they adopted the policy of 'peaceful penetration', started both technical and elementary schools in Tripoli, Ben Ghazi, and Derna, which in 1910 were attended by 840 pupils. In 1913-14, the time of their most effective occupation of Tripolitania, the Italians had opened 8 schools in Tripoli, ranging from technical to infant schools, attended by 1,700 pupils, and elementary schools at Khoms, Zanzur, Misurata, Gharian, and Yefren, attended by 500 boys.

There are also a few Jewish schools maintained by the Jewish Alliance.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

'The history of northern Africa', it has been said, 'is essentially a religious history.' This general statement is so far true that, though all the details are made up of local quarrels between local tribes and their chieftains, all the great movements, since the natives embraced the Moslem creed of their new Arab masters in the eighth century, have been religious in their origin. But within the world of Islam there are many divisions of religious opinion on minor points, which have in Libya, as elsewhere, led to bitter dissensions.

The pure Berber has always shown himself a born dissenter. In Christian times he was a Donatist and an Arian. No sooner had he embraced the Moslem faith than he joined the heretical sect of the Kharejites, and so gave to his long struggle with the Arab more of a religious than of a national character. To this day the Abadite Berbers of the Tripolitanian Jebel, the lineal descendants of the Kharejites, still keep themselves shut up in their mountain strongholds in sullen aloofness from their orthodox Malekite neighbours; whereas the arabized Berbers, who are Malekites, have also adopted, with the Arab faith, the Arab language and the Arab customs, and are generally eager to disown their Berber origin. But the whole population is in sentiment Moslem in the first place, and Berber or Arab only in the second.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) INTERNAL

(a) *Roads*

THE Italians found no metalled roads in the country, though some of the tracks were fit for use by motors. Before the revolt of 1914 the Italian military engineers had constructed about 750 miles of roads. These, however, are generally not metalled.

Tripoli is the starting-point of a number of caravan routes, which used to be much frequented by merchants trading between the Mediterranean and the Sudan. One of the most important leads to Ghadames, whence there are routes to Timbuctu and to Ghat, the Asben country, and Kano in Nigeria. Another notable track ran to Murzuk, where two principal routes diverged—one to Bilma and the region of Lake Chad, the other to the Wanyanga and Wadai districts. The last-named regions were also visited by caravans from Ben Ghazi, which followed a route through Kufra. The position and prospects of the caravan trade are discussed below (p. 53).

(b) *Rivers*

The few streams that exist are wholly unsuitable for navigation, and there are no canals.

(c) *Railways*

Several short railways were built by the Italians between 1911 and 1914. Except for a line from Ben Ghazi to Derna, all the lines of normal gauge are in the Tripoli district. From Tripoli a line runs eastward along the coast to Tajura, with a branch to Ain Zara; an extension to Khoms was under construction in 1914. Another

line goes inland, *via* Azizia, to Gharian, and a third follows the coast westward to Sorman, whence in 1914 it was being extended to Zuara. There are also a few short lines of narrow gauge. Altogether there were 164 miles of railway in Libya when the revolt of 1914 broke out, and many new lines had been projected, though the proposed routes had not been adequately surveyed.

(d) *Telegraphs*

Under Turkish rule there were lines from Tripoli to Sollum, Tunis, and Murzuk. The Italians have erected 875 miles of overland wires connecting all the principal towns.

(2) EXTERNAL

(a) *Ports*

Tripoli (population 68,000) is the chief port for sea-borne commerce and the main outlet of the caravan trade; it is also the market for the produce of a large oasis, and the seat of most of the native industries, the chief of which are weaving, leather-working, jewellery-making, and ostrich-feather sorting. The Italians have planned extensive schemes for the improvement of both the harbour and the town. In the former they had, by the end of 1914, built about 800 yds. of a large mole running east-north-east from a Spanish port on the west of the harbour, constructed a wharf 350 yds. long, dredged to a depth of 23 ft. alongside the wharf, and removed the sandbanks at the mouth of the port. It was hoped that by 1915 the mole would be lengthened by nearly 600 yds., that wharfing 1,300 yds. long would be in existence, sufficient for an annual traffic of 500,000 tons, and that the harbour west of the line of entry would be dredged to a uniform depth of 25 ft., making it available for vessels of medium tonnage. It is proposed that the mole should ultimately be about 1,900 yds. long, including a branch running north-north-east to protect the harbour completely from north and north-east winds, and that a subsidiary mole

should be constructed from the Karamanli tombs, on the east side of the harbour, running towards the principal mole and leaving a channel of 220 yds. There are also to be three or four dry docks, a series of wharves and jetties with warehouses, &c., and the whole harbour is to be dredged to a depth fitting it for use by vessels drawing 30–33 ft.—that is, large liners and ships of war.

In the town the Italians have erected barracks, a military hospital, and other public buildings, have improved the water-supply, which now amounts to about 8 gallons per head a day, and are constructing a proper system of drainage. Several Italian industrial establishments have been started for the supply of local needs.

Khoms (*Homs*, population 3,000) exports esparto-grass. A concrete mole 190 yds. long has been built to protect the harbour, and a wooden pier 100 yds. long has also been constructed. The depth of water in the harbour has been increased from 4½ ft. to 6½ ft., and a channel 13 ft. deep made to the pier-head. Barracks, &c., have been built in the town and a drainage system planned.

At *Misurata* (*Misrata*), though it was formerly a port for the slave-trade, the Italians found no harbour in existence, and vessels had to anchor 2 miles off shore. A harbour, 7½ miles away from the native town, has now been made with many public buildings and four piers. The old native town has a population of 9,000, and is the centre of a fertile oasis with a population estimated at 30,000 to 35,000; it has manufactures of woollen and silk *baracans*, rush mats, and carpets.

At *Ben Ghazi* (population 32,000), the chief port of Cyrenaica and head of the caravan route from Wadai, the Italians are confronted by a difficult problem. The present harbour is unsatisfactory and suffers from silting and the authorities do not appear to have decided whether to retain it permanently or to construct an entirely new harbour. For immediate purposes they have effected some improvements in the old harbour by building five piers—two for commerce, one for passengers, one naval, and one military—the largest being

intended for use by vessels of medium tonnage. The harbour has been dredged to a depth of 10 ft. alongside the largest piers. The town suffers from another disadvantage in the absence of water, as the only available supply is insufficient to allow the inhabitants $1\frac{1}{2}$ gallons per head daily. Moreover, the problem of drainage appears to be insoluble.

Some leather-work is done at Ben Ghazi, as at Tripoli. There are salt mountains behind the town and natural salt-pans along the coast.

Derna (population 6,000) has been called the Pearl of Cyrenaica. It has a beautiful situation, a fine climate, and an abundant supply of water, estimated at 600,000 gallons or more. Formerly an open roadstead, it has been provided with a wooden pier 98 yds. long by the Italians, who have also planned two moles of 570 yds. and 215 yds. respectively. It was expected that 330 yds. of the former would be completed by the end of 1914. Various military buildings have been erected in the town.

Tobruk is in charge of the naval authorities, and little information is available about the work undertaken. The old wooden pier has been retained and strengthened, and there is a wharf under construction. The place is unlikely ever to become a great commercial centre, for there is no water and the surrounding country is unproductive; but, as the best natural harbour on the Mediterranean shore of Africa, it will no doubt be of value as a naval station.

The following places are possible refuges for fishing and coasting vessels, though unsuitable for ships of any size: *Zuara*, *Makabez*, *Zliten* (*Mersa Sliten*), *Sirte*, *Tolmeta*, *Mersa Susa*, and *Sollum* (*El-Sellum*). At some of them minor improvements have been made by the Italians.

(b) Shipping

Even before 1911 about two-thirds of the total tonnage of the ships calling at Tripoli and Ben Ghazi were Italian; by 1913 the proportion was 82.5 per cent.,

and in the following year no less than 91 per cent. Italian tonnage entering the two ports had increased from about 335,000 to about 3,000,000 between 1905 and 1914. Of the Italian steamers calling at Tripoli 71 per cent. were subsidized mail steamers.

Before the war there were services by Italian companies from Syracuse, Genoa, Venice, and Naples, as well as a coastal service. Regular services were also maintained by the Deutsche Levante Linie (German), the Touache Line (French), and the Adria Line (Hungarian).

(c) *Cable and Wireless Communications*

The Turks had laid a submarine cable from Tripoli to Malta, and erected a high-power wireless station at Derna. The Italians have laid two submarine cables to Sicily, repaired the wireless station at Derna, and built twenty other permanent wireless stations, those at Tripoli and Ben Ghazi being the most powerful.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) LABOUR

The supply of labour is not satisfactory, for of the two native races—Arabs and Berbers—which inhabit Libya, the former are incurably indolent and the latter fanatical and bitterly hostile to European rule. In the first enthusiasm of 1911 Italian immigrants came forward in large numbers, but they were discouraged by the Administration, and there had been no considerable influx of agricultural colonists before the revolt.

(2) AGRICULTURE

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Vegetable Products.—The chief cereals grown are barley and wheat, which in Tripolitania were estimated to occupy 89,297 acres and 19,530 acres respectively. The barley is much prized by maltsters, owing to its

excellent quality and whiteness, and any surplus beyond what was required for home consumption went almost entirely to the United Kingdom. Potatoes, beans, peas, and many other vegetables are cultivated successfully. Saffron and henna are largely grown, though the production of the former decreased in the last years of Turkish rule, probably owing to taxation. A limited amount of tobacco is grown in the coastal oases. It is significant of the economic state of the country that its chief vegetable product, esparto-grass, requires no cultivation. The amount of this grass exported from Libya has, however, declined in recent times, partly because wood-pulp is taking its place in the manufacture of paper, and partly because the natives, in gathering it, often destroyed the plants. Hence, the grass, which was formerly found at the very gates of Tripoli, has now to be fetched from districts distant two or three days' journey from the town, and the extra cost involved places it at a disadvantage in competing with the produce of Tunis and Algeria.

There are no forests in Libya, but the country possesses several trees of commercial value. Of these by far the most important is the date-palm. Every part of it is utilized by the natives, and the dates of Fezzan and the oases in the interior are highly prized. It is thought that there may be as many as 2,000,000 date-palms in the country. Olives and figs are also abundant, and 1,142 tons of olives and 5,440 of figs are said to have been produced in 1909. Olive-oil, however, is not exported; indeed, in bad years supplies have to be imported from Crete. Among other fruits grown in Libya are pears, peaches, pomegranates, almonds, mulberries, and carobs. Bananas are cultivated at Derna.

Animal Products.—A large proportion of the inhabitants of Libya are nomads or semi-nomads, and much of their wealth consists in their domestic animals, of which the chief are sheep and goats, cattle, camels, donkeys, and horses. The sheep and goats are by far the most important and are said to number 1,107,000

in Tripolitania alone. The sheep are of the fat-tailed Berber variety, and their wool is partly exported and partly used in the local weaving industry at Tripoli and Misurata. Cattle in Tripolitania are estimated to number 200,000, camels 300,000, donkeys 500,000, and horses 5,000. Poultry are kept in large numbers. Ostriches were found formerly, but recent attempts to reintroduce them have been unsuccessful. Bees and silk-worms, though the country is not unsuitable for them, are unknown in Tripolitania, but the former are kept in Cyrenaica, at Ben Ghazi and Derna.

(b) *Methods of Cultivation*

These are extremely primitive, intensive culture being unknown. Before the war the Italians were endeavouring to improve matters in this respect, and had established an agrarian office at Tripoli. They had also placed on the free import list certain materials necessary for agriculture, and offered prizes for the successful planting of fruit and olive trees.

Irrigation.—The wells are often sufficiently prolific for the irrigation of plantations and gardens, for the watering of flocks, and for domestic purposes, but the quantity appears to be inadequate for extensive irrigation. Reports by recent Italian Commissions represent the conditions as unfavourable for extensive irrigation, even by the construction of large reservoirs in the wadis.

(c) *Land Tenure*

In 1911 the system of land tenure was analogous to that prevailing in other parts of the Turkish Empire. Land was divided into four main classes:

1. State-owned land, comprising both land used for public purposes and waste land.

2. Land held in common by tribes or villages: this also was regarded legally as State property, but it was left in the possession of its occupiers, subject to payment by them to the State of a tithe of the produce, in kind,

and of the *verghi* or *mirie*, a monetary tax levied in proportion to the richness of the land or the wealth of the inhabitants. About thirty years ago the total amount payable by Tripoli and Fezzan was fixed at £81,620 yearly, and had apparently not been altered down to the end of Turkish rule. Owing to exemptions, the tax was paid on about half only of the land nominally liable.

3. *Vakuf*, or land held by mosques or religious communities.

4. *Mulk*, or freehold land; this was rare.

The first action of the Italians was to prohibit all sales of land, by a decree of November 20, 1911; the next, to draw up a register of all classes of land, and a record of the titles of occupants. Many of the registry offices in the province had been burnt and the titles destroyed in the campaign; but with the help of duplicates from Constantinople the work was carried out not unsatisfactorily in the neighbourhood of the towns, though in the remoter districts the results were more dubious. In order to encourage agriculture a decree was issued on September 6, 1913, permitting the lease for three years of unoccupied agricultural lands and the extension of the lease for a similar period if the original occupier had not returned meanwhile. Finally, the decree of November 20, 1911, was rescinded by a decree of January 4, 1914, which permitted the sale of all lands in the pacified districts under civil government, the country being thus thrown open to Italian immigrants.

(3) FISHERIES

The only fishery of commercial importance is that for sponges, which is carried on chiefly by Greeks. About 40 per cent. of the total catch goes to Greece for re-export. Although the Tripolitanian sponges are not of the first quality, those of Cyrenaica are very good, and the total annual catch of the two provinces is worth on an average about £80,000.

(4) MINERALS

The only mineral of any actual commercial value is salt, which is obtained from the lagoons of both Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. The former produced 1,800 tons in 1913; the latter from 3,000 to 6,000 tons annually under Turkish rule. Natron and soda are found in the lakes of Fezzan, and deposits of sulphur and phosphates are said to exist, but it is quite uncertain whether they are of commercial value.

(5) MANUFACTURES

Arab garments are woven at Tripoli and carpets at Misurata, the industry being said to occupy over 2,200 workers at Tripoli alone. Rush mats and native jewellery are also made, and work is done on sheep- and goat-skins in Tripoli, Ben Ghazi, and Ghadames, while cattle and camel hides are exported unworked. Between twenty and thirty industrial establishments have been built since the Italian occupation, but they are intended merely to supply local requirements.

(C) COMMERCE

(1) DOMESTIC

(a) Inland Towns and Oases

Ghadames, on the borders of Tunis, has a population variously estimated at from 4,000 to 12,000. The caravan trade is practically the only resource of the natives, and as that has declined so the town has decayed. Its trade has recently been estimated at £40,000 a year, on which there may be a profit of £12,000. The cultivated land is diminishing, and nine-tenths of the dates required for local consumption have to be brought from Derj, 60 miles to the east.

Ghat, which is very little known to Europeans, has a population which may possibly number 8,000. The town lives on the caravan trade and is declining.

Murzuk, with a population of 3,500 to 7,000, lies in

an unhealthy district of salt marshes and, like Ghadames and Ghat, is a decaying place engaged in the caravan trade.

Sokna is in the oasis of *Jofra*, which has in all a population of about 8,000. The oasis is healthy although hot; there is but little trade, the inhabitants being engaged in horticulture.

Aujila-Jalo. This is a group of oases with a population estimated at 12,000. Horticulture and camel-breeding are practised.

Merj, the centre of a fertile district, and the only inland town of Cyrenaica, has a population of about 3,000.

The following oases are in the territory claimed both for Egypt and Tripoli :

(i) *Jaghbub* (*Jarabub*, *El-Geghabuk*), which owes most of its importance to the fact that it was formerly the head-quarters of the Senussi. Its population was estimated at 6,000 to 7,000 in 1886, but has declined considerably since then. It contains salt marshes, and is on the caravan route between Ben Ghazi and Egypt.

(ii) *Siwa*, which has a population of 4,000 to 8,000 : it is unhealthy but fertile, and rich in palms, fruits, and vegetables. It was famous in the ancient world as the seat of the oracle of Jupiter Ammon.

(iii) *Kufra*. The group of five oases known by this general name is the present head-quarters of the Senussi and one of the most inaccessible places on earth. Only two Europeans have ever visited it, and information regarding it is scanty and untrustworthy. It appears, however, to produce large numbers of date-palms, but very little else ; it is suggested that the population may be about 5,000.

(b) *Foreign Interests*

British interests in the domestic trade of Tripoli hardly exist, the handful of English in the country before 1911 being engaged in the esparto-grass trade. There were, however, about 4,000 Maltese, mostly fishermen and petty traders. The only other foreigners,

apart from Italians, were a few French and Germans and about 200 Greeks. It is clear that in the last years of Turkish rule German interests in the country tended to increase, following on the great extension of their influence at Constantinople. A German consul was appointed at Tripoli, who obtained some small concessions for his fellow-countrymen in the town; a regular steamship service by the Deutsche Levante Linie was established, and German engineers built the great long-distance wireless station at Derna. German private enterprise was encouraged by the Turks, at a time when they placed every possible obstacle in the way of Italians. Herr von Lochow, a young farming expert, held land near Tripoli and Ben Ghazi, and a financial syndicate headed by Herren Weicker and Encke established a banking concern in the former town.

(2) FOREIGN

(a) *Imports and Exports*

(i) *By Sea.* The only figures available are those for the ports of Tripoli and Ben Ghazi. The figures vary widely in different years, but the average annual volume of trade at the former place in Turkish times was about £800,000 to £1,000,000 and at the latter about £550,000. Exports amounted to rather less than half the total at Tripoli, rather more than half at Ben Ghazi.

In the last year of Turkish rule (1910-11) the chief exports from Tripoli were barley (£127,000), cattle (£56,000), raw and tanned hides and skins (£46,000), sheep and goats (£31,000), wool (£31,000), henna (£15,000), ivory (£15,000), and eggs (£13,000). The figures for esparto-grass and sponges are not included in the Turkish official returns, but the former varied from £80,000 to £120,000 and the latter from £45,000 to £70,000. The British Empire (chiefly the United Kingdom and Malta) was by far the largest customer of Tripoli, and several of the leading Arab merchants

had correspondents in Manchester. Practically all the barley exported and the whole of the esparto crop came to Great Britain, the latter trade being in the hands of the old-established Liverpool firm of Perry Burry. After the British Empire the best customers were the Turkish Empire and France. Imports consisted mainly of food-stuffs, cotton cloth, and cotton yarn. The first included sugar (£153,000), flour, semolina, &c. (£75,000), rice (£69,000), and tea (£30,000); the imports of cotton cloth, raw, bleached, and dyed, were valued at over £100,000, and those of cotton yarn at £19,000. The supplying countries, in the order of the importance of their trade, were the British Empire, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and France.

At Ben Ghazi the trade was of a very similar character; in 1908, the last year of Turkish rule for which figures are available, the chief exports were sheep and goats (£180,000), camels (£54,000), cattle (£28,000), wool (£19,000), ivory (£13,400), skins (£10,500), and salt (£10,700). The British Empire and Egypt, France, Italy, and the Turkish Empire were the countries chiefly interested. Imports included rice (£115,000), barley (£34,000), flour (£33,000), inferior olive oil (£23,200), cotton goods (£21,100), and sugar (£18,200). The same countries were interested as for the exports, save that the olive oil came from Crete.

The results of the Italian occupation were threefold; the total volume of imports and the proportion of Italian imports increased enormously, while exports declined owing to the disturbed state of the country, which had hardly been pacified before the outbreak of the European War and the pro-Turkish revolt. In these circumstances, statistics are apt to mislead; but it may be said that the total imports into Libya from Italy in 1912 were over £4,000,000 in value, in 1913 over £3,100,000, and in 1914 over £2,300,000—in each case considerably more than the total volume of trade with all countries before 1911. The exports to Italy in the same years were £250,000, £200,000, and £160,000 in value respectively, these being probably at least

50 per cent. of the total exports. Italian goods receive preferential treatment, in many cases paying customs duty on 50 per cent. of their invoice value only.

(ii) *By Land.* The caravan trade of Tripoli has for many years been steadily declining. Its value in the decade ending 1881 was over £1,600,000 ; in the decade ending 1901 it was under £1,000,000, and since that time it has probably declined still further. In 1898 the trade of Ben Ghazi with Wadai was worth nearly £100,000 ; it was only worth about one-third of that sum in the last years of Turkish rule. It is certain that this trade can never recover its former activity ; for the chief export from the Sudan, i. e. that of slaves, is now impossible, the production of ivory has fallen off owing to the ruthless destruction of elephants, while the ostrich feathers have been largely supplanted by those of the Cape. It is true that the ivory of Wadai is still brought to Ben Ghazi and that a trade in hides and skins with the United States has been developed ; but there is reason to believe that even these products will tend to follow other routes.

It is possible that something may be done to keep the caravan traffic alive by digging wells and establishing relays of camels, and no doubt Ben Ghazi will always retain a considerable share of the Wadai trade ; but the trade of Kano—the greatest emporium of Central Africa—is certain to be diverted to the Atlantic by the railway and the Niger river ; that of Timbuctu, so far as it goes to the Mediterranean at all, will no doubt go through French territory, while Wadai will find an outlet through Egypt or Port Sudan by the El Obeid Railway, now that British suzerainty has been made effective over Darfur.

(b) *Customs*

The Italians have not yet fixed a tariff explicitly discriminating against foreign goods ; but in many cases Italian goods are assessed for customs duties at 50 per cent. of their invoice values, and the same principle is followed with regard to anchorage dues.

(D) FINANCE

(1) *Revenue and Expenditure*

In 1914 the budget balanced at £2,835,868. Of receipts just over £600,000 were raised in the colony, the balance being made up by an increase of over £360,000 in the debt and by State contributions of over £1,840,000. The chief sources of the colonial income were customs £240,000, and monopolies, chiefly tobacco and salt, £220,000. Military expenses amounted to £1,600,000; ordinary civil expenses to £760,000, extraordinary to about £280,000; the remainder, about £168,000, was spent on railway construction, £128,000 in Tripolitania and £40,000 in Cyrenaica.

The year 1914 is the latest year for which complete figures are available, but the budget of 1915-16 was almost doubled, amounting to no less than £5,538,856. The increase is accounted for by the military expenditure (£3,680,000) necessitated by the revolt, which has forced the Italian Government to postpone its ambitious programme for the development of the colony.

The revenue of the country in 1905 under Turkish rule was only about £94,380.

(2) *Currency*

Before 1911 several coins were in circulation besides the official Turkish currency. Maria Theresa dollars, introduced from the Sudan by caravans, were used in the oases of the interior, especially at Ghadames. The Spanish duro circulated at places in touch with Morocco, and French and English gold was found at the ports. Italian money—chiefly paper—is now used in the territory occupied by the Italians, and in 1913 a decree was issued prohibiting the import of Turkish coins.

(3) *Banking*

The most important bank is the Banco di Roma, which has always taken especial interest in the country.

It has branches at Tripoli and Ben Ghazi, owns a flour-mill, an oil and soap factory, a hydraulic press for esparto-grass, &c., and is said to possess much of the land suitable for cultivation. For a time it was responsible for the service of coastal steamers, but in 1913 these were taken over by an Italian shipping company. The Banco di Sicilia and the Banco d'Italia also have branches at Tripoli and Ben Ghazi and act as agricultural banks.

(E) GENERAL REMARKS

It is easier to say what Libya will not be than what it will. It can never have a great transit trade, nor act as a link between Europe and the Sudan ; for under modern conditions commerce, as has already been shown, will follow other routes. Nor can it ever be a great manufacturing country, for there is neither fuel nor water-power available. Nor, finally, is the country ever likely to be important as a mining centre, though this is less certain, since it has not yet been exhaustively surveyed.

Its only future, then, is as an agricultural country ; yet labour difficulties, as already indicated, present an apparently insuperable obstacle even to this line of development. Assuming that the country is eventually reconquered by Italy, can the place of the natives be supplied by Italian workmen, who have done so much in the neighbouring territory of Tunis ? And if these can be imported in sufficient numbers, are the prospects of the colony even then favourable ? The answer to this question depends largely on our view of Libyan history and of the reasons for the change in its condition since Roman times, when Libya—and more particularly Cyrenaica—was regarded as one of the most prosperous countries on the shores of the Mediterranean. There are two explanations of its modern decadence. One school of writers asserts that there has been progressive desiccation in the last 1,500 years, and that the climate and character of the country have now radically deterio-

rated ; another school, more modern and on the whole more authoritative, rejects this view as being, if not improbable, at all events unconfirmed, and attributes the modern poverty of the country partly to deforestation, but mainly to the indolence and ignorance of its inhabitants. Support is lent to this opinion by three undoubted facts ; first, that the surviving remains of the classical period are found in the same zones of territory as are cultivated to-day—the coastal oases, the northern slopes of the plateau, and the wadis or gullies of the interior ; second, that much of the land at present untilled is certainly capable of cultivation ; and third, that to keep the land under cultivation requires unremitting labour and increasing vigilance against the encroachments of the desert.

It is not improbable that the prosperity of the district in ancient times has been exaggerated. The standard of agriculture was lower than it is at present ; and in any case the great modern corn-growing districts in Russia and America were then unknown. Commanding an unlimited supply of slaves and faced by no religious hostility, the Romans had no labour troubles ; and this great advantage may fairly be held to counterbalance the superiority of modern methods and implements of agriculture. Even so, ancient prosperity—such as it was—came only after centuries of effort ; and modern development on any considerable scale is likely to be slow, costly, and laborious.

APPENDIX

I. PREAMBLE OF CONVENTION BETWEEN FRANCE, ITALY, AND TUNISIA

SIGNED AT PARIS, SEPTEMBER 28, 1896

To determine the rights, powers, jurisdiction, privileges, and immunities of their respective consular agents in so far as they are charged with the protection of the Tunisians and their interests in Italy, and with the protection of the Italians and their interests in Tunisia.

[This Convention meant in practice Italy's first recognition of the French occupation of Tunisia, which had taken place in 1881.]

II. EXTRACTS FROM ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION

SIGNED AT LONDON, MARCH 21, 1899

1. Her Britannic Majesty's Government engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the west of the line of frontier defined in the following paragraph, and the Government of the French Republic engages not to acquire either territory or political influence to the east of the same line.

2. The line of frontier shall start from the point where the boundary between the Congo Free State and French territory meets the water-parting between the watershed of the Nile and that of the Congo and its affluents. It shall follow in principle that water-parting up to its intersection with the 11th parallel of north latitude. From this point it shall be drawn as far as the 15th parallel in such manner as to separate, in principle, the kingdom of Wadai from what constituted in 1882 the Province of Darfur; but it shall in no case be so drawn as to pass to the west beyond the 21st degree of longitude east of Greenwich, or to the east beyond the 23rd degree of longitude east of Greenwich.

3. It is understood, in principle, that to the north of the 15th parallel the French zone shall be limited to the north-east and east by a line which shall start from the point of intersection of the Tropic of Cancer with the 16th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, shall run thence to the south-east until it meets the 24th degree of longitude east of Greenwich, and

shall then follow the 24th degree until it meets, to the north of the 15th parallel of latitude, the frontier of Darfur as it shall eventually be fixed.¹

III. ROYAL DECREE, NOVEMBER 5, 1911

On the proposal of the President of the Council ; with the consent of the Council ; in view of Article 5 of the Constitution : We have decreed and decree : Tripolitania and Cyrenaica are placed under the full and complete sovereignty of the kingdom of Italy. A law will determine the definite regulations for the administration of these regions. Until this law has been promulgated, the necessary provisions will be made by Royal Decrees. The present decree will be presented to Parliament to be made into law.

This decree was transformed into law on February 25, 1912.

For a precedent to the decree, compare Lord Roberts's proclamations of May 24 and September 1, 1900, announcing the annexation of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

IV. EXPLANATORY CIRCULAR ADDRESSED BY THE ITALIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE ITALIAN AMBASSADORS ABROAD. NOVEMBER 5, 1911

The occupation of the principal towns of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, the constant successes of our arms, the overwhelming forces which we have already assembled there and the reinforcements which we are preparing to send have rendered ineffectual and vain all further resistance on the part of Turkey ; moreover in order to put an end to a useless shedding of blood, it is urgently necessary to dispel any uncertainty in the minds of the inhabitants of those regions. It is for this reason that by the Royal Decree, dated to-day, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have been definitely and irrevocably placed under the full and complete sovereignty of the kingdom of Italy. Any other less radical solution, which might have left to the Sultan even the shadow of a nominal sovereignty over these provinces, would have been a permanent cause of conflicts

¹ The text of the treaty is here self-contradictory, since a line drawn due south-east from the point indicated would meet the north-western boundary of Darfur before it reached longitude 24° east. In many maps, therefore, the line is not drawn south-east (in which case it would assign Wanyanga to the east or British zone), but farther north. In Hertslet's *Map of Africa by Treaty*, map 1, it runs E. 35° S. ; in Stieler's atlas (editions, 1909, 1916, 1918, map 70) E. 25° S.

between Italy and Turkey—conflicts, which might have broken out later, even against the will of the two Governments, at a moment much more dangerous for the peace of Europe. The solution adopted by us is the only definite safeguard of the interests of Italy, of Europe and even of Turkey: a peace signed on this basis will eliminate every cause for any fundamental differences between Italy and Turkey, and we shall thereby be the better enabled to inspire our whole policy with the great interest that we have in maintaining the territorial *status quo* in the Balkan Peninsula, of which the consolidation of the Ottoman Empire is the essential condition. It is therefore our strong desire, if the conduct of Turkey does not make it impossible for us, that the conditions of peace should be as consistent as possible with her lawful interests and prestige. Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have ceased to form part of the Ottoman Empire; but we are disposed to-day to consider in a most conciliatory spirit and in the manner the most suitable and most honourable for Turkey the means of regulating the consequences of facts irrevocably accomplished. Of course we cannot adhere to our conciliatory intentions, if Turkey persists in uselessly prolonging the war. We are however confident that the harmonious co-operation of the Great Powers will induce Turkey to take without delay those wise decisions and resolutions, which correspond with her own true interests and with those of the whole civilized world. In any case Italy will co-operate in arriving at these results by showing herself as well disposed to entertain equitable conditions of peace as determined to employ the most effective means of imposing it with the least possible delay.

V. TURKISH REPLY, NOVEMBER 8, 1911

The Imperial Ottoman Government understands that the Italian Government, having *proprio motu* promulgated a decree proclaiming the annexation of the Ottoman provinces of Tripoli and Benghazi, hereby communicates the fact to the Powers. The Sublime Porte protests in the most energetic fashion against this proclamation, which it considers to be null and void both in law and in fact. Such an act is effectively null, because it is inconsistent with the most elementary principles of international law. It is equally so, because Turkey and Italy are still in open war with each other, and because the Ottoman Government means to conserve and defend by arms its own imprescriptible and inalienable rights of sovereignty over these two provinces. Moreover this pro-

clamation and its communication to the Powers constitute a double and formal violation of engagements solemnly entered into under the sanction of Treaties—notably those of Paris and Berlin—not only by Italy herself in relation to the Great Powers, but also by the Great Powers in relation to the Imperial Ottoman Government, on the subject of the territorial integrity of the Empire. In these circumstances the annexation proclaimed by the Italian Government remains as null and void *de jure* as it is non-existent *de facto*.

VI. AGREEMENT PRELIMINARY TO PEACE. SIGNED AT LAUSANNE, OCTOBER 15, 1912, FOLLOWED BY AN IMPERIAL FIRMAN, A ROYAL DECREE, AND AN IMPERIAL IRADÉ

H.M. the King of Italy and H.M. the Emperor of the Ottomans, animated by an equal desire of putting an end to the state of war between the two countries and in view of the difficulty of arriving at a settlement owing to the impossibility for Italy of modifying the law of February 25, 1912, which proclaimed her sovereignty over Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and for the Ottoman Empire of formally recognizing this sovereignty, have named their Plenipotentiaries, who, having reciprocally examined their full powers respectively, and found them in good order, have agreed upon the following secret *modus procedendi* :

1. The Imperial Government binds itself to issue within a delay of three days at the most an Imperial Firman addressed to the populations of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in a form corresponding to the appended text.

2. The representative of the Sultan and the religious chiefs shall be previously agreed to by the Royal Government.

The salaries of the above-mentioned representative and of the Naïbs shall be fixed by the two Governments in agreement and be paid out of the local revenues : those of the Cadi shall on the contrary be paid by the Imperial Government.

The number of the above-mentioned religious chiefs shall not exceed the number existing at the moment of the declaration of war.

3. The Royal Government binds itself to issue within a delay of three days at the most after the promulgation of the Imperial Firman a Royal Decree in a form corresponding to the appended text (Annex 2).

4. The Imperial Government binds itself to issue within a delay of three days at the most after the promulgation of

the Royal Decree an Imperial Firman in a form corresponding to the appended text (Annex 3).

5. Immediately after the promulgation of the three unilateral acts above mentioned the Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting parties shall sign a public treaty corresponding to the text appended (Annex 4).

6. It is naturally understood and ratified by the present agreement that the Imperial Government binds itself not to send nor to permit to be sent from Turkey to Tripolitania and Cyrenaica arms, munitions, soldiers, or officers.

7. The expenses incurred respectively by the two Governments for the support of prisoners of war and hostages shall be regarded as cancelled.

8. The two High Contracting Parties bind themselves to keep the present agreement secret—saving that the two Governments reserve to themselves the right of publishing this agreement at the moment of presenting the public treaty to their respective Parliaments.

The present agreement shall come into force on the day of its signature.

9. It is understood that the Annexes mentioned in the present agreement form an integral part of it.

Annexe 1

To the inhabitants of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica :—

My Government, finding itself unable to give you the help necessary for the defence of your country, but anxious for your present and future happiness, wishing to avoid the continuation of a war disastrous for you and for your families and dangerous for our Empire ; in order to restore to your country peace and prosperity ; availing myself of my sovereign rights I concede to you full and complete autonomy. Your country will be governed by new laws and special regulations, in the preparation of which you will contribute your advice in order that they may correspond to your needs and customs.

I nominate as my representative among you my faithful servant Shemseddin bey with the title of Naïb-ul-Sultan, whom I charge with the protection of Ottoman interests in your country. The commission which I confer upon him is for five years' duration : at the end of that period I reserve to myself the right to renew his appointment or to provide for his succession.

Our intention being that the ordinances of the Sacred Law of the Sheriyat remain continually in force, we reserve to ourselves, with this end in view, the nomination of the Cadi,

who in his turn will nominate the Naïbs from among the local Ulemas, in accord with the rules of the Sheriyat. The stipend of this Cadi will be paid by us and the stipends of the Naïb-ul-Sultan and of the other functionaries of the Sheriyat will be chargeable on the local revenues.

Annexe 2

In view of the law of February 25, 1912, n. 38, by which Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have been subjected to the full and complete sovereignty of the kingdom of Italy : in order to hasten the pacification of the provinces above mentioned ; on the proposal of the Council of Ministers ; We have decreed and decree :

1. Amnesty, &c.

2. The inhabitants of Tripolitania and of Cyrenaica shall continue to enjoy, as in the past, the fullest liberty in the practice of the Mussulman Religion. The name of his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, as Khalifa, shall continue to be pronounced in the public prayers of the Mussulmans and his representative is recognized in the person nominated by him : his stipend will be chargeable upon the local revenues.

The rights of the pious foundations (*vakuf*) will be respected as in the past, and no hindrance will be offered to the relations of Mussulmans with the religious chief, called Cadi, who will be nominated by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, and with the Naïbs nominated by him, whose stipends will be chargeable upon the local revenues.

3. The representative above mentioned is also recognized as charged with the protection of the interests of the Ottoman Empire and of Ottoman subjects who may continue to live in the two provinces after the law of February 25, 1912.

4. A Commission, appointed by Royal Decree, of which native notables will also form a part, shall draw up civil and administrative regulations for the two countries, keeping touch with the principles of liberty and with respect for local customs and usages.

VII. EXTRACTS FROM THE TREATY OF PEACE

SIGNED AT LAUSANNE, OCTOBER 18, 1912

Article 1

The two Governments engage to take immediately after the signature of the Treaty the necessary steps for the immediate and simultaneous cessation of hostilities.

Article 2

The two Governments engage to give immediate orders of recall to their officers and troops and also to their civilian officials—the Ottoman Government in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, and the Italian Government in the occupied islands in the Aegean Sea, respectively. The complete evacuation of these islands by the Italian officers, troops, and officials shall take place immediately after that Tripolitania and Cyrenaica have been evacuated by the Ottoman officers, troops, and officials.

Article 10

The Italian Government engages to pay annually to the office of the Ottoman public debt on the account of the Imperial Government a sum corresponding to the average sum which in each of the three years preceding the declaration of war has been applied from the revenues of the two provinces to the service of the public debt . . . or in substitution of such annual payment, a corresponding capital sum calculated at the rate of 4 per cent. . . . The Italian Government recognizes that at present the annual payment cannot be less than 2,000,000 Italian lire and is disposed to hand over to the administration of the public debt the capital sum corresponding as soon as the demand for it shall be made.

VIII. ITALO-FRENCH DECLARATION

SIGNED AT PARIS, OCTOBER 28, 1912

Le Gouvernement Royal d'Italie et le Gouvernement de la République Française, désireux d'exécuter dans l'esprit le plus amical leurs accords de 1902, confirment leur mutuelle intention de n'apporter réciproquement aucun obstacle à la réalisation de toutes les mesures qu'ils jugeront opportun d'édicter, l'Italie en Lybie et la France au Maroc.

Ils conviennent de même que le traitement de la nation la plus favorisée sera réciproquement assuré, à l'Italie au Maroc, et à la France en Lybie : le dit traitement devant s'appliquer de la manière la plus large aux nationaux, aux produits, aux établissements, et aux entreprises de l'un et de l'autre États, sans exception.

IX. ANGLO-ITALIAN AGREEMENT, JULY 31, 1916

Great Britain and Italy having already agreed on the closing of the Egyptian frontier to supplies for the rebels and to the

closing of the markets of Cyrenaica to the rebels, due care being exercised not to starve the friendly populations, agree

(A) 1. To make no agreement with the Senussi without a previous understanding with one another.

2. That the opening and closing of the Egyptian and Cyrenaica markets shall be determined by common consent between the two Powers.

3. That, should the necessity arise, military co-operation may extend over Egyptian or Cyrenaica territory in an area to be agreed upon in each case, with reciprocal facilities for disembarking at the landing-places of Sollum and Bardia, it being understood that neither party will establish permanent posts nor construct forts in the territory of the other which they might be obliged to cross in order to attack the enemy.

4. That they will co-operate in the manner which shall be agreed upon between the naval commands in Egypt and Cyrenaica, in watching the coast, having the right reciprocally to cross the maritime boundary.

5. That they will establish exchanges of information between Egypt and Cyrenaica.

(B) As regards the special negotiations with Said Idris now on foot, Great Britain and Italy agree :

1. To recognize the Senussi confraternity and religious power and functions of its chief in the person of Said Idris el Senussi.

2. Not to accord any territorial concessions to the head of the confraternity.

3. Not to accord him independence or autonomy or in any way infringe the sovereignty of the State.

4. That it is possible to accord to the head of the confraternity the administrative autonomy of certain oases always under the sovereignty of the State in possession.

5. That they will exchange views on the following points :— whether, and, if so, what facilities can be conceded generally to the Senussi, excluding always arms and ammunition : whether, and, if so, what subsidies, honours, and privileges shall be conceded to the Senussi finally and to the head of the confraternity.

6. For their mutual advantage not to conclude either of them on their own account the negotiations now on foot with Said Idris without a previous general understanding regarding such clauses as may affect either Egypt or Cyrenaica.

The dispositions of this agreement do not prejudice the questions still to be settled in fixing the frontiers between Egypt and Cyrenaica—questions with regard to which the position of the contracting parties remains as before.

X. TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE
BRITISH, FRENCH, AND ITALIAN GOVERN-
MENTS, MARCH 28, 1917

[Substantially the same as (A) of the preceding.]

Les trois Gouvernements s'engagent :

1° à ne point conclure d'accord avec le chef de la Confrérie des Senoussis sans entente préalable entre eux ;

2° à régler d'un commun accord l'ouverture et la fermeture de leurs marchés dans les régions limotrophes de celles que parcourent les Senoussis ;

3° à accepter, en cas de nécessité, que la coopération de leurs forces puisse s'exercer au-delà de leurs frontières respectives dans une zone à convenir dans chaque cas, avec facilités réciproques de débarquement dans les ports desservant la dite zone, étant bien entendu qu'aucune des parties contractantes n'établira de poste permanent ni n'édifiera de fortifications sur la territoire de l'autre partie qui devrait être franchi afin d'attaquer l'ennemi ;

4° à coopérer, d'une manière à déterminer entre les autorités navales respectives, pour la surveillance des côtes, chacune des parties contractantes ayant le droit de franchir réciproquement la frontière maritime ;

5° à instituer un échange d'information entre les autorités locales.

XI. EXTRACTS FROM BRITISH AGREEMENT WITH
IDRIS ES-SENUSSI, APRIL 14, 1917

2. Although the [British] Government will not permit the existence of Senussi zawias in Egypt, Siwa and the oases in future, it will allow unarmed Senussists to collect voluntary offerings from Egyptians who belong to the Senussi tarika.

4. Although Jaghbub will remain as before included within the Egyptian frontiers, its internal administration will be entrusted to Sayid Idris, subject to the observance of the limitation with regard to the armed Senussists in condition No. 3 of the conditions to be carried out by Sayid Idris [i. e. not to allow any armed Senussi to remain at Jaghbub].

XII. EXTRACTS FROM AGREEMENT SIGNED BY
SAYYID IDRIS AND THE ITALIAN DELEGATES,
APRIL 14, 1917

1. We are ready to take steps to cause war in the district of Barca (Cyrenaica) to cease by preventing all acts of hostility against the Italians, or against the Arabs with them, or against traders. . . .

2. Commerce is to be carried on in complete security . . . in view, however, of the disordered conditions prevailing, trading between us must be limited to three points, Benghazi, Derna, and Tobruk. . . .

4. Italy will undertake to maintain courts of law according to the principles of the Sharia, where they now exist, and to found other religious tribunals in localities dependent on her where they may be required. These courts are to be placed in charge of learned and trustworthy kadis. . . . Similarly ordinary courts of law will act according to the principles of the Sharia and the Mussulman observances. . . . Italy will also found schools in Cyrenaica for the teaching of sciences and arts. The Koran must also be taught and there must be religious Ulemas, so that we may be able to send the sons of Arabs to study in the country itself and not elsewhere.

5. The zawias now occupied by the Italians are to be restored subsequent to the agreement. Italy will also restore the property admittedly necessary and belonging to the zawias. . . . We shall have the right to nominate, depose, or transfer the sheikhs of our zawias in the territory occupied by Italy. . . . Before, however, taking this action we will ask for the approval of his Excellency the Governor.

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
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MAPS

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