

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 155

D 6
.G7
no. 155
Copy 2

GERMAN OPINION ON
NATIONAL POLICY
PRIOR TO JULY 1914

PART I

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.


1920








Class II6

Book .G7









153

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 155

St. Brit.

207

1407

GERMAN OPINION ON
NATIONAL POLICY
PRIOR TO JULY 1914

PART I

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

2d set

HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE—No. 122
HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE

D6

.G7

Copy 2

GERMAN OPINION ON
NATIONAL POLICY
PRIOR TO JULY 1914

U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
NOV 29 1920

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE

1920

14/11/1921
manuscript

Editorial Note.

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

General Editor and formerly

Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

INDEX OF AUTHORS.

	Page
Bernhardi, General F. von ...	10, 11, 12, 20, 27, 28, 33, 46
Bernstein, E. ...	23
Bismarck-Schönhausen, Prince O. E. L. von	2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 16, 17, 27, 33, 34, 35, 36 37, 38, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50
Bonn, Professor M. ...	13
Brandt, M. von ...	22, 23
Bülow, Prince B. H. M. C. von	18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 51, 52
David, Dr. E. H. R. ...	32
Dove, Dr. K. ...	14
Erzberger, M. ...	14
François, H. von ...	13
<i>Frankfurter Zeitung</i> ...	9, 32
Frantz, G. A. C. ...	1, 14, 15, 41, 42
Freytag, G. ...	40
Garbe, Professor R. ...	22
Hasse, Dr. E. ...	iv, 28, 30, 43
Jagow, G. G. C. E. von ...	10
Lagarde, Dr. P. A. de ...	7
Lamprecht, K. ...	31, 51
Lange, F. ...	3, 4, 8
Leutwein, T. G. von ...	13
Lindequist, F. von ...	13
Lohan, O. ...	21
Moltke, Field-Marshal Count H. K. B. von ...	2, 29, 42
Naumann, Dr. F. ...	31, 34
Nettelbladt, N. von ...	13
Paasche, Professor Dr. H. ...	31
Peters, Dr. C. ...	13
Reventlow, Count E. C. E. L. D. zu ...	10
Rohrbach, Dr. P. ...	6, 12, 14, 15, 20, 21, 24, 25, 33
Roon, Field-Marshal Count A. T. E. von ...	41
Scheidemann, P. ...	32
Schrader, Deputy ...	9
Treitschke, H. von ...	3, 30, 43, 47, 48
Wegener, Professor G. ...	21, 22
Wiemer, Dr. ...	51
William II, Emperor ...	11, 35, 52
Wrochem, General A. K. E. von ...	12

NOTE BY TRANSLATOR

FOR the better understanding of the theories and projects of territorial expansion which are advanced in the following German utterances it seems desirable to say that the terms world-policy (*Weltpolitik*), world-power (*Weltmacht*), world-domination or world-rule (*Weltherrschaft*), and Imperialism are used very loosely by Pan-German writers and other representatives of a spirited foreign policy. This fact no doubt explains, in part, a certain confusion of ideas which is found in much English literature devoted to the exposition of German political designs.

It is probable that in advocating the pursuance of "world-policy" the more thoughtful of German writers and politicians merely claim for their country equality of opportunity of colonial expansion and an equal voice in the settlement of general world-problems, territorial and otherwise; and that "world-power" usually connotes to their minds no more than would be implied by the words "world-wide influence," political influence being here presupposed. Much of the literature of Imperialism and Pan-Germanism, however, openly avows aggressive and even spoliatory aims, and even points to the creation of a literal German world-domination as the rightful goal of national policy.

The sense in which the foregoing terms are used by the more moderate Imperialists is indicated in the following passage, taken from *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus, und Kolonialpolitik* (1908), by the late Dr. Ernst Hasse, one of the founders of the Pan-Germanist League:

The possibilities of and endeavours at expansion are expressed in the forms of world-economy, world-policy, world-power, exclusive dominion (*Alleinherrschaft*), imperialism and colonization. These expressions are unfortunately often regarded as

identical, and yet they are not only different but connote different ideas. . . . World-economy in the concrete can exist without world-policy, and world-policy can promote world-economy without leading to world-power. World Empires and World States can exist without world-supremacy being aimed at. Great States do not need to be World States, and an Imperium is not bound to lead to world-supremacy. If the word "world" is common to most of these expressions and conceptions, the suggestion of megalomania is not [necessarily] contained therein, as many politico-economical people and political parties try to make out, but it is simply a question of the progress of the relations of one part of the earth to the collective relations of the entire inhabited earth which we usually call "world" (pp. 2, 3).

Certain utterances of Dr. Hasse quoted in the following pages show that this writer, in practice, held extreme views on the question of German territorial expansion.

identical, and all they are not only identical but cannot be different. The word "being" is the subject of the sentence without world being, and world being can predicate world-being without leading to world-being. World-being and World-being can exist without world-being, being subject of the sentence and not to be World-being, and as predicate is not subject to lead to world-being. If the word "being" is subject to lead to these expressions and some others, the predicate of the sentence is not necessarily contained in the subject and vice versa. The subject and predicate are to make one, but it is subject to the predicate of the sentence of the sentence of the sentence which is the collected relation of the entire subject with which we usually call "world" (p. 2, 3).

I obtain instances of the cases quoted in the following pages show that the writer in practice had extreme views on the question of German territorial expansion.

GERMAN OPINION ON NATIONAL POLICY PRIOR TO JULY 1914

i. AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS OF GERMANY IN EUROPE

“ Why should we seek transoceanic possessions which could not become colonies, properly so called, instead of turning our attention to our old and true colonies which are within reach but have been lost to us—Livonia, for example—or promise to be lost, like the settlements which Germany possesses in Hungary and Transylvania? If we could at first recover only Livonia, it would be worth more to us than a dozen Samoan Islands. If it is a question of obtaining fulcra for our world commerce, nothing would be more essential than to gain the mouths of our two principal rivers, the Rhine and the Danube.”

Gustav Adolf Constantin Frantz, *Die Welt-
politik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf
Deutschland* (1882-83), vol. II, pp. 92, &c.

ii. AGGRESSION, POLICY OF

(a) *Moltke against*

“ The strength of Germany consists in the homogeneity of its population. We have within our frontiers subjects of the Empire who are not of German nationality. That is the historical result of centuries of struggles, campaigns, and treaties of peace, of victories and defeats; for the frontiers of a great State cannot be constructed according to scientific principles. These un-German subjects of ours have fought side by

side with Germans with equal bravery; but that not all their interests are identical with ours we in this House have been forced to hear oftener than can be pleasant for us. Why should we now be so foolish as to weaken ourselves by extensions of territory? I think Germany's tendency to peace lies so open to all eyes, and is so based in necessity, that the whole world must be convinced of it."

Field-Marshal Count von Moltke, speech in the Imperial Diet, April 24, 1877.

(b) *Bismarck against*

"Every Great Power which, going beyond the sphere of its interests, seeks to exert pressure on the policy of other countries, and to direct affairs lying outside the sphere which God has assigned to it, is carrying on a policy of power and not of interest; it works for prestige. We shall not do that. If Oriental crises arise we shall wait to see what position the Powers more interested than we take up before adopting a policy of our own."

Bismarck, February 6, 1888.

"There is nothing that we want to conquer, nothing that we wish to gain. We are satisfied with what we have; and it is a slander to attribute to us lust of conquest or of expansion of any kind."

Bismarck, February 9, 1876.

"My ideal has always been, after having cemented our unity . . . within the necessary territorial limits, to win the confidence, not only of the Great Powers, but the States of minor importance, and to convince them that Germany, after having repaired the wrongs done to her, and worked for unity, has only honest and pacific intentions."

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (1898), vol. II, pp. 266, 267.

“You may call the convention of London revolutionary the Vienna treaties were ten times more so it is only by European treaties that European law is established. If, however, you want to apply the standard of morality and justice to these latter they must well-nigh all be abolished.”

Bismarck, in letter to Count Goltz, December 24, 1863, quoted in *Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman* (1898), vol. II, p. 7.

iii. AGGRESSION, PRUSSIAN

“The ethnographical composition of Prussia is not advantageous; in order that a truly healthy State life may develop in Prussia, other States of Germanic stock must be added to it, in order to form the natural middle term between the Rhenish provinces and Pomerania. Grave reasons of self-preservation have led that State unceasingly into the path of territorial extensions.”

H. von Treitschke, *Bundesstaat und Einheitsstaat*, in *Historische und politische Aufsätze* (1864), vol. II, p. 202.

iv. ALIEN NATIONALITIES, GERMANY'S TREATMENT OF

“We have taken the territories of the Imperial Provinces [Alsace and Lorraine] by bloody struggles, because we knew they had been stolen from us; but to-day, after 33 years, we preserve towards the Alsace-Lorrainers the attitude of the gaoler who first tightens the prisoner's chains, then loosens them, in order to see whether he still struggles.”

Friedrich Lange, *Reines Deutschthum* (1904), p. 205.

“As to the Poles and the Francillons [of Alsace] we might say to them with a good conscience, what would be a frivolous and culpable irony in the case of our own compatriots: ‘If you are not satisfied in the German Empire, sell your shops and land to the Government, which will speedily find German buyers

who will take them; shake the dust from your feet, and seek another country.' ”

Friedrich Lange, *Reines Deutschthum* (1904), p. 207.

v. ALSACE¹, GERMANY AND

“Strassburg is the key to the house; I must have it. . . . I know very well that the Alsatians do not want to have anything to do with us; it will be a great burden for us, but we cannot help taking them.”

Bismarck, in interview with Jules Favre, September 21, 1870.

vi. ALSACE-LORRAINE

(a) *Strassburg and Metz alone demanded at first in 1870*

“Our conditions of peace must be entirely directed towards making difficult for France the next attack upon the German and particularly the hitherto defenceless South German frontier, by removing back this frontier and therewith the jumping-off place for French attacks, and endeavouring to bring into the power of Germany as a defensive bulwark the fortresses with which France threatens us.”

Circular letter of Bismarck, from Rheims. September 13, 1870, quoted in Ludwig Halm, *Fürst Bismarck, sein politisches Leben und Werke*, vol. II, p. 126.

“So long as France remains in possession of Strassburg and Metz, its offensive will be strategically stronger than our defensive in regard to the entire South and also the North of Germany left of the Rhine. In the possession of France, Strassburg is an ever-open sally-port against South Germany. In

¹ See also iv (p. 3).

German possession, on the other hand, Strassburg and Metz will gain a defensive character."

Ditto, from Meaux, September 16, 1870.

Ibid., p. 127.

(b) *Alsace-Lorraine, Neutralization of*

"Another alternative would have been to create [of Alsace and Lorraine] a neutral State like Belgium and Switzerland. There would then have been established a chain of neutral States from the North Sea to the Swiss Alps, which would certainly have made it impossible for us to attack France by land, since we are accustomed to respect treaties and neutralities, and since we should be divided from France by this intervening area; but France would not have been prevented from carrying out the plan, which she entertained but did not execute in the late war, of sending troops to land on our coasts or landing troops in the territory of allies, and marching against us. France would have secured a protecting girdle against us; but we should not have been covered at sea so long as our navy was not equal to that of France. This, however, is only a secondary objection to neutralization. The primary one is that neutrality is only tenable when the population concerned is determined to preserve an independent neutral attitude and to defend its neutrality by arms in case of need. That Belgium and Switzerland were prepared to do; certainly neither of them had any need to do it against us; but their neutrality has been respected by both belligerents; both of these States wished to remain independent and neutral. But this presupposition would not have been realized in the case of a neutralized Alsace and Lorraine in the immediate future. . . . Neutrality would have been only injurious for us, while for France it would have been an advantageous make-believe."

Bismarck, in the Imperial Diet, May 2, 1871.

"The time for neutral States is past. The French Government might agree to it, but not even that would

suffice to ward off war. We should no longer be able to threaten France by land, while France would be able to attack us by sea."

Bismarck, to Signor Crispi, May, 1889,
quoted in *Memoirs of Francesco Crispi*
(1912-14).

vii. ASIATIC TURKEY, GERMANY AND

"A good part of the future of Germany is in Asiatic Turkey, provided that we succeed in maintaining there, as far as is necessary, the integrity of the Ottoman dominion. Our political attitude in regard to Turkey is distinguished from that of all other European Powers in that in all sincerity we do not ask for ourselves any particle of Turkish territory, whether in Asia or Africa; we simply desire to possess in Turkey an outlet and a source of supply of raw materials for our industry, without wishing to assert, as regards other nations with which we are in competition, any other right than that of the unconditionally open door."

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den
Weltvölkern* (1908), pp. 315, 317.

"What we should aim at and what we may require in Asiatic Turkey is not a domain for our emigration, but a large sphere for German commerce in the zone commanded by the railway system of Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia."

Ibid., p. 323.

viii. AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, GERMAN RELATIONS WITH AND DESIGNS AGAINST

"Whoever wishes to preserve Austria should discover for her a task worth attempting. A hundred Beusts and Andrassys do not suffice to assure her a place in history. Let her propose an aim desired by universal history, and that aim, with the irresistible and urgent will which she devotes to its accomplishment, will be her life. There is no other task for

Austria than to serve as a colony of Germany. The peoples in the vast Empire are all, excepting the Germans and Southern Slavs, politically worthless: they are only material for German new formations. The Southern Slavs one may exempt from attempts at germanization. . . . All the other non-German races of the Danubian Empire—including especially the Magyars—are only a burden for Europe; the sooner they disappear, the better for them and for us. . . . The task of Austrian policy is simply to attract all German wanderers and to settle them thickly, first of all on the frontiers of the State. . . . The Bukovina may join hands with Saxon Siebenbürgen; Istria must be secured as the starting-point for German trade on the Adriatic and to Africa; the Jablunka must only hear German, and the tide must flow thence southwards, until nothing is left of the miserable little nationalities of the Imperial State.”

Dr. Paul Anton de Lagarde, *Ueber die gegenwärtige Lage des deutschen Reichs* (1876), p. 23.

“Austria has need of a ruling race, and only the Germans are capable of ruling in that country.”

Dr. Paul Anton de Lagarde, *Die nächsten Pflichten deutscher Politik*, in *Deutsche Schriften* (1886 ed.), p. 509.

“It has been said, ‘If Austria had not existed it would have been necessary to invent her.’ Well, I would like to see to-day the man who would deliberately invent such a political monstrosity as the Austro-Hungarian monarchy without immediately afterwards committing suicide from disgust at his bungling. It is not a State, and still less is it a bulwark of Germanism against Slavism. Formerly, it may have passed for that, but since the diplomacy of Taaffe has been in the ascendant, Austria has become a bastion of the Slavs; and far from being a bulwark of

Germanism it is the greatest danger that threatens us at the present time.”

Friedrich Lange, *Reines Deutschthum* (1904), pp. 209, 210.

“It is necessary that our German brethren of Austria should become again the masters in that house which adjoins ours, for our victories on the French fields of battle have been their victories also, and they are more qualified for order, for moral and intellectual work in their Austrian country than any of the other nationalities which now poison their existence. But as the Austrian Government seems to forget completely any kind of duty and gratitude towards its German peoples, it is necessary that our Government, as the authorised mandatory of germanism, should energetically remind its crafty neighbour of its duties, and in the event of its being unwilling to listen, should break off friendship and alliance with it. . . . The Danubian monarchy would be certain of disintegration if we withdrew from it our support.”

Friedrich Lange, *Reines Deutschthum* (1904), pp. 213, 215.

“Imagine the disappearance of Austria from the surface of Europe; then we should be isolated with Italy between France and Russia, the two strongest military Powers after Germany; and we should in all probability be continually in the position of one against two, or alternately dependent upon one or the other. But it will not be so. Austria cannot be imagined as non-existent; a State like Austria does not disappear. If Austria is left in the lurch, as at Villafranca, she will merely be estranged and disposed to offer her hand to any antagonist of an unreliable friend.”

Bismarck, in the Imperial Diet, February 6, 1888.

ix. AUTOCRACY¹, GERMAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY

“The unrestricted power (of the Crown) over the army simply implies that a relic of the absolute State

¹ See also xxxi (p. 32) and xxxv (p. 35).

still remains; and naturally its influence extends beyond the army.”

Deputy Schrader, in the Reichstag, March 18, 1909.

“Professions that the German nation is peaceably minded make no impression in Great Britain, since the English answer us, ‘We are glad to believe it, but the German nation does not make national policy. Its policy is made in a quarter which is absolute, irresponsible, and incalculable; and for that reason we attach merely a platonic and never a practical value to the national professions of peace.’ What answer are we to make to that? Unfortunately, it is a fact that on the main question, whether there is to be war or peace, neither the Reichstag nor the German nation has a word to say.”

Frankfurter Zeitung, January 5, 1912.

“According to the constitution, the rights over peace and war, the right to choose his Ministers, and the entire executive power belong to the King. You, on the other hand, claim that in foreign affairs the King shall follow not his own intentions but yours, and that even in the choice of the measures necessary to protect the rights and the honour of the country he shall adopt your ideas; in plain language, you wish to make the right of the Crown in regard to questions of peace and war dependent upon your vote.”

Bismarck, in the Prussian Lower House,
January 22, 1864.

X. BAGHDAD RAILWAY; A MENACE TO GREAT BRITAIN

“Even at the beginning of the century people spoke publicly [in Germany] of the line in an altogether anticipatory spirit of triumph, as menacing to India

and facilitating a Turkish invasion of Egypt. It was said that a German naval port was to be established on the Persian Gulf, and that Germany's superfluous population was to be settled in Mesopotamia. In this respect serious mistakes, for which there was no necessity, were committed by us. The more quietly the Baghdad Railway was built the better it would have been. That it would be possible, after the construction of the railway system, to make Turkey a dangerous menace to Egypt and India was, of course, true; but we should not have said it so long as Great Britain possessed the power to obstruct and delay the railway."

Count E. C. E. L. zu Reventlow, *Deutschlands auswärtige Politik, 1888-1914* (1915), p. 340.

xi. BALANCE OF POWER, GERMANY AND THE

"The principle of the balance of power in Europe, which has, since the Congress of Vienna, led an almost sacrosanct but entirely unjustifiable existence, must be entirely disregarded. . . . We must endeavour to attain our merited position at the head of a federation of Central European States, and thus reduce the imaginary European equilibrium, in one way or another, to its true value, and correspondingly increase our own power."

General von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), pp. 108-110.

xii. BELGIAN NEUTRALITY, GERMANY AND

"Belgian neutrality is defined by international treaties, and these treaties Germany will maintain."

Herr von Jagow, in the Budget Committee of the Imperial Diet, April 29, 1913.

"I and all Germany follow with friendly sympathy the astounding success which has fallen to the rest-

lessly active Belgian nation in every department of trade and industry. . . . May happiness and blessing flow forth from your Majesty's Government upon your royal house and your people! That is the deepest wish of my heart."

Emperor William II, at Brussels, October 25,
1910.

xiii. CENTRAL EUROPE, A MENACE TO FRANCE

"It cannot be desirable for France that a superior Power should arise in Germany, such as would exist if all Germany were united under Austrian leadership—an empire of 75,000,000, an Austria extending to the Rhine. Even a France extending to the Rhine would form no adequate counterpoise. It is for France, which wishes to live in peace with Germany, an advantage if Austria forms no part of this Germany."

Bismarck, in the Prussian Diet, December 20,
1866.

xiv. CIVILIZATION BY THE SWORD

"We Germans have a far greater and more urgent duty towards civilization to perform than the Great Asiatic Power [Japan]. We, like the Japanese, can only fulfil it by the sword."

General von Bernhardi, *Germany and the
Next War* (1911), p. 258.

"Our people must learn to see that the maintenance of peace never can or may be the goal of a policy. The policy of a great State has positive aims. It will endeavour to attain these by pacific measures so long as that is possible and profitable."

Ibid., p. 37.

xv. GERMAN COLONIES

(a) *German Ambitions in Africa*

“It is foolish for the English to be suspicious that we wish to conquer South Africa or Australia, to colonize Mesopotamia, or to plant the German flag in Brazil. Germany's possessions in Africa, however, are capable of large expansion, and this expansion will take place in an opportune and perhaps very near future. We wish to rob no one unjustly with violence, but, as matters are, one need not to be a prophet to be able to predict that the final readjustment amongst the African colonial Powers lies ahead, and that it will be our task to create a considerably larger ‘African Germany’ than we possess to-day.”

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), p. 134.

(b) *Colonies by Conquest*

“In all times the right of conquest by war has been admitted. It may be that a growing people cannot win colonies from uncivilized races, and yet the State wishes to retain the surplus population which the Mother Country can no longer feed. Then the only course left is to acquire the necessary territory by war. Thus the instinct of self-preservation leads inevitably to war and the conquest of foreign soil. It is not the possessor but the victor who then has the right.”

General von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), p. 22.

“A progressive nation like ours needs more territory, and if it cannot be obtained by peaceable means it must be obtained by war. It is the object of the *Wehrverein* to create this sentiment.”

Lieutenant-General von Wrochem, in a lecture reported by the *Danziger Neueste Nachrichten*, March 6, 1913.

(c) *Colonies, Opinions on their Value*

South-West Africa.—“Who would have dared to advise the Fatherland to acquire and retain this protectorate had he been able to foresee the sacrifices which would be entailed?”

Ex-Governor von Leutwein, *Elf Jahre Gouverneur in Süd-West Afrika* (1906), p. 548.

“I make the confession that, in my opinion, the whole of [German] South-West Africa will not be able to support more than 40,000 to 50,000 people, and that the four hundred million marks which Germany has expended on the suppression of the revolt represents many times the actual value of the colony.”

Nikolaus von Nettelbladt (colonial authority), quoted in *Kolonien und Kolonialpolitik* (Staatsbürger-Bibliothek, 1909), p. 13.

“German South-West Africa is in the main a land of oases. . . . It is obvious that such a territory can have but a very limited value for agriculture and cattle breeding.”

Dr. Carl Peters, in *Deutsche Monatshefte* (November, 1905).

See also disparaging judgments upon this colony by Major H. von François, ex-Governor, in his book *Nama und Damara*, and by ex-Governor von Lindequist.

(d) *Treatment of Native Populations*

“Apart from South-West Africa, where we solved the native problem by destroying tribal life and creating a scarcity of labour, we are only just now beginning to understand native administration.”

Professor Moritz Bonn, of Munich, at Royal Colonial Institute, January 13, 1914.

“Leniency to the blacks is cruelty to the whites.” Germany should “apply to the natives the treatment which the Boers have always applied to the Kaffirs.” “The mass of the natives constitute a permanent

menace to security, because an unbounded hatred of the whites lies in the hearts of these people, a hatred which no baptismal water will exorcise and no education eradicate, so long as the rulers of the country continue to be whites.”

Professor Dr. Karl Dove, in *Deutsch-Süd-West Afrika* (1913), p. 195.

“It is hard to say the words, but 30 years after the proclamation of a German protectorate over Cameroon, the hygienic conditions amongst the natives are in a large part of the colony worse than they were aforesaid, and the population is decreasing instead of increasing.”

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, May, 1913.

“Unless the Colonial Secretary succeeds in remedying these evils [forced labour, frauds upon the natives ill-treatment of labourers on the plantations, &c.], I shall no longer be ready to vote money for the colonies. Plantations which are fertilized by the blood of the natives are a curse for the German Empire, and have no right to exist at all.”

M. Erzberger, in the Reichstag, March 7, 1914.

(e) *No use for the Samoan Islands*

“What do the Samoan Islands represent in comparison [with New Zealand]? Would they perchance be important as a naval base? But is our shipping trade in that sea so large that we feel the need of such support? It might be true for the United States, . . . but the Samoan Islands are altogether out of our tracks. Would it enable us to monopolize the trade of the islands—a trade which would perhaps yield a profit of a few hundred thousand marks? . . . I do not believe the game would be worth the candle.”

Gustav Adolf Constantin Frantz, *Die Welt-politik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland* (1882-83), vol. II, p. 89.

XVI. COLONIZATION, GERMANY AND

“It would be best for Germany provisionally to erase from its mind all projects of oversea colonization. That Germany has a large emigration seems to be the fundamental justification for colonization. . . . But emigration alone is not enough. I question whether our emigrants are the sort of people for whom it is necessary to create new settlements in distant and still uncultivated countries. American experience is not in their favour, for it is rare that German emigrants venture there into the virgin forest unless American squatters have first prepared the way for them. . . . I will add that it is usual to exaggerate greatly the importance of transoceanic colonies for the material prosperity of the home country. One forgets to take into account the indirect loss entailed by the foundation and maintenance of colonies.”

Gustav Adolf Constantin Frantz, *Die Weltpolitik unter besonderer Bezugnahme auf Deutschland* (1882-83), vol. II, p. 92.

“Germany at present not only has no surplus population, and in consequence requires no ‘outlets,’ but it suffers from the lack of labour force. England herself offers the proof that a country can be far more densely populated than Germany, with simultaneously an inconsiderable emigration, and nevertheless can remain at the summit of economic prosperity and political power, so long as it is in a position to keep open for its industry and trade a sure and lasting entrance to the world’s markets both for buying and selling. It is that and nothing else that we need, and if we have a navy able to protect us against the danger of the destruction of our trade, we need neither in the present nor in the future, as now conceivable, any sort of ‘outlets.’ We give the assurance in the most definite and sincere manner that conquests in any part of the world lie outside the sphere of our aims and wishes.”

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), pp. 204-205.

xvii. CONSTANTINOPLE, RUSSIA AND

“ I believe that it would be advantageous for Germany if the Russians in one way or another, physically or diplomatically, were to establish themselves at Constantinople, and had to defend that position. We should then cease to be in the condition of being hounded on by England, and occasionally also by Austria, and exploited by them to check Russian lust after the Bosphorus, and we should be able to wait and see if Austria were attacked and thereby our *casus belli* arose. . . . As regards England, the position of modern Russia might perhaps be considered as improved if it ruled Constantinople; but as regards Austria and Germany, Russia would be less dangerous as long as it remained in Constantinople. It would no longer be possible for Prussia to blunder as it did in 1855, and to play ourselves out and hazard our stake for Austria, England, and France, in order to earn a humiliating admission to the Congress and a *mention honorable* as a European Power.”

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman
(1898), vol. II, pp. 285-286.

xviii. DENMARK, AND ARTICLE V OF
THE TREATY OF PRAGUE

“ Only His Majesty the Emperor of Austria has the right to require of us the execution of the Treaty of Prague—to what extent the treaty itself does not definitely say, for it leaves the Prussian Government a latitude in the matter; it allows it to act according to equity and the interests of the Prussian State.” . . .

“ The Treaty of Peace does not speak of ‘ the northern district of Schleswig,’ so dividing Schleswig into two parts; it does not speak of ‘ a district delimited by language’; the expression used is ‘ the northern districts.’ . . .

“ Before steps can be taken to execute this provision, it will be necessary to negotiate with the Danish

Government as to whether, to what extent, and on what conditions, it wishes the retrocession. If this retrocession involves the transference of German inhabitants who declare that they wish to remain German, we must safeguard the fate of these Germans either by reserving enclaves, or by concluding with Denmark a treaty for the precise observance of which we should have to require other sureties than those which formerly afforded to the Germans of Schleswig imperfect protection.”

Bismarck, in the Prussian Lower House,
March 18, 1867.

“ I regard the domination of Germans over reluctant nations—or I would rather say the co-existence of Germans in a commonwealth with such nations—which struggle to free themselves from the association, as inexpedient, though it is necessary. In Posen it is necessary, as a glance at the map will show. . . . In Schleswig the difficulty lies for us, not in the cession to Denmark of Danes who wish to be Danish, not in our refusal to give to Denmark what is Danish, but in the mixture of the population, so that we cannot give Danes to Denmark without giving her Germans as well. If all the Danes lived in a strip of territory adjacent to the Danish frontier, I should regard it as bad policy not to solve the difficulty with a stroke of the pen by giving back the purely Danish district to Denmark.”

Bismarck, in the Prussian Lower House,
September 24, 1867.

Note.—The article was annulled by a convention concluded between Germany and Austria on October 11, 1878, just after the Berlin Congress, in which Bismarck favoured Austria rather than Russia.

xix. ENCIRCLEMENT OF GERMANY, THEORY OF

“ In my speeches in the Reichstag, I made it quite clear that Germany was resolved to preserve her alliance with Austria at any cost. The German sword

had been thrown into the scale of European decision, directly in support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indirectly for the preservation of European peace, and, above all, for the sake of German credit and the maintenance of our position in the world. It would now be made manifest whether Germany really had been checkmated by the policy of isolation, and whether the Powers that had been drawn into the circle of anti-German policy would find it consistent with their vital interests in Europe to take up a hostile attitude towards the German Empire and its allies. The course of the Bosnian crisis, in point of fact, made an end of the policy of isolation. No Power was willing to subordinate its own European interests to the international interests of foreigners, or to sacrifice itself for others. The group of Powers whose influence had been so much over-estimated at Algeciras fell to pieces when faced with the tough problems of Continental policy. Italy sided with her allies, France awaited events and assumed an attitude not unfriendly to Germany, and the Emperor Nicholas gave the world a new proof of his wisdom and his love of peace by deciding on a friendly settlement of the existing difficulties. The ingenious isolation of Germany, for some time the terror of timid souls, proved to be a diplomatic illusion devoid of political actuality. The fundamental error in the calculations had been this, that they had not set down at its full value as a factor in the situation the importance of the German Empire as a Great Power of Europe."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 53-54.

xx. ENGLAND

(a) *German Relations with England*

"Doubtless German and English economic interests do clash here and there in the world. But in the course of her great world-policy, England has hardly found any Great Power bar her way less often than the

German Empire. This fact has not escaped the English, in spite of their anxiety about the German Navy. Germany and England are probably the only two Great European Powers who have never shed a drop of each other's blood. There has been friction and tension between them, but never war. Happily in England, too, the conviction is gaining ground that England, by continually opposing Germany, and by over-doing the anti-German policy, only injures herself. Finally, this greatest of commercial nations knows very well what excellent customers Germany and England are of each other, and how grievously British industrial life would feel the loss of German custom. If, on the one hand, there are many opposing interests in Germany and England, on the other they have very vital interests in common."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914),
pp. 91-92.

"Our relations with England require particularly firm and steady handling. We desire amicable and even cordial relations with England, but we are not afraid of hostile ones. Official Germany and the nation itself must model their behaviour accordingly. A policy of running after England is as pointless as a policy of offensiveness. The English people, politically the maturest of the nations, would not be turned aside from any course they had once recognised as profitable by the warmest protestations of friendship; and in friendly acts that were not obviously inspired by interest they would see only a confession of our weakness. On the other hand, a proud and courageous nation like the English is not to be intimidated by threats, whether open or veiled."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914),
p. 94.

(b) *Germany compared politically with England*

"We Germans must admit that our insight, our feeling of responsibility, and our readiness to make personal sacrifices for the advancement of the national

idea in the world are still but little developed, and in moral and material value are insignificant when compared with the corresponding English achievements.”

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), p. 58.

“In England every disturbance of public order is ruthlessly suppressed; but chicanery, which interferes with the liberty and comfort of the individual, is avoided with scrupulous care. Ill-grace on the part of the State, so common in Germany, is almost unknown in England. But the Englishman is such a good subject of the State, in no small degree, because the State gives him such liberty in his private life. The limits of State control, which in our country are still ill-defined, are perfectly definite in England.”

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), p. 207.

(c) *German Demands upon England*

“England must give us a completely free hand in European affairs, and acquiesce in advance in any extension of Germany’s power on the Continent which may be effected either through a Central European Federation or a war with France. It must not seek to harass us diplomatically in the development of our colonial policy so far as this is not at England’s cost. It must agree to any change in the ownership of North African colonies in favour of Italy and Germany. It must pledge itself not to impede Austria in asserting its interests in the Balkans, nor to get in the way of Germany’s economic endeavours in Near Asia, and not to oppose the extension of Germany’s naval power and the acquisition of coaling stations by the German Empire.”

General von Bernhardi in *Die Post*, December 23, 1912.

“During the Boer War, which strained the forces of the British Empire to the uttermost, and led England

into great difficulties, there seemed to be an opportunity of dealing the secret opponent of our international policy a shrewd blow."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914),
p. 31.

(d) *The British Empire*

"The English Empire, as the creation of the English national idea, and as the feeder and disseminator of this idea in the world, is something so great that it cannot be spoken of otherwise than with the highest admiration."

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), p. 56.

(e) *The English as Colonial Administrators*

"You may take up what attitude you will towards the English, but one thing cannot be denied, that they are the most experienced and successful colonial nation of the earth."

Professor Georg Wegener (Berlin), *Das heutige Indien* (1911), p. 6.

"Nothing could more fittingly characterize the often-praised active and enterprising spirit of the Anglo-Saxon race than the history of individual British colonies. . . . An eloquent example . . . is the colony of Singapore. . . . From a small, poverty-stricken Malay village, a dreaded haunt of pirates, the colony has become, in the space of scarcely a quarter of a century, the chief station on the great, much-travelled route between Europe and Eastern Asia, and has also become a trade emporium in which the ships of all seafaring nations meet."

Consul O. Lohan, in *Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik*, October 1912, p. 722.

(f) *British Rule in India*

“ In foreign circles, especially in recent times, British rule in India has frequently been characterized as implying the tyrannical exhaustion of the Indian people. There could be no greater mistake. He who knows the history of India, who knows the conditions which prevailed aforesaid in the country, which was continually raided and plundered by the robber hordes of the Mahrattas, Afghans, Sikhs, Goorkhas, and Pindaris—conditions infinitely worse than those in Germany during the Thirty Years’ War, or in the Netherlands during the War of Liberation with Spain—will not be able to deny that the rule of the English in India has brought for the majority of the people all the advantages of peace and security for life and property.”

M. von Brandt, *Englische Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialverwaltung* (1906), p. 29.

“ The English hegemony in India is all the more worthy of admiration since it is exercised with such an amazingly small display of power.”

Professor Georg Wegener (Berlin), *Das heutige Indien* (1911), p. 28.

“ A still further explanation of England’s dominant position in India is without doubt her quite exceptional genius for administration, which is peculiar to the English as it once was to the Romans. Their commercial talent is not their greatest gift; in this they have rivals, but in their constructive capacity for organization and administration they are unrivalled.”

Ibid., p. 31.

“ If the country [India] were overtaken to-day by that improbable disaster, the termination of the upright and beneficent British rule, the arbitrary domination of Mohammedans over the Hindus would be restored to-morrow.”

Professor Richard Garbe (Tübingen), *Indien unter der englischen Herrschaft* (1891), p. 64.

(g) *Great Britain in Egypt*

“Perhaps the Germans will say, ‘Well, yes, Australia has had fair treatment from the English Government but what have you to say concerning Egypt, for example?’ That question will spring from the blind, ignorant belief which seems to possess a great many German brains, that England seized Egypt merely with the object of exploiting all her vast natural resources for the benefit of the English. The plain fact is, of course, that English rule in Egypt brought with it first those moral and material advantages which are testified to by Germans in the case of India. It would be impossible to exaggerate the greatness of the administrative ability and organizing genius which have been shown by Englishmen in their task of rescuing Egypt from the chaos into which her incompetent Turkish rulers had brought her.”

Eduard Bernstein (Member of the Imperial Diet), *Die englische Gefahr und das deutsche Volk* (1911), p. 36.

“The Earl of Cromer . . . has made out of this poverty-stricken, debt-laden land (Egypt), as well as out of the desolate Soudan, a prosperous empire with considerable budget surpluses every year. . . . The foundation of his success is lowness of taxation. . . . This policy has been followed for more than twenty years in Egypt, with the result that the returns have shown an uncommon increase.”

M. von Brandt, *Englische Kolonialpolitik und Kolonialverwaltung* (1906), pp. 44-46.

xxi. ENGLISH CHARACTER AND
CIVILIZATION

“No reproach is oftener made against the English character than that of hypocrisy. It is regarded as hypocrisy that the Englishman, whenever foreign territories are brought under England’s control, represents such a proceeding as identical with the extension

of civilization, and regards Anglo-Saxon culture as the most perfect form of human civilization. That it is the most perfect, the other great civilized nations will dispute; but who can deny that it represents the most powerful, most concentrated, and most effective type ever evolved since the time of the Roman Empire? Where is to-day the achievement that can be compared with that of the English nation in its political and cultural influence upon the rest of mankind?"

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), p. 55.

"Such a steady consciousness of national civilization exists to-day among the English people. The Englishman is deeply imbued with the idea of the superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture. He certainly disapproves at times if other nations make more or less energetic propaganda for their own culture, but he seldom raises the question whether England might not be justified in taking such proceedings herself. He is convinced that English rule, with the consequent anglicizing, is a blessing, and he bases his right to expansion and conquest on his sense of the superiority of Anglo-Saxon civilization and Anglo-Saxon institutions. The grand fabric of the British Empire, the greatest the world has seen since the Roman Empire, for which no sacrifice of life or property was ever refused, was and is supported by the steadfast consciousness and firm intention on the part of English people of being bearers of a higher civilization to every spot where English power extends. The belief of the English in the superiority of their own intellectual, moral, religious, legal, and economic life is the vital force in English national policy."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 247-8.

xxii. ENGLISH POLITICAL MORALITY

"The English have attained the highest condition of political morality of all nations, since with them public institutions promote most perfectly the fertilization of

all individual forces in the service of the commonwealth, and it can be said least of all of them that separate groups of the nation use these institutions for their private convenience and enrichment.”

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), p. 112.

“It would be foolish to dismiss English policy with the hackneyed phrase ‘*perfidie Albion*.’ In reality this supposed treachery is nothing but a sound and justifiable egoism, which, together with other great qualities of the English people, other nations would do well to imitate.”

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), p. 23.

xxiii. FRANCE

(a) *Germany's Attitude towards France*

“The irreconcilability of France is a factor that we must reckon with in our political calculations. It seems to me weakness to entertain the hope of a real and sincere reconciliation with France, so long as we have no intention of giving up Alsace-Lorraine. And there is no such intention in Germany. . . .

“Also, as regards France, we must not hope too much from attentions and amenities, the small change of international intercourse. In saying this we do homage to the proud patriotism of a great nation. The resentment against Germany lies too deep in the hearts of the French for us to be able to overcome it by cheap expressions of friendship. France was never so hard hit, not even after the catastrophic defeats of 1812-15, as by the war of 1870-71. In France there is no comprehension of the fact that what seems to them the brutal severity of a conqueror was really a matter of national necessity to us Germans. Perhaps in course of time the French nation will grow reconciled to the decisions of the Peace of Frankfurt, when it realizes that they were and are irrevocable. But so long as France thinks she perceives a possibility of

winning back Alsace-Lorraine, either by her own unaided efforts or with the help of others, so long will she consider the existing arrangement provisional and not final.

“The French have the right to claim understanding for this feeling, with which the majority of the people are deeply imbued. It is a proof of a lively sense of honour, if a nation suffers so keenly from a single injury to its pride that the desire for retribution becomes the ruling passion of the people.”

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 71-72.

“The policy of revenge is supported by the unshakable belief of the French in the indestructibility of the vital power of France. This belief is based on all the experiences of French history. No nation has ever recovered so quickly as the French from the effects of national disasters; none has ever so easily regained its elasticity, self-confidence, and energy after grievous disappointments and apparently crushing defeats. More than once France appeared to be finally overcome by her enemies abroad, and so shattered by chaotic conditions at home, that Europe believed she had ceased to be dangerous. But always within a very short time the French nation confronted Europe in all its old strength, or even with added might, and was able again to take up the struggle for European supremacy, to threaten the balance of power once more. The rise and fall of this nation has always astonished the States of Europe anew.”

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 73-74.

(b) *Territorial Results of Defeat in War by France*

“France is infinitely stronger than she has ever been before. We have conquered her once, but that is not to say that we shall do so again. If we were beaten and the enemy entered Berlin victoriously, as we entered Paris, if we were obliged to accept her conditions, what would those conditions be? I do not

• speak of indemnity, though in that respect the French would not show to us the consideration which we showed to them.

“ We should be face to face with the same French whose domination we endured from 1807 to 1813, and who, as they said themselves, ‘ bled us white ’ (*nous ont saigné à blanc*). Returning to the idea of taking the Rhine as frontier, the largest possible part of the Rhine territory would be taken from us. I do not believe that France would be satisfied with Alsace-Lorraine; an *alterum tantum* lower down the river would be exacted. And even that would not be sufficient; above all things they would wish to re-establish the kingdom of Hanover. Without doubt we should also be obliged to cede Schleswig to Denmark. It would be difficult to impose upon us hard and vexatious conditions on the subject of Poland, so long as there was no *entente* between France and Russia, and that *entente* seems to me remote for France. But France might undertake a guarantee for the rights which the King of Prussia should be required to accord to his Polish subjects. . . . In its influence upon the destiny of France the war of 1870 would prove to have been child’s play as compared with a war which broke out in 1890 or some later year. On both sides the wish would be the same: each would wish to *saigner son ennemi à blanc*.”

Bismarck, in the Imperial Diet, January 11, 1887.

(c) *France, to be settled with first*

“ In one way or another we must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy; and since the hostility of France cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the matter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path.”

General von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), p. 106.

“Let it be the task of our diplomacy so to shuffle the cards that we may be attacked by France, for then there would be a reasonable prospect that Russia would for a time remain neutral.”

Ibid., p. 280.

xxiv. GERMANY

(a) *Political Immaturity of Germans*

“Our passion for logic amounts to fanaticism, and wherever an intellectual formula or a system has been found for anything, we insist with obstinate perseverance on fitting realities into the system. A German rarely applies the methods of modern science to politics; he mostly employs those of the old speculative philosophers. He does not attach importance to confronting Nature with open eyes and to observing what has happened, what is happening, and therefore what can and necessarily will happen again in the future. Rather, he grows intent upon finding out how things ought to have developed, and what they ought to have been like, for everything to harmonize with nice logic, and for the system to come into its own.”

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 129-130.

(b) “*Germany for the Germans*”

“Germany for the Germans! It is necessary to reserve to the subjects of the Empire the right to acquire German soil. We need an Imperial law to prohibit foreigners from acquiring real estate in the German Empire. . . . On the other hand, it is not necessary to disguise the fact that the possibility of German subjects acquiring estate in foreign countries is in the highest degree desirable.” [He would allow foreigners to acquire property in Germany in exceptional cases in virtue of treaties of reciprocity.]

Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Das deutsche Reich als Nationalstaat* (1905), p. 74.

xxv. GREATER GERMANY

(a) *Moltke's View*

“What sensible man would not wish that the enormous expenditure in Europe for military purposes should be directed towards peaceable objects? But international negotiations, such as have been recommended, will never lead to that result. If this end is to be achieved, I see only one possibility, and it is that in the heart of Europe there shall be created a Power which, without itself being one of conquest, shall be so strong that it will be able to forbid its neighbours to enter upon war. Hence I believe that, if this beneficent work is ever to be achieved, it will proceed from Germany.”

Field-Marshal Count von Moltke, in the North German Diet, June 15, 1868.

(b) *Prince Bülow's View*

“If the English speak of a Greater Britain, the French of a New France, and if the Russians advance in Asia, we, too, have a right to a Greater Germany. I do not understand by that that we wish to make conquests, but that we claim to develop our commerce peaceably and multiply its bases. We cannot tolerate and will not tolerate that matters are settled over the head of Germany. . . . In the course of the coming century Germany will be either ‘hammer or anvil.’ ”

Prince von Bülow, speech in the Reichstag on a Navy Bill, December 11, 1899.

xxvi. HOLLAND, GERMANY AND

“The German coast of the North Sea is ruined by shoals. . . . This Germany with its miserable coast was once the greatest sea-power in the world; and, please God, it will be again. . . . In the matter of rivers, Germany, to which nature has in so many things been a step-mother, is very fortunate, if it only realizes

its destiny and some day takes entire possession of its river. Our Rhine is the king of rivers. . . . Yet, by our own fault, the most useful part of it has passed into foreign hands, and it is the unalterable aim of German policy to regain the mouth of the river. A purely political union is not necessary, since the Dutch have become an independent nation, but an economic union is indispensable. And we are greatly to be pitied when we dare not say openly that the inclusion of Holland in our Customs Union is as necessary for us as our daily bread."

H. von Treitschke, *Politik* (1897-1901), vol. I, pp. 216, 218.

xxvii. LEGALITY, GERMAN SENSE OF

"Germany is not the country for a *coup d'état*. No people in the world has such a strong sense of law as the Germans. Nowhere does the infringement of law, whether of common law or of public equity, produce such passionate resentment as in Germany, nor is there any nation which finds it so hard to forget such a breach as we do."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), p. 181.

xxviii. LORRAINE, FRENCH INFLUENCE IN

"In the western marches of Alsace and Lorraine, Lorraine alone matters from the point of view of colonization. In Alsace the language frontier is almost identical with the frontier of the Empire, whereas, as is known, *that is not the case with Lorraine.*"

Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Die Besiedelung des deutschen Volksbodens* (1905), p. 142.

"It appears certain that Metz was partially German in language and nationality until the twelfth century; it is certain that Metz and its vicinity bore a French character at the time of their reunion with the Empire. With what rapidity that has been changed! Not only

has the population of the city been in large part germanized, but the external aspect of the country has already taken a German *cachet*, and in the north of the province a flourishing industry has led, with the growth of new localities and the development of the old, to a rapid influx of German immigration."

Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte* (1891-1909), pp. 402, 412.

XXIX. MILITARIST REGIME, THE

"Choose any place in Baden, or Württemberg, or Bavaria, and let the lieutenants and their colonel conduct themselves there as they did in Zabern, and you would see what would happen. . . . When our soldiers go to Alsace with the idea that they are entering an enemy country, and when the officers presume to play a political rôle and even to decide whether blood shall flow or not, the country sees in the army not a 'people's army,' but a foreign element."

Dr. F. Naumann, in the Reichstag, January 23, 1914.

"The Imperial Chancellor cannot console himself with the fact that this is a single case. It is of no consequence whether the Zabern regime shall be abolished a little sooner or later—it is a question of the spirit which is reflected by the whole proceeding."

Prof. Dr. H. Paasche, in the Reichstag, December 11, 1913.

XXX. MOROCCO AGREEMENT, THE

"The two Powers disposed arrogantly of a great and most important field of colonial interests, without even deigning to take the German Empire into consideration. It was clearly an attempt on the part of the Western Powers to lay claim to the right of decision in matters of international policy."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), p. 80.

xxxii. NAVAL RIVALRY, ANGLO-GERMAN

“So long as Germany and England continue on strained terms there can be no quiet for Europe. We have uttered our warning against the policy of inflated armaments, but we have not been believed. Now we see the result in increased distrust abroad. The English naval estimates are determined in Germany. Germany and England must come to a more intimate relationship and friendship. Millions think like myself, and are glad that this is said here; but, alas, no one believes us in England. There they say that the German people have no control over war; they know nothing of the game which their rulers are carrying on.”

P. Scheidemann, in the Reichstag, March 15, 1910.

“The English naval expenditure is the result of our German big navy policy. The English Government has seriously proposed the limitation of armaments since 1908, but all the time the German Government has refused to consider it.”

Dr. E. H. R. David, in the Reichstag, March 16, 1910.

“The agitation for new naval armaments which is conducted under the banner of patriotism, is the most effective means of making impossible for ever a sensible understanding with England.”

Frankfurter Zeitung, November 18, 1911.

“We have at last come to see that the protection of our commerce and the defence of our shores cannot possibly be the only object of such a navy, but that it, like the land army, is an instrument for carrying out the political ends of the State and supporting its justifiable ambitions. . . .

“It is an erroneous idea that our navy exists merely for defence and must be built with that end in view. It is intended to serve our political needs: . . .

“A war with England is probably that which we shall first have to fight out by sea.”

General von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), pp. 228, 229.

“Never yet has a German statesman or politician, our Press, or any thinking man in Germany expressed or suggested the idea that we wished to build a navy as large as the English, or even as the sea power which England maintains in the home waters.”

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* (1912), p. 196.

xxxii. NEAR EAST, THE, GERMANY'S INTEREST IN

“The question whether vessels of war shall be able to sail through the Dardanelles in peace time I do not regard as unimportant, but it is not so important that the world should be set in conflagration because of it. . . . The principal German interest in the East is that the waterways, both of the Straits and of the Danube, from the Black Sea upwards, shall remain free as heretofore.”

Bismarck, in the Reichstag, February 19, 1878.

xxxiii. PACIFIST MOVEMENT, THE

“We Germans ought not to be blinded by pacifist endeavours. It is evident that tribunals of arbitration would take as their basis the existing conditions of right and possession. For a State which is trying to raise itself, which has not yet its rightful power, which has an imperious need to extend its colonial power, and which can realise such extension only at the expense of others, these treaties of arbitration constitute a danger, since it is in their nature to prevent any displacement of power.”

General von Bernhardi, *Vom heutigen Krieg* (1911), pp. 11, 12.

XXXIV. PARLIAMENTARY REGIME, NEED FOR

“We on the Left are altogether in favour of the parliamentary regime, by which we mean that the Reichstag cannot for ever remain in a position of subordination. . . . The problem is to change the impotency of the Reichstag into some sort of power.”

Dr. F. Naumann, in the Reichstag, January, 1912.

“Germany did not look to Prussia’s Liberalism, but to her power. Prussia must concentrate her power until the favourable moment—which several times already had been allowed to pass—for her frontiers were unfavourable to a healthy body politic. . . . The great questions of the time will be decided not by speeches and resolutions of majorities—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron.”

Bismarck, in the Budget Committee of the Prussian Diet, September 30, 1862.

“Absolutism would be the ideal form of government for a European political structure were not the King and his officials even as other men are to whom it is not given to reign with superhuman wisdom, insight, and justice. The most experienced and well-meaning absolute rulers are subject to human imperfections, such as over-estimation of their own wisdom, the influence and eloquence of favourites, not to mention petticoat influence, legitimate and illegitimate. Monarchy and the most ideal monarch, if in his idealism he is not to be a common danger, stand in need of criticism; the thorns of criticism set him right when he runs the risk of losing his way. Joseph II is a warning example of this.

“Criticism can only be exercised through the medium of a free Press and Parliaments in the modern sense of the term. . . .

“The possibility of establishing Ministers in power who possess adequate qualifications must always be granted in the constitutional organism; but also the

possibility of maintaining in office Ministers who satisfy these requirements in face of occasional votes of an adverse majority and of the influence of Courts and camarillas.”

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman
(1898), vol. II, pp. 66-67.

“The present, which is full of grave and great political tasks, and which has, by means of Parliaments, given the people a share in State affairs, demands a political generation. It is not the duty of the Government in the present time to concede new rights to Parliament, but to rouse the political interest of all classes of the nation by means of a vigorous and determined national policy, great in its aims and energetic in the means it employs.”

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914),
pp. 289-290.

xxxv. PEACE

(a) *Emperor William II and Peace*

“When I addressed Sir Joseph Savory from this same place sixteen years ago, I said my aim is above all the maintenance of peace. History, I venture to hope, will do me the justice that I have pursued this aim unswervingly ever since. The main prop and base for the peace of the world is the maintenance of good relations between our two countries, and I shall further strengthen them as far as lies in my power. The German nation’s wishes coincide with mine.”

Emperor William II, in the London Guildhall, November 13, 1907. (*The Times*, November 14.)

(b) “*German Empire is Peace*”

“Powerful Governments are a guarantee of peace. But popular passions, the ambitions of party leaders,

public opinion misled by writings or speeches, are so many elements which get the better of the will of Governments. . . . If in this political tension there is a State capable of working for the maintenance of peace it is Germany—Germany which is not directly interested in the questions which excite the other Powers, which has proved since the institution of the Empire that she has no desire to attack any of her neighbours, unless she is obliged. . . . We have not the warlike instinct. We have no need of a war, we are of the States called by Metternich '*Etats saturés*.' . . . We wish for nothing that it is necessary to acquire by the sword."

Bismarck, in the Reichstag, January 11, 1887.

"Peace is the greatest blessing for Germany, and I do not believe that a German Emperor will ever cast a glance at the map with Napoleonic lust of conquest."

Bismarck, in an address to a delegation of students at Friedrichsruh, May 22, 1890.

xxxvi. POLAND

(a) *Future of Poland*

"The deputy [Herr von Jadzewski] says 'We wish for the re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, not by war, but by the pressure of public opinion.' But, gentlemen, that is absolutely impossible. The tearing away of provinces from the Prussian State, as it stands to-day under the guarantee of the Empire, is only possible by war, or by one other measure, equally violent, revolution. The choice is between these two. . . . The re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, the tearing from Prussia of her Polish-speaking provinces, is possible only if Prussia wages an unsuccessful war."

Bismarck, in the Imperial Diet, March 16, 1885.

"The establishment of the kingdom of Poland, the retrocession of North Schleswig to Denmark, the re-

establishment of the kingdom of Hanover in its old extent, and the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine are ends which are attainable only after a great defeat of Germany in war, only after the kingdom of Prussia has again been comparatively destroyed.”

Ibid.

“The Poles and many of their German friends speak of a Congress Poland as a buffer State. I do not know how this stage is to be reached without the subversion of all existing European arrangements. But even supposing that it were possible to create an enlarged Duchy of Warsaw without excessive contusions, what would be the result? It would be a thorn in the side of Austria, and would mean the destruction of our new, and, as I hope, permanent alliance with Austria. And even if a kingdom of Poland were created under an Austrian regime—that is naturally only a Utopia—it would be a misfortune. It is my political conviction that, though Russia as a neighbour is often inconvenient and dangerous for us, it is not so much so as a Poland would be.”

Bismarck, at Varzin, to a deputation from the province of West Prussia, September 23, 1894.

“Every success for the Polish national movement is a defeat for Prussia, and we cannot fight against this element by simple justice, but only according to the rules of war. The Polish question cannot be judged with impartiality, but only with hostility.”

Bismarck in a letter to Count Bernstorff in 1861.

(b) *Prussian Argument against the Restoration of Poland*

“The territory of the former republic of Poland—I abstract from it Livonia, which was ceded to Sweden by the peace of 1660, and the territory on the other side of the Dnieper, with the town of Kieff, ceded to Russia

by the peace of Andrussoff—is to-day [1867] inhabited by about 24 million people, among whom are $7\frac{1}{2}$ million Poles, of whom $1\frac{1}{2}$ million are dispersed in remote districts among other races which wish nothing in the world less than to return to Polish rule. . . . In the name of these $6\frac{1}{2}$ [$7\frac{1}{2}$] million Poles you demand over 24 million people, and that in a tone and with a feeling that suggest that it is the deepest and unworthiest tyranny and humiliation that you are not able to have these people again in your power and to tyrannize over them as was unhappily the case for centuries, aye, for half a millennium.”

Bismarck, in the Prussian Lower House,
March 18, 1867.

“ We possess Posen with the same rights as Silesia [to the Poles]. If you challenge the right of conquest you have not read your history; or rather, I believe you have read it, but you are careful to be silent about it. . . . The previous speaker has called the partition of Poland a crime. Gentlemen, it was no greater crime than the partition of Russia which you carried out in the fourteenth century when you had the power. Read your hearts and confess to yourselves that you committed the crime of annexation a hundred times when you were sufficiently powerful to do it.”

Bismarck, in the Prussian Lower House,
March 18, 1867.

“ The annexation by the Prussian State of our eastern provinces, Posen and West Prussia, would not and could not have come to pass if the Polish Republic of Nobles had been a State capable of continued existence. When their incorporation in the German dominion of the Prussian State took place, the effect was that of a belated, political requisition of rights which the German inhabitants of West Prussia and Posen had created long before by their civilizing achievements. Quite apart from the fact that if Prussia had not placed the Germans in Poland under

German rule, they would have fallen under the dominion of Russia."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 249-250.

(c) *No Concessions to Polish Nationality*

"If the attempt to extend Polish nationality had not been met by the Government with a determined effort to extend German nationality, things in Posen and West Prussia to-day would have been much the same as in Galicia. It is quite comprehensible that the Austrian monarchy, which is not a State based on the foundation of one nationality, has, for reasons of home and foreign policy, renounced all further attempts to germanize the Crown Land of Galicia since the 'seventies, and has responded in the most lavish manner to Polish wishes. Prussia is the support of the German Empire and of the national idea, is the German national State *par excellence*, and cannot grant such concessions without being false to her past, her traditions, and her German mission."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 273-4.

"It is wrong, in the fight dictated by reasons of State against the propaganda for the re-establishment of a greater Poland, to hurt our Polish fellow-citizens who fought so bravely under the Prussian standards in the wars of 1866 and 1870. Because we prize our own nationality so highly, we must respect the Pole, and sympathize with the loyalty with which he clings to his national memories. But this respect and sympathy stop short of the point where the desire and ambition of the aforesaid propaganda begin, these being to jeopardize the Prussian monarchy and to attack its unity and solidarity. No consideration for the Polish people must hinder us from doing all we can to maintain and strengthen German nationality in the former Polish domains. Nobody dreams of wishing to thrust our Poles outside the borders of the Prussian kingdom. . . . But it is the duty and the right of the

Prussian Government to see that the Germans do not get driven out of the East of Germany by the Poles."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 257-8.

xxxvii. PRUSSIA

(a) *The Stumbling-Block to Political Progress*

"The entire political contention of the present, the struggle against privileges, the Constitutional question, the German question itself, are all in the last resort only questions of Prussian internal politics, and the ultimate difficulty of their solution depends primarily on the position taken up towards them by the Prussian royal house."

Gustav Freytag, *Bilder aus der deutschen Vergangenheit* (1859-67), vol. IV, p. 486

"If the Empire is governed without reference to Prussia, ill-will towards the Empire will grow in that country. If Prussia is governed without reference to the Empire, then there is the danger that mistrust and dislike of the leading State will gain ground in non-Prussian Germany. It has always been disastrous for Prussia if necessary reforms, instead of being undertaken in time, were stubbornly refused until at last, by force of circumstances, they had to be granted in an extreme form. The art of governing in our country will always have to be directed chiefly towards maintaining the harmony between Germany and Prussia in the spirit as well as in the letter."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), p. 196.

(b) *The Prussian State*

"It is quite true that in many cases in non-Prussian Germany, owing to other political traditions, conceptions of State rule and freedom prevail that are fundamentally different from those that have sprung from the soil of Prussian traditions. This distinction

is found, not only in party differences, but in the parties themselves. In the South of Germany there is a tendency to slacken the reins of political power below, in Prussia a tendency to tighten them from above: in the former case a conception of political life more from the intellectual standpoint, in the latter more from the standpoint of the State. Each of them is the result of historical growth, and is justified in its peculiarity. The Prussian does wrong if he refuses to see anything but destructive democracy in the political life of South Germany; the South German is equally wrong if he exclaims in horror at the antiquated politics of Prussian State life."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914),
p. 283.

"German intellectual life, which the whole world has learned to admire, and which even the first Napoleon respected, is the work of the Southern and Western German domains, achieved under the protection of her Princes, small States, and free cities. German intellect was developed in the West and the South, the German State in Prussia. The Princes of the West were the patrons of German culture; the Hohenzollerns were the political teachers and task-masters."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914),
pp. 280-1.

(c) *Prussia, Created by Conquest*

"The territories which later formed the nucleus of the modern Prussian monarchy were gained by colonization and conquest."

G. A. C. Frantz, *Der Föderalismus* (1880).

"*L'équilibre* has been completely destroyed. Is not Prussia's sword to-day the sceptre of Europe?"

Field-Marshal Count von Roon (letter from Rheims, September 1870), quoted in *Denkwürdigkeiten*.

"The war of 1866 was entered on, not as a defensive measure, to meet a threat against the existence of Prussia, nor in obedience to public opinion and the

voice of the people; it was a struggle long foreseen and calmly prepared for, recognised as a necessity by the [Prussian] Cabinet, not for territorial aggrandizement or material advantage, but for an ideal end—the establishment of power.’’

Field-Marshal Count von Moltke, *The Franco-German War of 1870-71* (1893), p. 417.

xxxviii. RUSSIA¹

(a) *German Designs against Russia*

“ If it be desired that the military power of the new German Empire should have a substantial and durable result, and produce a salutary transformation in the organization of Europe, it should press Russia back to the frontiers which she has already over-stepped to the great detriment of Germany, and by so doing has become a menace to Western civilization. But then would at once be raised the question, what should become of the territories which Russia would be compelled to cede to us? First, as to the north-east, for it is there that it would be necessary to direct our principal attack. . . . In existing circumstances it would not be a very difficult matter for Prussia to wrest Poland from Russia. The difficulty would rather be to decide what should thereafter be the position of Poland. There would be only one solution: it would be necessary to make Poland a dependency of Prussia.’’

Gustav Adolf Constantin Frantz, *Der Föderalismus* (1880).

“ We want nothing from the Russians, we have Poles enough, as they have, and they can have no use for either Königsberg or Posen. We are, therefore, in the position—for a Great Power so desirable—that we do not covet each other’s goods, and that neither of us possesses what appears desirable to the other—a rare thing in politics.’’

Bismarck, in an address to a deputation at Friedrichsruh, April 10, 1895.

¹ See also xvii (p. 16).

(b) *German Government and Russian Army Discipline*

During the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, the Sultan appealed in July to the German Emperor and the Powers to move the Czar to put a stop to the acts of cruelty alleged to have been perpetrated against the defenceless Mohammedan population by the Russian army. The German Government declined to take action, on the ground that 'the discipline of the Russian Army and the character of the [Russian] people have a high reputation.' On the other hand, the German Government on receiving in August reports of acts of cruelty committed by Turkish troops against Russian wounded and captured soldiers in contravention of the Geneva Convention of 1864, promptly made representations to the Porte, and invited the other European Powers to do the same.

xxxix. SMALL NATIONS, MENACE TO

"The majestic march of German affairs, the unity of our Empire from the North Sea to the Lake of Constance, and the complete organization of that unity will not allow themselves to be obstructed by the scoldings of little peoples, who cannot forget the splendour of the past days."

H. von Treitschke, *Historische und politische Aufsätze* (1869), vol. II, pp. 542, &c.

"The globe is divided without intermission amongst the strong and the powerful. The little nations disappear. They must be dissolved in the large nations which adjoin them."

Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Grenzpolitik* (1906), p. 166.

xl. TREATIES, OBSERVANCE OF

"No Great Power can permanently adhere to the letter of a treaty which is in conflict with the interests of its own people; it must ultimately declare quite

openly 'The times have changed, I can no longer recognise it,' and it must justify its action in so doing to its own people and the other treaty Powers. No Great Power will agree to lead its people to destruction owing to adherence to the letter of a treaty concluded in different circumstances."

Bismarck, in the Reichstag, February 6, 1888.

"All contracts between Great States cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by 'the struggle for existence.' No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two. The maxim 'ultra posse nemo obligatur' holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever, nor can any treaty guarantee the degree of zeal and the amount of force that will be devoted to the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text and its earliest interpretation."

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (1898), vol. II, p. 270.

xli. TRIPLE ALLIANCE, POLICY OF THE

"It is no part of the policy of the German Empire to lend her subjects, to expend her blood and treasure, for the purpose of realizing the designs of a neighbour Power. In the interest of the European political equilibrium the maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy as a strong independent Great Power is for Germany an object for which she might in case of need stake her own peace with a good conscience. But Vienna should abstain from going outside this security, and deducing from the alliance claims which it was not concluded to support."

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (1898), vol. II, pp. 273-4.

"Our principal concern is to keep the peace between our two imperial neighbours. We shall be able to

assure the future of the fourth great dynasty in Italy in proportion as we succeed in maintaining the unity of the three Empire States, and in either bridling the ambition of our two neighbours on the east, or satisfying it by an *entente cordiale* with both. Both are for us indispensable elements in the European political equilibrium; the lack of either would be our peril; but the maintenance of monarchical Government in Vienna and St. Petersburg, and in Rome as dependent upon Vienna and St. Petersburg, is for us in Germany a problem which coincides with the maintenance of our own State regime.

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman
(1898), vol. II, pp. 271-272.

xlii. TRIPLE *ENTENTE*, THE

“The political leadership of this triple union has, at decisive moments, mostly been in the hands of England, and up till now England, like Russia, has refused to serve the cause of French revenge. She has been guided mainly by her own interests. English leadership has sometimes made our life difficult, but just as often it has had a soothing and sobering effect on France, and has done excellent work for the preservation of peace in Europe.”

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914),
p. 90.

“It is the aim of French policy, by means of alliances and friendships, to restore the balance between France and her German neighbour, or even, if possible, to turn the scales in her own favour. To this end France has had to renounce a part of her own free initiative, and has become more dependent than formerly on foreign Powers. The French, of course, are very well aware of this. The fact that the hypersensitive national pride of the French acquiesces in this, shows what is the predominant desire of the people. It is hardly possible to imagine any international situation which could

induce France to change fundamentally the policy inspired by the memory of 1870."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 87-88.

xliii. TURKEY, GERMANY'S ALLY

"Turkey is our natural ally. . . . Turkey is the only Power which can threaten England's position in Egypt, and thus menace the short sea route and the land communications to India. We ought to spare no sacrifices to secure that country as an ally for the eventuality of a war with England or Russia. Turkey's interests are ours."

General von Bernhardi, *Germany and the Next War* (1911), p. 101.

"We have carefully cultivated good relations with Turkey and Islam, especially since the journey to the East undertaken by our Emperor and Empress. These relations are not of a sentimental nature, for the continued existence of Turkey serves our interest from the industrial, military, and political points of view. Industrially and financially, Turkey offered us a rich and fertile field of activity, to which Rodbertus and Friedrich List had already drawn attention, and which we have cultivated with much profit. In the undesired but possible event of a general European war, the military strength of Turkey might be exerted in our favour. For our Austrian ally, Turkey was the most convenient neighbour possible."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914), pp. 62-63.

xliv. "VÆ VICTIS," THE DOCTRINE OF

[Speaking of the German States which fought against Prussia in 1886]: "They went to war with open eyes; they were determined to take Prussian provinces if they had conquered. They have, therefore, no right afterwards to be surprised that war should

have the serious results which it has, and to assume the tone of grievance against us because of the results."

Bismarck, in the Prussian Diet, March 11, 1867.

"If we, contrary to the expectations of our enemies, escaped the threatened danger of destruction, and as victors had the right to regulate the after-war conditions, it cannot be called an unjust conquest if, after having been compelled to take up the sword, we now think entirely of our future security."

Bismarck, in the Prussian Upper House, February 13, 1869.

xliv. WAR

(a) *Laudation of War*

"War is not only a practical but a theoretical necessity, a requirement of logic. The conception of the State implies the conception of war, for the essence of the State is power. The State is the nation organized as a sovereign Power. . . . A State which renounces war, which at once submits to an international tribunal, renounces its sovereign power—that is, itself. Whoever dreams of a perpetual peace seeks something not only unrealizable, but absurd."

H. von Treitschke, *Das konstitutionelle Königtum in Deutschland*, in *Historische und politische Aufsätze*, vol. III, pp. 469, &c.

"It is precisely political idealism that demands war, while materialism shrinks from it. What a moral perversity it is to wish to strike militarism out of the heart of man! . . . In war nations show of what they are capable, not only in the way of physical strength, but also in moral, and to some extent intellectual strength.

H. von Treitschke, *Politik* (1897-1901), vol. I, pp. 72, &c., and vol. II, p. 364.

“Among the workers there is spreading a theory of the absolute blessedness of peace, which is a scandal to the intelligence and moral energy of our age.”

H. von Treitschke, *Historische und politische Aufsätze*, vol. I, p. 782.

(b) *Ways and Means of War*

“In a war of this sort,¹ when it becomes a matter of life and death, one does not look at the weapons that one seizes, nor the value of what one destroys in using them; one is guided at the moment by no other thought than the issue of the war, and the preservation of one's external independence; the settling of affairs and reparation of the damage has to take place after the peace.”

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman (1898), vol. II, p. 64.

(c) *Prevention of War, not Germany's Business*

“The previous speaker has said that Germany had the authority—let us say, instead, the power—to prevent the [Russo-Turkish] war. I do not doubt it. It would, however, have been a great act of folly—not to use a stronger and more usual expression—if we had done it. Several attempts of the kind have been made in modern history, and those who have in this way prevented others from fighting, who have offered peace with a *quos ego*, have never been thanked for so doing.”

(He instanced the action of Czar Nicholas at Olmütz in 1850, the attempt to induce Frederick William IV of Prussia to forbid or prevent Russia from going to war in 1853, and Napoleon's intervention after Sadowa in 1866.)

Bismarck, in the Reichstag, February 19, 1878.

¹ The war with Austria.

xlvi. WARS

(a) *Bismarck on "Preventive" Wars*

At the time of the Luxemburg question [1867], I was on principle an adversary of preventive wars, that is of offensive wars waged because we thought that later on we should have to wage them against an enemy who would be better prepared."

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman

(1898), vol. II, p. 249.

His [Moltke's] love of combat and delight in battles were a great support to me in carrying out the policy I regarded as necessary, in opposition to the intelligible and justifiable aversion in a most influential quarter. It proved inconvenient to me in 1867, in the Luxemburg question, and in 1875, and afterwards on the question whether it was desirable, as regards a war which we should probably have to face sooner or later, to bring it on *anticipando* before the adversary could improve his preparations. I have always opposed the theory which says, 'Yes,' not only at the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development according to one's own calculation. It is natural that in the staff of the army, not only younger active officers, but likewise experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency of the troops led by them, and their own capacity to lead, and of making them prominent in history. It would be a matter of regret if this effect of the military spirit did not exist in the army; the task of keeping its results within such limits as the nation's need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the State. That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and even down to the most recent times, the Staff and its leaders have allowed themselves to be led

astray and to endanger peace, lies in the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forgo. It only becomes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences."

Bismarck: The Man and the Statesman
(1898), vol. II, pp. 101-102.

(b) *Bismarck on Wars of Aggression*

"I should regard it as perilous or ill-considered if we were to engage in another war, unless compelled by foreign attacks. We must keep on the defensive: we can never wage aggressive wars. I do not believe that any nation which has allowed itself to be forced into Cabinet wars has had a lasting success. Moreover, such a nation has not the right constitution."

Bismarck, at a *Kommers* held in his honour
at Jena, July 31, 1892.

[After the war of 1870-1871].—"We Germans had no reason to wage other wars. What we needed we had obtained. To go beyond that and fight from motives of conquest, for the annexation of territories which were not necessary to our satisfaction, appeared to me an act of profligacy, I might say a Bonapartist profligacy, a foreign profligacy which does not belong to our German sense of justice. After we had built and extended our house in the way which we believed to be necessary, I have always been a man of peace, and have even not shrunk from small sacrifices, for the strong can in certain circumstances give way. . . . That is the merit of the German character before all others, that it finds satisfaction in the consciousness of its own value, and has no need for privilege and domination."

Bismarck, in an address to a delegation of
German students, April 1, 1895.

xlvi. "WELTPOLITIK"

"It may be said that armed peace has been for Central Europe the result of the Franco-Prussian War,

and has acted contagiously upon the other Powers. It may be said that the foundation of the German Empire, the product of a certain foreign policy, has been naturally accompanied by a great economic expansion. It will also be said that there has resulted fatally from it an active competition with foreign countries, and that this competition forces us on to-day, &c. In reality all these transformations are a direct product of an internal evolution. The phenomenon of modern expansion has not shown itself only in the Empire and in the case of Germanism, but in all the States and nations which have in them the germs of economic and social evolution analogous or identical with those which determine the German evolution, no matter under what sky they live; for it is the same in Japan, in the United States, in France, in England. That being so, if one admits that internal evolution precedes the external transformation of modern States, it follows that a quite new character will distinguish the foreign policy of our epoch from that same foreign policy in other preceding epochs, notably from 1850 to 1880. That which has been accomplished here is the transition to modern *world policy*."

Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (1913), vol. II, p. 517.

"What to-day complicates and makes difficult our position are our oversea endeavours and interests. If we were not involved in this direction, if we were not vulnerable in consequence, we should not be so susceptible on the Continent, and it would be easier than it is to avoid friction with England."

Prince von Bülow, in the Reichstag, November 14, 1906.

Dr. Wiemer, speaking for the Radical party, replied: "It was extremely interesting to hear the Chancellor's confession that our oversea policy complicates and makes difficult our position at home. For that is what we

have always said—that Germany's European position, which for us is the principal matter, would not be made easier but more difficult by engagements of the kind. This holds good of our unfruitful colonial policy, but still more of what is called our *Weltpolitik*."


"About the time when we began to build our fleet, we established ourselves, in the autumn of 1897, in Kiau Chau, and a few months later we concluded the Shantung Treaty with China, which was one of the most significant actions in modern German history, and which secured for us a 'place in the sun' in the Far East, on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, which have a great future before them."

Prince von Bülow, *Imperial Germany* (1914).
pp. 96-97.

Emperor William II and Weltpolitik

"Taught by my study of history, I have vowed never to strive after an empty world-dominion. For what has become of the great so-called world-empires of the past? Alexander the Great, Napoleon I—all the great warriors have swum in blood and left behind enslaved peoples, who have at once risen up again and brought the empires to ruin. The world-empire of which I have dreamed is that of the newly-created German Empire enjoying on all sides the most absolute confidence as a tranquil, honourable, peaceful neighbour. If peradventure history should ever speak of a German world-empire, or a Hohenzollern world-dominion, it shall not be based on conquests won by the sword, but on the reciprocal confidence of nations possessing the same aims—briefly expressed, as a great poet says, 'limited externally, unlimited internally.'"

Emperor William II, Speech at Bremen
March 22, 1905.



4

LONDON :

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

To be purchased through any Bookseller or directly from
H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :

IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C. 2, and

28, ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1;

37, PETER STREET, MANCHESTER;

1, ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF;

23, FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH;

or from E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116, GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

1920.

Price 1s. 6d. Net.