HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 67

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CHINA

BY

CHARLES WILLIAM CAMPBELL, C.M.G.,
Late Chinese Secretary, British Legation, Peking.

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

I. POLITICAL HISTORY
Chronological Summary 1

I.—FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

i. Beginnings of European Intercourse 3
Chinese Exclusiveness 4
Embassies of Macartney and Amherst, 1793 and 1816 5

ii. Reign of Tao-kuang, 1820–50 6
Abolition of the East India Company's monopoly, 1834 7
Opium trade 8
First China War and Treaty of Nanking, 1842 ... 8
Christianity; Edict of Toleration, 1844 10
Hostility of the Cantonese 10

iii. Reign of Hsien-fêng, 1850–61 11
T'ai-p'ing Rebellion 11
Second China (*Arrow*) War and the Treaty of Tientsin, 1858 12
Rupture of 1859 and Convention of Peking, 1860 13
Russia and China, 1689–1860 15
Tsungli Yamên 17

iv. Reign of T'ung-chih, 1861–75 17
Suppression of T'ai-p'ing and Nien-fei Rebellions 18
Mohammedan Revolts in Kansu and Yunnan ... 18
Alcock Convention, 1869 19
Burlinghame Mission, 1868–70 19
Tientsin Massacre, 1870 20
Audience of Foreign Representatives, 1873 ... 20

v. Reign of Kuang-hsü, 1875–1908 20
(*a*) From Accession to the French War, 1885 ... 20
Murder of Margary, 1875 21

P.S. 978 Wt. 9014/849 1000 7/20 F.O.P. [3601]

PAGE

Chefoo Agreement, 1876 22
Reconquest of Kashgar 23
Kuldja and the Treaty of Petersburg, 1881 ... 24
Korea and Chinese Suzerainty 25
Loochoo Suzerainty... 27
France and Tonkin 28
Franco-Chinese Imbroglio of 1884–5 29

(*b*) From the French War (1885) to the Chino-Japanese War (1895) 30
Burma Convention, 1886 31
Occupation of Port Hamilton, 1885–7 31
China and Macao 31
Chungking opened to trade, 1890 31
Renewal of anti-foreign feeling 32
Chino-Japanese War, 1894–5 32
Retrocession of Liaotung 33

(*c*) From the Chino-Japanese War (1895) to the Boxer Outbreak (1900) 34
Burma Agreement (1897) and Franco-British Declaration (1896) 35
Lease of Kiaochow Bay to Germany, 1898 ... 36
Leases of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei, 1898 ... 37
Lease of Kwangchowwan to France and extension of Hongkong, 1898 39
Railways and spheres of influence 39
Russo-British Railway Agreement, 1899 40
"Battle of Concessions" 40
The United States and the "Open Door"... ... 42
Reform movement of 1898 42
Period of reaction, 1899 44

(*d*) The Boxer Outbreak and the Final Protocol of 1901 45
The Boxer movement 45
The movement supported by Prince Tuan ... 46
Siege of the Legations 47
Seymour expedition 47
Relief of the Legations 47
Flight of the Court; End of hostilities 49
Anglo-German Agreement, 1900 50
Final Protocol, 1901 50
Russian Occupation of Manchuria 52
Mission of Prince Ch'un to Berlin 52
Evacuation of Peking and Chihli 53

PAGE

(e) From the Final Protocol (1901) to the end of Kuang-hsü's reign (1908) 53
Return of the Court 53
Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902 54
Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty (Mackay Treaty), 1902 55
Russia and Manchuria, 1902–5 56
Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905; Transfer of Liaotung to Japan 57
Renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905 ... 58
Tibet Expedition, 1903–4 58
Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention, 1906 ... 59
Anglo-Russian Arrangement about Tibet, 1907 ... 59
Engagements to maintain integrity of China, 1907–8 59
Foreign religious missions 59
"Rights-Recovery" movement 60
Beginnings of political reform 62
Rivalry between Manchus and Chinese 63
Commencement of parliamentary institutions ... 63
Suppression of opium 64
Chinese Press 65
Deaths of Kuang-hsü and Empress Dowager ... 66

vi. Reign of Hsüan-t'ung, 1908–11 66
Dismissal of Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1909 67
Constitutional reform 68
Revolution of 1911 69
Opium, 1908–11 73
Foreign Affairs, 1909–11 73
Manchuria 73
Russian frontier 74
Burma frontier... 74
United States 75
Great Britain 76

II.—THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

i. Presidency of Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1912–16 76
(a) Founding of the Republic, 1912–13 76
Mutiny of troops at Peking 76
New Advisory Council 77
Parliamentary elections 78
Hostility of Provincial Assemblies 78
Peking Parliament and Reorganization Loan ... 79
Yangtse Rebellion, 1913 80

PAGE

Yüan Shih-k'ai elected President, 1913 81
New Council of Government 81
President rules without Parliament 82
Condition of Central and South China 82

(*b*) Foreign affairs during the founding of the Republic 83
Attitude of Western Governments and Japan towards the Republic 83
Unsympathetic attitude of Russia 83
United States policy of support 84

(*c*) Revolts in the dependencies, Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang 84

(*d*) Yüan Shih-k'ai as Dictator, 1914–16 86
Constitutional and legislative changes 86
Young China opposed to Yüan 87
Yüan's acceptance of the Throne 88
Revolt against the Monarchy and death of Yüan 88
Character of Yüan Shih-k'ai 89
Japan and Kiaochow, 1914–15 90
State of China under Yüan 91
Tibet, 1914... 91
Mongolia 91
Peace Treaty (China and U.S.A.), 1914 91

ii. Presidency of Li Yüan-hung, 1916–17 92
Parliament of 1913 reinstated 92
Renewed deadlock at Peking 92
Dissension in the provinces 93
Breach of relations with Germany 94
Revolt of the North 94
Attempt to restore the Manchus 95
Defeat of Chang Hsün 95
Resignation of Li Yüan-hung 96
Russo-Japanese Treaty, 1916 96

iii. Presidency of Fêng Kuo-chang, 1917 96
The Kuo-min Tang declare against the President 96
Declaration of war against Germany 97
Sun Yat-sen and the Parliament at Canton ... 97
National Council of November, 1917 98
Civil War in Szechwan 98
Ishii mission to Washington 99
"Arms Alliance" with Japan 100
Agitation against Japanese policy of the Cabinet 100
Situation in December, 1917 101
Opium, 1912–17 101

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS	
(1) Religious	103
Ancestor worship	103
Confucianism	103
Taoism	103
Buddhism	104
Mohammedanism	104
Christianity	104
(2) Political	104
Social Order	104
Machinery of Government	106
Public Examinations	107
Checks on official power	107
The Provinces	108
Parliamentary methods	109
Chinese an easily-governed race	109
Administration under the Republic	110
(3) Financial and Commercial	110
Main features of Manchu finance...	110
Land tax	112
Likin	113
Salt tax	113
Native Customs Duties	113
Maritime Customs Duties...	114
Miscellaneous taxes	115
Expenditure	115
Official corruption	115
Finance under the Republic	118
Foreign debt	119
Currency	119
Foreign trade and residence	121
(4) Naval and Military Organization	122
Army	122
Navy	125
(5) Public Education	125
General Observations	126
(1) Political Parties and Questions	126
(2) Conclusions	132
APPENDIX	
Principal treaties relating to China	135
AUTHORITIES	139
Maps	140

CHINA

I. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

1517 Portuguese arrive at Canton.
1624 Dutch establish themselves in Formosa.
1637 English first appear at Canton.
1689 Treaty of Nertchinsk between Russia and China.
1727 Treaty of Kiakhta between Russia and China.
1793 Embassy of Lord Macartney.
1816 Embassy of Lord Amherst.
1820 Accession of the Emperor Tao-kuang.
1834 East India Company monopoly ended.
1839 Opening of First China War with Great Britain.
1842 Treaty of Nanking, concluding First China War.
1844 Christianity: Edict of Toleration.
1850 Accession of the Emperor Hsien-fêng.
1851 Kuldja Convention with Russia.
T'ai-p'ing Rebellion begins.
1856 Second China War opens.
1858 Treaties of Tientsin with Great Britain, France, Russia, and America.
Treaty of Aigun with Russia.
1860 Conventions of Peking with Great Britain, France, and Russia.
1861 Accession of the Emperor T'ung-chih.
1864 T'ai-p'ing Rebellion suppressed.
1870 The Tientsin massacre.
1873 Mohammedan rebellions in Kansu and Yunnan suppressed.
Audience given by the Emperor T'ung-chih to the Foreign Representatives at Peking.
1875 Accession of the Emperor Kuang-hsü.
Murder of Margary.
1876 The Chefoo Agreement with Great Britain.
1877 Re-conquest of Kashgaria completed.
1881 Treaty of Petersburg restoring Kuldja to China.
1884 Hostilities begin with France over Tonkin.
1885 Treaty of Peace with France.
1886 Burma Convention with Great Britain.
1887 Treaty with Portugal recognising possession of Macao.
1894 Opening of war with Japan over Korea.

1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki with Japan.
Retrocession of Liaotung by Japan.
Convention with France rectifying Tonkin frontier.
1896 Franco-British Declaration relating to Yunnan and Szechwan.
1897 Seizure of Kiaochow by Germany.
1898 Kiaochow leased to Germany.
Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan leased to Russia.
Weihaiwei leased to Great Britain.
Kwangchowwan leased to France.
Colony of Hongkong extended.
Reform movement. Return to power of Empress Dowager.
1899 Russo-British Railway Agreement.
1900 The Boxer Outbreak.
Allied expeditions to China.
Flight of Chinese Court to Sianfu.
Anglo-German Agreement to maintain integrity of China.
1901 Final Protocol restoring peace with the Powers.
1902 Return of Chinese Court to Peking.
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
Anglo-Chinese Commercial Treaty.
Convention with Russia for the evacuation of Manchuria.
1904 Opening of the Russo-Japanese War.
British Expedition to Tibet.
1905 Treaty of Portsmouth.
Renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
1906 Anglo-Chinese Convention relating to Tibet.
Decree promising constitutional government.
Decree suppressing opium.
1907 Russo-British arrangement relating to Tibet.
Franco-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Conventions to maintain integrity of China.
Tzŭ-chêng Yüan (Senate) established.
1908 American-Japanese Convention to maintain integrity of China.
Programme of constitutional reform promulgated.
Deaths of Emperor Kuang-hsü and Empress Dowager.
Accession of Hsüan-t'ung. Regency of Prince Ch'un.
1909 Institution of Provincial Assemblies.
1910 Complete Senate assembled.
1911 Revolution begun.
Treaty of Tsitsihar with Russia.
Renewal of Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
1912 Abdication of Manchu dynasty.
Chinese Republic established.
Chinese driven out of Tibet.
1913 Yangtse rebellion.
Yüan Shih-k'ai President and Dictator
Outer Mongolia declared autonomous.

1914 Capture of Kiaochow.
Russo-Mongol Railway and Telegraph Agreements.
1915 Sino-Japanese Treaties.
Sino-Russian-Mongol Treaty of Kiakhta.
Sino-Russian Agreement relating to the Barŭkh country.
Yüan Shih-k'ai accepts the throne.
1916 Yüan abdicates.
Death of Yüan Shih-k'ai.
Li Yüan-hung succeeds as President.
Russo-Japanese Treaty.
1917 Attempt to restore monarchy.
Fêng Kuo-chang succeeds Li Yüan-hung as President.
Declaration of war against Germany.
Ishii Mission to Washington.

I.—FROM EARLY TIMES TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REPUBLIC

i. Beginnings of European Intercourse

Modern European intercourse with China dates from the arrival of the Portuguese in Canton in 1517, before the decline of the Ming dynasty. Their rivals, the Dutch, came a century later, and after two or three attempts to enter into direct relations at Canton —attempts which were frustrated by the Portuguese— about 1624 they established forts and trading posts in Formosa, which was then a no-man's land. The English, who had opened trade with Japan in the beginning of the seventeenth century, made their first appearance at Canton in 1637, during the reign of the last Ming Emperor. The Russians began their relations with China about the same period through the common land frontier: as far back as 1567 missions to Peking were recorded, but the Russians did not reach the Amur until about 1640, and it was in the reign of the Manchu Emperor K'ang-hsi (1661-1721) that the frontier collisions took place which led up to the Treaty of Nertchinsk or Nipchu (1689), remarkable as the first treaty made by China with a European Power.

Under K'ang-hsi the Manchu Empire was consolidated; Mongolia and Tibet were brought under more

than nominal control. His grandson, Ch'ien-lung (1735-1795), extended the dominion to Ili, invaded Burma, Cochin China and Nepaul, which were forced to pay tribute, and strengthened the Chinese hold on Tibet. This reign saw the culmination of the Manchu power. The Chinese dominions extended from the China Sea to Turkestan, from Siberia to the Himalayas and Cambodia, and, according to the *Ta Ch'ing Hui Tien*, the official Institutes of the Manchu Empire, Korea, Loochoo, Sulu, Annam, Laos, Siam, Burma, and Nepaul were all, to some extent, vassals. During this period also European trade made rapid progress and attained important dimensions. Down to the close of the seventeenth century, the three great trading nations, Portugal, Holland, and England, conducted their affairs at more than one place on the China Coast under a regime of exaction, accentuated from time to time by acts of gross injustice or contumelious insults, which were endured because of the lucrative character of the traffic. By the end of the seventeenth century, Canton had been found by experience to be more favourable to Europeans than Amoy, or Ningpo, or Formosa, and had generally been the only port open to foreign commerce; but even there, as the volume of transactions increased, the impositions and restrictions tended to become more grievous, and were often found intolerable.

Chinese Exclusiveness.—The real stumbling-block was the Chinese view of inter-State relations. China did not recognise that any other nation could expect to be treated as an independent equal. She knew none such and did not wish to know any. It was largely the arrogance natural in a State which had been for tens of centuries superior to her neighbours in wealth and civilisation; but China had always been a world to herself, and a policy of exclusion had been the traditional precaution against the foreigner. Native traditions go back to P'an-ku, the Chinese Adam, who existed millions of years ago, and they pass through ten different periods of mythical sovereigns

to Fu-hsi, the first historical Emperor, who flourished in the years 2852-2738 B.C. However critically we may regard these traditions, authentic vestiges, with characteristic ornamentation and hieroglyphic inscriptions, bear witness to a notable culture as old as the Minoan, which descended through the ages with no serious break and remarkable uniformity until it came into collision with the European. During all these epochs the Chinese race held sway over regions which were always large and eventually immense; and their language, literature, and art were dominating influences wherever they went.

Outside the territories actually administered by officers of the Empire there was a fringe of tributary neighbours who more or less acknowledged the dominion of the Emperor. The feudatory ties were of the loosest. Usually, the rulers of these peoples, on succession, sought investiture, and were granted patents and seals, but this was not invariable. China was under no obligation to keep an invested monarch on his throne if his subjects resolved to depose him; and a successful usurper was furnished with a new patent and seal as readily as his predecessor. Other countries who wished to enter into official relations with the Chinese Court were required, as a matter of course, to subscribe to similar conditions; and it is tolerably certain that until the Treaty of Nanking (1842) no foreign Power was unequivocally admitted to intercourse with the officers of the Manchu dynasty on equal terms. The only approach to this was in the case of Russia, where the Chinese point of view was thoroughly understood, but the diplomatic instruments and the history of the various missions testify that, while the Chinese had reason to consider the Russians too powerful to exact homage from, they were never publicly recognised in China as political equals.

Embassies of Macartney and Amherst.—The magnitude and increasing importance of Chinese trade and the humiliating conditions under which it was carried on at Canton led the British Government to endeavour

to enter into relations with the Chinese Court in the European manner. Lord Macartney was sent to Peking in 1793 at the head of an imposing Mission. He was received by the aged Ch'ien-lung in his summer palace at Jehol with every courtesy; but, though the Court ceremonial marked a distinct step in advance, the progress of the embassy through the country was attended by some of the characteristics of vassal Missions. So far as business was concerned, the Mission effected nothing. The contemptuous treatment and restrictions continued as before at Canton, and later, under the weaker rule of Chia-ch'ing (1795-1820), they were no better. Again the British Government sought to improve matters by sending a second Ambassador, Lord Amherst, who reached Peking in August 1816. The Macartney precedent was ignored, and he was told he must *k'o-t'ou* (prostrate himself) in the Emperor's presence if he wished to be received. When he refused, matters were so arranged that he courted dismissal unknowingly. He was bundled ignominiously out of Peking, and generally treated with scant consideration. His Mission proved as abortive for practical purposes as Lord Macartney's had been; and, unlike the latter, it had harmful after-effects at Canton.

ii. Reign of Tao-kuang, 1820-50

Soon afterwards Tao-kuang came to the throne, and with his accession came hopes of better things. He was popularly credited with some of the qualities of his grandfather, Ch'ien-lung, and he opened his reign with manifestoes foreshadowing reforms. The Court was moderately purged, but the provincial administration remained as corrupt as ever. Unrest increased; secret societies of a revolutionary type were rampant in South China; and insurrections occurred in many provinces. To add to his difficulties, European nations began to assert themselves in a manner which could not be ignored. Hitherto their

nationals had been dependent on the good-will of the Chinese, who had no real conception of the strength of the European Powers, and had tolerated the "ocean men" because trading with them was profitable. For over a century the English had been the leading merchants at Canton, and it was not unnatural that the British Government should be the first to bring home to the Court and mandarins the nature of the Powers they were dealing with.

Abolition of the E. I. Company's Monopoly.—The occasion arose through the termination in 1834 of the monopoly of the East India Company in the China trade. This monopoly had existed from the seventeenth century. There was a "factory" at Canton, and up to 1770 the controlling body was a committee of the super-cargoes of the season's ships. In that year a number of super-cargoes were stationed permanently in China to superintend the Company's affairs, and this "Select Committee," being subsequently given powers under an Act of Parliament (1787) to execute the laws of England, to that extent exercised the functions of government officials; but in other respects they simply represented the East India Company as traders. The status of the merchant being a low one in China in those days, the Select Committee had little prestige with the mandarins; and, when the Company's monopoly was ended and the China trade thrown open to unrestricted competition, a British representative of high rank in the person of Lord Napier, was sent out to superintend at Canton. The Chinese authorities, rendered suspicious, perhaps, by the rapid extension of British rule in India, declined to recognise this appointment. Lord Napier took up a firm attitude, but fell ill and died within three months of his arrival (October 1834). His procedure was not approved by the British Government, who were loth to abandon conciliatory methods, and his successors, originally servants of the East India Company, endeavoured for a few years to fit the new position into the policy of the old Select Committee.

The Opium Trade.—While the grievances of the European Committees were many and serious, the Chinese, on the other hand, had their grounds of complaint. Amongst these the smuggling of opium was prominent.[1] At one time the only foreign opium imported, about 200 chests a year, was obtained through the Portuguese at Goa, in whose hands the trade remained until 1773, when English merchants became concerned in it. In 1781 the East India Company took it over, and by 1790 over 4,000 chests were imported in the twelve months. Importation was prohibited in 1800, and opium smoking was forbidden under heavy penalties; but still the trade with India increased until, in 1820-30, it amounted to nearly 17,000 chests *per annum*. The opium was bought by the Chinese from depot ships moored in anchorages outside Chinese jurisdiction, with the open connivance of the provincial authorities from the Viceroy downwards, all of whom benefited largely by the traffic. No effective steps were taken by the Peking Government to stop it until 1839, when Tao-kuang sent the Imperial Commissioner, Lin Tsê-hsü, to Canton for the special purpose of doing so.

First China War and Treaty of Nanking.—Commissioner Lin's methods were peremptory. Captain Elliot, the British Superintendent of Trade, who had so far managed to keep the peace, in spite of interminable disputes, was called upon to destroy all the opium in the depot ships, to interdict importation, and to bind British subjects over to abandon the trade. Elliot under duress acceded to the first demand, and by May 21, 1839, 20,291 chests, valued at £2,000,000,

[1] This drug is said to have been introduced into China by the Arabs as far back as the thirteenth century; but opium-smoking appears to have followed tobacco-smoking and to have come from Java and Formosa in the seventeenth century. It is definitely known that opium was a common product in Yunnan Province early in the eighteenth century; and the first recorded edict against opium-smoking was issued in 1729 by the Emperor Yung-chêng.

were given up to the Chinese authorities, and by them destroyed. At the same time Elliot withdrew the British from Canton to Macao and forbade British ships to enter the port of Canton, pending instructions from home; stoppage of trade was the time-honoured remedy when situations became intolerable. Lin retorted by prohibiting trade at Macao.

The death of a Chinese in a foreign riot at Kowloon raised the vexed question of criminal jurisdiction and furnished a pretext for further measures against the "stiff-necked" English, including the stoppage of supplies. The Portuguese Governor at Macao not being able to guarantee their safety, Elliot embarked his nationals and retired to Hongkong, and Lin thereupon isued a proclamation on August 21, 1839, authorising the coast people to attack the English on sight. This was virtually a declaration of war. Hostile action followed, two British ships of war—the *Volage* and *Hyacinth*—opening fire on a fleet of war junks and sinking four (November 3). This was the opening act of war. Though opium was alleged by the Chinese to be the cause of it, the conflict was, in reality, the first open trial of strength in a long struggle for intercourse on terms of equality between China and the West. Lord Palmerston's long despatch of February 20, 1840, to "the Minister of the Emperor of China" contains a detailed presentment of the British case.

In 1840 Chusan was occupied by the fleet and a demonstration made off the mouth of the Pei Ho. In January 1841 the Bogue Forts at the entrance of the Canton River were captured. To save Canton the Imperial Commissioner, Ch'i-shan (Kishen), who had succeeded Lin, agreed to cede Hongkong and to pay an indemnity of six millions of dollars; but his action was disavowed by the Emperor and he was cashiered and degraded. Before his successor, Yi-shan, another Manchu, reached his post, Canton had been taken by Sir Hugh Gough, and other coast ports south of the Yangtse fell in quick succession. Attention was then

turned to the Yangtse; Chinkiang was stormed; and, Nanking being threatened, the Peking Government proposed terms of peace, and a treaty, signed by Sir Henry Pottinger on August 29, 1842, on board H.M.S. *Cornwallis*, lying off the city of Nanking, ended the first China War. After this treaty Canton no longer remained the sole port: Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were "opened," and the whole of the China coast south of the Yangtse became accessible to direct trade. The other conditions of importance were the payment of an indemnity of $21,000,000, the cession of Hongkong, and the placing of official intercourse on a footing of equality.

The British treaty was closely followed by one with America, concluded at Wang-hia, near Macao, on July 3, 1844; a French treaty, signed at Whampoa on August 14, 1844; and one with Sweden and Norway, signed at Canton on March 20, 1847. By an Imperial Rescript of July 25, 1845, Belgium was granted the right to trade under the procedure of the British and American treaties.

Christianity; Edict of Toleration.—The propagation of Christianity, which had been suppressed by the Emperor Yung-chêng in 1724, after more than a century of toleration, was once more allowed by an Imperial Rescript of December 28, 1844, obtained through the French Envoy, de Lagrené; and the Church property which had been confiscated by Yung-chêng was ordered to be restored to the Roman Catholic Missions by a Decree of February 20, 1846.

Hostility of the Cantonese.—The settlement effected by the treaties, having been imposed from outside by force—a novel experience—was resented intensely in Peking and Canton, and the Chinese administrators who had to carry out the new stipulations were confronted with opposition on all sides. The people of Canton, always turbulent and accustomed to treat foreigners as servile races, were, if anything, more hostile than before the war; and, their material interests having been seriously injured by the abolition

of the monopolies previously enjoyed, they set to work systematically to obstruct or evade the execution of the new obligations. The right of entry into the city secured by the treaty and conceded at the other ports was implacably resisted. Outrages on foreigners, chiefly English and Americans, were frequent at Canton from 1844 onwards, and they occurred also at the other open ports. The attitude of the Court throughout, rewarding officials who (rightly or wrongly) over-reached the foreigners and slighting or punishing those who acted reasonably, made hostility fashionable.

In consequence of repeated acts of aggression on British subjects, the Governor of Hongkong, Sir John Davis, in 1847 suddenly took a force to Canton to demand reparation. On the passage up river the Bogue Forts were dismantled, and, on arrival at Canton, Davis was waited upon by the Imperial Commissioner, Ch'i-ying (Ki-ying), who acceded to his demands. But the result was to intensify the hostility of the Cantonese and to diminish the power of the Imperial authorities to impose an effective execution of the treaties upon them.

iii. Reign of Hsien-fêng, 1850-61

On the accession of Hsien-fêng in 1850 the usual expectations of better government were entertained. But he was a youth of nineteen, who possessed less governing ability than his father, and easily succumbed to habits of self-indulgence.

The T'ai-p'ing Rebellion.—The lawless province of Kwangsi became at once the seed-bed of the great T'ai-p'ing rebellion. A new leader, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, arose to infuse energy and unity into the sporadic attempts of the secret societies. He professed a quasi-Christianity, and under him a religious crusade against "the wicked Tartar rulers" developed rapidly. Hung's followers, known as "the long-

hatred rebels," swarmed northward in 1852 through Hunan and captured Wuchang and Hanyang. In 1853 Hung occupied Nanking and proclaimed the T'ai-p'ing dynasty, and himself, as T'ien Wang, the first monarch of it. An army was sent north against Peking, but it was stopped in the neighbourhood of Tientsin, and eventually drifted back to Nanking in 1855. After this, the Imperial forces gradually closed in on the T'ai-p'ings, ousting them from the Yangtse cities until they were at last confined to the country between Anking and Nanking, both of which were invested. By 1858 the rebellion had been got well in hand and would probably have collapsed speedily but for the outbreak of a second war between China and England.

Second China War and Treaty of Tientsin.—The old attitude of arrogant superiority had been little affected by the first war, and after the advent of the new Emperor it increased notably. The High Commissioner at Canton, the sole channel of communication, refused personal interviews to foreign envoys on frivolous pretexts, and declined to consider the "treaty revision" which was provided for in the French and American treaties. Outrages against foreigners continued, and matters were brought to a head by the seizure of the lorcha *Arrow*, a Chinese-rigged vessel under the British flag, which was boarded in the Canton River in October 1856, the flag hauled down, and the crew imprisoned. Redress was demanded by the Consul, H. S. Parkes, and refused by the High Commissioner, Yeh Ming-shên. In consequence of reports from Parkes the Governor of Hongkong, Sir John Bowring, placed matters in the hands of Admiral Sir Michael Seymour, who seized the Bogue Forts and took Canton, but had not a sufficient force to hold it. Though an expedition was despatched from England in a short time, with Lord Elgin in charge, the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny necessitated the diversion of the troops. Commissioner Yeh, having steadily refused to do justice in regard to the torture and

murder of a French missionary, Père Chapdelaine, the French Government now took an active part in the reprisals. By December 1857 an adequate force was assembled, and Canton was captured. After fruitless negotiations, in which the American and Russian envoys figured largely, the Taku Forts were seized (May 1858), and Lord Elgin and Baron Gros went up the Pei Ho to Tientsin, on their way to Peking. At Tientsin they were met by plenipotentiaries offering peace; and treaties were concluded there with Great Britain, France, America, and Russia in June 1858.

Rupture of 1859 *and Convention of Peking*, 1860.—The ratifications of the British and French treaties were to take place at Peking within a year; but when Sir Frederick Bruce, who had been appointed Minister under the new treaty, arrived with M. de Bourboulon off Taku to carry out this arrangement, their passage was blocked, and they were asked to travel to the capital by another route from Pehtang. Admiral Hope, who was escorting the Minister, attempted to force a passage, and four of his gunboats were sunk by the forts. Hostilities were renewed. Lord Elgin was again sent out with full powers, accompanied by a large force under Sir Hope Grant. The French Government also sent an expedition; and the allied forces, some 17,000 strong, landed at Pehtang, on the coast of Chihli, north of Taku, on August 1, 1860. The Taku Forts were taken in rear; the allied fleet moved up the Pei Ho to Tientsin; and an advance thence was made on Peking.

A few days after the landing the Chinese commenced the usual attempts to arrest the hostilities by negotiation. On the arrival of the Ambassadors at Tientsin on August 25, they were informed that Special Commissioners had been appointed, and were on their way to ratify the 1858 treaty, and to conclude a peace. The allied conditions were accepted by these Commissioners, but on a draft convention being submitted to them, it was ascertained that they were not properly furnished with full powers. Negotiations were broken

off, and the march of the armies was resumed. At Yangtsun communications were received from new plenipotentiaries headed by Prince Yi, who (September 13) again accepted the allied conditions. The draft convention was considered by them and agreed to, and they wrote a letter of September 14 undertaking to produce an Imperial Decree conferring full powers. Lord Elgin's letter of acknowledgment was entrusted to Mr. H. S. Parkes, who rode forward accompanied by an escort to arrange for the necessary conference at Tungchow. However, he and his companions were seized, imprisoned, and tortured; and hostilities continued. After two more actions at Changkiawan and Palich'iao (Palikao) negotiations were resumed with a new High Commissioner, Prince Kung, a younger brother of the Emperor (who had fled to Jehol), and the Anting Gate of Peking was surrendered to the allies as a guarantee of good faith. As a special reprisal for the treacherous and inhuman treatment of Parkes and his companions, the Summer Palace (Yüanming Yüan) was destroyed. Lord Elgin entered Peking, the streets being lined with British troops, and there signed the Convention of Peking, and exchanged the ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin on October 24. On the following day Baron Gros signed a similar Convention and exchanged ratifications of the French treaty.

The Tientsin treaties settled, in some detail, the principles on which the Western nations have since conducted their intercourse with China. For the first time a foreign envoy had the right to reside permanently in Peking; and precise rules were laid down to protect his position and dignity. Foreigners were entitled to travel in the interior under passport, and were made subject to the jurisdiction of their national authorities only. Christianity was brought under treaty protection; by means of an interpolation in the Chinese text of the French Convention missionaries were even permitted the right to hold property in the interior, a right not acquired by other classes of

foreigners. Monopolies of the Canton co-hong[1] type were abolished; and freedom of contract was guaranteed. Each treaty had a most-favoured-nation clause. In 1858 indemnities of Tls. 4,000,000 and Tls. 2,000,000 were payable to England and France respectively; these amounts were increased by the Peking Convention to Tls. 8,000,000 each. Eleven additional ports were opened: four on the Yangtse, three in North China, including Tientsin, two in Formosa, and two in South China. Kowloon was ceded to Great Britain.

Russia and China, 1689-1860.—Russia also took advantage of the situation to obtain considerable advantages by diplomatic methods alone. She was in a better position to accomplish this; her relations through the long land frontier over two centuries gave her a more intimate understanding of the Chinese of the north, and furnished her with points of support. In 1689, by the Treaty of Nertchinsk, K'ang-hsi forced her to retire behind the Argun and beyond the Amur watershed; but at the same time the right was conceded to travel and trade under passport in Chinese territory. Soon afterwards, Ysbrand Ides and others were sent by Peter the Great on Missions to Peking, and arrangements were made with the consent of the Chinese for the presence of a priest to minister to the numerous Russian captives of pre-treaty days who were domiciled in that city. Under the Treaty of Kiakhta (concluded in 1727 to fix the boundaries from the Argun westward through the commercial mart of Kiakhta-Maimaichen to "Chabinai Dabagan," and to arrange for a free commerce), the abode of this priest became a hostel for Russian travellers; a church was built near it; a staff of three other priests was added; and relays of Russian students, six at a time, were maintained in this "Ecclesiastical Mission" at the expense of the Chinese Government

[1] Hong = firm. The co-hong was a limited number of native firms at Canton with whom foreigners were allowed to trade; they could not trade with anybody else.

from the reign of Yung-chêng to that of Hsien-fêng, a period of over 130 years. This treaty of 1727, with two more conventions of 1768 and 1792, regulated the traffic across the frontier, which centred at Kiakhta and was one of pure barter. At Kuldja and Tarbagatai in the far west of the Chinese Empire a similar trade grew up towards the middle of the nineteenth century, and the Kuldja Convention was concluded on July 25, 1851, to control it.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the attention of the Russian Government was directed to the Amur, and an unsuccessful attempt appears to have been made to obtain from the Chinese the right of using it to facilitate communication with Okhotsk and Kamschatka. Later, under the active rule of Count Muraviev, Governor-General of East Siberia, from 1847 onward the river was explored without reference to China, and settlements were established on its banks. In 1851 Nicolaevsk and Mariinsk were founded, and in 1853 Alexandrovsk and Constantinovsk were established on the sea-coast; all in territory which, according to the Treaty of Nertchinsk, was unquestionably Chinese. These and more warlike encroachments, arising out of the needs of the Crimean War, were the subject of protest from China, whose hands were tied by the T'ai-p'ing rebellion and the disputes with Great Britain; and finally, under pressure from Muraviev, the Treaty of Aigun was concluded (May 29, 1858) to regularise the new conditions. Under this the whole of the north bank of the Amur from the Argun fork to the sea was recognised as Russian; the south bank down to the Ussuri as Chinese; and the territory between the Ussuri and the sea was to be held in common, pending a settlement of the frontier.

An envoy, Count Putiatin, was also sent overland to China in 1857 to negotiate a treaty dealing with the maritime trade, from which heretofore Russia had been expressly excluded. Being refused permission to go to Peking, he passed down to Hongkong, and

there joined the British, French, and American envoys in pressing for free intercourse. When the allies went north he accompanied them, and was the first to sign a treaty at Tientsin (June 1/13, 1858), the important stipulation in which was a most-favoured-nation clause. The ratifications of this treaty were exchanged at Peking in May 1859, General Ignatiev being sent out overland for the purpose. After the rupture at Taku he remained on in Peking, and it is known that in March 1860 he was urging the cession of the trans-Ussuri country. In October he wrote to Baron Gros that he had been advising Prince Kung and other Chinese statesmen to come to terms with the allies, and at the same time he used his good offices to mitigate the demands of the latter. It is evident that his services were appreciated by China, because on November 14, three weeks after the conclusion of the British and French Conventions, he signed another by which the Ussuri territory (Primorsk) was ceded to Russia.

The Tsungli Yamên.—The maintenance of friendly relations with foreign Powers had become the most pressing and important duty of the Imperial Government, and it was confided in January 1861 to a Ministry created for the purpose and known under the short title of the Tsungli Yamên (Superintending Office). Prince Kung became its first president, and virtual Chancellor or Prime Minister of the Empire.

iv. Reign of T'ung-chih, 1861-75

Hsien-fêng died in the summer of 1861, leaving the throne to his son, T'ung-chih, a boy of five, whose mother had been promoted from the position of a favourite concubine to that of a consort under the style Tz'ŭ-hsi. The Empress of Hsien-fêng, Tz'ŭ-an, was childless. The two dowagers became joint-regents, and were known as the Tung T'ai Hou and the Hsi T'ai Hou, *i.e.*, East and West Empress Dowagers.[1]

[1] So much has been said on the subject that it is useful to mention here that a "concubine," or Court lady, held an entirely

Suppression of T'ai-p'ing and Nien-fei Rebellions.—During the *Arrow* War, the T'ai-p'ings had recovered breath. Two new and capable leaders inflicted defeats on the Imperialists, raised the siege of Nanking, captured Soochow and Hangchow (the capitals of the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang), and threatened Shanghai. This brought Europeans into the field. A force, known as the "Ever Victorious Army," and composed mostly of Chinese troops officered by Westerners, grew out of a small body of Europeans and Manila men which was organized by an American adventurer, Ward, for the defence of Shanghai. Eventually, this army, which at no time much exceeded the dimensions of a brigade, passed under the leadership of Major Charles George Gordon, R.E., and in co-operation with Anhwei troops, raised by Li Hung-chang, captured Soochow (November 1863); Nanking fell to Tsêng Kuo-fan (July 1864); the T'ai-p'ing chiefs were exterminated in the Chinese fashion; and the great rebellion was at an end. It is computed that 23,000,000 lives were lost in the course of it. North of the Yangtse the Nien-fei brigands still ravaged the country up to Chihli province for some years, and were not finally suppressed until 1868 by the combined efforts of Tsêng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chang, and Tso Tsung-t'ang, the three leading satraps of Mid-China at this period.

Mohammedan Revolts.—Contemporaneous with these insurrections there were two revolts amongst the Mohammedans of China Proper. The more extensive occurred in the north-west provinces of Shensi and Kansu, and lasted from 1862-1873, when it was suppressed by Tso Tsung-t'ang. The other arose in the

regular and honourable position, and was always a member of a patrician Manchu family. The Empress Dowager of fame was of the Yehonala family, one of power and influence, and she entered the Court of Hsien-fêng in the recognised manner as a *Kuei-jên*, lady of honour, or Court lady, of the fourth rank, in the early 'fifties. She was promoted to be a *pin* (third rank) in 1854; a *fei* (second rank) after the birth of T'ung-chih in 1856; and a *Kuei-fei* (first rank) in 1857.

south-west in 1856, and was known as the Panthay rebellion. The Panthays, under Tu Wên-hsiu, or Sultan Suleiman, held sway in West Yunnan, with Talifu as their capital, for seventeen years, and no serious efforts were made to suppress them until the Sultan sent his adopted son, Prince Hassan, to England in 1872, to obtain recognition as an independent government. Large forces were quickly despatched to Yunnan, and after some months of siege Talifu surrendered in February 1873.

Alcock Convention, 1869.—By the Treaty of Tientsin a revision of the tariff and commercial articles was provided for at the end of ten years, at the demand of either party. In a supplementary Convention which was negotiated by the British Minister, Sir Rutherford Alcock, and signed on October 23, 1869, amongst other advantages, arrangements were made to put a stop to the illegal transit dues which were levied on foreign trade, chiefly by provincial authorities, throughout the interior of China, in return for increases in Customs duties at the treaty ports. Owing to the general opposition of the British mercantile community, this supplementary convention, which was the outcome of two years' discussion, was not ratified by the British Government.

Burlinghame Mission, 1868-70.—While the Alcock negotiations for treaty revision were going on, Prince Kung and the Court decided in 1868 to send a special embassy to America and Europe to disabuse foreign Powers of an impression that China had entered upon a retrograde policy, and to deprecate any intention on the part of the European Powers to bring unfriendly pressure to bear on her "to induce her rulers to enter precipitately on a new system of policy which would seriously affect her independence." The embassy was placed under the leadership of Mr. Anson Burlinghame, the American Minister at Peking, whose remarkable speeches were its chief feature. His death at Petersburg in 1870 brought the Mission to an abrupt conclusion.

The Tientsin Massacre, 1870.—An incident of importance affecting foreign relations in this reign was the anti-foreign riot known as the Tientsin Massacre, in 1870. It arose through unfounded rumours of the kidnapping of Chinese children by the Sisters of the Roman Catholic Orphanage. The French Consul at Tientsin, the Sisters, and other foreigners, some 20 in all, were murdered by the mob. China paid an indemnity, and sent a Mission of apology to the French Government.

This incident gave rise to an argumentative circular from the Tsungli Yamên to the foreign Powers (February 9, 1871), asserting that the treaties had failed in the regulation of the missionary question; and suggesting measures to put a stop to objectionable features of the Christian propaganda. The arguments were rebutted by the Powers concerned, and no action was taken on the circular.

Audience of Foreign Representatives, 1873.—In 1873 T'ung-chih attained his majority and the regency of the two dowagers terminated. The occasion was taken to press the right of audience of the foreign representatives, and for the first time in history a Chinese Emperor received the Ministers of foreign Powers accredited to his Court in an appropriate manner (June 29, 1873).

v. Reign of Kuang-hsü, 1875-1908

(a) *From Accession to the French War of* 1885

T'ung-chih died in January 1875, rather suddenly, and left a young widow advanced in pregnancy. She, too, died—of grief, it was said—but not before the two dowagers had arranged that the infant child of Tz'ŭ-hsi's sister, by the youngest brother of Hsien-fêng, should be the successor. Kuang-hsü was T'ung-chih's first cousin and of the same generation. It was the first time in the annals of the Manchu dynasty that the succession did not take place in a younger

generation, in accordance with the State rules of ancestor worship, and this departure from dynastic usage, manifestly in the interest of Tz'ŭ-hsi's own family and to give her a fresh lease of power during a long minority, was always considered by orthodox Chinese as a serious defect in Kuang-hsü's title to the throne.

Murder of Margary, 1875.—The suppression of the Panthay rebellion turned the attention of the Government of India towards re-establishing the trade relations between Burma and South-West China, which had been interrupted during the period of disorder. Arrangements were made with the Chinese Government to send a Mission across the Burma frontier, and the necessary passports were issued from Peking. A member of the British Consular Service, Mr. Margary, was sent from Shanghai overland to Bhamo at the end of 1874 to accompany the expedition as interpreter. Margary reached Bhamo without difficulty, but as soon as the Mission approached the frontier, rumours of hostility reached them, and Margary, who made light of these reports, rode ahead to ascertain the state of affairs, accompanied only by his Chinese servants. He was killed near Manwyne (Man-yün), and next day an attack was made on the Mission by men in Chinese uniform (February 22, 1875). Colonel Browne, the leader, returned to Bhamo, and the expedition was abandoned. An enquiry on the spot in the presence of British officers was demanded, and after much evasion and delay a Chinese Commission was sent to Yunnan, three British officials being deputed to watch the proceedings.

The Chinese official story was that the murder and the attack were the work of irresponsible hillmen; but the evidence from the Burma side made it plain that this story was untrue, and that the orders to bar the progress of the expedition must have emanated from the Governor of Yunnan, Ts'ên Yü-ying, a man of Miao-tzŭ origin, who had distinguished himself by ruthlessness in the suppression of the Panthays. At

the enquiry some savages were produced as the culprits, and it was clear that the evidence was concocted. The British officers protested and withdrew. The trial proceeded, the hillmen were condemned to death, and a report was addressed to Peking in the hope that this would end the matter. The British Minister, Sir Thomas Wade, warned Prince Kung that, if the report were published or acted upon, he would break off relations.

In the British view, the Yunnan outrage was the outcome of the obstructive and anti-foreign attitude of the Court and Government generally; and in the discussions which ensued more importance was attached by Sir Thomas Wade to measures for the improvement of foreign intercourse and trade relations than to the actual reparation for the murder of Mr. Margary. The negotiations with the Tsungli Yamên were protracted; relations were more than once strained to breaking-point; and a flying squadron of British warships appeared off the coast. At last, in August 1876, Li Hung-chang was sent to Chefoo with full powers to treat, and with him Wade concluded a general settlement of outstanding questions.

The Chefoo Agreement, 1876.—This important agreement, dated September 13, 1876, closed the Yunnan case by an indemnity and a Mission of Apology to the British Court, and by the general publication throughout the Empire of an Imperial Proclamation setting out the treaty rights of foreigners to travel under passport and the obligations of the local authorities to protect them. It also provided for a code of etiquette for the treatment of foreign officials in China, and laid down the judicial principle in mixed cases that they should be "tried by the official of the defendant's nationality, the official of the plaintiff's nationality merely attending to watch the proceedings in the interests of justice." Four more ports were opened to trade, two on the Yangtse and one each in Chekiang and Kwangtung; a British officer was stationed at Chungking;

and six calling-stations were established on the Yangtse.

The agreement contained other clauses relating to trade matters which the British mercantile community objected to, especially one debarring the Chinese from the levying of *likin*[1] in foreign settlements, and thereby implying that they were at liberty to levy it unrestrictedly elsewhere. By an Additional Article to the Chefoo Agreement, signed in London (July 18, 1885), these matters were reserved for future consideration between the two countries; and another arrangement, more advantageous to China, was elaborated for the treatment of foreign opium in the Treaty Ports. Both the Agreement and the Additional Article were ratified on May 6, 1886.

Reconquest of Kashgar.—In the closing years of T'ung-chih the situation in the far west of the Empire, Kashgaria, became a matter of moment. Early in the reign of Tao-kuang there had been a struggle for the possession of this territory, which had been first conquered by Ch'ien-lung in 1759. A member of the old Khoja family of Kashgar, Jehangir, proclaimed himself Sultan in 1826. He was overcome and captured by the Chinese in 1828; and though there were minor revolts in 1846 and 1857 the country was left in comparative peace for thirty years. The Kansu insurrection of the 'sixties was followed by another Mohammedan rising in Kashgar led by Yakub Beg—the Atalik Ghazi—who made himself Amir of the whole region. This rebellion provoked the local intervention of Russia, by whose troops the Kuldja (Ili) Valley was occupied in 1871, under a promise to return it when Chinese authority was restored. Turkey and England also taking an interest in the progress of these changes, China was aroused to the necessity of prompt action, and, as soon as the Kansu insurrection was suppressed, preparations were made by the Viceroy, Tso Tsung-t'ang, to re-establish the Chinese

[1] Tax on merchandise in transit; see p. 113.

dominion in Kashgaria. A foreign loan of £1,600,000, the first of its kind, was raised to finance the expedition, which attained its purpose after a two years' campaign, carried out in the face of formidable difficulties of supplies and transport. Manas, the last stronghold of the Dzungars, was captured in November 1876; in 1877 Yakub Beg died; and by degrees Kashgar and Yarkand were re-conquered, and Chinese garrisons stationed in touch with Russian outposts on the Pamirs (December 1877).

Kuldja and Treaty of St. Petersburg, 1881.—Only Kuldja remained. Russia showing no disposition to restore it, a special envoy, Chung-hou, was sent to St Petersburg to negotiate, and by the so-called Treaty of Livadia, signed in September 1879, China recovered the greater part of the occupied territory on payment to Russia of 5,000,000 roubles as indemnity for the cost of occupation. When the terms of the treaty became known in China there was a chorus of opposition to the trade and territorial concessions, led by Li Hung-chang, Tso Tsung-t'ang, Chang Chih-tung, and other leading statesmen; Chung-hou was impeached, condemned, and sentenced to death in March 1880. Prince Ch'un, the Emperor's father, joined the party demanding full restitution by Russia, and for some months the danger of war steadily increased. "Chinese" Gordon, who was invited to Peking at this time, pointed out that China was not in a position to cope with Russia in Turkestan, and, calmer counsels prevailing, Prince Kung was supported by Li Hung-chang in his efforts to keep the peace. Chung-hou was reprieved and eventually released, largely as a concession to foreign opinion. Marquis Tsêng, Chinese Minister in London, was sent to St. Petersburg, and he concluded another treaty which was ratified in August 1881. This appeared to be less objectionable, though in effect the territorial arrangements of the Treaty of Livadia seem to have been little altered. Russia remained in possession of a portion of the Ili Valley.

Korea and Chinese Suzerainty.—China was now relatively in a state of peace and tranquillity, and exercised an unquestioned sway over territories little less than those ruled by Ch'ien-lung, the *roi soleil* of the dynasty. The famine of 1877-8 in Shansi and Shantung, in which 12 or 13 million persons perished, had been the sole misfortune in the domestic affairs of the reign. The loose ties of the tributary States, however, and the happy-go-lucky methods of suzerainty were involving the Government in complications with foreign Powers. So long as advantage was to be gained, China regarded the periodical Missions from her smaller neighbours conveying presents to the Court as tokens of homage from feudatories; but, when called upon to discharge the usual obligations of a suzerain, she was apt to view the "tribute" embassies as mere complimentary ceremonies.

Korea was the first instance. In 1866 Roman Catholic missionaries were murdered in that country, and about the same time an American ship was destroyed in the Pingyang River. When applied to by France and America, China declined responsibility and allowed reprisals to be taken upon Korea without protest. For reasons which had a deep root in the past, Japan also commenced to take an active interest in Korea. From the invasion of the peninsula by Hideyoshi in the sixteenth century the Korean kings had marked the accession of Shoguns by missions of felicitation, but these had ceased after the fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. From motives of policy the Korean Court retained the early objection to intercourse with foreign nations or imitation of foreigners in any shape or form, and Japan was informed that no relations could be maintained with a country embracing Western civilisation. An embassy from Japan was also refused reception. This contemptuous attitude was resented hotly, and must have caused a rupture, not only with Korea, but also with China, had not the statesmen controlling Japan's destinies at

this critical time (1873) refused to be diverted from the policy of internal reforms. In 1875, however, a crisis was provoked by the Koreans firing on the boats of a Japanese warship which was engaged in a survey of the coast. A squadron was assembled which overawed Korea, and a treaty was concluded in 1876, of which the first article declared that Korea was an "independent State enjoying the same rights as Japan." This being allowed to pass without protest, other nations proceeded to conclude treaties with Korea on the same basis, and, seeing her mistake, China now endeavoured to have a declaration added to each treaty by the King of Korea to show that he was a tributary of China.

There was a traditional enmity between Koreans and Japanese dating from the Hideyoshi invasion, and it was not long before the presence of a Japanese envoy in residence in Seoul gave rise to conflict. There was a party of progress and innovation which sought inspiration from Japan, and a larger conservative party which relied on China. In 1882 the King's father, known as the Tai Wön Kun (in Chinese, T'ai Yüan Chün), was the prime mover in an outbreak during which the Japanese Legation was attacked and the Japanese colony driven to fly for their lives. China interposed to preserve order; the Tai Wön Kun was carried off to exile in Chihli; and a strong Chinese contingent was quartered near Seoul for the protection of the Korean King. Japan afterwards guarded her Mission with a large escort; but, in 1884, the Tai Wön Kun having returned, a similar *émeute*, in which the troops of both countries took part, caused a situation of great tension in the relations between China and Japan. To obviate further risks Count Ito went to Tientsin in 1885 and made an arrangement with Li Hung-chang by which both sides withdrew their troops, advised the King of Korea to maintain a force sufficient to preserve order, and each undertook to give the other notice should it be found necessary to send troops again. Chinese influence continued

predominant, though Japan had made it abundantly clear that she was in no way disposed to acquiesce in this predominance.

The Loochoo Suzerainty.—Another question arose with Japan in connection with Loochoo. Though "tribute missions" had been regularly sent to China from these islands, they had for two centuries been considered in Japan to belong to the Satsuma fief. Apart from their proximity to Japan, the language and national characteristics showed affinities with the Japanese. In 1873 the Japanese Government sought redress from China for barbarous treatment which the crew of a wrecked Loochoo vessel had received from natives of East Formosa. The Chinese Government treating the complaints with indifference, Japan, to placate the Samurai of Satsuma, took the law into her own hands and sent troops to punish the Formosans. Against this act of force in her territories China protested, and warlike feeling was aroused in both countries. Largely by the good offices of the British Minister in Peking, Sir Thomas Wade, the dispute was composed, and it was finally arranged that the Japanese troops should be withdrawn from Formosa on payment by China of the cost of the expedition.

Soon afterwards, when Japan extended her new form of prefectural government in 1876 to Loochoo, which became the Okinawa prefecture, China, ignoring the precedent created by the Formosa expedition and its sequel, claimed Loochoo as a vassal. There the case rested—Japan in possession and China remonstrating—until 1880, when General Grant, who was on a visit to East Asia, suggested a compromise. Plenipotentiaries of the two countries met in Peking to divide the islands, Japan to take the north group and China the south. At the last moment the Chinese plenipotentiary was forbidden to sign the agreement which was reached, and the Japanese withdrew from the conference. Japan retained the islands and China let the matter drop.

France and Tonkin.—While these disputes were going on with Japan another and similar quarrel arose with the French over Annam. By a treaty concluded in 1874 between France and Annam, after the collapse of Garnier's expedition, the Red River (Songkoi) flowing through Tonkin from South-West China was opened to trade. The object of the French was to tap the provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan from a base of their own; and the suppression of the Panthay rebellion had opened the way from Hanoi and Haiphong, cities in the delta of the Songkoi.

Tonkin was, at this period, infested with lawless Chinese who had escaped from the Panthay and T'ai-p'ing rebellions, and the majority of these were enrolled in an outlaw association known as the "Black Flags," who had, in 1873, caused the failure of Garnier. In 1882 Le Myre de Vilers, then Governor of Saigon, sent Henri Rivière with a small force to open up the route to Yunnan. The Tonkinese officials greeted this expedition with hostility, and the Black Flags, under Liu Yung-fu, being again called in to help them, it perforce developed into a military occupation. Annam appealed to her suzerain, and China now interposed. When the Franco-Annamese Treaty of 1874 was brought to her notice she ignored it, or treated it as a matter which concerned Annam only, but when a French military force of some strength approached her south frontier she displayed anxiety, and protested to France on the ground that Annam was her vassal and under her protection. France refused to treat the protest seriously. It was found, however, that the Black Flags were not to be suppressed easily; and, as time went on, it became evident that they were well supplied with both arms and money from China; while Chinese soldiers were found opposing the French, and forts within the Tonkin frontier were known to be garrisoned by Chinese troops. The danger of a serious conflict with China was apparent, and Captain Fournier of the French Navy was sent to Tientsin to negotiate an arrange-

ment with Li Hung-chang. In May 1884 a Convention was signed, in which China undertook to withdraw her garrisons at once, and France agreed to waive her claim for an indemnity and to respect the prestige of China in the treaty she was about to contract with Annam.

This compromise was marred by a curious misunderstanding. In a memorandum to Li Hung-chang after the Convention was signed, Captain Fournier fixed dates for the evacuation of the Chinese posts; and this memorandum was acted upon without delay by the French in Tonkin. On the French troops advancing to occupy Langson on June 21, 1884, the date fixed by Fournier's memorandum, the Chinese commander declined to evacuate, and sent an official letter, which no one in the French camp was able to read, declaring that he was without orders, and asking for a short delay to allow him to report to his authorities. A collision occurred, and the French were repulsed. On reference to the two Governments, the French alleged bad faith; on the other hand, the Chinese insisted that the date in the memorandum had been altered to a later one in response to a request of Li Hung-chang, and that the French had broken their engagement by a premature advance.

Franco-Chinese Imbroglio of 1884-5. The Chinese Government expressed readiness to abide by the Convention and to pay an indemnity for the lives lost through the misunderstanding; but feeling in France demanded a more serious reparation, and to obtain it "reprisals" were taken on the China coast. The French fleet was allowed to ascend the Min River to Pagoda Anchorage in the absence of a formal declaration of war, and there it destroyed an inferior Chinese squadron, together with the arsenal (August 23, 1884). The forts on the Min were then taken in rear and easily demolished. Later, Keelung was occupied (October 4), but an attempt on Tamsui failed, and the fleet afterwards contented itself with a blockade of Formosa.

Other reprisals were taken near Shanghai and Ningpo, and, to bring direct pressure upon the Chinese Court, rice was declared contraband of war. The practical result of these operations was not apparent; and this fact, and the repulse at Tamsui, stiffened the attitude of the Chinese Government, who massed troops on the Tonkin frontier and made preparations to continue hostilities on a considerable scale. A war of this character did not enter into the views of the French Cabinet; and the adroit intervention of Sir Robert Hart brought about a settlement on terms which were practically those of the Fournier Convention (April 1885).

(b) *From the French War* (1885) *to the Chino-Japanese War* (1895)

The Chinese had legitimate reasons to be satisfied with the outcome of this conflict. They had not hesitated to try conclusions with a first-class European Power, and had come out of the trial without loss of honour. Erroneous estimates of relative Powers were formed, as well in European chancellories as in the Court of Peking. Before this, a beginning had been made in naval affairs; the arsenal at Foochow had been turning out small composite gun vessels; a training ship was bought and placed under a British officer; several armoured vessels were ordered from England, and progress was made with the fortification of Port Arthur. After the Tonkin affair the new Board of Admiralty, to mark its importance, was placed under Prince Ch'un; more war vessels were ordered from England and Germany; the Pei-yang (under the command of Admiral Lang with English instructors) and Nan-yang squadrons were strengthened; the works at Port Arthur were carried to completion; and some progress was made with the new naval base at Weihaiwei. Direct cable connection with Europe had been established in the early 'seventies, but the Russian scare over Kuldja having demonstrated the value of telegraphs, the first land line was constructed between

Tientsin and Shanghai in 1881, and from that date onwards the extension of telegraphic communication throughout the Empire has been continuous.

Burma Convention, 1886.—On the conquest of Burma in 1885-6 it was England's turn to discuss a question of vassalage. The discussion was amicable, and it was settled by a Convention of July 24, 1886, in which China recognised British authority and rule in Burma, and England agreed to the continuation of the customary decennial missions "to present articles of local produce . . . . the members of such missions to be of Burmese race." There was much criticism of this arrangement at the time; but, as a matter of fact, it has never been acted upon.

Occupation of Port Hamilton, 1885-7.—The occupation of Port Hamilton, which was Korean territory, by a British naval force in May 1885, to forestall Russian action on the coast of Korea, was made the subject of protest by China. The Russian Government having promised China that they "would not occupy Korean territory under any circumstances whatsoever," China gave a guarantee to Great Britain that no part of Korea would be surrendered to another Power, and the islands were evacuated on February 27, 1887.

China and Macao.—The long-standing question of the sovereignty of Macao was settled in 1887. The Macao Peninsula had been in Portuguese occupation, at first on sufferance and later under payment of a yearly rent, since 1557. In 1849 it was declared Portuguese territory by the Governor, but the Chinese refused to recognise this, and a Treaty of Commerce between China and Portugal which was signed at Tientsin in 1862 was not ratified because of this dispute. Eventually, in return for Portuguese co-operation to prevent opium smuggling, China concluded a regular treaty on December 1, 1887, under Article II of which she confirmed "perpetual occupation and government of Macao and its dependencies by Portugal, as any other Portuguese possession."

Chungking Opened to Trade, 1890.—By an Addi-

tional Article to the Chefoo Agreement of 1876, which was signed at Peking on March 31, 1890, Chungking was "declared open to trade on the same footing as any other Treaty Port." A British Consular Officer had been resident since 1877 to watch the conditions of trade, but merchants were not allowed to open establishments or to live in the place. The opening of Chungking gave commercial access to the secluded province of Szechwan, one of the richest of China.

Renewal of Anti-Foreign Feeling.—There was a renewal of anti-foreign feeling in the early 'nineties which developed into mob riots in the Yangtse region from Chinkiang to Ichang. In 1890 Admiral Lang was forced by intrigues of Chinese naval officers to resign his command of the Pei-yang squadron; and with his departure the fleet gradually deteriorated. Discipline was relaxed; the ships and material were not maintained properly; the ammunition was defective; and corruption became as rampant as in the army. The consequences were serious in the crisis which was approaching with Japan.

Chino-Japanese War, 1894-5.—The *modus vivendi* concluded in 1885 by Count Ito and Li Hung-chang was now brought to the test. The Tonghak revolt in South Korea assumed serious proportions in the spring of 1894, and the Government was in peril. An appeal for help was made to China, and in July, 2,500 Chinese troops were sent from Tientsin and encamped at Asan on the south-west coast of Korea. The notice required under the Ito-Li Agreement was given in due course through the Japanese Minister at Peking, but in giving this notice Korea was described as a state tributary to China. Moreover, during the previous decade the covert hostility of China in some incidents had offended Japanese susceptibilities. As soon as the landing of Chinese troops was announced Japan considered that the moment had come to place her position and interests in the peninsula on a footing more acceptable to her. It was not that Japan claimed rights superior to those of China; but she declined to admit

that Korea was China's tributary, and she viewed the intervention of Chinese troops as intended more to affirm China's predominance than to suppress the Tonghaks.

China's action was met by the prompt despatch of a large force from Japan to Seoul, and a protest against the claim of suzerainty. Of this protest no notice was taken. Then a proposal was made by Japan that both countries should combine to restore order, and to institute reforms by means of a joint Commission. China declined to force reforms on the Koreans; Japan retorted by undertaking the task herself and by announcing that her troops would not be withdrawn until guarantees were obtained for the "future peace, order, and good government of Korea." Steps were taken to strengthen the Chinese forces at Asan and to send an army from the north over the Yalu. The reinforcements to Asan were escorted by warships, and, the latter being encountered by a Japanese squadron, fought an engagement in which the Chinese were worsted (July 25, 1894). War was now declared on both sides. The Chinese were driven out of Korea in two months; and a conflict between the fleets off the Yalu left the seas open to Japan. Japanese columns from Korea were sent through Manchuria and captured Fenghwangcheng and Newchwang; others were landed on the Liaotung Peninsula and carried Ta-lien Wan and Port Arthur by assault; and one despatched to Shantung seized Weihaiwei. As the Japanese were now ready to march on Peking, China sued for peace early in 1895, and a treaty was concluded on April 17 at Shimonoseki by Count Ito and Li Hung-chang, which, besides declaring the independence of Korea, ceded Formosa, the Pescadores, and a portion of South Manchuria, together with an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels.

Retrocession of Liaotung.—There had been for some years a current of opinion that the ice-free port in East Asia which Russia was in search of was to be found in the territory thus handed over to Japan. At

all events Russia, in the interval between the signature and ratification of this treaty, invited the Great Powers to intervene to preserve South Manchuria to China, on the ground that the occupation of Port Arthur by Japan would "destroy the political balance of the Far East." France and Germany fell in with this view, but Great Britain declined to do so.

In May, Russia, Germany, and France made joint representations to Japan recommending her not to occupy permanently the territory ceded in South Manchuria; and indications were given that the advice would be supported by force of arms if it were unheeded. Japan yielded to this coalition, and in a Convention of November 8, 1895, retroceded the districts in question, receiving as compensation a money payment of 30,000,000 taels. The motives of Russia and France were plain. Russia did not wish to have a strong and progressive nation in possession of lands adjacent to her own frontiers, and especially lands which she herself coveted; and France lent support as Russia's ally. But the aims of Germany were not so clear, and it did not transpire till later that the German Emperor's main purpose was to prevent Japan from obtaining the means of raising huge armies of Chinese and becoming a serious "yellow peril."

(c) *From the Chino-Japanese War* (1895) *to the Boxer Outbreak* (1900)

The ease with which China was overcome in this short campaign of seven months irretrievably damaged her prestige. Her real weakness was revealed to the world, and she began to be treated as a negligible quantity. The three intervening Powers were naturally for a time looked upon as China's friends, and the abstention of Great Britain increased the feeling which had existed that she might have used her influence with Japan to stop the war in its early stages. In return for her services Russia was given the right to carry the Siberian Railway across North Manchuria from Stretensk to Vladivostok and thus commence

the peaceful penetration of this magnificent country; and she increased her hold on China by guaranteeing a 4 per cent. loan of £15,000,000 in Paris to enable China to pay the first instalment of the Japanese indemnity. It was further said that a secret treaty, known as the "Cassini Convention," but more probably an understanding negotiated by Li Hung-chang in Moscow, provided for assistance to China, and gave Russia the right to occupy Port Arthur in certain contingencies. By a Convention of June 20, 1895, France also secured a rectification of her Tonkin frontier, together with additional commercial privileges, and railway and mining rights in the provinces of Yunnan, Kwangsi, and Kwangtung.

Burma Agreement, 1897, *and Franco-British Declaration*, 1896.—This Convention led to a serious dispute between Great Britain and China. The delimitation of boundaries provided for in the Burma Convention of July 24, 1886, was carried out from the Mekong Valley to a peak in latitude 25° 35′ N. in the northern Shan States, and the delimitation was recorded in a subsequent Convention of March 1, 1894. In Article V of this document two small States, Mung Lem and Kiang Hung, over which the Kings of Ava and the Emperors of China had exercised suzerain rights concurrently, were left to China with the proviso that no portion of them should be alienated to any other Power without previous agreement with Great Britain. Kiang Hung lies astride the Mekong, and by the French Convention the portion of it on the left bank was assigned to France. Before the transaction was concluded the British Minister at Peking was informed of it and protested; but his protest was unheeded. Compensation being demanded for the breach of treaty, an agreement was signed on February 4, 1897, modifying the previous boundary in favour of England and opening the West River to foreign trade. Negotiations at the same time took place between Great Britain and France, and in a joint declaration of

January 15, 1896, the *thalweg* of the Mekong was made the boundary between the possessions or spheres of influence of the two Powers as far as the Chinese frontier, and all commercial and other privileges conceded in Yunnan and Szechwan either to Great Britain or France in virtue of their respective Conventions of March 1, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and all privileges and advantages which might in the future be conceded in these two provinces, were rendered common to both Powers and their nationals.

Lease of Kiaochow Bay to Germany, 1898.—Germany alone of the coalition which had menaced Japan in China's interests remained unrewarded. Unlike the two other Powers, she had no *point d'appui* in or near Chinese territory. According to her own account, on more than one occasion she had been offered a port and coaling-station in the South of China, but had refused these offers because of the "cordial relations existing between the Governments of Great Britain and Germany." It remains all the more remarkable that as soon as a colourable pretext was offered—the murder of two German missionaries by bandits in Shantung—she set to work with a characteristic disregard of Chinese opinion, and without more ado landed a force from her fleet to occupy the important harbour of Kiaochow (November 1897). In the negotiations which followed, the bay and some adjoining territory were leased for 99 years to Germany (March 6, 1898), who made the concession the point of departure for a methodical penetration of the Shantung hinterland.

The Kiaochow incident created a precedent of a new order, which was peculiarly obnoxious to the Chinese mandarin. In his previous conflicts with Europeans, there had been long preliminary wrangles, and he had been in some degree conscious of contributory negligence or provocation. But this was a bolt from the blue, and an intolerable act of aggression. At first, efforts were made to avoid pretexts for a repetition. A Decree of January 15, 1898, pointed to the menace

exhibited in the Kiaochow affair and called upon the higher officials throughout the Empire to guard in the strictest manner against missionary troubles. However, Kiaochow was followed by acts of *force majeure* on the part of other European Powers which seemed equally unmerited, and which gradually engendered a feeling of exasperation among the Government and lettered classes. To make matters worse, debates and discussions took place in European Parliaments and the European press which strengthened the growing conviction that nothing less than a partition of China was the aim of the competing Powers.

Leases of Port Arthur and Weihaiwei, 1898.—It was alleged that under the Cassini Convention Kiaochow was ear-marked for the use of Russia; and, whether that was so or not, the sudden seizure of the place was viewed with little outward satisfaction by Russia. It is, however, noteworthy that as early as 1896 an official statement was made in the Reichstag that Germany had come to an understanding with Russia on their respective interests in China. While China and Germany were negotiating over Kiaochow, the Russian fleet was sent to winter at Port Arthur (December 1897), and when two British cruisers put in there in January 1898 the Russian Ambassador in London was instructed to request their withdrawal "in order to avoid friction in the Russian sphere of influence."

At this time the date of payment of the second instalment of the Japanese indemnity—for which Weihaiwei was still held in gage—was approaching, and the British and Russian Governments were both in the field with offers of guaranteed loans to meet this liability. The British offer, made to offset the influence created by the Russian guarantee of the first instalment loan, was financially very favourable to China: in return she was (1) to give an assurance that no territory in the Yangtse Valley would be alienated to any foreign Power; (2) to maintain the existing British control of the Maritime Customs administra-

tion so long as the trade of Great Britain preponderated; and (3) to open the internal waterways to steam traffic and some more ports to foreign commerce. Among the ports first mentioned was Ta-lien Wan. Russia at once objected and generally adopted such a minatory attitude that China withdrew from the arrangements almost concluded with Great Britain. The latter replied by adopting a similar attitude towards a Russian guarantee, and by exacting the execution of the conditions (1), (2), and (3) (excluding Ta-lien Wan), without guaranteeing the loan, which was afterwards issued as a purely commerical transaction through the British and German Banks.

In March, when the German Convention was signed, a demand for a similar lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien Wan was put forward by Russia. A sharp correspondence ensued between the British and Russian Governments. The British Government were not opposed to "the lease by Russia of an ice-free commercial port connected by rail with the trans-Siberian railway," but pointed out that "questions of an entirely different kind were opened if Russia obtained control of a military port in the neighbourhood of Peking," and that the occupation of Port Arthur "would inevitably be considered in the East as a standing menace to Peking and the commencement of the partition of China." China, being unable to resist it, acquiesced in the demand; and the British Government received assurances that "the Russian Government had no intention of infringing the rights and privileges guaranteed by existing treaties between China and foreign countries," and that no interference with Chinese sovereignty was proposed. By an agreement of March 27, 1898, Port Arthur, Ta-lien Wan, and adjoining territory, all of which had been retroceded by Japan in 1895, were leased to Russia for 25 years. To maintain the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechili thus menaced, Great Britain immediately demanded the reversionary lease of Weihaiwei after

Japan relinquished possession—a demand conceded with little demur.

Lease of Kwangchowwan to France and Extension of Hongkong, 1898.—France, in her turn, now made demands; and on April 13, M. Hanotaux was able to announce that the Chinese Government had agreed (1) to lease Kwangchowwan in South Kwangtung as a coaling-station; (2) to grant a concession for a railway from Tonkin to Yunnanfu; (3) to promise not to alienate any territory in the three provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, and Yunnan, which border on Tonkin, or to cede the island of Hainan; and (4) to accept the nomination of a Frenchman to control the Chinese Posts should these be separated from the Maritime Customs. To counterbalance these concessions the British Government obtained (1) an extension of the colony of Hongkong; (2) the opening of Nanning as a Treaty Port; (3) a grant for a railway in Kiangsu; and (4) a promise not to alienate territory in Kwangtung or Yunnan to any foreign Power. Japan also was given an undertaking that no territory in the province of Fukien would be alienated.

Railways and Spheres of Influence.—The "open door" policy which had been professed generally by the Powers, but in reality had been favoured by Great Britain and the United States only, had apparently gone by the Board; and railways and mines, which had previously been regarded chiefly from the economic standpoint, now became acutely political questions. Previous to the Chino-Japanese War the Chinese Government had always put the drag on such projects. Railways were far too modern for the old governing classes, who feared loss of authority with the coming of new habits and conditions; and the masses were taught to regard them as injurious to the religious ideas which permeated the national life. A small line of ten miles which had been constructed from Woosung to Shanghai in 1876 was torn up in 1877, and the rails and rolling-stock were removed to Formosa. Later a colliery tramway at Kaiping in Chihli was

gradually enlarged by a British engineer, with the support of Li Hung-chang, into a standard-gauge railway to Tientsin, and before the Chino-Japanese War this was the only railway in China.

After the war, however, the advantages of railways were openly recognised, and only the political risks attending the multiplication of points of contact with subjects of foreign Powers restrained the Chinese Government. The Tientsin line was extended to Peking in 1896, and in the spring of 1898 the Chinese Government entered into negotiations with a British bank to raise a railway loan, secured on the lines already constructed, for an extension through South Manchuria to Newchwang. The Russian Representative at Peking, M. Pavlov, demanded that the British engineer, Mr. C. W. Kinder, should be replaced by a Russian in the sections north of Tientsin, and objected to these railways being mortgaged to British subjects with a right of control in case of default.

Russo-British Railway Agreement, 1899.—The British Government took the matter up strongly, both at Peking and St. Petersburg, as a breach of the Treaty of Tientsin, and in the end the British railway loan was carried through. At the same time, a general agreement was concluded between Great Britain and Russia by an exchange of notes on April 29, 1899, in which the former engaged—

> " not to seek for her own account, or on behalf of British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway concessions in that region, supported by the Russian Government ";

while Russia, on her part, gave an identical undertaking *vis-à-vis* railway concessions " in the basin of the Yangtse," and applications for railway concessions in that region, supported by the British Government.

The "Battle of Concessions."—Meanwhile a director-general of railways, Shêng Hsüan-huai, had been appointed, with powers to negotiate with foreign

capitalists. The first contract he had to deal with was one which had been signed with a Belgian syndicate for the trunk line from Peking to Hankow. There had been competing tenders for this; and the Chinese Government in 1897 had accepted a Belgian preliminary offer as the most advantageous and least likely to entail political consequences. But the Belgian syndicate was unable to carry out its original proposals, and, in order to obtain better terms, in May 1898 sought the assistance of French and Russian representatives in Peking (French capital was largely, and Russian to a less extent, supporting the Belgians). Since the line passed through what was now the British sphere, the British Government were assured by the Tsungli Yamên that the Russo-China Bank, a purely Russian Government institution, was not financially interested in this railway; but the published text of the Belgian final contract, signed on June 27, did not bear out this assurance. The British Minister, Sir Claude Macdonald, protested, and a promise was given to him that, before the contract was ratified (it had not then reached Peking officially), an opportunity would be given him to discuss it. This promise was not kept.

For the breach of faith, which the British Government considered "an act of deliberate hostility," an ultimatum was presented, demanding a number of railway concessions in the Yangtse Valley and Kwangtung, for which a British syndicate had applied. These demands were quickly satisfied by the Chinese Government. One of the concessions, the Tientsin-Chinkiang railway, brought Germany into the field. The extension of the British sphere of influence as far north as Tientsin was opposed by the German Government, who claimed that they already possessed the concession of the main part of the proposed line under "treaty rights" connected with Kiaochow. The construction of this line, afterwards known as Tientsin-Pukow, was eventually shared

between German and British financial groups, who came to a general agreement not to compete in each other's sphere. According to this arrangement (September 1898) the German sphere was the province of Shantung and the Hoang Ho Valley as far west as Shansi, and the British sphere was the Yangtse Valley and South China, together with Shansi.

The United States and the "Open Door."—During these occurrences the United States continued, with marked disinterestedness, to support the policy of equal opportunity. In 1899 Ta-lien Wan and Kiao-chow were thrown open to foreign trade by Russia and Germany, who were aware from the example of Hong-kong that free ports were most likely to be prosperous; and the United States seized the opportunity to initiate a correspondence with the Powers and Japan, with the object of securing a general adherence to the "open door." The British Government approved without reserve, and the replies of the other Powers, some of which were guarded and qualified, were accepted by the United States as satisfactory.

Reform Movement of 1898.—Reform had become a fashionable topic in mandarin circles after the Chino-Japanese War. A reform society, the Ch'iang Hsüeh Hui (Excelsior Society), which had a short existence, included in its members many officials in active service, and amongst them was Yüan Shih-k'ai. He had been Resident in Korea before the war, and was afterwards employed at Hsiao-chan, near Tientsin, in laying the foundations on which the modern army of China has been raised. The reform movement came to a head in 1898. The aggressions which followed the seizure of Kiaochow had moved the *literati* deeply, and from this class of obscurantists who had hitherto resisted all Western innovations there now came young leaders eager to emulate Japan. The Chinese press began to exercise a notable influence in the same direction.

Early in the year, and especially after the death of Prince Kung, in May, it became known that the Emperor was giving ear to advanced reformers, of whom the chief was a young Cantonese named K'ang Yu-wei, and under this influence decrees were issued in rapid succession in June and July which showed that the Emperor had been completely won over to a policy of rapid progress on modern lines. The *curricula* of the public examinations on which the whole edifice of government had rested for many centuries were superseded by a new system, based on Western learning, for the promotion of which temples were to be converted into colleges and schools all over the land. Western literature was to be translated and disseminated far and wide; foreign travel and education were inculcated; and all useless offices of government in Peking and the provinces were to be abolished.

These decrees and others were treated by the mandarins, who were without exception the products of the old education, and the vested interests entrenched behind them, with the obstruction and inertia usually exhibited by them when called upon to execute distasteful orders. The reformers did not fail to inform the Emperor, who vented his wrath on the leading officials of a metropolitan board by cashiering them for disobedience. In September 1898 he issued a fresh series of decrees inveighing against obstructive ministers and degenerate officials, and calling upon his subjects to make China powerful by working for reform with "united minds."

The bureaucracy were now thoroughly alarmed. The Empress Dowager, who was living in semi-retirement at the Summer Palace, was appealed to, and to prevent her from interfering with his plans the Emperor and the reformers were credited with an intention to imprison her or remove her into the interior of the country. The assistance of Yüan Shih k'ai, who commanded the only disciplined army in North China at the time, was relied upon for this

purpose; but Yüan, though a reformer, had little belief in the hot-headed visionaries around the Emperor, and instead of falling in with their plans communicated with the Manchu Viceroy of Chihli, Jung-lu, who promptly informed the Empress Dowager. Yüan's troops surrounded the Palace on the night of September 20th, and the Emperor was compelled to issue a decree, which in fact restored the regency of the Dowager. Though K'ang Yu-wei escaped, six of his associates were executed; the reform decrees were revoked; the reform societies and newspapers were suppressed; and a period of anti-foreign feeling ensued, which forced the foreign representatives to bring guards to Peking for the protection of the Legations.

Period of Reaction, 1899.—At first it was evident that the Empress Dowager, advised by Prince Ch'ing, who had succeeded to the position formerly held by Prince Kung, was anxious to stem the tide of reaction temperately, and to discountenance hostility to foreigners. She had the reputation of being prudent and far-sighted, and she knew enough of foreign Powers to appreciate the necessity of maintaining amicable relations. Before her resumption of the regency she had broken all precedents by undergoing "the ceremony of smelling hands" with Prince Henry of Prussia, who sailed to China with a squadron to celebrate the acquisition of Kiaochow, and was received with special pomp at the Peking Court (May 1898). On December 13, 1898, she made another startling precedent by receiving the wives of the foreign representatives in audience; at a gathering afterwards she and the Emperor mingled with the company and shook hands with the guests. By a rescript of March 15, 1899, Roman Catholic missionaries were allowed relative rank in dealing with Chinese officials, and empowered to treat directly with them—an unfortunate concession which was not welcomed by the missionaries of other denominations. But the rivalries of the European Powers and the seemingly endless

chain of demands—Italy also had demanded a lease of San-mun, near Ningpo, as a coaling-station—gradually brought her round to the reactionary Manchu view that force alone could preserve China from dismemberment. The patriotism of the people was stirred more and more; the old *t'uan-lien* (volunteer train-bands) were encouraged to furnish defence forces; a secret decree of November 21, 1899, warned the Viceroys and Governors to oppose a firm front to foreign aggression; a larger proportion of Manchus was placed in vital positions; and the province of Shantung was confided to an ignorant Manchu governor, Yü-hsien, with the design of guarding against the new German menace.

(d) *The Boxer Outbreak and the Final Protocol of* 1901

The Boxer Movement.—It was here that the storm began to burst. In the autumn of 1899 a society, called *I Ho Ch'üan* (literally "Patriot Harmony Fists"[1]) came into notice in Shantung. Members who were initiated performed incantations and claimed magical powers, and they found unexpected support in Yü-hsien, whose purpose appears to have been to utilise them for defence against foreign aggression.

As soon as it was seen that the provincial governor was sympathetic, the "Boxers," as they were named by foreigners, were joined by other secret societies of malcontents which infested South Shantung, and the movement rapidly got out of hand. The danger of complications with Germany alarmed the Court. In December Yü-hsien was transferred to Shansi, and Yüan Shih-k'ai and his foreign-drilled army were sent to govern Shantung. A few days after the new governor had taken up his post a band of Boxers killed an English missionary, Mr. Brookes; and though, largely

[1] The name was an old one, and belonged a century ago to a sect of revolutionaries in the same districts who professed similar powers and practised similar incantations.

through the efforts of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the murderers were punished, and Shantung was pacified, the movement spread northward into Chihli—another jurisdiction—with increasing force.

The Movement Supported by Prince Tuan.—The popularity of the Boxers had little religious significance. Their supposed supernatural powers were openly ridiculed by officials and scholars, though some of the rude peasantry of Shantung and Chihli believed in them, and alone the Boxers would have had as little success in 1900 as in 1816. The truth was that Yü-hsien had given place to a sponsor of the highest rank, the father of the future Emperor. On January 24, 1900, Kuang-hsü issued a decree declaring that it was impossible for him to have an heir, and appointing P'u-chün, the son of Prince Tuan, as heir presumptive. Prince Tuan, a grandson of Tao-kuang, at once took a commanding position in the councils of the Empire. He was an ignorant reactionary, with no political experience, and the last year's welter of foreign bullying had enraged him. His attention was drawn to the Boxers by Yü-hsien, who passed through Peking on the way to Shansi, and testified personally to their miraculous powers; and through him and the eunuchs, the Empress Dowager and many of the Court were led to credit them sufficiently to give them a trial. The patriotism of the Boxers, who had inscribed "Down with the foreigner, protect the Manchu!" on their banners, no doubt appealed to Prince Tuan, and, like Yü-hsien, he looked to a Boxer crusade as a means of removing the foreign incubus. It was due to him that the efforts of the foreign representatives to have the Boxers suppressed were evaded or thwarted all through the first five months of 1900, and it was his support at Court which gave the movement strength. Sufficient importance was not attached by foreigners to this Prince's attitude and influence at this stage. Moreover in its inception Boxerism seemed to be merely anti-missionary, and some of the Powers were not well disposed towards missionary enterprise.

The Siege of the Legations.—In April Boxers were drilling in public around the capital; in May villages were destroyed and native converts massacred; on June 2 two English missionaries were murdered at Yungching, 40 miles from Peking. Guards to protect the Legations were hurried through on June 1; but by this time Prince Tuan, leading the Court, and the Kansu army, under Tung Fu-hsiang, had publicly sided with the Boxers, who swarmed in Peking, murdering and pillaging native converts and those who were known to be associated with foreigners. The chancellor of the Japanese Legation, Sugiyama, was murdered by Chinese soldiers on June 11; on the 13th the foreign buildings in the city and neighbourhood were burnt and pillaged; and on the 20th Baron Ketteler, the German Minister, was killed, and the Legations were attacked by Chinese troops. All the foreigners and many Christian converts were hastily assembled in the British Legation and in the adjoining mansion of Prince Su, and with the personnel of the Legations and the guards a defence was organized, under the leadership of Sir Claude Macdonald, the British Minister.

The Seymour Expedition.—In response to urgent requests from the Legations, a mixed force (2,000 men) of eight nationalities from the fleets left Tientsin, under Admiral Seymour, on June 10 to restore communications with Peking. While they were engaged in repairing the railway, which had been cut, the Allied admirals, alarmed by military preparations of the Chinese, stormed the forts at Taku (June 16). The Seymour column was at once attacked by Imperial troops, and was obliged to cut its way in face of superior forces to the outskirts of Tientsin, where the arsenal was stormed by British marines, and occupied until the expedition was relieved by an international force from Tientsin.

Relief of the Legations.—Simultaneously with the attack on the Seymour column, the foreign settlements at Tientsin were bombarded, and they were probably

saved from destruction by the timely arrival of a Russian force. Reinforcements enabled the Allies to turn the tables and to storm the native city on July 14. On August 4 a mixed army of 19,000 set out for Peking, a British naval brigade having started up river the previous afternoon. The Chinese armies offered some resistance at Pehtsang, Yangtsun, and Hosiwu, but the march of the Allies was practically uninterrupted; Peking was reached on August 12, and the Legations were relieved the next day.

There is no doubt that the storming of the Taku forts by the Allied admirals, which was looked upon as another wanton act of aggression, was the deciding cause of the military action of the Central Government. It would seem that the weak side of the Empress Dowager, her personal pride, was also attacked by means of a forged despatch, purporting to come from the Diplomatic Body to the Tsungli Yamên, and demanding the Dowager's abdication, which was used by Prince Tuan to work up her feelings. At a Grand Council held during the night of June 19-20, it was decided, under the lead of Prince Tuan and against the advice of Prince Ch'ing and others, to attack the Legations and the Seymour column. Though the foreign Ministers were informed by the Tsungli Yamên on June 19 that, the capture of the Taku forts being equivalent to a declaration of war, they must leave Peking within twenty-four hours, the necessary facilities were withheld.

The siege of the Legations was sharply pressed by Tung Fu-hsiang's Kansu troops and by Boxers, up to the fall of Tientsin, but not so strongly by the troops of Jung-lu or Prince Ch'ing, which possessed the bulk of the modern artillery. The capture of Tientsin seems to have sobered the Court, but there had been serious dissensions before that. Five members of the Tsungli Yamên had been executed, two for altering the terms of an Imperial decree which ordered a general massacre of foreigners in the Chinese dominions, and three others for opposing Prince Tuan. The Viceroys

and Governors of Mid and South China, together with Yüan Shih-k'ai, had banded themselves together before the end of June in a compact to disregard the decrees against foreigners, and to preserve order in their several jurisdictions; and they concluded arrangements with the various foreign consular authorities to the same effect. For nearly a month before the relief there had been no serious assault, and Prince Ch'ing himself was later the authority for the statement that the Legations owed their escape from extermination to Jung-lu.

Flight of the Court; End of Hostilities.—The Empress Dowager, the Emperor, and the Court were still in the Palace when the Legations were relieved, and did not commence their flight till next morning. They fled to Sianfu, an ancient capital, 600 miles away. With their departure active hostilities ceased. The anti-foreign movement had in effect been confined to the north, and outside the valley of the Pei Ho the missionaries bore the brunt of it. In British and American missions alone over 200 persons were murdered, many of them with revolting cruelty, and the Roman Catholic missions suffered as severely. In the Yangtse region order was maintained by the Nanking and Wuchang Viceroys, Liu K'un-yi and Chang Chih-tung, and in Shantung by the Governor, Yüan Shih-k'ai; and foreigners were protected in spite of the Peking decrees. A strong force of Allied troops was landed at Shanghai, but it was not called upon to do anything. Though there were signs of unrest in South China, there also peace was preserved. In Manchuria the Governors were not so judicious, and, obeying the decrees, declared war on the Russians in June. Their sudden attacks created a panic along the Amur, and led to savage reprisals, the Chinese population of Blagovestchensk, some 5,000 men, women, and children, being driven into the river at the outset. The Chinese troops were easily overcome, the whole of Manchuria was occupied by Russian troops, and when Count Waldersee arrived in September, with 20,000

German soldiers, to assume supreme command of the Allied expeditionary corps, there were no hostile forces to contend with.

Anglo-German Agreement, 1900.—On October 16 an important agreement was concluded between Great Britain and Germany defining the principles of "their mutual policy in China." The two Governments agreed (1) not to "make use of the present complications to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions," to "direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire," and "in the case of another Power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages," they reserved "to themselves the right to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests." They also agreed (2) to uphold the "open door" at the treaty ports, "as far as they could exercise influence." The other Powers were invited to accept the principles recorded in this agreement. In formal letters Austria, Italy, and Japan accepted them unreservedly; the United States also, except that they expressed no opinion in regard to the "preliminary understanding." France and Russia, replying in memoranda, said that the Anglo-German agreement stated principles which were actuating their own policies. Though the German Government afterwards called this a "Yangtse" agreement, and construed the qualification of (2) to exclude Manchuria, at the time it was held to mean what it said, and there is little doubt that it had a steadying influence.

Final Protocol, 1901.—The Court arrived in Sianfu, chastened and repentant, and, though Prince Tuan and his satellites were still in power, Prince Ch'ing, who had remained behind near Peking, and Li Hung-chang were sent credentials empowering them to treat for a restoration of friendly relations. The concert of the Powers was resumed, and in spite of a noticeable cleavage of interests an agreement was reached on the

demands to be made on China, which were formulated in a joint Note of December 21, 1900. By a protocol of January 14, 1901, the Chinese Plenipotentiaries accepted these bases, and negotiations ensued which lasted nine months and resulted in the "final protocol" of September 7. The terms included (1) special reparation for the murders of the German Minister and the Japanese Chancellor, and for the desecration of cemeteries; (2) punishment of the personages and officials responsible for the attacks on foreigners; (3) an indemnity of 450,000,000 taels (£67,500,000); (4) a fortified Legation quarter with guards in Peking; the maintenance of communications with the sea by foreign troops, the razing of the Taku and other forts threatening these communications, and the prohibition of the import of arms; (5) the issue of proclamations throughout the Empire announcing the punishments inflicted, prohibiting anti-foreign societies under pain of death, suppressing examinations in cities where foreigners were massacred or ill-treated, and holding viceroys and provincial officials responsible for outbreaks against foreigners and for violations of treaties under penalties of instant dismissal with disability for life to hold office; (6) the revision of commercial treaties and the improvement of water approaches to Tientsin and Shanghai; (7) the reforming of the Tsungli Yamên (now called the Wai-wu Pu), and the modification of the ceremonial for the reception of foreign Ministers.

In the discussions of the final protocol the divergencies of opinion between the Powers became more marked, and the concert at times was subjected to strain. The indemnities especially caused friction; the claims put forward by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States were very moderate, but those of Russia, Germany, and Italy were out of proportion to the services rendered by their naval and military forces. Russia had all along endeavoured to establish the view that her limitrophe position entitled her to conduct independent negotiations in her own interests, and she

openly dissociated herself from some demands of other Powers. She opposed raising any question as to the complicity of the Empress Dowager, declined to join in requiring the punishment of officials responsible for the missionary murders, and gave lukewarm support to the German and Japanese demands for special reparation.

Russian Occupation of Manchuria.—This attitude was explained by the position of affairs in Manchuria. Soon after the country was overrun by Russian troops proclamations were issued which amounted to declarations of conquest. In December 1900 an agreement between M. Korostovetz and the Tartar-General[1] at Mukden came to light, by which Fêng-t'ien (Shengking), the most important province, was placed under Russian control. This was followed up by negotiations at Petersburg with the Chinese Minister for the conclusion of a formal convention, which would, in effect, constitute a Russian protectorate over Manchuria and give exclusive or preferential rights throughout Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan. Some leading Powers advised China to abstain from separate negotiations with one Power while the joint conference was proceeding at Peking, and Great Britain and Japan pressed for definite information at Petersburg as to the precise tenour of the proposed convention. The Chinese opposition, too, was strong. The Yangtse viceroys protested, and warned the Court that they would be unable to recognise such an instrument, and their attitude was endorsed by high officials generally and by the press. The Chinese Minister at Petersburg was instructed to refuse his signature, and on August 6 the Russian Government issued an official *communiqué* stating that their objects and intentions having been misrepresented, the convention was temporarily dropped.

Mission of Prince Ch'un to Berlin.—When the final protocol was ready for signature another difficulty

[1] "Tartar-General" is an old and accepted title for a Manchu Military Governor of the highest rank.

arose. Article I stated that Prince Ch'un, the Emperor's brother, had left Peking on the previous July 12 on a mission to express regret for the assassination of Baron Ketteler. The Prince had reached Basle, on his way to Berlin, when he was informed that he must *k'o-t'ou* to the German Emperor. This demand was resisted by the Chinese, and it was waived. Prince Ch'un was received in audience on September 4, and the final protocol was signed at Peking on September 7, 1901.

Evacuation of Peking and Chihli.—In accordance with Article XII of the protocol, the Allied troops, except the Legation guards and the garrison required to maintain free communication between Peking and the sea, were withdrawn from Peking on September 17 and from the province of Chihli on September 22. On October 7 the Chinese Court set out from Sianfu for Peking. A month later (November 7) Li Hung-chang died, and with him the last of the satraps who rescued the Manchu dynasty from the T'ai-p'ings.

(e) *From the Final Protocol* (1901) *to the end of Kuang-hsü's Reign* (1908)

Return of the Court.—On January 7, 1902, the Court arrived in Peking, and normal government was resumed. The Empress Dowager set to work at once to cultivate friendly relations with foreigners. On February 1 she received the ladies of the foreign Legations, claimed that Chinese and foreigners were all "one family," and lamented the Boxer relapse. Sir Robert Hart, who in all his forty years at the head of the Customs Service had never been thought worthy of the honour, was summoned to audience; so also was Monseigneur Favier, the Roman Catholic Bishop, who had been beleaguered in his cathedral in 1900. It was generally accepted that the old order must go, and that modern reform must really come at last. For a time progressive officials were encouraged, but the old Manchu clique, who continued to hold important posi-

tions around the throne, were adepts at blocking or thwarting changes repugnant to their feelings or interests. The type of mandarin employed to usher in the new era, chiefly Cantonese, and educated to some extent in America, was alien in habit and manner, and it was believed that with occasional exceptions he was as corrupt as, and less capable than, the man he was displacing. In the writer's view, the Empress Dowager saw clearly enough the necessity of reform, and was sincerely anxious in the interests of the dynasty to progress steadily towards modern methods; but the Chinese system of employing men of opposite opinions at the same work to balance each other deprived her of the first requisite in the circumstances—undivided counsels; and her experience and education did not enable her to exercise an independent judgment.

The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1902.—Foreign relations continued to engross attention. The Court had hardly settled down in Peking when the alliance concluded in London between Great Britain and Japan, by the agreement of January 30, 1902, was announced. The object of this agreement was "to maintain the *status quo* and general peace in the extreme East." The two Powers dwelt on their special interest "in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea and in securing equal opportunities in those countries for the commerce and industry of all nations," and disavowed "any aggressive tendencies in either country"; but, having in view their special interests—Great Britain principally in China, and Japan also "in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea"—they recognised that it would be "admissible for them to take such measures as might be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea." They pledged themselves to remain neutral if one of them should be involved in war with another Power in defence of

those interests, but if this was impossible and "any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally," the other should come to its assistance, conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement.

The significance of this alliance was not lost on the Chinese. Although Russia had relinquished the proposed convention relating to Manchuria in August 1901, she had in no way relaxed her grip on the country, and it was well understood that Japan at least was not disposed to acquiesce tamely in a permanent occupation. Russia and France thought it necessary to reply to the alliance by an agreement of March 16, 1902, in which they announced that they were satisfied to find in the Anglo-Japanese instrument "the affirmation of the essential principles which they themselves had repeatedly declared to constitute, and which remained the base of their policy." They in their turn reserved to themselves the right to concert measures for the protection of their special interests in the extreme East, if and when it might be necessary.

The Mackay Treaty, 1902.—The first of the new commercial treaties under Article XI of the Final Protocol was concluded between Great Britain and China at Shanghai on September 5, 1902. It covered the whole field of the trade requirements and grievances of foreign merchants, and its chief feature was an elaborate arrangement for the abolition of the levying of *likin*, transit, and *octroi* dues on goods; in return for which the British Government consented to a surtax on foreign imports not exceeding one and a-half times the tariff import duty, and to an export duty on native produce not exceeding 7½ per cent. *ad valorem*. This arrangement was not to come into force until all other most-favoured-nation Powers should have subscribed to the same engagements; and so far this indispensable condition remains unfulfilled. The negotiations for similar treaties with Germany and Italy are understood to have broken down in consequence of the concessions demanded as *quid pro quo* for the abolition of *likin*.

Russia and Manchuria, 1902-5.—Russia renewed her negotiations soon after the return of the Court. She abandoned some of the demands which had been objected to the year before, and on March 26, April 8, 1902, an agreement was signed at Peking which provided for the evacuation of Manchuria by stages in eighteen months. That the terms were so moderate was due to the support given to China by Great Britain, Japan, and the United States. It was soon apparent that they did not satisfy the Russian Government. In October 1902 the railway between Shanhaikwan and Newchwang was restored to the Chinese, and the country west of the Liao River was evacuated, in accordance with the April Convention; but when it appeared that, in the negotiations of Japan and the United States for the commercial treaties provided for in the final protocol, three new ports were to be opened in Manchuria, Russia refused to carry out the second stage of evacuation until certain further demands, designed to rivet Russian control on Manchuria to the exclusion of all other foreign influences, were conceded. In August 1903, a *ukase* was issued, creating a Vice-Regency of the Amur and Kwantung territories, with Admiral Alexéiev as Viceroy, and this was interpreted to mean a resumption of the forward policy. Both the Japanese and American treaties, by which the Manchurian ports were opened, were signed on the same day, October 8, 1903, which was also the date fixed under the Convention of April 1902 for the complete evacuation of the Moukden,[1] Kirin, and Hei-lung-chiang provinces. Both treaties provided that the ports should be opened after ratifications were exchanged; but China delayed ratifications through fear of a breach with Russia.

Great Britain, Japan, and the United States again stiffened the Chinese to refuse the fresh demands, and representations were made by all three Powers at

[1] Moukden, or Mukden, is really the name of the chief town of the province, the proper name of which is Fêng-t'ien. The province is also called Shengking.

Petersburg. Japan, whose interests ranked next in importance to China's, had watched Russia's proceedings with increasing anxiety, and had been specially disturbed by minor movements of Russian troops to the Yalu region, where a retired Russian officer, General Bezobrazov, was reported to have acquired some forest rights. China being unable to press matters to a practical conclusion, Japan entered into negotiations at Petersburg, and offered to recognise the special position of Russia in Manchuria if Russia would recognise that of Japan in Korea, and provided also that Russia would join with Japan in an engagement to recognise the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and to maintain the "open door" in both countries. These negotiations lasted over five months, Japan reducing her demands to a minimum, while Russia made not the smallest concession. She refused to admit that Japan had any interests in Manchuria, or any special position in Korea as conceded in the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and by her encroachments in the Yalu region she brought the Korean question so prominently forward that Japan had either to back out publicly or go to war. It was evident from the imposing display of naval and military force which was collected in Manchuria during this period that Russia calculated on overawing Japan into submission to her views; but Japan was not deterred, and preferred war to a permanent renunciation of her position in East Asia.

Treaty of Portsmouth, 1905; *the Transfer of Liaotung to Japan.*—The Russo-Japanese War, fought almost entirely in Chinese territory, lasted from February 1904 to September 1905. The Treaty of Portsmouth, which ended it (September 5, 1905), recognised Japan's "predominant political, military, and economic interests in Korea," provided for the simultaneous evacuation of Manchuria by the forces of both Powers, and transferred to Japan the Russian lease of Kwantung (Liaotung), with all privileges attaching, together with the railway south of Kwanchengtze (Changchun). Manchuria,

except the leased territory, was to be restored "entirely and completely to the exclusive administration of China," whose consent to the transfer of Liao-tung to Japan was to be obtained. Russia disavowed the possession of exclusive rights in Manchuria inconsistent with the "open door," and Japan and Russia "engaged reciprocally not to obstruct any general measures common to all nations which China might take for the development of commerce and industry in Manchuria." China's consent to the transfers and assignments made by Russia was obtained in a treaty between Japan and China, signed at Peking on December 22, 1905. In an additional agreement with Japan regulating railway and other matters, China engaged to open a number of cities and towns in all three provinces of Manchuria "as places of international residence and trade." China's own position in Manchuria was not greatly altered: she had two Powers to deal with instead of one; for Russia retained her railway zone in North Manchuria; but Japan in the South was more conciliatory in her methods than Russia had been.

Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 1905.—Before the Russo-Japanese War ended, the Anglo-Japanese Agreement of 1902 was replaced by another, signed in London on August 12, 1905. In this the engagements and aims of 1902 were confirmed, and their scope extended: Great Britain recognised "the right of Japan to take such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance" her interests, "provided always that such measures are not contrary to the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of all nations"; and Japan recognised the right of Great Britain "to take such measures in the proximity of" the Indian frontier "as she may find necessary for safeguarding her Indian possessions."

Tibet Expedition, 1903-4.—An account of this and of the events leading to it will be found in *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.

Anglo-Chinese Adhesion Convention, 1906.[1]

Anglo-Russian Arrangement about Tibet, 1907.[1]

Engagements to Maintain Chinese Integrity, 1907-8. —In two conventions, signed at Paris and St. Petersburg on June 10 and July 30, 1907, between Japan and France and Japan and Russia respectively, mutual engagements were entered into for the maintenance of the *status quo* and support of the principle of the "open door" for commerce and industry in China. By an exchange of notes at Washington on November 30, 1908, the United States and Japan mutually pledged themselves to the same policy.

The Chinese had come to look upon these diplomatic engagements between foreign Powers, ostensibly for their protection, with a critical eye, and those mentioned above, coming as they did in the midst of the "rights-recovery" agitations (hereafter described), were specially objected to in the press as "interferences with China's sovereign rights."

Foreign Religious Missions.—Missionary troubles did not cease with the suppression of the Boxers. From 1902 to 1905 fifteen missionaries were murdered; but these outrages were not encouraged. In the north and west of China Proper the Christian example of Mr. Timothy Richard and others in the measures of expiation for the 1900 murders of British and American missionaries produced a marked effect on educated Chinese opinion, and there was a noticeable *rapprochement* between foreign religious missions and the Chinese officials and people in localities where their relations had not been friendly. This showed itself in a wide eagerness to take advantage of the educational work of the missionaries, to learn from them some of the methods which had given the foreigner his superiority; but there was at the same time a rising determination amongst the Chinese to emancipate themselves from foreign intrusion in internal affairs.

[1] See *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.

As it was not possible to expect the missionaries to remain mute in cases of flagrant injustice amongst their converts and their friends, conflicts were almost unavoidable.

In consequence of a serious outbreak at Nanchang, in Kiangsi province, in February 1906, directed primarily against a French mission, but involving the death of three British subjects, the British Government formally invited the attention of the French Government to the inconvenience and danger arising from the practice of French missionaries treating with Chinese authorities directly and without the intervention of their Consuls. France replied by pointing out that the rights of Roman Catholic missionaries in this respect rested on the rescript of March 15, 1899, already mentioned. However, the Chinese themselves took the matter up, and under the influence of Yüan Shih-k'ai the rescript of 1899 was revoked by another of April 16, 1907.

"*Rights-Recovery*" *Movement.*—The "China-for-the-Chinese" temper also showed itself in a widespread opposition to the fulfilment of existing engagements relating to railways and mines, and to the granting of new concessions. These were always unpopular, not only on account of the opportunities afforded for political interference, but also because they were universally believed to enrich the foreigner at the expense of the Chinese. After the Japanese victories in Manchuria had shown that an Eastern people could fit themselves by Western methods to cope with a Western Power, both governors and governed were fired with an ardent desire to do as Japan had done. What was at first a mere "Young China" agitation developed rapidly into a popular movement for the extinction of foreign control and all other forms of political inferiority. There was also behind the movement a strong economic pressure arising from the increased demands of the Central Government on the provincial resources to defray the Boxer indemnities. In the Yangtse provinces foreign railway and mining

agreements were obstructed or repudiated, and the Peking Government, when applied to, pleaded to the foreign representatives that they could not run counter to provincial feeling; they even alleged that in such matters counsels alone could be given, not orders. An Imperial decree in 1905 authorised the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang to ignore a British contract and build the Soochow-Ningpo railway themselves. In Shansi an agitation was stirred up by students and the press against the Peking Syndicate, an Anglo-French concern, engaged in working coal-mines; the Wai-wu Pu's orders were disregarded, and the syndicate was eventually induced to surrender its rights in that province on payment of compensation. In other instances it was evident that Peking was unable or unwilling to enforce valid foreign contracts in the teeth of local opposition, and agreements were in some cases modified to meet the popular views. A revival of Chinese exclusion policy in California provoked a boycott of American goods in China in 1905; and the antagonism to America, which had always been regarded as the friendliest Treaty Power,[1] suddenly grew to such a pitch that the United States President sent a telegraphic message to the Chinese Government calling attention to it. There was a serious anti-foreign riot at Shanghai in December 1905, which, though the immediate pretext was an interference of the European police with persons suspected of "white slave" traffic, was really directed against the exercise of foreign authority on Chinese soil. In May 1906 an attempt was made to establish a direct control of the Imperial Maritime Customs, which up to then had been left entirely to Sir Robert Hart; in 1908 there was a boycott of Japanese goods on the *Tatsu Maru*[2] case, in which public offence was taken at the official attitude

[1] A large portion of the Boxer indemnity had just been refunded to China by America.

[2] The *Tatsu Maru* was a Japanese vessel seized in Chinese waters, but outside the three-mile limit, for attempting to smuggle arms to Chinese insurgents.

of the Japanese Government; and also one of German steamers because of an obnoxious ordinance at Kiaochow.

Beginnings of Political Reform.—The signs of the times were not disregarded by the Peking Government. The demand of the provinces to have a controlling voice in their own affairs, and the menace of revolt underlying it, abated the obstruction of the Manchu clique, and the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War coincided with an enactment of serious reform. A decree of September 1905 swept away the old system of examinations and substituted a new one, under which scholars of the modern schools were enabled to enter the public service. The abolition of the old system created a feverish demand for Western education, which took the country by storm. In this Japan played a great part. Young men flocked to Japan to learn; students educated in Japan guided and moulded opinion in the provinces; schoolboys, always faithful reflectors of their parents' views, aped the foreigner and his ways instead of reviling him; an Imperial university of Western pattern was founded at Peking; and schools for teaching Western science and learning were established all over the Empire.

An Imperial Commission, headed by Prince Tsai-tsê, a relation of the Empress Dowager, was sent abroad in 1905 to study the administrative systems of foreign countries, with a view to the introduction of representative government. The Commission returned in July 1906, and its reports had as a first result the decree of September 1, 1906, in which a Parliamentary Government, with a Constitution, was definitely promised as soon as the country was fit for the change. The preliminaries declared to be necessary were (1) remodelling of the public service; (2) revision of the dynastic laws; (3) development of general education; (4) financial reforms; (5) reorganization of the army; (6) establishment of a police force; and (7) awakening of public interest in State affairs; and many edicts were issued to further these objects. The

decree of September 1, 1906, was welcomed by the people as a sort of national charter.

Rivalry between Manchus and Chinese.—But the reactionaries were not done with. The violence of the feeling aroused was exemplified by a bomb outrage against the members of the Tsai-tsê Commission, the first outrage of the kind in China. At the end of 1906 and beginning of 1907 decrees were issued erecting the cult of Confucius into a national religion. These were intended to placate the old school, who looked to Chang Chih-tung as their leader. A more serious feature was a revival of the old rivalry between Manchus and Chinese. The Court became a centre of intrigue, stimulated by a conservative Hunanese, Ch'ü Hung-chi, and the struggle soon spread to the provinces. Anti-Manchu feeling was rampant. The assassination of En-ming, the Manchu Governor of Anhwei, created a period of terror for Manchu officials everywhere. Strong decrees were issued in the summer of 1907 abolishing distinctions between Chinese and Manchus, and depriving the latter of special privileges; a decree of August 10 invited suggestions for the removal of differences between them; and to strengthen the Peking Government in Chinese members Yüan Shih-k'ai was made President of the Wai-wu Pu, and Chang Chih-tung was called to the Grand Council. In February 1908 a rescript placed Manchus and Chinese on the same footing before the criminal and civil law.

Commencement of Parliamentary Institutions.—While the Manchu-Chinese dissensions were being composed the Tzŭ-chêng Yüan was established in October 1907. It was a Senate of high officials, which sat three times a month to frame measures in preparation for constitutional government. The members at this stage were mostly aged reactionaries. In July 1908 a decree appeared approving a preliminary instalment of regulations for this Senate, or National Assembly, which was announced to be the beginning of the future Chinese Parliament. According to these regulations the Senators were to be nominated by the

Throne, or elected by a select number of dignitaries and notables (members of the Imperial family, officials, large landowners, and deputies from the Provincial Assemblies mentioned below), under the careful scrutiny of the Peking Government. This decree was closely followed (July 22, 1908) by another of the Empress Dowager commanding the regulations of the Tzŭ-chêng Yüan to be put into operation within twelve months, and instructing the Provincial Governments to form Tzŭ-i Chü, or Provincial Assemblies, according to population and revenue. The qualifications restricted the Assembly franchise to the *literati* and official classes, who had always dominated the administration, and ample power was reserved for control by the viceroys or governors. The most weighty decree of all, one issued by the Empress Dowager on August 27, 1908, promulgated a comprehensive programme of constitutional and parliamentary reform, which was based on the procedure which had been followed by Japan in similar circumstances. In nine years, from 1908, measures recasting the whole framework of government from top to bottom, were to be brought gradually into operation, and were to be sufficiently advanced by 1917 to allow of the proclamation of a constitution and a complete plunge into modern parliamentary institutions.

Suppression of Opium.—Early in the "rights-recovery" movement the desire to get rid of the national curse, opium, took shape, under the influence of Tong Shoa-yi. It was considered by many patriotic men that the first essential towards a general betterment of the conditions of the people was a drastic regulation of this, the "drink question" of China. A decree of September 20, 1906, ordered that the growth, sale, and consumption of opium should come to an end within ten years; and regulations were issued in the following November which provided for a yearly reduction of poppy cultivation by one-tenth, the registration of all opium consumers, the closing of opium shops and divans, the adoption of prophylactic measures, and the

retirement from the public service of all officials under 60 who did not abandon the opium habit.

The British Government were invited to assist by agreeing to a reduction of the import of Indian opium *pari passu* with the restriction of cultivation in China, and in January 1908 an arrangement was concluded by which the Indian Government reduced the export by 5,100 chests annually for a trial period of three years, with the understanding that, if during that time the Chinese Government on their part carried out the contemplated reduction of the production and consumption of opium in China, Great Britain would continue in the same proportion the annual diminution of the export after the three years' period of trial. China displayed unwonted energy in the enforcement of the decree of September 1906, and before the end of the reign considerable progress had been made in the anti-opium crusade.

The Chinese Press.—The native press gained rapidly in influence during the last decade of Kuang-hsü. Formerly confined to the treaty ports, newspapers spread (after the Chino-Japanese War) over the interior, and in 1908 were published in every important town. Even in the treaty ports they had always been anti-foreign; but during the "rights-recovery" agitations they became a real danger to China's foreign relations by their support of the boycotts of American and Japanese goods, and by their vociferous opposition to the Peking Syndicate in Honan and Shansi, and to railway concessions everywhere. Every matter which could be construed as an encroachment on China's sovereign rights was seized upon and made the subject of press invectives, and the censorship, which as a rule tabooed all criticism of the internal government of the country, permitted violent abuse and incitement to disorder in matters affecting foreign interests. At the same time, much good work was undoubtedly done in stimulating interest in public affairs, arousing patriotism, and pressing for reform and progress.

Deaths of Kuang-hsü and of the Empress Dowager.—Kuang-hsü died on November 14, and the Empress Dowager on November 15, 1908. The death of the former was not unexpected; ten years previously he had been examined by the physician of the French Legation to stifle rumours that his life was in danger, and it was then known that he was neurasthenic and suffering from chronic nephritis. But the Empress Dowager's demise came as a shock; and the two events occurring so closely together gave rise to suspicions of foul play. The Manchus and Chinese best qualified to know were, however, satisfied that there were no grounds for these, and foreign medical opinion in Peking generally accepted the official account of the last illnesses of both the Emperor and Empress Dowager. Tz'ŭ-hsi had been indisposed for some time when the Emperor's illness took a grave turn, and, knowing too well the dangers of delegating powers at such a juncture, she overtaxed her energies in her efforts to keep all the threads in her own hands, and suddenly collapsed.

Though his reign had not been a short one, Kuang-hsü had rarely been more than a figure-head. On the other hand, Tz'ŭ-hsi had been, for good or evil, the leading force in the government of China during two reigns, and for at least a quarter of a century she had been one of the commanding personalities of the world. No other individual of the ruling Manchu race had a tithe of her influence during her lifetime, and it is a striking testimony to her capacity and judgment, which in purely Chinese affairs was rarely at fault, that all the great officers of State who came into contact with her regularly had the greatest confidence in her, and seldom failed to rally around her in every emergency.

vi. Reign of Hsüan-t'ung, 1908-11

At a Grand Council held on November 13, 1908, in anticipation of the death of Kuang-hsü, P'u-yi, the five-year-old son of Prince Ch'un, was selected to succeed his uncle. At this Council the Empress Dowager,

though ill, presided. The new reign was styled Hsüan-t'ung. Once more Tz'ŭ-hsi treated the throne as a family affair, and saw to it that one of her own blood, her sister's grandchild, should follow Kuang-hsü, her sister's son. It was considered at the time a good arrangement, for the reason that the new Regent, Prince Ch'un, had an experience unique for a Manchu prince —he had been to Europe on a mission of expiation in 1900—and had been specially prepared in modern ways to take part in political life. The popular estimate of his character was favourable, and there was a general belief that he would be able to guide the ship of state steadily and prudently.

Dismissal of Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1909.—Misgivings soon arose. The dismissal of Yüan Shih-k'ai, the progressive statesman of China, on a trivial pretext, within a few months of his assumption of power, was the Regent's first and cardinal error. In this it was believed that he was swayed by the Dowager of Kuang-hsü, and by his wife, a daughter of Jung-lu, who is reputed to be a lady of strong character. This step was undoubtedly actuated by revenge for Yüan's so-called betrayal of Kuang-hsü in 1898, but there were also grounds for the feeling that the Manchus were jealous of Yüan's influence in the country. The British and American Ministers made representations to the Chinese Government about it, and Prince Ch'ing, in reply, gave assurances that no change of policy was contemplated. The Regent also wrote to President Taft reiterating his determination to carry out the promised reforms.

The Regent's next great blunder was to display a marked partiality for men of his own race, in open disregard of the recent decrees enjoining equality of treatment and the removal of all distinctions between Manchu and Chinese. Apart from "petticoat" intrigues, which became stronger than ever, it was soon apparent that China was run by a camarilla composed of his two brothers, Tsai-hsün and Tsai-t'ao, youths in the twenties, and T'ieh-liang, a kinsman, which came

to be known as the "Inner Grand Council." No one of these men was experienced or capable, or seemed to have much thought above his personal interests. In 1909 and 1910 Tsai-hsün visited England, Japan, and the United States, ostensibly to enquire into naval matters; and a decree of December 1910 appointed him to be the head of the new Ministry of Marine, which was to control the naval forces of the Empire, provincial and imperial. Tsai-t'ao, who also went on tour abroad, was made chief of the General Staff, and had the land armies under his orders.

Constitutional Reform.—The valedictory decrees of Tz'ŭ-hsi and Kuang-hsü contained injunctions to persevere with Government reforms, and the first important edict after the enthronement of Hsüan-t'ung was a manifesto declaring the unalterable intention of the Court and Government to obey these injunctions (December 3, 1908). The Provincial Assemblies were inaugurated on October 14, 1909, eighteen in China Proper, three in Manchuria, and one in Turkestan. On October 3, 1910, the complete Senate or National Assembly met for the first time. Half of the members were Princes and members of the Imperial family, high officials, eminent scholars, or men of property; the other half were deputies from the Provincial Assemblies. They were appointed for three years, and allowed the modest sum of £50 a year and travelling expenses. By regulations the powers of the Senate were strictly circumscribed and merely advisory; but in practice these limitations were disregarded, and very soon the Senate came into conflict with the Grand Council. The Regent, called upon to decide, asserted the supremacy of the Grand Council, relegated the Senate to its advisory duties, and rebuked it severely for presuming to dictate in matters which were the prerogative of the Throne.

Both the Senate and the Provincial Assemblies proved to be actively progressive and in favour of hastening constitutional government, and at the close of the Senate's session on January 11, 1911, the Court

found itself committed, much against its will, to a shortened programme, covering five years instead of the original nine.

In May, 1911, the office of Prime Minister was created, and Prince Ch'ing appointed to it, and the old Grand Council (Chün-chi Ch'u), Government Reform Council (Chêng-Wu Ch'u), and Grand Secretariat (Nei Ko), were abolished to give place to a Cabinet and Privy Council. Ostensibly measures of reform, these changes really placed power more firmly in the hands of the Manchu Court clique. An outcry arose against the presence of Imperial Princes in the Cabinet and Privy Council.

Revolution of 1911.—Though the new reign opened peacefully and there was at first no disorder, the provinces continued to assert themselves, and the "rights-recovery" agitations became more and more insistent. Categorical demands were made that the treaty privileges of foreigners should be curtailed or extinguished, after the example of Japan, and that railway and other concessions should be annulled. The impression of strength which the Regent had given by removing Yüan so summarily faded rapidly, and gave place to a general conviction that he was irresolute and incapable, especially in the handling of foreign questions. The Court policy of gathering all power in the hands of the Imperial family and Manchus was resented, and a spirit of disaffection to the dynasty and Government spread like wildfire. In 1910 there was a mutiny of troops at Canton, plots against the lives of the Regent and Tsai-hsün, and riots in Hunan, Kiangsu, Shantung, and Yunnan; Halley's comet is said to have had some influence in these disturbances. Matters came to a head over the Hukuang Railway Loan agreement, which had been negotiated with a consortium of European and American bankers for the financing and construction of railways from Hankow to Canton, and from Hankow to Szechwan. The terms of this agreement encountered fierce opposition from the provinces concerned, and to disarm this opposition a decree was

issued on May 9, 1911, deciding that all trunk lines should be built by the State, and that subsidiary railways should continue to be the work of provincial companies.

In Hupeh, Hunan, and Kwangtung, the decree caused intense dissatisfaction; in Szechwan, where the provincial railway companies had conducted their finances scandalously, the result was open rebellion. The railway policy indicated was certainly conceived in the best interests of the country as a whole, but the author of it, Shêng Hsüan-huai, was notoriously corrupt, and, as he was to execute it, the provinces, whose desire was to run their railways for their own benefit, concluded that they would be plundered: they had just seen Shêng arrange a Government expropriation of the interests of private shareholders in the telegraph administration in a manner which did not inspire confidence (January 1911). There had been premonitions of revolt earlier in the year, especially at Canton, where the Manchu Tartar-General was murdered, and attempts were made on the lives of the Viceroy and Admiral; and simultaneous outbreaks in many provinces pointed to a widespread organization. Tuan-fang, ordered up as Imperial Commissioner to quell the Szechwan rebellion, was assassinated by his own escort at Tzechow on the way to Chengtu, and the Viceroy, Chao Êrh-fêng, was later executed in Chengtu by the insurgents (December 22).

The main revolution broke out at Wuchang (Hankow) on October 11, the second in command of the troops, Li Yüan-hung, being forced to put himself at its head. By a decree of October 14, Yüan Shih-k'ai was summoned from his retirement and appointed Viceroy at Hankow; and Ts'ên Ch'un-hsüan, who, as Viceroy at Canton, had quelled an insurrection in Kwangsi in 1904, was before that designated Viceroy of Szechwan. But the revolt now spread to the troops in Chihli, near the capital. On being ordered to entrain for Hankow, the General commanding at Lanchow addressed a memorial to the Throne on

October 29, demanding certain changes, with the object of removing the Court and Imperial family from direct interference in political affairs. The changes were agreed to with panic-stricken haste, and decrees were issued prohibiting Imperial princes from holding Cabinet appointments, and ordering the Senate to draft a Constitution. Prince Ch'ing resigned at once. Yüan Shih-k'ai was appointed Prime Minister in his place (November 1), and entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet. At a special sitting of the Senate a constitution in nineteen Articles, based on British precedents and making the Prime Minister responsible to Parliament, was framed, and this was ratified by Decree. Yüan was formally voted Prime Minister, and on November 26 the Prince Regent took the constitutional oath before the tablets of the Manchu Emperors in the T'ai Miao (Ancestral Temple of the Dynasty).

In the meantime, the revolution had swept over the whole of South and West China. Shansi was the first to follow the lead of Szechwan (October 20); then in rapid succession came Yunnan (October 30); Kiangsi (October 31); Kweichow (November 4); Chekiang (November 5); Kwangsi (November 7); Kwangtung and Fukien (November 9); Shantung (November 13); Shensi (November 22); and Kiangsu (December 2), Chang Hsün, the Imperialist General, escaping north to Süchowfu (Kiangsu) from Nanking. Under Imperialist pressure Shansi and Shantung reverted; Manchuria, Chihli and Honan remained faithful. Many Manchus were killed at Wuchang and Foochow; at Sianfu the Manchu quarter was sacked and over 10,000 men, women, and children were butchered. Under the shock of these events the Regent lost nerve and abdicated on December 6; the Empress Dowager assumed the Regency.

Hankow was recaptured by the Imperialist troops on November 27, and hostilities ceased early in December. A truce was arranged, and peace negotiations were begun on December 18 between Tong Shoa-yi, representing the Prime Minister Yüan, and Wu Ting-fang, acting for the revolutionaries. On December 26, a

conference of delegates from thirteen revolutionary provinces appointed Li Yüan-hung general-in-chief of the revolutionary forces, and Sun Yat-sen, an old rebel, was made provisional President of the Chinese Republic. Sun took up his residence in the Viceroy's yamên at Nanking on January 1, 1912. It seems clear that Tong Shoa-yi, in his negotiations with the revolutionaries at Shanghai, played a double part; while the official advocate of the Manchu cause according to Yüan's instructions, he made no secret of his republican sympathies. On December 28, at his urgent request, a decree was issued commanding a National conference to decide whether China should be a constitutional monarchy or a republic. As soon as Sun was installed, Tong came out openly on the side of the revolutionaries, and resigned his position as Imperial delegate at the Shanghai conference. Thereafter, Yüan conducted his negotiations directly with the Southern leaders by telegraph. So far he had favoured a monarchy: it would seem that the determined attitude of the Southern provinces, which were obdurately set against the Manchus, changed his views, and in January he inspired a memorial, signed by forty-four generals and commanders, which showed that the Court could not rely on the army to support the dynasty in opposition to the people.

The National conference was abandoned; the Manchu extremists withdrew to Moukden and Jehol; the Court accepted the inevitable peacefully; and Yüan treated with the Southern leaders for the formation of a coalition of North and South to take charge of the Government as soon as the dynasty abdicated. Terms having been arranged for the pensioning of the Manchus, on February 12 the decree of abdication was issued by the Empress Dowager on behalf of the boy Emperor, and a republic was declared under the Presidency of Yüan Shih-k'ai, who, in virtue of his election as Prime Minister by the Senate, was empowered to organize a provisional republican government, comprising Manchus, Chinese, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans, in one unified Dominion.

Opium, 1908-11.—The crusade against opium continued unabated during the reign of Hsüan-t'ung. Though the supply of foreign opium came mainly from or through India, it was still open to other countries under their treaties to produce and import the drug. At an International Conference, held at Shanghai in February, 1909, presided over by the American Bishop Brent, resolutions were adopted urging the various Governments represented at it to assist China by regulations for the purpose. On May 8, 1911, an agreement was concluded in which Great Britain recognised the sincerity of the Chinese Government and their pronounced success in diminishing the production of opium during the previous three years. The arrangement of 1908 with Great Britain was continued; that is, the annual diminution of export from India was to continue *pari passu* with the decrease of production in China, and the export was to cease in seven years. It was also agreed that export from India was to cease in less than seven years, if proof was given of the complete suppression of poppy cultivation in China; and that no Indian opium should be conveyed to any province where the production, trade, and consumption had been effectively suppressed.

On August 28, 1911, the Wai-wu Pu satisfied Great Britain that the three provinces of Manchuria and Shansi and Szechwan were free of opium, and consent was given on August 30 to a prohibition of the import of Indian opium into those provinces.

Foreign Affairs, 1909-11; *Manchuria*.—The Wai-wu Pu fell into weak hands after the dismissal of Yüan by the Regent, and there was acute tension with Japan and Russia over Manchurian affairs. Two agreements concluded on September 4, 1909, improved relations with Japan: in one the vexed Chientao question was settled by making the Tumen the boundary between China and Korea, and in the other railway and mining questions in Manchuria were arranged, though not to the satisfaction of the "China for the Chinese" party. A preliminary agreement with Russia on May 10, 1909,

provided for the organization of municipalities on the lands of the Chinese Eastern Railway (the Manchurian part of the Trans-Siberian Railway). On July 4, 1910,[1] a Convention between Japan and Russia was signed, in which, after declaring their adherence to the principles of the Convention of July 30, 1907, the two Powers agreed to work together in Manchuria on railway questions, and to maintain the *status quo* in that country resulting from treaties and other arrangements concluded up to date between Japan and Russia, or between either of them and China. Copies of the aforesaid arrangements were exchanged between Japan and Russia. The consensus of opinion in China was that this Convention increased the grip of Japan and Russia upon Manchuria; and that nothing short of force would ever dislodge it. And when, soon afterwards (August 22, 1910), the treaty definitely annexing Korea to Japan was published (there had been a Japanese Protectorate since 1905), the fate of Korea was urged as a lesson to China in regard to Manchuria.

Russian Frontier.—Since the Russo-Japanese War China had been disposed to treat Russian affairs with little consideration. Disputes with regard to the long frontier accumulated, and a series of demands were made by Russia at Peking to secure the full enjoyment of the 1881 treaty, which, according to Russia, had been practically abrogated. After a long discussion an ultimatum was delivered by Russia on March 24, 1911, and the acute controversy was closed by a Note of the Wai-wu Pu accepting the Russian demands completely and unequivocally. A treaty was concluded at Tsitsihar (Manchuria) on December 20, 1911, delimiting the frontier in North Mongolia from "frontier point No. 58 to frontier point No. 63, and further along the Mutny tributary up to the River Argun," and thence along the Argun to the Amur.

Burma Frontier.—A forward policy on the part of

[1] This Convention is believed to be the direct result of the Knox proposal for the neutralization of Manchurian Railways (see *infra* p. 76).

China had been noticeable here for some years. South of Manang Pum Peak (25° 35′ N.) the whole of the frontier, except the 200-mile Namting—Nalawt section, was duly demarcated in the spring of 1899. By the 1897 agreement the delimitation of the portion north of Manang Pum was deferred until the conditions were known, but in consequence of aggression in this section in 1898 China was notified that the provisional boundary was the N'mai Kha—Salween divide. A collision at Hpare in February 1900, and a further violation of the provisional line by Chinese troops in August 1902, led to the N'mai Kha boundary being pressed by Sir Ernest Satow. After fruitless discussions the Chinese Government were informed that the provisional frontier must not be violated. In March 1905 there was a joint investigation, and this was followed in 1906 by a formal demand from Great Britain that the Irrawadi—Salween watershed should be the frontier. The demand being refused, China was informed that Great Britain would occupy the country and administer it without further discussion. There was a raid from China into Pien-ma (Hpimaw), which was burnt, in October 1909, and in December 1910 an expedition was sent from Burma under Mr. Hertz to administer the country. China protested.

The whole question of undefined frontier between British and Chinese dominions from Bhutan to the demarcated Burma frontier line was taken up by the Indian Government in 1911, and five distinct expeditions were sent—Miri, Abor, Mishmi, Nkamti, and Upper N'mai Kha—to investigate.

United States.—After the Russo-Japanese War there had been a marked tendency on the part of the United States to champion the rights of China against Japan and to yield to Chinese chauvinism. In 1909, an active policy, commercially and politically, was inaugurated by President Taft in China, and the first step taken was to insist on the participation of American financiers in the Hukuang Railway Loan. The real aim, however, was Manchuria, where there had been a

special American trade interest for years. An American group was given a concession for a railway in Manchuria, from Chinchow to Aigun; and in November 1909 an unsuccessful proposal for the neutralisation of railways in Manchuria was made to Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, Japan, and China, by Mr. Knox, the American Secretary of State.

Great Britain.—The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902, which had been renewed in 1905, was again revised and confirmed by an agreement of July 13, 1911. The same objects were maintained. An additional feature was a proviso that arrangements were to be made by the naval and military authorities of both parties should armed assistance be afforded by either Power to the other in the circumstances mentioned in the agreement.

II.—THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

i. Presidency of Yüan Shih-k'ai, 1912-16

(a) *Founding of the Republic*, 1912-13

Mutiny of Troops at Peking.—Yüan Shih-k'ai was from the beginning faced with extraordinary difficulties. There had been strong opposition to him personally from the South, which had only accepted him as a compromise, after much bribery, to avoid an open breach with the North, on the understanding that the capital was removed from Peking to Nanking. At this point Sun Yat-sen proved himself the most self-denying patriot of all by assisting the compromise and by resigning his provisional presidency as soon as the Nanking Assembly was satisfied with the Cabinet arranged by Yüan and Tong Shoa-yi (a Cantonese), the new Prime Minister (April 1). The finances of the Imperial Government had been thrown into complete disorder during the last three months of 1911 by the cessation of the provincial quotas, and the same difficulty assailed the Republic. While Yüan was arranging with a consortium of foreign bankers, known as the

sextuple group (Great Britain, France, Germany, America, Russia, and Japan), for the provision of funds which were indispensable, a portion of his troops mutinied in Peking itself (February 29). The mutineers looted and burned some of the principal streets of the capital. Similar excesses occurred in Tientsin and other places throughout the provinces. In Peking the first attack was made on the abode of the Southern delegation; and among the causes of the mutiny, it was said, were resentment at the approaching departure of Yüan for Nanking, and fears that the change of capital meant material loss to the North. At any rate, Yüan made the disturbances his reason for remaining in Peking. The disbanding of surplus troops became the prime necessity, and by means of advances from the sextuple group early in the year, and later with money borrowed by hook or by crook from whatever foreign source was available, this was partially accomplished in 1912.

New Advisory Council.—On the severance of relations with Peking, the revolted provinces proceeded to elect their own "Military Governors" (Tutu), and to exercise the functions of independent States. To put a stop to this, soon after Yüan Shih-k'ai's installation as Provisional President, with Li Yüan-hung as Vice-President (March 10), a "Mandate" was issued, after the style of the old Imperial decrees, announcing that in the interests of unification there "existed no longer what used to be termed independence in the provinces," and that "the local official system shall be framed and promulgated, according to the provisional law, by the Central Government for adoption." On March 30, the Wai-wu Pu, "Foreign Affairs Board," was renamed Wai-chiao Pu, "Foreign Relations Board." An Advisory Council was established on April 29, to represent the country until Parliamentary elections could be held. Its members quarrelled at once. In the process of buying over Southern leaders to accept the presidency of Yüan, Tong Shoa-yi had expended the proceeds of loans from an Anglo-Belgian Syndicate of

1¼ millions sterling, and the quarrel arose when he was called upon by political opponents to account for the money. An attempt was made on Tong's life, and he fled in June to the security of a treaty-port concession. His successor, Lu Chêng-hsiang, a more moderate politician, was not acceptable to the *T'ung-mêng Hui*, "Leaguers," or Cantonese Radical Party, who were in a majority. They set Yüan at defiance, and attempted to dominate his administration by forcing its members to resign, and by refusing to elect his nominees. He countered this by calling to his assistance the provincial Military Governors, who threatened the T'ung-mêng Hui members of the Advisory Council with forcible measures if they failed to act reasonably. Yüan was compelled more than once to take drastic steps to suppress revolts and conspiracies designed to overthrow his government, a notable case being the summary execution, in August, of two generals for plotting against the Republic.

Parliamentary Elections.—Towards the close of 1912 there was a short lull in the acute dissension while the elections for the Provincial and National Assemblies were in progress. The Urga agreement,[1] which was construed to mean the loss of Mongolia, also created a wave of national feeling, in which the jealousies of North and South were temporarily forgotten. By the end of January, 1913, the provincial elections were finished. They were conducted with conspicuous illegality and injustice. By dint of intimidation and corruption in every quarter majorities were obtained for the Kuo-min Tang, or "Nationalist Party," which had been formed by a coalition of the T'ung-mêng Hui with five minor groups of more moderate complexion. The Nationalists stood for decentralisation and provincial Home Rule, in opposition to the President's policy of control from Peking.

Hostility of Provincial Assemblies.—The Provincial Assemblies met in January. In consequence of the temper displayed by them, Yüan issued a Presidential

[1] See *Mongolia*, No. 68 of this series.

Order deploring their factious spirit, and warning them against assuming an excessive degree of political independence. He had already aroused opposition by attempting to impose on them executive and financial officials, who were his own nominees and natives of other provinces, just as the Manchu Court had done. The provinces refused to accept these officials; the appointment of a civil administrator to the province of Kiangsi in defiance of the wishes of the Military Governor was opposed by force, and Yüan's nominee was not allowed to take up the post. A further grievance was the Reorganization Loan, the negotiations for which were carried on by Yüan with the sextuple group in the spring of 1913. The breach was widened by the assassination, on March 21, of Sung Chiao-jên, the acknowledged leader of the Kuo-min Tang, and one of Yüan's arch-enemies.

Peking Parliament and Reorganization Loan.—The National Assembly's first sitting took place on April 8, at Peking. The Kuo-min Tang was preponderant. There was an utter lack of method or order in the proceedings, and it took three weeks to elect the Speakers of the two Houses. A fresh crisis was provoked by the final stages of the loan negotiations. On April 25, Sun Yat-sen, who had been the founder of the T'ung-mêng Hui, but who had so far supported Yüan, published a communication to the effect that the signature of the loan agreement without consent of Parliament would lead to the secession of all China south of the Yangtse, together with Shensi and Shansi. The finances of the Chinese Government were at this time in a critical state. The advances of the sextuple banks, Crisp Loan,[1] and other doles, were all exhausted before the end of 1912; the revenue had diminished enormously, there being no contributions from the provinces—which, indeed, instead of remitting were applying to Peking for grants-in-aid; funds were lacking to carry

[1] A loan issued in the London market against the wishes of H.M. Government, and without the safeguards required by the sextuple group.

on the Government; and indemnity payments were in arrears. The taxation which was essential to meet the foreign obligations and the legacy of external debt left by the Manchus were matters which none of the Provincial Governments attempted to face. In spite of two gross breaches of faith in 1912 in connection with the moneys borrowed from the Anglo-Belgian Syndicate and the Crisp Loan, the foreign banking groups (now reduced to five by the withdrawal of America) were still willing to finance the Republic under suitable guarantees, and it was these guarantees which the provinces opposed as intrusions on sovereign rights. Yüan paid no heed to Sun's warning, and signed the loan agreement on April 27; he foresaw civil war, but declared himself able to deal with it if assured of the moral support of the Powers.

Yangtse Rebellion.—As soon as the "Reorganization Loan" of £25,000,000 was floated (May 21) Yüan acted. He began by demanding the resignation of the Military Governor of Kiangsi. The Tutu refused to resign, and on June 9 a Presidential Order cashiered him. Meanwhile, Parliament was reduced to impotence by the blocking tactics of the Nationalists, and preparations for an insurrection were clearly in progress. It broke out on July 11, on the seizure of the Hu-k'ou forts near Kiukiang by the ex-Tutu of Kiangsi. A declaration of independence followed at Nanking, and Kwangtung also attempted to secede. The rebellion of 1913 was organized by a small band of men out of animosity to the President, and to obtain the lucrative positions which he was filling with the nominees of the Central Government; it was assisted by the "Young China party," who claimed to be fighting for republican ideals as opposed to the autocracy of Peking. Yüan Shih-k'ai was supported by the forces of law and order, and, as he possessed an abundance of funds, the army and navy remained loyal to him. It was, without doubt, the success of the Reorganization Loan which decided the issue between North and South. There was much staging of troops, but little serious

fighting, and the rebellion collapsed with the fall of Nanking on September 1.

Yüan Shih-k'ai elected President, 1913.—Parliament, from which the advanced Nationalists had flown before the outbreak, had continued to obstruct. On August 2 an inquiry into the relations of the Nationalist party with the revolutionaries was instituted, and at the end of August a number of Nationalist senators and deputies were arrested. There was little opposition left by the end of September, and the party was definitely ruled out by the appointment of a new Conservative Cabinet, in which the Nationalists were not represented. The first chapter of a permanent Constitution, that relating to the President, which had been drafted by a special committee, was hurriedly passed through Parliament. On October 6, the election for President was at last held, and Yüan Shih-k'ai was chosen. At his inauguration, four days later, he made a public declaration that existing treaties and engagements would be observed, and all rights and privileges enjoyed by foreigners maintained; whereupon the Chinese Republic was formally recognised by the European Powers and Japan. This step had already been taken by the United States on May 2.

New Council of Government.—Yüan now felt firmly seated. Strong measures were taken with the irreconcilable Nationalists. Early in November the party was suppressed, and its members expelled from Parliament by a Presidential Order; the Provincial Assemblies were instructed to act similarly and to close the Nationalist clubs and meeting-places. Another Presidential Order of November 26 founded a Council of Government, which was clearly designed to take the place of the existing Parliament. It was composed of 71 members nominated by the President, Governors of provinces, and Ministers, and all were to be men over 35, possessing previous administrative experience. This qualification ruled out the radical *novi homines* of the revolution, whose motto was "to the victors the spoils," and favoured the nomination of officials of the Manchu

regime. To strengthen the control of the President no measures suggested by Ministers or from the provinces were allowed to reach the Council except through him.

The President rules without Parliament.—The formation of this Council marked the last stage but one in the elevation of Yüan to the position of Dictator. The last step was taken nominally on the petition of the Governors of twenty-one provinces, i.e., China Proper and Manchuria. Parliament was dissolved on December 19. The Council of Government was ordered to consider revised rules for the election of members to a future Parliament; but for a year no experiment in representative assemblies was to be attempted, and Yüan was left practically free to do what he thought best for the salvation of his country.

Condition of Central and South China.—These arbitrary measures were not taken without abundant reason. By the middle of November the Reorganization Loan funds were exhausted, and the Republic was without means to carry on the Government until normal financial conditions should be restored. Recourse was had once more to the sextuple group, who were asked for another large loan; but in the absence of security—all available revenues were pledged—this was not immediately feasible. The state of affairs throughout the country had gone from bad to worse since the revolution of 1911. South Honan and North Hupeh were ravaged by a notorious brigand "White Wolf"; in Shensi, Kansu, and Szechwan, an old secret society, the Ko-lao Hui, was responsible for serious disorder; on the lower Yangtse in the creeks and hills of Anhwei, Kiangsu, and Kiangsi, there was much piracy and robbery, the work of another secret society; a mutiny of troops took place at Talifu in Yunnan in December; piracy and brigandage were rife in Fukien, Kwangtung, and Kwangsi. In these circumstances, to hand over power to the Nationalists, or to allow them to continue their intrigues unhindered, meant anarchy, and Yüan had the general approval of all the stable elements in China in his autocratic and unconstitutional treatment of the Assemblies.

(b) *Foreign Affairs during the Founding of the Republic*

Attitude of Western Governments and Japan towards the Republic.—All through the changes of the Revolution and the attendant disorders, foreigners and foreign interests suffered comparatively little injury. Both Revolutionaries and Imperialists avoided provoking the intervention of any of the Powers in the treaty ports. The policy of Great Britain from the outset was the traditional one of letting the people work out their own salvation. It was well known that in the opinion of the British Government, as things were, a limited monarchy under the Manchus was probably the most advantageous government for China; but England did not wish to force that opinion on the Chinese, and she felt that any attempt to do so might prejudice the monarchy. She desired a stable administration, and was prepared to accept any form of government freely chosen by the Chinese people, provided that it was stable. Whatever the tendencies of sections of American and European opinion, the Governments generally took much the same line as Great Britain, and held aloof. Japan alone let it be clearly understood, as soon as the Manchu dynasty was in danger, that she favoured the retention of Manchu rule under the new Constitution of November 1911, and she lost no opportunity of pressing that view upon Yüan Shih-k'ai and the Chinese Government, her reasons being that a purely democratic Republic was unsuitable for China, and that Japan disliked the introduction so near her doors of a form of government so different from her own. This attitude called forth a warning from the Republicans that the responsibility for the continuance of the internal struggle would rest with Japan; and any design there may have been formed of imposing a monarchy on the Chinese from without was quickly abandoned.

Unsympathetic Attitude of Russia.—With Russia relations during 1912 and 1913 were not very friendly. The Russian attitude in Manchuria, where disputes

were frequent, was unsympathetic. Ultimata and threats of force were frequently employed at Peking to support political demands, especially in connection with Mongolian affairs. Redress for minor cases being delayed by China, a concentration of troops—some 7,000, it is said—took place at Tsitsihar. This demonstration had the desired effect; the Russian demands were conceded next day.

United States Policy of Support.—The United States continued, throughout, their regular policy of careful consideration for China's interests. In March 1913, on the return of the Democratic party to power, the United States Government withdrew from the sextuple group on the grounds that the conditions of the Reorganization Loan went near to infringing the administrative independence of China, and that by becoming a partner in the transaction the United States would incur a heavy responsibility, which might involve intervention. As already mentioned, the United States were the first Power to recognise the Republic.

(c) *Revolts in the Dependencies, Tibet, Mongolia, and Sinkiang*

Tibet and the Szechwan Marches[1].

Mongolia.[2]

Sinkiang or the New Dominion (Kashgaria and Ili).—The telegraph line to Chinese Turkestan was destroyed shortly after the outbreak of the revolution, and the course of events in Mongolia and Tibet all tended to the isolation of this remote region. The Ili country north of the T'ien Shan (Celestial Mountains) was originally the home of the Dzungars or Sungars, who were subdued by Ch'ien-lung in 1759, at the same time that the Mohammedan cities south of the T'ien Shan, Kashgaria, were conquered. Both territories were joined in one large province known as Hsin Chiang, the New Dominion, ruled by a Military Governor, for whom a fortress-city was built at Hui-yüan

[1] See *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.
[2] See *Mongolia*, No. 68 of this series.

Ch'êng (Ili or Kuldja). Large bodies of Manchus and Mongols were transferred to Ili as military colonists, and towards the close of Ch'ien-lung's reign settlers from the Mohammedan population of Kansu and Shensi were encouraged by extensive allotments of land in Sungaria. The Chinese Moslem colonists were called by their Turki neighbours, Dungans or Tungani. In addition to Manchus, Mongols, Dungans, and native Turkis, there was also in Ili a population of Mohammedans from Kashgaria, known as Taranchi. The Mohammedans of Kashgaria are chiefly of the Turki or Uigur race, though many Dungans have penetrated to the south of the T'ien Shan.

The Chinese authority, which had been last re-established by Tso Tsung-t'ang in 1877, was thus exercised over a very mixed population, chiefly of Mohammedans, who inhabited a number of scattered cities and oases in a region of marked sterility. Latterly it was under the general rule of a Governor, whose seat was at Urumtsi; the Manchu Military Governor at Kuldja exercised a concurrent jurisdiction over the Manchus and Mongols of Ili. The points of political importance are Tarbagatai (Chuguchak), Kuldja, and Kashgar, by reason of their proximity to the Russian frontier.

Early in 1912 there was a riot at Urumtsi, and a revolutionary outbreak in Ili. An Imperial force from Urumtsi was defeated by the insurgents on April 1. Another revolt followed at Aksu, when the Taot'ai and Prefect were killed. In May the Taot'ai and Magistrate at Kashgar were murdered, and the assassins elected new officials to replace them. A reign of terror ensued, which led to Russian intervention. On June 22, the Russian Consular Guard was reinforced by a battalion of soldiers, who established themselves in Kashgar and maintained order. Subsequently, the Republican Government was formally acknowledged at the principal cities, and the authority of the Governor was re-established.

(d) *Yüan Shih-k'ai as Dictator*, 1914-16

Constitutional and Legislative Changes.—The Council of Government, with which as virtual Dictator Yüan Shih-k'ai designed to carry on the Government of China, held its first sitting on December 29, 1913. An inspired joint telegram from the military and civil governors of the provinces, which was countersigned by the Vice-President, demanded the dissolution of the National Assembly rump. This telegram was referred by Yüan to the Council, whose first important act was to recommend the suspension of the Assembly. The suspension was decreed (January 14, 1914) with the explanation that it was temporary, and that the convocation of a new Assembly would take place as soon as the necessary organization was effected. A Commission for the drafting of a Constitution was appointed by Presidential Order (January 26), to consist of sixty elected members, two each from the twenty-two provinces, four from Peking, four from the Chambers of Commerce, and eight from Mongolia, Tibet, and Kokonor. The qualifications required from the members of the Commission, and from their electors, restricted its composition to the official and propertied classes. The result of its labours was the "Constitutional Compact," or Provisional Constitution of May 1, 1914, under which the President was invested with complete autocratic powers; the Cabinet was abolished; the Premier replaced by a Secretary of State; and Ministers by Secretaries, after the American system. A new Council of State (Tsan-chêng Yüan) was erected to take the place of the Council of Government of November 1913, and seventy members of the same type, including a Mongol Prince, a Tibetan Lama, and the Vice-President, were appointed to it. Its functions were purely consultative. The election of two Assemblies was also provided for: (1) a Legislature, called the Li-fa Yüan, to enact laws, and (2) later a Citizens' Convention, to pass into law a new Constitution, the drafting of which was entrusted to a committee of the Tsan-chêng Yüan.

Government from Peking was gradually established over the provinces. A Presidential Order of May 23 restored the provincial hierarchies in something like the old forms. Civil governors were appointed to exercise control over finance, justice, police, and general administration; *tao-yin* took the place of the old *tao-t'ai* (intendants of circuit) with extended powers; and the *hsien* (district magistrates) received their commissions from the President at the recommendation of the Civil Governor. A little later the military *tutu* was abolished, the title of *chiang-chün* (general), so obnoxious to Young China, was substituted, and the bearers were restricted to military functions, except in the Chahar, Jehol, and Suiyüan districts (Inner Mongolia), where the Military Governors were invested with civil powers as of old.

The laws elaborated by the Tsan-chêng Yüan for the formation of the new Li-fa Yüan, were proclaimed by a Presidential Order of October 27, and three days later a bureau to carry the organization through was established. By these enactments Parliament was to meet on September 1, 1915, and it was to be formed of ten representatives from each province, forty from Peking, and twenty-four from Mongolia, Tibet, and Kokonor. The franchise was continued as before to keep the legislative power in the hands of the propertied classes. On December 29, it was enacted that the office of President was to be tenable for ten years, and that the holder was to be eligible for re-election—which meant that Yüan intended to be President for life.

Young China opposed to Yüan.—The forces opposed to Yüan's autocratic rule continued to be recruited from Young China, the youths who had returned from courses of education in Japan and the West. Under the Manchus Yüan had distinguished himself above all other Chinese satraps in the amount of use he made of American-educated Cantonese; but after the two rebellions of 1911 and 1913 his attitude towards the foreign-bred students became distinctly unfriendly; in this he was supported by the older bureaucracy, and by

1914 they had gone into permanent opposition. Anti-Yüan plots became numerous. The brigandage of "White Wolf" in Hupeh, Shensi, and Kansu, continued on a large scale, and Yüan accused Sun Yat-sen and Huang Hsing, the Young China Leaders, of assisting the outlaw to provoke another rebellion.

Yüan's Acceptance of the Throne.—When the date fixed for the new Parliament was approaching, a movement towards the establishment of a monarchy became very noticeable. It took definite shape in September 1915, Yüan having by this time disclosed to his intimates an ambition to become titular as well as virtual sovereign. On October 8, a bill was promulgated calling for a referendum on the question. An official statement issued by the Japanese Government, which was in the nature of a warning to Yüan against pursuing his design, was communicated by the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires to the Wai-chiao Pu on October 29, the British and Russian Ministers accompanying him and associating themselves with the statement. This step was naturally taken by the revolutionaries to mean that Japan was opposed to the proposed change, and it is noteworthy that the opposition in the provinces took an open form after this intervention. Though Yüan replied on November 11 that he was not going to hasten any change, the referendum continued. Voting took place at the provincial capitals and at Peking. There is little doubt that the officials everywhere exerted themselves to the utmost to obtain a response favourable to Yüan, and by fair means and foul the country was made to declare unanimously for a monarchy. The offer of the throne was accordingly made to him, and after one or two mock refusals he formally accepted the offer on December 12, 1915. A large distribution of titles from Prince and Duke down was made to his principal adherents.

Revolt against the Monarchy and Death of Yüan.—In less than three weeks a revolt, engineered by Young China, broke out in Yunnan. It was headed by Tsai Ao, a Japanese-educated officer, who had led the re-

volution in these parts in 1911, and the two Governors declared the independence of the province on January 1, 1916. The attitude of Japan was accentuated by the refusal (January 24) to receive the congratulatory mission which China had arranged to send on the Coronation of the Emperor. The feeling against Yüan spread in South China, and on February 23 a Mandate was issued postponing enthronement. The rebels failed to make progress, and must have collapsed but for the active hostility of Japan to Yüan Shih-k'ai. Tong Shoa-yi and other leaders of Young China were in close contact with Japanese at Shanghai, and Japanese officers were assisting the revolt in Yunnan, Canton, and elsewhere. Yüan issued a Mandate, on March 22, cancelling his acceptance of the throne. This expedient failed to placate the South; Kwangtung, Chekiang, and Kweichow declared independence; and a month later (April 22) Yüan, confessing that his autocratic rule was a failure, proceeded to organize a Government on approved modern lines, with a Prime Minister and a Cabinet. But the South was determined to eliminate Yüan from political life; and to avoid bloodshed he was arranging to abandon the contest and to expatriate himself when an old illness, which had all along been weakening his resolution, took an aggravated form, and he died so suddenly as to create suspicions of poisoning (June 6).

Character of Yüan Shih-k'ai.—Yüan Shih-k'ai, who came of a well-to-do family of *literati*, and possessed abundant private means, was beyond question the ablest Chinese of his generation. No scholar—as a rule, the Chinese statesman in his day rose to power by the aid of his pen—he owed his influence to a combination of practical wisdom, patriotism, courage, frankness, and tenacity, rarely seen in the Chinese public service. He was also personally clean-handed, than which in Chinese eyes there can be no greater merit in an official, but he attached too little importance to financial integrity in his adherents, and he failed signally to appreciate,

until it was too late, the part which official corruption had played in the misfortunes of his country.

Japan and Kiaochow, 1914-15.—Shortly after the outbreak of the war Japan addressed an ultimatum to Germany (August 15, 1914) demanding the surrender of Kiaochow (Tsingtau) "with a view to its eventual restoration to China." The demand being ignored, Kiaochow was invested by a Japanese army, assisted by a small British force, and it capitulated on November 7. Following this event Japan made a series of demands upon China of a far-reaching character (January 18, 1915). In Shantung province she required a transfer to her of all the mining and railway privileges previously enjoyed by Germany, and the right to construct a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to Weihsien; in South Manchuria, an extension of the Kwangtung lease and of railway agreements to a 99 years' term, and a right to Japanese to settle and acquire land; in East Mongolia, exclusive mining rights, a promise that no railways be built without Japan's consent, and the right to colonise; in the Yangtse Valley, joint control with China of the Hanyang ironworks and Tayeh ironmines, with an undertaking that other nationals should not be granted rights in the Pingsiang Collieries calculated to impair the Hanyang and Tayeh undertakings, and concessions to build railways from Wuchang to Nanchang, Nanchang to Hangchow, and Nanchang to Chaochow (Swatow); in Fukien province, an undertaking that no mines, railways, or docks should be conceded to other Powers without the consent of Japan; and generally that no part of the coast should be yielded to a foreign Power. Other demands were that Japanese advisers, political, financial, and military, should be accepted; that the police should be placed under Japanese direction; that arms should be purchased from Japan; and that Japanese priests should have the right to carry on religious propaganda in China. China whittled down or postponed a few of the terms, but in the end was presented with the

familiar ultimatum (May 7), which was as usual accepted within the time limit (May 9), and on May 25 she signed treaties and exchanged notes with Japan recording the transaction.

State of China under Yüan.—The general trend of Yüan's administration during the dictatorship was a steady progress from chaos to moderate order. By the end of 1913 the revolutionary levies had been disbanded, and, though the financial outlook was bad, great economies had been effected. Optimism about the Republic was shaken in the early part of 1914 by the failure to solve the financial difficulties and to put down the brigandage in North-west China and other parts, and by a mutiny of troops at Kalgan in June; but the energy displayed by the Central and Provincial Governments in the suppression of "White Wolf," and the improvement in the finances, restored confidence later in the year. In May 1, 1915, General Ch'ên Yi and a Northern army of 10,000 men were sent to Szechwan to restore complete order. By the middle of 1915 China was on the whole in a fair state of tranquillity, trade was prosperous, the revenue was rising, and the foreign obligations were punctually met. The change for the worse began with the revolt against Yüan's acceptance of the throne (December 1915), and at the time of his death brigandage was again rife and the finances had fallen once more into disorder.

Tibet, **1914**[1].

Russo-Mongol Agreements, 1914; *Tripartite Treaty of Kiakhta*, 1915; *Russo-Chinese Agreement about the Barŭkh Country* (*Barga*), 1915[2].

Treaty between U.S.A. and China, 1914.—A treaty for the maintenance of peace was concluded between the United States and China on September 15, 1914. The two Governments agreed that disputes arising between them should, "when ordinary diplomatic proceedings have failed, and the High Contracting Parties do not

[1] See *Tibet*, No. 70 of this series.
[2] See *Mongolia*, No. 68 of this series.

have recourse to arbitration, be submitted for investigation, and report to a Permanent International Commission," the constitution of which was provided for.

ii. Presidency of Li Yüan-hung, 1916-17

The Parliament of 1913 *reinstated.*—On the death of Yüan Shih-k'ai the succession of the Vice-President Li Yüan-hung took place normally and without interruption. He soon showed that he was prepared to go considerable lengths to placate the South. Within three weeks of his accession the admiral commanding at Shanghai, in combination with Tong Shoa-yi and other Southern leaders, sent him an ultimatum to the effect that "the Navy would declare its independence" unless the Nanking Parliament and the Provisional Constitution of 1912 were restored; and whether this ultimatum decided him or not mandates were issued immediately afterwards (June 29) reaffirming the validity of the Provisional Constitution and of the Presidential election law passed on October 4, 1913; revoking the constitutional arrangements made during Yüan's Presidency; announcing the formation of a coalition Cabinet; and summoning the Parliament of 1913 to resume sittings in Peking on August 1.

Renewed Deadlock at Peking.—But it was all to no purpose. Li, an honest, well-meaning soldier, was not the man to cope with the welter of intrigue and personal ambitions. The old deadlock in Parliament was reproduced. There it was a struggle between the Kuomin Tang, who were in the majority, and the Premier, Tuan Chi-jui, representing the military and conservative elements of the country, who controlled the central executive. Tuan was impeached for disregarding the Constitution, but he paid no heed. The Provisional Constitution requires the concurrence of the Legislature in the appointment of Cabinet Ministers and Ambassadors, and in the conclusion of treaties, and gives it the right of veto in the matter of public loans and questions affecting the treasury. The Nationalists

took full advantage of these powers to block any attempt at government by Tuan and his Cabinet. The draft of a permanent constitution, which had been completed in October 1913, but of which only the first chapter (relating to the election of the President) had been passed into law, was again brought forward, and in the discussions the Nationalists consistently laboured to give the provinces wider self-government, as against the Pei-yang party and the Cabinet, who dreaded the consequences of reducing the power of Peking and the executive.

Dissension in the Provinces.—Authority over the provinces dwindled. At first in South and West China the various faction leaders, deprived of the common enemy in the North, were settling old scores and contending for power among themselves without reference to Peking. In Canton there was discord between the civil and military governors, the former representing Peking rule and the latter the Nationalists; by the autumn of 1916 the discord became anarchy, and the old Black Flag leader, Lu Yung-t'ing, was selected by Peking to govern the province. In Szechwan, the other storm centre, the original disorder existing since 1911 was complicated by the increasing power of the Yunnanese, whose military assistance had been welcomed by the discontented politicians and soldiers in the movement against Yüan's monarchy, but who soon exhibited a tendency to monopolise the government of their rich neighbours. The situation in the lower Yangtse region was stationary; the military leaders, Fêng Kuo-chang (who was elected Vice-President on October 31, chiefly owing to the support of the Kuo-min Tang at Nanking), Ni Ssu-chung in Anhwei, and Chang Hsün at Süchowfu (an important strategical position on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway), continued to control their respective spheres of influence. Chang Hsün, the arch-opponent of the Kuo-min Tang, had held absolute sway all along from 1912 in the area of North Kiangsu and South Shantung, covered by his 20,000 troops.

Breach of relations with Germany.—A new bone of contention between North and South resulted from the invitation of the United States Government (February 5, 1917) to China to sever relations with Germany, on the ground of the latter's notorious breaches of international law. On February 9, China, whose Foreign Minister, Wu Ting-fang, was, for personal reasons, peculiarly amenable to American advice, formally called upon Germany to abandon her submarine policy, and, not receiving a satisfactory answer, notified the German Minister at Peking of the severance of diplomatic relations (March 14). The next move, a declaration of war, was recommended by Premier Tuan and the military party, and opposed by Parliament (which is alleged to have been bribed with German money) and the President. The latter now dismissed Tuan by a mandate of May 26, which also appointed Li Ching-hsi, a nephew of Li Hung-chang and a prominent member of the Pei-yang party, in his stead to forestall action by the Northern military leaders.

Revolt of the North.—Tuan refused to accept his dismissal. He circularised the provinces by telegraph questioning the legality of the President's action, and he was supported at once by the governors of the Manchurian and Northern provinces, by Fukien and Chekiang, and by the generals at Shanghai and Yochow. The sympathies of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan, Kweichow, and Hunan were with the President and Parliament; Kansu, Shensi, Hupeh, and Kiangsi were undecided; and Szechwan was too torn by internal dissensions to give the dispute attention. Fêng Kuo-chang, the Vice-President and Military Governor of Kiangsu, maintained a neutral attitude at Nanking, and worked for a compromise and the avoidance of civil war. But the South shirked taking active steps to defend the Parliament, while the Northern generals occupied the three main railways leading to Peking, concentrated troops in the vicinity of the capital and Tientsin, and established a military headquarters at the latter place, where it was proposed to form a Pro-

visional Government. Li Ching-hsi declined the Premiership and joined the military party.

Attempt to restore the Manchus.—The President, at bay, called the notorious Chang Hsün from Süchowfu to Peking to mediate (June 1). On his way to the capital Chang stopped at Tientsin to interview the Northern leaders (June 7), whence he served the President with a series of demands, which included the dissolution of Parliament. Parliament was accordingly dissolved by a mandate of June 12 " to save the country from civil war and foreign intervention," and the Nationalist members took flight to Shanghai. Chang now came on to Peking (June 14), and in consequence of his efforts some of the provincial leaders resumed allegiance to the President, and expressed formal regret for their share in the revolt. On July 1, Chang, throwing off all disguise, bluntly demanded the resignation of Li Yüan-hung, and declared the restoration of the Manchu dynasty. In a series of decrees issued in the name of the boy-Emperor in the old manner the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, and various other reforms, were promised, and a number of high appointments of officials of the old school were announced.

Defeat of Chang Hsün.—The challenge was taken up at once by the Northern leaders, headed by Tuan Chi-jui and Fêng Kuo-chang. On July 3, the military governor of Chihli gave Chang Hsün twenty-four hours to evacuate Peking. Next day it was announced that Tuan and Fêng had assumed command of the Republican armies of the North and South respectively, and the railway was cut between Peking and Tientsin (July 5). After some encounters at Langfang and Fêngtai, on July 8-9 Chang's troops were driven into Peking, and all avenues of escape were blocked by superior forces. Though promised life and property, Chang refused to surrender. He was attacked in the northern city of Peking by Tuan's army on July 12, and took refuge in the Netherlands Legation on the same day. His troops surrendered on July 13, and were

dismissed and sent home. The remainder of his Süchowfu battalions were split up later and dispersed amongst various provincial commands.

Resignation of Li Yüan-hung.—Li Yüan-hung, who had found sanctuary at the Japanese Legation on July 1, handed over the office of President to Fêng Kuo-chang, the Vice-President, on July 7. On the cessation of hostilities, though he returned to the President's residence, he announced his fixed resolution to retire permanently. The restoration episode was closed by the publication in the official gazette of a communication from the ex-Emperor disclaiming responsibility for the decrees which were issued by Chang Hsün in his name. There is hardly a doubt that the long conflict between Tuan and Parliament had really inclined the military leaders towards a return of the Manchu Emperor as the best solution of an impossible situation, and that Chang was relying on this frame of mind when he launched his *coup d'état*; but his error lay in assuming that his lead would be followed. On the contrary, the other generals feared the prospect of a Court dominated by him much more than they disliked the Kuo-min Tang, and they were at one in preventing a restoration in which they would not be the leading figures.

Russo-Japanese Treaty, 1916.—By a treaty of July 3, 1916, Japan and Russia agreed that neither should be "a party to any political arrangement or combination directed against" either of them, and to "take counsel of each other as to the measures to be taken in view of the support or the help to be given in order to safeguard or defend the territorial rights or the special interests in the Far East of one of the contracting parties recognised by the other contracting party," should these be threatened.

iii. Presidency of Fêng Kuo-chang, 1917

The Kuo-min Tang declare against the President.—After a short period of consultation with the other

military leaders, Fêng Kuo-chang agreed to succeed Li Yüan-hung in the Presidential chair, and he arrived in Peking on August 1, 1917. Though a recognised member of the Pei-yang party, and an old satellite of Yüan Shih-k'ai, his wise and moderate views during a long term of government at Nanking had secured him the confidence and respect of a large portion of the South. A new Cabinet of moderates, with Tuan Chi-jui as Premier and Minister of War, was formed, but was objected to by the Kuo-min Tang, who issued a manifesto to the Allies denying that they were opposed to war with Germany, and insisting that their antagonism to Fêng and Tuan arose from their detestation of the "beast of militarism."

Declaration of War against Germany.—Fêng and Tuan's Cabinet agreed at once on a policy of participation in the world struggle, and after a brief delay, caused to some extent by the defection of a part of the Navy, which had joined the Southern malcontents at Canton, a formal declaration of war was issued against Germany and Austria on the ground of the continuance of the submarine campaign in the face of China's protests (August 14). The immediate effect was to complete the destruction of Germany's position in the Far East. The German concessions at Tientsin and Hankow were occupied, the important financial obligations of the Chinese Government were suspended or cancelled, interned German and Austrian shipping—some 40,000 tons—was confiscated, the large number of Germans and Austrians in Chinese administrations were dismissed, and German institutions, banks, clubs, newspapers, were everywhere closed or seized by the Chinese authorities. In recognition of China's action, and to assist her finances, the Allies postponed Boxer indemnity payments for five years (except in the case of Russia, whose share being the largest, only a proportion of the indemnity was postponed), and promised to use their best endeavours to raise the Customs' tariff to an effective 5 per cent.

Sun Yat-sen and the Parliament at Canton.—Sun

Yat-sen left Shanghai for Canton at the end of July to organize an independent league of South and West, and he and a rump of the 1913 Parliament proclaimed a "Military Government" at Canton (September 10), which was also declared to be at war with Germany. The Central Government threw down the gauntlet to these radical extremists by a mandate of September 29, ordering the arrest of Sun and his colleagues. To pacify the more moderate of the Southern leaders, two other mandates of the same date established an office to prepare for the convocation of a Parliament, and directed the provinces to send each five representatives to Peking within a month to organize a National Council, which would draw up a new election law.

In spite of Sun Yat-sen's proceedings at Canton, Lu Yung-t'ing, the Black Flag leader, maintained his position, and continued to exercise the dominating influence in the two provinces of Kwangtung and Kwangsi. Early in November a mandate raised him to the rank of Marshal, and summoned him to Peking, General Lung Chi-kuang being ordered from Hainan with his troops to replace him. This step was considered to be a challenge to Lu, who had been adopting a neutral attitude, and had been credited with aspirations to form an independent State in the South and West, to declare himself for or against the Central Government.

National Council of Nov. 1917.—On November 10 the National Council of five representatives from each province, except Kwangtung and Yunnan, and ten nominally representing Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkestan, was formally opened at Peking. It contains not a single member of the Kuo-min Tang; all are selections of the provincial governors.

Civil War in Szechwan.—At the close of 1917 Szechwan and Yunnan were not only in a disturbed state; they were practically independent of the Central Government. After the revolution of 1911 Szechwan had a long spell of unsuccessful rule by its own officials. The hold of Peking was nominal; the finances fell into

chaos, and though two-thirds of the revenue was squandered on the provincial army, there was neither peace nor order owing to the fraternisation of the soldiers and brigands. In the spring of 1915 President Yüan sent General Ch'ên Yi with 20,000 Northern troops to bring the province into line, and though this step had a measure of success, disorder continued. In the movement against Yüan's monarchy Yunnan troops went to Szechwan, and at first the discontented Szechwanese politicians and soldiers threw in their lot with them. The monarchy disposed of, the Szechwan and Yunnan leaders contended for mastery. In the early part of 1917 the Yunnanese governor was driven out, but his successor, a Kweichow man, was equally obnoxious to Szechwan. The autumn of 1917 saw the forcible ejection of the Kweichow party from Chengtu, and at the beginning of the December quarter there appeared to be imminent a struggle between Szechwan and Northern troops on one hand, and Yunnan troops on the other, the latter massing at Suifu and the Northern at Ichang.

Ishii Mission to Washington.—The feelings created in Japan and America in connection with the American Note to China of June 6 led to the mission of Viscount Ishii to Washington in August, for the purpose of securing an understanding in regard to China, and also a more complete co-operation on the conduct of the war. Notes were exchanged between Japan and America on November 2, in which the principle of the open door and equal opportunity and the territorial integrity of China were enunciated once more, and the two Governments recognised that—

> "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently the Government of the United States recognises that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in that part to which her possessions are contiguous."

Japan, on the other hand, repeated assurances that she

> "has no desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations or disregard the commercial rights heretofore created by China in treaties with other Powers."

The United States' recognition of special interests too clearly recalled to the Chinese the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, in which the special interests of Japan in Korea were similarly emphasised, and the Peking Government took the precaution to issue a special declaration (November 8) that China would observe her treaty relations with all friendly nations, as well as those whose relations are special because of territorial contiguity, but that she would "not allow herself to be bound by any engagement entered into by other nations."

"Arms Alliance" with Japan.—An arrangement concluded with Japan in October 1917, and spoken of as the "arms alliance," disclosed the fact that the Northern party, under the new President, had decided to enlist Japanese support to defeat the South. By this arrangement a special loan of thirty millions of yen (£3,000,000) was granted by Japan, and at the same time a contract for the supply of rifles and guns was signed, under which the rights to nominate military advisers and to work an iron region near Nanking were conceded. The ear-marking of the Fêng-huang Shan iron area attracted special attention. The Japanese previously controlled nearly a half of the iron deposits of China, and they were in possession of all the iron mines and works employing modern machinery; with the new acquisition they could be considered to hold a virtual monopoly of the iron production of the country.

Agitation against Japanese Policy of the Cabinet.—A great outcry arose as soon as these transactions became known. The commercial guilds at Shanghai made a weighty protest; the three governors of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Hupeh, all adherents of the President, and appointed to maintain the balance of power in his favour in the Yangtse region, telegraphed their objections, advocated a peaceful solution of the differences between North and South, and offered themselves as mediators to secure unity; and two generals in command of the Northern troops in Hunan urged a

cessation of hostilities and a settlement by discussion. The politicians were bluntly accused of sacrificing the country and using the military to advance their own interests. This insubordination of his own supporters led to the resignation of Tuan and his Cabinet (November 23). The resignation was withdrawn for a few days through the intervention, it is stated, of the Japanese Minister, and the policy of overawing the South was resumed. As a result the Northern control in Hunan collapsed, and Changsha was captured by the forces of the South. Wang Shih-chên, one of Yüan Shih-k'ai's men, became Premier on December 2, and Tuan was appointed Director of a special War Bureau (December 20). Latterly the situation in Peking had developed into a contest between two factions of the Pei-yang party, the Anhwei, led by Tuan (a native of Anhwei), and the Chihli, headed by the President and his associates on the Yangtse, all Chihli men.

Situation in December, 1917.—At the end of 1917 the question nominally dividing North and South was the constitution and powers of the Parliament to be convened at Peking. The South contended for the Parliament of 1913, the rump of which at Canton claimed to be the accredited representative institution of the whole country, and the North demanded a new assembly which would help to govern, and not spend its energies in mere obstruction. The real difficulties arose from the large masses of ill-organized troops ranged under a number of leaders, most of whom were simply fighting for their own hand. In the words of Sir John Jordan (December 20): "confusion reigns everywhere, and the country looks in vain for a strong man to take control, but there is no second Yüan in sight. Even restoration of the boy-Emperor is again advocated in responsible quarters as offering a better solution of China's difficulties than can be obtained by a premature adoption of Western institutions, for which the country is unsuited."

Opium, 1912-17.—A second international confer-

ence was held at The Hague in January 1912, at which America, China, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia, and Siam were represented. The result was a Convention (January 23), which provided that the signatory Powers should enact laws (1) to control the production and distribution of raw opium; (2) to suppress the trade in prepared opium; (3) and to supervise the trade in morphia and cocaine. They also agreed to co-operate in preventing the smuggling of these drugs from and into China.

In China itself the British agreement of 1911 was carried through to a successful conclusion. Under this the prohibition of the import of Indian opium, which had been applied to the three Manchurian provinces, Shansi and Szechwan in August 1911, was extended to Chihli and Kwangsi in February 1913; to Shantung, Hunan, and Anhwei in May 1913; to Fukien in May 1914; to Hupeh, Chekiang, and Honan in June 1914; and to Kansu in November 1915. Some doubtful transactions took place between the Chinese authorities and a British opium combine whose object was to obtain speculative profits; but with the good-natured tolerance of the British Government of these and other questionable tactics on the part of the Chinese, hitches were avoided, and the last six provinces—Kwangtung, Kweichow, Yunnan, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, and Shensi—being declared free of poppy cultivation, the whole of China was practically closed to Indian opium in December 1917.

II. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

Ancestor Worship.—The worship of ancestors is the outstanding religious feature of the Chinese race. It is the oldest cult; it existed as far back as historical evidence extends. From Emperor to peasant, everyone sacrificed to the spirits of former ancestors, that they might protect the living and assist their descendants to prosperity; and at the present day there is no religious duty which is more faithfully and universally performed. Almost as general in conception, but with a great variety in practise, is the worship of the spirits of Nature—of the deities of heaven, earth, wind, rain, thunder, and of the tutelary gods of home and soil.

Confucianism.—The teachings of Confucius (B.C. 550-478) were little tinged with religious notions. We find references to a Supreme Being (heaven), but Confucius made no claim to divine revelations, and the basis of his teaching was justice and right between man and man: "Do not to others what you would not wish them to do to you." It is more as a model of sage government and wise statesmanship that he has been reverenced.

Taoism, which is based on the philosophy of Lao Tzŭ (*circa* 570 B.C.), appears to be the only indigenous attempt to furnish a solution of the puzzle of existence; but it early became a religion in imitation of Buddhism, from which the ceremonial, vestments, temples, &c., were borrowed. In modern times Taoism can hardly be distinguished from Buddhism, and scarcely one Chinese in a thousand can explain the difference betwen the dogmas or liturgies.

Buddhism was imported from India shortly after the Christian era, and spread rapidly over China. It took a form peculiarly Chinese. Chinese mythology and philosophical beliefs were mingled with the Mahāyāna system of Buddhism, and form a blend which is a mystery to the mass of the Chinese people. The ordinary layman simply burns incense and goes through forms of worship at a temple when some want in his personal life drives him; and he pays his contribution to the priests without the smallest understanding of the meaning of the service.

Mohammedanism was started in China in A.D. 628 by an uncle of Mahomet. The first mosque was built at Canton. The existing Mohammedans in China are largely descendants of a force of 4,000 Arabs, who were sent by the Caliph Abū Jafar in 755 to assist in repressing a rebellion. During the Mongol period, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the number of Mohammedans in China increased. They are estimated to number from fifteen to twenty millions at the present day; and the bulk of them are found in Sinkiang, Kansu, Shensi, and Yunnan. They have the same rights as other Chinese, and are free to practise their religion untrammelled.

Christianity has made little impression on the mass of the population. The Roman Catholic Church, which has existed in China since the Ming period, is said to number nearly two millions. Protestant missions, which are only a century old, are estimated to have about half a million converts.

(2) Political

Social Order.—The theory of government under the Manchus differed little from that which descended through a long succession of dynasties from the days of Confucius. It rested on a traditional social system of four classes—the literary, agricultural, artisan, and trading. Above and outside these four great divisions were the Imperial Family, and below them the pariah or unclean callings, actors, yamên-runners, barbers, &c.

A nobility, in the European sense, scarcely existed, apart from the Imperial Family; a few Chinese held hereditary titles, the most notable being Duke Yen, the lineal descendant of Confucius, and the possessor of the oldest genealogical tree in the world. The aristocracy was one of officials, the great majority of whom came from the literary classes. Though the legal emoluments of an official were small, custom allowed him to levy or receive all sorts of contributions; and a successful official who retired without disaster was as a rule a rich man. He usually invested his wealth in land, had a country seat, and received rents. This seat was in his own native district, in the neighbourhood of his numerous relations, many of whom followed his example. After many generations, a family of this kind, known as *shên-shih*, gentry or notables, acquired great influence, and became a sort of clan, which every local official—who was never a man of the same province—had to consider very carefully. Such families, with literary traditions and means to provide tutors of distinction for their children, made a practice of sending their sons into the public service, and in process of time they came to wield a definite hereditary power in the government of the country.

The bulk of the population are uneducated peasants, mostly small landowners. Early marriages and large families being the rule, and primogeniture not being recognised as regards property, the land is much subdivided, and the majority of holdings run between one and three acres. The numbers engaged in industries not directly connected with agriculture are relatively small, and they are not influential. The Chinese is a clever merchant, and trade in all its forms comes next in importance to agriculture; but the national contempt among the educated for the trader—his ideal is avowedly personal gain pure and simple, while that of the official or scholar, whatever the practice may be, is the good of others—is still noteworthy, and the merchant has got some way to go to attain the standing given to him in Western countries.

Machinery of Government.—The whole social and political organization is based on the family. The control of parent over child is complete all through lifetime, and filial piety is held up as the highest virtue. A collection of families, or ward, is represented for official purposes by a *ti-pao* (land warden, or beadle), who is selected from the local elders by the magistrate, but with the popular concurrence. Each ward or village is a unit in which the elders exercise authority according to immemorial usage—the customs vary with the locality—the *ti-pao* being the constable and tax-gatherer. Above the *ti-pao* in Manchu times came the *chih-hsien* (district-knower or magistrate), who was the official head of the *hsien*, district, the administrative unit, and received his appointment from the Emperor. He provided himself with staffs of all kinds, was judge, police magistrate, coroner, sheriff, surveyor of taxes, land registrar, and many other things, and was generally held responsible for peace and good order in his jurisdiction. The work of a number of *chih-hsien* was supervised by a *chih-fu* (prefect), and two or three *fu* were grouped under the *tao-t'ai* (intendant of circuit). Over the *tao-t'ai* was the *hsün-fu* (governor), or *tsung-tu* (viceroy), who ruled the province with the assistance of a superior hierarchy of financial and judicial colleagues. The viceroy or governor was directly responsible to the Emperor, who had to help him in governing the provinces a huge agglomeration of officials of all ranks in the various public *yamên* (offices) of the metropolis.

From family to Emperor the social and political link was the natural relationship—the magistrate was the "father and mother" of his district, as the Emperor was of the whole of his people. Authority, though arbitrary from bottom to top—fathers had by custom practically power of life and death over their children—was on the whole exercised lightly, and with a careful regard for public opinion. In few countries was there a greater freedom from restrictions on personal liberty, under ordinary conditions, and the rulers were

kept in bounds by the knowledge that riot or disorder meant loss of post.

Public Examinations.—At the same time, the age-long system of competitive literary examinations established an equality of opportunity which was theoretically perfect. Every man, excepting only those whose parents were of the pariah callings, had the right to compete, and the poorest, if successful, was entitled to take his place in the official hierarchy. Not only did this system diffuse a general sense of political justice, but it also served as a social cement of an enduring character, and competent observers have noted it as one of the leading factors in the past stability of the Chinese civilization. The Confucian and other "classics" were the basis of the education required by candidates in these public examinations, and all parents throughout the land, from Yunnan to Manchuria, who had the means or opportunity were thus induced to impart to their sons an intimate knowledge of them. The essential political doctrines taught in these classics are the superiority of moral to physical force—of right over might; the duty of employing only the wisest and ablest in the work of government; and the right of a people to depose a ruler who permits or practises tyranny. The intense study of the same literature and political philosophy by practically every boy who went to school in Chinese dominions produced a uniform type of mental cultivation over a wide area which had no parallel elsewhere in the world.

Checks on Official Power.—In the public service itself the exercise of authority, limited as it was by custom and the principles imbibed from the Confucian education, was kept in constant check by administrative rules and devices, which were the result of experience. All provincial officials received their appointments from the Court, and only the Court could promote or cashier them; in that way the control of the Central Government was maintained. No civil official was appointed to his own native province; wherever he went he was a stranger, often unable to speak or under-

stand the dialect of the people he ruled, and he took with him a large body of personal henchmen, mostly his own connections, as secretaries and assistants. Appointments were for a limited time—usually three years, and, except in a few cases of statesmen of recognised reputation, the rule was strictly observed; for this reason the number of officials who could strike root in a locality and establish a personal influence was small. There were parties in the State service, generally the adherents of prominent public men, who were often identified with different interests or principles. For years the "Hunan" party, originally headed by Tsêng Kuo-fan and Tso Tsung-t'ang (both Hunanese), were considered to be the opposition to the "Anhwei" party, led by Li Hung-chang; the Yüan Shih-k'ai party and that of Chang Chih-tung were similarly held to be political adversaries. In making provincial and Cabinet appointments, the Court took care to balance these parties, and a Tsêng man would be found to have a Li man as his immediate coadjutor above or below. Manchus were thrown in at important points as a further element in the political balance. Outside the executive stood the Censorate, an influential board of high officers, assisted by staffs in every province, whose duty it was to denounce to the Emperor all abuse of power or acts of misgovernment. Unfortunately, it suffered from the defect that the members, being officials themselves and only censors for a period, were more concerned in preserving the privileges of their class than in defending the interests of the people.

The Provinces.—A great deal of latitude was left to the provincial administrations under the old regime. The Peking Government took very little initiative in the conduct of provincial affairs. It criticised or kept in check or punished, rather than governed. So long as a province provided its quota of imperial revenue, and arranged its own difficulties and disturbances with its own means, it was left practically to itself. This quasi-autonomy was disturbed by the increasing pressure of the European. Foreign relations became too

serious to leave to provincial officers, and the concentration of the governing power in Peking began with them; it progressed to other matters, nearly all connected with modern progress; received its first serious check in the "rights-recovery" movement of the latter part of Kuang-hsü's reign; was the provoking cause of the revolution of 1911; and has been the main reason for all the dissension since then.

Parliamentary Methods.—The advent of parliamentary methods in the reign of the last Manchu Emperor brought a new advisory element into the Provincial and Central Governments, but it does not appear to have altered the main features of the actual administration as above sketched. The Provincial Assemblies were composed chiefly of notables who had always made themselves heard; and the Senate represented the privileged classes in the capital, and the provincial notables into the bargain. Acting in bodies, they took a stronger stand for their own views, which were in most cases dictated by their own local interests; and, whereas hitherto they yielded to Imperial requirements, or the behests of a viceroy, with little opposition, in the assemblies they were emboldened by combination to challenge the highest commands, even Imperial decrees, regardless of consequences.

The Chinese an easily-governed Race.—The great mass of the Chinese are a law-abiding and easily-governed people; though poor, they rarely suffer from want of food unless through natural calamities, such as flood or drought; and they are on the whole lightly taxed. Unfortunately the taxes are levied on the empirical principle of seeking them where they can be found, and this leads in the hands of a legion of venal and unscrupulous collectors to intolerable abuses. There is no one who appreciates the "square deal" more keenly than a Chinese; but the system under which the officials were remunerated in Manchu times made it impossible for him to get this without a constant struggle. The magistrate was supposed to keep the machinery of government going on a mere pittance,

when all the world knew that he was collecting the large sums which were necessary, and often many more that were not necessary, by methods forbidden by law, though consecrated by custom. It was only when he exceeded the bounds of custom—and very often he was forced to this by the exaction of superiors, or he was a victim of his own underlings—that the riots and revolts of which we have heard so much took place. Under weak rulers the corruption, which was the basis of all official remuneration, became shameless; and the injured were driven for redress or protection to the secret societies, which were in most cases the offspring of chronic injustice.

Administration under the Republic.—Under the Republic the administration in general appears to go on very much as it did under the Empire. Authority has been weakened, in some parts lamentably weakened, but the interests of the older Chinese of all classes are opposed to disorder, and the *ti-paos* and elders continue on the whole to keep a considerable portion of the social fabric together, despite the difficulty of levying necessary taxes. Though in the provincial hierarchies changes of name have taken place, and the machinery of government is in a fluid condition, the bearers of the new titles and offices act very much as their forerunners did under the Manchus. Corruption and "graft"—the source of all misgovernment in China—are said to be more rampant amongst the politicians of to-day than they were under the Empire, and while this is so unrest will continue.

(3) Financial and Commercial

Main Features of Manchu Finance.—The public exchequer under the Manchus was managed on principles which were discarded in progressive European States in the eighteenth century. The Empire was treated financially as a large "farm," the units of which were the *hsien* districts. The *chih-hsien* (district magistrate), appointed by the Emperor to govern this unit,

collected his own revenue, paid his own services, and contributed a stated amount to the provincial treasury. So long as he furnished this contribution regularly, without riot or disorder, or without denunciation by censors or superiors, he was a successful magistrate. He was never called upon for a real account of revenue and expenditure. It was recognised that he had to collect a much greater sum than the contribution in order to maintain his numerous subordinates and to remunerate himself, and no objection was raised on any side if he kept within the measures and limits which his predecessors had found sufficiently lucrative in the past. Each district was assessed according to its means and the necessities of the province. There was rarely a reduction of the assessment; it was always on the increase.

Into the provincial treasury were poured the district quotas, and the provincial treasurer, a high official also appointed by the Emperor, farmed the provincial revenues in much the same manner as the magistrate, but under the direct supervision of the Viceroy or Governor. A fixed sum was remitted to Peking as a contribution to the expenses of the Court and the Imperial administration, and this sum again varied with the capacity of the province and the needs of Peking. The provincial services, as distinct from those of the districts, were financed by the funds remitted to the provincial treasurer, and any sums remaining after the Peking quota was deducted became the property of the provincial hierarchy, a ring of perhaps half-a-dozen high officers. In no province were trustworthy statistics published for any fiscal purpose; memorials containing financial statements were made known from time to time in the *Peking Gazette*, but they were in no way reliable. The Central Government did not collect revenue directly. The Maritime Customs and Salt Gabelle receipts, which might be considered Imperial and not provincial revenues, were passed through the provincial accounts before appropriation by Peking.

Land Tax.—The basis of taxation was the claim of the Emperor, as lord of the soil, to a share of the produce. The rent, or land tax, which was the mainstay of the Chinese public finances in olden days, was fixed in 1712, when the land and poll taxes were amalgamated into one permanent and immutable tax. This "permanent settlement" was adhered to and the land tax leviable as entered on the title deed of a plot could not be changed. Temporary remissions were made for drought, flood, or disorder. The tax was stated to be payable partly in silver, partly in produce, but in most provinces the grain portion of the tax had been commuted into silver; Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, and Shantung continued to send taxes in grain. In 1905 the reported collection of the land tax for the Empire that is, the amount remitted to Peking, was 26,000,000 taels, or something under £4,000,000; the actual collection was estimated by reliable authorities at not less than 100,000,000 taels (£14,000,000), and possibly 400,000,000 taels (£56,000,000). The explanation of the differences between these figures furnishes a key to Chinese methods of tax collection. No allowance being provided for the costs of collection, they varied with the desires of the magistrates and the rapacity of the yamên-runners, who were the actual collectors. The greater part of these costs was usually obtained by converting the sum in silver stated on the title deed into copper cash (in which the taxes were paid) at a rate widely different from the market rate, say 3,600 per tael, instead of 1,200; thus, by fixing an arbitrary exchange for revenue purposes, the deed tax in silver was adhered to, though the tax, in fact, was trebled. But there were a host of more ingenious expedients employed to increase the income of an official under cover of legality which it would take a volume to describe.

Besides the land tax, the other sources of revenue were *likin*, the Salt Gabelle, the customs, native and foreign, and a miscellaneous assortment of fees (land transfer, licences, sale of official ranks, &c.), subscriptions, and "benevolences."

Likin.—*Likin* was a tax on merchandise in transit, which was introduced during the T'ai-p'ing rebellion in 1853 to provide the extra funds required. It was levied capriciously at "barriers," like tolls, along the main arteries of inland and river trade, and constituted a serious impediment to trade from the friction and delay occasioned, apart from the levies themselves, which on a long journey might easily amount to 15 per cent. or 20 per cent. *ad valorem.* For long it was opposed by foreign Powers as a contravention of treaty provisions. In 1905 the reported *likin* on general merchandise and native opium amounted to 14,000,000 taels (£2,000,000).

Salt Tax.—Salt was everywhere under the strictest Government control, and taxed at every stage—manufacture, purchase at the salterns, transport, sale at destination depôts, and sale to the people. There were eleven great salt collections. Production, transport, and sale were in private hands, under licences issued by the administrations of each salt area. The whole system was very complicated, and abuses abounded. The actual cost of salt to the consumer was at least ten times the cost of production. The reported collection in 1905 was 13,000,000 taels (under £2,000,000); the estimated actual collection was, at the lowest computation, five times this sum.

Native Customs Duties.—The native customs, i.e., the old original Chinese customs, were also "farmed." The stations existed at important trade centres on the coast and on the frontiers, and the fixed quotas from each sent to Peking were but a fraction of the actual sums levied. The Hoppo of Canton was the typical case. From the beginning of the Manchu dominion till the abolition of the post in 1904, the Hoppo collected duties on the rich trade of South China for the immediate benefit of the Court. The regulation sum he was required to provide bore no relation to his actual collection, or indeed to the gifts in addition—fans, silks, pearls—which he regularly supplied to the Palace. Another characteristic and lucrative post was the

Peking Gate (Hata-mên), usually held by a Manchu courtier, who levied *octroi* dues on goods entering the city, and "benevolences" on all officials summoned to Court. He also furnished a regulation amount to the Palace, but over and above it there was a far larger sum which had to be provided in douceurs to people in high places to secure undisturbed possession of the office for the appointed term. In 1905 the native customs were estimated to furnish about 4,000,000 taels (£600,000) to the Imperial revenue.

Maritime Customs Duties.—In marked contrast to the native fiscal methods, the Maritime Customs stood out as an object-lesson of what could be accomplished by honest administration and proper accounting. This service took its rise in the transfer to foreign control of the customs at Shanghai in 1853, as a consequence of the capture of the native city by the T'ai-p'ings. The native custom-house being closed, the foreign merchants deposited with their consuls bonds for the duties for which they had become liable. This inconvenient plan was later superseded by an agreement with the Chinese authorities for the establishment of a Customs Board of three foreign inspectors. Afterwards, by Rule 10 of the Rules of Trade of November 1858, a uniform system was agreed upon at every treaty port, and the appointment of a British Inspector-General of Customs, Mr. H. N. Lay, followed, with power to employ foreigners to assist him. Mr. Lay was succeeded by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Robert Hart, in 1863, who during his service of nearly fifty years made the Chinese Imperial Maritime Customs known throughout the world for efficiency and integrity. The collection of the Maritime Customs in 1865 was about $11,000,000; fifty years later it was $50,000,000. Peking has always had the Maritime Customs revenue at its disposal; before the Chino-Japanese War it was shared with the provinces, four-tenths being retained for Imperial purposes and six-tenths going to the provinces. At the close of the Manchu régime the whole of it was absorbed by the service of the foreign debt.

Miscellaneous Taxes.—The miscellaneous taxes were believed to represent a very large sum, though the reported contribution to the Imperial Exchequer was only about 4,000,000 taels, or £600,000, altogether.

Expenditure.—There was no budget of expenditure under the Manchus, and the estimates given below were formed from fragmentary items of information scattered over a variety of official reports. The bulk of the revenue collected was spent by the provincial governments on local administration, and the yearly amount of this expenditure was reckoned at about, as nearly as possible, twice that of the Central Government, which was estimated at 100,000,000 taels, say £14,300,000. Of this the Court and Manchus and the Metropolitan Administration used nearly 19,000,000 taels (£2,700,000), the Imperial military and naval forces 35,000,000 taels (£5,000,000), the Customs 4,000,000 taels (£600,000), and the foreign debt and obligations 42,000,000 taels (£6,000,000). The total of Imperial and provincial expenditure was figured at about 300,000,000 taels, or £43,000,000, which, for an empire of such dimensions, was considered by Europeans to be small.

Official Corruption.—If the above-mentioned sum were a true approximation to the amount exacted from the people of China to support the edifice of government in all its ramifications one would have to conclude that the remuneration of the vast army of officials must have been on a moderate scale. Unfortunately, the total of 300,000,000 taels represented only the amount which more or less openly changed hands between private persons and the mandarins in the year. It barely touched the mass of clandestine and corrupt payments which were the bane of the whole political system, and the root cause of the downfall of the Manchus. It is necessary to explain this subject more fully to Europeans, and it is best to begin with the Court, which set the example for the rest of the official world. From the reports on which our figures were based it appeared that the Imperial household cost the country only 1,500,000 taels in

cash, and supplies in kind (silks, porcelains, &c.), or some £250,000 altogether. But this modest sum merely represented the total of the reported contributions to Peking for the Palace expenses. There was hardly a soul in or about the Court who did not receive an undisclosed income, wrung eventually from the people. The Empress Dowager herself received, usually through her chief eunuch, huge payments from officials, either on appointment or when seeking appointment, or during office; expensive gifts of all kinds from those presented at Court; and "benevolences" under the guise of loans from persons enjoying her "bounty." The form was well known: the eunuch wrote a polite letter enquiring after the health of the recipient, mentioning that he was in want of money, and asking for a "temporary" loan of a sum suited to the capacity of the selected individual. It was equally well known that the Empress got the major share of these loans, which were never repaid, and that she hoarded them with her other receipts in bullion secreted in the Palace, for the benefit of her own family and clan. This Palace hoard ten years ago was reputed at nine or ten millions sterling, and there were shrewd Chinese who put the amount much higher. The chief eunuch was celebrated for his riches. Every official coming from the provinces, after passing the gauntlet of the Peking Gate, had to buy his way through the outer entrances of the Palace, and again through the inner courts to the Audience Hall; and it was no uncommon event to find a statesman of renown waiting for his audience for days in lodgings outside the city or palace, until he satisfied, after long and characteristic haggling, the demands of the different sets of harpies. Only the highest officers of State with a reputation for poverty were spared these levies. No one could attempt to approach the Palace for a right or favour without payment, and he stood little chance of success if he did not err on the side of liberality.

The system descended down to the smallest official in the Empire. Every one of them might be considered

to have had his court, into which those below him in power sought entrance in much the same manner. Not one received a salary at all commensurate with bare needs. From yamên-runner—the lowest collector of taxes and dispenser of justice—to Viceroy, all fended for themselves; justice was bought and sold flagrantly, and was rarely to be had except by purchase. The following quotation from Mr. Morse's book, *The Trade and Administration of China*, correctly describes this portion of the system:—"The collector takes his charges, but it is a mistake to suppose that his takings are all pure profit; to maintain his position he must satisfy all in direct authority over him, thereby securing to his superiors what is considered the just Chinese equivalent of 'salary.' The Hsien will have received his share in collector's charges, and from this must provide for the maintenance of all his subordinates, less the proportion which they themselves may have secured as their share out of the collector's charges; and he must then provide for the maintenance (what we would term salary) of all in direct control over him or able to influence his appointment or his actions. On his first appointment, and annually or at more frequent periods during his term of office, he must give gratifications, depending in amount upon the more or less lucrative character of his post, to his immediate superiors, the Prefect and the Taot'ai; and he is the more bound to satisfy the provincial magnates, Judge, Treasurer, Governor, and Viceroy, in whose patronage lies his appointment, retention in office, and promotion; and he must not neglect these great men's secretaries and accountants, who are in a position to slip a good or evil word into their masters' ears. So with the Prefect and Taot'ai. The high provincial authorities, too, must fortify their position at the capital; and a portion of their emoluments, received from their subordinates, must be passed on, regularly and almost as an assessment, to the higher metropolitan officials and Ministers of State, and to the officials of the Palace, any one of whom, if neglected, might have influence to reduce the

perquisites of a self-seeking official or delay his promotion, and to put a spoke in the wheel of one who proposed measures to benefit his province. This is the Chinese system; as it is, the system obviously prevents any, even approximate, statement of the cost of government in China."

Finance under the Republic.—The preceding sections describe the state of affairs towards the close of the Manchu dynasty. Under the Republic finance was forced upon the attention of the Government from the beginning, and President Yüan made an attempt to banish abuses and to follow European methods. An annual budget became a necessity, and no less than six were presented in the first two years of the new order. The budgets were based upon the total annual collection, and not upon the amounts contributed to Peking from the provinces; that for the financial year ending June 30, 1916, put the revenue, ordinary and extraordinary, at $472,000,000 and the expenditure at $471,500,000. This is equivalent to about 330,000,000 taels, and corresponds roughly with the estimate given above of the Manchu revenue and expenditure.

The great items of revenue—land tax, customs, salt, &c.—appeared in this budget with a considerable alteration of amounts, but we can conclude from other evidence that the methods of collection, except in the case of salt, remain the same. The Salt Gabelle was in 1913 placed under the control of Sir Richard Dane, and under his capable administration the salt revenue, which produced $17,000,000 in 1905, contributed $70,000,000 to the republican exchequer in 1915.

President Yüan was soon forced to see the danger of the universal corruption, and in June 1914 he issued a mandate making bribery and miscarriage of justice a capital offence. Towards the end of 1914 a magistrate in Chihli Province and the Governor of the Peking Prefecture were executed for corrupt conduct; in September 1915 the Provincial Treasurer of Kiangsi was sentenced to death for the same offence; and there is little doubt that if Yüan's rule had continued a salutary

change might have been hoped for. But official Young China, as well as the men of the old regime, are, with rare exceptions, conspicuously wanting in financial integrity of the Western type, and the corruption at present is considered to be worse than under the Manchus. It goes without saying that in all areas of disorder revenue collection is at an end while the disorder lasts, and brigandage takes its place.

Foreign Debt.—The foreign debt was inconsiderable before the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The indemnity to Japan was paid by means of foreign loans secured on the Maritime Customs, and these loans were followed by a long series ending in the Reorganization Loan of 1913. Including the Boxer indemnity of £64,000,000, the total foreign indebtedness at the present day cannot be far short of £200,000,000, of which only one-fifth was spent on productive works—railways. The remaining four-fifths of this huge sum has produced nothing, and so far as the Chinese people are concerned was pure waste. However, if we consider the size and population of China proper, it must be conceded that, judged by the only other suitable standard, India, the burden of debt per head is low. In India it is 22*s.* 6*d.*; in China, about 10*s.* But over 90 per cent. of the Indian debt represents investments in railways and irrigation works, returning good interest to the country and to the bondholders; of the Chinese debt 80 per cent. gives no return at all.

Currency.—The monetary unit is the Chinese ounce or tael of silver. The weight is not uniform: it varies from one commercial centre to another. The purity of the silver also varies with the locality. It circulates in the form of ingots, "shoes" (*sycee*), of different shapes and sizes up to 50 or 60 taels in weight. The tael weighs about $1\frac{1}{3}$ oz. troy; but there are innumerable shades of difference. For instance, in Chungking (Szechwan) alone there are current twelve local weights of tael for general purposes, and half as many more different weights of tael for transactions in important commodities, such as salt or cotton. To add to the con-

fusion, there are three different qualities of silver, so that with the score of tael weights in combination with the three grades of silver, sixty currencies can be possible in this one town. This is characteristic throughout China.

The currency of the people is the copper "cash," originally a coin equal to 1-1,000th of a tael. These are supplemented by small paper notes, representing so many *tiao* or strings of cash, which are issued by private banks and circulate within a limited area. The tiao also varies; it should consist of 100 cash pieces, but it never does. (Cf. *Manchuria*, No. 69 in this series, p. 72.)

It would be difficult to exaggerate the evils daily inflicted upon the Chinese people by this inchoate and irregular currency. One does not know where to turn to find a parallel to such a state of things. In the opinion of an expert, "there is no more vital reform, none more urgent, none more far-reaching in result, none, but for the vested interests it encounters, so simple to effect as the reform of the currency of China. It would, I believe, do more to establish the peace and prosperity of that country than any other reform whatsoever." Anyone who knows China, or who has travelled extensively there, will endorse this view of Sir Charles Addis. Since the foundation of the Republic, an attempt has been made to introduce a national currency. A dollar coin of 416 grs. weight and 900 fine, bearing the stamp of the Republic and the effigy of Yüan Shih-k'ai, was struck and put into circulation, and it was adopted by the Chinese Government as the money of account in presenting the annual budget. Railway fares are paid and the accounts of the companies kept in dollars. Sir Richard Dane determined from the first to collect his Salt Gabelle in dollars, and he has succeeded beyond all expectation. The gradual substitution of the dollar for the tael as the monetary unit of China is possible, and it is only necessary to add that the advantages which would accrue to China from the adoption of a uniform dollar currency are incalculable.

Foreign Trade and Residence.—The ocean trade is carried on at designated ports "opened" by treaty or selected by the Chinese Government. They comprise all the principal harbours on the sea-coast from Korea to Tonkin; on the Yangtse up to Chengtu; and on the West River to Nanning. At these ports foreign goods can be imported, and native produce exported, on payment of one duty according to a tariff which is based on an *ad valorem* 5 per cent. rate. Merchandise which has once paid this duty can be shipped from one treaty port to another or others without further taxation, but as soon as it leaves the treaty port it is liable to the taxation which is levied in China on all movement of commodities not exempted by special privilege. Foreign imports sent up-country can be protected from these levies by transit passes, for which protection an additional half-duty is paid; similarly, native produce purchased in the interior by a foreigner for export can be protected from *likin* levies on the road to the treaty-port by half-duty certificates. There are a number of inland places, generally on or near frontiers or leased territories, which are opened to trade in the same manner as the coast treaty-ports. At all open ports foreigners may reside and carry on industries and trade under their own officials and laws; at the principal ports there are concessions or settlements where they may organize their own municipalities and live under European conditions of sanitation, &c.

The foreign trade, import and export, has averaged £120,000,000 in value over the period 1911-15. The leading share is taken by Great Britain, 42 per cent. in 1914; Japan comes next, 24 per cent. in 1914; and Germany was third in 1914 with 7 per cent. During 1915 206,000 vessels, of 90,000,000 tons, entered and cleared at Chinese ports; excluding Chinese-owned shipping, of the remainder 56 per cent. was British, 35 per cent. Japanese, and less than 3 per cent. Russian. In addition to the overseas trade, there is a large coast and river trade, in which foreign vessels are allowed to participate.

(4) Naval and Military Organization

Army.—The Manchus depended in the first place on an army of their own race, the organization of which dated from the foundation of the dynasty. The victorious troops, chiefly Manchus, but including also Chinese and Mongols, were then formed into an hereditary army. It was divided into eight "banners," and under these banners were incorporated all Manchus, and the descendants of the Chinese and Mongols who were admitted to the corps at its inception. The permanent headquarters were at Peking and in the neighbourhood, and there the bulk were stationed; detachments were also sent to garrison important strategic points such as Canton, Foochow, Hangchow, Chinkiang, Kingchowfu (Hupeh), Chengtu (Szechwan) and Sianfu (Shensi). As a fighting force the Manchus at Peking had greatly deteriorated, and the provincial garrisons had entirely lost their martial character when foreign troops first met them in conflict. Later a special corps known as the Peking Field Force (Shên-chi Ying) was formed from the banners, and drilled and armed after the European fashion. This corps, with other Manchu troops of inferior quality, probably numbered 35,000 or 40,000 men at the beginning of the twentieth century.

In the provinces there were separate military organizations known as the Lü Ying (Green Regiments), which were supposed to number 20,000 to 30,000 men for each province, or say half a million in all, but the actual strength was much less, probably a third of that total. They were enrolled to preserve order, and were a constabulary rather than an army. Some of the provincial forces, specially armed and equipped, became identified with individual leaders—Tung Fu-hsiang, Nieh Chih-k'uei, Yüan Shih-k'ai—and these were quartered in the Peking neighbourhood during and after the Chino-Japanese War for the protection of the capital.

A decree of 1901, after the Boxer rising, ordered the reform of the army, and something was accomplished,

chiefly in Chihli, on the foundations laid by Yüan Shih-k'ai, whose division was the only one to survive the Boxer upheaval; but it was not until the Russo-Japanese War that serious efforts were made to organize a National army on Western lines. Another decree of 1905 provided a principal military college for the Empire in Peking and subsidiary ones in other parts, and also training schools for officers in each of the provinces. An Army Council was formed and a General Staff, and in 1907 a scheme, contemplating thirty-six divisions in two armies, North and South, was actively prosecuted. The recruitment was voluntary, except in the case of the Manchus, who were formed into Imperial guards, and the service was three years with the Colours, three years in reserve, and four years in the Territorial army.

At first the new War Office was placed under T'ieh-liang, a leading Manchu of the Court clique, to whom the main control of the military strength was transferred from the capable hands of Yüan Shih-k'ai (1906); but T'ieh being one of the protagonists in the Manchu *versus* Chinese struggle, his appointment was severely criticised, and to disarm this criticism he was superseded by Prince Ch'ing, who was more moderate in his views. A complete change in the status of the military officer took place; the soldier had never been highly esteemed in China, the *literati* scorning the career of arms as one of unreason and violence. The victory of Japan over Russia, and the conviction that China would be dismembered if she did not make military strength her first concern, changed all this. Patrician Manchus and members of Chinese official families crowded into the military schools, and in 1909 the Regent's brother, Prince Tsai-t'ao, who became Chief of the General Staff, set the fashion by riding about the streets of Peking in a khaki uniform of European type.

Manœuvres of the Western type, organized by Japanese instructors, were held for the first time in the autumn of 1906. A decree of 1907 reorganized the

"Green Regiments," who were placed under the control of the Minister of War at Peking; in peace they were, as before, to act as police, but in war they passed under the orders of officers of the regular army. At the close of the Manchu dynasty the Lu Chün (Regular Army) consisted of ten divisions and twenty-two mixed brigades, over 200,000 men, all of whom were armed and drilled after the Japanese pattern. The provincial troops numbered about 250,000, and were far inferior in quality and training.

Under the Republic the Lu Chün became what was generally known as the Northern army, which was the mainstay of the Central Government, and some provinces of the South and Centre formed contingents of their own, which were practically under the independent control of the different governors. It was officially stated that at the end of 1916 there were seventeen divisions and fifty-two mixed brigades, in all 540,000 men, under the direct control of Peking, and 40,000 men in Peking pay, who were under the command of three semi-independent provincial generals; in addition, there were large bodies of troops, chiefly in Yunnan and Szechwan, maintained independently of Peking. No reliable estimate has been given of the number of men enrolled at the close of 1917, but it may be assumed that, as the power of each governor depended on his armed forces, efforts have been made to maintain them at the highest strength possible. It is computed that at present (December, 1917) probably 65 per cent. of the total expenditure of the Central and Provincial Governments is devoted to military purposes.

The training and armament are, as a rule, Japanese, and many of the officers have passed through the military schools of Japan. Of late years Japanese military advisers and instructors have been employed in the Yangtse and Southern provinces, and since 1916 a Japanese military mission, headed by General Aoki, has been engaged by the Central Government to "unify" the land forces after the Japanese model.

Navy.—Of old there was no sea-going fleet. The war junks which represented the naval power were used for police purposes in rivers and harbours. In the 'eighties a fleet of modern warships, in two squadrons, North and South, was formed. The North, Pei-yang, squadron was for a time trained under British officers, and was more or less efficient; but it was destroyed during the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5. A few small cruisers were purchased afterwards. Following the military reorganization in 1905, the navy was taken in hand by Admiral Sa. By a decree of 1909 a new Board of Admiralty was created, under Prince Tsai-hsün; Nimrod Sound, near Ningpo, was chosen as the naval base (the old naval harbours were Port Arthur and Weihaiwei); and a scheme of four naval schools for training purposes was instituted; but no real progress in naval affairs has been made through want of funds. In June, 1916, the navy sent an ultimatum to President Li Yüan-hung, demanding the revival of the Nanking Constitution of 1912, and it was then stated to consist of four modern light cruisers, a training squadron of four ships, and some eighteen other vessels and gunboats.

There are small naval docks at Foochow, Kiangnan (Shanghai), Whampoa, and Taku; and well-equipped arsenals at Shanghai and Tientsin, and others less efficient at Nanking, Wuchang, Canton, and Chengtu. There are forts at the Bogue (Canton River), Kiang-yin, and Hokow (Yangtse), and on the Min River (Foochow); those at Taku were dismantled under the Final Protocol of 1901. Elsewhere there are no fortifications worthy of mention.

(5) Public Education

Until the twentieth century education in China was centred in the study of the Confucian "classics," the Chinese counterpart of the purely classical education of the West. Education was voluntary. A small proportion of the population received a thorough instruction through a system of private tutors; and the

elementary schools formed in every village did little more than teach the rudiments of letter-writing and easy composition. The educated were prepared for the public examinations (see p. 107), success in which ensured appointments in the public service, the only road to distinction. Three degrees were conferred—*hsiu-ts'ai* (bachelor of letters), *chü-jên* (master), and *chin-shih* (doctor), the last being given to those who were successful in the final series of the triennial examinations at Peking.

Western education was first countenanced by the Chinese Government after the Franco-British Campaign of 1860; two colleges, *T'ung-wên Kuan*, were founded at Peking and Canton to teach foreign languages in 1861. In 1880 a number of youths were sent to America to receive a training. But these measures received little real support. Not until the Boxer rising was the problem of modern education seriously touched, and the movement in favour of it did not gain full force until the Russo-Japanese War. In 1906, a new system of public education based on Western models, but substituting the Chinese language and literature for those of Greece and Rome, was instituted. By 1910 universities had been founded and primary and secondary schools established in numbers; primary education was to be compulsory and under provincial control, while secondary education was to be under the Central Government. Since the revolution of 1911, the chronic civil commotion has interfered with the operation of the 1906 system, and at the present moment education appears to be suffering like everything else in China from the disturbed conditions.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

(1) Political Parties and Questions

It must be remembered in considering the present condition of affairs that until 1911 a Republic had never seriously entered into the aims of Chinese reformers. The revolution itself was anti-dynastic, not republican. Its objects were to destroy the privileges

of the Manchus, and to introduce a constitutional monarchy. There was a strong reform party which did not even contemplate a change of dynasty; with Yüan Shih-k'ai they feared that "if the dynasty were overthrown all interests would suffer, and for several decades there would be no peace," and their desires would have been satisfied by a constitution of the Japanese or German type. As for a Republic, the idea was scouted as an impossibility by all but a few foreign-educated Chinese, generally of Cantonese origin. When it was first seriously proposed at the end of 1911, Yüan Shih-k'ai, in common with all experienced administrators, treated it with derision; and there are good grounds to believe that if he had been adequately supplied with money at this period there would have been no republican experiments, whatever else might have happened.

It is one of the commonplaces of human experience that while the slowly evolved characteristics of a people remain unaltered a rapid change in the political organization cannot be accomplished. In China it is unquestionable that the characteristics of the masses of the people are still what they were centuries ago, and if there is anything in the transmission of "collective heredity through culture" they are monarchical or patriarchal by instinct and education. The demand of such a people is always for "a strong Government under capable leadership," and their notion of leadership is ultimately some one man who commands their respect. But if he wishes to carry the masses with him, he must govern on the lines established by experience, and if changes are necessary he must introduce them gradually and with general consent. It is precisely this which has not been done. Yüan Shih-k'ai endeavoured to do it, and it is probable that he would have succeeded if he had had only his countrymen to reckon with. For his failure in the first instance to preserve the dynasty, the Manchus themselves by their want of courage, and the foreigners who failed to support him at a vital moment with financial means, were respon-

sible; his final discomfiture could not have occurred but for the foreign support given to his enemies.

The Chinese who were mainly instrumental in producing a state of disorder were collectively known as Young China, though a good many of their leaders were by no means young and inexperienced men. They were first heard of after the Chino-Japanese War (1895), and may be said to have become a political entity during the Russo-Japanese War (1905), when Sun Yat-sen founded the T'ung-mêng Hui (Covenanters or Leaguers) at Tokyo. This society consisted chiefly of the foreign-educated student class. The sentiments which these students acquired from their superficial studies were in the main iconoclastic; e.g., the Cantonese radicals at the founding of the Republic decided to render no more official homage to Confucius, and at the same time the Advisory Council in Peking resolved to eliminate religious teaching from the programme of the Ministry of Education, on the ground that the State was not concerned with religion; showing in both cases a hopeless disregard for the ingrained feelings of the overwhelming masses of their countrymen. What helped most to swell their ranks was the change in the centuries-old competitive examinations. The successful candidates under the new system were discriminated against by their seniors of the old; and, after 1906, a smaller proportion of them was absorbed in the public service. Of old the *literati* had always suffered from want of employment—not one in ten could hope to obtain a permanent official post; but there was no discrimination on the score of education. Moreover, their education taught them that patience and perseverance were merits in a scholar. The old suffered in silence; the new met on noisy platforms to ventilate their grievances, or plotted revolution in secret.

The students who returned from Japan were so generally of a revolutionary tendency that before Kuang-hsü died instructions were issued to secure that a larger proportion of scholars went to Europe and

America rather than to Japan. But Japan was nearer; and a makeshift education was more easily procurable there at less expense. In Tokyo the Chinese youths were noted for their turbulence; the free life of the Japanese student was turned into license by the Chinese who were unaccustomed to it, and they became inoculated with a hatred of constituted authority. A great many of them were engaged in military studies —a subject formerly neglected, which led a certain number to subvert the Confucian political creed and to place force above reason. Yüan Shih-k'ai, in the last year of his life, saw the necessity of making greater provision for the employment of foreign-educated students, and he made some recommendations of a general kind in their favour; but he had had many reasons to distrust them, and to rely for preference on men of the old education, and after the 1913 revolution he had no real desire to employ them in responsible or influential positions. This was the root-cause of their opposition to him.

Though Young China is alien in thought and in a hopeless minority, it is vociferous out of all proportion to its numbers, and it has a far larger voice in the destinies of China at the moment than its interests or merits justify. But when it comes to an election, the Chinese, in common with other Eastern peoples, are inclined to choose their tyrants as their representatives. It is true that they are accustomed to manage their own affairs, but these are the affairs of the village or district—their views rarely extend beyond. Physical conditions obstruct the formation and spread of a public opinion of a national character. In the great majority of instances little notice is taken of the general affairs of state, and electors are only inclined to exercise the suffrage to serve private interests. On the other hand, the Young China representatives, when they are not visionaries, are in nine cases out of ten conspicuously venal and unscrupulous, and merely seek power in order to gain fortune. In such circumstances "if the executive is weak, it is distracted by the fierce

struggle for place; if it is strong, the despot shares the spoils."

One cannot pass from the subject of Young China without a reference to the south-eastern province of Kwangtung. The Young China movement, broadly considered, was founded by a Cantonese; and this province, the home of revolution and secret societies, of brigandage and piracy, furnished leaders and a large section of the personnel. Much of the money which financed the revolution came from the purses of Cantonese at home and abroad. From Kwangtung came the initiative in the demand for a republic; and but for the Cantonese pressure the demand could scarcely have made headway in Central China. The people of Kwangtung are the most unruly of the Chinese race, and they have shown that they are prepared to accept assistance from any source which will give them the means to overcome their domestic opponents. It has been said, and it is possibly true, that the Cantonese will either dominate the government of China, or they will be autonomous; but, whatever happens, it may be assumed as certain that they will continue to be in the future as in the past the most disturbing influence in Chinese politics.

Other groups, usually of Southern or Yangtse origin, were formed in imitation of the T'ung-mêng Hui (Covenanters), and when the Republic was started they practically coalesced with the Covenanters to become the Kuo-min Tang (Nationalist Party). The policy of the Nationalists was decentralisation; the few patriots amongst them contended that the old system directed from Peking led to abuse of power, but the bulk merely saw larger opportunities for plunder in a weak executive. This policy was firmly and successfully opposed by Yüan Shih-k'ai during his Presidency. After his death the Nationalists returned to power in the Parliament, but the executive, backed by the majority of the military leaders and by a volume of Conservative opinion (collectively known as the Pei-yang Party), have carried on the struggle. The

cleavage between North and South has increased, and at the close of 1917 it was probably as wide as it has ever been, though the causes of difference seem to be less matters of principle than of persons. Both sides profess to desire a "strong and united China," but neither is willing to trust the other with the power necessary to secure it, and, so far, the usual *via media* has not been found.

On the question, which has been much debated, of the most suitable form of government, there is little division of opinion amongst foreign experts. Republicanism has not proved itself; and it is pointed out that the precedents elsewhere do not favour the probability of a stable republican government in China. In America there was from the beginning a high standard of education, and the people were for centuries bred in representative institutions; in France it took the best part of a century of political change to educate the masses to republicanism. Economically and politically there is more analogy to the conditions in the Central and South American states, whose histories demonstrate the perils of a too abrupt plunge into republicanism. The succession to executive power is a difficult problem in a republic, which may be solved harmoniously by a people with a high average intelligence due to education and a highly-cultivated general experience in the art of managing their own affairs under some system of representative government. But it becomes less and less likely that a huge helpless and valuable territory situated as China is will be permitted to gain its own experience and to work out its own salvation through disorder and revolution. The intelligence of the great mass of the people cannot be rated high, owing to the comparative lack of schools and education; though conducting their own local affairs with success they have participated little in what is called government, and their political capacity is low. Moreover, they have for ages been accustomed to autocratic rule, in which the succession to executive power is automatic or in the hands of an oligarchy.

Bearing these considerations in mind, and in view of China's history and traditions, her social and economic condition, and her relations with foreign Powers, it has been argued with much reason that the change from autocratic to republican government in 1911 was too violent, and that a monarchy would be more conducive to her independence and integrity. As for the Chinese themselves, given a suitable candidate and no foreign interference, it is probable that an unfettered *plebiscite* at the present time would result in a large majority for some form of monarchical rule.

(2) Conclusions

Some broad conclusions which emerge from the foregoing survey of Chinese affairs and from other well-known facts may now be shortly stated.

The Chinese are a sober, industrious race, highly endowed with judgment, good sense, and tenacity. Though comprising many types, they are markedly homogeneous, owing to centuries of uniform mental cultivation. The ideals of their intellectual life are not inferior to those in the Western world; and their religion—ancestor worship—tends to bind society together. They are amenable in intercourse; moderation is a virtue with them; and they are accustomed to conduct their own private and local affairs with tact and consideration. By education and temperament they are markedly pacific. They possess the qualities and attributes which entitle a people to independent existence, and if they are not rapidly inoculated with militarism there is no inherent reason why other nations should fear them or exercise a preventive domination.

What has failed in the past, with remorseless certainty, and always for the same reasons, is the higher government and administration. The most important of the reasons for this ever-recurring failure must be sought in the education of the rulers; the palace life, most of the time, and certainly during the impressionable years, under the tutelage of eunuchs and women,

bred princes of weak character, without experience of the outside world, who were either vicious or indolent, and who possessed neither the will nor the knowledge to exercise their enormous powers wisely. The crowning defects were the tolerance of corruption which this life perpetuated, and the inability to see that the financial corruption struck at the root of all permanent authority—even-handed justice. In his private dealings a Chinese is perfectly honest in money matters; but, with the example of the Court to guide him, it was only natural that he should look upon public money as fair prize to be seized by everyone who was given the opportunity. There is no doubt that, if reform in this respect begins at the top, and if the rulers can be brought to regulate their private finances openly and with moderate honesty, China can be purged of the grosser forms of corruption easily and rapidly. The Maritime Customs' service shows the way; and the revolution of 1911 has left the ground free for the selection of rulers of the requisite type.

The Chinese have always demanded moral qualities from their leaders; and it is reasonably certain that if left to themselves they would in a short time show their customary good sense by placing suitable men of their own race in power. But they have not been left to themselves in the recent revolts. The process of change has been complicated by the presence of the foreigner, who, in the last three-quarters of a century, has gradually established interests, territorial and commercial, all over the Chinese territories, and those interests have to be treated with the greatest circumspection by contending parties to obviate intervention and attack. The foreigner, too, has ambitions in the country, and these are liable to be used, and indeed are used, by unscrupulous politicians to overcome their opponents.

While it is open to any foreign Power to intervene with money or arms, or actively in any form, in order to assist any one political party from selfish motives, without let or hindrance from another foreign

Power, such a party will always be kept alive in present conditions in a diversified country of China's dimensions; it will always have strength because of the external support, if for no other reason; and it will either have its way or continue its revolutionary avocation. There can be no peace while such a state of things is possible. To put an end to it the Great Powers have only to agree to carry out effectively and sincerely the policies to which all of them have solemnly proclaimed adherence for the past twenty years—the integrity of China and the "open door." But to these policies all would have to conform with complete good faith. Once a departure is made from them by one Power, others are bound in self-defence to take countervailing action, usually of a similar nature, in pursuit of their own interests.

Changes of dynasty in the past have invariably been ushered in by periods of convulsion like the present, and it is important to remember that these have been taken advantage of on notable occasions by external powers—the Mongols and the Manchus were the last two instances—to impose a foreign domination on this remarkable people. The precedents are there to point the way, and there are too many Chinese who are ready to play the part of Wu San-kuei (who called in the Manchus to suppress the revolutionaries responsible for the fall of the Ming dynasty) rather than allow themselves to be ruled by their domestic rivals. In existing circumstances it is undoubtedly possible for any first-class Power to establish a supremacy in China similar to British rule in India, if the rest of the world chooses to allow it. It would be a simple matter for such a Power to suppress the internal rivalry and corruption; it could easily content the masses by giving them peace and justice, or keep them in subjection by retaining the mineral resources and vital industries in its own hands, thereby preventing them from arming for revolt. But it is hardly possible to believe that a domination by any one Power will be acquiesced in peaceably by the rest.

APPENDIX

PRINCIPAL TREATIES IN FORCE RELATING TO CHINA

(Unless specially mentioned, the other contracting party in each case is China)

Great Britain

Treaty of Nanking	1842
Treaty of Tientsin	1858
Convention of Peking	1860
Chefoo Agreement	1876
Burma Convention	1886
Burma Convention	1894
Yunnan and Szechwan: declaration relating to (with France)	1896
Burma Agreement	1897
Yangtse region, non-alienation of: Exchange of Notes ...	1898
Extension of Hongkong: Convention	1898
Lease of Weihaiwei: Convention	1898
Agreement (with Germany): Integrity of China	1900
Railway Agreement (with Russia)	1899
Final Protocol of	1901
Treaty of Commerce	1902
Convention of Lhasa (with Tibet)	1904
Convention concerning Tibet	1906
Convention concerning Tibet, &c. (with Russia)	1907
Opium Agreement	1911
Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement (with Japan) ...	1911

Austria-Hungary

Treaty of Peking	1869
Final Protocol of	1901

Belgium

Treaty of Peking	1865
Final Protocol of	1901

Brazil

Treaty of Tientsin	1881

Congo Free State

Treaty of Peking	1898

Corea

Treaty of Seoul	1899

Denmark

Treaty of Tientsin	1863

France

Treaty of Tienstin	1858
Additional Convention	1860
Treaty of Tientsin	1885
Commercial Convention	1886
Additional Convention	1887
Convention: Tonkin frontier	1887
Convention: Tonkin frontier	1895
Convention: Commerce	1895
Declaration relating to Yunnan, &c. (with Great Britain)	1896
Convention: Lease of Kwangchowwan	1898
Final Protocol of	1901
Agreement: Integrity of China (with Russia)	1902
Convention: Integrity of China (with Japan)	1907

Germany

Treaty of Tientsin	1861
Supplementary Convention	1880
Lease of Kiaochow: Treaty	1898
Agreement: Integrity of China (with Great Britain) ...	1900
Final Protocol of	1901

Italy

Treaty of Peking	1866
Final Protocol of	1901

Japan

Convention: Withdrawal of Troops from Corea	1885
Treaty of Shimonoseki	1895
Convention: Retrocession of Liaotung	1895
Treaty of Commerce	1896
Final Protocol of	1901
Treaty of Commerce	1903
Treaty of Portsmouth (with Russia)	1905
Treaty respecting Manchuria	1905
Railway Agreement: Manchuria	1907

Convention: Integrity of China (with France)	1907
Convention: Integrity of China (with Russia)	1910
Convention: Manchuria (with Russia)	1910
Anglo-Japanese Alliance Agreement (with Great Britain)	1911
Agreement: Outer and Inner Mongolia (with Russia): not published	1912
Treaties and Exchange of Notes: Shantung, Manchuria, Mongolia, &c.	1915
Treaty of Alliance (with Russia)	1916
Ishii Agreement (with United States)	1917

Mexico

Treaty of Washington	1900

Mongolia (Outer)

Agreement of Urga (with Russia)	1912
Treaty of Urga (with Tibet)	1913
Railway and Telegraph Agreements (with Russia) ...	1914
Treaty of Kiakhta (with Russia and China)	1915

Netherlands

Treaty of Tientsin	1863
Final Protocol of	1901

Peru

Treaty of Tientsin	1874

Portugal

Treaty of Peking	1887

Russia

Treaty of Nertchinsk	1689
Treaty of Kiakhta	1727
Treaty of Kuldja	1851
Treaty of Tientsin	1858
Treaty of Aigun	1858
Additional Treaty of Peking	1860
Protocol of Chuguchak	1864
Treaty of Petersburg	1881
Regulations for Russian land trade	1881
Railway Agreement (with Great Britain)	1899
Final Protocol of	1901
Agreement relating to Manchuria	1902
Agreement: Integrity of China (with France)	1902
Treaty of Portsmouth (with Japan)...	1905
Convention concerning Tibet, &c. (with Great Britain) ...	1907

Convention: Integrity of China (with Japan)	1907
Convention: Manchuria (with Japan)	1910
Treaty of Tsitsihar	1911
Agreement of Urga (with Mongolia)	1912
Agreement: Outer and Inner Mongolia (with Japan), not published	1912
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Railway and Telegraph Agreements (with Mongolia) ...	1914
Treaty of Kiakhta (with China and Mongolia)	1915
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Treaty of Alliance (with Russia)	1916

Spain

Treaty of Tientsin	1867
Final Protocol of	1901

Sweden

Treaty of Commerce	1909

Tibet

Convention of Lhasa (with Great Britain)...	1904
Treaty of Urga (with Mongolia)	1913

United States

Treaty of Wang-hia	1844
Treaty of Tientsin	1858
Trade Convention	1858
Additional Articles to above	1868
Immigration Treaty	1880
Emigration Treaty	1894
Final Protocol of	1901
Treaty of Commerce, &c.	1903
Integrity of China: Exchange of Notes with Japan ...	1908
Treaty for the Advancement of Peace	1914
Ishii Agreement (with Japan)	1917

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General

Blue-Books and *White Papers* issued by His Majesty's Government. (These contain the bulk of the material on which the foregoing survey has been based. The narrative has been provided with dates, by the help of which it will be easy to find any paper giving details of special subjects.)

British and Foreign State Papers. London.

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MAPS.

A map of China, showing railways, telegraphs, and Treaty Ports (G.S.G.S., No. 2361), on the scale of 1:5,000,000, with inset sketch maps showing railways round Peking and in Manchuria, has been published by the War Office (1913, corrections 1918).

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F.O.P. [3435] 7/20

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