

*HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 152*

D 6
.G7
no. 152
Copy 2

EUROPEAN COALITIONS
ALLIANCES, AND ENTENTES
SINCE 1792

BY

FOSSEY JOHN COBB HEARNshaw, LL.D.
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

LONDON :
PUBLISHED BY H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE.


1920







Class II 6

Book .G7







153

HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 152

gt. Brit

207
—
1407

EUROPEAN COALITIONS
ALLIANCES, AND ENTENTES
SINCE 1792

BY

FOSSEY JOHN COBB HEARNshaw, LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF LONDON



LONDON :

PUBLISHED BY H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920.

ad set

II 6
.G 7
Copy 2

N. of D.
OCT 22 1920

EDITORIAL NOTE

12/1/18
maps 3/1/21

IN the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connexion with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious, and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous inquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics, and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes ; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense ; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,

*General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.*

January 1920.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
I. First Coalition against France, 1792-3	3
II. Second Coalition against France, 1799	6
III. The Armed Neutrality, 1800	8
IV. Third Coalition against France, 1805-6	10
V. Loose Alliance against France, 1809	12
VI. Fourth Coalition against France, 1812-14	14
VII. Fifth Coalition against France, 1815	17
VIII. The Holy Alliance, 1815	19
IX. The Quadruple Alliance, 1815	20
X. Triple Alliance on behalf of the Greeks, 1827	22
XI. Quadruple Alliance concerning Portugal, 1834	25
XII. Quadruple Alliance against Mehemet Ali, 1840	26
XIII. Alliance against Russia, 1854	28
XIV. The <i>Dreikaiserbündniss</i> , 1872	31
XV. The Triple Alliance, 1882	33
XVI. The Triple Entente, 1907	35
XVII. The Balkan League, 1912	37
XVIII. The Agreement of London, 1914, and the Alliance of 1914-18	39
AUTHORITIES	41

EUROPEAN COALITIONS, ALLIANCES, AND ENTENTES SINCE 1792¹

INTRODUCTION

THE modern European System, in which the political unit is the sovereign national State, owes its origin to the break-up of mediaeval Christendom during the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation. Its definite constitution and its formal recognition may alike be attributed to the Treaties of Westphalia which terminated the Thirty Years' War in 1648. Those treaties established the fundamental postulates of modern International Law, viz. (1) that States and not their Governments are the constituent members of the Society of Nations: for by recognizing the independence of the United Netherlands and of Switzerland the treaties gave their sanction to successful rebellion; (2) that States are secular institutions: for only by abandoning the view that they are religious in character could the equality assigned to Catholics and Protestants be justified; (3) that States are sovereign and independent of external control: for the treaties ignored the mediaeval claims to suzerainty once strenuously maintained by both Pope and Emperor; and (4) that States are in theory equal: for only by the acceptance of such a principle could the small principalities and free cities of Germany hope for security and autonomy.²

It was the disintegration of the mediaeval Common-

¹ It should be observed that this survey is confined to combinations of three or more Powers.

² Cf. J. Westlake, *International Law*, s. v. *Peace of Westphalia*.

wealth of Europe thus consummated in 1648 that prepared the way for the formation of those coalitions, alliances, and ententes which have become increasingly numerous, extensive, and important as the period of modern history has progressed. For the disappearance of all political authority superior to that of the national State left the members of the new European System dependent upon their own resources both for security and for extension of power. Among these resources not the least important was that of voluntary association for defensive or offensive purposes, from which the practice of diplomacy developed. It became increasingly the custom to maintain permanent ministers at foreign courts rather than to send occasional envoys; an ever-growing body of treaties and agreements began to knit together into groups the newly emancipated units of the European Society of States; the theory of the Balance of Power was developed.

The principle underlying this theory of the Balance of Power has been the foundation of most of the coalitions, alliances, and ententes of modern times. It is true that a few (e. g. the Family Compacts of the Bourbon rulers of France, Spain, and Naples) have been merely dynastic; but these dynastic unions have rarely comprised more than two Powers, and even so have rarely endured for long. The really operative force which has welded isolated States into compact and permanent associations has been the dread of the rise to ascendancy of some one Power whose resources have for a time given it a position of superiority in strength to its neighbours, and whose ambitions have threatened to transmute the theoretical equality of States postulated by international law into the practical suzerainty of one State over the rest. Thus the threatened nations combined in the sixteenth century to resist the hegemony of Spain under Charles V and Philip II; thus in the seventeenth and eighteenth

centuries alliances were formed to oppose the aggressive designs of Louis XIV and Louis XV; and thus, as we must now proceed to note in detail, after 1792 coalitions were constituted to ward off the domination of the Continent by Revolutionary and Napoleonic France.

I. THE FIRST COALITION AGAINST FRANCE, 1792-3

The French Revolution, which broke out in 1789, seemed at first to be purely a matter pertaining to the domestic affairs of the French people. It was regarded with interest by other peoples—with general disapproval by the Governments, with widespread sympathy by the masses—but without any anticipation that they themselves would be drawn into its vortex. Gradually, however, it was elevated and enlarged into a catastrophe of world-wide importance, partly by the universal significance of the principles which it embodied, and of the appeal which it made to all autocratically governed peoples, but mainly by reason of the incompetence with which it was handled by the Government of Louis XVI, and because of the efforts made by the French antagonists of the Revolution to secure external aid in its suppression. The French Revolutionists themselves, in fact, laid the foundation of the First Coalition against their Government when on April 20, 1792, the Girondist ministers compelled the reluctant Louis XVI to declare war upon his nephew, the King of Hungary and Bohemia. They had ground for resentment, it is true, in the Emperor's unconcealed hatred of and contempt for their régime, and in his known desire to send help to his sister Marie-Antoinette; but they were rendered eager for war rather by the revolutionary outbreak in the Austrian Netherlands. It was

no more than natural that the revolutionary government of France should be eager to go to the assistance of a neighbouring people struggling to be free. Austria was already in alliance with Prussia by the Treaty of Berlin (February 7, 1792); and this alliance was renewed on July 25. But Frederick William II, though detesting the Revolution, was a half-hearted ally, his interest being concentrated upon the eastern border of his dominions, where Catherine of Russia was contemplating the second partition of Poland. Russia, it is true, might be regarded as a member of the Coalition. She signed a defensive alliance with Austria on July 12; and Catherine II vigorously denounced the revolutionary proceedings in France. Russia, however, took no action, and was known to be ready to seize the moment when Prussia and Austria should be involved on their western frontiers to pursue her own aims in Poland. It was this ambiguous attitude of Russia that rendered the actions of the Coalition so feeble and half-hearted.

Sardinia entered the Coalition on July 25; and France declared war on her on September 10. Turin was a centre of *émigré* intrigue against the Girondist Government, and the territory of Savoy was coveted by Frenchmen in order to give them their natural frontier of the Alps.

The opening phases of the struggle were fatal to the French monarchy. Louis XVI was deposed in August 1792 and executed in January 1793. A republican Government under a national Convention was established. This Government speedily enlarged the circle of its foes. On February 1, 1793, it declared war on Great Britain and on the Dutch Netherlands; these Powers had refused to recognize the new régime and had protested against the Republic's repudiation of treaties relating to the navigation of the Scheldt. On March 7, 1793, Spain, as a Bourbon monarchy, became involved in the conflict. The Empire, which, even after the fall of Mainz, was not

formally at war with France, decreed a levy of 120,000 men on November 25, 1792; but the formal declaration of war was not ratified till April 30, 1793. Soon afterwards Portugal, Naples, Tuscany, and the Papal States came in. The First Coalition was complete. All Europe, with the exception of Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Venice, Genoa, and Turkey, was now arrayed against France.

This First Coalition was, however, a very loose and imperfect form of union. It lacked cohesion and central control. The Governments who entered into it were generally weak and unpopular; the peoples of Europe as a whole rather sympathized with the emancipated French nation, which was struggling to realize and reorganize itself. Hence the Coalition, formidable in appearance, was in operation feeble. Under the blows of misfortune, freely administered in 1794, it began to crumble, and in 1795 it had virtually ceased to exist. First the Dutch Netherlands were overrun by the French armies and placed under French administration; secondly, Prussia, jealous of Austria, and with her treasury exhausted and her people tired of the war, made a separate peace with France by the Treaty of Basel on April 5, 1795; thirdly, Spain, alarmed at the growing naval and colonial power of Britain, came to terms with the Republic in July 1795. Tuscany had already made peace in February. In the autumn of that year only Britain, Austria, and Sardinia were maintaining any sort of resistance to the victorious Revolutionaries. Early in 1796, as the result of an overwhelming attack by Napoleon Bonaparte, Sardinia was compelled to buy peace by the formal cession of Savoy and Nice (May 15, 1796), and on October 11 a treaty was signed between France and Naples. Britain and Austria, though nominally allies, henceforth waged separate campaigns, one on the sea, the other on land. The crushing defeat of Austria by

Bonaparte in the campaigns of 1796-7 forced her to make peace at Campo Formio in October 1797. The Papal States had made peace in February 1797 and Portugal in August. Thus Great Britain remained alone in arms against France. The First Coalition was dissolved by the military might of the French, assisted by the treachery, selfishness, incompetence, and half-heartedness of the Allies themselves. For two years the French had leisure from strife in Europe. They used the period to carry through some sweeping changes in their own country, to organize their conquests into a series of subject republics, and to embark on the oriental adventure which came to grief in the Bay of Aboukir (1798) and before the walls of Acre (1799). Pitt, meantime, was busily engaged in trying to construct a second coalition.¹

II. THE SECOND COALITION AGAINST FRANCE, 1799

The desire of Pitt to secure allies for Great Britain in her protracted struggle with France was entirely in accord with the wishes of the Tsar Paul I, who had succeeded to the Russian throne in 1796. The Tsar, who detested the principles of the French Revolution, and was intensely irritated by Bonaparte's occupation of Malta in 1798—for shortly after the surrender, Paul had been elected Grand Master of the Knights of St. John—was much alarmed by the French invasion of Egypt and the general menace to the integrity of Turkey.

¹ The leading treaties relating to the formation and dissolution of the first coalition will be found in Martens, *Recueil des Traités*, vol. v, and in G. de Garden, *Histoire générale des Traités*, Paris, 1848-87 vol. v. For a brief résumé of those relating to Great Britain, see T. H. Dyer, *Modern Europe* (3rd ed.), London, 1901, vol. v, pp. 109-110.

Early in 1798 he had tried to get Austria and Prussia to join him in a combination hostile to France. Prussia persisted in her neutrality, but Austria entered into a treaty the precise date and details of which have never been divulged.¹ On December 23, 1798, a Russo-Turkish alliance against France was concluded;² and six days later an agreement was reached between Russia and Great Britain,³ which was developed on January 2, 1799, by Britain's accession to the Russo-Turkish pact.⁴

Meantime, Ferdinand of Naples, much perturbed by the French occupation of Rome, had been engaged in secret negotiations with Austria. These had culminated in a treaty concluded on May 19, 1798.⁵ This treaty was supplemented by agreements with Russia on November 29, 1798,⁶ with Great Britain on December 1, 1798,⁷ and with the Porte on January 21, 1799. Thus Naples became a full member of the Coalition. Portugal also gave her adhesion,⁸ but she played no active part in the ensuing war.

The Second Coalition proved to be even more ephemeral than the first, for its main cohesive element was no more than the erratic will of the semi-insane autocrat Paul I. Paul soon became violently dissatisfied with the conduct of his allies; he blamed them for the severe sufferings of the Russian troops which he sent to aid in the expulsion of the French from Italy and Switzerland; he accused them of slackness, incompetence, and treachery; finally he withdrew from the Coalition in

¹ Cf. Garden, *Traité*s, *op. cit.* p. 147.

² Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 532.

³ Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 557.

⁴ Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 568.

⁵ Garden, *Traité*s, vol. vi, p. 79.

⁶ Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 524.

⁷ Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 528.

⁸ Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. vi, p. 536.

1800. Austria, deprived of Russian support, was crushingly defeated at Marengo and Hohenlinden, and was forced to make peace with France in the Treaty of Lunéville (February 9, 1801).

Once more Great Britain was left virtually alone to face the vastly increased power and prestige of victorious France. She continued the struggle with but scanty assistance from Turkey, Naples, and Portugal. Turkey signed preliminaries of peace on August 30, 1801, and a definitive peace on January 25, 1802. Naples made peace on March 28, 1801; Portugal on September 29, 1801; and Britain, in order to escape from what appeared to be stalemate, concluded with her enemy the general Peace of Amiens (March 27, 1802). Before, however, this pacification occurred, Britain herself had had to deal with a hostile combination of Powers euphemistically termed 'the Armed Neutrality'.

III. THE ARMED NEUTRALITY, 1800

During the whole period of the war with Revolutionary France, Great Britain had persisted in maintaining her old-established practice of searching neutral vessels on the high seas and taking from them any enemy goods which they were found to contain; she further refused to abandon this right even though the neutral vessels were convoyed by warships of the Government whose flag they flew. This 'right of search' claimed and enforced by Britain, coupled with the aggravation of her refusal to recognize any privilege of immunity from search in virtue of official convoy, greatly incensed the Baltic Powers; and, so early as March 27, 1794, Denmark and Sweden formed an alliance to maintain the 'freedom of the seas',¹ and incidentally to

¹ Martens, *Recueil*, vol. v (2nd ed.), p. 274.

close the Baltic. Their protests and resistance, however, were ineffective. Neither Britain nor France modified her maritime practice; and the rights of neutrals to trade with belligerents were reduced to very narrow limits. Hope of more successful action revived when it became known that the Tsar Paul was breaking away from the Second Coalition, and that he was filled with anger against his allies in general and Great Britain in particular. Denmark and Sweden seized the occasion to foment his fury; and in August 1800 they were rewarded by receiving an invitation, in which Prussia as a Baltic Power was included, to a conference at St. Petersburg. The diplomatists on their arrival at St. Petersburg found that a plan for joint action had been drawn up for them in advance by the Tsar and his minister Rostopchin. A few days' discussion sufficed to organize the Armed Neutrality, which was cemented by a series of treaties signed December 16-18, 1800. The four Baltic Powers agreed to maintain the principles (1) that neutrals may freely trade with belligerents, (2) that free ships make free goods, (3) that a blockade to be valid must be effective, (4) that convoy gives immunity from search.¹

As it was known that Great Britain could not in 1800, any more than in 1780, accept the principles thus laid down by the Baltic Powers, they prepared for war. The British reply was to send a fleet into the Sound, and to destroy the Danish fleet in the battle of Copenhagen (April 1, 1801). It was not, however, this or any other military event that broke up the Armed Neutrality. Its disintegration was due to the assassination of the Tsar Paul, which (although the fact was unknown to the fleets that battled at Copenhagen) had already taken

¹ Martens, *Recueil*, vol. vii (2nd ed.), pp. 172 sqq.; Garden, *Traité*, vol. vi, pp. 303 sqq.; J. E. von Goertz, *Mémoire sur la Neutralité armée*, Basle, 1801; *Collection of Public Acts and Papers relating to the Principle of Armed Neutrality*, London, 1801.

place, on March 24, 1801, at the Mikhailovsky Palace. The new Tsar, Alexander I, completely reversed his father's policy. He made a Convention with Britain on June 17, 1801, in which he recognized her claims to search and seizure. Denmark and Sweden, being powerless to stand against Britain without Russian support, gave their assent to the Anglo-Russian agreement, in documents dated October 23, 1801, and March 30, 1802, respectively. The Armed Neutrality was at an end.¹

IV. THE THIRD COALITION AGAINST FRANCE, 1805-6

The Peace of Amiens, which in 1802 brought the Revolutionary War to a close, was of but short duration. For Napoleon seized the opportunity afforded by the cessation of hostilities to effect extensions of French influence vaster than had been possible in the years of war. He secured military occupation of the Batavian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics; he forcibly annexed Piedmont; he compelled the Duke of Parma to surrender his territory; he became 'mediator', i.e. virtually dictator, in the Helvetic Republic; he dispatched a mission under Sebastiani to the East, which, though nominally commercial, seemed clearly to foreshadow a renewal of the attempt to secure control of Egypt and the Ionian Isles. In these circumstances Britain made counter-demands which, after acrimonious discussion, eventually led to a formal declaration of war on the part of the British Government on May 18, 1803.

For nearly two years the war was a Franco-British duel; but in 1805 both sides began to build up alliances. Napoleon on his side, by the exercise of a good deal of

¹ A good short summary of the events of this period is given in *Camb. Mod. Hist.*, vol. ix, pp. 34-54.

pressure, acquired the reluctant aid of Spain, Bavaria, and Württemberg. Pitt, on the other hand, while the British fleets safeguarded the United Kingdom from invasion, was busy constructing his third coalition. He discovered that some of the foundations had already been laid for him. For on May 24, 1804, Sweden, alarmed at the French occupation of George III's Electorate of Hanover, had made a military convention with Russia designed to stop further French aggression in northern Europe.¹ Similarly Austria, gravely disturbed by the enlargement of Napoleon's power in Italy, had concluded, on November 6, 1804, an agreement with Russia according to which any new attempt of Napoleon (who had just proclaimed himself Emperor) to extend his sphere of influence should be met with joint resistance by the two Powers.²

Pitt hastened to get into touch with the three Powers who thus independently of Britain had entered into pacts hostile to Napoleon. The result was the formation of the Third Coalition by means of treaties with Sweden (October 3, 1805) and Russia (April 11, 1805), and the accession of Austria (August 9, 1805).³ Strong efforts were made to secure the adhesion of Prussia; but the weak and ill-advised Frederick William III was lured into inactivity by Napoleon, who dangled before him the bait of the Electorate of Hanover, combined with further extension of territory in Poland and commercial advantages,

¹ Garden, *Traités*, vol. viii, p. 385.

² Garden, *Traités*, vol. viii, p. 397.

³ Garden, *Traités*, vol. viii, pp. 318 sqq., and Martens, *Recueil*, vol. viii, pp. 330 sqq. The Powers made great efforts to draw Naples into the Coalition; and, in spite of her expressed desire to remain neutral, she so far compromised herself as to become the object of Napoleon's attack. It does not appear, however, that she was ever a member of the Coalition; and on September 21, 1805, she made a treaty with France.

as the price of neutrality. Not until the close of the year, when the Austrian army had suffered the disaster of Ulm, when Prussian territory had actually been violated by French troops, and when conclusive evidence had appeared of Napoleon's bad faith, did Frederick William make up his mind to join Russia, Austria, and Britain in resistance to the common enemy. The Treaty of Potsdam, by which he threw in his lot with the Allies, was concluded on November 3, 1805.¹ The accession of Prussia to the Alliance, however, came too late. Austria was crushed at Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, and was compelled to make a separate peace at Pressburg.² Prussia hastened to do the same (December 15, 1805); but, though Napoleon contemptuously granted peace for the moment, he was resolved on Prussia's destruction. In 1806, by a series of insults and injuries, into the details of which it is needless to enter, he goaded her into a declaration of war and then fell upon her and overwhelmed her at Jena and Auerstädt (October 14, 1806). The Tsar continued the struggle for another six months; but then, disgusted with the inadequacy of the support which he received from Britain, he not only made peace with Napoleon but actually entered into an anti-British alliance with him in the Treaty of Tilsit (July 7, 1807).³ The Third Coalition had crumbled away, and Napoleon was left at the height of his power.

V. LOOSE ALLIANCE AGAINST FRANCE, 1809

Napoleon used the ascendancy in western Europe, which his understanding with Alexander I gave him, to pursue two lines of policy destined ultimately to lead

¹ T. H. Rose, *Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era* (6th ed.), Cambridge, 1907.

² Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. viii. p. 388.

³ Martens, *Recueil* (2nd ed.), vol. viii, p. 637.

to his own overthrow. First, he remodelled the regions under his control—in particular Germany and Italy—carving out of them, regardless of the sentiments of their inhabitants, kingdoms for himself and his brothers and principalities for his generals. Secondly, he organized against his implacable enemy Britain the so-called Continental System, which was intended to sap the sources of her strength by preventing her ships and her goods from entering any port within the territories over which he himself or his confederate Alexander held sway.

Resistance to Napoleon's schemes first manifested itself in the Iberian Peninsula. In the autumn of 1807 Portugal refused to comply with Napoleon's demand that she should not only close her ports to Britain, but should also seize all British subjects found within her borders and confiscate their property. The King of Spain, Charles IV, was persuaded to become an accomplice of Napoleon; he allowed French armies to traverse his territory, and agreed to join the invader in the partition of the Portuguese dominions. He soon, however, paid the penalty of his treachery and folly. For Napoleon, when once he was firmly established in the Peninsula, intervened with decisive violence in the domestic affairs of the Spanish royal house. He forced the abdication first of Charles IV, then of his son Ferdinand, and finally secured the recognition of his own brother Joseph as king of Spain. The Spanish people rose spontaneously in revolt against this usurpation, and joined the Portuguese in appealing to Britain for aid towards the recovery of their national independence. The British Government, after a severe conflict of opinion in the Cabinet, decided to respond favourably to the appeal. Hence the Peninsular War.

During its course, when Napoleon himself, with large numbers of French troops, was occupied in Spain, Austria ventured for the third time to declare war (March 27,

1809). Thus four Powers—Spain, Portugal, Britain, and Austria—were co-operating, though without any formal bond in the shape of treaties, towards the same end, viz. the overthrow of the Napoleonic tyranny. Before the end of the year, however, Austria was once more compelled to make a humiliating surrender. Unaided by other Powers, she was defeated in a series of battles culminating at Wagram (July 6, 1809), and on October 14, 1809, she made the separate and disastrous Peace of Schönbrunn.¹ The defeat of Austria had a serious effect upon the Peninsular War, inasmuch as it released several French armies for employment in Spain. Hence the British forces, with their irregular Portuguese and Spanish auxiliaries, found increased difficulty in carrying out the slow process of wearing down Napoleon's power.

VI. THE FOURTH COALITION AGAINST FRANCE, 1812-14

Napoleon's ascendancy in western Europe during the period following the Treaty of Tilsit was due largely to his understanding with Alexander of Russia. Several causes, however, tended to alienate the two emperors, especially from 1810 onward. Napoleon on his side was offended by the unwillingness of the Russian Court to entertain his idea of a matrimonial alliance between himself and a Russian Princess, and also by the incompleteness with which the 'Continental System' was enforced in the Tsar's dominions. Alexander, for his part, resented the French occupation of the territories of the Duke of Oldenburg, his brother-in-law, and also grew alarmed at the serious dislocation of Russian trade caused by the economic struggle with Britain in which he was engaged at Napoleon's command and for the

¹ Martens, &c., *Nouveau Recueil*, vol. i, p. 210.

sole benefit of Napoleon. A series of negotiations, increasingly unfriendly in character, caused Alexander to determine, early in 1812, that he would take advantage of the absence of 300,000 French troops in the Spanish Peninsula to precipitate a struggle which he saw to be inevitable. By way of preparation for war he made it his first business to form an alliance with Sweden, and this he secured by the Treaty of St. Petersburg (March 24/April 5, 1812), in which he promised to help Sweden to obtain from Denmark, either by negotiation or by force of arms, the cession of Norway.¹ He next turned his attention to Turkey, with whom he was at war, and whose friendship Napoleon was clearly beginning to cultivate. He brought the Russo-Turkish conflict to an end, and frustrated Napoleon's hopes of a Franco-Turkish alliance by the prudent Treaty of Bucarest (May 28, 1812), wherein he agreed to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, which his troops had overrun, in return for Bessarabia and a benevolent neutrality in the impending Franco-Russian war.²

Napoleon by this time was thoroughly alive to the menace of the situation. His military preparations were immense. He compelled both Prussia³ and Austria⁴ to join him and to send contingents to swell the great army destined for the invasion of Russia. He further made large drafts upon the manhood of the peoples whom he held in subjection—Germans of the Confederation of the Rhine, Italians, Poles, Illyrians, Dutch, Swiss, and even a few Spaniards and Portuguese. All these efforts ended in disaster; and the destruction of

¹ Garden, *Traités*, vol. xiii, p. 214.

² Koch and Schoell, *Traités*, vol. xiv, p. 539.

³ By a convention signed 24 February 1812. See Garden, *Traités*, vol. xiii, p. 237.

⁴ By a convention signed 14 March 1812. See Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, vol. i, p. 427.

Napoleon's Grand Army during the retreat from Moscow opened the way for the liberation of Europe. On the basis of the Russo-Swedish Alliance of 1812 was gradually built up that Fourth Coalition which achieved the purpose that had proved to be beyond the power of its predecessors. First, Prussia, in spite of the fact that her fortresses were in the hands of French troops, was emboldened to throw in her lot with Russia by the Treaty of Kalisch (February 16/28, 1813). Secondly, Britain came to terms with Sweden on March 3, 1813. Thirdly, conventions were concluded between Britain on the one hand and Russia and Prussia on the other hand at Reichenbach on June 15/27, 1813. Fourthly, after much careful calculation and much subtle diplomacy, Austria deserted Napoleon and entered into definitive treaties of alliance with Russia and Prussia at Teplitz on September 9, 1813. At the same place a month later (October 3, 1813) Britain made a preliminary treaty of alliance with Austria. Finally, during the closing months of 1813, Austria secured the adhesion of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Saxony, and other members of the crumbling Confederation of the Rhine.¹ The combined forces of the Coalition broke Napoleon's power in the great three-days' battle of Leipzig (October 16-18, 1813); and in 1814 they crossed the Rhine and invaded France itself. Napoleon, however, made so good a fight that at one time it seemed possible that he would reassert his ascendancy and break up the Coalition. In these circumstances its four leading members entered into a new and more definite Quadruple Alliance in the Treaty of Chaumont (March 1, 1814).² This treaty, which was to retain its validity for twenty years, may

¹ For the numerous treaties by means of which this extensive Fourth Coalition was built up, see Koch and Schoell, *Traités*, vol. ix; Garden, *Traités*, vol. xiv; and Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, vol. i.

² Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, vol. i, p. 683.

be regarded as the basis of that clearly defined Concert of Europe which manifested its existence in the Fifth Coalition, the Holy Alliance, the Quadruple Alliance of 1815, and the long series of subsequent European Congresses. The immediate effect was the overthrow of Napoleon, who abdicated on April 11, 1814.¹

VII. THE FIFTH COALITION AGAINST FRANCE, 1815

The downfall of the Napoleonic Empire was followed by the conclusion of the Peace of Paris (May 31, 1814) and by the summoning of the Congress of Vienna which assembled on November 3, 1814. At the Congress many problems were settled easily and harmoniously; but two questions, viz. the fate of Poland and that of Saxony, caused so serious a schism that early in 1815 an outbreak of war seemed to be imminent. These dissensions among the Allies encouraged Napoleon to attempt the recovery of his lost authority over France. His return put an end at once to all dissensions among his enemies. A common declaration was issued at Vienna on March 13, 1815, in which Napoleon was declared an outlaw and a disturber of the repose of the world. On March 25, 1815, a more formal treaty of alliance was drawn up between the four great Allies; each of them agreed to raise and maintain an army of 150,000 men,² and took a pledge not to cease from war until Napoleon should be crushed, deposed, and effectively banished.³

The main part of this agreement was merely a renewal

¹ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, vol. i, p. 696.

² Great Britain had the alternative of paying £30 per head for every man short of her contingent.

³ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, vol. ii, pp. 110 sqq.

of the Treaty of Chaumont of the preceding year. Within a few weeks most of the European Powers had expressed their assent and had joined the anti-Napoleonic Alliance.¹ Long, however, before the vast forces at the disposal of the Allies had been mobilized, the Hundred Days' campaign had been fought, and Napoleon was once again a fugitive. His internment at St. Helena brought to a close his powerful and disturbing influence upon the course of world-politics; and the second Peace of Paris (November 20, 1815) restored tranquillity to Europe. The terms accorded to France were much more severe than those of the first Peace concluded the year before. It was no longer possible to advance the mitigating theory that the French people were the innocent victims of a Corsican tyranny; they had shown a far too general and spontaneous enthusiasm on the return of Napoleon.² Hence it seemed to be necessary not only to mulct them of a heavy indemnity, but also to arrange that for some time to come they should remain under the strict surveillance of the Allies. Thus the close union organized at Chaumont in 1814 and confirmed at Vienna in 1815 was perpetuated and made actively operative in a new Quadruple Alliance, which was signed on the same day as was the Second Peace of Paris,—November 20, 1815.

¹ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, vol. ii, pp. 124 sqq. The dates of the accessions of the various Powers were as follows:—Hanover April 7, 1815; Portugal April 8, 1815; Sardinia April 9, 1815; Bavaria April 15, 1815; Princes and Towns of Germany April 27, 1815; Low Countries April 28, 1815; Baden May 11, 1815; Switzerland May 20, 1815; Hesse May 23, 1815; Saxony May 27, 1815; Württemberg May 30, 1815; Denmark September 1, 1815.

² For a summary of the treaties, see Koch and Schoell, *Traités*, vol. xi, pp. 498 sqq.

VIII. THE HOLY ALLIANCE, 1815

Before this formal alliance of Austria, Britain, Prussia, and Russia was defined and confirmed, another remarkable coalition of a very different kind had been inaugurated by the Tsar Alexander I. Alexander was a man of unbalanced mind, much addicted to moods, and liable to be dominated temporarily by personalities stronger and more extreme than his own. In 1815 the prevailing determinant of his opinions and actions was the Baroness Krudener of Riga, a German mystic, who was genuinely eager to see the affairs of nations governed by the same principles of Christian ethics as those which should regulate the private conduct of individual believers. Under her inspiration, in September 1815, the Tsar proposed to his fellow monarchs assembled in Paris the conclusion of a new and solemn agreement among themselves. They were to pledge themselves 'to manifest to the universe their firm resolution, both in the administration of their respective States and in their political relations with every other Government, to take for their sole guide the precepts of that Holy Religion, namely the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace'. The signatories were further to agree 'on all occasions and in all places to lend each other aid and assistance', and were finally to implore their subjects 'to strengthen themselves every day more and more in the principles and exercise of the duties which the Divine Saviour has taught to mankind'.¹

Frederick William III of Prussia, the close friend and faithful henchman of the Tsar, welcomed with enthusiasm the proposals of the 'Holy Alliance', and on September 26, 1815, appended his signature. On the same day

¹ For the full text, see Martens, *Nouveau Recueil* (1817-42), vol. ii, pp. 656 sqq., and Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. i, p. 317.

Francis of Austria also expressed his adherence. He did it without zeal or understanding, on the advice of Metternich, who regarded the Tsar's project as 'mere verbiage', but felt it desirable not to offend so powerful a ruler by any manifestation of dissent. Thus was the 'Holy Alliance' inaugurated. In due course all the other European potentates were invited to join the sacred association, except the Sultan of Turkey, who could not be expected to pledge either himself or his subjects to the observance of the principles of the Christian religion. All those who were invited intimated their willingness, with or without mental reservations, to enter the alliance, save only George III of England and the Pope. The British Government viewed the whole scheme with profound distrust. Castlereagh described it as 'a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense'. But, though under his advice the Regent refused to pledge the British Crown, the refusal was intimated gently in a letter in which the lofty motives of the Tsar received most flattering recognition.

So far as can be discerned, the Holy Alliance was never operative, and with the death of Alexander, in 1825, it became a mere historical name. It is, however, often confused with the far more important contemporary Quadruple Alliance of 1815, to which we must now return.

IX. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE, 1815

The Holy Alliance was a widely-inclusive association of benevolent despots, who were bent, it appeared, on the realization of a high moral ideal. The Quadruple Alliance was a merely mundane confederation of the four Great Powers who had overthrown Napoleon, and was directed to the severely practical purposes of, first,

permanently excluding the Napoleonic dynasty from the French throne and, secondly, effectively preventing the outbreak of French revolutionary ideas in Europe. By means of it the four Powers perpetuated and organized, for the anticipated period of peace, that close alliance which had originally been instituted for the prosecution of the war against the Corsican usurper. They created a European Tetrarchy and established it in place of the French hegemony which they had attacked and overthrown. But, since the sphere of their joint jurisdiction was wider than that of Napoleon, it is correct to say that never before had Europe been reduced so nearly to the condition of a unitary State as it was by this Treaty of November 20, 1815. The four Powers took the Continent under their protection, expressed themselves as 'uniformly disposed to adopt every salutary measure calculated to secure the tranquillity of Europe', and agreed, in order 'to consolidate the connections which at the present moment so closely unite the Four Sovereigns for the happiness of the world', to renew their meetings 'at fixed periods, either under the immediate auspices of the sovereigns themselves or by their respective ministers, for the purpose of consulting upon their interests or for the consideration of measures which at each of these periods shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe'.¹

Thus was founded at Paris, on the bases laid down at Chaumont and Vienna, that Concert of Europe which for the next seven years kept the Continent under so severe a discipline. Under its auspices were summoned the Congresses of Aix-la-Chapelle, Troppau, Laibach, and Verona. During the intervals between these congresses

¹ For full text, see Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. i, pp. 372-5, and Martens, *Nouveau Recueil* (1817-42), vol. ii, pp. 682 sqq.

the ambassadors of the four Powers resident in Paris formed a sort of permanent or standing committee through which the four Governments could easily and rapidly act in unison. The general control of the Concert and its policy fell into the hands of Metternich, and he used his enormous influence to combat everywhere the principles of the Revolution, viz. democracy and nationality. The harmony and unity of the Concert, however, did not long stand the strain which Metternich's conductorship placed upon it. In 1822 Britain formally dissociated herself from her three colleagues, protesting against the principle of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States. In 1827 Russia was forced to separate herself from Austria and Prussia in order that she might act in defence of the Greeks, who were threatened with extinction by the Turks.

X. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE ON BEHALF OF THE GREEKS, 1827

It was the disunion rather than the union of the Powers that in 1827 led to the Triple Alliance, which, in effect, established the independence of Greece. Russia, under Alexander's brother and successor Nicholas, was the one Power that on religious grounds was resolute to intervene to save orthodox Christians from extirpation at the hands of the infidel. Britain and France joined her, partly at any rate because their politicians were suspicious of Russia, and determined that, if she were to act at all, she should not act alone. But diplomacy could not, in the face of growing public opinion in London and other capitals, ignore the claims of the Greek people; and practical help was given by Philhellenes from England, France, and Italy. The sentiment aroused by the appeal of the Greeks and their supporters, such as Byron,

to the ancient glories of their land certainly counted for much in the struggle, and acquired for them a sympathy which would not have been readily accorded to an unknown subject people revolting against its oppressors.

In 1821 the Greeks had first risen in revolt. They had taken the Turks by surprise at a time when they were fully occupied in suppressing a serious rebellion in Albania on the part of Ali Pacha of Janina. Thus they had been able to secure possession of the Morea and to destroy in a general massacre its Turkish inhabitants. The Turks had replied by sanguinary reprisals on the Greeks scattered throughout their dominions, and had further outraged the Orthodox religion and insulted the Russian flag. Thus Russia was roused to protest and to threaten intervention. Both Austria and Britain tried to keep her from precipitate action—Austria because of sympathy with the Sultan, Britain because of a desire to maintain the integrity of Turkey. When, however, in 1824, Mehemet Ali of Egypt sent an expedition to aid the Sultan in the suppression of the Greek revolt, and when, in 1825, his troops began systematically to waste the Morea with fire and sword, it was no longer possible to hold Russia back. Great Britain accordingly decided that she must act in conjunction with the Tsar.

In 1826 conversations took place between the two Powers, which resulted in the protocol of St. Petersburg (April 4, 1826). According to this document the two Powers were to offer their mediation and were to endeavour to persuade the Turks to reduce their control over Greece to a nominal suzerainty.¹ The Turks, secretly instigated by Austria, refused to accept mediation or to surrender the exercise of their sovereignty over the Morea. Thus, reluctantly, Great Britain was brought to see that coercion, or at any rate a threat of coercion,

¹ Hertslet, *Map of Europe*, vol. i, p. 741.

must be applied. Accordingly a summons was sent out to the four Powers, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France, to send representatives to a new conference to be held in London in July 1827. Austria and Prussia emphatically declined an invitation which portended so flagrant a violation of the old British principle of non-intervention. The three remaining Powers met, accepted the general principles of the protocol of April 1826, and decided 'to secure the autonomy of Greece under the suzerainty of the Sultan, but without breaking off friendly relations with the Porte'.

The Treaty of London embodying these resolutions was signed on July 6, 1827.¹ A joint naval demonstration was decided upon. The result was the battle of Navarino (October 20, 1827), which, by destroying the Turkish and Egyptian command of the sea, made the success of the Greek revolution possible. On August 8 Canning, the British Prime Minister, had died, and his place had been taken by Wellington, who strongly disapproved of this Greek adventure. He deplored Navarino as an 'untoward event', and apologized to the Sultan. But the result of the battle was nevertheless generally welcomed, and the British admiral was decorated. Neither England nor France took any further official part in the conclusion of the campaign. Russia, however, declared war on Turkey in 1828, and compelled her in the end to accept the Peace of Adrianople (September 14, 1829), which recognised the independence of Greece.² On February 3, 1830, the protocols establishing an independent Greek State were signed by Great Britain, France, and Russia, which have ever since been regarded as the three 'Protecting Powers' of the new kingdom.

¹ Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. i, p. 769.

² Hertslet, *Map of Europe*, vol. ii, p. 813, and Martens, *Nouveau Recueil* (1817-42), vol. viii, p. 143.

XI. THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE CONCERNING PORTUGAL,
1834

Before the problem of Greek independence had been settled, constitutional crises had arisen in both kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula. In 1826 John VI, the mild and liberal ruler of Portugal, had died and had been succeeded by his son Pedro, Emperor of Brazil. Pedro, however, had no desire to leave his American dominions. Hence, after taking formal possession of the Portuguese throne, he abdicated in favour of his youthful daughter Maria da Gloria, at the same time appointing his younger brother Miguel regent. In 1828 Miguel usurped the throne and drove Maria to seek refuge in England. Miguel's despotism and cruelty, however, kept alive in Portugal the flame of resistance which the means that he had employed to secure the crown had roused. British sympathies, for both personal and constitutional reasons, were strongly on the side of Maria. In 1831 Pedro left Brazil in order to take up his daughter's cause in Europe.

Two years later, while as yet the Portuguese conflict was undecided, the reactionary Ferdinand VII of Spain died. He left no sons; but, by means of a pragmatic sanction setting aside the Salic Law, he had secured the succession to his young daughter Isabella, for whom her mother Queen Cristina was to act as regent. But for this revocation of the Salic Law the succession would have passed to Ferdinand's brother, Carlos. Carlos, accordingly, refused to recognize the validity of Ferdinand's pragmatic sanction, and, supported by clericals and absolutists, claimed the crown. Cristina was forced to pose as a constitutional ruler, and to seek the aid of secularists and Liberals. Thus in 1833 the Carlist War broke out.

Carlos in Spain found a natural ally in Miguel of Portugal, and both of them looked for sympathy and aid to the absolutist rulers of Russia, Prussia, and Austria. On the other side Maria of Portugal made common cause with Cristina of Spain, and both of them appealed for assistance to Britain (then under the Liberal ministry of Earl Grey) and to France (where the constitutional government of Louis Philippe had been established in 1830). A Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, France, Spain, and the Government of Queen Maria was concluded on April 22, 1834, in virtue of which British, French, and Spanish forces entered Portugal on behalf of Maria, overthrew Miguel, and restored the constitutional régime.¹ In Spain the alliance was less effectual, as both Britain and France declined to give direct help to the Cristinos.

XII. QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE AGAINST MEHEMET ALI, 1840

The cordial relations which existed between Britain and France in 1834 in reference to the affairs of the Iberian Peninsula were not destined to endure. At the very time when the Spanish and Portuguese troubles were at their height, the Near East was embroiled by the ambitious activities of Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. This man, an Albanian adventurer who had risen to power during the period of anarchy which had followed Napoleon's invasion, had placed the Sultan Mahmoud II under heavy obligations by the aid which he had sent to him in his struggle with the revolted Greeks in 1824. The intervention of Russia, France, and Britain, however, had neutralized Mehemet's support, and the Sultan was reluctant to grant the exorbitant demands of the

¹ *Camb. Mod. Hist.*, vol. x, p. 336.

ally who was nominally his subject. Mehemet claimed Syria for himself and Damascus for his son Ibrahim. On the refusal of the Sultan to make these cessions an Egyptian army overran Syria and pressed on through Asia Minor towards Constantinople. After suffering three serious defeats the Sultan appealed to the Powers. Russia responded favourably, but, after giving assistance, which compelled Mehemet Ali to withdraw from Asia Minor and to make peace,¹ she took advantage of the situation to make with Turkey the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi (July 8, 1833), which practically converted Turkey into a Russian protectorate. The Sultan Mahmoud strongly resented this sacrifice of his independence, and he was encouraged in the hope of recovering it by the British Ambassador, Stratford Canning (afterwards Lord Stratford de Redcliffe). But still more strongly did he resent the rebellion of Mehemet Ali, which had been the cause of his humiliation, and he bent his first energies to compass Mehemet's fall. In April 1839 he invaded Syria, but Mehemet Ali was ready for the attack. Once again he utterly defeated the Turkish army and gathered his forces for a counter-assault upon his suzerain. At this crisis Mahmoud died (June 30, 1839), and the hour of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire seemed to have arrived. France, under Louis-Philippe and his minister Thiers, was inclined to welcome the prospect, believing that Mehemet Ali would make good his ascendancy in the eastern Mediterranean, and that French interests required his recognition and support; it was in some degree a revival of Napoleonic ideas. The other Great Powers, however, took a different view. They dreaded the European conflict which the disappearance of Turkey would inevitably involve, and they determined to put a stop to Mehemet's victorious career.

¹ Convention of Kiutayeh, 5 May 1833.

Hence, by the Convention of London, signed July 15, 1840, Russia, Austria, Prussia, and Britain formed the Quadruple Alliance, whose objects were, first, to restrict Mehemet Ali's power and jurisdiction to Egypt;¹ secondly, to establish a joint guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The Quadruple Alliance was effective. Mehemet was reduced, and the new Sultan, Abdul-Medjid, established upon his throne. France was bitterly aggrieved by this 'new Treaty of Chaumont', which had thus culminated for her in a 'diplomatic Waterloo'; and at one moment a European war seemed imminent. But the danger passed; Thiers resigned; and the more cautious Guizot took his place.²

XIII. THE ALLIANCE AGAINST RUSSIA, 1854

Anglo-Russian co-operation in the suppression of Mehemet Ali greatly improved the relations between the two countries whose friendship had been strained as a result of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi. The improvement, however, did not continue for long. Russia resented the attitude of Palmerston towards the Poles, and his bullying of Greece in the famous Don Pacifico case. Palmerston, for his part, did not conceal his suspicion of Russian designs in the Near East, or his general unfriendliness towards the despotic Tsar Nicholas I. Meantime France discovered causes of her own for a quarrel with Russia. In 1848 the monarchy of Louis-Philippe fell; and the Second Republic was founded under the presidency of Louis Napoleon. In 1852 he

¹ If he were to make submission to the Allies within ten days he should be allowed to retain Syria for life. He did not submit, and therefore was expelled.

² See *Camb. Mod. Hist.*, vol. x, pp. 545 sqq.; E. de Cadalvène and E. Barrault, *Deux Années de l'Histoire d'Orient*, Paris, 1840.

converted the Republic into an Empire, and took the title 'Napoleon III'. The Tsar of Russia refused to recognize the upstart as a 'brother', and declined to admit the dynastic claims implicit in the number 'III'. Napoleon did not hide his chagrin. Soon a more serious source of friction developed on the question of the guardianship and control of the Holy Places in Jerusalem. The French, as representatives of the Catholic Church, claimed possession under the terms of capitulations signed in 1740; Russia, as representative of the Orthodox Church, based a counter-claim on the more recent Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774). Britain—and particularly Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, her ambassador in Constantinople—lent support to France, and encouraged the Sultan to resist the Russian demands, because of a firm conviction that the Russian claims to the Holy Places really veiled large designs for the establishment of Russian dominance over the Turkish Empire. Hence, after a long diplomatic duel with Lord Stratford, the Russian envoy (Prince Menschikoff) broke off negotiations and a Russo-Turkish war began (May 1853). In June the Russians invaded the Danubian Principalities, an act which evoked emphatic protests not only from France and Britain but also from Austria and Prussia. Russia, alarmed at this chorus of condemnation, agreed to discuss the situation at a Conference in Vienna (August 1853), and on this occasion showed herself much more moderate and reasonable than she had done in her direct dealings with the Porte. It was the Turk who now was obstinate and intractable. In spite of the efforts of his friends, he formally declared war on Russia (October 4, 1853), and this provoked the Tsar into that crossing of the Danube which he had been told would be the signal for a general European struggle (January 1854). Even more alarming to Britain and France were the naval operations of the Russians in the Black Sea. These two Powers accordingly broke off

relations with Russia in February, entered into an alliance with Turkey on March 12, and formally declared war on March 27, 1854.¹ Prussia, whose policy at the time was directed by the singularly feeble and irresolute Frederick William IV, held aloof. Austria demanded from Russia the evacuation of the Principalities, and, if the Russians had continued to hold them, would probably have joined the offensive alliance against her. The Turks, however, showing unexpected vigour, cleared them with some assistance from French and English forces, and Austria contented herself with the conclusion of a merely defensive alliance (December 2, 1854).² The surprising and unanticipated entry of Sardinia on January 26, 1855,³ completed the anti-Russian coalition. Sardinia had no cause of quarrel with Russia, and no special affection for Turkey. Her entry was due to the fact that her great statesman Cavour wished to give Sardinia a place in the Concert of Europe, to enable her to make her voice heard at the Peace Congress, and to establish on her behalf a claim to the gratitude and sympathy of France and Britain, which might be of use in her approaching conflict with Austria.

The course and the conclusion of the Crimean War are well known. The struggle was terminated by the Peace of Paris signed on March 30, 1856;⁴ and therewith the coalition came to an end.

¹ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil, Continuation* (1843-75), vol. xv, p. 565.

² Martens, *Nouveau Recueil, Continuation* (1843-75), vol. xv, p. 600.

³ Bolton King, *History of Italian Unity*, London, 1899, vol. ii, pp. 5 sqq.

⁴ Hertlet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. ii, p. 1250, and Martens, *Nouveau Recueil, Continuation* (1843-75), vol. xv, p. 770.

XIV. THE *DREIKAISERBUENDNISS*, 1872

The fifteen years which followed the conclusion of the Crimean War were marked by changes of the most profound and revolutionary character in western and central Europe. The empire of Napoleon III, which even in 1856 seemed to have attained a position somewhat resembling that of Napoleon I, reached the height of its splendour and power in 1860. From that date it declined; for in dealing with the problems of Poland (1863), Mexico (1864), Italy and Germany (1866), Napoleon III manifested that 'great but concealed incompetence' which Bismarck had detected in him from the first. While France drifted towards the *débâcle* of 1870, Prussia rapidly increased in might and influence. In 1858 the feeble intellect of Frederick William IV gave way, and his vigorous soldier-brother, William, became regent on his behalf; in 1861 William succeeded as king. Under the guidance and inspiration of Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, in spite of strenuous opposition from the Prussian Parliament, the Prussian army was reorganized, and preparations were made to effect by force the unification of Germany under Prussian headship. This object was attained in the three wars against Denmark, Austria, and France. The proclamation of the German Empire at Versailles in 1871 signalized not only the unification, but also the Prussification, of Germany.

The new Empire, by reason of its strength, at once took a front place among European Powers, for it was evident that nothing except an extensive coalition could overthrow it. Bismarck's main preoccupation after 1871 was to prevent the formation of such a hostile coalition. He realized that the reconstituted Germany needed rest and peace above all things, in order that she

might complete her internal cohesion, settle her relations with the Church, and deal effectively with the menace of Socialism. Bismarck, of course, perceived clearly that no reconciliation with France was possible; the humiliations and spoliations of 1870-1 had imposed an insuperable and apparently everlasting barrier in the way of any Franco-German *rapprochement*. No impassable obstacle, however, divided Germany from any other Power; and Bismarck desired to establish good relations with all, so that France might be diplomatically isolated. With no countries was Bismarck more anxious to come to terms than with Austria and Russia. He dreaded lest the memory of the kindred defeats of 1866 and 1870 should draw Austria and France, the two victims of Prussian militarism, together. Still more did he fear a Franco-Russian alliance, which might crush Germany as in a vice. Hence, cleverly concealing divergences of interests, and displaying questions on which the views of the three Governments agreed, Bismarck arranged that the three Kaisers—William I of Germany, Alexander II of Russia, and Francis Joseph of Austria-Hungary—should meet at Berlin and come to a mutual understanding. The meeting took place in September 1872, and resulted in what is called the *Dreikaiserbündniss*. Perhaps the term *Dreikaiserverhältniss* would have been more appropriate; for there appears to have been no formal contract, the settlement being merely a personal agreement among the three autocrats; thus it closely resembled the Holy Alliance of 1815. It was directed (1) to the suppression of the 'Revolution', which in 1872 meant antagonism to the spread of Socialism; (2) to the prevention of boundary disputes between the three empires; and (3) to the joint consideration and determination of the vexed problems of the Near East. The conclusion of the *Dreikaiserbündniss* was a triumph for Bismarck. It left France in complete isolation, and

it gave to the new German Empire that external security which was necessary for the working out of the numerous internal questions raised by the sudden transformations of the previous eight years.

XV. THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE, 1882

Bismarck's ideal was to maintain an equal friendship with both Vienna and St. Petersburg. But, during the decade that followed the conclusion of the *Dreikaiserbündniss*, this ideal became increasingly difficult of realization. Russia and Germany differed radically in their attitudes towards France; Russia and Austria had irreconcilably conflicting interests in the Balkans. The first serious strain upon the friendship of the three emperors came in 1875, when the rapid recovery of France from the blows of 1870-1, and the formidable increase of her military power, caused the German General Staff sufficient anxiety to incline them to a new war. Warning of the impending danger to the peace of Europe reached the ears of Alexander II, who (in conjunction with Queen Victoria) brought such pressure to bear upon the German Emperor as to prevent the projected attack.

Three years later Bismarck found himself compelled to choose definitely between Austria-Hungary and Russia. The conclusion of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 saw the summons of a European Congress to discuss the settlement of Balkan problems at Berlin. Although Bismarck professed to act as an 'honest broker' free from distorting prejudices and distracting interests, he used his influence to lessen the fruits of Russia's victory and to increase the prizes of Austria's inactivity. The Russian representatives went away from Berlin furious at the frustration of their hopes and alienated from both Germany and Austria. In these circumstances Germany

and Austria concluded in secret a defensive alliance specially intended to guard them from an attack by Russia. This alliance, signed at Vienna on October 7, 1879, remained operative down to 1918. Its existence was publicly announced for the first time in November 1887, and its terms were made known on February 3, 1888.¹

The Austro-German alliance of 1879 was 'the solid and probably unbreakable core' of the Triple Alliance of 1882. This alliance was completed by the accession of Italy. That Italy should thus join herself in an unequal yoke with her ancient enemy, Austria (who still held in her grasp the *Italia Irredenta* of Trentino and Istria), was remarkable, but not unintelligible. Italy dreaded a great ultramontane effort to recover Rome for the Papacy; and an alliance with Austria seemed the surest means of preventing it. Further, she was alarmed at the spread of revolutionary Socialism; and Austrian aid seemed to be the surest safeguard against its perils. Finally, she was eager to extend her power and to open up markets for her produce on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, and she was intensely irritated by the French occupation of Tunis (a region which she had marked out for herself) in 1881. Thus to check the French, the Clericals, and the Socialists she forgot her old enmities, abandoned her natural friendships, and on May 20, 1882, joined the Central Empires. The Triple Alliance was originally entered into for five years. It was renewed in 1887, 1891, 1896, 1902, and 1912.²

Two years after the conclusion of the Triple Alliance,

¹ The German text is given in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, 2nd ser. (1876-1908), vol. xv, p. 477; English translations are to be found in the *Annual Register*, 1888; Mowat's *Select Documents*, p. 20; and J. R. H. O'Regan's *German War*, London, 1915, p. 27.

² The terms of the Triple Alliance remained secret until the time when Italy denounced the alliance and entered into the recent war

viz. on March 21, 1884, the alliance of the Three Emperors was renewed, as a result of their meeting at Skiernewicze, Austria, Germany, and Russia entering into a secret agreement that, in the event of any of them being attacked, the others should maintain a benevolent neutrality. This pact was revived, between Russia and Germany alone, in the secret treaty of November 18, 1887, known as the *Rückversicherungsvertrag*.¹

XVI. THE TRIPLE ENTENTE, 1907

Both the Dual Alliance of 1879 and the Triple Alliance of 1882 were defensive only. They were not incompatible with the treaty which Bismarck made with Russia in 1887. German policy, however, which remained on the whole pacific so long as the Emperor William lived, and during the brief reign of his son, the Emperor Frederick (March–June 1888), became warlike and provocative on the accession of the present Emperor, William II. After the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890, a *Weltpolitik* was developed markedly different from that of the old Chancellor. The Emperor refused to renew the Russian agreement; he cultivated the friendship of the Turkish Sultan; he eagerly fostered German colonial, commercial, and maritime expansion; he alarmed all his neighbours by his militant speeches and his military preparations.

In these circumstances the neighbours of Germany, who had been kept in impotent separation by Bismarck's skilful but unscrupulous diplomacy, began to draw on the side of the Western Allies. Three clauses of the treaty, viz. 3, 4, and 7, were revealed by Austria in the *Vossische Zeitung*, 27 May 1915, and were published in translation by *The Times*, 1 June 1915. They are reprinted in O'Regan's *German War*, pp. 28–29, and in *Austria Hungary, &c.*, No. 1 of this series, p. 122. On the Reinsurance Treaties, cf. pp. 77–79 of the same.

¹ See C. Grant Robertson, *Bismarck*, London, 1918, Appendix B.

together in instinctive desire for mutual defence. First Russia and France came to terms. Important steps in the gradual rapprochement were (1) the Russian Loan taken up by French financiers in 1888; (2) the visit of the French fleet to Cronstadt in 1891, together with the return visit of the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893; (3) the visit of the Tsar Nicholas II to Paris in 1896, followed by the return visit of the French President, Faure, to St. Petersburg in 1897. On this last occasion the fact was revealed that an actual alliance had been concluded between the French Republic and the Muscovite Empire. The treaty was drafted in 1891, and the Military Convention was signed in December 1893.¹

At the time when this Dual Alliance was announced to the world, Great Britain was on bad terms with both France and Russia. As to France, there were old-standing causes of friction in respect of Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, and Senegambia. As to Russia, serious conflicts had threatened in regard to rival claims in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. With Germany, on the other hand, British relations were good, in spite of the fact that the famous 'Kruger telegram' of the Kaiser (1896) had surprised and alarmed the nation. The Boer War, however, which broke out in 1899, confirmed the suspicion that Germany, once so friendly to Britain, had become violently hostile; and responsible statesmen realized that Britain's 'splendid isolation' was in fact extremely perilous. The result was that a settlement of all causes of dispute was effected with France in 1904;² and that an agreement was reached with Russia in regard to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet in 1907.³

¹ See The French Yellow Book *L'Alliance Franco-Russe*, 1918.

² See treaties, signed 8 April 1904, in Parliamentary Papers, 1904, France, No. 1.

³ See treaty, signed 31 August 1907, in Parliamentary Papers, 1907, Treaty Series, No. 34.

None of the treaties of 1904 and 1907 had direct reference to European affairs. They merely removed old sources of friction in other parts of the world. Nevertheless they cleared the way for the establishment of an *Entente Cordiale* of far-reaching efficacy. The new spirit of friendship and co-operation between Britain, France, and Russia was manifested in the Balkan crisis of 1908, and in the Agadir crisis of 1911. It was evident that, opposed to the Triple Alliance, there had come into existence a new 'diplomatic group' which, though bound by no formal ties, was held together by the menace of German militarism.

XVII. THE BALKAN LEAGUE, 1912

In these conditions of unstable equilibrium, any disturbance of the European balance was fraught with extreme danger. The first actual breach of the peace was made by Italy in 1911. Protesting against the treatment of her subjects in Tripoli, she declared war upon Turkey, and after a year of conflict forced the Sultan to make peace by the cession of Tripoli.¹ The whole episode was distasteful to the Central Empires. On the one hand it seemed to indicate the crumbling of the Triple Alliance; on the other it resulted in a serious weakening of the Turkish power, which both Austria-Hungary and Germany had been for some time assiduously fostering. The reason why Turkey, who was far from being beaten in Tripoli, made her sudden and complete surrender in October 1912 was that she had just received an ultimatum respecting Macedonia from Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, acting in unison. The Governments of these countries—and particularly M. Geshoff in Bulgaria,

¹ Treaty of Lausanne, 18 October 1912; see Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, 3rd Series (1907-14), vol. vii, pp. 3 sqq.

M. Pashich in Serbia, and M. Venizelos in Greece—had recognized that Turkey's embroilment with Italy presented to them a golden opportunity not only to evict the alien Ottoman power from Europe, but also to place a strong Balkan federation in the way of the formidable Austro-German *Drang nach Osten*, which threatened to reduce the isolated Balkan States in turn to vassalage. The foundation of the Balkan League was laid by a Bulgaro-Serbian treaty signed on February 29/March 13, followed by a military convention concluded on June 19/July 2, 1912. Next came a Greco-Bulgarian treaty completed May 16/29, 1912, supplemented by a military convention on September 22/October 5, 1912.¹ The conclusion of these treaties and conventions was followed by the presentation of the ultimatum and the commencement of the first Balkan war. Montenegro made a treaty with Serbia in September 1912, arranging for military co-operation, and was the first to commence the struggle by a declaration of war against Turkey, issued independently on October 8.

The military success of the League exceeded both the most sanguine hopes of its members and the most gloomy fears of the Central Empires. The collapse of Turkey was rapid and almost complete. The diplomatic intervention of Austria, however, saved her from the extremity of disaster, and shattered the unity of the Balkan League. Austria (supported by Italy) made it clear that Serbia would not be allowed to keep Albania, which she had conquered, or to retain access to the Adriatic. Austria, moreover, encouraged Bulgaria to refuse Serbia's consequent demand for compensation in Macedonia, and increased facilities for

¹ These documents are given with comments in *The Aspirations of Bulgaria*, by 'Balkanicus', an anonymous but obviously well-informed Serbian. An English translation of this work was issued in London in 1915.

access to the Aegean. Hence the disruption of the League, the second Balkan war, the discomfiture of Bulgaria, the recovery of Turkey, and the laying of the train for the world-conflict of 1914.

XVIII. THE AGREEMENT OF LONDON, 1914 AND THE ALLIANCE OF 1914-18

The second Balkan war was terminated by the Treaty of Bucarest on August 10, 1913.¹ Within a week Austria approached Italy and sought her views respecting an immediate attack upon Serbia. Italy declined to be drawn into an aggressive war, and for the moment the project was abandoned, but only for the moment. The greater Serbia was too serious a barrier to Austro-German expansion towards the East to be allowed to consolidate itself. All through the autumn of 1913 and the early part of 1914 military preparations went on, and nothing but a pretext was needed to precipitate a war. That pretext was afforded by the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo on June 28, 1914. The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia was issued on July 23; five days later the first shots were fired.

The Austro-Serbian conflict speedily involved Russia and consequently her ally France. The attitude of Britain was at first uncertain; for she was bound by no formal treaties to come to the aid of either of her two colleagues in the Triple Entente. But various causes, principally the German invasion of Belgium, combined to convert the Entente into a definite military alliance. This was in effect accomplished when Great Britain proclaimed, on August 4, 1914, that a state of war existed. Its formal intimation, however, was reserved for the

¹ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil*, 3rd Series (1907-14), vol. viii, pp. 61 sqq. and Mowat, *Select Treaties*, p. 121.

following month, when (September 5, 1914) the Agreement of London was signed by representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia. It ran ;

‘The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that, when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.’¹

The Triple Alliance thus cemented received, formally or informally, numerous accessions as the war proceeded. The following are the dates of the chief declarations : Serbia, August 6, 1914 ; Montenegro, August 9, 1914 ; Japan, August 23, 1914 ; Italy, May 23, 1915 ; Portugal, March 9, 1916 ; Rumania, August 28, 1916 ; United States of America, April 6, 1917 (speedily followed by Cuba and Panama) ; Greece, June 29, 1917 ; Siam, July 22, 1917 ; China, August 14, 1917 ; Brazil, October 26, 1917. On the other hand the Central Empires were joined by Turkey on or about November 1, 1914, and by Bulgaria on or about October 15, 1915. In 1915 Japan acceded to the Declaration of September 5, 1914 ; and on November 30, 1915, the Declaration was renewed between the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia. During the course of 1917 many Central and South American States broke off relations with Germany without actually proclaiming a state of war.


¹ *French Yellow Book*, No. 160.


AUTHORITIES


- ALBIN, P., *Les grands traités politiques* [from 1815], Paris, 1911.
- GARDEN, G. DE, *Histoire générale des traités de paix, &c.*, 15 vols., Paris, 1848-87.
- HERTSLET, Sir E., *Map of Europe by Treaty*, 4 vols., London, 1875-91.
- KOCH, C. G. DE, and SCHOELL, M. S. F. *Histoire abrégée des traités de paix* [to 1815], 15 vols., Paris, 1817-18, and 4 vols., Brussels, 1837-8.
- MARTENS, G. F. VON, AND OTHERS, *Recueil des principaux traités, etc.* (1761-1801), 2nd ed., 8 vols., Göttingen, 1817-35.
- *Supplément au Recueil, etc.* (1802-8), 4 vols., Göttingen, 1808.
- *Nouveau Recueil, etc.* (1808-39), 17 vols., Göttingen, 1817-42.
- *Nouveaux Suppléments au Recueil, etc.* (1761-1839), 3 vols., Göttingen, 1837-43.
- *Nouveau Recueil, etc. Continuation* (1839-74), 20 vols., Göttingen, 1843-75.
- *Nouveau Recueil, 2me sér.* (1874-97), 35 vols., Göttingen, 1876-1908.
- *Nouveau Recueil, 3me sér.* (1907-14), 8 vols., Leipzig, 1909-15.
- MOWAT, R. B., *Select Treaties and Documents to illustrate the development of the Modern European State-System*, Oxford, 1915.
- OAKES, Sir A., AND MOWAT, R. B., *Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century*, Oxford, 1918.
- O'REGAN, J. R. H., *The German War of 1914, illustrated by Documents of European History, 1815-1915*, Oxford, 1915.

ALPHABETICAL

[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]







LONDON :

PUBLISHED BY H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

To be purchased through any Bookseller, or directly from
H. M. STATIONERY OFFICE at the following addresses :—

IMPERIAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY, LONDON, W.C. 2, and

28 ABINGDON STREET, LONDON, S.W. 1 ;

37 PETER STREET, MANCHESTER ;

1 ST. ANDREW'S CRESCENT, CARDIFF ;

23 FORTH STREET, EDINBURGH ;

or from E. PONSONBY, LTD., 116 GRAFTON STREET, DUBLIN.

1920.

Price 1/- net.