HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 35

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SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE.

1920

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Editorial Note.

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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A LIST OF PLACE NAMES IN SCHLESWIG SHOWING THE DANISH AND GERMAN FORMS.

Danish.	German.	Danish.	German.
Aabenraa ..	Apenrade	Isted	Idstedt
Als	Alsen	Jybæk . ..	Jübek
Amrom ..	Amrum	Jylland ..	Jutland
Asbøl	Atzbüll	Kappel.. .	Kappeln
Bredsted ..	Bredstedt	Langenæs ..	Langeness
Dagebøl ..	Dagebüll	Lygumkloster	Lügumkloster
Danevirke ..	Dannewerk, Danewerk	Nibøl	Niebüll
		Okholm .	Ockholm
Dybbøl ..	Düppel	Pelvorm .	Pellwurm
Eckernførde ..	Eckernförde	Rødding ..	Rödding
Ejder, Eider .	Eider	Rømø	Röm
Eidersted .	Eiderstedt	Sild	Sylt
Femern ..	Fehmarn	Skærbæk ..	Scherrebek
Flensborg ..	Flensburg	Skodborg ..	Schottburg
Før, Føhr ..	Föhr	Slien . ..	Schlei
Frederikstad	Friedrichstadt	Slesvig ..	Schleswig
Gjelting, Gelting	Gelting	Sønderborg .	Sonderburg
Glücksborg ..	Glücksburg	Tinglev ..	Tingleff
Graasteen .	Gravenstein	Tønder . ..	Tondern
Haderslev .	Hadersleben	Tønning ..	Tönning
Halligerne	Die Halligen	Trene, Trei Aa	Treene
Hjoldelund ..	Joldelund	Vid Aa .	Wied Au, Widau
Hollingsted ..	Hollingstätt		
Højer	Hoyer	Vojens . ..	Woyens

In Danish the term Sønderjylland, *i.e.*, South Jutland, is sometimes applied to Schleswig, while the term Utland is used to denote the Frisian coast and islands.

I. GEOGRAPHY PHYSICAL AND POLITICAL

(1) Position and Frontiers

The Prussian province of Schleswig-Holstein consists of the former duchies of Slesvig[1] (which forms the southern half of the Cimbrian Peninsula), Holstein and Lauenburg. It has an area of 19,005 sq. km. (7,338 sq. miles), and is situated between 53° 22′ and 55° 28′ north latitude, and (as regards mainland) between 8° 35′ and 11° 8′ east longitude. The greatest breadth of the province is 95 miles; its greatest length from north to south, 140 miles.

The northern boundary has since 1864 been that between Prussia and Denmark. In the west the province includes various islands, of which the principal are Röm, Sylt, Föhr, Amrum, the Halligen, Pellworm, Nordstrand, and Heligoland. With the exception of Heligoland, which is 30 miles from the coast, these islands are connected with the mainland at low-tide by wide stretches of mud-flats. The chief islands belonging to the province on the east are those of Alsen and Fehmarn. In the south-west the Elbe is the boundary between the province of Schleswig-Holstein and that of Hanover, except for the enclave formed by the free city of Hamburg and its territory, which includes a number of isolated districts. In the south-east a boundary which follows no natural features divides the province from the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the Principality of Ratzeburg (belonging to the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz), the free town of Lübeck (both of which include certain detached areas within Schleswig-Holstein) and the Principality of Lübeck (belonging to the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg).

[1] For the sake of consistency the German form, Schleswig, will henceforward be used in this book.

(2) Surface, Coast, and River System

Surface

The peninsula forms part of the north German plain, reproducing its physical features in miniature, and is therefore divisible into three physical regions.

In the east is a north-to-south line of low wooded hills, studded with numbers of small lakes. The highest hills are found to the south of the chain, in the Wagrien Peninsula, where the Bungsberg and Pilsberg rise to 538 ft. and 420 ft. respectively. From the town of Schleswig to the Baltic the Schlei forms a depression in the upland, and beyond it the low hills continue northward. This strip occupies 32 per cent. of the surface.

To the west lies the Geest, a plain formed of loose sand and gravel. This, the northern continuation of the great Lüneburg Heath, occupies 56 per cent. of the surface, and slopes very gently westward, in three places touching the coast. The eastern boundary of the Geest is not sharply marked, but on the west it ends abruptly, usually in a low cliff, and west of it lies the marshland forming the third region. None of the real marsh is more than 16 feet above, while much is below, sea-level, and it has been protected by dykes from inroads of the sea. West of this marshland occurs a chain of sand-dunes, in places 150 ft. high.

The eastern upland region is the most suitable for cultivation, as the Geest is largely barren heath with boggy moorland in its lower parts. A considerable amount has been reclaimed, but it is still the poorest and most thinly populated district. Poor farming only is carried on in the north of this region, but in the south successful results have been obtained by means of thorough manuring; and in addition there is a certain amount of reclamation forestry. The marshlands, extending along the western rivers as well as the coast, have been reclaimed by dyking and draining, and now provide excellent pasturage.

Coast

The west coast is flat, and its outline at high tide is broken by few indentations, the chief being the Eider estuary and Meldorf Bay. It is fringed, however, by low islands, and by extensive mud flats. The western edge of the islands represents a former coastline, marked by sand-dunes, which was broken up by the sea in historical times. The former western extensions of the present river-beds remain as channels which intersect the flats. Dykes have been built on many of the islands, to prevent further erosion, and considerable areas of the flats have been reclaimed as pasture land.

The nature of this coast renders it extremely difficult to approach from the sea, and there are no harbours of any importance.

The east coast presents a complete contrast to the west. It consists of an alternation of long narrow firths (*Förden*) and rounded peninsulas occasionally ending in islands, while inland the shore rises almost immediately into a series of low hills.

River System

There are in Schleswig-Holstein three drainage areas, including streams flowing respectively to the North Sea, the Elbe, and the Baltic.

A large number of rivers flow parallel westwards into the North Sea, e.g., the Wied Au, the Soholm Au, and the Eider. Of these the most important is the Eider, with a basin of 630 square miles, which rises south of Kiel, flows north and then west with wide sweeping curves, and after 117 miles enters the North Sea at Tönning. Its most important tributary is the Treene, on the right bank. The Eider is embanked from its mouth up to a point 10 miles below Rendsburg.

The Elbe forms the southern boundary of the province from Lauenburg to its mouth. The Elbe valley is generally some ten miles wide. The soil is marshy, but is now drained and protected by dykes. The most

important tributaries of the Elbe in Schleswig-Holstein are the Stör, Pinnau, Alster, and Bille, on the right bank. These flow in a south-westerly direction, and are navigable for small boats.

The majority of the Baltic streams are quite small, but there are three of some importance—the Trave, the Schwentine, and the Schlei. The Trave rises in Lübeck, and flows into the Trave firth which enters Lübeck Bay. The Schwentine drains the lake of Plön and its connexions, and enters Kiel Harbour, while the Schlei joins up a series of long, narrow lakes which occupy the depression between the northern and southern parts of the eastern lowland.

The Schleswig rivers as a rule are sluggish in flow, and are fullest in winter and spring. The Elbe with its tributaries and the North Sea rivers are tidal, the Stör, for instance, having a difference of four feet between high and low water at Itzehoe. Most of the western rivers are embanked in their lower reaches.

(3) Climate

The climate is chiefly determined by the low relief of the country, and the proximity of nearly every part of it to the sea. In consequence there is little difference either of temperature or rainfall in different parts of the country, and the seasonal range of temperature is small—from about 32° F. (0° C.) to 61° F. (16° C.). The rainfall is about 29 inches (736 mm.) fairly evenly distributed throughout the year. In Schleswig the greatest rainfall occurs in August, September, and October, while in the central parts of Holstein July is the wettest month. There is a considerable amount of mist and fog, especially in the autumn, but not much frost or snow.

The prevalent wind is the strong and moist south-westerly, coming from the North Sea. This often reaches the velocity of a gale, and by its strength and saltness injures tree growth in exposed places.

(4) Race and Language

The two duchies into which the province was divided prior to 1864 were radically different as regards race. Holstein formed part of the Low German or Low Saxon district which embraces nearly all Germany north of a line from Aachen to Frankfurt-on-Oder. Schleswig, i.e. the portion of the province north of the river Eider, was, apart from German immigrants, Danish by race, except for a strip along the west coast from Husum northward to a point south of Hoyer, which was Frisian. The Frisian race also occupied the islands off that part of the coast, including Heligoland. Linguistically they belong to the Anglo-Frisian group, and are less closely related to Scandinavians, Dutch, and Germans.

The Frisian language is still spoken in the south-west of *Kreis* Tondern, in the north-west of *Kreis* Husum, and in the islands of Sylt, Föhr, Amrum, Langeness, and Heligoland. As the Frisians are too few in number to form a separate state, the linguistic problem in their case would be of slight importance were it not for the fact that some German writers assume, in defiance of all the facts, that they should be considered as Germans.

The Danish language[1] has in the course of time been supplanted by German (i.e. Low German as spoken in Holstein) in the southern part of the Duchy of Schleswig, the boundary between the languages being now roughly a line running from a point two or three miles north of the town of Flensburg and south-west to Joldelund (Hjoldelund). The line dividing Germans from Frisians is roughly a continuation of the Flensburg-Joldelund line to Bredstedt and the sea. The line dividing the Frisians from the Danes runs roughly north-west from Joldelund to Hoyer. Thus if, on a plebiscite being taken, the Frisians chose to join the Danes, the boundary would be a more or less straight

[1] The Danish dialect spoken in Schleswig differs considerably from literary Danish.

line from Flensburg to Bredstedt. If, on the other hand, they chose to join the Germans, the boundary would take the form of an angle of about 90° with its apex at Joldelund. In this case it is questionable whether a more satisfactory boundary would not be obtained by drawing a straight line from Flensburg to Aventoft, south-east of Hoyer, leaving the triangle between Flensburg, Joldelund, and Aventoft to Germany. The triangle so formed, though predominantly Danish, is sparsely inhabited, and an awkward angle in the frontier would be avoided by its inclusion in Germany. As, however, the existence of the triangle depends on the wishes of the Frisians, and there is no evidence available as to the direction in which their choice would lie, the position of the most satisfactory boundary remains an open question.

The only part of the province in which any other language than German is spoken by any considerable proportion of the inhabitants is thus the area north of the Flensburg-Bredstedt line. The figures according to the German census of 1910 for the *Kreise* of this northern district are as follows, the figures for Danes including those Danes who also have a knowledge of German:—

Kreis.	Danes.	Per cent. of total.	Frisians.	Per cent. of total.	Germans.	Per cent. of total.
Hadersleben (Haderslev)	50,742	79·8	93	0·1	12,203	19·2
Sonderburg (Sønderborg)	28,700	71·9	36	0·1	10,576	26·5
Apenrade (Aabenraa) ..	24,171	74·6	85	0·2	7,809	24·1
Tondern (Tønder) ..	24,245	40·9	12,450	21·0	22,427	37·8
Husum ..	314	0·7	2,950	7·2	37,457	91·1
Flensburg (Flensborg), urban	3,936	6·4	358	0·6	56,074	92·1
Flensburg (Flensborg), rural	2,216	4·9	99	0·2	41,959	94·4

Persistent efforts have been made by the Prussian Government since the annexation in 1864 to suppress

the Danish language. These efforts, as in Prussian Poland, have met with partial success in so far as they have prevented any spread of the Danish language. They have, however, aroused the same organised antagonism on the part of the Danes as on the part of the Poles; and the net result of increasingly arbitrary measures has been a great increase of national solidarity among the Danes.[1]

(5) Population

Distribution

The population of Schleswig-Holstein (1,621,004 in 1910, or about 221 persons to the square mile) is rather denser than that of most parts of Northern Germany, owing partly to the relative fertility of much of its area, but mainly to the existence of the towns of Kiel and Altona, and the close proximity of Hamburg.

Nearly half the population of the province (45 per cent.) is contained in the towns of Kiel and Altona and the three *Kreise*, which, like Altona itself, depend economically on Hamburg (*Kreise* Pinneberg, Steinburg, and Stormarn, with the town of Wandsbek). The rest of the province had in 1910 an average of 132 persons per square mile. This figure, one of the lowest in Germany, is due to the absence of industries other than agriculture and fishing, apart from those existing in the towns of Flensburg, Rendsburg, and Neumünster; and also in part to the large extent of the Geest (see above, p. 2). The average population of the Geest, apart from the *Kreise* of Steinburg and Pinneberg, is only 77 per square mile. In the *Kreise* of Steinburg and Pinneberg, which are more residential and to some extent industrial, the population is considerably higher. The population of the Danish-speaking districts of North Schleswig is somewhat lower than that of the average of the agricultural area (106 per square

[1] See below, pp. 57-9.

mile as opposed to 132) except in *Kreis* Sonderburg (including the island of Alsen) where it is exceptionally high (232 per square mile).

Towns

The relative proportions of persons living in the country and in towns (with a population of over 2,000) were, in 1910, country, 41 per cent.; towns, 59 per cent. The populations in 1910 of the chief towns were: Kiel 211,627, Altona 172,628, Flensburg 60,922, Wandsbek (practically a suburb of Hamburg) 35,212, Neumünster 34,555. Rendsburg (population 17,314) is the chief town on the Kiel Canal. Altogether there are eleven towns in the province with over 10,000 inhabitants, and 33 towns with from 2,000 to 10,000.

Movement

The average yearly increase of population since 1875 has been 1·1 per cent. Since 1895 (the year of the opening of the Kiel Canal) it has been 1·5. The increase has been mainly confined to the towns. In the country it has been steady though small, only one *Kreis* (Oldenburg) showing a tendency to diminish in population. The birth and death rates fell slowly from 1875 to about 1900, and rapidly since then. The excess of births over deaths has remained very nearly constant since 1880. The figures per 1,000 for 1913, including still-born, were—

	Births.	Deaths.	Excess of births.
Schleswig-Holstein	26·1	13·4	12·7
Kingdom of Prussia	29·0	15·8	13·2

II. POLITICAL HISTORY

Chronological Summary

1326 Constitution of Waldemar.
1460 Christian I of Denmark becomes Duke of Schleswig and Count of Holstein.
1533 Death of Frederick I of Denmark.
1544 Partition of the Duchies with the Gottorp branch of the Royal House.
1665 The *Lex Regia*.
1767 Catherine II renounces Holstein-Gottorp claims in Schleswig.
1773 The renunciation confirmed.
1779 Both Duchies under the Crown of Denmark.
1806 End of the Holy Roman Empire.
1813 The War of Liberation.
1815 Lauenburg given to Denmark.
1830 Agitation in favour of a liberal Constitution and partial independence for the Duchies.
1847 Death of Christian VIII of Denmark.
1848 Constitution of 1848. Revolt of Holstein. Prussian invasion of Schleswig. Peace of Malmö (August 26).
1849 Renewal of hostilities.
1850 Treaty of Berlin (July 2).
1851 Pacification of Holstein. Banishment of the Augustenburgs.
1852. Treaty of London (May 8). The Augustenburg renunciation.
1859 Frederick of Augustenburg protests against the renunciation. *Interim* Constitution for Holstein (September 23).
1863 Charter separating Holstein from Schleswig. Death of Frederick VII of Denmark (November 15). Christian IX signs Constitution (November 18). Federal troops invade Holstein (December).
1864 Austro-Prussian invasion of Schleswig and Jutland. Fall of Düppel (April 18). Conference of London (April 25). Treaty of Vienna (October 30).
1865 Convention of Gastein (August 14).
1866 War between Austria and Prussia. Battle of Königgrätz (July 3). Peace of Prague (August 23).
1872 Treaty of Apenrade (January 16).
1878 Treaty of Vienna modifies terms of Treaty of Prague.

(i) Introductory

The question of Schleswig-Holstein has been so canvassed and written round by interested parties, and is to such an extent confused by side-issues, that it is very necessary, before embarking on any discussion of it, to single out the main issues in advance. Questions of genealogy and of historic and feudal rights, treaties, protocols, and renunciations all presented their difficulties, and each had its influence on the ultimate solution; but the problem was, in the main,—as has been admitted by all serious students of the question—a problem of nationality.[1]

The tract of country which forms the neck of the Cimbrian Peninsula is fertile in itself; but its main importance is due to its geographical position, between two seas as well as between two races. An intermediate region where two distinct nationalities, languages, and civilisations struggled for the mastery, it was bound to become the scene of international complications. Dominating as it does the mouth of the Elbe, possessing important harbours, the most valuable of which is the Baltic port of Kiel, and offering the one opportunity for linking up by artificial means the Baltic and North Seas, it could not fail to become an object of desire to Germany so soon as the sense of German nationality was awakened. The gratification of this natural desire might well have proved impossible but for the fact that the district was to a large, and latterly to an increasing, extent inhabited by a population of German race and sympathies, and speaking—more or less corruptly—the German tongue. The River Eider, which separates Schleswig from Holstein, had been the extreme northern boundary of the Holy Roman Empire and the frontier between Germany and Scandinavia. The entire province of Holstein was, and had always been, almost entirely German in blood,

[1] Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, VII, 10. Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, *passim*.

speech, character, and sympathy, and had only come to be a part of the Danish Kingdom through the fact that the Duke of Holstein happened also to be King of Denmark. Schleswig in earlier times had been as wholly Danish as Holstein was German; but by degrees German speech, blood, and manners had spread across the Eider, and the Germanisation of Schleswig had begun.

This process was no nineteenth century, nor even an eighteenth century, phenomenon. It dated back to the fourteenth century, and by the close of the eighteenth century the linguistic frontier had been pushed northwards as far as the region of the Gulf of Schlei. The change—so far as language was concerned—was largely due to social and economic causes. The wealthier and better-educated classes being to a great extent German, and the business interests of the country centring in Hamburg rather than in Copenhagen, it was inevitable that the German language should supersede the Danish; the change was, in its earlier stages at any rate, not effected by any sinister pressure on the part of the Germans, but mainly by the action of the Danish authorities themselves. In its later stages the "penetration" of Schleswig was no doubt, in part, deliberate, but it may well be admitted that it was also inevitable. None the less, when the designs of the Germans became apparent, they provoked opposition on the part of the Danish Government; and to them may be attributed the oppressive legislation and administration that provoked so much protest and discontent in the nineteenth century. It was not till about 1840 that the process of Germanisation in Schleswig began to be speeded up by political pressure, with the result that by 1864, when the partition of Schleswig along national lines seemed to be the best solution of the question, the Schlei boundary had become out of date.

The question of national boundaries is a notoriously difficult one, and it is seldom possible to define such a boundary accurately at any particular moment. At best, no more than rough

justice can be done. It is probable that in 1864 such justice would have been attained by the adoption of a line not far distant from that of Husum—Kappeln[1] ultimately proposed by Great Britain at the Conference of London. Since that time, however, further inroads have been made; and, from the most recent examination of the conditions in North Schleswig, it appears that the line Flensburg—Bredstedt is the most that can now justifiably be asked for by Denmark on national grounds. It is not suggested that the frontier of language—even supposing it can be accurately defined—is always the most suitable frontier. Frontiers must also be considered from the point of view of national defence. One of Germany's great arguments in favour of the retention of Alsace after the Franco-Prussian war was that it would provide a protective *glacis* in the event of another war with France, and the soundness of the argument from a purely military standpoint has been amply proved by recent events. No such arguments apply to Schleswig, at any rate at the present time; for the peninsula is at the mercy of the guns of any fleet that has the mastery of the sea. In this context it must not be forgotten, moreover, that the predominance of one nationality in the important towns may be outweighed by the conditions in the outlying districts. There was a good deal of force in the German argument that it was unreasonable to ask her to abandon good towns and desirable seaports where the Germans were in a majority because they were outvoted by the adjacent rural districts.

The point to be emphasised, however, is that, wherever the boundary line might be, this important district, so necessary to Germany, was, in the middle of the nineteenth century, to a very great extent German in blood, speech, and sympathy; and that the

[1] Husum—Gelting might have been even better. It should be remembered that there was only a matter of 10 miles between the minimum German and the minimum Danish demands at the Conference of London.

awakening of the national spirit in Germany after the Napoleonic wars aroused a strong and natural impulse to redeem these German regions from a yoke which, if not conspicuously oppressive, was, at any rate, both irksome and alien.

The treatment by Denmark of Holstein and the German districts of Schleswig undoubtedly inflicted certain hardships and disabilities on the German inhabitants; it is probable that these were not the less irritating because they were petty, and certain that they were rendered more provocative by Denmark's failure to redeem her promises that they should be remedied. Apart from the great grievance that provoked the troubles of 1863 and 1864—which will be dealt with at length subsequently, but may be briefly summarised here as the imposition, contrary to promise, of a corporate Constitution which laid the Duchies at the feet of a perpetually governing Danish majority—there were a number of sufficiently galling minor grievances. These included (1) contributions to the national exchequer disproportionate to the relative means and resources of the Duchies; (2) the application to the general purposes of the Monarchy of the revenues of the ducal domains lying in Schleswig and Holstein; (3) the proposed appropriation of the Sound dues to the purposes of Denmark alone; (4) the imposition of the Danish coinage, which would have been a much more serious matter had not the coinage proved totally inadequate for the purpose; (5) the imposition of a single Customs tariff for the whole of the Monarchy; (6) the inclusion of Holstein, which had previously been in the German postal union, in the greatly inferior Danish union. Add to these restrictions on the public press and on the right of public meeting, and the prevalence of Danish officialdom, which implied the exclusion of the Germans from public affairs and administrative positions, and it will be seen that the grievances, though no one of them was in itself crushing or intolerable, were by no means negligible when it is remembered that they were cumulative in

effect. In Schleswig, moreover, there was an additional grievance, that of language. In many districts Germans were obliged to send their children to schools where the teaching was done in Danish; and, before being confirmed, children were also examined in Danish. Compared with the restrictions imposed by the Germans on the Danish inhabitants of Schleswig after the Duchy came into the possession of Prussia these were but trifling matters; nevertheless, it was no more than natural that they should provoke discontent and protest.[1]

If the instinct to come to the rescue of an "oppressed sister race," to free the Germans of Holstein and Schleswig from alien rule, and to remove the disabilities under which they laboured, was the prime motive of the German interest in the question, it must not be supposed that Germany, and Prussia in particular—and in Prussia Bismarck above all others—, were blind to the economic, political, and geographical advantages attaching to the possession of that region. This is not to suggest that the far-reaching consequences of the liberation of the Duchies were generally apparent to Germany, at any rate in the earlier stages of the quarrel. They were, indeed, becoming apparent to the far-seeing political vision of Bismarck; but they had no influence on the generality of Germans, or even on the generality of Prussians. No anticipation of the astonishing development of Germany under the hegemony of Prussia, which was to a large extent the direct consequence of the transfer of the Duchies, was in their minds, at least until the very final stages of the struggle. Even the desire for naval ports did not define itself until the need for naval expansion had been demonstrated by the Danish blockade of the German coasts in 1848.

[1] See the Report of Mr. J. Ward, British Consul-General at Hamburg (May 28, 1857); and that of Mr. Vice-Consul Rainals (February 15, 1861) presented to House of Commons, March 8, 1864 [No. 834].

After that experience the Germans made no attempt to disguise the fact that they were influenced by this desire as well as by their sympathies with the aspirations of the German inhabitants of the Duchies. In 1860, for instance, a Committee of the Prussian House of Representatives at Berlin reported that

> "without these Duchies an effectual protection of the coasts of Germany is impossible, and the whole of Northern Germany remains open to a hostile attack so long as they belong to a Power inimical to Germany";

and another Committee reported that

> "the Duchies are for Germany and Prussia a strong bulwark under all circumstances against any attack coming from the north. This, as well as their maritime position, is an advantage which Prussia can never relinquish."[1]

Nevertheless, Germany's—as distinguished from Prussia's—intervention in the Duchies was no mere bid for aggrandisement; and, if we admit that Italy may fight for *Italia irredenta* in the twentieth century, we cannot reproach Germany for her desire to liberate the "unredeemed Germany" of Holstein and southern Schleswig in the nineteenth. Sir Robert Morier used the same argument cogently in 1863.

> "Why is it a noble sentiment," he questioned, "to feel the touch of kith and kin on the Po, and mere dreaming sentimentality to feel the same on the Eider?"[2]

And there is plenty of evidence that this reasoning carried weight with Napoleon III, as, indeed, it was impossible that it should not. It may be frankly admitted that, had the struggle ended, as at one time it seemed likely that it would end, in the creation from the German parts of the Duchies of a new German State and member of the Germanic Confederation, no unprejudiced voice could have been raised against the transaction. Unfortunately, owing to a chain of circumstances which remains to be described, the disputed districts were

[1] See Egerton, *British Foreign Policy in Europe*, p. 264.
[2] Morier, *Memoirs and Letters*, I, 372.

ultimately transferred, not to Germany, but to Prussia, a solution which was rightly and universally condemned;[1] and, as the transfer comprehended the whole of Schleswig, part of which was preponderantly Danish, one breach of the principle of nationality was replaced by another, though it must not be forgotten that the original breach was the graver of the two.[2] With this preliminary exposition of the fundamentals of the Schleswig-Holstein problem, the ground has been cleared for a detailed consideration of the very tangled transactions[3] which led to the transfer of "the Duchies" to Prussia in 1866.

(ii) Early History of Schleswig and Holstein

Schleswig and Holstein had for many centuries been, wholly or in part, under the sceptre of the Danish Kings, Schleswig being either a fief or a possession of the Danish Crown, and Holstein a fief of the Holy Roman Empire. The two Duchies—for the sake of simplicity Lauenburg may be excluded[4]—had undergone many political vicissitudes, and had often been divided under different rulers. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the King of Denmark and the Duke of Holstein-Gottorp each governed

[1] Queen Victoria, who was thoroughly in sympathy with the idea of redeeming the Duchies for Germany, roundly condemned the perfidy of Prussia.—Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, I, 477.

[2] See Ollivier, *L'Empire libéral*, VII, 10. "Both" (*i.e.*, the extreme Danes and the extreme Germans) "wished to override national frontiers. At the same time, if it was necessary to preserve the indissolubility of the Duchies, it would have been more just to transfer them intact to Germany than to keep them intact under Denmark."

[3] As Palmerston caustically remarked: "Only three persons have ever understood the Schleswig-Holstein question—the Prince Consort, who is dead, a German professor, who is in a madhouse, and myself; and I have forgotten."

[4] The small Duchy of Lauenburg was added to Denmark as part of the European adjustments in 1815. It was an absolute possession of the Danish Crown; but, owing to its geographical position, became a mere pendant of Holstein, whose fate it was bound to share.

a part of each Duchy, a small remnant being divided among the ducal family of Sonderburg and other houses. From the middle of the seventeenth century it was the policy of the Kings of Denmark to recover the parts of Schleswig possessed by other families. By 1713 Frederick IV had succeeded in occupying the Gottorp parts, and on the conclusion of peace united the whole of that Duchy to the Danish Crown, under a guarantee by France, England, and Russia, which, however, in the case of France at any rate, appears to have applied only to the ducal as opposed to the royal parts of the Duchy.[1] The union was finally established by a series of Acts in 1721. In the case of Holstein a similar policy was carried out half-a-century later. The Holstein-Gottorps succeeded to the throne of Russia, and renounced all their rights upon any part of Schleswig, ceding all their possessions in Holstein in exchange for the Counties (*Grafschaften*) of Oldenburg and Delmenhorst. The portions of Schleswig and Holstein that remained in other hands were gradually bought up; and by 1779 both Duchies were wholly under the Danish Crown, Holstein, however, remaining a fief of the Holy Roman Empire until the break-up of the latter in 1806. Subsequently Holstein and Lauenburg were included in the German Confederation, the King of Denmark, in virtue of his position as Duke of Holstein, becoming a member of the German Diet.

(iii) The Constitutional Question

The awakening of national self-consciousness in Germany during the later Napoleonic wars threw the anomalous position of the Duchies—largely Ger-

[1] When, in 1864, Denmark appealed for French support, on the ground of the guarantee of 1720, Drouyn de Lhuys, after examining the documents, came to the above conclusion. He discovered, in the course of this examination, that in a treaty of March 24, 1715, Prussia had guaranteed Schleswig to Denmark. See also *Les Origines diplomatiques de la Guerre de* 1870-71, I, 334, 335.

man in character and sentiment, yet ruled by a Danish monarch—into strong relief. But their aspirations to national unity received scant recognition at the Congress of Vienna. They might, indeed, have been permanently set aside but for an intricate series of events, which placed the cards in German hands, and which it must now be our business to examine.

So long as Denmark remained an absolute monarchy and the Estates of the Duchies mere consultative assemblies, existing conditions and existing relations with the Crown might have continued, and the question of the exact amount of independence that the Duchies should enjoy might never have been raised; but as soon as the demand for Parliamentary government arose it was inevitable that a controversy as to the relations between the Duchies and the Crown should follow, and that an attempt would have to be made to define those relations. Obviously, the establishment of a single supreme Parliament for the entire realm would tend to transform the Duchies into a constituent and inalienable part of the Danish Kingdom. On the other hand, the establishment of a federal Government, with a Parliament or Parliaments for the Duchies, and another for Denmark proper, would emphasise the independent character of the Duchies, and might endanger the integrity of the realm. It was not with any deliberate intention of using the constitutional question as a means of destroying the independence of the Duchies that Denmark approached this dangerous ground. On the contrary, there was a strong democratic party in Denmark and a clear demand for liberal institutions, and the King was driven by popular clamour and obvious political necessity to attempt the solution of a question which he must have known to be beset with pitfalls.

Constitution of 1848.—In 1830 an agitation in favour of a liberal Constitution and partial independence for the Duchies was suppressed; but a common Court of Appeal and a common system of administration for the two Duchies were granted in

1834, and provincial Diets, which, however, were mere consultative bodies, were set up. But an arrangement such as this could clearly be no more than temporary; and in 1847 Christian VIII, in the hope, amongst other things, of reconciling the Duchies to permanent union with Denmark, decided to surrender his despotic power and to give a Constitution to the whole country. He died, however, before this Constitution had been proclaimed, leaving the completion of the matter to his son and successor, Frederick VII. The draft Constitution left by Christian VIII proposed the creation of a General Diet for the whole of the Danish monarchy, in which the kingdom and each of the Duchies should have numerically equal representation, and which should deal with all matters that concerned the monarchy as a whole, matters that concerned Denmark only or the Duchies only being left to the representative assemblies or Estates, which, by the Constitution, were to be retained.

The Constitution of 1848 was conceived in a reasonable and conciliatory spirit, and might have provided a solution for the problem but for the opposition of the extremists on either side. It is difficult to realise the intensity of national feeling which had by this time been aroused in Germany. Antagonism to Denmark was not only augmented by the tendency towards democracy of her Government as evidenced in the Constitution, but had foundations of greater antiquity dating back to the Napoleonic wars, when Denmark had been the most faithful ally of France. This made all attempts at conciliation exceedingly difficult. Moreover, the German nationalists regarded the constitutional concessions as an attempt to undermine their aspirations to an ultimate union of the Duchies with Germany. The extreme Danes, on the other hand, resented the favourable terms offered to the Duchies, and a very strong opposition was raised by the party known as the "Eider-Danes," who stood for the surrender of Holstein and the incorporation of an undivided Schleswig in the Kingdom of Denmark.

The Eider-Danish party exercised a pernicious influence on the Schleswig-Holstein question, and, in the main, the blame for the final catastrophe of 1864 and 1866 lies at their door. It was this party that resisted the pressure brought to bear on Denmark by the Powers friendly to her to make reasonable concessions to Germany, urged the country into a war which was bound to end disastrously, and gave justification to the verdict that "no nation has ever sought its own ruin so directly and so resolutely as Denmark."[1] At the same time, it must be remembered that on the German side there was also an extreme party which was equally opposed to any partition of the Duchies, but held that they should be secured intact for Germany. They urged the permanent indissolubility of the Duchies, fortifying their arguments with a sophistical appeal to history, and drew the logical conclusion that, as the obvious destiny of Holstein was union with Germany, a similar destiny awaited Schleswig. It is noteworthy that the policy of both these parties was to override national frontiers, and that each scouted the idea of a new national frontier which should do rough justice to both the Danish and the German population of the Duchies.

The Theory of Indissolubility.—The theory of the indissolubility of the Duchies, which received such wide support in Germany, has been the subject of much dispute; it had so great an influence in consolidating opinion in Germany that it demands something more than passing mention. In its full development the argument was that the Duchies had been united under the King-Duke for 400 years, that they were independent of Denmark, and indissolubly connected with one another. This idea was greedily seized by German students, publicists, and politicians, and actively propagated, with all the circumlocution and obscurity peculiar to the German genius, in the Duchies, in

[1] Vitzthum, *Memoirs*, II, 375.

Germany, and even outside the bounds of either. In support of it patriotic songs were written, and the hyphenated name of "Schleswig-Holstein" was invented and forced upon the world, with the result that the theory was widely and somewhat undiscriminatingly accepted throughout Western Europe. Diplomatists such as Morier regarded it as an incontrovertible axiom; and public servants such as Mr. Ward, the Consul-General at Hamburg, who undertook investigations into the conditions of Schleswig for the British Government, never thought of disputing it. In support of their argument that the Duchies had always been independent of Denmark, save in so far as they were bound by a vague and personal tie to the Danish Crown, German students went back so far as 1326, to what was known as the Constitution of Waldemar, in which it had been laid down that Denmark and Schleswig should never be ruled by one man. The arguments based on this ancient document were ridiculed by the late Lord Salisbury in a pungent article contributed to the *Quarterly Review*, which, by reason of its brilliant and epigrammatic language, has perhaps had too much weight with subsequent students of the question. Recent criticism seems to have established the fact that the Constitution of Waldemar was, at all events, genuine (a fact which Lord Salisbury disputed); but, in any case, the circumstances under which it was granted deprived it of validity, and there can be no doubt that German historians overreached themselves by pressing to unwarrantable lengths arguments based on so dubious a document.

But the theory of indissolubility was fortified by historical evidence of a more serious character. The "Privileges" of Christian I of Denmark (1460), in which it was enacted that the lands of Schleswig and Holstein should remain "for ever together and undivided," afforded some proof that the union of the Duchies was a matter of concern to the Crown. The historical evidence was by no means conclusive; but, exploited as it was by historians and politicians, it

afforded precisely that justification for something more than national demands which was calculated to rouse enthusiasm in Germany and to secure acquiescence in Europe. The most effective answer to the argument is found in the feudal relations of the Duchies. The distinction between Schleswig, a fief of Denmark, and Holstein, a fief of the Empire, was juridically fundamental. Even had each of the Duchies been ruled continuously by one and the same line of dukes (which they had not), and had that line, at any time during the feudal period, become extinct through failure of heirs, the connection between the Danish fief of Schleswig and the Imperial fief of Holstein would at once have been broken, and the appointment of new ducal sovereigns would, in the case of Holstein, have fallen to the Emperor; in that of Schleswig, to the Danish Crown. That this fundamental distinction remained and was recognised after the Holy Roman Empire had ceased to exist, is proved by the fact that on September 28, 1863, the German Diet decreed a Federal Execution against the Duke of Holstein, but refrained from any similar action against Schleswig, and that, when invasion of Schleswig became a part of German policy, it was necessary for Prussia and Austria to move against that Duchy independently of the Federation.[1] The distinction between Schleswig and Holstein was also recognised by the conditions of the Treaty of Berlin, July 2, 1850, and by the Treaty of London, May 8, 1852, and in the engagements entered into by Denmark with the German Powers in that year.

The War of 1848-49.—Threatened as it already was by the uncompromising attitudes of the extremists on either side, the Constitution of 1848 was finally ruined by the revolutionary crisis in Europe which followed the February Revolution in Paris. That crisis reawakened in Germany all the ideas of nationality which had been put to sleep by the reactionary policy of the Congress of Vienna; and one of the simplest

[1] See p. 35.

means of expressing these ideas in action seemed to lie in the redemption of Holstein and Schleswig from Danish rule. The Estates of the Duchies, jointly assembled, demanded an independent Constitution for a united Schleswig-Holstein, and even the entry of Schleswig into the German Confederation. The Eider-Danes, on the other hand, then in the ascendant at Copenhagen, forced the King to declare his intention of incorporating Schleswig in the Kingdom of Denmark and of granting a separate Constitution to Holstein. These extreme steps on both sides made recourse to arms inevitable. A provisional Government was set up at Kiel; the Duchies flamed into insurrection; and Prussian troops, acting in the name of the Germanic Confederation, came to the support of the insurrectionaries. The Danes were quickly driven out of Holstein.

Wrangel, the Prussian Commander, mastered Schleswig, entered Jutland, and took Fredericia (May 2), but was checked by the Danes in an attack on Düppel. Matters were in this dubious condition when Russia intervened, and obliged Prussia to agree to the Truce of Malmö and to leave the revolted Schleswig-Holsteiners in the lurch (August 26). This truce, which Prussia had no authority to conclude, and which was much resented throughout Germany, was followed by negotiations for a definitive peace; but Denmark refused to accept Palmerston's suggestion—to which the German and Prussian Governments had assented—that Schleswig should be formed into an independent State, and on April 3, 1849, declared the truce at an end. The war was again indecisive; the insurrectionaries, aided by Federal troops, won some initial successes, but were repulsed from Fredericia. Then once more, this time by British mediation, a six months' truce was arranged (July 10) between Prussia, on behalf of the German Confederation, and Denmark. The truce was followed by peace preliminaries, and ultimately (July 2, 1850) by the Peace of Berlin. The insurrectionaries, thus

abandoned by Germany, carried on the war, but were defeated at Idstedt, north of Schleswig (July 25), and Friedrichstadt (September 7); after which the whole of Schleswig was soon in Danish hands. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, it was incumbent on Denmark to call in the German Confederation for the pacification of Holstein. On January 6, 1851, an Austro-Prussian Commission of pacification arrived at Kiel, and to this Commission five days later the insurgents yielded. The Holstein Army was disbanded, and Holstein was occupied on behalf of the Confederation by an Austro-Prussian force.

Treaty of London, 1852.—The European importance of the relations between Denmark and the Duchies had long been recognised; and the urgency of the question was greatly enhanced by the probability that, with the death of the reigning King of Denmark, the male line of the Royal House would become extinct. A Conference of the Powers had assembled in London in 1850, and on August 2 of that year had signed a Protocol, in which the Powers acknowledged the importance of the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, and approved of the expressed intention of the King to regulate the succession in such a manner as to maintain that integrity without altering the relations of Holstein with the Germanic Confederation. This Protocol was signed by the plenipotentiaries of France, Denmark, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden, and was acceded to by Austria on August 23. A further Conference subsequently assembled at London, whose deliberations ended in the signature of the celebrated Treaty of London (May 8, 1852), on which, and on the Protocol above referred to, the whole of the subsequent relations between the Duchies, Denmark, and Germany hinged for the next twelve years. The fundamental provision of this treaty was the recognition (though not the guarantee) by the Powers of the succession of Prince Christian of Glücksburg to all the realms at that time united under the sceptre of Denmark (see p. 101).

The absence of a male heir in the direct line to the throne of Denmark had brought the difficult question of the succession into prominence; and it was hoped that the recognition of Prince Christian, who was married to the heiress[1] in the female line, would avert the crisis which was otherwise bound to arise on the death of Frederick VII. The conditions on which this arrangement was made were embodied in Articles II and III of the treaty. Article II "acknowledged as permanent the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy," and Article III declared that it was "expressly understood that the reciprocal Rights and Obligations of the King of Denmark and of the Germanic Confederation concerning the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg" should not be affected by the treaty. No other conditions were attached to the Treaty of London, and it is important to note that the Duchy of Schleswig is not so much as mentioned.

But, while the treaty was in course of negotiation other engagements were entered into by Denmark, which were not embodied in the treaty, but on which the acquiescence of the German Powers no doubt largely depended. The King of Denmark engaged, with regard to Holstein, to discharge all his federal obligations; with regard to Schleswig, not to incorporate the Duchy with Denmark; while Austria and Prussia engaged to respect the decision of the King of Denmark that Holstein and Schleswig should be entirely separated. These engagements resulted in a Proclamation by the King of Denmark on January 28, 1852, in which he promised to secure to both nationalities in the Duchies "a complete equality of rights and effective protection." It was the failure of Denmark to redeem these pledges that provoked all the troubles of the next twelve years, and ultimately led to the catastrophes of the period 1864-66. Germany

[1] Not originally the heiress; but her brother and elder sister had resigned their claims in 1851.

reproached Denmark with not fulfilling her obligations, and Denmark declared that the demands made by Germany and her interpretation of the engagements were such as to make it impossible for Denmark to comply; in both of which allegations there was a considerable amount of truth. However this may be, there can be no doubt that the conditions were not embodied in, or in any way binding on the signatories of, the treaty. Bismarck, indeed, asserted that they were intrinsically connected with it; but the fact remains that they were no part of the European settlement embodied in the Treaty of London.

That treaty, if judgment must be passed on it, provided no true solution of the question with which it was concerned. It may, indeed, be regarded as the high-water mark of those dynastic and legitimist principles which had triumphed at the Congress of Vienna. It was backward- rather than forward-looking; for its concern was with the integrity of a monarchy and the maintenance of a dynasty rather than with the national issues involved. It was concluded as a result of the reaction from the revolutionary outbreak of 1848, and was destined to prove a hindrance to the solution along national lines of the question with which it professed to deal. Far-sighted people recognised it as a retrograde half-measure. Queen Victoria wrote: "Lord Palmerston ought not to be surprised if, instead of tending to preserve peace, it should be the occasion of war."[1] Events were to prove the correctness of her warning.

And, if the Treaty of London was unsatisfactory in its terms, it was also incomplete in its scope. It was, indeed, signed by all the Great Powers; but it lacked the accession of the Germanic Confederation and of certain of the smaller German States which followed the Confederation: Baden, Bavaria, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and Saxe-Weimar had refused their accessions, and

[1] Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, I, 457.

Saxony and Oldenburg had acceded only with reservations. Moreover, it was not binding on the Duchies themselves, to whose Estates it was never submitted. Thus the distinction was drawn which was eventually to throw the Powers which adhered to the treaty into opposition to those which did not adhere to it, and which was, in particular, to create a wide divergency of views and policy between Germany, as represented by the Germanic Confederation, and the great German Powers, Austria and Prussia. The former were at liberty to challenge the presence of the Danish Crown in the Duchies and to support the claims of a rival dynasty, while the latter were bound as signatories to respect the rights of the Danish Royal House as indicated in the terms of the treaty.

Constitution of 1855.—In spite of the apparently favourable treatment accorded to her by the Treaty of London, the position of Denmark in relation to the Duchies continued to be one of extreme difficulty. The obligation to make some settlement of the Constitutional question remained; but any settlement which was likely to commend itself to Danish public opinion was bound to bring Denmark into conflict with Germany. Grants, in the year 1854, to Schleswig and Holstein of deliberative assemblies of a more or less aristocratic character for the management of local affairs[1] were followed, in October 1855, by the proclamation of a Constitution for the whole Monarchy, which provided for a common Rigsraad to deal with matters common to the whole realm, comprising 80 members, of whom 20 were to be chosen by the King and 30 by the local assemblies, while the remainder were to be directly elected on a property franchise. The Rigsraad, in which, as in the Rigsdag, the Danes would command a majority, was to have the right of passing laws, but not that of initiating them. This Constitution was a serious provocation to the Duchies, which

[1] Lauenburg had already been given a similar assembly in 1853.

it reduced to practical impotence. It was also, as Lord Russell pointed out, an infraction of the agreements between Denmark and Germany which had preceded the Treaty of London, by which Denmark had undertaken not to incorporate Schleswig and to respect the rights of the German inhabitants of the Duchies. The virtual incorporation of the Duchies by the Constitution of 1855 provoked violent opposition in Germany; and this opposition continued until the issues were brought once more to the arbitrament of arms.

An appeal was now made to the Germanic Confederation, which had a direct interest in the affairs of Holstein, and of which, it must be remembered, the King of Denmark was actually a member. In 1858 the Diet passed a resolution refusing to recognise the corporate Constitution of 1855 as valid for Holstein and Lauenburg. In deference to this resolution, Denmark withdrew the Constitution so far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned. This step, which had all the appearance of a concession, was regarded in extreme German quarters as a provocation. Any step, in fact, which tended to separate Schleswig from Holstein, and to draw the former into closer union with Denmark, was held to be an attempted breach of the doctrine of indissolubility, to the establishment of which, as we have seen, so much pains had been devoted. When Denmark made a concession to Holstein and withheld it from Schleswig, the air rang with cries of indissolubility.

Interim Constitution of 1859, *Charter of* 1861, *and Constitution of* 1863.—As a temporary way out of these difficulties, the Rigsraad (September 23, 1859) issued an *Interim* Constitution for Holstein, which was slightly more favourable to the Duchy, and promised that a conference between the Holstein Estates and the Rigsraad (in which each should be represented in equal numbers) should be summoned to prepare a scheme for the treatment of the common affairs of the Monarchy.

In 1861, the German Confederation having categorically demanded compliance with its suggestion for a legislative vote for the Duchies pending the settlement of a joint Constitution, the Danes endeavoured to placate the people of Holstein by the grant of a Charter which included freedom of the press, right of association, a Habeas Corpus Act, and responsibility of officials to ordinary tribunals, and thus offered a very high degree of constitutional liberty. Holstein, however, was not to be tempted from her traditional policy, and rejected the Charter. The Danes, therefore, set themselves to the task of framing a new Constitution. On March 30, 1863, a Charter providing for the separation of the affairs of Holstein from those of Denmark and Schleswig was decreed. This Charter was wholly unacceptable to Germany. Austria and Prussia entered formal protests, Austria on April 13 and Prussia on April 15; but they were precluded from independent action by their adherence to the Treaty of London. They approached the Diet with proposals for a Federal Execution against Denmark; a resolution was passed in the Diet calling on the Danish Government to withdraw the Patent of March 30 within six weeks, and to prepare a Constitution in conformity with their engagements. Denmark, encouraged by the fulminations of Palmerston, refused; and on September 28 a Constitution was introduced, which made no change in the relative powers of the Rigsraad and the provincial Diets; the Rigsraad was given full constitutional authority, and was to be composed of two Chambers, one of which was to be elected by universal suffrage. This Constitution, which completely separated Schleswig from Holstein, and implied the incorporation of the Northern Duchy with Denmark, was an undoubted breach of the undertakings given by Denmark in 1852; it was, in fact, the *coup de hache* which brought matters to a real issue.

Death of Frederick VII.—There was at this moment a strong movement on both sides in favour of compromise. Even in Prussia, the King and the

Chamber viewed the policy of encroachment on Denmark with disfavour, and Bismarck was forced to adopt a conciliatory attitude. Great Britain brought strong pressure to bear on Denmark to remedy all the grievances of the German inhabitants of Schleswig, and so to convince the Powers of her sincerity and moderation, and to present an unassailable front to Germany.[1] But the Danish Government, under the influence of the Eider-Danish party, were obstinately determined on the incorporation of Schleswig; and on November 13 the new Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig was passed. Frederick VII, however, did not live to put his name to the document. He died on November 15, and his death not only left the Constitutional question in the troubled and menacing state that has been described, but raised a new question which was to lead to consequences fatal to Denmark. It is necessary, before proceeding with the narrative, to set out the complex problem involved in the extinction of the direct male line of the Danish Royal House.

(iv) The Danish Succession Question

Frederick I of Denmark, who died in 1533, had two sons, Christian III and Adolf. Christian III had, in turn, two sons, Frederick II and Hans. The descendants of Frederick II constituted the Royal House of

[1] This was the line consistently taken by Paget, the British Ambassador at Copenhagen, as well as by Wodehouse, who was entrusted with a special mission to Copenhagen in January 1864, and also by Fleury, who came on a similar mission from Paris. In Wodehouse's instructions the following words occur:—" It is desirable, but extremely difficult, to procure the repeal of a law so recently passed as that of the Dano-Schleswig Constitution. It is alleged that this law is at variance with the engagements taken by the King of Denmark in his Proclamation of January 28, 1852. It might be possible for the King to declare that, so far as the Duchy of Schleswig is concerned, the law cannot come into force without the consent of the Diet of Schleswig. A declaration of this kind might satisfy the Cabinets of Austria and Prussia."

Denmark; those of Hans were, in the senior line, dukes of Augustenburg and, in the junior line, dukes of Glücksburg; the descendants of Adolf were the dukes of Holstein-Gottorp, of whom the elder line afterwards ascended the throne of Russia, while one branch of the junior line became the Royal House of Sweden, and another the ducal house of Oldenburg. So far as the Danish Crown was concerned, the question of the succession was simple enough. That Crown had become hereditary in 1660, and in the year 1665 a *lex regia* had been decreed, which enacted that, in the event of the failure of the male line, the female heirs of the reigning monarch, Frederick III, should succeed. In accordance with this law, the Crown passed, on the demise of Frederick VII, without dispute to Christian of Glücksburg, who was married to Louise, cousin of the late King, and, in view of the renunciations of her brother and elder sister, the rightful heiress. This arrangement of the succession had been specially provided for in the Treaty of London (see p. 25).

The Augustenburg Claim.—The question of the succession to the Duchies was by no means so simple. It had always been a point of dispute whether they were so far part and parcel of the Danish Sovereignty as to be necessarily governed by the rules of succession applicable to the Danish Crown; and this is one of the explanations of the opposition which had been offered to the attempts to incorporate them in Denmark. Lauenburg, which had been annexed in 1815-16, was clearly a direct appurtenance of the Crown. Schleswig, however, happened to have been partly independent, under Holstein-Gottorp rule, at the moment of the passing of the *lex regia*, and it was more than doubtful whether that law could be held to be applicable to it, or whether the Duchy should not pass to the next heir male, Frederick of Augustenburg. The case of Holstein was even more difficult. On the break-up of the Empire in 1806 that Duchy ceased to be a fief, and was united to Denmark by Letters Patent, which declared it to be "henceforth an inseparable part of the

Monarchy." This step, however, had been taken without the approval of the Estates of the Duchy, and it was difficult to maintain that Holstein could have been brought under the *lex regia* by mere Letters Patent of the Crown. Large portions of the Duchy were, indeed, allodial possessions of that Crown, and were tied to it, however it might descend; they had never been fiefs, were not united to the Duchy till 1806, and Augustenburg could have no shadow of claim to them. On the other hand, the renunciation of their claims by the Holstein-Gottorp family in 1773 had been made in favour of the male line of Frederick V only. Clearly, then, unless the character of the Duchy had been changed by the events of 1806 and 1815 (in which case Augustenburg would have no claim), Kiel and the Baltic shore might be claimed by Russia, the allodial possessions in the west by Denmark, and the claim of Augustenburg would be restricted to the remainder. It is evident that the situation involved a nice series of legal problems, and that the Augustenburg claims were plausible enough to rally round them the excited national sentiment of the German people, both in the Duchies and in Germany.

The Renunciation of Duke Christian August.—The matter, however, was still further complicated by transactions of a more recent date. Christian August of Augustenburg and his brother Frederick had taken a prominent part in the rising of 1848, with the result that in 1851 both had been banished. In the following year, in order to clear the ground for the Treaty of London, and by the agency of Prussia, Christian August was paid a sum of 1,500,000 rix dollars (about £400,000) in compensation for his lost estates in the Duchies, and undertook, in return, "for himself and for his family," not

> "to counteract in any way the resolutions which the King of Denmark had taken, or might afterwards take, in reference to the arrangement for the succession of all the lands united under his sceptre or the eventual organization of the Monarchy."

Around the wording of this renunciation the waves of controversy have copiously broken. On the one hand, it was maintained by the Danes and their supporters that the House of Augustenburg had thereby abandoned all claim to the ducal succession. This view was taken by Bismarck, who combated the King of Prussia's scruples by urging that the Augustenburgs neither had nor ever had had any right to the ducal portions of the Duchies, and had twice (in 1721 and 1852) renounced their claims to the Royal portion.[1] It was also taken by the committee of Prussian lawyers to whom the question was referred in 1863. These opinions of the greatest Prussian statesman and the highest Prussian legal authority are very damaging to the Augustenburg case; but it is fair to point out that Bismarck was never very scrupulous as to the means he used to gain an end, and that the Prussian Crown lawyers were neither unanimous nor ignorant of the nature of the verdict which would be acceptable to those in authority. Both opinions came from persons who were interested in discrediting the Augustenburg case.

On the other hand, it was argued that Christian August had only abandoned his estates in the Duchies; and, moreover, that, in spite of the wording of the renunciation, he had no power to abandon even those for his sons, who were of age at the time, and therefore not, legally speaking, his "family" at all. It is difficult to extract the truth from the mass of controversy with which the question has been overladen. This much, however, would appear to be beyond dispute—that there was considerable ambiguity in the terms of the renunciation (Blume, the Danish negotiator, was blamed for permitting this ambiguity, and, indeed, the negligence was unpardonable); further, that the sum of money paid to Christian August was not more than the value of the estates, which, however, it has to be remembered, were already confiscated;

[1] Bismarck, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, 3.

that in German law sons, when of age, were not bound by the undertakings of their father, a fact which deprives of their force the caustic comments of Lord Salisbury, who urged, in the *Quarterly Review*, that "apparently in the vocabulary of Augustenburg the word 'family' does not include sons"; finally, that Christian August's eldest son, Frederick, who afterwards became the claimant, was only restrained from an immediate protest by the wishes of his father, who preferred the substantial compensation he received to any shadowy claim on a ducal crown. On the whole, it must be acknowledged that, even after the renunciation, there remained reasonable ground for the raising of the Augustenburg claim in the event of the extinction of the direct male line of the Danish Royal House.

Augustenburg lays claim to the Duchies.—On the death of Frederick VII, accordingly, it soon became apparent that neither the renunciation nor the Treaty of London had settled the question of the succession in the Duchies. Frederick of Augustenburg had already, in 1859, protested against the assumption that he had resigned his rights; and he now put forward his claim, and received homage at Kiel as Duke, public feeling in Germany acclaiming his action with practically unanimous approval. This unanimity was due not so much to any personal enthusiasm for the claimant as to the action of the new King of Denmark, who, on November 18, 1863, under pressure of strong public opinion, had signed the Constitution, and thus thrown down the gauntlet to Germany, the promulgation of the Constitution being, as Bismarck stated, "a formal and final violation of the engagements of Denmark."

(v) The War of 1864

Germany had rallied round the Augustenburg claim, seeing in it the best means of vindicating the indissolubility of the Duchies, of rescuing the German population from Danish rule, and of preventing the

incorporation of Schleswig with Denmark. The two great German Powers, however, proceeded with great caution; their policy was by no means so simple or so disinterested; and already they looked upon each other with some measure of distrust. One great preliminary difficulty confronted them, and kept their policy distinct from that of the Confederation—the fact that they were both signatories of the Treaty of London, and consequently debarred from joining in any action which menaced the integrity of Denmark. Neither of them at that moment desired the annexation of the Duchies, a policy which then existed only in the brain of Bismarck; but both disliked the liberalising and parliamentary trend which was associated with the Augustenburg claim and the policy of the Germanic Confederation; and Prussia in particular viewed with grave apprehension the prospect of the creation of a new petty German State. Austria stood to gain nothing by associating herself with Prussia in an attack on Denmark, but she very ardently desired the goodwill of Prussia, to whom her declared enemy, Napoleon III, was making overtures; and in these critical months she allowed herself to be dragged at the chariot wheels of Prussia, mainly in order to keep Prussia from falling into the arms of France.

Meanwhile, the first action came from the Federal Diet, which suspended King Christian's vote, and on December 24 invaded Holstein with a body of Federal troops, and was soon master of that Duchy. Prussia and Austria urged the Confederation to push on into Schleswig, where Federal intervention had no possible justification; and, when the Diet refused, entered into an agreement to occupy Schleswig themselves.[1] This

[1] January 16, 1864. Drouyn de Lhuys to the Duc de Gramont, January 16, 1864: "Les deux grandes Cours allemandes . . . ont notifié à leurs confédérés qu'elles allaient substituer leur action comme Puissances européennes à l'action fédérale. Le Sleswig . . . sera saisi, à titre de gage, par les troupes de l'Autriche et de la Prusse. Théoriquement, il existe une différence. . . . Pratiquement cette différence s'efface." *Les Origines diplomatiques de la Guerre de* 1870-71, I, 141.

was a breach of the terms of the Treaty of London, but they got over this difficulty by declaring that their occupation of the Duchy was not an assault on the integrity of the Monarchy, seeing that their intention was merely to hold it " as a pledge " until Denmark should carry out the undertakings of 1852, but with the private understanding that the eventual fate of the Duchies should be determined by mutual agreement between them. This significant step may be regarded as the first advance made by Bismarck on the long and tortuous road which did not end until Sadowa and the Peace of Prague. Bismarck had, on January 3, 1864, declared his true intentions—to use the Duke of Augustenburg as a catspaw and Austria as a stalking-horse in order to secure from the Schleswig-Holstein imbroglio the aggrandisement of Prussia—to his colleagues and the King and Crown Prince; they lifted their hands in horror at the proposal, but in the end were not averse to taking those first steps which alone were for the time being essential. The Austro-Prussian invasion of Schleswig commenced on February 1; the troops had been for some time concentrated with the ostensible object of supporting the Federal Execution in Holstein.

Meanwhile, the non-German Powers had been busily engaged in trying to promote a pacific solution. Great Britain despatched Lord Wodehouse on a mission to Berlin and Copenhagen; and he brought the strongest possible pressure to bear on Denmark to persuade her to withdraw or suspend the obnoxious Constitution, and categorically informed her that, if this advice were not taken, " Denmark would be left to encounter Germany on her own responsibility." France, Russia, and Sweden associated themselves more or less completely with these representations. On January 18 Russell sent an identical note to Berlin and Vienna asking for a formal recognition of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. On January 31, the day before the invasion of Schleswig, Austria and the Diet acknowledged this integrity, but Prussia refused to give any

guarantee. The policy of Palmerston's Government at this juncture may be described as follows:—(1) to persuade Denmark to withdraw the Constitution and give satisfaction to Germany; (2) to persuade the German Powers to grant the delay necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose; (3) to prevail on the non-German Powers to agree to joint action for the preservation of Danish integrity if the German Powers persisted in the invasion; (4) to leave Denmark to her fate if she refused to act on the proffered advice.

This policy was so far successful that the Danish Government agreed to summon the Rigsraad and propose to it the withdrawal of the Constitution. This was the only legal means by which the end could be secured, and the Powers could hardly have urged the Danish Government to an illegal act. But it offended Germany, because it put into force the very Constitution against which they were protesting. Prussia and Austria declared that they could not suspend their action, and pointed out that there was no guarantee that the Rigsraad, when assembled, would agree to the proposed withdrawal of the Constitution. To meet this objection, England offered to procure a protocol signed by the Powers declaring that, should the Rigsraad refuse the proposal, Denmark would forfeit all right to expect support from them. With this proposal England—supported by France—asked for a delay of six weeks. The German Powers refused;[1] and it was this refusal that convinced British statesmen of the bad faith of Austro-Prussian motives, and made them anxious to procure active intervention for the protection of Denmark. Russell was now convinced that Germany was wrong; from this time forward Palmerston certainly, and Russell rather less certainly, were ready even for an unsupported British intervention; and they were only restrained by the resistance

[1] *Les Origines diplomatiques de la Guerre de* 1870-71, I, 186.

offered by the remainder of the Cabinet and by Queen Victoria.[1]

Without the co-operation of the other Great Powers, however, the British Cabinet felt itself unable to move to the assistance of Denmark. On February 19, for instance, Russell, in his capacity of mouthpiece of the British Cabinet, definitely informed the Danish Ambassador that "every step which Great Britain may take can only be taken after full consideration and communication with France and Russia"; and the grouping of the European Powers at the moment made joint intervention extremely difficult, if not impossible. France, under Napoleon III. had her attention fixed upon Italy, and was antagonistic to Austria; it was largely Napoleon's suggestion of a European Congress that drove Austria into the arms of Prussia. Napoleon had no intention of involving himself in hostilities unless he was guaranteed English support on the Rhine; and there could be little doubt that he would claim to compensate himself in the Rhenish Provinces for his intervention; this, to use Palmerston's words,[2] would "have been an evil for us, and would have seriously affected the position of Holland and Belgium." Clearly, therefore, the difficulties of co-operation with France were not small. Russia, involved as she was in Poland, was strongly disinclined to active intervention, though anxious to give diplomatic assistance. She was influenced by the refusal of France to move in the matter. Sweden was more ready to commit herself, and was prepared to send an army to the assistance of Denmark the moment England intervened.

It is necessary to take this careful stock of the attitude of the Powers, and of England in particular, because they have often been charged with the desertion of Denmark. One thing, however, is quite clear: that none of the Powers ever gave a definite promise

[1] See Walpole, *Life of Russell*, II, 403.

[2] Palmerston to Russell (February 13, 1864), quoted by Walpole, *Life of Russell*, II, 403.

of material assistance to Denmark. The most that can be said is that Lord Palmerston, at the close of the session of 1863, had uttered a warning against any attempt to overthrow the rights of Denmark and to interfere with her independence: "those who make the attempt will find that it will not be Denmark alone with whom they will have to contend." Although these words may have been rash, they could not be regarded as an unconditional promise to assist Denmark in the event of her being attacked. Taken in conjunction with the repeated diplomatic assurances to Denmark that England would not move except in unison with the other Powers, they may be regarded as a simple notification to Germany that this was a question in which the Powers were interested. There was no proof that the invasion of Schleswig was a menace to Danish integrity: indeed, Austria and the Diet had just reiterated their adherence to the principle of that integrity; nor was there evidence of an attempt to overthrow the rights of Denmark: the German Powers ostensibly occupied Schleswig as a means of securing the execution of certain promises which Denmark had undoubtedly made, and equally undoubtedly failed to keep. On the whole, therefore, England may be exonerated from the accusation of holding out false hopes of assistance to Denmark. There is some evidence that Bismarck, with a characteristic absence of scruple, gave it out at Copenhagen that Prussia was threatened with British intervention.[1] Denmark may, indeed, have hoped for European intervention; but such intervention was never promised, and the attitude of England was scrupulously correct.[2]

[1] Beust, *Memoirs*, I, 242. Bismarck said to Beust: "I made the Cabinet of Copenhagen believe that England had threatened us with active intervention if hostilities should be opened; although, as a matter of fact, England did nothing of the kind." Both in its want of scruple and its readiness to avow that want, the saying is so characteristic of Bismarck that it may well be correctly reported.

[2] For a more detailed discussion of the attitude of England see below, p. 75.

The invasion of Schleswig had only been accomplished by Bismarck in the face of much opposition. Austria was only persuaded to co-operate by her fear of what France might do in the event of a break with Prussia. The bulk of the German Powers, who demanded the establishment of Augustenburg in the Duchies, resented the action of the two Powers bitterly; in Bavaria it was bluntly described as "treason to Germany." Bismarck had even met with violent opposition in Prussia itself, where the King and Chamber, and all but Bismarck's immediate entourage, favoured the Augustenburg claims; the King, honest man, taking for his motto the words "I have no right to Holstein."[1]

The Danes were quickly driven from the Dannewerk, and retired into Jutland, leaving a garrison in the fortress of Düppel and retaining their hold on the islands. Jutland was immediately invaded, and on April 18 Düppel capitulated. Denmark had maintained her supremacy at sea, and the blockade of the German coast was a serious menace to her enemies. The invasion of Jutland was declared by Austria and Prussia to be an act of retaliation for the Danish seizure of German ships. Austria prepared to despatch a squadron to Danish waters, an announcement which provoked Palmerston to a fierce protest to Apponyi, the Austrian Minister (May 1), in which he declared that, if an Austrian squadron were to pass along our coasts and ports, and go into the Baltic to help in any way the German operations against Denmark, he would look upon it as "an affront and an insult to England," and that he "could not, and would not, stand such a thing." Queen Victoria and the Cabinet were alarmed at this language, and at the prospect of its embodiment in a despatch to Vienna; and it was eventually slurred over as the impetuosity of a fire-eating Minister.[2]

[1] Bismarck, *Reflections and Reminiscences*, II, 13.

[2] See Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, I, 462; Walpole, *Life of Russell*, I, 405.

Meanwhile, after the fall of Düppel, the British Government, anxious to protect Denmark by diplomatic means, as it seemed hopeless to persuade the Powers to active intervention, had proposed a Conference. The German Powers agreed, Bismarck having previously satisfied himself that France would not oppose Prussian aggrandisement. Denmark, after some hesitation, also agreed; and on April 25 the Conference assembled in London, where its first business was to arrange an armistice of one month between the belligerents.

(vi) The Conference of London

The Conference of London, though it failed to find a solution of the questions which it met to solve, marks an important stage in the controversy, and throws much light on the difficulties of the Powers, the complexity of the problem, and above all on the scientific duplicity with which Bismarck conducted the diplomatic warfare on which he had embarked for the aggrandisement of Prussia. This, then, is a convenient moment to attempt a survey of the motives by which the various Powers were guided.

In the first place, there was a general and natural reluctance to plunge Europe into war for the sake of some 50,000 Danes in North Schleswig, or in order to oblige the inhabitants of the Duchies to accept the rule of a Power which, to use the lowest argument, was not strong enough to impose or maintain its rule by force, and whose triumph in the Duchies could not be permanent and must lead to further troubles. Reflections such as these carried considerable, and not by any means unreasonable, weight with the Powers, and were specially effective in restraining France from intervention. Bismarck was not blind to them, and traded on the scruples of the Powers for his own purposes.

Secondly, the obstacles to active co-operation between France and England were obvious. Not even the Opposition in England—ready, as it was, to accuse

Russell of pusillanimity—desired a *dénouement* which would leave France supreme in Europe. Such a development was contrary both to England's interests and to her traditional policy. France, however much the sentiments of Napoleon might incline him to Augustenburg and a solution on national lines, was forced in her own interests on to the side of Prussia, whose support was necessary to her if she was to succeed in the much larger national task to which she had put her hand in Italy. She was also alienated from England, by whom she felt that she had been left in the lurch on the Polish question. She quite frankly declined to court another such rebuff. Under these conditions joint action by England and France was practically hopeless, a fact which was quite clear to Bismarck, and which might have been clear to England and Denmark also.

Thirdly, Austria was profoundly embarrassed. She abhorred the idea of revolution, and was suspicious of the candidature of Augustenburg. On the whole, also, she disliked the idea of despoiling the Danish King. She was being led whither she would not, and whither also she knew not. Never was there a more reluctant robber.

Fourthly, Germany, as distinct from Austria and Prussia, was pursuing a perfectly correct and honest policy. The German Confederation was not a signatory of the Treaty of London, and it was, therefore, open to Germany to contemplate the dismemberment of Denmark; and this she did with the frank object of uniting the Duchies as a unit in the German Confederation under the rule of Augustenburg. This was a policy which would have ruined the schemes of Bismarck; but it was also a policy which in the first stages of the controversy he could turn to the profit of Prussia. Germany could be used to secure a definite object—the rejection of the idea of a personal union of the Duchies under the Danish Crown, which was bound to be proposed at the Conference. When that card was played it could be trumped by

playing Germany. Bismarck could get rid of this obstacle without showing his hand, and he had no doubt that he could subsequently find a way of securing the rejection of the German solution of the question.

Fifthly, Prussia, now under the guidance of Bismarck, was embarked on a very far-seeing, very risky, and very tortuous policy which could only be brought to success by infinite duplicity and patience. Bismarck grasped the essentials of the situation with amazing skill, and played on the varying interests of the Powers with a resource which was never at fault. He traded on the vanity of Napoleon III, the embarrassments of the British Cabinet, the impulsiveness of Palmerston, the credulity and obstinacy of Denmark, the fears of Austria, and the honest simplicity of the German Diet, with unerring instinct. Above all, he traded on the want of unity, the mutual mistrust, and the divergent interests of the European Powers. It was no campaign of positions that was thus waged by the Prussian statesman: it was a war of movement, a step-by-step policy; he made use of circumstances even as they changed; the prejudices of his colleagues, the special aims of the various Powers were weapons in his hands. To use his own metaphor, he "uncoupled every hound that would bay." He made use of the Diet to eliminate the proposal of personal union under Denmark, of Denmark herself to secure the rejection of the scheme for a new German State under Augustenburg, as well as of the various proposals for a partition of Schleswig. He relied on the suspicions of England to preserve him from a plebiscite, which he himself, with daring self-assurance, actually proposed, but which would have been fatal to his plans. In all these matters Prussia played the decisive part; but it was unseen; the hidden hand was the hand of Bismarck.

Bismarck's first aim was to clear away the débris of the Treaty of London which blocked his path. The Prussian plenipotentiaries, therefore, urged that

recent events had made that treaty void; and, by agreeing to hear the proposals which, on this assumption, Germany now proceeded to lay before the Conference, that body tacitly agreed to the assumption. Prussia, speaking for the German Powers, then made a proposal for the personal union of the Duchies, with political independence. What Bismarck desired was the independence without the union, and he instructed the Prussian plenipotentiaries to see that the former was not adopted, but at the same time to make sure that its rejection was not attributed to the action of Prussia. He counted on the opposition of Beust, the plenipotentiary of the Diet, but above all on the obstinacy of Denmark, and did not count in vain. The Danish plenipotentiaries, greatly to his satisfaction, rejected the proposal, even if Christian IX were himself declared successor to the Duchies. The expedient of personal union thus perished at the hands of the Danes themselves.

The next proposal put forward by Prussia was similarly one which she by no means desired to see accepted. With a view to displaying her disinterestedness, to covering up her tracks, to gratifying Austria and the Diet, and to conciliating public opinion in the Duchies and in Germany, she proposed the union of Schleswig and Holstein as an independent State under Augustenburg. Greatly to her relief, this proposal also was rejected.

England then put forward her solution—a partition of Schleswig on the basis of nationality. There can be no question that this was the true solution, the only one that could have been satisfactory and enduring. In advocating it England made some reparation for the backslidings of the Treaty of London. The line of demarcation proposed by Russell, that of the River Schlei and the Dannewerk, rather transparently favoured Denmark; it would have given her the district of Angeln, which, though Danish by race, had long been a chief centre of the German party, together with the control of the approaches to the town of Schleswig.

The proposal was apparently based on the supposed military importance of the Dannewerk, which was about as useful against modern weapons as the great wall of China, and whose uselessness had just been demonstrated. Neither the Danes nor any of the Powers ventured to reject offhand the principle of partition. It was notorious, however, that any such partition would be very distasteful to the Eider-Danes. In 1862 the British Ambassador at Copenhagen had written:

> "There is one basis on which I think it right to state at once that I believe neither M. Hall's Government nor any other which could be formed in Denmark would consent to treat, and that is the partition of Slesvig. Rather than agree to such an arrangement, under whatever form it might be presented, I believe the worst chances of war would be incurred."

Since those words had been written Denmark had experienced the penalties of war with the German Powers, and might be expected to be more open to reason. Her objections to partition, however, remained; and, though she accepted the principle, she could make its reduction to practice impossible. It was on this that Bismarck calculated, and once again his calculations proved correct. The Danes stood out for the line Friedrichstadt—Eckernförde, a concession slight in area, but important, since it would have given control of the mouth of the Eider. The Germans, after at first suggesting the line Apenrade—Tondern, which was manifestly unfair, as it would have given them Alsen and the important fortress of Düppel (the true defensive bulwark of Jutland) fell back on the much more reasonable suggestion of Flensburg—Tondern. When Bismarck saw how unyielding the Danes were, he even indicated that a line from Gelting to Bredstedt might be acceptable. In face of the obstinacy of the Danes, Russell approached France with a final proposal. He suggested a modification of his original line slightly in favour of Germany (viz., from Kappeln, on the Gulf

of Schlei, to Husum, on the North Sea), and stipulated that his suggestion should be accompanied by an ultimatum from Great Britain and France. That he did not seriously contemplate the enforcement of his proposal by arms is demonstrated by his failure to give an answer to Drouyn de Lhuys' pertinent question as to what England would do should France be attacked on the Rhine. With the abandonment of the proposal for an ultimatum, the negotiations for partition fell to the ground. Neither Denmark nor the German Powers had honestly desired it. Eider-Danish feeling, in particular, utterly condemned it, and the Danish plenipotentiaries had been unwilling to budge an inch from their original extreme suggestion. Germany had seemed to be more pliable, but had only made concessions in order to preserve appearances, and calculated all the while on Danish obstinacy. Thus the one satisfactory solution had been condemned to failure from the start.

It was at this juncture that Bismarck took up his idea of the plebiscite. He was anxious to ingratiate himself with Napoleon III, and he once more calculated that he could safely play with a dangerous question in the assurance that the onus of rejection would fall on others. He was justified in his calculations; the proposal found no favour with the Conference.

Seeing that no agreement as to frontier was possible, and alive to the fact that the sands were running out, Russell now made a final suggestion—the reference of the question of frontier to a friendly Power. Austria was agreeable to this; but Bismarck, who now desired the break-up of the Conference, was not. He was clever enough to leave the onus of rejection to Denmark. The German Powers accordingly accepted Russell's suggestion, with modifications. Denmark refused, and the Conference broke up (June 25). It had accomplished nothing save the destruction of the Treaty of London; but it had demonstrated the

apparent moderation of Prussia and the intransigency of Denmark.

(vii) The Treaty of Vienna

Hostilities were at once resumed. Their result, in the absence of European support for Denmark, was a foregone conclusion; but the inevitable happened even more quickly than could have been anticipated. The seizure of Alsen by German troops involved the complete defeat of the Danes, and there was nothing left for them but to seek terms of peace. A Peace Conference assembled on July 25, the Diet being excluded from participation, a fact which demonstrated that the affairs of Schleswig and Holstein had ceased to be a German question, and now concerned Austria and Prussia alone. The principle of the cession of the Duchies to Austria and Prussia was accepted, and on August 1 the preliminaries of peace were signed which developed into the Treaty of Vienna (October 30, 1864). Schleswig and Holstein were ceded to Prussia and Austria, no mention being made of self-government, and none of special treatment for the Danish districts. Denmark was forced to pay the expenses of Prussia and Austria in the war; the public debt of the Danish Monarchy was divided. A further step in Bismarck's patient and long-sighted policy was thus recorded.

(viii) Austro-Prussian Condominium in the Duchies

The joint occupation, or condominium, of the Duchies established by the Treaty of Vienna obviously required further definition. It was regarded in different lights in different quarters. By Germany at large, and by Austria, it was accepted only as a step towards the establishment, under Augustenburg or another prince, of a new German petty State which should swell the Germanic Confederation; by a large majority in the Duchies it was regarded as the prelude

to the " restoration " of Augustenburg, who was still at Kiel, and still called himself Duke. By Bismarck, on the other hand, and the small body of Prussian statesmen who had penetrated the significance of his policy, the Treaty was regarded as definitive in so far as it involved the extinction of the Augustenburg claims, and as temporary only in so far as it admitted Austria to a joint dominion in the Duchies.

The next step was obviously to get rid of Augustenburg. Bismarck had already made it clear to the Duke in a three hours' interview on June 1, 1865,[1] that Prussia would only accept him on terms to which no self-respecting ruler could agree; and, on February 22, Berlin announced to Vienna the conditions on which the Duke might be accepted. These conditions were that Schleswig and Holstein should be included in the Zollverein; that its posts and telegraphs should be absorbed in the Prussian system; that the territory necessary for the construction of an inter-oceanic ship canal should be ceded, and that the canal should be constructed by Prussia, Kiel becoming a Prussian naval station; that Rendsburg should become a federal fortress, with a Prussian garrison; and that the naval and military forces of the Duchies should be incorporated with the Prussian Army and Navy.

There is no reason to suppose that these provisions would not have satisfied Bismarck; but he must have known that they would not be acceptable either to Augustenburg or to Austria. They were rejected by the Austrian Government as contrary to federal law, and the relations between Prussia and Austria became extremely strained. Bismarck and his friends pronounced themselves in favour of annexation even at the cost of war with Austria, and the situation was only saved by a Ministerial crisis in that country and by the reluctance of the Prussian Royal Family to commit themselves to an absolute rejection of Augustenburg and a policy of undisguised annexation. An

[1] Matter, *Vie de Bismarck*, II, 361.

ultimatum to Austria was, however, prepared, and the King of Prussia was persuaded to request Augustenburg to withdraw from the Duchies. Finally, Austria was persuaded to enter into negotiations for a redefinition of the conditions under which the condominium of the two Powers should be exercised in the Duchies. It was agreed that Holstein should be administered by Austria and Schleswig by Prussia, Prussia being granted two military roads and a telegraph line through Holstein, with permission to construct (but not to control) a canal uniting the Baltic and North Seas. She was also given the right to garrison Kiel, and Kiel and Rendsburg became federal fortresses. Holstein and Schleswig were both included in the Zollverein. Lauenburg was sold to the King of Prussia. The Convention of Gastein (August 14, 1865), which embodied these conditions, marked another step in the patient policy of Bismarck; it established the fact that the occupation of the Duchies, whatever further developments might ensue, was not a temporary expedient, and that the transfer of sovereignty from Denmark was absolute, and, while it apparently handed to Austria the lion's share, it procured for Prussia just those concessions which put the ultimate fate of the Duchies in her hands.

Great Britain and France were much shocked at this unprincipled convention. In a circular to the diplomatic agents abroad the British Government made the remark that "the dominion of force was the sole power acknowledged and regarded." Queen Victoria was even more outspoken.

> "Her Majesty," she wrote, "thinks that it is quite right that we should no longer mix ourselves up in the question, and that Prussia should at least be made aware of what She and her Government, and every honest man in Europe, must think of the gross and unblushing violation of every pledge and assurance that she had given, which Prussia has been guilty of"[1] (August 25, 1864).

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[1] Fitzmaurice, *Life of Granville*, I, 476.

Bismarck's hand was enormously strengthened at this moment by the delivery of the opinion of the Prussian Crown lawyers, to whom, at his initiative, the Augustenburg claims had been referred. The opinion, indeed, was not unanimous and may not have been unbiassed; but a majority declared that Christian August's much-canvassed renunciation was binding on his successors, and that consequently Duke Frederick's claim was invalid. This opinion cuts the ground from under the feet of those historians who, in order to strengthen the case against Denmark in 1864, bring forward plausible arguments against the validity of the renunciation. The opinion of the Prussian Crown lawyers is not decisive, but it is very suggestive; and it is certainly difficult to get over the fact that the highest legal opinion in Prussia pronounced in favour of the validity of the renunciation. The chief immediate value of this legal opinion lay in its effect on the King of Prussia, whose reluctance to insist on the withdrawal of Augustenburg was thereby to a great extent overcome.

(ix) The War of 1866 and the Peace of Prague

After the Convention of Gastein there remained but one further step in Bismarck's long and tortuous journey towards full Prussian annexation. Austria had to be set aside. This was a difficult matter, and it had long been recognised by Bismarck and his immediate entourage that it would involve a war between Prussia and Austria. To narrate the events which led to the war of 1866 would be to open subjects far removed from Schleswig and Holstein. It must suffice to say that Austria was already arming, that her resentment was increased by the negotiations opened by Prussia with France, and that in reply she began to make overtures to the secondary German Powers, and to urge the reference of the Schleswig-Holstein question to the German Confederation. Her summons of the provincial Diet of Holstein to discuss the future of

the Duchy was the signal for war. On June 7, 1866, Prussian troops invaded Holstein; on July 3 the war ended in the Prussian victory of Sadowa or Königgratz. Seven weeks later (August 23, 1866), after the usual armistice and preliminaries, the Peace of Prague was signed.

The main terms of this treaty do not concern us, but it marked the last stage in the long process of absorption by Prussia of Schleswig and Holstein. The two Duchies were made over intact to Prussia in full sovereignty, with the important reservation (introduced with the object of conciliating France) that the northern parts of Schleswig should be returned to Denmark if, by a popular vote, they expressed their desire for restoration.[1] This reservation of the Treaty of Prague was entirely ignored by Prussia, but it must be remembered that the engagement was made not with Denmark, but with Austria only, and it was cancelled with Austria's consent, and without protest from Denmark, in 1878.[2]

(x) Prussian Rule in North and Middle Schleswig

The Treaty of Prague brings the Schleswig-Holstein question proper to a close. The Germans of Holstein and South Schleswig have offered no opposition to Prussian rule; they have, indeed, in certain cases, been roused to express indignation at the treatment of their Danish neighbours; but, as a rule, they, or their leaders, appear to have urged the Prussian authorities to expand Germanism by all available means. Many of the most extreme Pan-Germans have sprung from the former Duchy of Holstein. We are concerned, therefore, with the Prussian rule in North Schleswig, and to a less degree in Middle Schleswig. North Schleswig may be roughly described as the district lying to the north of a line drawn from a point a short distance south of Tondern to a point in the northern suburbs of Flensburg. The term "Middle Schleswig"

[1] See Appendix IV, p. 105. [2] See Appendix V, p. 106.

is more difficult to define. If we confine it to those parts of Schleswig in which there is a considerable proportion of Danish-speaking people it may be described as the area contained in a triangle whose base is the southern boundary-line of North Schleswig, and whose apex lies midway between the town of Schleswig and the town of Husum. Otherwise, it would seem to include all the territory between Schleswig—Husum on the south and Flensburg—Tondern on the north.

Article V of the Treaty of Prague.—Bismarck appears at first to have been ready, if not to carry out the conditions of Article V of the Treaty of Prague, at any rate to make some territorial concession to Denmark; but he was not willing to enter into a conflict with the chauvinistic elements in Germany on the subject. He began to question the possibility of settling matters by a vote, and indicated that only a small part of the territory concerned could be ceded. When negotiations between Denmark and Prussia were opened at Copenhagen, and continued later at Berlin, it became clear that Prussia did not want a settlement. The Danes could get no information as to the amount of territory to be ceded; and the conditions laid down for the protection of the German minority in the districts that might be ceded were so stringent that they were constrained to discontinue the negotiations In 1878 the King of Denmark allowed his daughter to marry the pretender to the throne of Hanover, and omitted to stipulate for a renunciation of his claims. Prussia seized the opportunity in order to terminate an awkward situation, and by the Treaty of Vienna (October 11, 1878) abrogated that part of Article V of the Treaty of Prague which referred to the cession of the North Schleswig districts to Denmark. In spite of this, and in spite of the subsequent forced recognition by Denmark—e.g., in the Treaty of Berlin (January 11, 1907)—of the frontier laid down by the Treaty of Vienna in 1864, the Danes of Schleswig still consider Article V of the Treaty of Prague as a promise broken by Prussia; and their attitude, if it has no justification

in international law, cannot be regarded as wholly unreasonable.

In spite of her disregard and subsequent abrogation of Article V of the Treaty of Prague, it is possible that Prussia might have won over her new subjects to acquiescence in German rule if she had acted towards them with consideration for their language and liberties. But she has chosen to inflict on them much petty persecution and considerable hardship, with the result that Danish feeling in Schleswig has, on the whole, been strengthened rather than weakened. It is this policy of repression that we have now to consider.

The Optants.—The first and most difficult question is that of the class of people called "Optants." By Article XIX of the Treaty of Vienna (1864) it was laid down that all subjects domiciled in the ceded territories should for a space of six years have the option of exporting their movable property, withdrawing into Denmark, and keeping their status as Danish subjects, while retaining their immovable property in the ceded districts. All individuals who enjoyed the "right of indigenacy" (*droit d'indigénat*) were to preserve it. This right, which was peculiar to Denmark, distinguished the possessors of it from mere domiciled subjects. The former were alone capable of holding public offices, and this right by the law of Denmark was inalienable.

An *indigène* had full rights of citizenship, and in particular the right to reside in the country. It was this right of "indigenacy" that was specifically reserved by Article XIX of the Treaty of Vienna to all those who possessed it, whether in Denmark or in the Duchies, at the time of the ratification of the treaty. The inhabitants of both Denmark and the Duchies had, therefore, by the treaty the right to become subjects of either Denmark or Prussia by making a declaration of their intention, and subsequently taking up residence in the country of their choice. Generally

speaking, however, the Prussian Government refused to recognise the right of "indigenacy" in the case of Optants, and also treated as Optants all those who had expressed the intention of settling in Denmark, whether they had carried out their intention or not. Many people had exercised their option in anticipation of the cession of northern Schleswig under Article V of the Peace of Prague; when their hopes were disappointed they returned to find that they were regarded as mere resident aliens, destitute of all civic rights, and liable to arbitrary expulsion by the Prussian authorities.

The terms of military service were a further source of trouble for the Optants. Their only choice was either to serve in the Prussian Army or to leave the country. During the Franco-Prussian War many Danes objected to serving against France; but, although the six years allowed by the treaty had not expired, they were not allowed to use their right of "option." Many Danes who emigrated to Denmark in order to avoid service in the Landwehr were treated by Prussia as deserters.

On January 16, 1872, these troubled questions were the subject of an agreement between Denmark and Prussia, known as the Treaty of Apenrade, by the terms of which the Optants, with certain exceptions, were allowed to return and remain unmolested. For ten years this treaty was observed; but in 1882 the Prussians raised an outcry that it was intolerable that the Optants should remain exempt from military service, while the Prussians had to serve. They chose to forget that the Danish Optants were deprived of all rights as citizens, while Prussian Optants (Danes who had opted for Prussia) not only enjoyed the right of "indigenacy" in Denmark, and with it the rights of citizenship, but were also by a law passed in 1875 exempted from service in the Danish Army. In spite of this, the sons of Danish Optants born in or after 1863 were, on attaining military age, summoned to join the Prussian Army or to leave the country.

Those born after November 16, 1864, were most hardly treated, since, although born in Prussian territory, service in the Prussian Army did not make them Prussian citizens; hence they remained aliens as before. On the other hand, they could not be Optants, for by the law of Denmark the right of "indigenacy" did not pass to the children of *indigènes* born abroad, and consequently these unfortunate people were neither Danish nor Prussian, but *Heimatlose*—citizens of no country. In 1898 Denmark came to their rescue as far as she could by enacting that children born to Danish *indigènes* in foreign territory could inherit their parents' rights, an arrangement which slightly alleviated the position of children of Optants born after 1898.

The enactment of this law coincided with a period of great anti-Danish activity in North Schleswig. About a thousand Danes were expelled from the country; the "homeless" were prevented from establishing domiciles; if they married they were subject to fine and imprisonment, and even expulsion, a state of affairs which naturally increased the number of illegitimate children, who retained the status of their (often Prussian) mothers. Expedients were found for artificially increasing the number of "homeless"; even men who had fought for Germany in the Franco-Prussian War were deliberately reduced to this condition, about 1,000 people being treated in this way.

These harsh measures roused opposition in Germany, and were condemned in the severest terms by such men as Hans Delbrück, with the result that the persecution stopped, and a treaty dealing with the Optants was concluded at Berlin in 1907. The children of Optants born in German territory before the Danish law of 1898 were allowed to become Prussian citizens, those born since that date being apparently reckoned as Danish citizens. This settlement, though it by no means fulfilled the conditions of Article V of the Treaty of Prague, at least put an end to a great extent to the tragedy of the

" homeless." It may be added that it aroused great indignation among the Pan-Germans of Schleswig-Holstein. Unfortunately the Prussian Government marred the completeness of the settlement by electing to treat as homeless, and to subject to the old persecution, all children born in Germany to Danish workmen who had settled in Schleswig, chiefly before 1880, and whose fathers were not Optants. The treatment of these people, who in 1913 numbered about 2,000, provoked considerable indignation; and legislation to alleviate their lot was introduced in the Reichstag; but, beyond admitting them to service in the army and according rights of naturalisation after a year of service, nothing had been done before the outbreak of war in 1914. The people of North Schleswig seem to have obeyed the Prussian call to arms in 1914 with loyalty; but during the mobilisation the Prussians appear to have taken the precaution of placing all prominent Danes under arrest. Nothing is known of their subsequent treatment.[1]

No exact statistics as to the number of Optants have been published. Between December 1867 and December 1895, 57,000 persons emigrated from the relatively small territory of North Schleswig. In the year 1867 alone there were 8,000 emigrants. Those who remained outside German territory, however,—and only those who emigrated before 1870 were properly Optants—do not concern us. In North Schleswig itself in the year 1898, after all the emigration and expulsion, there were 20,000 so-called Danish subjects, of whom 4,000 were Optants; 12,000 children of Optants; and 4,000 immigrants from Denmark. The Prussian census of 1905 gives the total number of Danish sub-

[1] In a work entitled *Sønderjylland under Verdenskrigen* ('South Jutland during the World War'), by Vilhelm la Cour, published in Copenhagen in 1916, the author states that by the end of 1915 every second North Schleswiger called to the colours was either dead or wounded—a total of 12,500. The number of men mobilised is stated to have been 25,000.

jects in Schleswig-Holstein as 20,000—a decrease of almost 10,000 since 1885.

The Schools and Language Questions.—We have now to consider the treatment accorded by Prussia to those Danes who were received as citizens of the Prussian State. Many instances of petty oppression are charged against the Prussian Government and officials. They are set forth in considerable detail in Franz de Jessen's *Manuel historique de la Question du Slesvig*, and in its continuation, *Le Slesvig du Nord*; but it is only necessary here to deal with the principal methods by which the Germans have waged war on the Danish nationality—their policy, that is to say, with regard to the schools, the churches, and the land. The schools are the most effective weapon in such a warfare, and we may consider them first. The first stage was the suppression of the Danish language in the schools of Middle Schleswig and in those of the southern parishes of North Schleswig. In the rest of North Schleswig the Danish language was retained in teaching, but the teacher was obliged to give three special lessons a week in German to children whose parents desired it. This quite reasonable arrangement was introduced in 1864. The next stage was in 1871, when German lessons (six hours a week) were made compulsory after the first two years of attendance, Danish remaining the language of instruction.

In 1876 German had been made the official language for all Schleswig, and it became necessary to see that the children learnt German. In 1878, therefore, it was decreed that above the infant class a proportion (about a third) of the lessons should be given in German: in other words, German became to that extent the language in which the teaching was given. In 1888 a further step was taken. With certain modifications, German was imposed in all teaching, and the teachers were ordered to use German in conversation with the children. Danish was allowed only in religious instruction in those parishes where Danish was used in church; and even this restricted use of

the mother-tongue is apparently being slowly repressed. These measures were very much more violent than any which had been attempted in the contrary direction by the Danes during their period of government in Schleswig. The Danish measures had set aside four hours a week for instruction in German, and, above all, had only been applied to the mixed districts of Middle Schleswig. In 1883 it was decreed that private schools should not be founded or pass under new management unless they responded to a real "need"; a proviso which was construed to mean where the public schools were judged to be adequate. By 1888 the last of the old private Danish schools had disappeared—just at the time when the insistence upon the use of German in the schools became more severe. By similar measures the employment of private tutors has been made almost impossible; and of course only a few families would be able to afford such a luxury in any case. In 1882 the parents were also forbidden to send their children to Denmark for their elementary education. A good Prussian citizen must be educated within the territory of the Prussian State. The question of the time when the children are allowed to leave school has also caused the Danes a good deal of trouble. This is supposed to be when they are confirmed; but it is somewhat vaguely defined, and the authorities refused to recognise confirmation except in the State Church. In 1912 the authorities decided to strengthen the process of Germanisation by making attendance at continuation classes compulsory so as to cover the period between leaving the elementary school and entering upon military service. That this measure is directed especially against North Schleswig is clear from the fact that, while it applies to the whole Province of Schleswig-Holstein, the Government gave the assurance that they did not intend to enforce it against the wishes of the local authorities "except in the districts of the province where the national point of view is threatened."

The Danes have met these measures by the foundation of two societies, the League for the Defence of the Danish Language and the Academic League for North Schleswig. The former has done a great deal by establishing Danish libraries and distributing Danish literature to counteract the defects of the school education as well as the prohibition of Danish lectures and theatrical entertainments. The latter has offered financial assistance to parents who wish to send their children to secondary and continuation schools in Denmark. Both of these societies have steadily grown in influence, in spite of innumerable obstacles thrown in their way.

The Churches of North Schleswig.—Before the war of 1864 the Danish language, either alone or alternately with German, was employed in 162 parish churches of North and Middle Schleswig; in North Schleswig 108 parishes used Danish exclusively. The Germans immediately restricted the use of Danish in all the towns where the services had hitherto been alternately in Danish and German, and abolished the use of Danish entirely in 42 parishes of Middle Schleswig, with the result that when peace was concluded there were only 120 parishes where Danish was retained. In 106 of these, however, it was still the only language employed.

For some time this arrangement, with trifling modifications, was maintained. Petitions demanding services in Danish in parishes where German had excluded Danish were refused, even in cases where many of the parishioners were incapable of understanding German; but the employment of the German language was not extended much beyond these limits.

In 1885, the knowledge of German having become extended through the medium of the schools, the German policy became more aggressive. Even since then, however, Danish has in comparatively few cases been abolished altogether. In 1913 there were still 113 parishes in which Danish was employed to a greater or less degree alongside of German. On the other hand, German services have been thrust upon

numbers of purely Danish parishes. In 1890 there were only 69 parishes without German services, in 1897 only 53, and in 1913 only 26. The policy is to introduce a few German services and then gradually to extend their number. This number varies considerably for different parishes. In 27 parishes the German services stand to the Danish as 1 to 11, in 43 parishes as 12 to 20, and in 16 parishes the number of German services is approximately equal to those in Danish.

The results of these methods have naturally not been in the interests of religion or of the Lutheran Church. The Danes refuse to attend the German services, and in cases where the pastor is a strong upholder of Germanism become alienated from the Church altogether. The position of pastor is rendered unattractive, and there is a dearth of suitable candidates, which is partially due to the lack of people with suitable linguistic qualifications, as the Danish candidates are rejected in advance.

Another result has been a secession from the State Church; and a number of "free communities" have been established with pastors of their own. This movement began in the smallest possible way; but there are now nine of these churches in North Schleswig and a large number of other places where services are conducted. Every possible obstacle has been thrown in their way. The Danes were prevented from making use of the churches which they had built; services were forbidden on Sundays between the hours of 10 and 4, and were treated as public meetings of which special notice had to be given—apparently in the hope that they would ultimately be suppressed by the law which will, after the year 1928, prevent the use of any language but German at any public meeting in German territory. Petty persecution of the "free communities" in the matter of funerals has also prevailed, no service being permitted at the graveside of any seceder, and the communities being prevented from constructing cemeteries of their own.

The Struggle for the Land.—North Schleswig is essentially a country of peasant proprietors. The most effective way of undermining the independence and the Danish patriotism of the inhabitants is therefore to deprive them of the possession of the land. This policy has been pursued by the Prussian Government with comparatively little success owing to the skill and determination with which its efforts have been opposed. In 1914 new and more formidable weapons seemed likely to be directed against the recalcitrant Danes when the outbreak of war secured them at least a temporary respite.

The extensive emigration from North Schleswig before 1880, followed by ten years of agricultural depression, should have made the task of the Prussians easy. Fortunately for the Danes, it was not till about 1900 that any attempt was made to organize a systematic assault upon the land. In the thirty years between 1863 and 1893 the total loss of the Danes is estimated at only 106 farms, of which 63 were bought by Germans and 43 by individuals whose convictions were doubtful. All this occurred in the ordinary way of business, and was not the result of a deliberate policy carried out by the Government.

After two conspicuously unsuccessful attempts by private companies to establish colonies of Germans in North Schleswig, a policy of State purchase was introduced in 1880. By the end of 1911 more than 6,000,000 marks had been spent for this purpose. No additional land was acquired in 1912 or 1913.

This policy has not been a great success. The Danes as a whole were disinclined to sell their land, while indebted Germans were glad to take advantage of the high prices offered, especially as the seller was often allowed to go on farming his land as a tenant on favourable terms. This, of course, did nothing for the spread of Germanism. In cases where Danes were bought out—and considerably more than a third of the 6,000,000 marks passed into Danish pockets—the results were not very serious. The hold of the Danes

upon the land of North Schleswig was weakened; but families of German colonists, who are the greatest danger to the prevalence of the Danish language and sentiment, were not introduced. The policy of the Government had raised the price of land till it was too dear for purposes of colonization. The labour necessary for the exploitation of the new State land was obtained from the inhabitants of the country, unmarried Germans, or even Poles.

A real attempt to settle German colonists on the land of Schleswig-Holstein only began seriously in 1900 with the spread of the *Rentengut* system. This was originally a weapon employed against the Poles by the laws of 1890 and 1891. It was less successful in the Duchies than in Poland, where there were large areas of uncultivated land suitable for colonization.

The system may be described briefly as follows. The buyer of a *Rentengut* was required only to pay down a certain portion of the price, the balance being supplied by the State as a loan upon very favourable terms. In return for this the State received a right of pre-emption at a price considerably below the real value, whenever the property changed hands. The proprietor was not allowed to lease his farm to a tenant without the consent of the Government. In addition, the right of pre-emption accrued to the State if the proprietor failed to maintain the farm in German hands, or committed any act, such as furthering anti-German propaganda, which was classed as hostile to the State. The main point is that the proprietor of a *Rentengut* was, in fact, deprived of his political liberty.

This scheme was at first more successful in Holstein, where the people, because of the existence of large estates, were less independent. It proceeded very slowly in Schleswig, where before 1900 there were for some time only 37 *Rentengüter*. At the end of 1908 these had risen to 138, covering 2,557 hectares. In 1913, as a result of more energetic measures on the part of the Germans, there were 368 of these *Rentengüter* in the northern districts of Schleswig.

In 1909 the Germans founded at Kiel the Schleswig-Holsteinische Gemeinnützige Siedlungs-Genossenschaft, or Schleswig-Holstein Society for Colonization, with a capital of over 500,000 marks. The shareholders were principally public bodies (including the Prussian State) and societies. Only 76 private individuals subscribed. The aim of the society was to buy up land and sell it in the form of *Rentengüter*, and by this means to construct "a rampart of German colonists." The operations of the society were not, however, very successful, and fell far short of its ambitions. It eventually went into liquidation.

A similar society was the Gemeinnützige Kleinsiedlungs-Genossenschaft of Hadersleben. In 1911 it founded 14 small *Rentengüter* for agricultural labourers. It only succeeded, according to its own confession, by means of State assistance. There was great difficulty in finding buyers, and its financial situation was admitted to be precarious.

These methods on the part of the Prussians—the purchase of lands for the State, the establishment of *Rentengüter*, and the activity of the two colonization societies—naturally aroused some disquiet among the Danes. The land in Danish possession was considerably indebted—up to almost 27 per cent. of its value in the *Kreis* of Tondern and up to about 40 per cent. of its value in that of Hadersleben—and it was realised that in these circumstances something more was necessary than a simple trust in the patriotism of individuals, if the land was really to be saved.

The result was the foundation of the Credit Society for North Schleswig (*Nordslesvigske Kreditforening*). Its capital, derived, of course, from private subscribers, was considerably more than 800,000 marks, and this was subsequently increased to about 1,000,000. Its aim was to carry on the ordinary functions of a bank, and especially to come to the assistance of farmers by issuing loans. After the usual official difficulties had been surmounted, it was inscribed on the Register of Commerce in May 1910.

It appears to have met with complete success. Up to the end of 1913 it had dealt with 577 loans amounting in all to very nearly 5,000,000 marks. Its net profit in the year 1913 was over 50,000 marks, and its turnover amounted to a little under 7,500,000 marks. It has saved several farms from passing into German hands, and its successful activity tends to strengthen the self-confidence and determination of the Danes.

During this period there went on, of course, the usual unsystematic buying and selling of land by private individuals. There were before 1910 no statistics as to whether the Danes or the Germans were gaining by these transactions—it is probable that the Danes had been gaining slightly upon the whole—but in the years 1910 and 1911 these changes were registered, and it was shown that the Danes had gained by 6 properties, amounting to 322 hectares in all, on a series of transactions involving 201 properties with a total area of 3,259 hectares. This fact was greatly exaggerated in the German press, and was instrumental in producing the law of 1912 dealing with the Conservation of Property.

By this law 100,000,000 marks were set aside to be used for the purposes of conserving the land in East Prussia, Pomerania, Silesia, and Schleswig-Holstein. It aimed at acquiring land in order to sell it as *Rentengut* and at supporting the societies already trying to secure that end. Proprietors were to receive loans from the State on conditions which turned their property into *Rentengüter*. This scheme was to be applied only in districts where "national ideas" were professed.

The Schleswig-Holsteinische Höfebank was founded at Kiel for the purpose of acting as the agent of the State in this matter. The State contributed 600,000 marks to a capital of about 1,000,000 marks. Everything was made easy for the new enterprise. The contracts had only to be signed in the presence of an official, and the services of lawyers were not required.

It was inevitable that certain individuals should succumb to the new temptation, yet in spite of vigorous German efforts the system is not altogether a success. The Danes have shown themselves superior to the temptation; and, while some of the *Hjemmetysker*, i.e. natives of North Schleswig with German sympathies, have taken advantage of the scheme, many of the others have resented this attack upon their political liberty, and have passed over into the camp of the Danes.

The Danes of North Schleswig have taken measures to counteract the German assaults, and to instruct their compatriots upon the true meaning of the Prussian proposals. For this purpose they founded in October 1913 the society called *Landeværn*, with its local branches called *Sogneværn*. The aim of this society is to preserve the land of North Schleswig "as free land in the hands of free men." It instructs the peasants as to the dangers threatening themselves and their land, and offers them every assistance in its power. It makes its appeal not only to the Danes but to the *Hjemmetysker*. The members of the *Sogneværn* make a promise never to allow their land to become State land or *Rentengut* or "conserved" land. By May 1914 there were already 84 *Sogneværn* founded for 93 parishes, with a total of 6,713 members. The results attained by this society cannot, of course, be described in detail, as its activity is primarily preventive, but before May 1914 it had occupied itself, on the invitation of the *Sogneværn*, with 27 cases where free land was in danger of being lost, and in 15 cases succeeded in saving it with the co-operation of the Nordslesvigske Kreditforening. In other cases the land was saved without their assistance. Only 3 cases were without result.

All these attacks upon the land by the Germans, and the necessity laid upon the Danes of organizing themselves in self-defence, have done a great deal to increase national consciousness. The success with which, upon the whole, the Danish efforts have been attended has

served to augment their unity and to develop their self-confidence.

An attack on Danish landowners, more serious than any that had preceded it, was developing at the moment of the outbreak of the Great War, in the form of a Bill dealing with the Division of Land, which was to apply to the whole of Prussia, with special provisions for Schleswig-Holstein, the districts that formerly belonged to Poland, and certain other areas. By this measure, whenever land above 10 hectares in area was sold in whole or in part, the State was to have a right of pre-emption, which it could make over to societies for colonization or other analogous societies. Exceptions were made where the land was sold to public institutions or to relations of the vendor. The same principles were to apply where land was exchanged, made over to a society, and so on. Various other enactments attempted to make the *Rentengüter* more attractive, and forbade the division of land without the consent of the Prussian authorities.

It is clear that the most important result of this law would be to prevent Danes from buying land altogether. Whenever a Dane wished to buy a piece of land the authorities would be in a position to exercise their right of pre-emption, and there is no reason to believe that they would hesitate to do so. The Bill aroused some opposition in the Reichstag, and was referred to a Committee, by which it was somewhat modified. The outbreak of war followed, and it was suspended. Thus the Danes of Schleswig were saved, temporarily at least, from the most serious menace that had ever threatened them.

(xi) Historical Proposals for the Partition of Schleswig

Since the very beginning of the Schleswig-Holstein troubles, many different proposals have been made to partition Schleswig according to nationality or other considerations.

1832.—The earliest suggestion of the kind was, as we should expect, made first of all from the German side. It was put forward by Uwe Jens Lornsen—the originator of the Schleswig-Holstein agitation—in a letter written in 1832, where he suggested that the departments of Hadersleben, Apenrade, and Lügumkloster might be handed over to the Danes. There is, however, no mention of such a possibility in his work on the Union of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.

1838, 1839, 1844.—In 1839 a similar suggestion was made in a letter by Olshausen, who was later a member of the Provisional Government (see p. 23), but the first public proposal of the kind was made in 1838 by a Dane called J. P. With in the Provincial Diet of North Jutland. In 1844 H. N. Clausen, then President of the Diet of the Islands, also suggested the idea. Neither of these proposals was seriously considered.

1842.—A more precise proposal was made in 1842 by W. Beseler, subsequently a member of the Revolutionary Government. The department of Hadersleben was to be given up to Denmark in return for the Danish parts of Sylt and Föhr. The sacrifice proposed was a small one; and possibly the suggestion should be regarded as a political move rather than as a genuine attempt to solve the difficulty.

So far the question of partition had been purely theoretical, but it became a matter of practical politics during the war of 1848. The subject was seriously discussed again in 1861-62, and also at the Conference of London in 1864. The different proposals made on these three separate occasions will be given in some detail.

1848.—In 1848, when things were becoming serious, there were certainly discussions—notably between the Danish Minister Lehmann and the two German delegates Clausen and Olshausen—as to the possibility of determining a partition of Schleswig by means of a parish plebiscite. It is believed that the German delegates suggested a possible line running somewhere in the vicinity of Flensburg. The Danish Minister

appears to have rejected it; but he definitely entertained the idea of partition in the autumn of 1848, although he referred to partition as an "amusing idea" when the rising had been suppressed. After the defeats of 1864 he returned to his original opinion.

The Provisional Government of Schleswig-Holstein was originally willing to allow the Danes of North Schleswig to be given to Denmark, if they freely declared their desire to this effect. One of the leading members of it suggested a line running to the north of Flensburg and Tondern and leaving to Denmark the islands of Alsen and Aarö. Later, when opinion was more excited and there was a possibility of winning the whole of Schleswig by German help, the idea began to be regarded with disfavour. In a communication to the Prussian Government the Provisional Government made use of arguments which have often been made use of since: that there was no true frontier possible owing to the interpenetration of languages; that the division was rather according to social position than language, the upper classes being largely German; and that it was impossible to abandon excellent ports where the Germans were in a majority.

The Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, recognised that it was impossible to secure the whole of Schleswig, and hoped by means of a plebiscite to secure something more of North Schleswig than corresponded to the linguistic boundary. The Prussian representative at London, who was a supporter of the Schleswig-Holstein party, was willing to agree to partition if North Schleswig were made into an independent duchy and guarantees could be secured for the German minority. The German Confederation and its representative at London were willing to accept partition without further conditions. Russia was also in favour of partition, and Palmerston from the first supported the idea. He wished to determine the frontier by a statistical enquiry and not by a plebiscite, and he recognised the right of both Germans and Danes

to have their children taught in their own language where they were in a minority.

The Danes, possibly after a slight hesitation in the beginning, set themselves definitely against all idea of partition. The Danish Ambassador at London put forward very much the same arguments as those maintained by the Provisional Government. He wished Schleswig to continue to be a country of transition between Denmark and Holstein.

Palmerston did not accept his contentions, and insisted on the necessity of concession on both sides. Unfortunately the Danes would not yield, and the very maximum they were prepared to concede was a line from the Schlei to the south of Husum, leaving the town of Schleswig to Germany. Palmerston made in October 1848 the very equitable proposal of a line from the south of Flensburg to Ockholm, opposite the island of Föhr, which would have given the Danes all that they could reasonably ask from the point of view of nationality. The Danes regarded this as the very greatest concession which they could possibly make, but they proposed to discuss the question of partition, and a month later the Prussian Government agreed that partition was the only true solution. Unfortunately, in December Palmerston withdrew his proposal, on the ground that he could find no support in Denmark or the Duchies.

There can be no doubt that at this time public opinion in Denmark was quite impracticable on the question, and the King of Denmark took up the same attitude as his subjects. Their position was that they would surrender nothing. The Germans were much more reasonable, and there was a certain amount of opinion in Schleswig-Holstein itself which was in favour of partition. The opinion of Prussia at the conclusion of the armistice in July 1849 was in favour of partition along the line Flensburg—Tondern.

There can be no doubt that at this time partition would have been perfectly possible, if Denmark and Schleswig had agreed to accept it. At the end of the

war, however, Danish feeling appears to have been that Schleswig as a whole had been won for Denmark by the war, and must be retained at all costs. It was not realised that South Schleswig, including Angeln, was as much Germanophile as North Schleswig was Danophile, and that the rising had served to arouse and intensify national feeling upon both sides. There is little doubt that, if Holstein had received all the Germans of the Duchies into its borders, it would ultimately have become joined to Germany. Its position as a member of the German Confederation attached to the Danish Crown would certainly have been very anomalous as soon as there was a real elected Parliament for the German people. No doubt it was hoped that the intermediate position of Schleswig would help to attach Holstein to the Danish Crown. The fact remains, however, that the Danes never really succeeded in getting a hold upon Holstein after 1848, and that their attempt to retain everything was the real reason why everything was ultimately lost.

During the years preceding the war of 1864 the Danes remained in a state of false security, and public opinion was completely unprepared when the crash ultimately came. The Germans during this period were much more moderate than the Danes in their attitude towards partition on this particular point, and various suggestions made at this time in England showed that the idea would have been supported there. Immediately before the war, in 1861 and 1862, partition would have been easy. The Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Bernstorff, advocated it, and England, France, and Russia expressed their agreement. Bismarck himself, so late as September 1862, spoke of it with favour. Unfortunately, in June of the same year Palmerston declared, to the great satisfaction of Copenhagen, that it was now too late to put forward this solution. Austria was definitely opposed to it on the ground that an enlarged Holstein would be likely to break away from Denmark and lead to an increase in the strength of Prussia. There is

little doubt, however, that if the Danes had been willing it would have been possible to arrange for a just solution.

The last opportunity came with the war itself, but even after the disaster of Düppel the Danes refused to accept it. The various proposals for partition put forward during the Conference of London have already been described.[1] Denmark clung with an almost incredible obstinacy to the original British suggestion of the line of the Schlei and the Dannewerk. The Danish Government refused a plebiscite as an insult to the dignity of the King; they refused arbitration; and they refused even the continuation of the armistice. The Conference of London broke up, and the whole of Schleswig was secured for Prussia.

When the Schleswig-Holstein question is considered solely from the point of view of nationality, the policy of Denmark, as the Danes would themselves admit, appears both impolitic and unreasonable. It must be remembered, however, that to consider the situation solely from the national point of view is to make an abstraction and so to distort the real state of affairs. The tragedy of Denmark was precisely that her ancient historic rights were, as we have seen, so well founded that she felt herself justified in ignoring a new right, or at any rate a new claim, which had arisen, the right or claim of nationality. For so doing she has been severely punished. Not only has her historic right been overridden by force, but a certain portion of the Danish nation has been subjected to an oppression incomparably greater than any oppression of which Denmark can be justly accused.

It would appear from what has already been said (p. 45) that there are roughly five possible frontiers. These are (1) Apenrade to Tondern; (2) Flensburg to Tondern; (3) Flensburg or Gelting to Bredstedt; (4) Schleswig to Husum; and (5) if it be assumed—though the assumption rests on insufficient

[1] See p. 44.

evidence—that the Frisians of the East Coast would desire to remain German, and at the same time that justice to the Danes could only be done by some such line as Flensburg—Bredstedt, a triangular frontier, Flensburg—Joldelund—Tondern, might be considered, though this would be open to obvious disadvantages.

The first and fourth of these suggested frontiers may be immediately set aside—so far, at least, as language and national sentiment are regarded as determining considerations. They represent the maximum German and the maximum Danish demands respectively, and either would be seriously unjust to one or the other nationality. It is certain that any boundary determined primarily by national considerations would lie somewhere within the triangle formed by the three towns Flensburg, Tondern, and Husum. Even within this triangle the line Flensburg to Husum, or the more reasonable line Flensburg to Bredstedt, while it would give to the Danes practically all the districts where Danish to any extent survives, would necessarily hand over to Denmark a considerable proportion of German-speaking people as well as Frisians, and it would also be subject to obvious strategic disadvantages.

On the other hand, the line from Flensburg to a point a little south of Tondern is said to be strategically the strongest line in North Schleswig, and it has, upon the whole, met with the greatest support; as we have seen, it corresponds most fairly with the linguistic boundary, and it gets over the difficulty of the Frisian population. It only remains to be added that this is the proposal made by De Jessen in the *Manuel historique de la Question du Slesvig*,[1] which may be taken as representative of moderate Danish opinion to-day. There it is maintained not only that this is the real southern boundary of the Danish region, but also that it is the most obvious physical frontier. The *Manuel* makes no suggestion as to whether the boundary ought to run north or south of Flensburg. Flensburg is predominantly German, but

[1] See Eberling's remarks quoted in the *Manuel*, pp. 153-4.

it may be doubted whether its position is such that it can properly be separated from North Schleswig, and whether it might not be fairly considered as compensation for the loss of the Danes in the mixed regions of Middle Schleswig. The *Manuel* also makes no suggestion as to the island of Sylt, which is largely Frisian. Its population is only 4,500, and (apart from its military value) it is chiefly of importance as a health resort. Both these questions would have to be considered before a new frontier could be satisfactorily determined.

III. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS

(1) Religious

The population of the province, whether Danish, Frisian, or German, is almost uniformly Protestant, the percentage of Protestants in 1910 being 96·1. The percentage would be even higher but for the presence of Catholics from other districts in the cities of Altona and Kiel. In the individual districts the percentage of Protestants varied in 1900 between 94·5 (Kiel urban) and 99·8 (Tondern). The principal figures for 1910 were:—

Protestants	1,558,789
Catholics	53,606
Jews	3,345

(2) Political

Administrative Divisions.—The province of Schleswig-Holstein is divided for purposes of administration into 25 *Kreise.* Every *Kreis* forms a self-administering corporation. A town with over 25,000 civilian inhabitants forms an urban *Kreis.* The urban *Kreise* are Flensburg, Kiel, Neumünster, Altona, and Wandsbek.

Schleswig in the narrower sense is divided into 10 *Kreise*, of which one, Flensburg, is an urban *Kreis.* Each *Kreis* is divided into *Amtsbezirke*, and these sub-divided into *Gutsbezirke* (manors) and *Landgemeinden* (rural communes or districts). Some great manorial estates form a single *Amtsbezirk.* The *Kreis* of Husum appears to have a special method of sub-division into 14 parish *communes.* A considerable field is left to local self-government.

The following *Kreise* fall in North and Middle Schleswig :—

	Towns.	*Guts-bezirke.*	*Land-gemeinden.*
1. Apenrade	1	5	79
2. Urban Flensburg ..	1	—	—
3. Rural Flensburg ..	1	21	154
4. Hadersleben	1 (+ 1 small town)	5	131
5. Sonderburg	1 (+ 2 small towns)	3	67
6. Tondern	2 (+ 3 „)	11	181

(3) Educational

The organization of public education in Schleswig-Holstein is on the well-known Prussian lines. The figures for 1911 (the last available at present) show that there were 1,919 primary schools, with 251,853 pupils; 45 middle schools, with 15,476 pupils; and 32 higher academies, with 4,391 pupils (figures for 1912). The University at Kiel was attended by 3,094 students, of whom 1,511 were Prussians. There are the usual technical and art academies. Shipbuilding is taught at Flensburg, and navigation at Altona, Flensburg, and Apenrade. The higher technical academy at Kiel had 654 pupils.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

(1) The Conduct of Great Britain in respect of the Schleswig-Holstein Question

(i) Great Britain had been wrong in making herself the sponsor of the London Treaty of 1852. It was the price she paid for Russian support in her policy in Greece.[1] She committed herself to the maintenance of

[1] Morier, *op. cit.*, I, 363. "Russia, at that time omnipotent in Europe, was the one most interested in the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. . . . The rights of Slesvig-Holstein were unhesitatingly sacrificed by Palmerston to effect a compromise"—and to extract himself from the complications due to his hasty action in the Don Pacifico affair.

the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, which integrity was in conflict with the principle of "national boundaries." In signing that treaty England had, as Queen Victoria put it,

> "committed the grievous fault of signing away other people's rights, and of handing over people themselves to a Sovereign to whom they owe no allegiance."

Moreover, in doing so, England had made no stipulations for the protection of the German inhabitants of the Duchies. Such stipulations were indeed made, but they were made independently by Germany, and were not embodied in the terms of the treaty. England could, and did, urge Denmark to carry out these pledges; but she could not insist on them as an integral part of the settlement of 1852. She was bound by that treaty to maintain the integrity of Denmark whether those pledges were observed or repudiated. She had, in fact, in conjunction with the other signatories, put herself into a false position.

(ii) During the eleven years that ensued British statesmen were much occupied in giving good advice to Denmark and to the German Powers, in the hope of securing a peaceful settlement of the question. After the Patent of March 30, 1863, and the consequent Constitution, which was a breach of the pledges given by Denmark in 1852—but not in any way a breach of the terms of the treaty of 1852—the issue between Germany and Denmark was a straight one. Great Britain continued to press Denmark to give satisfaction to Germany, and at the same time gave Germany to understand that any attempt to use force against Denmark would be regarded with disfavour, and might lead to intervention, by the Powers. After the promulgation of the Constitution in November 1863, and the consequent invasion of Holstein (Federal Execution) by the forces of the German Confederation, and, above all, after the invasion of Schleswig by the joint forces of Austria and Prussia, Britain redoubled

her efforts. She adjured Denmark to take immediate steps to revoke or suspend the Constitution. This could only be done by the summoning of the Rigsraad. The Constitution having been solemnly promulgated, the King had no power to revoke it by autocratic means. The summoning of the Rigsraad was a lengthy business, and it was also viewed by Germany with disfavour, as putting into action the very Constitution against which their protest was made. The Danish Government, with some reluctance, agreed to act on the advice given by England and France; and, to satisfy Germany, Britain undertook to get a protocol signed stating that if the Rigsraad failed to revoke the Constitution Denmark would forfeit the right to look to the Powers for support. She approached Prussia with these offers and a demand for a six weeks' suspension of hostilities, to admit of the summoning of the Rigsraad.

The Austro-Prussian refusal to grant this delay was a turning-point. From that time forward Russell, the British Foreign Minister, who had hitherto always had what he called a " twinge of feeling " that there was something to be said for the German point of view, and that the Danes were not wholly in the right, was strongly of opinion that Germany, so far as her opinions were represented by the two German Great Powers, had put herself in the wrong. Henceforward he may be regarded as willing and anxious to do whatever was in his power to assist Denmark.

(iii) The policy of the British Ministry was by no means simple or homogeneous. Palmerston was Prime Minister, and, with characteristic and disconcerting directness, he had publicly protested in July 1863 against the attitude of Germany. " If the rights and independence of Denmark are attacked," he said in the House of Commons, " those who make the attempt will find that it will not be Denmark alone with whom they will have to contend." Small wonder if Denmark, after such a blunt pronouncement,

assumed that she would have the support of England in case she were attacked. At the same time, it must be pointed out that this promise or threat was not unconditional; that the phrase "rights and independence" was capable of many definitions; that Palmerston was, no doubt, speaking of a joint intervention of the non-German Powers; that his words were meant more as a warning to Germany and a stimulus to his more lukewarm colleagues than as an encouragement to Denmark; and, above all, that in the diplomatic communications between the British and Danish Governments it was repeatedly stated that Britain would only act in conjunction with her Allies. Nevertheless, the "notches" which Palmerston at intervals "made off his own bat" were distinctly injudicious, and gave some colour to the idea that in the last resort Britain would come to the defence of Denmark. Nor can there be much doubt that this was in the back of Palmerston's, and to a less extent at the back of Russell's, mind. It is curious to note that in February 1864 it was Russell who proposed a policy of intervention and Palmerston who counselled moderation. But when Austria made preparations for the despatch of a squadron to Danish waters Palmerston once more broke out with a violent protest to the Austrian Ambassador; and it was only the action of the Cabinet and the Queen that prevented the embodiment of his wild and whirling words in a despatch to Vienna.

The truth was that there was a considerable divergence of opinion, not only between the Queen and her Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, but also between those statesmen and the rest of the Cabinet. Queen Victoria had not only a "twinge of feeling," but a very pronounced opinion, that Germany was, broadly speaking, in the right; that the "wretched" Treaty of London had been a gross blunder; and that no settlement of the question of the Duchies would be satisfactory which left a large proportion of their population under a rule which they detested. She

was also keenly alive to the importance of the movement towards German unity of which her more prominent advisers seem to have had little cognisance, and she viewed with distaste and alarm the prospect of this country's being drawn into a European conflagration, the limits of which it was impossible to foresee, for the sake of a policy which she rightly regarded as reactionary. Lord Granville and certain other members of the Cabinet were inclined to adopt the Queen's view, and this accounts for the fact that the voice of the Cabinet differed considerably from that of its two most prominent members.

Whether this unfortunate ambiguity did affect the policy of Denmark, and did encourage the Danish Ministers to obstinacy, in the expectation of ultimate material aid from England, it is difficult to say. There is no evidence of any such direct encouragement in the official documents. The attitude and language of the diplomats was scrupulously correct. Both Paget, the Ambassador at Copenhagen, and Wodehouse, who went on a special mission to that Court in January 1864, repeatedly informed the Danes that, unless they adopted counsels of moderation, they could not expect material assistance from England, and that in any case England could not move without the co-operation of the other Powers. It is difficult to believe that even the hasty rhetoric of the Prime Minister carried more weight with the Danes than the deliberate warnings of the diplomats. And, in spite of what Lord Palmerston said, England may be exonerated from the reproach of having held out hopes to Denmark and failed to carry them out in action.

The international position of England was a very difficult one. On more than one occasion during the crisis of 1863-64 it is clear that she would have lent assistance to Denmark had she been assured of the co-operation of the non-German Powers. To have moved without their co-operation would have been dangerous, and might have been ineffective. Any such move would at once have united Germany and the

German Great Powers, and it must be remembered that one of the most hopeful signs for Denmark was the want of unity between Prussia, Austria, and the German Confederation.[1] It is also doubtful if the material help that England could give would have been sufficient to carry the day for Denmark. Her chief assistance would have been naval, and it was at sea that Denmark, unaided, proved herself able to cope with the forces of Germany. By land England, of course, carried weight, but it is doubtful if she carried weight enough to defeat the united forces of Prussia, Austria, and the German Confederation.

If she looked to the other Powers, England found little comfort. Alone of the non-German Powers, Sweden was ready to fling herself into the conflict at a sign from England; but her material forces were not great.[2] Russia, while willing to give all possible diplomatic aid, was not prepared to lend armed assistance.[3] But it was on the attitude of France that that of England chiefly depended; and here she was in the unfortunate position of not knowing which she chiefly feared—intervention or failure to intervene. France was certainly in the best position to help, and, indeed, English intervention came in the end to depend on French co-operation; but such co-operation could be too dearly bought. Napoleon III was bound by the Treaty of London as much as England, but his antecedents and policy forbade him to disregard the plea of the German inhabitants of the Duchies. It would have been too patently illogical to pursue one policy on the Eider and another on the Po. He was, therefore, not a whole-hearted supporter of Denmark. His attitude was by no means that of England; he was not ready to go to the assistance of Denmark from purely

[1] Count Platen (Hanover) stated to Sir H. Howard, on February 4, 1864, that if England intervened the whole of Germany would take up arms in support of Prussia and Austria; and expressed his belief that Germany could effectively oppose England.

[2] B.B., V., 730. 200,000 men was Sweden's proposed contingent.

[3] B.B., V., 728.

altruistic motives. He had other objects nearer at heart—in Italy and on the Rhine; and he was willing to intervene in the Danish controversy only if he could see in such intervention some profit for his policy in those directions. In fact, he was not prepared to embroil himself with the German Powers, and to plunge Europe into a general conflagration, for the sake of some 50,000 Danes in North Schleswig, unless he saw some prospect of a general rearrangement of European boundaries which would secure substantial advantages to France. And it was very definitely part of his Italian policy to keep on good terms with Prussia in order that she might be a set-off to his inevitable antagonism with Austria.[1]

This, in itself, as Prussia quite well knew, was sufficient to keep him from intervention in the Danish struggle; unless, indeed, England would guarantee him advantages which would outweigh the loss of Prussian friendship and the consequent blow to his Italian schemes: and it was just this that England could not do. It was utterly contrary to her traditional policy and to the interests she had at heart to take any step which would involve the aggrandisement of France. When Napoleon hinted at "something on the Rhine,"[2] as the reward of French intervention, England instinctively drew back. As Palmerston expressed it: "The conquest of that territory (the Rhine provinces) by France would be an evil for us and would seriously affect the position of Holland and Belgium."[3] As France was quite unwilling to move

[1] The causes of the reluctance of the French Government to give material assistance to Denmark are well summarised in a note of Drouyn de Lhuys printed in *Les Origines diplomatiques de la Guerre de* 1870-71, I, 197-200.

[2] June 24, 1864.

[3] Walpole, *Life of Russell*, II, 403. It is worthy of note that Disraeli was of the same opinion. On January 20, 1864, he wrote to Sir George Sinclair:—"An English Government that, in its wisdom, goes to war with Germany must make France the mistress of Europe." Derby took the same line. (Monypenny and Buckle, *Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, IV, 344, 345.)

to the help of Denmark without the guarantee of some substantial *quid pro quo* of this kind, it was clear that a joint intervention of the Powers for the protection of Denmark was a most unlikely development. Prussia knew this, and England ought to have known it, and Denmark ought to have known it.

To sum up: (1) England had never guaranteed material aid to Denmark, and had repeatedly declared that she would not move except in conjunction with the other non-German Powers. (2) It is not clear that the intervention of England alone, which would have definitely united Germany, would have saved Denmark. (3) The other non-German Powers, France in particular, would not move except on terms which England rightly regarded as more dangerous to the future of Europe than any calamity that could happen to Denmark. (4) Prussia was well aware of this, and shaped her policy accordingly; while, if Bismarck can be believed, she did not scruple to let it be understood at Copenhagen that she stood in fear of British intervention. (5) In its earlier stages, until the idea of a partition of Schleswig was rejected, and the policy of annexation of the Duchies by Prussia developed, the German solution, however distasteful to Denmark and however contrary to the terms of the Treaty of London, was, on the whole, the only policy which provided a solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question that was likely to be permanent and satisfactory.

(2) The Future of Schleswig

There is no question of the wholesale return of the Duchies to Denmark. Europe has marched too far from the non-national ideas of 1815 and 1852; and, even if Denmark desired to recover Schleswig and Holstein, Europe could not countenance the transaction. To do so would be merely to revive the conditions which led to the crisis of 1863-64. But Denmark does not desire it. What she does desire is reparation for the injustice inflicted on her in 1866; that injustice did

not lie in the transference of Holstein and the German parts of Schleswig to Germany, but in their transference, together with the Danish district, to Prussia. It was the loss of North Schleswig that constituted the main injustice to Denmark. The Prussian annexation was an affront to Germany and a menace to Europe.

To restore the Danish districts of North Schleswig to Denmark, either by the exercise of a plebiscite or by an arbitration, would be both a reparation to Denmark and a permanent solution of a troublesome, if somewhat subordinate, question. The position has been put with considerable force and moderation by a Danish writer[1] :—

> "On l'a dit une fois,—et c'est une pensée à la fois belle et spirituelle,—que le sort du Danemark en 1864 était vraiment tragique parce que dans sa lutte pour un droit ancien (droit politique, droit historique) il a péché contre un droit nouveau (le droit des peuples, l'état de choses réel). On voulait défendre les frontières du pays, mais on oubliait que ce sont après tout les habitants qui donnent au pays sa valeur et son caractère, et qu'ils ne doivent pas être assimilés aux objets et animaux constituant l'inventaire d'une ferme. Il ne nous reste plus qu'une espérance, c'est que précisément le même droit qui nous fit perdre alors le Slesvig danois à la suite du Slesvig allemand, nous rende un jour celui-là, lorsque le temps sera venu."

Whether the usurpation by Prussia of territory which, if it could no longer be held by Denmark, should have been absorbed in the Germanic Federation, and to which Prussia had no right save the right of force, is to be condoned is a question which opens up a much wider and more difficult subject. There is no denying that Prussia has entrenched herself deeply in the Duchies, and that the question of their future must depend on what the immediate future has in store for Prussia and for Germany.

[1] Emil Eberling in De Jessen's *Manuel historique de la Question du Slesvig*, p. 153.

IV. ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(A) MEANS OF COMMUNICATION

(1) Internal

(a) *Roads*

The province is well provided with roads, the aggregate length of which at the end of 1912 was 3,653 miles, of which 2,004 miles were provincial roads, 205 miles circle (district) roads, 1,350 miles Highway Board roads (this being nearly half the total length of such roads in the whole of Prussia), and 94 miles communal or township roads.

(b) *Canals and Rivers*

Kiel Canal[1].—The most important canal of the province is that variously known as the Kiel Canal, the Baltic Ship Canal, or the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, the construction of which was inaugurated by the Emperor William I as an imperial undertaking in 1887. It was completed in 1895 at a cost of £7,647,000. It runs from Holtenau, in Kiel Harbour, to Brunsbüttel, in the estuary of the Elbe, and its length is about 61 miles. The canal crosses the land at sea level, and the double set of locks at each end serves merely to neutralise the tidal changes. These locks,

[1] For a full description, see No. 41 of this series, *Kiel (Kaiser Wilhelm) Canal and Heligoland.*

when the canal was originally completed, measured 492 ft. by 82 ft. The width of the canal at water level was 213 ft., decreasing at a depth of 20 ft. to 118 ft., and at the bottom to 72 ft. The general depth was 27 ft. 10 in., but at the entrances, resting places, and quays, it was 29 ft. 6 in. The canal was constructed to take vessels up to 443 ft. long, 65½ ft. broad, and 26¼ ft. deep.

Operations for the enlargement of the canal were begun in 1908, at an estimated cost of £11,421,000, and were completed in 1914. The enlargement has increased the depth to about 36 ft., and the surface width to 335 ft., and has doubled the bottom width. The locks have been doubled, being now 1,082 ft. by 148 ft. The canal banks are lighted throughout by electricity, and navigation can proceed uninterruptedly by night.

The canal includes the old Eider Canal, built between 1777 and 1784, which ran from Holtenau to the Eider at Rendsburg, the point where the river turns southwest. Until 1895 this was the only connection between the North Sea and the Baltic.

Elbe-Trave Canal.—The Elbe-Trave Canal runs through the province, but its importance lies in its connecting the free city of Lübeck with the Elbe. It was constructed between 1895 and 1900 at a cost of £1,177,700, shared between the Government of Prussia and the city of Lübeck. It runs from Lübeck to Lauenburg, a distance of about 42 miles. The bottom width is 72 ft., the surface width varies from 105 ft. to 126 ft., and the minimum depth is about 8½ ft. There are seven locks, each 262½ ft. by 39¼ ft. The canal is navigable for vessels up to 800 tons burden.

Other Canals and Navigable Rivers.—There are several small canals—the Kudensee Canal (9·3 miles long) between the Holstenau and the Elbe, near St. Margarethen; the "Süderbootfahrt" (3·7 miles long) from Garding to the Eider; and the Tondern Canal from Tondern to the Wied Au. The Elbe is navigable for large ships along the whole stretch where it forms a

boundary to the province, and the Trave is navigable up to Oldesloe.

(c) *Railways*

The total length of the railways in the province at the beginning of 1913 was 973·4 miles. The length of the main lines was 521·6 miles, and of the branch lines 451·8 miles. An overwhelming proportion of the railway system either belonged to the State or was under State management; the State lines measuring 830·2 miles, and the privately owned lines 143·2 miles, of which latter only 54·2 miles are main line. There were about 58·8 miles of railway to every 100,000 inhabitants.

The general arrangement of the railways is simple. There are two trunk lines running from north to south, one of which divides into two main lines. They are as follows:—

(i) From Braminge and Ribe, in Denmark, by Tondern, Niebüll, Husum, Friedrichstadt, Heide, Meldorf, St. Michaelisdonn, Wilster, Itzehoe, Glückstadt, Elmshorn, and Pinneberg, to Altona.

(ii) From Kolding and Vamdrup, in Denmark, to Woyens and Tingleff, and thence to Flensburg, near which the line divides into (*a*) Flensburg-Schleswig–Rendsburg–Neumünster, and thence by two routes, viz., *via* Kellinghusen and Elmshorn to Altona, and *via* Oldesloe to Hamburg; and (*b*) Flensburg – Eckernförde–Kiel – Preetz – Plön – Eutin – Lübeck – Ratzeburg–Mölln–Lauenburg.

The most important of the branch lines and of the lines which link up the system are:—

Branch Lines from (i):—

Tondern–Hoyer.
Niebüll–Dagebüll.
Husum–Jübek–Schleswig.
Husum–Tönning–Garding.

Friedrichstadt–Hollingstätt–Schleswig.
Heide–Büsum.
Heide–Hennstedt–Heide (circular route).
St. Michaelisdonn–Dieksand.
Itzehoe–Lockstedt (near Kellinghusen).
Itzehoe–Barmstedt–Oldesloe.

Transverse Lines in North Schleswig, crossing (ii):—

Schottburg–Hadersleben, Ness, and Aarösund; with branch Hadersleben–Christiansfeld.
Rödding–Hadersleben } connecting with (1) at
Toftlund–Hadersleben } Scherrebek.
Brede (north of Tondern)–Apenrade–Atzbüll. Sonderburg–Lysabild.
Tondern–Tingleff–Atzbüll.

There is a network of lines in Angeln, supplying indirect connections between Flensburg and Schleswig and between Flensburg and Eckernförde (*via* Glücksburg, Gelting, and Kappeln).

Other Branches from (ii) are Kiel–Neumünster, Neumünster–Plön, Oldesloe–Lübeck, Eutin–Lütjenburg, and Eutin–Oldenburg–Fehmarn–Neustadt.

The railway system seems to be adequate to the needs of the province. It now includes 33 light railways (*Kleinbahnen*) of varying gauge. The total length of these in 1913 was 589 miles, and they served chiefly the interests of agriculture. There were also seven tramways with a total length of 84 miles.

(2) External

(a) *Ports*

Small ports abound on the Schleswig-Holstein seaboard and on the islands. There are two great ports, Kiel and Altona; and among the more important of the smaller ports are Tönning, Husum, Flensburg, Apenrade, and Sonderburg. The most important fishing ports are Altona, Eckernförde, and Blankenese.

Altona.—The trade of Altona is closely connected with that of its immediate neighbour Hamburg, but the two ports are under altogether independent management. Altona has three harbours, viz., the Western, Eastern, and Fish Harbours. The depth of the first two varies at spring tide from 19½ ft. to 26 ft.; the third is intended for trawlers and smacks. There are numerous steam cranes lifting up to 15 tons, and a floating dry dock for lifting vessels up to 520 tons.

Kiel.—Kiel Harbour is 11 miles long, with an average depth of 40 ft. The breadth varies from ¼ mile at the southern end to 4½ miles at the mouth. The depth of the harbour is 20 ft. alongside the quays. There are four floating docks for large vessels, two of which are Government docks. One of these is constructed to lift vessels up to 40,000 tons. There are seven dry docks, the two largest of which belong to the Government. The port has a large equipment of cranes, two of which lift up to 150 tons.

Tönning.—This port is one mile above the bar at the mouth of the Eider. The depth at the entrance of the harbour is about 15 ft. at high water. There are no docks, but the harbour is equipped with cranes and will accommodate vessels not drawing over 11½ ft. There is a 75-ton electric crane at Eiderwerft.

Husum.—The depth is 16 ft. at the bar at low water, and 15 ft. at the quays. There is anchorage in 20 ft. of water. Railway lines come down to the quays, and there are two portable steam cranes.

Flensburg.—The depth of the harbour is from 22 to 24 ft.; steamers drawing more than 24 ft. cannot come alongside the quays, and have to discharge over long stages. An off-shore floating dock can lift vessels up to 2,000 tons (net register).

Apenrade.—There are two harbours, the North, with a depth of 17 ft., and the South, with a depth of 14 ft. Vessels can unload straight into railway trucks. There are two electric elevators for discharging small corn ships.

Sonderburg.—This port on Alsen Sound is connected with the mainland by a footbridge. Having a good harbour, it is used as a naval station, and it also accommodates a large number of cargo vessels.

(b) *Shipping*

The official German records give figures for some 50 ports in Schleswig-Holstein, 8 of which are in the vicinity of Kiel. With the exceptions already mentioned the trade of these ports is insignificant, and is confined to small coasting vessels. Thus, for example, the port of Eckernförde had in 1910 a total number of 398 entrances from German Baltic ports, but the average tonnage was 29; the port of Neustadt had 217 entrances with an average tonnage of 63; and the five harbours in the island of Fehmarn had together 348 entrances with an average tonnage of 43. All these are Baltic ports, and trade chiefly with other German Baltic ports.

The figures of entrances for the larger and some of the smaller ports are given as follows in the official statistics for the year 1910:—

Port.	Total entrances of laden ships.		Total entrances of ships in ballast.		Entrances of laden ships bound for German ports.		Entrances of ships in ballast bound for German ports.	
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
Altona ..	3,368	585,878	100	4,031	312	37,730	90	3,557
Kiel ..	2,887	536,777	92	15,830	1,323	123,643	33	1,922
Holtenau ..	142	49,221	4	81	54	8,479	4	81
Flensburg ..	1,963	213,263	57	3,162	965	64,396	37	1,867
Sonderburg ..	1,175	101,850	145	4,453	803	60,378	109	3,101
Apenrade ..	779	63,263	60	2,211	110	3,999	16	1,060
Hadersleben ..	932	57,078	33	1,780	424	15,959	14	761
Nobiskrug ..	45	29,093	22	716	4	1,527	18	584
Rendsburg ..	250	61,849	4	95	89	11,825	4	95
Brunsbüttel ..	191	78,201	17	765	72	12,679	12	544
Glückstadt ..	210	40,341	4	228	29	1,910	4	228

Statistics of shipping returns give some indication of the foreign trade, but it must be remembered that produce carried to Altona is not necessarily consumed in the province. The total numbers of entrances and clearings from all Schleswig-Holstein ports together in the year 1910 were as follows:—

Ships.	Baltic Ports.		North Sea Ports.	
	No.	Tonnage.	No.	Tonnage.
German	10,349	795,605	14,377	978,905
Danish	2,228	268,904	402	100,965
British	57	36,847	369	296,288
Swedish	785	88,527	255	46,160
Norwegian	95	40,279	279	74,090
Dutch	364	36,530	289	66,581
Finnish	73	21,036	27	8,142
Russian	78	17,502	4	1,933
Belgian	—	—	4	2,573
French	—	—	2	1,509
Italian	—	—	1	1,092
Totals	14,029	1,305,230	16,009	1,578,238

The figures show that the shipping trade was almost equally divided between the Baltic and the North Sea ports. German ships represented in the Baltic ports 73 per cent. of the number of ships and 60 per cent. of the tonnage, and in the North Sea ports 80 per cent. of the number of ships and 62 per cent. of the tonnage.

The only foreign trade of considerable volume in the Baltic ports was with Denmark, Danish ships representing over 15 per cent. of the number of ships and 20 per cent. of the tonnage. Trade with the British Empire was small, but the tonnage of the British ships was in most cases large. The average tonnage of British ships in the Baltic ports of Schleswig-Holstein in 1910 was 646, the average

tonnage of Danish ships 120, the average tonnage of German ships 76, and the total average tonnage 93.

In the North Sea ports of Schleswig-Holstein, the most important trade was with the British Empire. British ships formed nearly one-fourth of the foreign ships, and about 2 per cent. of the total number, but over 18 per cent. of the total tonnage, and about 50 per cent. of the total foreign tonnage. The average tonnage of British ships in the North Sea ports of Schleswig-Holstein in 1910 was just over 800 tons, the average tonnage of Danish ships 251, the average tonnage of German ships 68, and the total average tonnage 98 tons.

(B) INDUSTRY

(1) Labour

Supply of Labour.—Apart from its two large industrial seaports, Kiel and Altona, with 211,627 and 172,628 inhabitants respectively in 1910, and a considerable seafaring population, the province is essentially agricultural in character. The occupation census of 1907 showed that more persons followed agriculture and the allied occupations than industry, in spite of the fact that no less than 20 per cent. of the total population resided in the two seaports named. The broad grouping of the population at that time, according to occupation, was as follows:—

Numbers of persons following as a principal occupation:

(a) agriculture, gardening, stock-breeding, forestry, etc.	230,749
(b) industry, including mining and building	222,517
(c) trade and transport	100,457

The general standard of life of the labouring classes of the province is high, alike in town and country, and it is significant that the rates of wages for day labour, as officially determined for the purposes of the Industrial Insurance Laws, are amongst the highest in Germany.

Migration and Emigration.—The natives show great attachment to the homeland, and the province gains more than it loses by the constant migration which goes on within Prussia and the Empire. Latterly the principal migration has been to Hamburg, Lübeck, Berlin, and Alsace-Lorraine, while the province has chiefly gained population from the Prussian provinces of East Prussia, Hanover, and Pomerania, and from Mecklenburg-Schwerin. It is a notable fact that the contribution of Schleswig-Holstein to the population of the industrial district of Rhineland-Westphalia, one-sixth of which, according to the census returns, consisted in 1910 of persons born in other parts of Prussia, is smaller than that of any other province.

The amount of emigration overseas has of late years fallen to a low figure, as has been the case with Germany as a whole. While the average number of emigrants during the years 1881-85 was 9,778, the number gradually decreased from 1895 until in 1912 it was only 814. There were 15,337 Danish subjects in the province in 1910, and among other foreigners were 7,500 Austro-Hungarians, 2,603 Russians, and 2,229 Swedes. It is estimated that 60,000 Danes have emigrated to Denmark since the annexation. By 1883 25,000 of these had returned; some of them have since been expelled, while 2,000 of those who remain have been treated by both Prussia and Denmark as foreigners without citizenship of either State (see p. 56).

(2) Agriculture

(a) *Products of Commercial Value*

Of the total area of the province about 55 per cent. is arable land, about 22 per cent. pasture and meadow land, and less than 7 per cent. forest. The most important crops are oats, rye, wheat, barley, potatoes, and turnips. Oats occupy 20 per cent. of the area under crops other than hay, rye 14 per cent., wheat and barley each 5 per cent., and potatoes only 3 per cent. The average yield per acre of cereals is high.

Between 1878 and 1900 there was little change in the area under cultivation, as the following table shows :—

—	1878.	1883.	1893.	1900.
	Hectares.	*Hectares.*	*Hectares.*	*Hectares.*
Arable	1,079,856	1,084,471	1,070,412	1,063,106
Meadow	205,792	204,083	205,244	206,655
Pasture and poor and waste land	343,923	334,522	336,905	339,030
Forests and plantations ..	115,167	119,690	124,531	126,314
Garden	5,174	12,957	15,145	17,124

The following table shows for 1913 the areas under various crops, with the total yield and the yield per hectare:—

Crop.	Area cultivated.	Total yield.	Yield per hectare.
	Hectares.	*Metric tons.*	*Metric tons.*
Winter wheat.. ..	51,812	168,229	3·25
Summer wheat ..	1,113	3,036	2·73
Winter rye	145,922	306,202	2·10
Summer rye	1,009	1,369	1·36
Summer barley ..	52,745	140,714	2·67
Oats	219,052	563,680	2·57
Potatoes	31,047	497,846	16·04
Sugar-beet	284	9,062	31·91
Clover (hay)	75,424	401,649	5·33
Lucerne (hay).. ..	215	1,451	6·75
Irrigated meadows (hay)	4,754	25,232	5·31
Other meadows (hay)	200,471	813,193	4·06

The high proportion of grazing land attests the important place occupied by stock-breeding and dairy-farming. The Prussian live-stock enumeration of 1912 showed that the ratio of stock to population was higher in Schleswig-Holstein than in the monarchy as a whole, the excess in the case of cattle and pigs being

particularly noteworthy. The following table shows the relative ratios, both for population and for areas devoted to agriculture :—

	Ratio to every 1,000 inhabitants (census of 1910).		Ratio to every 1,000 hectares of land devoted to agriculture.[1]	
	Prussia.	Schleswig-Holstein.	Prussia.	Schleswig-Holstein.
Horses ..	79·5	128·4	152·2	146·4
Cattle ..	295·4	671·9	565·5	766·1
Sheep ..	102·4	98·9	196·0	112·7
Pigs ..	385·3	863·8	737·5	985·0
Poultry ..	1,277·6	1,878·9	2,445·5	2,142·4

The enumeration of live-stock in 1912 gave the following totals and values :—

	Number.	Value.
		£
Horses	208,183	7,607,950
Donkeys	310	2,557
Horned Cattle	1,089,171	17,937,650
Sheep	160,264	440,200
Pigs	1,400,293	5,595,950
Goats	46,051	71,900
Poultry	3,045,707	—
Bees (hives)..	88,580	—

The most fruitful land is in the Wilstermarsch and in the Eiderstedt, Norderdithmarschen, Oldenburg, Süderdithmarschen, and Sonderburg *Kreisen*. The district near Altona abounds in nursery gardens and orchards, and the Gravenstein apple grown there is celebrated beyond the boundaries of Germany.

[1] The figures of area relate to 1907.

(b) *Land Tenure and Methods of Cultivation*

A notable feature of the rural economy of the province is the multitude of holdings of small and medium size and the comparative dearth of large estates. In 1907 the 159,010 agricultural holdings of the province, with a total area of 1,663,896 hectares, were classified as follows:—

Agricultural holdings.	No. of holdings.	Area of holdings in hectares.
Up to ½ hectare	81,124	19,858
½ to 2 hectares	15,945	26,314
2 to 5 „	14,994	61,776
5 to 20 „	25,004	333,721
20 to 50 „	16,401	607,430
50 to 100 „	4,620	353,471
100 to 200 „	561	95,506
Over 200 „	361	165,820
Totals .. .	159,010	1,663,896

Between 1895 and 1907 there was a considerable increase in the number of very small holdings up to half a hectare (about 1¼ acres) in extent, viz., from 57,318 to 81,124, a decrease from 32,501 to 30,939 in those from ½ to 5 hectares, an increase in those from 5 to 20 hectares (22,997 to 25,004) and from 20 to 50 hectares (16,089 to 16,401), but a decrease from 6,588 to 5,542 in the holdings of still larger area.

Great attention is given by the Government and the provincial authorities to the advancement of agriculture. In 1912 the province shared to the extent of 164,125 marks in the State grants for the encouragement of horse, cattle, sheep, pig, goat, poultry, and rabbit breeding, and to the extent of 248,427 marks in the State grants in aid of agricultural organisation, works of amelioration, the encouragement of gardening, &c. A large system of technical schools ministers to the special interests of agriculture. These schools

comprised in 1911, 15 purely agricultural schools, all but one held in the winter months, with 96 teachers and 1,379 scholars in the aggregate; 224 agricultural continuation schools with 324 teachers and 2,037 scholars; and a rural peripatetic school for domestic training, attended by 64 scholars. There is at Flensburg a seminary for the training of teachers for the agricultural continuation schools.

Considerable expenditure has been incurred upon land reclamation, river regulation, and general works of amelioration, such as dyke construction, drainage, and irrigation. There are in the province three corporations which advance money to co-operative associations and private owners for works of this character, and the provincial authority does much to assist and encourage enterprise of the kind. A large part of the western coast is protected by dykes, and in this way extensive areas of *Watten* (mud flats) have been, and are still being, recovered from the sea.

The length of dyke on the Baltic Sea coast is small. Between the fertile hilly land running east of the peninsula and the low-lying *Marschland* in the west there is a large expanse of moorland, a continuation of the great Lüneburg heath. The high-lying moors are as a rule dug for peat, though in some places land has been reclaimed and afforested or converted into pasture. The low-lying moorland when the peat has been cut away also makes good meadow and pasture land.

(c) *Forestry*

Seven per cent. of the area of the province is forest and woodland, rather more than one-third of the timber grown being coniferous. The principal deciduous woods are in the east. The *Geest* district was formerly forest-land, but was mostly stripped of its timber in recent centuries, and is now largely heath. Re-afforestation is in progress in many places, but the province still has a greater extent of moorland (2 per cent. of the total area) than any other of the Prussian provinces except Hanover.

The total area of forest in 1900 was 126,313 hectares, of which 36,295 hectares were in State, 15,561 hectares in communal, and 74,457 hectares in private ownership. In 1911 the State had receipts of 1,685,975 marks from timber sold.

(3) Fisheries

The province is the centre of an extensive fishing industry. Haddock and herring are caught both in the North Sea and in the Baltic, and cod in the North Sea. Kiel in particular is famous for its smoked sprats (*Kieler sprotten*), which are in great demand throughout Germany. Lobsters are obtained off Heligoland, and there are oyster beds off the western islands. There are many lakes in Holstein, of which some of the principal are formed by the rivers Trave and Eider, and these are fished to some extent, though not on a commercial basis.

(4) Mineral Resources

Schleswig-Holstein forms geologically part of the North German plain, and is almost entirely covered with a thick layer of Quaternary strata. Boulder clay was deposited by the great ice-sheet; while the sand and gravel of the *Geest* were laid down by the waters which flowed from it. Islands of older geological strata occasionally appear at the surface, or sufficiently near it to be worked, but the province is poor in valuable mineral products.

The oldest rocks found are of Permian age, and occur at the surface, notably near Segeberg and at Langenfelde, north of Altona. They are of value as containing extensive layers of rock salt and gypsum. Numerous salt springs are found in connection with the Permian rocks. Mineral oil has also been found in them or connected with them, and for some years it was worked until the industry was killed by American competition. Throughout the mineral oil region natural gas is present. There are traces of lignite in some localities, notably on the island of Sylt.

Chalk is found near the Elbe and near Itzehoe. Tertiary clays provide material for bricks, pottery, and cement at many points.

There is no iron except some clay ironstone of eocene age, which is not rich enough for working. The alluvium of the eastern border provides clay and sand for building material. Peat is obtained in the moors of the *Geest*.

(5) Manufactures

There is considerable industrial activity at the naval port of Kiel and at Altona, notably in shipbuilding and the trades dependent thereon. Altona has important glass, chemical, and margarine manufactures, timber-yards, and saw-mills, and owing to its contiguity to Hamburg it has shared largely in the prosperity of that city. Except for shipbuilding at some of the smaller towns, such as Ellerbek, on Kiel Harbour, and at Flensburg, and cloth manufacture at Neumünster and several other places, the industry of the rest of the province is of a miscellaneous character, and outside the larger towns there are comparatively few undertakings of great size.

The census of occupations taken in 1907 showed the following classification of the occupied population, with its grouping according to the size of the undertakings in the various industries and trades:—

Occupation.	Fewer than 6 persons.		6 to 50 persons.		Over 50 persons.		Totals.	
	No. of works.	No. of persons.	No. of works.	No. of persons.	No. of works.	No. of persons.	No. of works.	No. of persons.
Building	5,963	11,356	1,443	20,955	120	11,842	7,526	44,153
Chemical industries... ...	177	425	62	961	14	3,407	253	4,793
Cleaning	3,070	4,853	191	2,002	5	464	3,266	7,319
Clothing industries ..	15,213	20,183	269	2,821	11	1,147	15,493	24,151
Food and luxury trades ...	7,989	17,843	955	11,252	47	5,899	8,991	34,994
Graphic arts and crafts ...	583	1,072	118	1,739	6	417	707	3,228
Leather industry	1,197	2,102	93	1,288	23	2,930	1,313	6,320
Machinery industries ...	2,243	3,819	320	5,044	81	16,783	2,644	25,646
Metal-working	3,527	7,246	291	3,218	39	6,771	3,857	17,235
Mining, smelting, &c. ...	87,633	148,355	7,235	94,271	550	75,092	95,418	317,718
Paper-making	244	451	42	728	16	1,541	302	2,720
Quarrying	618	1,270	341	5,973	44	6,953	1,003	14,196
Salt-working and turf-digging	133	202	24	522	4	381	161	1,105
Soap and oil manufacture ...	47	130	67	1,111	10	1,042	124	2,283
Textile industries	898	1,273	120	2,251	27	4,376	1,045	7,900
Wood-working	4,118	7,099	490	6,613	21	2,261	4,629	15,973

(6) Water and Electric Power

The greater part of the country lies at a low level, and even in the hilly districts in the south-east of Schleswig and the north-east of Holstein the highest points only range from 400 to 540 feet. In these circumstances the natural water power available is negligible and of no practical value for industrial purposes. Electric power, however, is in wide use, and 259 industrial undertakings employed it in 1913.

(C) COMMERCE

Apart from the seaports already named, there are few towns of commercial importance. The chief of these are Schleswig, on the River Schlei, the administrative capital of the province, with a population in 1910 of about 20,000, Neumünster with a population of 34,555, Wandsbek (35,212), Itzehoe (16,547), Hadersleben (13,046), and Elmshorn (14,789).

In the absence of large industries, general trading occupies a much larger proportion of the population than is the case with the provinces near at hand or with Prussia as a whole. There are three Chambers of Commerce, viz., at Kiel, Altona, and Flensburg, and Industrial Courts for the summary adjudication of money disputes between employers and workpeople exist in fourteen towns.

(D) GENERAL REMARKS

The general social level and standard of culture of the population of Schleswig-Holstein are relatively high, and there is evidence of steady material progress.

The co-operative movement is fairly strong, particularly among agriculturists. In 1911 there were 962 registered co-operative societies with a membership of 115,343, and the figures for later years are believed to be higher. In 1912 there were 219 public and private savings banks, with accumulated deposits of 808,930,000 marks at the end of the year. The

number of deposit books issued was 679,550, equal to 41 for every 100 inhabitants, as compared with 33⅓ for Prussia as a whole. The deposits averaged 1,190 marks per book issued and 484 marks per head of the population, as compared with 900 marks and 300 marks respectively for all Prussia.

The Danish population of North Schleswig, although principally agricultural, maintains a high social level, and supports an extensive system of associations for economic and national purposes. On the other hand, official positions and the chief openings for trade in the towns of the Danish district are mainly in the hands of Germans.

APPENDIX

I

TREATY OF LONDON, MAY 8, 1852

Art. I.—After having taken into serious consideration the interests of his Monarchy, His Majesty the King of Denmark, with the assent of His Royal Highness the Hereditary Prince, and of his nearest cognates, entitled to the Succession by the Royal Law of Denmark, as well as in concert with His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, Head of the elder Branch of the House of Holstein-Gottorp, having declared his wish to regulate the order of Succession in his dominions in such manner that, in default of issue male in a direct line from King Frederick III of Denmark, his Crown should devolve upon His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and upon the issue of the marriage of that Prince with Her Highness the Princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, by order of Primogeniture from Male to Male; the High Contracting Parties, appreciating the wisdom of the views which have determined the eventual adoption of that arrangement, engage by common consent, in case the contemplated contingency should be realised, to acknowledge in His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, and his issue male, in the direct line, of His Highness the Prince Christian cess, the Right of Succeeding to the whole of the Dominions now united under the sceptre of His Majesty the King of Denmark.

Art. II.—The High Contracting Parties, acknowledging as permanent the principle of the Integrity of the Danish Monarchy, engage to take into consideration the further propositions which His Majesty the King of Denmark may deem it expedient to address to them in case (which God forbid) the extinction of the issue male, in the direct line, of His Highness the Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, by his marriage with Her Highness the Princess Louisa of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderbourg-Glücksbourg, born a Princess of Hesse, should become imminent.

Art. III.—It is expressly understood that the reciprocal Rights and Obligations of His Majesty the King of Denmark, and of the Germanic Confederation, concerning the Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, Rights and Obligations established by the Federal Act of 1815, and by the existing Federal Right, shall not be affected by the present Treaty.

Art. IV.—The High Contracting Parties reserve to themselves to bring the present Treaty to the knowledge of the other Powers, and to invite them to accede to it.

Art. V.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications shall be exchanged at London at the expiration of six weeks, or sooner if possible.

II

TREATY OF VIENNA, OCTOBER 30, 1864

Art. I.—There shall be for the future Perpetual Peace and Friendship between their Majesties the King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, and His Majesty the King of Denmark, as well as between their Heirs and Successors, their States, and their respective Subjects.

Art. II.—All Treaties and Conventions concluded before the War between the High Contracting Parties are re-established in their vigour, in so far as they are not abrogated or modified by the tenor of the present Treaty.

Art. III.—His Majesty the King of Denmark renounces all his Rights over the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg in favour of their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, engaging to recognise the dispositions which their said Majesties shall make with reference to those Duchies.

Art. IV.—The Cession of the Duchy of Schleswig includes all the Islands belonging to that Duchy, as well as the Territory situated on *terra firma*.

In order to simplify the Delimitation, and to put an end to the inconveniences arising out of the position of the Jutland Territories enclosed in the Territory of Schleswig, His Majesty the King of Denmark cedes to their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria the Jutland Possessions to the south of the southern Line of Frontier of the District of Ribe, such as the Jutland Territory of Mœgeltondern, the Island of Amrom, the Jutland parts of the Islands of Fœhr, Sylt, and Rœmœ, &c.

In exchange, their Majesties the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria agree to an equivalent part of Schleswig, and including, besides the Island of Aerœ, Territories contiguous to the above-mentioned district of Ribe, with the remainder of Jutland, and to correct the Line of Frontier between Jutland and Schleswig, on the side of Kolding, being detached from the Duchy of Schleswig, and incorporated into the Kingdom of Denmark.

Art. V.—The new Frontier between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Duchy of Schleswig shall start from the middle of the mouth of the Bay of Hejlsminde on the little Belt, and after crossing that Bay, shall follow the southern frontier of the Parishes of Hejls, Vejstrup, and Taps, the latter as far as the Stream to the south of Gejlbjerg and Bränore, thence following that Stream from

its mouth in the Fovs-Aa, along the southern Frontier of the Parishes of Odis and Vandrup, and the western Frontier of the latter, as far as Königs-Au (Konge-Aa) to the north of Holte. From that point the Thalweg of the Königs-Au (Konge-Aa) shall form the Frontier as far as the Eastern Limit of the Parish of Hjortlund. Starting from that point, it shall follow the same Limit, and its continuation as far as the projecting angle to the north of the Village of Obekjär, and then the Eastern Frontier of that Village as far as the Gjels-Aa. From thence the Eastern Frontier of the Parish of Seem and the Southern Limits of the Parishes of Seem, Ribe, and Vester-Vedsted shall form the new Frontier, which, in the North Sea, shall pass at equal distances between the Islands of Manœ and Rœmœ.

In consequence of this new Delimitation, all Titles and Mixed Rights are declared to be extinct, secular as well as spiritual, which have heretofore existed within the enclosures, in the Islands, and in the Mixed Parishes. The new Sovereign Power, therefore, in each of the Territories separated by new Frontiers, shall enjoy in that respect its full Rights.

Art. XXII.—The Evacuation of Jutland by the Allied Troops shall be effected within the shortest possible delay, at latest within three weeks after the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty.

Art. XXIII.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the Ratifications thereof shall be exchanged at Vienna within three weeks, or sooner if possible.

III

CONVENTION OF GASTEIN, AUGUST 14, 1865

Art. I.—The exercise of the Rights acquired in common by the High Contracting Parties, in virtue of Article III of the Vienna Treaty of Peace of 30th October, 1864, shall, without prejudice to the continuance of those rights of both Powers to the whole of both Duchies, pass to His Majesty the Emperor of Austria as regards the Duchy of Holstein, and to His Majesty the King of Prussia as regards the Duchy of Schleswig.

Art. II.—The High Contracting Parties will propose to the Diet the establishment of a German Fleet, and will fix upon the Harbour of Kiel as a Federal Harbour for the said Fleet.

Until the resolutions of the Diet with respect to this proposal have been carried into effect, the Ships of War of both Powers shall use this Harbour, and the Command and the Police Duties within it shall be exercised by Prussia. Prussia is entitled both to establish the necessary Fortifications opposite Friedrichsort for the protection of the entrance, and also to fit up along the Holstein bank of the inlet the Naval Establishments that are requisite in a Military Port. These Fortifications and Establishments

remain likewise under Prussian command, and the Prussian marines and troops required for their Garrison and Protection may be quartered in Kiel and the neighbourhood.

Art. III.—The High Contracting Parties will propose in Frankfort the elevation of Rendsburg into a German Federal Fortress.

Until the Diet shall have issued the regulations respecting Garrisoning the said Fortress, the Garrison shall consist of Imperial Austrian and Royal Prussian troops under a command annually alternating on the 1st July.

Art. IV.—Whilst the division agreed upon in Article I of the present Convention continues, the Royal Prussian Government shall retain two Military Roads through Holstein; the one from Lubeck to Kiel, the other from Hamburg to Rendsburg.

All details as to the Military Stations, and as to the transport and subsistence of the Troops, shall be regulated as soon as possible in a Special Convention. Until this has been done, the Regulations in force as to the Prussian Military Roads through Hanover shall be observed.

Art. V.—The Royal Prussian Government retains the disposal of one Telegraphic wire for communication with Kiel and Rendsburg, and retains also the right to send Prussian mail-vans, with its own officials on both lines through the Duchy of Holstein.

Inasmuch as the construction of a direct Railway from Lubeck through Kiel to the Schleswig Frontier is not yet assured, the concession thereof shall be granted on the request of Prussia, for the Territory of Holstein under the customary conditions; but no claim shall be made by Prussia for Rights of Sovereignty with regard to the line.

Art. VI.—The High Contracting Parties entertain in common the intention that the Duchies shall enter the Zollverein. Until they shall enter the Zollverein, or until some further agreement shall be made, the system of Duties hitherto in force in both Duchies, and the equal division of the Revenues, shall continue to exist. If it should appear desirable to the Royal Prussian Government, even during the existence of the division agreed upon in Article I of the present Convention, to open negotiations respecting the entry of the Duchies into the Zollverein, His Majesty the Emperor of Austria is prepared to empower a Representative of the Duchy of Holstein to take part in such negotiations.

Art. VII.—Prussia is entitled to make the Canal that is to be cut between the North Sea and the Baltic, through the Territory of Holstein, according to the result of the professional investigations undertaken by the Prussian Government.

In so far as this shall be the case, Prussia shall have the right to determine the direction and the dimensions of the Canal; to acquire possession of the Land necessary for carrying out the work by means of expropriation, with an indemnification to the amount of the value; to conduct the construction of the Canal; to superin-

tend the inspection and conservation of the Canal; and to give her assent to all regulations respecting the said Canal.

With the exception of the Navigation Dues, which are to be levied for the use of the Canal, and which are to be regulated by Prussia, and to be the same for the Ships of all Nations, no Transit Tolls or Dues upon Ship and Cargo are to be levied at any part of the Canal.

Art. VIII.—Nothing is changed by the present Convention in the Stipulations of the Vienna Treaty of Peace of 30th October, 1864, relative to the Financial Obligations to be undertaken by the Duchies both as regards Denmark and as regards Austria and Prussia; but the Duchy of Lauenburg is to be released from every obligation of contributing towards the expenses of the War.

The division of these Obligations between the Duchies of Holstein and of Schleswig will be based upon the proportion of population.

Art. IX.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria cedes to His Majesty the King of Prussia the Rights acquired in the aforementioned Vienna Treaty of Peace with respect to the Duchy of Lauenburg; and in return the Royal Prussian Government binds itself to pay to the Austrian Government the sum of 2,500,000 Danish rix-dollars, payable at Berlin in Prussian silver, four weeks after confirmation of the present Convention by their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia.

Art. X.—The carrying into effect of the foregoing division of the Co-Sovereignty, which has been agreed upon, shall begin as soon as possible after the approval of this Convention by their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, and shall be accomplished at the latest by the 15th September.

The joint Command-in-Chief, hitherto existing, shall be dissolved on the complete Evacuation of Holstein by the Prussian troops and of Schleswig by the Austrian troops, by the 15th September, at the latest.

Art. XI.—The present Convention shall be approved by their Majesties the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia by exchanging written Declarations at their next meeting.

IV

TREATY OF PRAGUE, AUGUST 23, 1866

Art. V.—His Majesty the Emperor of Austria transfers to His Majesty the King of Prussia all the rights which he acquired by the Vienna Treaty of Peace of 30th October, 1864, over the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig, with the condition that the populations of the Northern Districts of Schleswig shall be ceded to Denmark if, by a free vote, they express a wish to be united to Denmark.

V

TREATY OF VIENNA, OCTOBER 11, 1878

Art. I.—The Union laid down in the Peace concluded at Prague between His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Bohemia and King of Hungary, on the 23rd August, 1866, by which a form is added to the transfer to His Majesty the King of Prussia of the rights of His Majesty the Emperor of Austria over the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig acquired by the Vienna Treaty of Peace of 30th October, 1864, is hereby cancelled, so that the words in Article V of the above-named Treaty of the 23rd August, 1876:—"With the condition that the population of the northern districts of Schleswig shall be ceded to Denmark if by a free vote they express a wish to be united to Denmark," shall be annulled.

Art. II.—The ratifications of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Vienna within a period of three months, or sooner if possible.

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Another special map of "Slesvig-Holstein," giving the various boundaries proposed, and showing the nature of the terrain, has been issued by the same Department, on the scale of 1:850,000.

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