PLAN OF THE TOWN OF JELLALABAD, AND OF THE ACTION OF THE 7TH OF APRIL, 1842.

A Cabul Gate.—B Peshawur Gate.—C River Gate.—D South Gate.—E North-West Bastion (one 9-pounder, one 24-pounder howitzer, one 8-inch mortar.)—F Left Bastion on Cabul Gate (one 9-pounder, one 5½-inch mortar).—G "The Cazi" (16-pounder), and one 8-inch mortar.—H A Mountain-train 3-pounder. — I A Mountain-train 3-pounder and one 12-pounder howitzer.—K A Mountain-train 3-pounder.—L North-East Bastion (one 9-pounder, one 2½-inch howitzer). — M A Mountain-train 3-pounder.—N A 9-pounder.—O Azeez Khan's Head-Quarters in action of 1st December, 1841.—P Aga Jaun's Fort.—Q Fort.—R Fort where Colonel Dennie fell, on the 7th of April, 1842.—S Fort.—T Abbott's Guns, Action of the 7th of April, 1842.—U Fort.—V Cavalry.—W 35th Native Infantry.—X 13th Light Infantry.—Y Sappers, &c.—Z Akbar's Camp and Guns.—Z′ Picket of Afghan Cavalry.

1 Cabul River.—2 Perpendicular Banks —3 Sand Hills.—4 Sandy Plain.—5 Piper's Hill.—6 Old Walls.—7 Cantonment (burnt by enemy).—8 Envoy's Residence and Shah's Garden.—9 Walled enclosure.—10 Mosque whence Abbott was wounded.—15 Ford.—16 Road to Lughman.—17, 18 Road to Cabul.—19 Bed of Cabul River (low, marshy, and covered with rushes).



THE AFGHAN WAR, 1838–1842

FROM THE

JOURNAL AND CORRESPONDENCE

OF THE LATE

MAJOR-GENERAL AUGUSTUS ABBOTT

C.B., ROYAL (BENGAL) ARTILLERY.

BY

CHARLES RATHBONE LOW, I.N., F.R.G.S.

AUTHOR OF "HISTORY OF THE INDIAN NAVY," "MEMOIR OF SIR GARNET WOLSELEY," &c.

" Per damna, per cœdes, ab ipso
Ducit opes animumque ferro."
HOR. BOOK IV., ODE 4.

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THE AFGHAN WAR.

(1838-42.)

INTRODUCTION.

MAJOR-GENERAL AUGUSTUS ABBOTT is the eldest of five brothers who have "done the State some service" in India and the East. The second, General Sir Frederick Abbott, C.B., was educated at Addiscombe, and entered the Bengal Engineers, which has been a prolific *Alma Mater* of eminent men. When a very young officer, he earned distinction by his professional skill in the first Burmese war of 1824-26, and was wounded whilst leading Major Gulley's column near Prome, on the 2nd of December, 1825. He served as Chief-Engineer of the army, which, under the late Field-Marshal Sir George Pollock, retrieved our laurels in Afghanistan. Captain Abbott was present at

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the forcing of the Khyber Pass on the 5th of April, 1842, and at the actions of Mammoo Khail, Jugdulluck, and Tezeen, in the following September. Again, when in 1845, war broke out with the Sikhs, he was second in command of the Engineers and gained the thanks of Lords Hardinge and Gough by the rapid and skilful manner in which, after the battle of Sobraon, in February, 1846, he bridged the Sutlej, in a few hours, with boats, over which the army, with its guns and stores, marched through the Punjaub to Lahore. Lord Hardinge—*clarum et venerabile nomen*—wrote of his services on this occasion: "Two days before the battle of Sobraon, I consulted with you and Colonel Henry Lawrence as to the best means of overcoming some difficulties which had arisen, relating to the employment of the heavy artillery in the attack of the Sikh entrenched camp, and I sent you to the Commander-in-Chief, confidentially to communicate with his Excellency; the result being a ready concurrence of Lord Gough, and the decision taken to storm the enemy's camp after the defences should have been shaken by the fire of thirty-five pieces of heavy artillery. The instant that great victory was achieved you returned to the ghaut, and, without repose night and day, directed all your

energies and talents in laying down the bridge of boats, by which the army, its siege train, and its enormous baggage, was able in a few hours to enter the Punjaub, and march to Lahore." In September, 1847, Colonel Abbott relinquished the office of Superintending Engineer of the North-Western Provinces, and returned to England. On the retirement of Sir Ephraim Stannus, from the post of Lieutenant-Governor of Addiscombe, in 1850, the Court of Directors conferred upon Colonel Abbott the appointment, which he held until the abolition of that famous military seminary in 1861. He now found a new and congenial scope for his talents, as Member of the Council of Military Education, where he remained until 1868. In 1859 he was nominated one of the Commissioners for the National Defences.

The third brother, General James Abbott, C.B., was educated at Blackheath, where he had among his schoolfellows, no less a personage than Lord Beaconsfield, whom he describes as being a leader among the boys. From Blackheath he proceeded to Addiscombe, whence he went to India as an Artillery Cadet on the Bengal Establishment. Lieutenant Abbott was engaged at the siege of the great Jât fortress of Bhurtpore in 1826, and

in the Afghan war, but, soon after our army reached Candahar, he was attached to the mission of Major d'Arcy Todd, our envoy at Herat, who despatched him to Khiva, to effect the release of the Russian prisoners detained by the Khan of that State. From Khiva he proceeded, on his own responsibility, to St. Petersburgh, with terms of accommodation from the Khan to the Government of the Czar.

How he fulfilled his mission, its dangers, hardships, and difficulties, and how he was cut down in a night attack on the shores of the Caspian, and narrowly escaped with his life, are narrated in his work on Khiva, of which a *Times'* reviewer says, "that it still affords the best materials we have for forming an idea of the country and people."

He describes in the following terms the incidents of the mêlée, when, amid darkness and the confusion consequent upon a sudden attack, he had, with a few terror-stricken native servants, to cope against some fifty Kuzzauk robbers :—" My finger was upon the trigger of my pistol, for I dared not fire, lest I should kill my own people. Suddenly, I was struck from the rear by three clubs falling together. I staggered, but did not fall, until the blows were

the next instant repeated, and I was prostrated, though without losing my pistol. I sprang to my feet, but the Kuzzauks who were standing over me, instantly struck me to the earth, and one of their clubs falling upon my arm, struck the pistol out of my hand. I believe I was stunned for the moment. When I recovered, having still my sabre by my side, I laid hand upon it and had reached my knee and right foot, when several clubs took effect, and stretched me upon my back, and two Kuzzauks threw themselves upon me, the one seizing my sabre, and endeavouring to wrench it, belt and all, from my body; the other trying to tear away a dagger, bound in my girdle. A third, with a light club, showered blows from behind upon my head and shoulders. The struggles of the plunderers recalled me to consciousness again, which previously was almost lost. Their tugs at my girdle assisted the strength still left me; I suddenly sat up, and drawing my own dagger, stabbed at the junction of the throat and thorax the Kuzzauk in front of me. He fell, and I was turning upon the other, when I saw the arm of a fourth raised to strike me with some weapon. I raised my dagger to guard my head. The sabre fell upon my hand, severing two fingers, disjointing the thumb, and shattering

the solid ivory handle of the dagger. Other blows of clubs, from the rear, stretched me again upon my back, no longer able to move. My right hand was numbed, but I knew not the extent of damage, and tried to rise. The slightest motion of the head produced vertigo, and my limbs were quite powerless, the flesh being, in fact, beaten to a jelly. Every now and then a Kuzzauk spied me out, and cut at me, in passing, with sabre, hatchet, or club. My left hand like my right, would have been severed, but that the edge of the sword was turned by a ring." At length one of the Kuzzauks, whose sympathy was either aroused by the gallantry of the young officer, or quickened by the hope of gain, bestrode his body and protected him from death. After a brief imprisonment, the Kuzzauks, finding they had assailed, not a Russian, but a friend of the Khan Huzrut of Khiva, released Captain Abbott, who, embarking at Nuovo Alexandrofski, crossed the Caspian and proceeded by Gorief, Orenburgh, and Moscow, to St. Petersburgh, whence he made his way to England.

Lord Palmerston thanked Captain Abbott for his conduct of this mission, and Captain Burnaby relates in his well-known book, "that he left behind him in Khiva many friends."

But the most important service he rendered his country was during the Punjaub campaign. When Chutter Singh, the Sikh Governor of Huzara, declared for Moolraj, with a large force of regular Khalsa troops, Captain Abbott raised some raw levies among the mountaineers of that Alpine province, and, though he was for several months cut off from all communication with the British troops, and dependent upon his own resources, being the only British officer who had neither retired nor been taken prisoner, he baffled the superior force of the Sikh Sirdar, and occupied, with 1500 matchlock men, the Marquella Pass, which 16,000 Sikh troops, and 2,000 Afghan horse were preparing to thread. When the battle of Goojerat brought the campaign of 1848-49 to a glorious termination, Captain Abbott was still at his position at Nara, which he had held with local levies while bodies of 10,000 Sikhs and 12,000 Afghans were encamped within sight. For his services he received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament; and Lord Dalhousie expressed his appreciation, in a letter to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated, Ferozepore, 7th of March, 1849. He said:—

"Captain Abbott has been heard of up to the

25th of February, at which time he was quite safe and confident in his resources, although at that time he had not heard of the decisive action at Goojerat. It is a gratifying spectacle to witness the intrepid bearing of this officer, in the midst of difficulties of no ordinary kind, not merely maintaining his position, but offering a bold front at one time to the Sikhs, at another to the Afghans, notwithstanding that religious fanaticism has been at work to induce his Mahomedan levies to desert his cause. He must have secured the attachment of the wild people amongst whom he has been thrown, by his mild and conciliatory demeanour in times of peace, as well as by his gallantry as their leader in action, thus enhancing the credit of our national character, and preparing the way for an easy occupation of an almost impregnable country."

In 1852, Major Abbott, then Deputy-Commissioner of the Huzara District, commanded a column in an expedition against the Black Mountain, which stands in the north-west corner of Huzara, on the left bank of the Indus, above Umb. This Expedition, though little known, forms so interesting a chapter in our frontier history that we will give some account of it, on the accuracy of which implicit reliance may be placed.

In the year 1852, Messrs. Carne and Tapp, collector and sub-collector of the salt tax, were murdered by a party of sixty Hussunzyes, of the Black Mountain, in Jehandad Khan's territory, near the British border. The assailants were led by Meer Ali, who openly boasted of the deed, which he declared he had perpetrated by order of Bostan, the Minister of Jehandad. He offered to present himself before any tribunal appointed by the British, on condition that, should he prove that he had only obeyed the orders of Bostan,* the British Government should cease to require his capture; and failing such proof he offered to surrender his person. This offer with which Major Abbott would gladly have closed, the Government of India rejected, but he was permitted to invite Hussunzye deputies to a conference, which they attended, when he conjured them to seize and surrender for trial Meer Ali, promising, on their compliance, that they should not be molested, but that sixty merchants of the tribe, who had been captured as hostages, would be restored to liberty. They allowed the justice of the demand, but pleaded that Meer Ali had escaped to the territory of another tribe, and was quite beyond

* Bostan had no land and was but the servant of Jehandad Khan, but he had complete ascendancy over his master.

their reach. Such being the result of the conference, and the reward offered for the apprehension of Meer Ali having failed of effect, Major Abbott urged upon the Lahore Board the necessity of attacking and punishing the whole tribe.

The Hussunzyes, who occupy the western slopes of the Black Mountain, are rated at 10,000 matchlockmen, each soldier representing a family, a number which includes those of the clan dwelling on the further bank of the Indus. All attempts of the Sikhs, our predecessors, to conquer the Hussunzyes had been eminently disastrous, and the Black Mountain still remained impregnable as it soared 10,000 feet above the sea's level, covered on the eastern face with pine forest, while the western side descends rapidly in gigantic spurs to the stream of the Indus, which, though there a considerable river, dwindles by contrast to a thread. The murder of the British officials had been part of a plot for securing the *purdah** of the chiefs of Upper Huzara, and Bostan, the author, had acted under their assurance of support, aided by the Wahabee fanatics across the Indus. The latter, invited by Bostan, took possession of the principal strongholds of his

* Purdah, or "curtain" of Asiatic privacy, here means the leisure for the chiefs to perpetrate atrocities unchecked by law.

master, Jehandad Khan, called Kotli, trans-Indus, and of his castles of Chumbairi, on the ridge of the Black Mountain, and of Shoongli, at its eastern roots.

Owing to needless delays, the Expedition was not undertaken until near the end of the year, when a heavy fall of snow would have rendered it impracticable. As the rebellious Syuds of Kazan were the least accessible of our enemies, they were first attacked. This Expedition having been successfully accomplished by detailing five columns to clamber over the mountain walls of that remote valley, by routes debouching in rear of the Syuds' defences, Major Abbott, after having destroyed one of their castles, and left a strong garrison, marched with the other columns to rejoin Colonel Mackeson,* the Commissioner, at Shargurh, a castle near the south-eastern foot of the Black Mountain. The Commissioner had collected two brigades of Native troops† to keep the peace below, while the attacking

* This gallant and distinguished officer was murdered in open Kutcherry at Peshawur a few years later.

† Viz.: 1st Brigade, 3rd Regiment of Native Infantry, Khelat-i-Ghilzi Regiment, 16th Irregular Cavalry; 2nd Brigade, 3rd Sikh Regiment, two Horse-Artillery guns, two Jumboo Regiments, Mountain Battery of Jumboo. Of these the Jumboo troops alone ascended the mountain.

force, in three columns, should be engaged in the mountains above. The Castle of Shoongli, taken, abandoned, and ruined by the enemy, was first rebuilt, and then, soon after Christmas Day of 1852, the assailing forces ascended the Black Mountain by three several routes.

The right column, formed of the *élite* of the force—the Guides and 1st Sikh Regiment, with two mountain-guns of the Huzara Battery, and some drilled Police—commanded by Major Robert Napier (now Lord Napier of Magdala), had to ascend a very long spur of the mountain, wooded with pine, leading circuitously by the right to the enemy's rear. It was defended by its inhabitants, the Akazyes, who made an obstinate resistance. The left column, consisting of two Jumboo Regiments, each about 500 strong, with mountain-guns carried by men, and commanded by Colonel Mackeson, had for its object to march by a *détour* to the left, so as to attain the rear of the enemy's main force, and form a junction there with the right wing. The only obstacle in the path of this column was a picket of the enemy, which Major Abbott drove in before they commenced the ascent, so that they reached their destination at one o'clock p.m. without having seen an enemy. A large body of the armed peasants of Huzara formed

the centre column, led by Major Abbott, and opposed to the main body of the enemy, who held a post unassailable by an ascending force, and strengthened with *abattis*. It had not been intended that the centre column should advance until the enemy's position had been turned by the flank columns, as the road of their advance had been rendered so dangerous, but the day previous to the attack the Deputy-Commissioner suggested that, to prevent succour being sent by the main force of the enemy to the opponents of the right column, the centre column should engage their attention, and act according to circumstances. This being approved, and the peasants of Huzara being best controlled by their Deputy-Commissioner, it was decided that he should lead the centre column.

The centre column, headed by Major Abbott, threading in single files the path that climbed up the huge ravine, had been advancing more than an hour, when they came in sight of the high, steep mound, rising like an island, in the ravine, under which their path was conducting them to destruction but for the incaution of the Hussunzyes, who, though invisible from beneath, were posted on its summit, and now, warned by their scouts, suddenly showed themselves on the summit in a

dense mass, 600 strong, with a wild shout of "Il lil la!" Taking heed of the warning, Major Abbott led his column up out of the ravine to the ridge of a spur, one of several which radiated from a woody summit on the left; and, observing that the spur further on descended to the ravine at a point in rear of the enemy, he commenced a skirmish with the Hussunzyes, under cover of which he sent on the rest of his levies, as they arrived, to the farther spur, out of reach of the enemy, with orders to descend the spur to the rear of the enemy's position. As soon, however, as the enemy discovered this purpose, they retreated in haste up the ravine, pursued by the centre column along its brink, and took post at its head on the edge of a perpendicular cliff of singular conformation. From this cover they kept up a sharp fire upon every moving object, being themselves quite invisible. Major Abbott decided to wait the arrival of the left column, whose guns would so greatly lessen the expenditure of life when storming the position. But, to his dismay, when at one o'clock that column arrived, the Commissioner decided not to attack until the arrival of the right column. This was already overdue, and though its fire had been heard rattling incessantly since sunrise, it seemed now more distant than ever,

an effect manifestly due to its having encountered a resistance wholly unexpected. As the day wore on, and the firing continued, Major Abbott became anxious lest other tribes from beyond the Indus should have joined during the past night, or that our column should be encumbered with wounded, or short of ammunition. It seemed to him urgently necessary to attack the enemy at once, and form a junction with Major Napier, if only to avoid the disgrace of waiting to be attacked during the night on ground familiar to the enemy, who would be fighting *pro aris et focis.* His men, who shared his anxieties and were eager for the fray, entreated to be led against the enemy, but his arguments failed to convince his chief, who objected on the score of the heavy loss of life which an attack must have cost, when, as he believed, the enemy would have no road of retreat, while they must surrender on the arrival of Major Napier. The sun was setting when at length the head of the right column was seen on the distant ridge of the mountain, and the Hussunzyes below, who had some means of information, fled in hot haste, pursued by volleys from the troops of Jumboo, and by the centre column at headlong speed.

The columns were now united on the crest of

that once formidable Black Mountain, which had repulsed with slaughter every previous attack; but the enemy had vanished, leaving the British officers the choice of retreating without having inflicted any punishment for two atrocious murders, or of burning the wretched villages deserted by them. The force spent that night on the mountain crest and on a huge spur given off westward to the Indus, and before daybreak next morning parties were sent to burn the deserted villages, in sight of the owners, who, in large numbers, looked on. The force then bivouacked another night on the mountain, when the first snow of the year began to fall, and at daybreak marched southward along the mountain ridge; Major Abbott descending to the basin of the Indus, to hold the heights above its left margin, while Jehandad Khan, with his horsemen, rode up the basin to burn the villages, in presence of a dense body of the enemy who stood gazing on either brink. But no sooner did our force begin to retire than they paddled their rafts of inflated hides across the river, landed, and rushed up the precipitous mountain, hoping to head the British columns and cut off their retreat, but, being met by the fire of a succession of pickets left to secure the rear, they

dashed back as wildly down the headlong steep, affording a singular spectacle.

A third night having been passed on the ridge of the Black Mountain, the force descended to the Indus basin, and Major Abbott, with the centre column, the 1st Sikh Regiment, and two mountain-guns, crossed the Indus to attack the Castle of Kotli, occupied by the Wahabee fanatics. These men, who might have given some trouble behind the walls of the little fort, lost heart, and fled at his approach, and some twenty or thirty of them were cut up. Major Abbott would then have marched to attack the cantonment of these fanatics at Sitana, on the river's brink lower down, but was recalled by a peremptory order from the Commissioner; and thus was lost the opportunity of scattering for ever a nest of fanatics whose presence had been the cause of all the disorders of that frontier, and to exterminate whom two costly campaigns have since been undertaken.

The small muster of the Hussunzyes on this occasion, was owing to the great popularity of the British officers at that time on the frontier, and none but those whose villages were imperilled took arms; whereas, in the days of the Sikhs, more than 10,000 matchlocks from all quarters were ready to defend

the inviolability of the Black Mountain. This enterprise, though imperfect from the causes detailed, had the wholesome effect of teaching the Hussunzyes and other tribes that no position was strong enough to shelter them from a British attack. The Expedition was planned, movement by movement, by Major Abbott, who made a model in sand of the mountain, and all of whose suggestions as to the points of attack and manner of attacking, were adopted by Colonel Mackeson.

Major Abbott found the province of Huzara, a hot bed of lawlessness, and left it, after a service of eight years, a contented and loyal province of the Punjaub, a change due in no small degree to the personal regard he inspired among the chiefs and all classes of the people, a large deputation from whom, on the occasion of his departure, escorted him to the foot of the hills with many marks of regret.

A man of genius and a shrewd observer of character, the late Sir Henry Lawrence, has placed on record his opinion of Major Abbott, in the following terms :—" He is one of a thousand. In his principles like L——, he has a most pleasing manner and very superior talent. We may not

meet again, but I will not soon forget one whom I greatly admire."*

The fourth of the brothers is Major-General Saunders A. Abbott, who proceeded from Addiscombe to India in June 1828, served in the Shekewattee campaign, and in the Revenue Survey from 1836 to 1842, when from financial considerations, it was broken up, and he was nominated aide-de-camp to Lord Ellenborough. In the latter part of 1843 he was appointed Assistant to the Governor-General's Agent on the North-West Frontier, and served on the staff of Lord Hardinge in the sanguinary field of Ferozeshah, where the fate of India hung in the balance. Of thirteen officers of the staff of "the hero of Albuera," eleven were either killed or wounded, among the latter being Saunders Abbott, who was dangerously wounded, and was laid in a tent by the side of the late Sir Herbert Edwardes, and Sir Frederick Paul Haines, the present Commander-in-Chief in India.

His services at this great crisis of our Indian rule were of a meritorious character. Lord Hardinge having applied to the Deputy Commissary-General to know how soon he could collect the

* See "Life of Sir Henry Lawrence," by the late Sir Herbert Edwardes.

supplies, was informed that it could not be done under six weeks, upon which his lordship directed Major Broadfoot, the talented and energetic Commissioner on the North-West Frontier, who fell at Ferozeshah, to undertake the task which he required to be completed in four days. Major Broadfoot sent by express to Captain Abbott and directed him to arrange for supplies at two depots, and in the morning of the fourth day Saunders Abbott, having ridden 100 miles, reported the completion of the arrangements. The Governor-General despatched him express, after the battle of Moodkee, to bring down from Kussowlie and Subatoo, Her Majesty's 29th Regiment and the Bengal Fusiliers, and to join him in the field wherever he might be. By forced marches of twenty-five and thirty miles, Saunders Abbott conducted these two famous regiments and a battery of artillery (to which he attached the drag ropes and baggage elephants) and brought them up in time for the battle of Ferozeshah. It was by the hearty and patriotic services of such officers that our Empire in India has been gained, and by which alone it can be maintained. Captain Abbott was mentioned in Lord Hardinge's despatches, and received promotion to the brevet rank of Major.

He served as political officer at Umballa during the Punjaub Campaign, and by his influence assisted in keeping quiet the Cis-Sutlej States. In November, 1854, Major Abbott proceeded on sick leave to England for fifteen months, and on his return to India resumed his appointment of Deputy Commissioner of Hooshiapore.

When the Mutiny broke out, his old Punjaub chief, Sir Henry Lawrence, then Chief Commissioner of Oude, sent for him to officiate as Commissioner in that province, but owing to a telegram for which he was waiting being intercepted by the mutineers, he remained in the Punjaub. Here he kept the district and station of Hooshiapore in a state of tranquillity whilst the troops in almost every station in the province revolted, and he raised levies and furnished supplies and stores to the Army before Delhi. In March, 1858, after the capture of Lucknow, he was nominated Commissioner of the Division, and obtained repeated acknowledgments of his services in reducing the city to order and conducting difficult trials consequent on the Mutiny. In 1863, Colonel Abbott retired from the Government service, when he was presented with a flattering address from the "Princes, Nobles, and Citizens of Lucknow," and

undertook the management of the Scinde and Punjaub Railway. In 1872 he finally quitted India.

The youngest brother of this family was the late Mr. Keith Abbott, who, for many years, filled, with conspicuous success, the post of British Consul-General at Tabriz, and latterly at Odessa, where he died, much lamented by the European inhabitants. During his lengthened service in Persia, he furnished to the Government most full and valuable reports on the resources and geography of that country, with every portion of which he was familiar.

It is of the services of the eldest of these brothers that we have to deal in the ensuing pages.

Augustus Abbott was born in London on the 7th January, 1804, soon after the return from Calcutta of his father, a merchant of good family and position in the "City of Palaces." He was first educated under Dr. Faithfull at Warfield, in Berkshire, and afterwards as gentleman-commoner at Winchester College. In his childhood he was remarkable for his courage, his high spirit, and his generosity. An instance of the latter was told to his mother by a pastry-cook in the neighbourhood of his home. When a boy of eight years of age, he had gone thither with a sixpence in

his hand to purchase some pastry, which the woman had actually handed to him on the counter, when a poor woman with an infant in her arms came in and asked for a halfpenny-worth of bread. Augustus looked at her, then at the pastry, then at the sixpence, and finally pushing back the pastry, put the sixpence into the poor woman's hand and vanished. This was characteristic of him through life, the necessities of others always taking precedence of his own, in his estimation. His talents were of a high order and he was gifted with a remarkable memory. He was of an affectionate disposition but not demonstrative; his temper was excitable but the storm was soon over, and he never remembered an injury. His conscientiousness was the most remarkable of his qualities—whether the duty upon which he was engaged was pleasant, or repugnant, he discharged it with his whole soul.

At the age of fourteen, Augustus Abbott entered Addiscombe, and, in April, 1819, when only fifteen years of age, he went out to India as an Artillery Cadet, having passed through Addiscombe in one year, which was partly owing to an extra demand for cadets that season. There was at that time great difficulty in obtaining access to books, and more especially to useful and improving works in

the Bengal Presidency. The Artillery had a military library at Dum-Dum, but every officer shunned those head-quarters because they offered no chance of active service, and few were there longer than a year. But a reading club supplied a few light works, and he gleaned the shops of each station of all books worth attention, while his fine memory retained the substance of all he read. Augustus Abbott had an intense love of field sports, and was a crack shot and billiard player; he had acquired also the art of distinguishing covers containing game, or rather their most probable habitat, and when others who were accounted good sportsmen, came home disappointed, he rarely returned without a bag.

Augustus Abbott's first service in the field was in December 1822, at the reduction of the Fort of Buckhara, in Malwa, which was evacuated after a practicable breach had been effected. In the latter part of 1825, Lord Combermere, the Commander-in-Chief in India, with an army of 20,000 men, undertook the siege of Bhurtpore, which had resisted the utmost efforts of Lord Lake, "the hero of Laswarree and Delhi," in 1804. Bhurtpore was a most formidable fortress of vast extent and great strength, and the siege that ensued is the

most memorable in our Indian annals, with the exception, perhaps, of that of Mooltan, twenty-four years later. At this time we were still engaged in our struggle with Burmah, and the resources of the Bengal Artillery, that noble service, declared by no mean judge, the late Lord Hardinge, to be the finest in the world, were taxed to the utmost. But they were equal to the occasion, and nearly 100 guns and mortars were assembled to lay siege to the virgin fortress, which was regarded as the last bulwark of national independence. The eyes of all India were fixed on the operations that ensued, the success of which was regarded as of such importance, that though a Government loan had been opened for subscription in the month of August, the moneyed classes in Calcutta hung back from supporting it, until a decisive issue had been attained.

The defences of the fort consisted of lofty and thick walls of clay, hardened in the sun, supported and bound by beams and logs, and rising from the edge of a ditch, fifty-five feet in depth, and a hundred and fifty feet broad. These defences were strengthened by the outworks of nine gateways, and flanked by thirty-five lofty mud bastions, one of which, called the "Bastion of Victory," was built to

commemorate the defeat of Lord Lake, and, as the Jât soldiers vauntingly said, with the skulls and bones of those who had fallen in the first siege.

The artillery opened fire with thirty-six mortars and forty-eight pieces of heavy ordnance, which played on the ramparts for many days without creating a practicable breach, as the heaviest shot only caused the defences to crumble into rugged masses falling down on each side of the conical wall, but leaving the ascent scarcely less steep and inaccessible than before.

Lieutenant Abbott held command of a battery of two 18-pounder iron guns, built on the very counter-scarp of the ditch, at the north angle, which he held for three weeks without relief. Here Lord Combermere came daily, having been delighted with his practice from the battery, first erected at Keedur Kundi, nearly a mile from the defences of the citadel. The enemy, with their huge iron guns, had by long practice got the range of this battery, and being very troublesome, one day when his Lordship was visiting it, he asked Lieutenant Abbott whether he could silence them. Abbott said he would try, and prepared some shrapnel, the first of which burst in the embrasure of the troublesome gun, the next proving equally accurate. The

bastion was silenced for the rest of the day. This had drawn Lord Combermere's notice to him, and his plainness of speech amused instead of offending him. His Lordship brought him his own rifle to practice with when the guns were not firing; and, after the siege, gave him the Adjutancy of the Sirhind Division of Artillery.

A number of sayings attributed to Augustus Abbott were in circulation in the camp, having more or less foundation in fact. One was to the effect that an aide-de-camp brought him a message one day from Lord Combermere, asking whether he could not clear the ditch of the people of Bhurtpore, who resorted thither in the twilight, and that he had replied that "he thought it a pity to waste ammunition upon old women and pigs; but that if his Lordship commanded, he was ready to fire at the moon." The real occurrence was as follows:—The enemy were in the habit of using huge bales of raw cotton as extempore parapets, and would sometimes saturate them with oil, and after setting them alight, roll them down the incipient breach at night, to show whether any troops were climbing up it. On one occasion they had rolled several bags into the ditch, and used them as a screen, when Lord Combermere, observing this, and appre-

hensive that the cover might be designed for the protection of their countermines, asked Abbott, "whether he could not knock the cotton bales to pieces with his shot." Abbott replied, "that as shot made so little impression on bales of cotton, it would cost a large expenditure of ammunition to demolish these, and would probably destroy many of the miserable old women who resorted thither to gather shot and fragments of shells; but, that if his Lordship would allow him the choice, he would take a dozen artillerymen with him into the ditch, and rip the sacking of the bales with knives, when they would fall to pieces." His Lordship would not allow this, as it could not be done without considerable loss of life, and so the cotton bales were allowed to remain. Abbott was too thoroughly the soldier ever to forget what was due to his superior, the more so when he was one who had treated him so kindly, but, says one qualified to speak of him, "the flash of his large dark eyes, when he spoke as freely and fearlessly to a commander-in-chief as to a subaltern, sometimes gave bystanders the idea that he was rebuking his superiors."

Lord Combermere had the good taste to appreciate the respectful independence of the young subaltern,

who kept the battery alive with his wit and high spirits, and whose skill as a marksman, both with gun and rifle, was so pre-eminent. Abbott's position on the enemy's counterscarp for so long a time was one of some peril, for the enemy had skilful miners, and when his brother James, who was in the trenches, was one night roused out of his sleep by the explosion of some of our tumbrils, his first idea was that a mine had been exploded under the battery on the enemy's counterscarp.

At Bhurtpore the fact was confirmed that round shot from the gun of that day were not effectual in breaching the mud walls of the native forts in India. We had, indeed, a gun breach at the north-east angle, but it was not considered practicable for the attack of that point. Mining was had recourse to, and one lodged under the "Long-necked Bastion" was exploded, but being overcharged it acted like a volcano; huge building stones were hurled into the air, whence some of them fell at the distance of 500 yards from the ramparts, killing several of our men. At length, nearly a fortnight later, a great mine was completed and charged with 10,000 pounds of powder. The explosion that took place was terrific, and immediately the storming column, under General Reynell, rushed up the breach, and bayo-

neted the defenders, who fought with desperation. Thus fell on the 18th of January, 1826, after a siege of thirty-six days, this great, and hitherto invincible, fortress, with a loss to the British of only 1,000 men, that of the garrison being, it was said, 6,000. The state treasure and jewels were divided among the victors, the share of the Commander-in-Chief being no less than £60,000. The capture of Bhurtpore greatly increased British prestige, and, combined with the simultaneous conclusion of the long and arduous Burmese war, dissolved the hopes of the disaffected, and strengthened the power of the Government.

In 1833-34, we find Lieutenant Abbott—for he did not obtain his captaincy until April in the latter year--serving in the field with the artillery of the Army, which marched through and demolished the Forts of Shekewattee, a bloodless campaign, but, from the nature of the country, one of no ordinary difficulty.

In 1838 we entered upon the memorable Afghan war, and Captain Abbott again took the field, and served throughout the entire operations, entering Afghanistan with the army under the command of Sir John Keane, and quitting it, four years later, with the victorious columns, which, under Generals

Pollock and Nott, retrieved the honour and prestige of British arms, tarnished by the pusillanimity of General Elphinstone.

Captain Abbott's battery, consisting of Golundauze, or Native artillerymen, was, on the suggestion of Major Penn of the Bengal Artillery, ordered to employ camels for draught purposes, and it was owing to his established reputation as a first-rate artillery officer that he was selected to conduct the experiment. The camels selected were those employed in sandy districts for the plough, and were of a peculiar breed, known by a head more finely formed than is usual among camels. Captain Abbott's battery was perfectly equipped by the care and skill of the commander, and offered a novel spectacle, the camels having never before been seen in harness in Upper India. Strange as was their aspect it was far from unmilitary. The weight which they could oppose to the *vis inertiæ* of the guns, by merely leaning against the harness, made the 9-pounder field-pieces mere playthings to the teams, on hard, sandy, or stony ground, and their speed was such, that in a race with the fleetest buggy horse they could show it the muzzle of the gun, as was proved at Delhi before the battery marched. But they had their weak points. On

slippery ground they proved helpless, and in crossing those places so common in the clay soil of Afghanistan, which became girth deep after the passage of much cattle, where rapid scrambling alone avails to carry any animals across, the camel was utterly at a loss. He quietly thrust in his long leg up to the elbow, and his broad splay foot clinched it there for ever. It was also found that the camel's constitution, when he is domesticated, is far more delicate than that of the horse. The battery soon after its arrival at Cabul became crippled by deaths among the draught camels, and none could be procured in Afghanistan, trained to draught. So Captain Abbott got permission to horse it from the Yaboos, or Galloways, of the country, which proved most efficient.

No. 6 Light Field Battery, under Captain Abbott, was the first British artillery that crossed the Kojuck Pass, intervening between Quetta and Candahar, and throughout the ensuing arduous and protracted operations, it was always on active service, and Captain Abbott frequently received the thanks of the Commanding Generals for the skilful and dashing manner in which he carried it into action, and for the skill and resource he displayed in overcoming all difficulties of transport and

supply. On the bloodless capture of Candahar, and the entry of Shah Soojah on the 25th of April, 1839, the battery formed a portion of the column, detached under Sir Robert Sale, in pursuit of the Candahar Sirdars, and followed them as far as Giriskh. After a delay of ten weeks, occasioned by a want of food, the Army marched from the capital of Western Afghanistan, and soon arrived before Ghuznee, 230 miles distant. Ghuznee, which is the most important fortress in Afghanistan, had the reputation of impregnability, and as Sir John Keane had brought no battering guns with him, it would have defied the efforts of the British force encamped before it, but for the genius of Captain Thomson, of the Bengal Engineers, who hit upon the happy expedient of blowing in the gate, and the never-failing valour of the British rank and file, who, led by their officers, stormed the fortress, and, thus left open the road to Cabul, ninety miles distant. No further opposition was offered to the advance of the Army, which encamped before Cabul, and, on the 7th of August, our puppet king, Shah Soojah, resplendent in jewels, was conducted in great pomp through the city, to the Bala Hissar, or citadel.

Afghanistan being subjugated, in September, 1839, General Willshire, returned with the Bombay

column, on his way capturing by storm the city of Khelat, the ruler of which, Mehrab Khan, had withheld supplies from our troops. Upon the removal of Shah Soojah's Court from Cabul to Jellalabad, for the winter of 1839, Captain Abbott's battery formed part of the brigade which escorted him to that town. In January, 1840, an expedition, undertaken to coerce a refractory chief, marched for Pushoot, which is some fifty miles to the north-east of Jellalabad. The troops, which included No. 6 Light Field Battery, marched on the 11th of January, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Orchard, C.B., and, on their arrival before the Fort, Captain Abbott opened fire with his guns, and battered down the *fausse-brai.* But every attempt by the Engineer officer to repeat the Ghuznee exploit of blowing in the gate, was unsuccessful, and after a storming column had been beaten back with much loss, the Fort was evacuated by the enemy during the night. Colonel Orchard expressed his high approval of the services of Captain Abbott on this occasion.*

* Extract from Detachment Orders by Lieutenant-Colonel Orchard, C.B., commanding the Force.

"Camp near Pushoot, 20th January, 1840.

"To Captain Abbott, who has successfully overcome the nume-

In the ensuing spring Shah Soojah returned to Cabul, and with him the greater portion of the troops. But there was trouble in the Kohistan, as the mountainous country to the north of Cabul is called, and the Ameer Dost Mahomed, whom we had ousted from his throne to make way for his *fainéant* rival, defeated by Brigadier Dennie at Bameean, in the Hindoo Koosh, reappeared in the Kohistan. As he said, "I am like a wooden spoon, you may throw me hither and thither, but I shall not be hurt." On the 24th of September, 1839, Sir Robert Sale, accompanied by Sir Alexander Burnes as Political Officer, marched from Cabul against the Ameer, with a force including Captain Abbott's battery, and, on the 29th, an attack was made on a fortified village at the entrance of the Ghorebund Pass, known as Tootum-Durrah. The village, with a chain of detached forts, fell to the fire of the guns directed by Abbott, and the advance of the infantry. The success was complete, though at the cost of the life of a young and very promising

rous difficulties he has had to contend with, for the zealous and indefatigable manner in which he has conducted the arduous duties devolving upon him, and for the great assistance and valuable service rendered by him on the morning of the 18th, Lieutenant-Colonel Orchard requests he will accept his warmest thanks."

cavalry officer, Lieutenant Edward Conolly, acting aide-de-camp to Sir Robert Sale, one of three brothers, all of whom perished in Afghanistan or Bokhara.

After destroying the defences of Tootum-Durrah, Sale marched, on the 3rd of October, upon Joolgah, another fortified position held by the "rebels," as they were called. The walls of this place were too thick to be breached by nine-pounder field guns, and when an attempt was made to carry the fort by storm, the scaling-ladders were found to be too short. Many gallant men fell in the breach, and the assaulting column was forced to retire. Fortunately, as at Pushoot, the Kohistanees did not await a renewal of the attack, but abandoned the fort.

It was known that Dost Mahomed was in the Ghorebund Valley, within forty or fifty miles of Cabul, and Sir William Macnaghten was in a state of great anxiety, expecting even then "the disgrace of being shut up in Cabul for a time." But a gleam of unexpected good-luck fell upon our arms and our Afghan policy. Dost Mahomed moved into the Nijrow country, whither he was closely followed by Sir Robert Sale, and on the 2nd of November, an anniversary memorable in Afghan annals, the Ameer was brought to bay at Purwan-Durrah. In

the affair that ensued, the 2nd Bengal Cavalry behaved like cravens, and when Dost Mahomed, followed by a small party of horsemen, advanced to meet them, they turned and fled back to the protection of Abbott's guns, leaving their officers to bear the brunt of the attack. These, like English gentlemen, scorned to flee, but met their fate with the heroism we applaud in the great names of Greece and Rome. Dr. Lord, the Political officer, Lieutenants Crispin and Broadfoot (the latter one of three gallant brothers, two of whom died the soldier's death in Afghanistan, and the third at Ferozeshah) were cut to pieces, and Captains Fraser and Ponsonby, after performing prodigies of valour, retired, covered with ghastly wounds. But Dost Mahomed, instead of following up his success, recognised the futility of resistance, and rode straight from the field of Purwan-Durrah to Cabul, where he delivered himself up to Sir William Macnaghten, and, on the 12th of December, was sent in honourable confinement to India.

The next Expedition on which Captain Abbott was engaged, was into the Zoormut district, to reduce some refractory tribes, and retrieve a repulse sustained by Captain Hay in an ill-judged attack on the fort of Zao. The column, which included four

guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, the Mountain Train, and some mortars, the whole under Captain Abbott, marched from Cabul on the 28th of September, 1841, under the command of Colonel Oliver. But there was no fighting, and, after blowing up the forts and receiving the submission of the chiefs, the column returned to Cabul. While operating in this country, Captain Abbott took his guns over a pass 9,600 feet high.

As the column approached Cabul they were met with the news that the Eastern Ghilzye Chiefs, who held the passes between the capital and Jellalabad, were in arms, in consequence of the reduction of the subsidies hitherto paid them by the British Government, which they regarded as a breach of contract. Sir William Macnaghten made light of this trouble, but it was the beginning of the storm that was so soon to burst on his devoted head. The Indian Government, desirous of reducing the drain on the Exchequer caused by supplying a large army with stores from arsenals 800 miles distant in a direct line, resolved on leaving a force of only 10,000 men, including what was known as the Shah's Contingent, to garrison Afghanistan. Accordingly, when in October, 1839, Sir John Keane returned to India, the Army of Occupation

was considerably reduced, and the command devolved on Sir Willoughby Cotton, a veteran of the Peninsular and Burmese wars, who, again, in November, 1840, returned to India, and gave place to General Elphinstone, an amiable and personally gallant officer, but incapacitated for command, as he himself pleaded, by reason of his feeble health, and still more by an undecided and vacillating temperament. Thus, with the Eastern Ghilzyes in arms; with an army reduced to a condition of weakness, and led by an officer of infirm purpose, the second in command at Cabul being not less remarkable for a fatal obstinacy and intractability; with a Political Chief whose sanguine temperament and bad judgment blinded his eyes to dangers recognised by every one who had eyes to see; with a martial and, for the most part, hostile population; and with a province, the Punjaub, torn with contending factions, in the rear—the situation was one that demanded the vigilance, the forethought, the prescience in council, and the vigour in action of the best officer that the Indian Government had in their pay. And such an officer they had ready to hand in the country, one who was not only qualified by reason of his soldierly virtues, but who was familiar with Afghanistan and with the Afghan

character. But, lamentable to relate, private reasons were suffered to override the paramount consideration of the public weal. General Nott—for we need scarcely say we refer to him—was distasteful to the Envoy by reason of his unconcealed contempt for the Shah and his sham Court, and his directness of purpose and bluntness of manner. Finally, he was a Company's officer, and in those days this was almost a virtual disqualification for high command.

As though the troops in Afghanistan, which only included three European regiments, were not already too weak, Sir Robert Sale's Brigade, which included Captain Abbott's battery, was under orders to return to India, and it was decided that they should coerce, *en route*, the refractory Ghilzye chiefs who were in open arms, and had established themselves at the Khoord-Cabul Pass, within fifteen miles of the capital. On the 9th of October, Colonel Monteith, of the 35th Native Infantry marched with a small force, including two guns of Captain Abbott's battery, under Lieutenant Dawes, and that night his camp was attacked at Boothak, the first march from Cabul. On receipt of this news, Sir Robert Sale proceeded with his regiment, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, and having cleared the

Khoord-Cabul Pass, where he left Monteith, returned to Boothak.

On the 20th of October—Captain Abbott, without whom Sale would not proceed, having returned on the previous day from the Zoormut country—the Brigade marched to clear the passes to Jellalabad, and after a halt of one day at Khoord-Cabul, for want of camels, proceeded on to Tezeen. Here Captain Macgregor, the political officer of the column, entered into negotiations with the Ghilzye chiefs regarding the restoration of the subsidies to their former footing, and, as he reported, arranged the matter satisfactorily. But when, on the 26th of October, the Brigade marched, Abbott being with the artillery of the advanced guard, they found the whole armed force of the district arranged against them. The Ghilzyes attacked the rear guard on the 26th at Sei Baba, on the 27th at Kutta Sung, and on the 28th on approaching Jugdulluck, but the enemy were repulsed on every occasion. Between the Jugdulluck Pass, where Captain Abbott commanded the advance guard, and Gundamuck, the fighting was specially heavy and continuous, as not only had the heights to be cleared, but the immense baggage train, with which all Indian armies are encumbered, required protection. The column lost

thirty officers and men killed and ninety wounded, and at length, after eight days' harrassing warfare, the troops found brief repose at Gundamuck, where they found located in an open cantonment the Khyber Regiment, under Captain H. P. Burn, a body of Afghan Horse, and 300 *juzailchees* (matchlockmen), under Captain Gerard.

While halting in this fertile spot alarming news was received from Cabul, and Sale was ordered by Macnaghten and Elphinstone to return with all despatch, but a council of war decided against a return march though the passes, encumbered as the column was with 300 sick and wounded, and on the 11th of November, the Brigade moved to Jellalabad. A running fight with the enemy, who tried to cut off the baggage, was kept up throughout the following day, concluding with a brilliant charge of the 5th Cavalry, and on the morning of the 13th Sale entered Jellalabad.

Throughout the prolonged investment of this town by the forces under Mohamed Akbar Khan and other chiefs, Captain Abbott commanded the artillery of the "illustrious" garrison. The works of Jellalabad were very extensive, the circumference of the walls being 2,300 yards, and it was impossible to man them; but the defences were strengthened

under the superintendence of Captain Broadfoot, a Madras officer of Infantry, who had a real genius for war, and guns were mounted in the most suitable positions by Captain Abbott, who collected ammunition as he best could in the neighbourhood. Sir Robert Sale was not the man to remain on the defensive, and on the day after his arrival at Jellalabad, sent out Colonel Monteith, with 1,100 men, against the enemy. All arms were engaged, and Abbott covered the advance with his guns. Soon after the Afghans closed in menacing array on the garrison, and on the 1st of December Colonel Dennie, of the 13th Light Infantry, sallied out with a column and dispersed the investing force. In this affair Abbott's guns worked much havoc on the dense masses of the enemy. On the destruction of the British force under General Elphinstone, Akbar Khan, the most fiery of the sons of Dost Mahomed, was enabled to bring a larger force before Jellalabad, and there was constant occasion for Abbott to drive away the enemy, who took advantage of the ruined buildings near the *enceinte* to annoy the garrison. On the 11th of March, while thus engaged, he was hit by an Afghan matchlockman, whose ball, fired from a mosque 240 yards distant, struck him in the breast, but fortunately only inflicted a flesh

wound, and he refused to absent himself from duty for a single day.

The last action fought by the Jellalabad garrison as such, was on the 7th of April, 1842, when Akbar Khan and his army of 6,000 men were finally driven away in irretrievable rout. In this action Captain Abbott commanded the guns, consisting of his battery and that of Captain Backhouse, of Shah Soojah's Artillery, and, advancing at the gallop, by the precision and celerity of his fire, contributed greatly to the victory. Akbar Khan on this occasion himself directed the fire of his guns, but they were silenced and captured. Four cannon, lost by the Cabul force, and two standards were captured, and, as Sale wrote, "the field of battle was strewed with the bodies of men and horses." Our loss was small—only ten killed and fifty-three wounded, but the victory was dimmed by the death of the gallant Dennie, who was shot through the body. During the siege thus happily raised, when their prospects were at the gloomiest, Captain Abbott sought to cheer the men with his fun; and an anecdote is told of his having set up a General's cocked hat at the unoccupied corner of his battery, to draw thither the fire of the enemy, who marvelled that the British General had so many lives to spare.

The deputation that waited upon Sale to implore him to allow them to make the famous sally of the 7th of April, which broke up the investment, was originated by him, with the aid of Captains Oldfield and Backhouse. When the enemy's camp and baggage fell into our hands, he found in Mohamed Akbar's tent, the gold repeater watch given to that treacherous chief by Sir W. Macnaghten, just previous to the murder of the latter. This he gave to the prize agents, and purchased at their sale. It was in his hands constantly on the night of his death, in his restless desire to know the hour. His letters from Jellalabad to an officer of the Head-Quarter Staff were put into Lord Ellenborough's hands on his arrival in India, as affording the most accurate picture of events and of the position of affairs.

In the following pages will be found a narrative of many episodes of the Afghan War, of which no detailed account has hitherto appeared, beyond the published despatches. Sir John Kaye, in his admirable and comprehensive work, disclaims any intention of writing a military history; the works of the military historians, Hough, Havelock, and Kennedy, only deal with the operations ending with the return of Sir John Keane to India in November,

1840; while Mr. Gleig treats more exclusively of the defence of Jellalabad, and the narratives of Vincent Eyre and Lady Sale record only the Cabul disasters. The following pages, on the other hand, give hitherto unpublished details of the Expeditions to Pushoot and to the Zoormut and Shinwarree Valleys, and the campaign in the Kohistan. Moreover, some extracts we have made from the journals and correspondence of Augustus Abbott, when commanding the Artillery at Jellalabad, shed a new light on this interesting and glorious episode of our military history; more particularly we would point to the affair of the 1st of December, 1841, and the brilliant action of the 7th of April following, by which the "illustrious garrison" broke up the investment. The unimpeachable veracity of Augustus Abbott *va sans dire*, as the French say, and the sober narrative of his journal and letters, jotted down from day to day, and despatched to India as opportunity offered, presents a strong contrast to the graphic, though highly-coloured, account of Mr. Gleig.

On the 15th of April, General Pollock arrived at Jellalabad with the relieving army, of which Frederick Abbott was Chief Engineer. The garrison were full of eagerness to avenge the disasters

of the preceding January, but circumstances over which General Pollock had no control, prevented him from advancing on Cabul until the following August, though he did not remain inactive. A column proceeded, under the command of Colonel Monteith, into the Shinwarree Valley, and Captain Abbott went in charge of the artillery. The Afghan forts and villages were destroyed, and on the 26th of July, at Mazeena, where the enemy made a stand, Abbott's guns were brought into requisition. On the 3rd of August, the column returned to Jellalabad, and on the 20th, General Pollock began to move on Cabul, with 8,000 men and 17 guns, including Captain Abbott's battery. On the 24th of the month, the villages of Mammoo Khail and Koochlee Khail, a few miles from Gundamuck, were captured after a short action, in which Abbott participated, and on the 7th of September General Pollock marched from Gundamuck with the first Division of his Army, under the command of Sir Robert Sale. On the following day took place the action of Jugdulluck, when, under cover of Abbott's and Backhouse's guns, the columns led by Broadfoot and Wilkinson vied with each other as to who should first expel the Afghan *juzailchees* from the heights.

But Akbar Khan determined to make a final desperate stand at Tezeen, where, in an almost impregnable position, he concentrated an army of 16,000 men. On the 13th of September the strength of the opposing forces was put to the test of battle, and the result was a crushing and decisive defeat for the Afghan cause. Where every branch of the Army covered itself with glory, it need scarcely be added that No. 6 Field Battery, under its gallant chief, was hotly engaged, as it had been since quitting Jellalabad, and that it performed its *devoirs*.

Akbar Khan fled from the field of Tezeen to the Ghorebund Valley, leaving Cabul at the mercy of the conqueror. On the 15th of September, General Pollock encamped before the city, and the British Standard was once more hoisted on the topmost pinnacle of the Bala Hissar under a royal salute. The return march to India of the combined columns of Pollock and Nott was conducted without any fighting of importance, and on the 17th of December, the "illustrious" garrison of Jellalabad, under its gallant leader, Sir Robert Sale, defiled over the bridge of boats on the Sutlej, and was welcomed with especial marks of distinction by Lord Ellenborough, who had assembled a large army at Feroze-

pore. Thus Major Abbott returned to the British provinces, after an absence from India of four eventful years, during which he was constantly engaged with the enemy upon as arduous service as falls to the lot of few officers to undergo.

Lord Ellenborough, in an autograph letter, dated the 16th of September, had already offered him the appointment of Gun-Carriage Agent at Futtehgurh in the following flattering terms: "Your practical knowledge of the service of artillery in the field, under the most difficult circumstances, renders you eminently fit for this appointment, and I doubt not that before you receive this letter you will, before Cabul, have acquired new claims to whatever mark of public approbation the Government of India can bestow upon you." Previous to this communication, in a letter dated the 2nd of April of the same year, his Lordship also wrote: "Desirous of marking my sense of your distinguished services in the field, I have appointed you one of my Honorary Aides-de-Camp."

This mark of distinction was repeated by Lords Hardinge, Dalhousie, and Canning. Lord Ellenborough, whose instincts were military, and who always lamented that a hard fate had made him the wearer of a black, instead of a red, coat, showed his

appreciation of the distinguished services of No. 6 Field Battery, by directing that "Jellalabad" should be engraved upon the guns, and that they should be retained for use in the battery.*

In recognition of his services Her Majesty, in 1840, conferred on Major Abbott the Companionship of the Bath. From 1843 to 1847 he held the post of Agent for Gun Carriages, and from 1848 to 1855, that of Principal Commissary of Ordnance. In the latter year he was appointed Inspector General of Ordnance, and, in 1858, was promoted to the command of the Bengal Artillery. During this period his professional acquirements were often called into requisition by the Government of India in matters in connection with his branch of the Service. Among important committees on which he served, was one assembled to inquire into the

* The following is a copy of the letter, which, with others in the handwriting of his Lordship, is now lying before us:—"January, 1843. I understand that your troop are anxious to have again, in the event of their being called into active service, the same guns with which they obtained, under your command, so much distinction at Jellalabad, and that these guns will be placed in the magazine at Futtehgurh. You will therefore continue to have them under your care, and you will preserve them for service with your troop, and I beg you will have engraven upon each gun the word 'Jellalabad.'"

defences of Ferozepore, which, up to our annexation of the Punjaub, was our extreme north-west frontier station, his coadjutors being General Sir George Brooke, Bengal Artillery, and Colonel (now Major-General) J. T. Boileau, of the Bengal Engineers.

Shortly after attaining the command of his regiment, the legitimate object of ambition of a "gunner," Colonel Abbott was compelled, by failing health, to return to his native land, after an interrupted absence of thirty-nine years. Besides the order of the Bath, he received medals for Bhurtpore, Jellalabad, Ghuznee, and Cabul, and held the "Douranee" Order, instituted by the ill-fated Shah Soojah, and conferred upon him by Sir W. Macnaghten, in November 1840, though he never wore it.

He attained the rank of Major-General in April 1860, and expired at Cheltenham on the 25th of February, 1867, much regretted by a large circle of friends, among whom was the Earl of Ellenborough,* who resided near that town.

* In 1846, Lord Ellenborough erected in the garden at Southam House, a monument to commemorate the names and services of those to whom he considered himself to be more especially indebted for the success of his administration in India, and among the names inscribed on the walls is that of Major Augustus Abbott.

It is no uncommon circumstance in India for several members of one family to achieve distinction. Thus there are the three Lawrences, who each guided a province through the perilous times of the Mutiny: the three Conollys, and the three Broadfoots, who all showed talents of the highest order, which a cruel fate untimely nipped in the bud; also the Chamberlains, the Johnsons, the Andersons, the Lumsdens, the Boileaus, the Mackenzies, and many other families whose names were familiar in India, but whom the advent of the "competition-wallah" may drive out of the field, as it would have excluded those of Wellington and Nelson from the services of which they are the brightest ornaments, had the present rage for competitive examinations animated our forefathers. However the system may work—and we have no wish to depreciate the importance of high mental culture, provided, so far as India at least is concerned, such acquirements as gentlemanly bearing, high character, and physical and social gifts, are deemed indispensable—we trust that our rulers will despatch from the palatial seat of Government at Westminster a race of statesmen and soldiers for the hour of trial which appears to be impending, equally sagacious in council, and bold in action, as those sent out by old

"John Company" from his modest house of business in Leadenhall Street. The qualities and accomplishments essential to a successful career in India, either in the political or military department, (and often times a soldier finds himself intrusted with extended civil powers,) are not solely those of an Oxford Don, or an Inspector of Schools. The French staff officers, it is true, sneered at the German "spectacled professors" who overran their country and dictated peace at Versailles, but then these representatives of a superior military culture were certainly not behind their opponents in the dash, hard riding, and other qualifications requisite for an officer, which were found combined in the person of the typical Uhlan, who was wont to ride ahead of armies and achieve the surrender of fortified posts.

It was by similar qualities that all our great names in Indian History are distinguished. Clive was a dunce at school and would have been ignominiously spun by the Civil Service Commissioners, those awful judges of our incipient soldiers and statesmen, and, on the other hand, the ill-fated Macnaghten was a brilliant scholar who carried off all the prizes at the Calcutta University. But the one was the "heaven-born general" of the

elder Pitt, who founded our Indian Empire, and showed his surprising aptitude to lead men in a crisis—while the other, though a brave gentleman, a generous enemy, and an amiable friend, went nigh to wreck the Empire founded by the genius of the hero of Arcot and Plassey. The natives of India are quick to distinguish between a *parvenu* and a gentleman "to the manner born," and mortal offence may be given to a native Prince, or ally, by the superciliousness of an ill-bred political officer, who sneers at the pride and state of the descendant of a thousand kings, such as the Maharana of Oodeypore.

Major-General Augustus Abbott was acknowledged in India to be one of the finest Artillerists of his day, and the late Field-Marshal Sir George Pollock, himself a "gunner," once stated to the author, that the gallant soldier in question was "the finest artillery officer in India." But this Memoir is not undertaken with the object of elevating one who has passed away into the character of a hero; such a proposal would be alike contrary to the wishes of his family, and to the simple, manly character of the officer of whose services it treats. His modest wishes would rather have preferred the epitaph dictated by his friend

and brother officer, the dying hero of the Defence of Lucknow :—" Here lies Henry Lawrence who tried to do his duty." Happily England can give the proud answer of the mother of Brasidas to the strangers who praised the memory of her son :—" Sparta hath many a worthier son than he."

The object of bringing the experiences of Major-General Abbott before the world at the present critical conjunction of affairs is, rather, to show the serious nature of the task upon which this country has entered in the projected war with the Ameer of Afghanistan, by recounting the difficulties of the operations of 1838-42, and the manner in which an artillery officer, who participated throughout these operations, surmounted those difficulties and brought his battery in triumph from Delhi through Afghanistan to Ferozepore. At the present time, when British troops are about to invade Afghanistan, the observations and experiences of General Abbott in his marches through the country, as jotted down daily in his journal or written to friends, will be of value as emanating from an officer who never exaggerated difficulties; moreover, by showing the difficulties against which he had to contend,

measures can be taken to provide against them in the forthcoming operations. It is with this object that the family of General Abbott have placed in my hands the preparation of this work, which to me, personally, is a labour of love, for among my oldest and most valued friends I am proud to number more than one of this band of brothers.

C. R. LOW.

Kensington,
November, 1878.

CHAPTER I.

THE MARCH ON CANDAHAR AND CABUL.

The Simla Proclamation of 1st October, 1838—Assembly of the Army at Ferozepore—The March to Bukhur—Occupation of the Fort of Rohree—The March into Scinde and Submission of the Ameers—Crossing the Indus—The March from Shikarpore to Dadur and through the Bolan Pass to Quetta—Advance on Candahar—The Difficulties of the Kojuck Pass—Arrival at Candahar—The March to the Helmund and Occupation of the Forts of Ghirisk—Departure from Candahar—Incidents of the March to Ghuznee—The Storm of Ghuznee—The March on Cabul—Arrival at the Capital—Dispersion of the Army of the Indus.

ON the 1st of October 1838, Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India—who, two years before, at the customary banquet given by the Court of Directors to their departing Proconsuls, spoke "of the exultation with which he regarded the prospect of doing good to his fellow-creatures, of extending the blessings of good government and

happiness to millions in India"—issued at Simla the famous manifesto, directing "the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus," with the object of relieving Herat, besieged by a Persian Army, and of replacing on the throne of Afghanistan Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk. This prince, whose incompetence had been frequently manifested throughout his adventurous career, was described in this manifesto as one "whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved to his lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities," though beyond Captain (afterwards Sir) Claude Wade, the custodian of the ex-king at Loodiana, it would be hard to discover who were these "best authorities." Certainly not Captain (afterwards Sir) Alexander Burnes, who, in the preceding April, some time before quitting Cabul, on the failure of his "purely commercial mission" as Lord Auckland styled it, addressed to his lordship a communication in which he declared:—"There is but one way of making Afghanistan a barrier against the Russians, and that is to form a strict alliance with Dost Mahomed, to strengthen his authority, which has been compromised by family quarrels, and let everyone be thoroughly convinced that the Government of

India will never allow any attempts to be made to injure or subvert it."* It was only when Burnes was directed by Lord Auckland to inform the Ameer, that Peshawur, which had been treacherously acquired by Runjeet Singh, could never be given up by the Sikhs, that Burnes approved of the Shah Soojah project, and wrote on the 2nd of June, that he conceived it expedient to adopt "not what was best, but what was best under the circumstances, which a series of blunders had produced." Thus it happened that the Governor-General refused the alliance proffered in terms of humility by Dost Mahomed,† who had been *de facto* ruler of Afghanistan since 1826, and, concluding a tripartite treaty with Runjeet Singh, the old "Lion of the Punjaub," then tottering on the brink of the grave, and our pensioner, the

* "History of the Afghans," by J. P. Ferrier. London, 1858.

† "Let his Lordship," said he, "give me but two words of encouragement, let him recognise me as Ameer of Cabul, and I will forget the mortal feud between me and the Shah Kamran, my enemy by blood, and I will rush to his support with my best troops to defend him from the Shah of Persia, on the simple condition of receiving a subsidy for the troops that I shall employ in the service of the Company." He even added, "that for the present he would not say another word about the restitution of Peshawur."

incapable Shah Soojah, announced in his Simla proclamation the invasion of Afghanistan.

Almost before the ink was dry, all semblance of necessity for this step had ceased by the raising of the siege of Herat on the 9th of September, but the occupation of Afghanistan as a means whereby the intrigues and progress of Russia might be checked, was a project that commanded the approval of Lord Palmerston, and of Sir John Hobhouse,* then President of the Board of Control, as well as of the Secretaries about Lord Auckland, of whom the moving spirit was Mr. William Macnaghten, who had conducted the negotiations with Runjeet Singh; and it was persevered with, notwithstanding the protest of the Supreme Council, and the disapproval of such men as the Duke of Wellington, the Marquis Wellesley, and Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, who disapproved even of our having an agent at Cabul.

On the 3rd of August the Regiments intended for the invasion of Afghanistan and the raising of the siege of Herat were warned for service, and, on the 13th of September, Sir Henry Fane, the Commander-in-Chief, published a General Order

* The late Lord Broughton, the friend and fellow-traveller of Lord Byron.

brigading the force, naming the staff officers, and ordering the whole to assemble at Kurnaul on the 31st of October. The Army, of which Sir Henry Fane assumed the chief command, was to consist of two divisions, under Sir Willoughby Cotton and General Duncan, divided into five brigades of Infantry, under Colonels Sale, Dennis, Nott, Roberts, and Worsley; a brigade of Cavalry under Colonel Arnold, and a brigade of Artillery under Colonel Graham. In addition, a Bombay column, under Sir John Keane, Commander-in-Chief in that Presidency, consisting of two brigades of Infantry, led by Colonels Willshire and Gordon, a brigade of Cavalry under Colonel Scott, and a brigade of Artillery under Colonel Stevenson, was to proceed by sea to the mouth of the Indus, thence marching to Sukhur. There was, in addition, the irregular force, called Shah Soojah's contingent, though officered and paid by the English Government, under the command of Major-General Simpson, consisting of two Regiments of Cavalry, a troop of Horse-Artillery, and four Regiments of Infantry, the whole numbering some 6,000 men. Captain Augustus Abbott was, at this time, stationed at Delhi, being in command of No. 6 Light Field Battery, consisting of nine-pounder guns manned

by native gunners, which was among those selected for service beyond the Indus, and was equipped, as an experiment, with camels.

On the 4th of November, he marched in company with Her Majesty's 16th Lancers, and the 2nd Bengal Light Cavalry, by a new route skirting the desert, to join the "Grand Army of the Indus" at Ferozepore, where the brigade arrived on the 21st of the same month.

The officers attached to the battery were:—Lieutenants R. Shakespear, M. Dawes, and R. Warburton; and Assistant-Surgeon Mackintosh. Of these, the two former were officers of special promise, and all three subalterns earned distinction in Afghanistan. Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear, by his successful conduct of the mission for the relief of the Russian prisoners at Khiva, and, by his subsequent services on General Pollock's Staff, and Lieutenant Michael Dawes, by the gallantry and skill he displayed throughout the protracted operations, until the return of the battery four years later.

The army, officers and men, tired with the long peace, unbroken, save by the brief Coorg campaign, since the Burmese war and siege of Bhurtpore, twelve years before, hailed with indescribable enthusiasm the prospect of service

with its attendant excitement and chances of promotion.

History repeats itself, and the scene that was presented exactly forty years ago, by the mustering legions on the banks of the Sutlej and Indus, is now being faithfully reproduced. *Absit omen!* Let us trust that the parallel may not be complete, that no disaster may befall our arms, should, in the future, "the Cossack and the Sepoy meet upon the banks of the Oxus." In the event of the issues of Central Asian politics being decided on that classic stream, by the dread arbitrament of battle, the Sepoy, backed by his big brother, the British soldier, will doubtless, man for man, give a good account of the Cossack; but there are other considerations which must engage the attention alike of the statesman and soldier, and these are plainly stated in the opinions already referred to as expressed in the crisis of 1838, by the most experienced and sagacious Indian politicians. The Duke of Wellington wrote to Mr. Tucker, one of the Directors of the East India Company, that the consequence of crossing the Indus, to settle a government in Afghanistan, will be "a perennial march into that country." Sir Charles (afterwards Lord) Metcalfe expressed an opinion, that "the

surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves, is for us to cross the Indus, and meddle with the countries beyond it;" and Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, wrote to Burnes, "I have no doubt you will take Candahar and Cabul, and set up Shah Soojah, but for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong, and remote country, among a turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless. If you succeed, I fear you will weaken the position against Russia."

But the old saying, "*Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat*," received a telling illustration within the next few years. The prime mover in India in this Afghan invasion, Sir William Macnaghten, titular Envoy and Minister to Shah Soojah, but *de facto* ruler of Afghanistan, and his chief assistant and successor-elect, Sir Alexander Burnes, together with many gallant officers and men, who were the tools for carrying out the policy others initiated, paid the penalty with their lives.

Though our frontier since the last Afghan War has been pushed forward from Ferozepore to Peshawur, and a distance of 800 miles no longer intervenes between the seat of war and our base of supplies, and, though the Sikhs, from being a source of possible danger, are now our staunchest

supports, there are, on the other hand, not less weighty motives against a "spirited" policy, in the financial question and in the mistrust within our borders caused by the events of 1857, which showed what elements of danger may arise in our rear. *Quieta non movere* is not a bad motto for those responsible for Indian Affairs, if we can rest upon our laurels without loss of honour or injury to the interests of the Empire committed to our care. In the event of war, though much suffering may be caused by a winter campaign, our previous experience proves that it is only after we have overrun the country and occupied Cabul and Candahar, that our difficulties will commence, financially because of the drain on our resources, and militarily because of the great distance from our base, with a hostile population proficient in guerilla warfare, and the outposts of Russia on the other side of the Hindoo Koosh, requiring the maintenance of a large army of occupation. The Umbeyla campaign of 1863 showed us the trouble even such petty tribes can give us, and we may find it easier to conquer Afghanistan than either to hold the country, or evacuate it without loss of prestige, while an important factor in the question, in the event of a successful invasion, is that colossal power which

stands bestriding the world, with one foot on the Danube and the other on the Oxus, which will make any rectification of frontier an euphemism for annexation, a pretext for an advance on his part. As we found to our cost in 1841, the difficulties of an Afghan expedition consist not in conquering the country, but in holding it, though if an occupation, in whole or in part is determined upon, it is not likely that the fatal blunder will be repeated of reducing the army to a condition of numerical weakness, or of selecting for the command a general enfeebled in body and infirm of purpose.

The army assembled in November at Ferozepore, where, amid surroundings of Oriental magnificence, meetings took place between Runjeet Singh and Lord Auckland, followed by reviews of the respective armies, that of the Sikh Maharajah, consisting of 15,000 excellent troops, manœuvring on the opposite bank of the Sutlej. But intelligence was now received of the raising of the siege of Herat, and orders were issued for the reduction of the "Army of the Indus," which was now to consist of one division under Sir William Cotton, including three brigades of Infantry, under Colonels Sale, Nott, and Roberts, the Cavalry brigade under Colonel Arnold, and the

Artillery brigade, reduced to two troops of Horse Artillery, and Captain Abbott's Field Battery, under Major Pew; Sir Henry Fane, to the regret of the army, which reposed confidence in him, declined to command the diminished force, of which Sir John Keane, by virtue of seniority, subsequently assumed charge. The Bengal division now had a strength of 9,500 men,* the Bombay column numbering 5,600, and Shah Soojah's contingent 6,000.

Captain Abbott's battery marched from Ferozepore on the 12th of December, in company with the second Brigade, consisting of Native regiments, which, says Abbott in his Journal, "refused to pitch their tents at the first encamping ground, because an order granting extra allowances for service beyond the river Indus had not been issued. The artillerymen, though natives, took no part in this disloyal movement. The order was obtained from Lord Auckland in the course of the day, and

* For this Division alone, the camp-followers, those necessary curses of all Indian armies, numbered no less than 38,000, and the camels 30,000. Fortunately, in the present day, Indian armies move with less impedimenta, and officers do not expect to have the luxuries of a camp life in a campaign. Sir Charles Napier did much to initiate this much needed reform, though Spartan simplicity and self-denial are difficult of attainment in India.

no further difficulties occurred." The order in question was obtained by Major-General Nott, then temporarily commanding the Infantry division, though, as he says in a letter written in March, 1840, the batta was denied to the Europeans "because they had not mutinied."

The march from Ferozepore to Rohree, on the banks of the Indus, which was reached on the 24th of January, 1839, was quite devoid of interest. The road was excellent, supplies were abundant, and the people friendly. Sir Alexander Burnes had preceded the army to negotiate with the ministers of Meer Roostum, the Khyrpore Ameer, for the occupation of the fortress of Bukhur, which though temporarily ceded to us, the Ameer was desirous of retaining in his possession until the treaty had been ratified by the Governor-General. The fort of Bukhur, which was originally built by Alexander to curb the neighbouring tribes, is situated on an island in the Indus, opposite the town of Rohree, and was of considerable strength.

On the night of the 26th of January, the treaty arrived from the Governor-General, duly ratified, and, on the following day, Sir Henry Fane, whose fleet of budgerows was moored off Sir Willoughby Cotton's camp, received Meer Roostum in full

durbar and produced it. Presents were made to Meer Roostum, who then witnessed a review of the cavalry and artillery. For a day or two longer the Ameer delayed fulfilling the terms of the treaty, and matters began to look threatening, when, at length, on the 29th of January, the keys of the fortress were delivered up to Sir A. Burnes, and a detachment of troops, accompanied by Captain Abbott, with a bag of gunpowder to blow open the gate in case of necessity, proceeded in command of Sir W. Cotton to take possession, the garrison evacuating the fortress on the other side.

Intelligence was now received at Bukhur that the Ameers of Scinde demurred to accepting Colonel Pottinger's *ultimatum*, which included the payment of twenty-eight lacs of rupees, and assumed a hostile attitude towards the Bombay Army; upon which Sir W. Cotton, marched on the 1st of February, with two Brigades of Infantry, some Cavalry, and Captain Abbott's battery, to the assistance of Sir J. Keane. The division arrived at Khandiyara, six marches towards Hyderabad, when, on the 7th of February, the Ameers came to terms and escaped the fate which befell them four years later, when the vast accumulated wealth of Hyderabad fell to the army of Sir Charles Napier. Sir W. Cotton

now returned to Bukhur, when the army crossed the Indus* by the bridge of boats, the whole force, with baggage and stores, being on the Shikarpore side by the 18th of February. Abbott's guns were dragged across by the soldiers, while the heavy ordnance was transported on a strong raft.

* The extent of river bridged by Captains G. Thomson and E. Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, was 500 yards, and seventy-four boats were used in the formation of the bridge, nineteen being from Sukhur, on the right bank, to the island on which Bukhur stands, and fifty-five from the island to Rohree on the left bank. The operation of bridging occupied fourteen days and was completed on the 3rd of February. Captain Abbott describes the arrangements by which the baggage was transported across the Indus by means of a flying raft. "The river was in full flow, eight feet deep, and running with great velocity. The arrangement was as follows: A 5½-inch shell was filled with lead, from which an iron loop projected at the fuse-hole. About two yards of coir rope were attached to the loop, and a long light cord of hemp was added; three ounces of powder threw the shell ninety yards well beyond the stream, and thus a 4-inch rope was drawn across, one end being fastened to high rocks on the eastern side, and the other to a picket on the low ground westward of the river. A block carrying a rope about 100 yards in length, traversed the stream. The raft was drawn up under the 4-inch rope; the block was drawn across to the opposite bank and made fast there. Then the raft was loaded and allowed to swing across, which it did very quickly, making the passage to and fro in nine minutes."

On the 16th of February, Sir Henry Fane, who had accompanied the army down the Indus from Ferozepore to Bukhur, took leave of the troops in a complimentary order, and, on the same day, he paid the Engineers a well-deserved tribute, for the skill with which they bridged the river.

The following, relating to an officer who also did good service on the Indus, is from the pen of the late General Havelock (then a Captain in the 13th Light Infantry, and Aide-de-Camp to Sir W. Cotton) whose "Narrative of the War in Afghanistan in 1838—39," is the best work extant of the early portion of the war. In the latter part of 1840, Captain Havelock returned to Afghanistan with the ill-fated General Elphinstone, and participated in the defence of Jellalabad. He says—" It would be ungrateful in speaking of our means of passing the great river to forget the valuable aid which was received in the course of the undertaking from Lieutenant Wood, of the Indian Navy, an officer, who, not content, with discoveries immediately connected with his own profession, and with having carefully surveyed the Indus from its several mouths to Attock, had carried his researches into the countries on the left bank of the stream near that celebrated passage, and along both

margins of the Cabul river. Regarding the tracts thus visited, his information is said to be extensive. He had accompanied the fleet of Sir Henry Fane to Bukhur, and his counsel and personal efforts were most useful to us, from the period of the first exertions of our Engineers at Rohree, to the breaking up of our bridges on the rise of the river in the middle of March, when the mass of our force with its cannon and baggage, was already traversing the plains of Cutch Gundava."

A redistribution of the army now took place. The Bengal and Bombay Cavalry were placed in one division, under the command of General Thackwell, the whole of the Artillery under Brigadier Stevenson of the Bombay Army, and the Infantry was divided into two divisions, placed respectively under Sir W. Cotton, and General Willshire. Head-quarters still under Sir W. Cotton—as Sir J. Keane did not assume personal command of the combined force until the 6th of April, at Quetta—reached Shikarpore on the 20th of February, and marched thence on the 23rd, for Jagan, the first march in the direction of Dadur at the mouth of the Bolan Pass. Captain Abbott's battery accompanied the first Brigade of Infantry, on the 24th, and, on the following day, entered

Cutch Gundava, or Cutchee, then one of the provinces of Beloochistan. The intervening desert, a distance of twenty-six miles and a half, was crossed without any incident of note, the troops marching by night to avoid the heat and glare. Captain Abbott arrived with head-quarters at Dadur on the 10th of March, and marched on the 16th into the Bolan Pass,* which is nearly sixty miles in length. "The road," writes Abbott, "presented no serious difficulties, but water was scarce in the desert, and there was no forage in the Pass. Much baggage was abandoned by the cavalry and infantry, but the artillerymen lost nothing. The baggage camels were generally overloaded, and this was the main cause of the loss by the army. An officer of the 2nd Cavalry told me that he had seen fourteen maunds taken from the back of one camel, the maximum load allowed by regulations being five maunds only. In the case of the battery, the loads

* The daily record of the marches from Shikarpore, through the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Candahar, are given in Major Hough's valuable "Narrative of the March and operations of the Army of the Indus," and in Havelock's equally important work; but as the road as far as Quetta is perfectly familiar since the occupation of that town by British troops, it is unnecessary to give any account of its features.

were strictly limited to five maunds. Spare camels, at the rate of one to four in use, were taken from Delhi, and not an article of baggage was abandoned by the artillerymen until they reached Candahar."

On the 26th of March, head-quarters, with the advance and Captain Abbott's battery, arrived at Quetta, which is situated 5,637 feet above sea level, the losses *en route* being confined to the camels and a few stragglers cut off by the savage hillmen. Supplies now ran short, and from the 28th of March, the loaf of the European soldier was diminished in weight, the Sepoy received half rations, and the camp-followers, quarter rations, while, says Abbott, "the cavalry horses and camels of the battery ceased to receive gram, and the horse-artillery horses were reduced to six pounds per day." On the 6th of April Sir John Keane, who had advanced with the Bombay column by the right bank of the Indus, through the Lukhee Pass, Sehwan, and Lakhana, arrived at Quetta, accompanied by Shah Soojah and Sir W. Macnaghten, and assumed command of the combined army.

As there was no prospect of obtaining supplies from Mehrab Khan, ruler of Khelat, and little could

be obtained at the miserable village of Quetta, the army resumed its march on the following day, General Nott, notwithstanding a warm protest on his part, remaining behind in charge of the station with the Second Brigade, while the command of the Bombay column was given to Major-General Willshire, his junior in rank, and Sir W. Cotton reverted to the command of the Bengal Division. On the 7th of April a forward movement was made in the direction of the Kojuck Pass and Candahar, where, it was stated, vigorous preparations for defence were in progress by the three brothers, Kohun Dil Khan, Ruheem Dil Khan, and Miher Dil Khan, of the Barukzye family, a powerful clan of which Dost Mahomed was the head, as his rival Shah Soojah was of the Suddozyes. "The efficiency of the army," says Captain Abbott, "had been greatly reduced by the loss of camels and the failure of supplies; the cavalry horses received no gram, and were forced to subsist on the green crops with which the country was covered. They died or were destroyed by dozens, and, by the time that the force reached Candahar, our cavalry were nearly unfit for service. Even the horse-artillery, though their horses had received six pounds of gram daily, were in little better order

than the cavalry. The camel battery was still fit for active service, great care having been taken by the Commissariat to provide dry forage for the cattle wherever it could be obtained at any price. The only Bengal Cavalry corps that was fit for service, on its arrival at Candahar, was the 3rd Cavalry, the horses of which were of a better caste than those of the 2nd, while the officers spared no expense in purchasing, with their own funds, any gram or forage that was obtainable." Thus with camels dying by thousands, the army of the Indus proceeded towards Candahar on what it was promised would be a "grand military promenade." Fortunately no enemy appeared to contest the march through the Kojuck Pass, where a handful of resolute men might have given trouble to an army, and Afghanistan was entered, the Shah's contingent leading the way.

Captain Abbott describes in a letter to a friend the march from Quetta to Candahar, which was reached by the Shah on the 25th of April, when the monarch made his triumphal entry into the capital of Western Afghanistan. Here the army, fatigued by its exertions and crippled by the loss of no less than 20,000 camels, rested, and awaited the arrival of the Bombay Division. "We were," says

Abbott, "a fortnight in the valley of Shewal, a pretty place, but which afforded no forage for our cattle, and we were all glad when Sir J. Keane arrived and the advance was ordered. On the 7th the cavalry and 1st Brigade Infantry, the troop horse-artillery and my battery, marched at daylight and went twelve miles, passing across a low range of hills into another valley, less green, and less pretty than that we had quitted. The Shah's force moved at noon of the same date, leaving Captain Bean's corps at Quetta to keep the post on the departure of the 4th Brigade with the siege-train.

"On the 8th we made a tiresome and difficult march, crossing deep and muddy nullahs to the entrance of the valley of Pisheen. The road was good on the 9th, but rather heavy in some places, and the horse-artillery suffered a good deal; we encamped on a fine open plain covered with hyacinths, blue lilies, and a variety of other flowers. There were several large villages near us, from which we obtained gram at the rate of three seers (6 lbs.) per rupee. On the 10th we crossed the Lora River and encamped with the infantry on its banks, the cavalry going forward seventeen and a-half miles for the sake of forage;

the interval between our camp and theirs was covered with an open thorn jungle very favourable to the operations of marauders who took full advantage of it, and carried off some of the cavalry baggage. On this day the 2nd Cavalry lost fifty-eight horses from fatigue and starvation. On the 11th we joined the cavalry camp, and halted for the Engineers to prepare the Pass for us. On the 13th we moved into the broad entrance of the Pass, a stage of about seven and a half miles, deep sand and gentle but steady ascent. The stony bed of a torrent gave ground for our camp. The Engineers, guarded by the 16th Native Infantry, were six and a half miles ahead, rendering the crest of the pass practicable for guns. On the 14th we marched at three a.m., and ascended slowly until six, when we reached the difficulties. A road cut in the hill side gave a tolerably easy slope to the first ascent; crossing the hill the track descended rather abruptly and ran along the ledge of a precipice, and dropped into the bed of a clear rocky nullah. Another very steep and crooked ascent took us to the crest of the Pass, whence the view was very fine, and very interesting to us. Before us lay the plains of Candahar, about 2,500 feet beneath our level, and the hill immediately

above Candahar was distinctly visible. The descent to the plain was however somewhat bad for wheel carriages, ill-provided with ropes. First a short steep descent terminated on the brink of nearly a precipice, then a sharp turn to the right was made, and the slope was easy for fifty yards, when another sharp turn to the left commenced a descent so steep, that forty Europeans could scarcely keep a 9-pounder, with wheels locked, from running wildly down the hill. After 200 yards of steep descent the slope became moderate. Great varieties of vegetation were scattered about; wild oats, barley, onions, rhubarb, mixed up with poppies, tulips, blue lilies, blue-bells, and scores of varieties of flowers whose names I know not.

"Well, the scenery was very pretty, and the vegetation very pleasing, but the Pass was a dreadful one for our baggage. At six p.m. our last bullock waggon came into camp, and as there was no sign of our baggage, I walked off one and a half miles and dined with the Engineers. On my return, at ten p.m., I found one tent in camp; we were all very tired indeed, and commending our baggage to the protection of the marauders, who were moving round it in the Pass, we all slept

soundly and were agreeably surprised next morning to find that all had safely arrived.

"The 13th Light Infantry and 48th Native Infantry had not their tents up until the evening of the 15th. The cavalry came up on the 15th, and went on the following day about thirteen miles, in the hope of water, which here is scarce, but their baggage is not fairly through the Pass even now. To day the siege-train comes in, and all disposable hands have been sent to aid it. The work will be severe. The Bombay people have reached Quetta; they had to fight all through the Bolan Pass, but suffered very little and inflicted severe chastisement on their assailants. Our people managed rather badly, with the exception of one company of the 36th under a Mr. Toogood. They were attacked by 300 Beloochees, who fired a volley and rushed on his party sword in hand. At about twenty paces he gave them his fire, which killed forty on the spot, and the remainder ran before the bayonets reached them; the chief was killed, and they gave no further trouble.

"The valley into which we are about to descend is very little better than a desert. A few pools of water shimmer in the sun here and there, and on a nullah twelve or thirteen miles distant we see the

tents of the Cavalry Brigade; a few little green patches denote cultivation, and numerous little eddies in the atmosphere raising those mountains of sand, which are vulgarly called 'Devils,' denote that sand and dust predominate. The Shah passed on this morning with all his rabble. Timming's troop of horse-artillery still in capital order, went with him as usual, and Grant's troop of the Bombay division rolled a gun (horses and all) down the first ascent into the Pass; the horses escaped wonderfully, and only a wheel was smashed to pieces. On the 18th only two mortar carts and one 18-pounder got through the Pass; 300 Europeans were dragging at the gun on the first ascent. Sir J. Keane went forward this morning to the cavalry camp, and we hope to join him to-morrow, but this whole brigade must remain here until the siege-train is fairly through the Pass. I dined with the Commander-in-Chief last night, we had a pleasant party and he was on his good behaviour. Sir John declares he will not move one mile from Candahar to the westward without four months' supplies, and we have not camels to carry half that quantity. The Bombay Cavalry are very neatly equipped, and their clothes are better fitted to them than those of our men. They

certainly look very well indeed, but both horses and men are small, and quite unequal to charge anything in the shape of regular cavalry. I am anxious to see their artillery of which they have brought twenty guns through the Bolan Pass, two troops of six guns each, and two companies with four each.

"Everyone is surprised at the mis-information given us regarding the roads and the resources of this country, and the disposition of its inhabitants towards Shah Soojah. Until my battery was in the Kojuck Pass, I had no idea that it was particularly difficult. You may have an idea of what it is by learning that between daylight and noon this day, two brigades of infantry have only brought two 18-pounders across and a third down the last slope. I will give you a detail of our force and the state of each regiment. 1st. The 16th Lancers have about fifty men without horses, which are generally more than half starved, and the regiment can scarcely be pronounced fit for service. The 2nd Cavalry are much worse than the Lancers and are about 180 horses short; they lead their horses on the march and are quite unfit for service. The 3rd Cavalry are in good order and nearly complete. The Horse Artillery of the

Cavalry Brigade is in a bad state, but its cattle can still draw the guns (the men leading) and the battery is therefore able to act at a slow pace. The Native Troop with Shah Soojah is still efficient. The 13th Light Infantry has about 400 men fit for duty and about forty sick. The European regiment about 400 fit for duty and seventy sick. The Native Infantry 16th, 37th, and 48th have about forty men each in hospital, but sickness is daily increasing amongst the natives.

"My battery is still on its legs, though the cattle get nothing but what they can pick up in the jungle. My supply of gram has long since ceased, and, at this ground, I not only can get no boossa, but have to send the animals five miles for water. The camels live upon a singular plant, about as large as a furze bush, and bearing leaves exactly like those of a common thistle, with sharp thorns. Our servants are allowed half-a-pound of *atta* daily and the sepoys one pound, and at this rate we have about another week's supply of food. The men find the difference between the bazaar price of their food and that at which the commissariat sell it, and it is calculated that a grass-cutter costs Government twenty-five rupees a month.

The whole extra expense is estimated at two lacs daily.

"We came down at least 2,000 feet to-day, and have the hot winds as delightfully as you can imagine them to be, without 'tatties.' We find Major Leech's ten mile marches to be seldom less than thirteen or fourteen. The 4th Brigade will have two more days' work bringing the train through the Pass. On the 20th we halted, but suffered sadly for want of water, and on the following day, we came ten miles over an excellent road, but water is salt and scarce and the scramble for it is dreadful, while the heat is 102° in a good tent. We have now come across the valley twenty-four miles. Two most severe marches over difficult ground brought us twenty-seven miles nearer to Candahar. We chose the worst road that offered itself. Our cavalry and horse-artillery suffered terribly, and my half-starved camels got over the ground but slowly. The cavalry made the two marches on the same day, and lost an immense number of horses."

The greatest sufferers in this promised *promenade militaire* were those patient beasts, the camels, of which, it is said, no less than 20,000 perished from hunger and being overladen, for, as Byron writes:

"Mute
The camel labours with the heaviest load."

There was much barbaric show in the triple camps of the Shah, the Envoy, and the Commander-in-Chief, gay with flags and resplendent with the many-coloured dresses of the attendants, but it was a pity more regard was not displayed for the life of these "ships of the desert," which patiently bore over the sands of Scinde and Cutch Gundava, and through the rocky defiles of the Bolan and Kojuck Passes, the loads which were to minister to the necessities of the soldier, and the luxuries of his superior. The scenes of that march would have afforded a fine scope for the energies of a representative of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, and it is well that such reckless and wholesale disregard for the sufferings of these necessary creatures will not be permitted in these more merciful and more economical days.

On the 4th of May, the Bombay Division, under the command of General Willshire, arrived at Candahar, before the walls of which the Army lay inactive for a lengthened period owing to a scarcity of supplies.

The halt at Candahar was broken by an Expedition against the Barukzye Sirdars, who held

Candahar under feudal tenure of their brother Dost Mahomed, and had fled to Ghirisk, a place seventy-five miles in a westerly direction from Candahar. Captain Abbott, who commanded the artillery of the column, describes the road to the Helmund and the proceedings of this force, in a letter addressed to Colonel Chambers, commanding the 5th Light Cavalry, an officer who fell in the disastrous retreat from Cabul in the winter of 1841 :

" Ghirisk is held by a son of Kohun Dil Khan, and is a strong little place, with an artificial mound and a deep ditch. The Sirdar himself is encamped about four miles from the fort, with a few followers and two guns ; he brought three from Candahar when he left on the Shah's approach, but lost one of them in the Helmund. The second fort is rather stronger than Ghirisk, and was built by Futteh Khan, the famous minister whose influence drove Soojah from the throne thirty years ago. Both these places are on the direct road to Herat, and it is requisite that the Shah's influence should prevail in their garrisons. The Sirdar having refused all terms offered him, it was decided to send out a force to take possession of these strongholds.

" Accordingly, the following troops were ordered : 13th Light Infantry, 120 men ; 16th Native In-

fantry; 2nd and 3rd Cavalry, one troop each; Shah's Cavalry, 300; Shah's Infantry, 450; Sappers, 160. The whole of my battery, two 18-pounder guns, and two 5½-inch mortars, manned by Garbett's Company.

"Our first march, the 12th of May, was a difficult one, owing to the numerous canals, some of which had bridges so narrow that great nicety was required in crossing, while others had no bridges at all. The cavalry and infantry marched thirteen miles and a half, crossing the Urgundaub River on the 12th, but I encamped on the high ground on its left bank, in order to make a day of the crossing. The stream was three feet deep, and running with such force, the men could scarcely wade through, and beyond the river there were six deep canals without bridges, so that it was requisite to cut ghauts for the guns. Our encampment was the prettiest we have enjoyed during the whole of this service. The river, pouring its rapid waters immediately beneath our feet; the broad valley beyond it, studded with villages, and shaded by innumerable trees, the crops green, but varying in shade, extended as far as the eye could reach; and beyond them, rose the rugged, barren hills, in marked contrast to the fertility of the valley beneath them.

"Our baggage was detained by the heavy train at the narrow bridges, and some of our camels did not arrive till night. Next morning we prepared for the passage across the river and its canals. The water rushed against the broad naves of the wheels, rose a little, and poured over the naves without reaching the bores. The soil being gravelly, the canals did not stop my camels, and we had an easy morning's work. On our march out, we passed the ancient city of Candahar, which Nadir took about a century since. The buildings, though nearly all 'pucka,' are still in good preservation, a proof of the dryness of this climate. The old city was built so as to include a steep rock within the line of fortifications. At present there are numerous inhabitants of the suburban villages, and the whole country is green with mulberry and other fruit trees, which are cultivated with some care.

"The march this morning (the 14th of May) was made in the dark, but we lost nothing, as, though the road was excellent, the country was not worth seeing. The mornings are quite cold, and the troops get under canvas before the sun becomes very powerful. A hot wind rises about 10 a.m. and lasts until sunset; the heat as great as 109° in our tents."

Writing from Khak-i-Choupan, on the 16th of May, he says: "Our last two marches have brought us into something like a desert. The first of them to Khooshk-i-Nakhood was along an excellent road for twelve miles, when it quite cleared the valley of the Urgundaub, and enters upon rough ground and deep sand-hills. We found the distance to be sixteen miles. Coming here, we encamped near an ancient city, built, according to the native account, by the Kaffirs long before the Mahomedans had power in the land. The fortifications and houses are still standing, the dry climate having preserved them in a remarkable manner. The waters of a small river, which used to run past this town, have been diverted from their natural channel, and now run through six or seven canals, which considerably impeded the troops this morning. We soon, however, got upon dry, stony soil, and at the end of nine miles came amongst sand-hills, which we threaded for another mile to camp. The little grove and its stream at which we are encamped are quite worthy to confer upon the spot the title of 'the diamond of the desert.' This is the first water the traveller from Ghirisk sees after crossing the Helmund, when twenty-four miles of arid sand intervene.

"On the night of the 16th, we marched at 10.30 p.m., and came at an easy pace twenty-one miles and a half. We descended considerably, and have reached a precious hot place. Our camp was about two miles short of the road, as it is called. On the 18th, we commenced the passage at eight o'clock, with two rafts, extemporised from casks, as the Sirdar had destroyed the ferryboat. Each raft was capable of transporting fourteen soldiers, and took an hour and half to cross and return, so that at one p.m. there were about eighty men across, when an order came from head-quarters to halt on the left bank, and send a portion of Shah Soojah's troops to occupy the fort of Ghirisk and other places abandoned by the Sirdar. We were glad of the order, as we should have drowned half the cavalry horses, the current being most rapid and the river eight feet deep."

The troops commenced their return march on the 24th of May, and arrived at Candahar on the 29th. The people of the country showed their hostility to the British Army and its *protégé*, Shah Soojah, by attacking convoys, stealing camels, and murdering stragglers. Early in June, all the camels of Captain Abbott's battery were stolen from their

grazing-ground by some thieves, but the greater portion were recovered after some difficulty.

On the 21st of June, he notes in his Journal the departure to Herat of his brother James, who accompanied Major d'Arcy Todd, the newly-appointed Envoy to Shah Kamran, of that city, in the capacity of Political Assistant. The other officers of this mission were: Lieutenant Richmond Shakespear, of Captain Abbott's battery, Political Assistant; Captain Sanders, of the Bengal Engineers, and Lieutenant North, of the Bombay Engineers, who went to place Herat in a proper state of defence, and Dr. Logan.

Every officer and man of the army was eager to leave Candahar, the monotony and heat of which were insupportable, and corn being now more abundant, the army marched in three columns from Candahar towards Ghuznee and Cabul, on the 27th of June, the day on which Runjeet Singh breathed his last at Lahore. Captain Abbott's battery accompanied head-quarters, with which also marched the horse-artillery and cavalry of both Presidencies, and the 1st Bengal Brigade of Infantry. He writes, on the 26th of June, to a correspondent in India: "At present the heat is fearful, being 111° and upwards in our tents. The long-

looked-for caravan came in on the 23rd, with 2,700 camel-loads of rice and atta. The people, however, refused to proceed any further, and our Commissariat, having no camels to carry the supplies, were obliged to bribe the *surwans* by an offer of twenty rupees per month for each camel to go on as far as Cabul; 1,700 of them have agreed to this, and thus we are able to move. Had the caravan failed, we should have been detained here three months, for we had neither camels nor cash wherewith to purchase them. The issue of pay this month was a great uncertainty, and we are not to have any next month we hear. The safety of the caravan was very questionable at one time; no escort had been attached, and a report came that 700 Ghilzyes had gone out to attack it. The 3rd Cavalry, 48th Native Infantry, and two guns went out, and missed the caravan; then the 35th Native Infantry and a squadron of the 2nd Cavalry went out, and missed it also. Finally, Colonel Wheeler caught it up on his return to camp, about five miles short of Candahar. It seems that a party amongst its guard of chokedars had agreed to give it up in case of the Ghilzyes attacking it, but that a guard of Skinner's Horse, who went out with spare camels to assist the Kafila, disconcerted the arrangement. The

chief of the Kafila was faithful, and aided by the Hindostanee troopers, kept the rogues in proper order. Brigadier Sale is looking forward to service in Nepaul, which is talked of very confidently. He is quite of the bull-dog genus, and loves fighting for its own sake, I believe. His regiment, however, is sadly cut up by sickness. I don't think it can muster above 350 men fit for service, and it has 120 in hospital, with many dangerous cases. Inflammation of the brain quickly follows a fever here, and few recover. Our long stay at Candahar has raised all the thieves in the country against us, and nearly every corps has had its camels taken off. I lost forty-four and got back only twenty-six. The 13th lost all their's, and recovered none. They had two Europeans killed in the affair; the poor fellows were acting as *surwans* (drivers), and had no arms, and the guard of eighteen men was asleep in a village, and gave no assistance. These annoyances we must expect until we get clear of this land of thieves, who sneak after our baggage in the dark, and murder any unlucky man that falls in the rear."

Writing, on the 10th of July, he says: "On the 27th of June, we quitted Candahar, and made two short marches of six and ten miles over a level plain to Killa Azeem. Thence to the Turnuk

River was a severe stage of fifteen miles and a half over undulating ground. The Turnuk is a small stream running down a narrow valley of rich and well-cultivated soil, on either side of which are hills and barren downs. The river runs generally under its southern boundary of hills, rarely crossing the valley to the north, on which side our road lies. We have found the marches most trying to our cattle, as sometimes a score of little canals cross our path, and at other times we traverse the undulating ground, which is still worse. The crowd of baggage is quite suffocating, and all orders to keep it in the rear are quite unavailing. Fortunately, we have no enemy to attack it, and the crowd is too numerous to be assaulted by common plunderers. When near Khelat-i-Ghilzye, we were told we should find the forts occupied by 30,000 men. We therefore approached in battle array, and found that the only fort worthy to be so called, had been destroyed by Sultan Mahomed, and the two that remain are about eighty yards square, with their mud walls, and no ditch. The old fort stood on a remarkable hill; a spring of fine water issues from the hill-side, just below the citadel, giving nourishment to some fine mulberry trees, and offering an abundant supply for the garrison; but the place is quite deserted,

its bastions are nearly washed down, and the remains of fortification are barely perceptible. We encamped on some fine undulating high ground about two miles on this side of Khelat-i-Ghilzye. The barometer gave 5,500 feet as the elevation of our camp above sea-level, but the stony ground accumulated so much heat from the sun's rays that we did not enjoy the fine climate to be expected at such an elevation. After our halt we came on by easy stages, if any can be so called in this country, and we are now, after four days' marching, only fifty-seven miles beyond Ghilzye, and still ninety from Ghuznee. Our elevation above the sea is about 6,500 feet, and the climate is very pleasant. Our army has greatly improved in efficiency since it reached Candahar; the horses get five seers* of barley and plenty of forage; the men are on half-rations, but can buy as much atta as they please at the villages, and compensation is given for the difference in price. Our cavalry have recovered condition in a great measure, and only Grant's troop of horse-artillery remain in such a weak state as to halt the whole column when an obstacle occurs. The Bombay Horse-Artillery has an odd appearance, with its clumsy carriages and its small

* A seer is two pounds.

Cabul horses enclosed between enormous shafts, but it answers admirably. Its horses, though small, beat our's completely in working; their system, too, is better, and their discipline much stricter. Not only I, but all the Bengal Artillery officers with me, are quite converted from our dislike of the Bombay system, having witnessed its superiority over our own. My poor camels are quite overtasked by these perpetual ascents, and the want of more cattle in draught is evident, otherwise I have got on pretty well, and even with my insufficient means, have not delayed the column as the troop has delayed it."

"The 11th of July.—We came nine miles and a half this morning to Chusma-i-Shadee, which we expected to have passed four miles short of our camp. We have entered into a well-cultivated country; one clear spring issues from under a high rock close to our camp, and there are numerous *kahreez* (wells)."

Writing from Mookloor, on the 14th of July, he says: "We have arrived at the half-way house between Candahar and Cabul, a nice spot; villages abundant, and shaded by large groves of trees, with fine lawn of 'dhoop' grass for camp; a sweet spring, one of the sources of the Turnuk, gushes from a

hard rock, and passes our camp in the form of a clear stream, with water-cresses on both banks. The country is quite open on our right, and the last marches have been apparently level, the real ascent of about 1 foot in 200, not being perceptible. We are 7,300 feet above sea-level, and enjoy a delightful climate. The country is open and level for nine miles, with villages and forts in great number. The road, also, quitting the bed of the Turnuk River and its undulating banks has been far more easy for our cattle. We get plenty of supplies, grain, boossa, sheep, cows, horses, tattoos, fowls, and all sorts of odd things are brought into camp. The Doomba sheep are fine, fat, good-looking animals, and no gram-fed mutton could be more promising than the meat, but I cannot endure it except in the shape of a steak; it is so highly-flavoured and rather tough. The 'Ducks' (as the Bombay troops are called) enjoy it much, and his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, in particular, is loud in his praise of the abomination. The lambs are tolerable, and we get them at a rupee each.

"The next marches—to Oba, fourteen miles, Jumrood, twelve and a half miles, and Musheekee, eight and a half miles—were over open country, road

pretty level, but crossed by several dry nullahs, which gave the Pioneers some work; soil coarse, sandy, and heavy for our wheels. Gram is cheaper than we have hitherto found it; we get fourteen seers either of wheat or barley and eight seers of gram for a rupee, but the latter is scarce. The ghee is all composed of fat from doomba's tails and kidneys. The fine water of this country is the greatest luxury we enjoy. All liquors have long since vanished from our table, and the pure element is a very good substitute. A great storm on the night of the 17th laid the sand for us, or the march of the 18th, though but eight miles and a half, would have proved a severe one. As it was, we crossed numerous nullahs and about fifty water-courses in heavy, coarse sand mixed with stones."

Writing on the 20th of July, he says: "Two short stages of nine miles to Ahmed Khail, and eight miles to Nannee, through heavy sand, have placed us near Ghuznee. As soon as we reached the camp, my battery was sent a mile in advance to fire a royal salute on the Shah's arrival. On the 19th, the Shah, with the 4th Brigade and the Park, joined us, and to-day the 'Duck' Brigade is to come up. It consists of two Queen's regiments of infantry and the 'Duck' Howitzer battery of four 24-pounders,

with the Poonah Horse; altogether we form a marvellous large camp, and the natives wonder where all the troops are. A Cabul man told Lawrence, of the 2nd Cavalry, yesterday, that we were an army of tents and camels, that our horses were weak, and our men sickly, and 'as for your artillery, wait till you see the Dost's guns!' I suspect we shall wait long enough. We certainly are, as the man says, an army of tents and camels, and were a night attack made, there would be few troops in the lines to meet it, as almost two-thirds are on picquets and guards in various places, and few men could stand on parade when the assembly sounded. We are now about 7,500 feet above sea-level, in a very broad valley, well cultivated and studded with villages. The village of Nannee is a little in our rear, and Ghuznee about ten miles ahead."

On the 21st of July the army arrived before Ghuznee, 230 miles distant from Candahar, and 90 from Cabul. Relying upon reports furnished to them that the place was of no great strength, and that the Afghans would not defend it, Sir John Keane had left behind him at Candahar the siege train, brought with such difficulty all the way from Ferozepore and through the Bolan and Kojuck

Passes, and when he arrived before the fortress of Ghuznee—reported, and not without reason, to be one of the strongest in Asia, and called in the days of the conqueror Mahmood, "Dav-oos-Sultanut-i-Ghuznee," (the seat of the Sultan's power)—he found himself compelled to undertake its reduction with 9 and 6-pounder field-pieces. But a *Deus ex machinâ* arose in the person of Captain Thomson, of the Bengal Engineers.

With a view of making the Afghan commandant, Mahomed Hyder Khan, a son of Dost Mahomed, unmask his force, the guns of the Horse-Artillery and Captain Abbott's battery began a smart bombardment, to which the enemy replied with vigour, while an infantry fire was kept up between the 1st brigade, which was moved up towards the walls, and the *juzailchees* of the enemy.* Having obtained the object of the reconnaissance, Sir J. Keane withdrew the troops and guns.

The remainder of the day was passed in changing ground to the south-east side of

* Captain Abbott writes :—" I picked up a five pound shot and a six ounce jinjall both of hammered iron. These jinjalls were fired pretty correctly, and I saw a horse killed at 600 yards by a matchlock."

the fortress, thus cutting off the communication with the Cabul road, by which it was understood that Ufzul Khan, another son of the Ameer, and the forces of the Ghilzye chiefs were marching to the succour of the beleaguered fortress. On the following morning, Sir John Keane, accompanied by Sir W. Cotton and the Engineer officers, made a reconnaissance of Ghuznee from the heights, and acting upon information supplied by Abdool Reshed Khan, Barukzye, a deserter from the fortress, it was decided that an attempt should be made to storm the place by the Cabul gate, the only one that was not walled up, after Captain Thomson had blown it in with bags of gunpowder.

That night the troops and batteries took up their appointed positions, and everything was ready for the assault at three a.m., the storming column being placed under the command of Brigadier Sale, with Colonel Dennie leading the advance. Captain Thomson directed the movements of the explosion party, which was led by Captain Peat and Lieutenants Durand and Macleod.

Amid the roaring of the elements, at three a.m., the guns opened fire upon the fortress, and, while the attention of the enemy was thus distracted, the

explosion party boldly advanced with twelve bags, containing 300 pounds of powder, which were laid and fired with complete success. The Cabul gate was forced in, and Colonel Dennie rushing in with his stormers, the British soldier carried all before him with the bayonet. Brigadier Sale followed with the main column, and in less than a quarter of an hour the colours of the 13th Light Infantry were planted on the ramparts of the citadel. Thus, on the 23rd of July, Ghuznee was lost and won, with a loss to the victors of 17 killed and 165 wounded, including Brigadier Sale and 17 other officers. Of the Afghans, 514 were slain in the assault, exclusive of about 100 killed by the cavalry, and 1,600 prisoners were taken, including Mahomed Hyder Khan, together with 1,000 horses, 300 camels, and vast stores of provisions. There was an auction of the booty captured at Ghuznee, and, says Captain Abbott, "so anxious were the officers to carry away some reminiscence of the fortress, that an Afghan knife, which when new cost five rupees, sold for seventy."

He writes of the attack to an Indian correspondent:—"We are all quite astonished at the quiet way in which the garrison allowed our batteries to move along a road which they com-

pletely enfiladed, and they must have kept a very bad look out indeed. I was nearly three-quarters of an hour with the head of my column standing only 300 yards from the wall, so great was the difficulty of getting my carriages down into the ravine under cover. The two guns in the ravine were beautifully placed, but we were working in the dark, and had not the garrison shown blue lights we should have had no mark to fire at. The moon went down at half-past ten o'clock and the darkness was great until daybreak, when our troops had possession of the place. We all thought the people had evacuated the fort, as only a few matchlock balls were fired, previously to the advance of the Engineers. The prisoners say we took them quite by surprise, and do not seem to understand such energetic proceedings. Ghuznee, though by no means calculated to stand a siege, has walls too lofty for escalade, and presents a serious obstacle to a force unprovided with siege ordnance. The gate was barricaded with timber eight inches in diameter, and had an ordinary charge of powder been used, it would probably have failed. The amount used, however, shook down much of the gateway, and large stones fell on our men as they fought under the broken arch. I saw one poor fellow retiring quite be-

wildered, and complaining of an injury to his head. On examination, I found a stone weighing about two pounds in his cap, having smashed the patent leather top. A thick chupattie he had put there to eat at a favourable opportunity, saved his life."

On the 24th, he writes, "I have just been into the town and citadel. The gateway is a narrow place and, well defended, must have indeed been difficult to take. Beyond it, however, is a good open space where a corps might form up, and a right-half turn commences the ascent to the citadel, which has both upper and lower works, the latter containing the guns, and the former appearing rather calculated for a dwelling than for any military purpose, being a square, or rectangle, with a dead wall outwards and dwelling openings to the centre. The ditch in some places is wet, in other places dry, but deep. There is an enormous brass 68-pounder (cast by Nadir Shah) which seems to have been cut down, as the 'trunnions' are far forward, and there is a copper swell to the muzzle, evidently put on by the hammer. Great quantities of grain and forage were found in the place, and evident preparations had been made to stand a protracted siege. A note on the Bank of Russia

for 2,000 ducats was also found, I believe, in the citadel."

On the 30th of July the army resumed its march towards Cabul, a small garrison being left at Ghuznee, in command of Major Maclaren. Captain Abbott says in his Journal:—"We marched at half-past four a.m., on the 30th of July, first ascending the Gundi Sheni Pass, and then descending to Shushgao, where we encamped at an elevation of about 9,000 feet, after a tedious march of fourteen miles. On the following day we marched to Huftosaya, an easy descent, and, on the 1st of August, to Hyder Khail, a continued descent, the road stony, and crossing many streams. The march of the 2nd of August took us to Sheikabad, nine miles and a half, crossing the Logur river. The road was bad, broken up by canals and ravines, two rivers, and some mud; a bridge crosses the Logur river, but is two narrow for guns. We halted on the 3rd of August, and, on receipt of intelligence that Dost Mahomed had fled from Urghundee, a party was sent in pursuit, and another detachment went on to secure the guns at Urghundee. On the 4th we arrived at Beni Budaum, a march of ten miles and a half, and camp was pitched 8,010 feet above the level of the sea. My battery encamped with the

party at Beni Budaum, the main force going about seven miles and a half further on the road to Cabul. On the following day we marched to Mydan, nine miles, crossing the Cabul river, two miles beyond which we encamped. A march of eight miles brought us to Urghundee, where we found all Dost Mahomed's guns.* On the 7th of August we entered and encamped in the valley of Cabul, after a short march of six miles."

On the 7th of August Shah Soojah, in magnificent state, accompanied by Mr. Macnaghten and Sir A. Burnes, Sir John Keane, Sir W. Cotton, and other officers of rank, with their staffs, made his public entry into Cabul, and established his residence at the Bala Hissar. The restored monarch was received with respect by a vast crowd, who were glad to be rid of the exactions of the Barukzyes, but there was no enthusiasm. On the 14th of August, the mail route was opened from India, viâ Jellalabad and Peshawur, instead of by the circuitous route by Candahar and the Bolan Pass, owing to the successful operations of Colonel (afterwards Sir Claude) Wade, who, at the head of an

* "These mustered," says Havelock, "twenty-two pieces of various calibre, on field carriages, and two more in battery at the village of Urghundee."

army of Sikhs, Afghans, and Hindoos, escorting Timour Shah, the Shahzada, forced the Khyber Pass, as far as Ali Musjid, with the loss of 150 killed and wounded, and the hasty recall of Akbar Khan by his father on the fall of Ghuznee, enabled him to thread the passes leading to Cabul without opposition.

Of the two chief cities of Afghanistan, now in the possession of a British Army, Abu-l-Fazil, secretary to Akbar the Great, Mogul Emperor of India in the sixteenth century, writes in the *Ayeen Akbary*, "Cabul is the gate of Hindoostan towards Tartary, as Candahar is towards Persia, and if both places be properly guarded, that extensive empire is safe from the irruption of foreigners." And the same writer remarks (page 7) "that according to the Indians no man can be called the ruler of India who has not taken possession of Cabul."

On the 3rd of September, Colonel Herring, C.B., commanding the 37th Bengal Native Infantry, was killed at Hyder Khail, four marches from Cabul, whence he was proceeding to Candahar on escort duty, an event which afforded an indication of the hostile feeling of the Afghan nation. His death was avenged by Outram, who attacked and almost exterminated the tribe of Kwajucks, his murderers.

On the 22nd and 23rd of August, the army again changed ground, and Captain Abbott's battery encamped on the heights beyond Sia Sung. He now received orders to exchange his camels, which were unequal to the work of dragging guns in a hilly country, for horses, and to have his battery ready for immediate service.*

Early in September, Lieutenant Dawes was despatched with three of the newly equipped nine-pounder guns in company with the 48th Native Infantry, to Ghuznee, to escort to Cabul Hyder Khan and the other prisoners. Captain Abbott says in his Journal: "I was obliged to advance cash for the food of the horses. The Shah's commissariat gave gram for sixteen days only, but could not provide cash to purchase more, so I paid 300 rupees from my own purse."

On the 17th of September Shah Soojah held his first investiture of the newly instituted Order of the Dooranee† Empire, and on the following day, the

* Hough (p. 260), in quoting this order in his work, adds:—"The camel battery worked well during the campaign. The camels, were in better condition than the horses in going through the Bolan Pass. They had marched 1600 miles in ten months."

† This word is a corruption of *Door dowran*, "pearl of the age,"

Bombay column, under General Willshire, commenced its march for India viâ the Bolan Pass, on the way capturing by storm the fortress of Khelat, where Mehrab Khan and many of his chiefs fell sword in hand in the breach. By orders of the 9th of October,* the "Army of the Indus"

thetitle taken by Ahmed Shah Abdulee, founder of the dynasty in 1747, and grandfather of Shah Soojah and Zemaun Shah.

* "General Orders, October the 9th. Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, and the 35th Native Infantry to remain at Cabul, and to be accommodated in the Bala Hissar. Colonel Dennie, C.B., to command. Three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, the 48th Native Infantry, the 4th Brigade and detachment of Sappers and Miners, and 2nd Cavalry, with a Rissalah of Skinner's Horse, to be cantoned at Jellalabad. Ghuznee to be garrisoned by the 16th Native Infantry, a Rissalah of Skinner's Horse, and such details of His Majesty Shah Soojah's force as are available. The whole to be under the command of Major Maclaren. Candahar will have for its garrison the 42nd, and 43rd Native Infantry, 4th Company 2nd Battalion Artillery, a Rissalah of the 4th Local Horse, and such details of His Majesty's Shah Soojah's troops as may be available. Major-General Nott will command." Besides the Shah's contingent, under command of Major-General Roberts, who succeeded Major-General Simpson, which was divided between the garrisons, there were raised a little later some Regiments of Afghan horse and foot, who proved themselves totally unreliable, and went over to the standard of the enemy when called into the field, though in some instances, as

was broken up, and, accompanied by Sir John Keane, the greater portion commenced its return march to India on the 15th, leaving three brigades at Cabul, Jellalabad, and Candahar respectively, with a garrison at Ghuznee, the whole under Sir Willoughby Cotton, with General Nott in command in Western Afghanistan.

during the advance of Sir Robert Sale's Brigade from Gundamuck to Jellalabad, in November, 1841, they did good service.

CHAPTER II.

CAMPAIGNING IN AFGHANISTAN.

March from Cabul to Jellalabad—The Khoord-Cabul, and Jugdullluck Passes—The Expedition to Pushoot—March to the Kamer Valley—Repulse of the Assault—Evacuation of Pushoot—The Kaffirs—Return to Jellalabad—March to Cabul—The Campaign in the Kohistan—Action at Tootum Durra—Attack on Julga—Repulse of the Storming Party—Action at Purwan Durra—The Cabul Cantonment—Expedition to the Zoormut Country—Destruction of the Forts at Zao—Return to Cabul.

ON the 30th of October Lieutenant Dawes returned from detached duty, with three guns of No. 6 Light Field Battery, having marched 400 miles; and, on the 2nd of November, a portion of the Cabul Brigade, including Captain Abbott's battery, accompanied Shah Soojah to Jellalabad, which, from its being 3,000 feet lower than Cabul, was the winter residence of the Afghan sovereigns. In his Journal he describes in detail the difficulties of

a march made in the depth of winter, through passes which have since acquired a sad interest for all Englishmen. The first day's march was to Boodhak,* about eight miles along the valley, where they encamped near the entrance of the Khoord-Cabul Pass, a tremendous defile about three miles and a half in length, which is, in fact, the bed of a rivulet passing through a range of high, steep, and rugged hills. On the 3rd of November they entered the Pass at seven a.m., and during the day crossed twenty-eight times the stream that runs down the defile. "The cold was so intense," says Abbott, "that everything was glazed with ice, and the horses' tails became masses of hair and ice, and icicles hung from their bellies, traces, and equipments. At three and a half or four miles the hills again open out, and we saw the sun. My carts, drawn by bullocks, gave great trouble on this march, the animals frequently falling and fracturing the poles."

The march upon the following day, to Tezeen, was over a broken and stony road, and the descent of the Huft-Kothul was very steep. Abbott

* The name of this place signifies the "dust of the Idols," Mahmood of Ghuznee having here destroyed many that he had seized in India.

says :—"Broke all but one of my locking chains, bullock waggons had two poles broken, and the cattle were quite knocked up at five miles from camp. Sent back spare poles and eight horses to help them on, and all reached camp at sunset." On the 5th of November the march was resumed down the bed of the river, and the force encamped at the Fakir's Tomb, a little short of Bareekaub, and near to the entrance of the Pass, where there is a direct but difficult route to Cabul. On the following day they made a short but arduous march to Kuttur Sung, commencing with a long but easy ascent, and ending with a steep descent, which made Captain Abbott lock his wheels. The march of the 7th, brought them to Peri-Bagh ("fairy-gardens") in the middle of the Jugdulluck Pass. The battery went up the narrow bed of the stream at a good pace, and reached camp long before the infantry, who marched over the hills. This Pass, Captain Abbott notes in his Journal, a "a very formidable one when held by an enemy, the road being extremely narrow, with a steep wall on either side; its length is about three miles." The march of November the 8th, a severe one for artillery, brought them to Soorkaub. "First," says Abbott, "we ascended for three miles and

a half the crest of the Pass, and then dropped down to the stony bed of a torrent, which we followed for four miles when the road emerged to the left upon undulating ground. At one mile from camp a very steep descent of the valley of the Soorkaub occurred. One of my locking chains broke, and the team of eight horses rushed down at full speed, but luckily none of them fell. The bridge across the Soorkaub was broken, and we forded the river to our camp."

On the 9th, the march was to Gundamuck. "The road was about half a mile of ascent, then a mile of sandy but level road; about a mile of descent over gravel into broken ground and water; another ascent and a mile or two of good road; a very steep descent, after which the road was easy as far as the eighth mile, when a steep, crooked ascent occurred." After this they reached the table-land of Gundamuck, crossing two rocky nullahs to their camp. The day was stormy and the hills, southward of them, were covered with snow. The march of the 10th was to Futtehabad. "It commenced by an easy descent of about five miles, followed by a steep descent of half-a-mile to the valley of Neemlah, crossed a stream and traversed high, rough, stony ground and encamped

at the entrance of the valley of Jellalabad." Much rain fell during the march in the day, and great annoyance was caused during the night by robbers, two of whom were shot by the sentries. The next march was to Sultanpore, or Shahabad, about seven miles, and, on the 12th of November, they arrived at Jellalabad, eight miles distant.

Captain Abbott writes to an Indian correspondent:—"The 2nd Cavalry and the European regiments move to-morrow to the ground for our permanent camp, of which the left flank rests on the Cabul river, the right consequently being a good mile from water. Jellalabad is a poor place, the Shah has a small wretched residence in it, and the walls are in ruins. There are ten brass guns, but, as usual, they have unserviceable carriages. The valley is fertile along the river, and there are plenty of canals, but there seems to be a scarcity of springs. My horses work admirably during the march, and have arrived in the highest condition. My bullock-carts all broke down. Bullocks are utterly useless for draught here."

The 37th and 48th Native Infantry marched towards Peshawur, to relieve Ali Musjid, which was assailed by the Khyberrees, and support the negotiations set on foot with these tribes by

Captain Mackeson, Political Agent at Peshawur; and, on the 1st of December, Captain Abbott followed with his battery. He describes as follows this arduous march made in the depth of winter:—"On the 1st of December we marched to Ali Boghan, seven miles, over a good road. We heard last night of the capture of Khelat. On the following day we marched to Buttee Kote, a distance of fourteen miles; four miles of steady ascent, after which you enter a Pass, about one and a half miles in length, and emerge upon a stony plain, which you cross to Buttee Kote, a cluster of walled villages with a little cultivation. The plain is barren, and can scarcely be crossed in summer owing to the extreme heat. A 13-inch shell of oval form lay at the gate of one of the villages. The battery made this march in four hours, the cavalry in three hours and three-quarters, and the infantry in five hours. The large round stones distressed man and beast, and injured the wheels of my carriages. The march of the 3rd to Hazar-Nao was by a long road, which descends gradually for ten miles. My battery made the march in two hours fifty minutes, and the infantry in three hours twenty minutes. On the following day the battery reached Dakka, nine miles distant, by a

good road which threads a very narrow pass, and which must cause great delay to a large force. At six and a half miles there is a narrow pass which terminates opposite to Lalpoora, a large village on the left bank of the Cabul river. We encamped on the right bank of the river, which could with difficulty be forded by camels."

The troops halted at Dakka between the 5th and 9th, when an urgent request for their return arrived from Captain Macgregor, as Jellalabad was menaced. Accordingly, at half-past six a.m. on the 10th, the column marched for Buttee Kote (nineteen miles distant) which was reached at twelve; Colonel Salter, commanding the troops, was about to push on to Jellalabad before night, when a second message was received from the Political Resident, which induced him to march easily to Jellalabad, where the column encamped on the 12th of December. No. 6 Light Field Battery remained encamped at Jellalabad for a month, but on the 12th of January, 1840, their services were called into requisition to accompany a force despatched to Pushoot, about fifty miles in an E. N. E. direction from Jellalabad, to displace Syud Hashim, the Padshah, or ruler, of Kooner, in the valley of the Kama river, and

restore his brother Bawadeen,* who had been displaced by Dost Mahoned.

The Kooner, or Kama, river, mentioned by Arrian in his narrative of Alexander's march, after traversing the country of the Kaffirs, enters the Kooner valley at Chaga Serai, continues its course W. S. W. to Pushoot, Kooner, and Kash-Kote, where it enters the Jellalabad district, and flows

* The father of Bawadeen rebelled against Zemaun Shah, King of Cabul, whose threatened invasion of India in 1798 disturbed the equanimity of the Marquis Wellesley at Government House, in Calcutta, and the King's brother, Shah Soojah, punished him by invading the valley. On the death of the Padshah, his son, Bawadeen, held the country undisturbed by the Barukzyes until the year 1838, when he commenced intriguing with a view to the restoration of Shah Soojah. Dost Mahomed, becoming aware of the correspondence, sent his son, Akbar, with an army and guns to reduce the fort of Pushoot, the stronghold of the Padshah, and a partial breach having been effected, the garrison surrendered. Akbar had with him the "Cazi," a 16-pounder, which was afterwards used by the British in the defence of Jellalabad, and was eventually destroyed by General Pollock's army on the return march to India. Bawadeen was deposed, and his brother Syud Hashim was placed on the throne. When Shah Soojah was restored to power in 1839, the ex-Padshah appeared at Court, and begged to be reinstated in his dominions. Hashim refused to abdicate, and a detachment was ordered to displace and, if possible, to capture him.

into the Cabul river, three or four miles to the east of that town. The country between Chaga Serai and Kash-Kote, a narrow valley about fifty miles in length, is watered by canals led from the Kama river. The inhabitants are an unwarlike race of agriculturists, and the defence of the country is entrusted to a wild race of mountaineers, called Saffees, who perform military service in consideration of an annual allowance of grain. Of the country to be invaded, nothing was known beyond what the Ex-Padshah chose to tell the British Envoy. Bawadeen declared that the road was excellent for guns, and that the forts were not more formidable than sheep-pens. A detachment, consisting of two regiments of cavalry, one of infantry, and three guns, was ordered to make a night march of fifty miles, and surprise Hashim in his Fort at Pushoot; but the order was cancelled in consequence of a report that Saadut Khan was about to attack the depôt of supplies at Dakka, and the detachment intended for Pushoot, was sent off hastily towards the Khyber. Hashim, a bold and clever schemer, made the most of the respite thus allowed him. He came into Jellalabad and commenced negotiating the terms of his abdication, while his nephew, Ay-ood-deen, was

engaged repairing the forts, collecting revenue, and purchasing ammunition. These objects completed, Hashim suddenly disappeared. The expedition could no longer be delayed, and the march of a force was ordered.

On the 12th of January, 1840, Colonel Orchard, C.B., of the 1st European Regiment, marched from Jellalabad with a column, consisting of eighty men of his own regiment; a wing of the 37th Native Infantry; the Shah's 3rd Infantry; and two 9-pounders, and one 24-pounder howitzer, under Captain Abbott. Two days before, a regiment of the Shah's cavalry, under Captain Christie, had been sent forward with orders to invest the fort of Pushoot, and prevent the escape of the Padshah, and a detachment of twenty sappers had proceeded to improve the road. Colonel Orchard's column commenced its march by crossing the Cabul river, a rapid stream which the guns forded while the infantry were ferried across on rafts. The baggage cattle forded with difficulty, and many of them were drowned. Three miles of canal country were crossed without accident; the road through the Tung-i-Topchi (Artillery pass) was wide and good, and the troops reached Shewa, sixteen miles distant from Jellalabad before sunset,

where the camp was formed on the right bank of the Kama river. On the 13th of January the march was continued. The rocky nature of the mountains, which close upon the river a little to the north-east of Shewa, render the road that side quite impracticable for guns, and it was necessary to cross the Kama, a wider, deeper, and more rapid river than the Cabul. The passage of the infantry upon rafts occupied nearly the whole day. The guns and baggage forded with great difficulty, and many camels and much baggage were lost. The large round pebbles, which rendered the fords of the Kama so dangerous to the army of Alexander the Great, were as numerous as ever, and an animal falling into this rapid current was very seldom saved. The fort of Kash-Kote, a strong little place, for the capture of which neither time nor ammunition could be spared, fired a few shots at the column as it passed on to form its camp on the left bank of the river. On the 14th the river was again forded by the detachment, but the bed was wide, and the ford was better than that at Shewa. No accident occurred, and the camp was formed near the village and fort of Moorgul on the right bank of the Kama. On the 15th the river was again

crossed by a dangerous ford, and a tolerably good ferry, and the column encamped under the walls of the town of Kooner, the little fort on the opposite side of the town being held by Hashim's adherents.

On the 16th the force continued its march amid much rain, and arrived without difficulty at the camp formed near the town of Pushoot, by Captain Christie, who reported that he had moved without a halt from Jellalabad to Pushoot, a distance of fifty miles. Pushoot was a fortified town about a mile in circumference, with a strong fort about 400 yards north-east of it. Both the town and fort were held by Ay-ood-deen, and Hashim himself was in the fort of Kotekee on the opposite side of the river.

During the night of the 16th, Ay-ood-deen evacuated the town, his numbers being insufficient to defend both that and the fort. On the following day the town was occupied by Colonel Orchard, and the fort was reconnoitred by Captain Abbott, Lieutenant Pigou, the Engineer officer, and Captain Macgregor,* the officer in

* Now General Sir G. H. Macgregor, K.C.B., K.C.S.I., an officer of great ability and distinguished services, of whom the

political charge of the Expedition. Both town and fort are on the left bank of the Kama, and about 400 yards distant from the stream, and the same distance from each other. The fort is upon high stony ground, but, at twenty paces from the river face, there is an abrupt descent, and the ground between this steep bank and the river is cultivated in terraces. The fort measured 150 by 140 yards, with a rampart eighteen feet high, ten feet thick at base, and seven at summit, and a thin loopholed parapet. The outer wall ran parallel to, and at an interval of ten feet from the rampart, and beyond the outer wall was a deep dry ditch. The gate was between two bastions nearly in the centre of the river face, and included between the outer wall and the gate there was a traverse which completely screened the gate. The only passage across the ditch was by a very narrow wooden bridge leading to the gate in the outer wall at the north-east end of the traverse, and this bridge was easily removable in less than ten minutes.

The means at Colonel Orchard's disposal for the reduction of this fort were altogether insufficient. Any attempt to breach such a wall

writer published a Memoir in *Colburn's United Service Magazine* in 1869.

with two light 9-pounders would have been absurd, and an attack on the gateway alone offered a reasonable chance of success. Colonel Orchard had no hesitation in deciding upon this mode of attack and the following arrangements were ordered. On the morning of the 18th of January, about an hour before daylight, Captain Christie was to cross the river by a ford at some distance below camp, and to proceed up the right bank to invest Kotekee as closely as the range of the enemy's matchlocks would allow. The infantry and guns were to make a wide circuit to the south and east, passing round the fort of Pushoot to a spot on the low cultivated ground from which the outer gate could be seen, and the guns were to open their fire on the gate as soon as there was light enough for effective practice. It was correctly calculated that this fire would have the double effect of demolishing the gate, and of preventing the enemy from removing the little bridge, by which alone the storming party could cross the ditch. On the outer gate being destroyed, the Engineer officer was to advance with bags of powder to blow open the main gate, which was quite safe from the fire of the guns.

At half-past four a.m. on the morning of the

18th of January, the troops proceeded to carry out the above detailed orders, and all of them reached their appointed posts. At seven a.m. the first shot was fired. The cannonade was at first very slow, as owing to there not being the slightest motion in the air, and a light drizzling rain falling, the smoke lay so heavily on the ground in front of the guns, that after each round the gate for some minutes could not be seen. At eight o'clock, however, a breeze arose, and drove the smoke away. The firing now became rapid, and at nine o'clock the gate of the *fausse-brai* was demolished and nearly separated from the wall, though it did not actually fall. Lieutenant Pigou now advanced with his powder, and a covering party, consisting of fifteen European soldiers and twenty-five Sepoys of the 37th, lined the canal that passed close in front of the river face, and opened a smart fire on the loop-holes to distract the attention of the garrison. A bugler, seeing the covering party move forward, imagined that the river gate was open, and sounded the "advance." The storming party rushed on, pushed down the gate of the *fausse-brai*, and crowded the intervals between the outer and inner walls. The main gate, however, effectually arrested their progress. It was composed of

planks seven inches thick, and was fitted into a very massive frame. In vain did the men fire volleys into the gate with the points of their bayonets touching the wood; it defied all their efforts to force it. The stormers were with difficulty persuaded to withdraw and take shelter in the canal, while the Engineer officer laid his powder at the main gate. This dangerous and difficult task was accomplished by Lieutenant Pigou, assisted by Lieutenant Tytler.* The powder was laid, the fuse was fixed and success appeared to be certain. But, unhappily, the powder, which had been supplied from the Shah's magazine at Jellalabad, was of a loose spongy nature, and had absorbed so much moisture that it would not explode; the bag into which the fuse was introduced, burnt like a squib, and the other bags remained entire, so that the gate was uninjured. Lieutenant Pigou now obtained a barrel of 9-pounder cartridges from Captain Abbott, who urgently advised him to carry it up entire to the gate, and to insert the fuse at the bung-hole, as the heavy rain that was falling would wet uncovered powder. He, however, con-

* The late General Fraser-Tytler, who only died during the present year.

sidered the weight* too great to be moved by one man, and, taking out all the cartridges, placed them in two open baskets, each of which he gave to a sapper. One of these men was killed, and fell with his load between the canal and the gate, while the other arrived there with the contents of his basket thoroughly wetted. Lieutenant Pigou inserted the fuse into one of the cartridges, some of which he piled against the gate. The train was fired, but only the cartridge into which the fuse was inserted exploded, the others were not ignited, and a second failure occurred.

Lieutenant Pigou, in despair, now begged that

* One hundred and thirty-three pounds as he placed the amount in a letter to his brother Frederick. On this point Captain Abbott says, "As the men were under cover only twenty yards from the gate, the carriage of a load of one hundred and thirty-three pounds that short distance, might, I think, have been easily effected." Of Lieutenant Pigou he writes, "Lieutenant Pigou, who failed to blow open the gate of Pushoot, was more successful against a fort in the Shinwarree country in 1841, but he destroyed not only the gate but himself also by the explosion. The same dislike to be advised, which caused him to take the 9-pounder cartridges out of the barrel at Pushoot, induced him to shorten his fuse on the subsequent occasion, because Captain Bellew told him that it was already dangerously short. The powder exploded before Pigou could make his escape, and he was killed in an instant."

the howitzer might be advanced to a spot behind the embankment of the canal, for the purpose of battering down the outer wall and the traverse, and eventually the main gate. The piece was accordingly dragged forward over ploughed fields, by the battery guard, and Captain Abbott ran on to examine the spot selected for it, but he instantly perceived that it would be impossible to touch either the traverse or the gate from that position, and that the only spot from which they could be seen, was within twelve paces of the edge of the ditch. Captain Abbott's endeavours to drag on the howitzer entirely failed. Of four men who accompanied him, three were immediately struck by matchlock balls, and a bullet was only prevented from passing through Captain Abbott's body by the buckle of his sword belt, off which it glanced. It was evident that to persevere in the attempt would only cause a severe loss of men, without any chance of success, as the operations to be performed, would have required two hours firing, and a gun's crew could not have lived five minutes within twenty yards of the wall. That Captain Abbott escaped under this murderous fire, exposed as he was to it for a considerable time, was not a little remarkable. Lieutenant Collinson, of the

37th, a very gallant young officer, and two Sepoys of the same Regiment, were wounded, the former mortally. Seeing the futility of persevering, Captain Abbott went to Colonel Orchard, who, agreeing that any further attempt would involve a useless sacrifice of lives, decided on calling off his men. The troops had now been seven hours under arms, and during five hours of that time had been exposed to the rain. Their limbs were benumbed, their muskets were useless, and all the 9-pounder shot had been expended. The bugles sounded the "recall" and the detachment withdrew, leaving nineteen of their number dead within a few paces of the fort, and carrying off forty-eight wounded, many of whom died in camp.

That the loss of the assailants was not much greater, must be attributed to a mistake committed by the garrison, who, when they saw the storming party advance, imagined that the gate had been forced, and in that belief descended from the wall to meet our men in the narrow entrance. Before they had resumed their posts in the towers, our party had found shelter in the deep double canal. "I fired away," says Captain Abbott, "all my round shot, excepting five, and have only shells and grape left. Had my whole battery been present, I

would have breached the wall, but two 9-pounders had no chance. The guns weigh only 8¾ cwt., and can be used either for foot or horse battery. The conveyance of the wounded men was a matter of some difficulty, owing to the want of doolies, and the return to the camp was made amid a storm of rain and sleet, which continued to fall throughout the night, so that the tents stood in from two to three inches of water."

The enemy, dreading another attack, abandoned the fort during the night of the 18th, and Syud Hashim fled from Kotekee, and the whole of the forts of Kash-Kote, Noorgul, and Kooner were evacuated by his adherents.

Captain Abbott writes from Pushoot on the 9th of February :—" Several of our wounded have died, and we have altogether lost about twenty-seven lives. The ball struck poor Collinson with as much force as if it had gone into a tree; it went through an arm, through a rib, wounded the liver, and made a deep groove in the backbone. It has rained almost incessantly for three weeks, and now we have a very cold wind blowing over the snow. Exercise is out of the question without running a risk of being shot or stabbed. Fraser, of the 2nd Cavalry, came out with a troop and a company of the

48th Native Infantry escorting supplies. Ponsonby brought a second convoy, escorted by another troop and some Sepoys. They were each about ten days on the road and were attacked almost daily. The whole party returned on the 30th, but were, together with one of Christie's Rissalahs, brought up at Kooner, eleven miles from this, by about 250 Soofees who lined the bank of the river opposite the ford. Fraser wrote for reinforcements of infantry, and Macgregor bought a free passage for the detachment. I am sure we might have caught Syud Hashim had a party made a night march into the valley, as he was known to be only ten miles from us in an open village. The Soofees can muster 1,500 men, but of these, not 500 have muskets. The people hesitate to give him up, being a Syud, but lots of them have offered to murder him."

The camp was moved to higher ground, and Colonel Orchard remained at Pushoot until the 16th of February, during which the weather was so inclement that nearly all the camels died. The remains of Lieutenant Collinson—whose sword Captain Abbott purchased at the sale of his effects for transmission to his family—and some European soldiers, were interred in the fort,

and the rose, thistle, and shamrock, planted by their countrymen over their grave, had taken root before the detachment marched for Jellalabad.

During the halt at Pushoot, some information was obtained of the strange tribe known as Kaffirs, whose frontier is about sixteen miles north-east of Pushoot. Captain Abbott has the following remarks concerning them in a letter to his brother Frederick. "At Chaga-Serai, there is a class of men who carry on the little traffic that exists between the Kaffirs and the Mahomedans. The Kaffirs are very hostile to the Mussulmen, who drove them out of Afghanistan; indeed, no Kaffir is allowed to marry until he has killed a Mahomedan. There are two classes of Kaffirs; one, fair and having blue or grey eyes; and the other class, black as Indians. The fair Kaffirs are the aristocracy of the country, and the others do all the hard work. Doubtless they are respectively the descendants of the Greeks and aboriginal inhabitants. Some of the female names, as Amy, Camille, Miriam are familiar to us. The fair Kaffirs sit upon benches, instead of squatting on the ground, as other Asiatics do. They walk with small canes in their hands, drink wine from goblets, and are extremely hospitable."

The Fort of Kooner and the best of the Kash-Kote forts were destroyed, the gates being blown in by small quantities of the country powder which had failed on the 18th of January. Colonel Orchard was blamed by some persons for having repeated the experiment which succeeded so well at Ghuznee, but Captain Abbott was of opinion that no other mode of attack, of which the assailants had a choice, could possibly have succeeded. The result of the attack on Julgah, in the Kohistan, a comparatively weak place without any ditches, afforded convincing proof of the difficulty of breaching mud walls with light field-guns. Mining was out of the question at Pushoot, and a *coup-de-main* alone offered a fair chance of success.

In crossing the river at Kooner, on the return march to Jellalabad, Captain Abbott dismantled his carriages and dismounted the guns, which were ferried across the deep stream on rafts made of inflated skins, with a little brushwood thrown over them, similar to those described by Herodotus, and employed by Alexander in crossing the rivers of the Punjaub.

Captain Abbott writes to a correspondent :—" At Kooner I had a raft of fifty 'mussucks,' very badly put together, and with scarcely any timber on it.

This carried a gun, with the wheels and boxes of its limber, and twenty or thirty men. At the Cabul river I had only twenty-four 'mussucks,' with a pretty good framework over them. This carried the gun alone, with the boxes of the limber, and a few men besides; the operation is not very troublesome when the men are well taught to mount and dismount the guns and carriages. The rafts are very buoyant, and are the best contrivance imaginable for crossing these streams. They are pulled to pieces in a few minutes, and reconstructed in an hour or two, if you have plenty of people to blow air into them. The natives use bellows for this purpose. A camel can carry enough skins for a good raft."*

* To the same correspondent he writes of a report that appeared in the papers as to his having been wounded:—"I must not forget to say that I was not wounded at Pushoot. I wish people would not write such stuff in the papers. The truth was, that a ball hit the ring of my sword-belt, and glanced from it into a tree. It gave me a smart blow, and I asked Tytler to look whether I was scratched, as I could not see the place myself. This was the origin of the story. I received only a bruise of no consequence whatever, and it was a useful admonition not to stand still another time within so short a distance of a loopholed wall. A person moving quickly has little chance of being hit, as we all found on the following day."

The fords of these rivers from the left to the right banks, being up stream, the water deep and very rapid, and the footing on round shingle very insecure, Captain Abbott preferred losing a little time to running any risk of drowning his horses. Although there are no hills to be crossed between Jellalabad and Pushoot, yet the march is a most difficult one; the Cabul river is crossed once, and the Kama river thrice, and close to Jellalabad there are five miles of sloppy ground, with scores of canals of all sizes. Colonel Orchard's column arrived at Jellalabad on the 22nd of February, and remained there until the roads to Cabul became passable.

The following extracts from his letters give further accounts of this Expedition. He writes to his friend, Colonel Chambers, on the 13th of January, from Shewa:

"Yesterday at eight a.m., we quitted Jellalabad for a *dour* (expedition) upon Pushoot, the Engineers and Pioneers having preceded us on the 10th. The ford of the Cabul river is most dangerous and difficult. My guns got through it safely, as I had made two men examine the place well, but I was nearly washed away myself, and got a precious ducking. Two camp followers were drowned, and

some camels, with their loads, were swept away and lost. On this side, we found canals and watercourses innumerable, and we came sixteen miles over the heaviest ground I ever encountered out of Shekawattee. Our course lay through fields, some of them swamped previously to ploughing, and some (the greater part) already ploughed. My guns were sometimes up to their axles in stiff mud, from which the horses, unaided, could not extricate them. We were detained at the Cabul River an hour and a half, waiting for the infantry, which was ferried over on rafts, a tedious operation, and altogether were eight hours and a half on the road. We reached Shewa a little before sunset. Christie is before Pushoot (we *hope*) with his own corps, and about 1,500 Afghans, who were to join at Kooner. He must have made a severe march. Forty-five miles in twenty-four hours over such roads is a good performance, and will, I think, raise the credit of his corps, which is undeservedly at a discount just now.

"Now, having detailed some of the inconveniences of the road, I must say that the valley is a very fine one, and must be very pretty when the trees are in leaf, and the numberless vines of gigantic size hang

their blue and amber-coloured clusters from the branches of the trees to which they are trained.

"At about six miles from Jellalabad, we quitted the valley of the Cabul river, and entered that of the Kama or Kooner river. I have not seen so fine a valley as this anywhere. The Kama is a large rapid stream, with about a mile of rich soil on either side, sometimes considerably more. The villages are large and well peopled. We have come with the Pioneers, who had just completed the road thus far. Our progress hence must be slow, and the absurdity of attempting a *dour* with artillery over this country is pretty clearly proved. Had we started without sending on the Pioneers, we should have been three days on the road as far as this place only. Not a single atta or barley load has arrived, and my horses stand the chance of being starved. It is, no doubt, a device of the enemy, who has great influence with the Governor of Jellalabad."

"13th of January.—We made a short and disastrous march yesterday. The ford of the Kama is very difficult. The river runs in four streams, intersecting a bed about a mile and a half in breadth. Three fords are tolerable, but after the third, there occurs a quicksand, over which my guns, with ten

horses to each, were obliged to pass at full speed, and even there narrowly escaped destruction. The ford is about two feet and three-quarters deep, but if you diverge from it at all to the right, you get into deeper water. Here about twenty or thirty camels were lost, as well as 100 lbs. of powder and 4,000 rounds of ammunition. I lost three of my own camels, with their loads; a fourth fell, but got up again, and only one came safely through. Just as I thought all was safe, down went a waggon, team and all, in a *dûl-dûl*. I dug out the horses, dismantled the waggons, and got all safely out in about three-quarters of an hour. I had four miles to go to meet the infantry, who were at the ferry (much above the ford). On reaching their vicinity, I found the sappers and pioneers halted, and the small fort of Kash-Kote firing upon them. A party came from the ford to protect the guns, and we moved on, passing about 800 yards from the place. The fellows came out and fired, at about 500 yards, with their juzails, but hit no one. We halted at 1,000 yards from the fort, and remained till near four p.m., when the troops were all over, and now we are about a mile and a half in advance of Chota Kash-Kote, and about as far short of the principal fort of that name. The rascals in the small fort

gave us great applause as we came on. They have since murdered a *surwan*, and one Sepoy got a slight wound in the leg, the only mischief done by about two hours' firing, which we, of course, did not return.

"13th, four p.m.—The advantages of leaving enemies in our rear are beginning to be seen and felt. We found the ford this morning rather a good one. It was very rapid and two feet and three-quarters deep, but there were no holes or rapids to be avoided. I crossed without a check and waited about an hour and a half for the infantry, who, after vainly looking for rafts, were obliged to ford also. Everything that remained far in rear has been attacked by marauders.

"We are now close to Noorgul, a fortified village, with a fort at a little distance from it and the road passing between. But I believe we are to sneak round this place also, and thus maintain our character for consistency. A Cossid, passing through to Macnaughten, brought a verbal message from Macgregor, saying that he had cooped up the heathen nicely in Pushoot, but we are still a great distance from that place. I have a difficult ford to cross about two miles and a half from this camp. Our camels have now been three days without food,

and are quite done up. I have now only *one* camel able to carry. I started with twenty-five excellent animals; of these, three were drowned yesterday, the fourth is scarcely able to move. Immediately below our ford this morning is a very remarkable rock, an island in the middle of the river. It rises about 100 feet above the water, and is steep and rugged. The remains of an ancient fort are on its summit, and it seems to be a favourite station for thieves, of whom we can see fourteen or fifteen now watching the ford. They have done very little business, however, being arrant cowards. The Padshah of Kooner is with us in camp, and a precious rabble he has with him. The country here is resuming its wild character. The valley is narrow, and there is but little land under cultivation. We are encamped on high, level ground, just above the river, barren, rocky hills rising north-west and south-east, the valley open south-west, and making a turn northwards beyond Noorgul.

"Kooner, 16th.—Yesterday, we forded the Kama river a third time. The ford difficult and dangerous as usual; some of the Europeans, with the ammunition camels, had narrow escapes, and one native and a few camels were drowned. We encamped here at four p.m. Macgregor is here to

meet us and conduct us to Pushoot, twelve miles distant. Kooner is a poor village, about 200 yards square. It has a fort on the side opposite to us, held by a few of Hashim's people. We leave this also in our rear. Hashim himself is in a little fort on the right bank of the Kama river. This is our relative position. If Hashim fights, we shall have sharp work, for I have not the means of breaching.

"Half-past three, p.m.—We made a march of about twelve miles between half-past nine and one o'clock, and joined Christie's camp here. Pigou is reconnoitring the place, and the fellows are popping away long shots at his escort, one of whom came in just now with a scratch on the head. Rain commenced as we moved from our last ground, and it continues heavily. Snow is falling on the hills on each side of the valley. We can do nothing until the weather clears, and we fear Hashim may bolt. A letter to his family was intercepted to-day; in it he tells them that the Ferringhees have been such fools as to send only 200 sowars, who expected to find the fort empty; but that his men had proved themselves heroes, and that the party was encamped, doing nothing. He will probably write a different account to-morrow, after seeing the red coats of our infantry and the white tents rising on

this ground. The nearest bastion of Hashim's fort is crowded with people staring at us.

"17th, eight p.m.—Will close this for despatch, in case of accidents. We (Macgregor, Pigou, Tytler, and self) went through the town to-day, and closely reconnoitred the fort. The enemy fired at us smartly, and will no doubt fight. We attack to-morrow morning at daylight. My guns open on a wicket by which the *fausse braie* is entered. This should be demolished by a few rounds. Then I clear away the parapets and amuse the enemy with shells. After this the storming party rush forward with ladders to cross the ditch, which has neither bridge nor crossing. My guns during the advance will turn on the parapets of the flanking bastions, which are not shot-proof, and I shall shell away from the howitzer as fast as possible, until the troops are in advance of my battery, after which shot only will be the order of the day. We are all disappointed in Colonel Orchard, who has done nothing, and who now acts solely on Pigou's and my report, without having reconnoitred the place himself. The enemy fired to-day very accurately at our party, and are much better shots than any natives I have as yet seen."

To his brother Frederick, he writes from Pushoot,

on the 28th of January, particulars of the attack on the fort:

"My two 9-pounders opened on the barrier gate of the *fausse braie* at seven o'clock, and at nine it was fairly cut out of the wall, and knocked about so that a man might walk through it and on each side. Pigou, of the Engineers, ran on and found a narrow foot-bridge across the ditch, but the main gate was closed. The advance was sounded by mistake, and the troops became exposed to a severe fire of rifles from the loop-holes of the parapet. They retired while Pigou laid 200 lbs. of Cabul or Jellalabad powder, which went off like a wet squib, and did no harm to the gate. I gave him all my 9-pounder Shrapnel cartridges (about 90 lbs.) in a barrel, advising him to insert a fuze, and thus make sure of the explosion. He, however, thought the affair too heavy, so he took out and divided the cartridges, taking half himself, and giving the remainder to be carried by a sapper, who was shot dead ere he reached the gate. The few cartridges he had with him became wet, and again the explosion failed. He now came and pressed so urgently for a gun to be taken up that I got a number of Sepoys and advanced the howitzer, but on running forward to look for a place whence it might fire on the gate,

I could find none; the high embankment was an insuperable obstacle, and there was no bridge by which the gun might have been taken across the ditch. Colonel Orchard, who commanded, was quite at his wits' ends, and as both he and Pigou insisted on the possibility of battering with the howitzer, I asked for men to bring it forward, as the party that had originally advanced it to within sixty yards of the place, had retired, after several had been wounded. I went back and collected a few men, and Collinson, of the 37th, came to help me, but was shot close to the howitzer, and I could not get it forward. After making three trips forward and the same back again, crossing the fire of eighty rifles at fifty or sixty paces each time, I succeeded in dissuading Colonel Orchard from an idle exposure of his men; and the troops having now been five hours under very heavy rain and sleet, with all their fire-arms totally useless, the recall was sounded, and the men were taken back to camp. Nineteen fell dead on the spot within fifty yards of the place, and forty-eight, wounded by rifle-balls, were carried off. Collinson's wound is a very dangerous one, and a young lad named Hicks, of the European regiment, was also severely wounded. After the first explosion had failed, I wished to

batter the gate from my right gun, which commanded about one-half of it after the barrier-gate was removed and a portion of the traverse destroyed by my shot; but Colonel Orchard said I should bring down too much rubbish. I fired five rounds before he interfered, and the effect of these convinces me that twenty more shot would have opened a way to our troops. The five shots took effect, and one, which struck the door, drove it off its hinge, for it was of six-inch mulberry plank, and presented great resistance to the shot. The enemy were afraid to stand a second.

"1st of February.—Collinson died of his wounds on the 30th; several men also have died. This dirty little Expedition has cost us thirty lives of fighting men, about a dozen camp-followers drowned or frozen to death, and about 120 camels. Two troopers of the 2nd Cavalry were smashed by pieces of rock rolled down upon them at one of the passes. They were part of an escort of a troop and company under Captain Fraser, with supplies for our force. The Soofees are a miserable race of mortals, who subsist by selling wood and by plunder. They inhabit a narrow valley about sixteen miles in length, the northern extremity of which is about four miles west of this place. The valley is but 600 yards in

breadth, and of course the fire of rifles can cross its centre easily."

On the 27th of April, Shah Soojah left Jellalabad, escorted by the troops under Sir R. Sale, on the return to Cabul. The march was without any incident of note, except an attack, on the fifth march, on the baggage by a body of 150 Ghilzyes, as it emerged from the Purwan-Durra Pass, the bed of a narrow rivulet, with perpendicular rocks on either side—the very place for a robber raid. The infantry took the mountain road, sending two companies to escort the guns, which had cleared the Pass and reached the open bed of a river, when a fire of matchlocks was opened from a hill in the rear upon the spare horses and some remounts. The drivers mounted on the spare horses trotted up to the battery, but the syces in charge of the remounts allowed them to run loose. Captain Abbott, who looked in vain for the infantry, unlimbered the 24-pounder howitzer and fired three shells, which killed several of the assailants, who dispersed before the escort made its appearance. The infantry, on hearing the sound of artillery and matchlocks, returned across the hills and assisted in securing the loose horses. Sir Robert Sale, who had shortly before passed the spot without escort, accompanied

by his wife and daughter (wife of Captain Sturt, of the Engineers), rode back on hearing the firing, and all arrangements were made for securing the baggage. It was afterwards ascertained that their assailant was a Ghilzye chief, named Azeez Khan, a son-in-law of Dost Mahomed, who, with 150 men, had stationed himself at the Cabul end of the Pass, for the purpose of capturing baggage, and mistook the remount horses for baggage cattle. Had he allowed the guns which escorted them to pass on, he would have secured a large amount of plunder, as most of the camels were led through the narrow Pass.

On the 10th of May, the troops encamped at Sia Sung ("black rock") under a low range of hills, rendered memorable eighteen months later as the place whence the Afghans attacked the Cabul cantonments with such fatal persistency.

Captain Abbott gives an account of his march to Colonel Chambers, jotted down from day to day. It is headed, "Commenced in camp near Bareekaub, 6th of May:—We quitted Jellalabad on the 27th, and marched eight miles to Sultanpore, halted there a day, and on the 29th came on eight miles more to Futtehabad, where we found a decided improvement in the climate, although the

ascent had been very trifling. On the 30th we made Neemla, seven miles, and next day ascended the steep hill to Gundamuck. There was a very severe fall for three-quarters of a mile, and then a gradual ascent for a mile more, after which two rocky nullahs were crossed and we encamped in a fine cool climate at Gundamuck. The march to Soorkaub was a very severe one of only eight and a half miles; we found the river unfordable, and my guns were handed over the broken bridge. The next march to Jugdulluck was a very trying one indeed; a steep ascent I pulled up, but could not get round a sharp turn at the top, and was obliged to obtain the aid of the infantry. After this there was a steady ascent up shingle for eight miles, then a severe ascent for two miles, and a descent of three miles to camp. We halted to mend my howitzer, whose axletree had given way, and yesterday came on through the Purwan-Durra Pass. Two companies of infantry followed the guns down the bed of the nullah, the remainder going over the hills. I came safely through all the worst part of the Pass, and was about 600 yards clear of it, when a sharp fire was opened from a hill (in my rear) about 700 feet high, upon my spare horses and Garbett's remounts, which were passing under

it. I looked in vain for the infantry, and observing that about 100 men had occupied the height whence they might have played mischief with our baggage, I just gave them a couple of shrapnels. The first shell had rather a long fuse and burst over the men, throwing all its contents forward. The fellows did not seem at all alarmed and remained on the spot, so I sent a second which took effect exactly, covering the ground about the people with bricks and splinters. They scuttled off as fast as they could, carrying five of their number pick-a-back. Racing over the hill, they came in contact with the infantry, exchanged shots with them, and one Sepoy was shot there through both legs. Sale had ridden through with his wife and daughter, about half a mile ahead of me, without any sort of escort, and was not molested. He came back when he heard my guns, and the column struck across to join me; we made all needful arrangements to secure our baggage, and lost nothing but one of the remount horses, thirteen of which were running loose the moment the fire commenced. The syces were so alarmed that some fell off the horses from sheer fright, some were thrown, some jumped off and ran; but one of them was touched by the assailant's fire, and two

were half killed and are now quite useless, owing to their own cowardice. This day we came only four and a half miles, but the road was most awful. Ten horses required thirty men to aid them on the ascent, and afterwards we had a steep descent with locked wheels—a job I detest, particularly because it takes so much time, and our chains are continually snapping. Last night an old Afghan came to warn me that 500 men were collected near this to attack our baggage on the march, and that if they failed in this attempt, they were determined to make a *chappow* on our camp at Tezeen.

"The route to Khiva which my brother took is quite impracticable for troops, owing to the want of water between Merv and Khiva. James followed the Moorgaub to Merv and found it a rapid stream flowing between deep banks of clay. The jungle on the banks is filled with pheasants and chuckores (whence its name I suppose.) The country on either hand is a desert. Merv is a poor place, and the Governor is decidedly our enemy. From Merv the party took on twelve days' food, and five days' water, and proceeded by a footpath, crossing wave after wave of sand, at the rate of thirty miles a day. The cold was so intense that they were obliged to dismount every hour during the night

to light fires, which the low scrubby bushes on which camels subsist, afforded them the means of doing. One night snow fell heavily and the path was completely covered; the camels were then used as guides and led the way with the greatest certainty. The traveller emerges at once from these sandhills upon the fertile country around Khiva, a respectable town in appearance, surrounded by a wall, but having no ditch. The houses are mean and gloomy as to the interior, being unprovided with windows. The Khan is a man of prepossessing appearance and address, but very ignorant and rather timid. Both he and the Wazeer asked James to prescribe medicine for them, and the Wazeer wanted him to mend three old watches and to convert some brass into gold. The vehicles of the country are small carts drawn by one horse (between shafts), with an oddly shaped collar. The women are almost as fair as French women, and have generally a high colour and fine eyes. The people have nothing of the bull-dog appearance of the Chinese and southern Tartars, and are mostly good looking. This is all I can tell you of the new country. James avoids all politics, of course, but his letter leads me to suppose him to be well on his way to

Orenburg as the bearer of proposals from the Khan to the Emperor of Russia. The Khan seems inclined to make any required concession, and to submit to any terms however humiliating. In this case the Russians will be deprived of their pretence for the invasion of Khiva, and the mask will be torn from their faces. Their real nature, a desire to approach our Indian dominions, will stand undisguised. I have no idea that any terms will be granted. The Russians will have Khiva this season, and Bokhara next. They then will be almost in contact with us, and a large force must always occupy Afghanistan, unless we crush the power of the Sikhs and obtain entire possession of the Punjaub. It would never answer to have a small force here, with all the Sikh army interposed between them and India, and the Russian advance of 8,000 or 10,000 troops at Bokhara.

"7th, Tezeen.—Last night some Afghans attacked our picquet stationed at the entrance of the Lutabund Pass which was just in rear of camp. They were easily driven off, and no one was touched; three balls came amongst my horses, but hit none of them. This morning we marched nine miles, ascending very considerably all the way, our course was up a stony nullah, but the large stones

had been removed, and the march proved easier than any since we had quitted the valley of Jellalabad. I had looked forward to it with dread, remembering the huge stones with which it was formerly covered. The valley here opens out, and we have a good camp near the wretched village of Tezeen. If Saadut Khan and Azeez Khan did intend to attack us, they have allowed the opportunity to pass. At least the attempt would be absurd on our present camp. The Pass near Boodkak indeed remains, but it is within ten miles of Cabul, and these vagabonds never like going to any distance from their own homes. Broadfoot of the Engineers destroyed Azeez Khan's fort the other day, and this is the cause of the present bad feeling towards us. That Salter's detachment will be molested I have little doubt; they have the treasure and only one regiment with it, for the cavalry could do nothing in these parts, and cannot be considered as a sufficient guard of the escort. The 37th is a capital corps, and will give a very good account of their charge.

"Koord-Cabul, 8th of May:—All my troubles are over. This morning my guns came up that long hill with aid only at one awkward turning where three of the five carriages stuck and required to be

started again. The other two galloped round it and completed the two mile ascent without any assistance. All are in excellent condition, and only one horse has been injured on the march from Jellalabad. The road now is down hill, or on level, until we reach Cabul.

"Cabul 10th.—Arrived this morning all well. Sir W. Cotton crows not a little at the condition of my horses, and at the howitzer having been used. He is welcome to his victory as it has put him into high good humour with me."

The summer and autumn of 1840 was a time of anxiety for Sir William Macnaghten, and of action for the troops under Sale and Dennie. Dost Mahomed, who, with his sons Afzul Khan and Akbar Khan, had sought protection at the court of the Khan of Bokhara, had been imprisoned by that capricious tyrant; but in August escaped and sought refuge with the Wullee of Kholoom, who placed all his resources at the disposal of his old ally. The Dost soon found himself at the head of a considerable force, and in September advanced with 6,000 men upon Bameean, in the Hindoo Khoosh, where a British column had wintered. In the latter part of June, the 4th Goorkha Regiment of the Shah's contingent, under Captain Hay, forming a portion

of this force, had occupied the advanced fort of Bajgah, near to which a disaster took place involving the lives of some thirty or forty of the Goorkhas. Bajgah and Syghan were abandoned, and the garrisons retreated upon Bameean, while the 35th Native Infantry were hastily despatched from Cabul, under Brigadier Dennie. The Kohistan, or hilly country to the north of Cabul, was now reported to be ready to rise in favour of the Dost, and on the 12th of September we find the Envoy writing to the Governor-General, endorsing the opinion expressed to him by Sir W. Cotton, "that unless the Bengal troops are instantly strengthened, we cannot hold the country," and urging the dispatch of another brigade. Dennie arrived at Bameean on the 14th of September, and after disarming Captain Hopkins' regiment of Afghans, who had shown disaffection, he advanced against Dost Mahomed and his ally, the Wullee, with 900 men, and defeated them with heavy loss on the 18th of September. On the 24th, the Brigadier entered the Syghan valley, and destroyed the fort, and four days later, Dr. Lord, the Political Agent, concluded a treaty with the Wullee of Kholoom, when Brigadier Dennie returned with his force to Cabul. But Dost Mahomed, who only escaped with his

sons from the disastrous field of Bameean by the swiftness of their horses, reappeared in the Kohistan, and on the 24th of September, Sir Robert Sale, accompanied by Sir A. Burnes, quitted the camp at Sia Sung with a brigade, consisting of the 13th Light Infantry, one squadron 2nd Cavalry, two companies 37th Native Infantry, and three guns and the 24-pounder howitzer of No. 6 Field Battery, under Captain Abbott.

The troops skirted a lake, and turning the range of hills which were impracticable for artillery, by an easterly pass, proceeded by a steep rocky descent, where three locking-chains of Abbott's guns snapped, and at length emerged upon open cultivated ground. At a distance of ten miles they passed Killa Hadji, and then went through a pass between hills, and turning to the north-west, made a long and steep descent to the bed of a stream, where having again broken his locking-chains, Captain Abbott was obliged to take the guns down by hand. Ascending the opposite side, the encamping ground was reached after a march of fourteen miles. The next march was over a road, rough and stony, with an easy descent for about four miles, when it enters the bed of a dry nullah. Marching over uneven ground, they reached by a very narrow path the

river under Ak Serai, crossing which, the march was resumed along a rocky and dangerous descent down the hill side, and another awkward descent down a narrow lane, when level country was reached, and a distance of three miles and a half brought the troops to Karabagh, where camp was formed for the day. "From the hill above the Serai," writes Abbott, "we looked down upon a beautiful valley covered with orchards, vineyards, and trees of various kinds. The silver poplar holds a conspicuous place in the landscape, and under the hills that bound the valley to the north are extensive groves and orchards giving shelter to considerable villages, the property of Kohistanee chiefs, of which the largest is Istalif, above which is a small castle." On the 28th, Sir R. Sale marched to Rohat, and on the following day proceeded thence to Chareekar, where he was joined by a detachment* that had preceded him from Cabul, under Captain Fraser, of the 2nd Cavalry, to watch the passes."

At eight a.m., the Brigadier marched from Chareekar, with the object of attacking the forts at the entrance of the Ghorebund valley, belonging to Ali Khan, and known as Tootum-Durra. On reach-

* A squadron of 2nd Cavalry, two 6-pounders under Lieutenant Warburton, one Kohistanee Regiment, and some Afghan Horse.

ing the ground in front of the village, which was strongly fortified, the guns went to the front, and cannonaded the village. A strong party of infantry, with two guns, under Lieutenant Warburton, proceeded to clear the hill to the left, and then to take the position of the enemy in flank, while three companies of the 13th Light Infantry, supported by Captain Abbott's 9-pounders, advanced to the attack of two detached forts on the right, the guns also directing their fire on the towers and other defences of the village. "These operations," says the Brigadier, in his dispatch, "were crowned with complete success." The main column of attack now moved on the village at a rapid pace, and the enemy fled on their approach. Captain Abbott then brought his guns and howitzer to the right, and formed them for action within sixty yards of the gate of the large fort, upon which the enemy evacuated it from the rear. The whole chain of forts was in possession of the British by eleven a.m., with but small loss, "a fact which," says Sir Robert Sale, "I, in a great measure, attribute to the dread inspired by the excellent practice of artillery under the able direction of Captain Abbott, assisted by Lieutenants Maule and Warburton." In this affair Captain Edward

Conolly was shot through the heart. This gallant young officer was a learned antiquarian, a classical scholar familiar with the literature of Greece and Rome, and a traveller who could express his observations and experiences with precision and in polished language. His body was taken into Cabul for interment, and his relative, the Envoy, bitterly mourned over his untimely end. He was one of three brothers, who all died in this war, and the eldest of whom, Arthur, is well known as the companion of Colonel Stoddart in his cruel imprisonment and death at Bokhara. The Engineers were occupied until the 2nd of October blowing up the forts with mines of 100 lbs. of powder. Captain Abbott experimented with his guns on the penetration of shot into the mud walls, when he found that at a range of 240 yards, with a charge of 2¼ lbs. of powder, a shot penetrated 2 feet into the solid part of the bastion, and from 2½ feet to 2¾ feet into the hollow part.

Sir Robert Sale was not equally successful in his next affair. On the 2nd of October, the column marched from Tootum-Durra for Chareekar, when a council of war was held, at which it was decided to attack the fort of Julgah, sixteen miles north-east of Chareekar, in which Sir A. Burnes had

ascertained the "rebels," (*moofsids*) as they were called, had taken refuge. At five a.m., on the 3rd, the Brigade marched. "The road," writes Abbott, "was abominable, crossing canals, water-courses, and flooded fields for five miles, which broke much harness." At about half-past ten, the battery reached Julgah, and was immediately ordered to open fire on the fort, which, like other Afghan forts, was constructed as follows: The tower was solid to a height of twelve feet, above which were two chambers, loop-holed all round, with a thin parapet above all. The curtain consisted of a wall about thirty feet high, with a thickness of six feet at its base and three feet at its summit. Against the interior, houses, about twelve feet high, are built, and their roofs serve as a rampart, from which the garrison fire through loopholes in the thick walls. Such was the place that Sir Robert Sale set himself to breach with three light 9-pounder guns drawn up on the open plain, without shelter of any sort.

"There would have been no difficulty," says Captain Abbott, in his Journal, "in breaching a curtain at eight feet, or more than that, above the ground, but the objections were: (1) If the breach were made above the roofs of the houses, the rubbish would not suffice to form an ascent for the storm-

ing party; (2) if below the roofs, the roofs would fall in, and effectually check the advance of the stormers." He adds: "I therefore decided on breaching the hollow chamber of a bastion at a height of twelve feet from the ground, the breach being easily accessible by means of ladders, while no opposition could be offered by the enemy, as our guns would keep them out of the bastion." The guns, accordingly, opened upon a bastion at 300 yards' range, and at noon had effectually breached the lower chamber, "but," says Abbott, "the Engineer officer now insisted on the curtain being breached, and much time and ammunition were thus wasted."

At three p.m., the curtain breach was reported practicable, and the storming party, led by Colonel Tronson, of the 13th, advanced to the assault. They took ladders also for the assault of the tower, but no instructions seem to have been given as to their use. The ladders, instead of being placed against the tower, were placed on the rubbish of the curtain breach, where they were worse than useless, as the rubbish being soft, the men sunk knee-deep in it. The attack failed, and the party retired, leaving many men dead on the ground. Although the battery reached Julgah at ten a.m.,

the 6-pounder guns of the Shah's horse-artillery did not arrive until an hour later, and the 8-inch mortars only made their appearance at three p.m.

Captain Abbott immediately set one of them on loose planks, knocked out the head of a barrel of powder, and managed to put thirty-three shells into the fort before the firing ceased, by order of the General. Soon after dusk, the enemy evacuated the fort, and escaped through the lines of the Afghan horsemen, who formed part of the force. In this disastrous affair, the British loss was thirteen soldiers of the 13th Light Infantry killed, besides many wounded.

During the 4th of October, Captain Abbott busied himself recovering his shot* from the breach, and thus replenished his stock, which the previous day's work had reduced to fifty rounds per gun, no supply being available within 700 miles of Cabul. On this point, he says: "My urgent application for 200 rounds per gun had been rejected with contempt by the Military Board, with some wise remarks on the extravagance of such a demand."

* The following was the ammunition expended at Julgah:—9-pounder, 452 round shot and nine shrapnel; 24-pounder howitzer, 8 shrapnel and 1 shell; 8-inch mortars, 33 shell; and 6-pounders, 114 round shot.

The brigade marched at four p.m. on the same day, and encamped in the valley of the Ghorebund river, about three miles below Beghrami (*Alexandria ad Caucasum*), of which celebrated city no remains exist, excepting mounds of clay, much broken pottery, and many coins bearing Greek inscriptions. Here the force halted till the 8th, and Captain Abbott and other officers examined some forts which the rebel chiefs had abandoned. "That of Meer Musjidi," he says, "is the most formidable, but none could have resisted 18-pounders, though all would have been troublesome to a force having only 9-pounder field guns of less than 9 cwt. metal."

Sir R. Sale marched early on the 8th of October for Chareekar, expecting to meet Dost Mahomed. "I had prepared," says Abbott, "an excellent road for the guns, but was not allowed to use it, General Sale insisting that I should follow a path which I knew and reported to be impracticable for my cattle. After much injury had been done to carriages and harness, the horses were untraced, and all the guns were taken up by the hand. Beyond this, the road selected by the General was desperately bad, and we were nearly five hours on a march of six miles, and my horses were often thrown down. The mortar carts drawn by

bullocks,* had their poles and most of their yokes broken, and were dragged into camp at Chareekar by Maule's Regiment of Kohistan Infantry." Here the column halted until the 15th.

"On the 10th of October," he continues, "I looked at Meer-dad Khan's fort, about two miles and a half from camp, also the remains of an old building, probably a tope;† breakfasted with Sir A. Burnes, and while with him, heard that Dost Mahomed had arrived in the Ghorebund Valley,

* He says in his Journal, "The utter worthlessness of bullocks on such ground was on this occasion proved. The three mortars and their beds were carried on four carts, each drawn by eight gun bullocks. The poles and yokes were nearly all smashed, and the carts were dragged into camp by the Kohistan Regiment."

† In India the word *tope* is applied to a clump of trees, but in Afghanistan the term is applied to the numerous mounds scattered about the country, which are supposed to be the monuments of kings. Captain Abbott, who was a keen numismatist, and had an excellent collection of coins which cost him 600 rupees, says of these topes in a letter to a friend, from Jellalabad:—"On opening them we find numerous coins, both of copper and silver, bearing in clear Greek characters the names and epithets of the Sovereigns who once ruled over the land. Of Menander the coins are very abundant, and some are very beautifully executed. Those of Antimachus are less numerous, and of Appollodotus the coins are more scarce. Copper coins are more abundant. The city of Nysa is supposed to have existed close to Jellalabad."

which was later confirmed by people who had seen him."

He says in his Journal:—"While we were thus encamped at Chareekar a remarkable execution took place close to the piquets. When Dost Mahomed was in power, a landowner of the Kohistan was murdered by his man-servant, and left two widows, one of whom was childless while the other had a large family. The murderer married the childless woman and shared the property with her. On the appearance of Prince Timour in the Kohistan the other woman complained to him, and insisted on having revenge. There was no evidence to convict the murderer, who however pleaded guilty, and the Prince was obliged to pass sentence of death upon him. He was led to execution close to the British camp, when his hands were tied behind him, and he was ordered to kneel on the ground. The widow, who was furnished with an Afghan knife, rushed at the kneeling man, drove the weapon into his bowels, and then tried to turn it round. The man was writhing in agony for a few moments, but was soon put out of pain by a blow from a sword which struck off his head. The woman then called her children, who dipped their hands in the blood. The body remained on the spot on which it fell, and a

crowd of children covered it with a heap of large stones."

On the 15th the force marched to Karabagh, and Captain Abbott sent to Cabul for his two remaining guns. Two days later Sir R. Sale marched on the fort of Baboo Koosh-gurh, the chief of which, on being ordered to submit to the government of Shah Soojah, had sent an insolent message, that as the British were all day long battering the fort of Julgah and did not get in, he had made every preparation for resistance and would "fight to the last." However, he was not as good as his word, and when the column approached the fort, which was a very strong one, the chief thought discretion the better part of valour, and, swallowing his "prave orts," as Fluellyn would have said, incontinently bolted with his garrison, and the troops took peaceable possession when the fort was destroyed.

While halting here, the camp was attacked at nine p.m., on the 18th of October, by about 1,000 men hidden in the gardens around, but after much expenditure of ammunition, the enemy ceased firing at midnight and retired, having only killed two men and wounded a few, and some horses. During all this fusillade the soldiers were ordered to lie flat

on the ground without returning a shot, as the night was so dark that no object was visible.* "This attack," writes Captain Abbott, "called by the Afghans, 'Shub-Koon,' was the only good instance of the kind that I witnessed. The firing was well maintained for two hours and a half, but the soldiers were ordered to lie down, and the officers only remained on their legs. The assailants had flint locks to their juzails, and, as they had damped their priming and caked it in the pans, it went off like a squib, illuminating their visages at each discharge. The effect was very picturesque on that pitch dark night. A ravine, forty yards in front of the battery, was filled with the enemy, but one round of case gave them a hint to keep down their heads, and they fired too high to do any harm. The Afghans highly prize flint locks,

* Sir W. Macnaghten at Cabul chafed at this delay, and wrote despatches and letters complaining of the dilatoriness of Sir R. Sale, and magnifying every check. He says in a letter to a colleague:—"Burnes and Sale, with nearly 2000 good Infantry are setting down before a fortified position about twenty miles distant, and are afraid to attack it. The enemy made an attack upon them the night before last, killed and wounded some of our people, and got off unscathed. All this is very bad."

because they save slow-match and do not betray the movements of troops in the night."

On the following day, six companies of the 37th Native Infantry and Captain Abbott's two nine-pounders reached camp from Cabul, and, early next morning, he and Captain Sanders,* of the Engineers, escorted by two squadrons of cavalry, 200 infantry, and two 6-pounders, reconnoitred Kardurrah, the people of which had attacked the camp on the night of the 18th. They selected a position for a camp with the right resting on a small fort, while the left extended towards Kardurrah. The camp was moved to this position, and on the 21st, the brigade advanced in battle array at daylight to attack Kardurrah, which, however, the enemy evacuated. The remainder of the day was employed in destroying the place, which was found to be of considerable strength, and on the following morning Sir R. Sale marched southwards. Early on the 29th, an express was received from Lieutenant Maule that his Kohistanees were deserting to Dost Mahomed, and, at noon of the same day, when near Karabagh, intelligence arrived that the Dost had descended from the valley of Nijrow, forty miles north-east

* This very distinguished officer was killed at Maharajpore in 1844.

of Chareekar, and had entered Kohistan at the head of a large force of infantry. The column immediately moved northwards from Meer Musjidi's* fort, over a difficult country, full of ravines, canals, and deep water ruts, to Purwan-Durra, a small valley, through which runs a rapid stream, with several forts scattered on the plain.

Dost Mahomed, whose object was to make a dash on Cabul, without encountering the British force, pursued a course under the hills, and had reached Purwan-Durra, when Sale, crossing the Ghorebund river, headed him back and he retired over the brow of a bluff mountain towards the Punjsheer river. The path, however, was very difficult, and as his cavalry were forced to lead their horses, two squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry, numbering 240 sabres, led by Captains Fraser and Ponsonby, moving at a trot along the base of the hill, appeared certain to intercept him. Seeing the state of affairs,

* Meer Musjidi disappeared in a suspicious manner in the following November, during the investment of the Cabul cantonment by the Afghans, and it was said that he was made away with, a reward having been offered for his head by Captain John Conolly, then representing the Envoy with Shah Soojah in the Bala Hissar; but the charge was never proved, and for the credit of the British name, and the honour of a very distinguished and high-minded young officer, we are glad to discredit the statement.

the Dost descended to the plain, resolved to stake his crown and life on the hazard of the die. Taking off his white '*loonghie*' (turban) from his head, he called to his followers:—"In the name of God and the Prophet fight, drive those Feringhee Kaffirs from the country, or I am a lost man." Accompanied by only eighty troopers, the infantry remaining on the hill, the Dost, with a chivalrous courage worthy his gallant race, rode down to encounter the cavalry, which, having crossed the Purwan river, together with the guns and infantry, was now a mile in advance of them. To the astonishment and horror of all eye-witnesses, when Captains Fraser and Ponsonby led on their squadrons to the charge, the troopers first hung back and then finally fled back to Abbott's guns, leaving the officers to bear the brunt of the charge of Afghan Horse. Dr. Lord, the Political Officer with the force, a man of ability, Lieutenat Broadfoot, of the Engineers, and Lieutenant and Adjutant Crispin, were killed; and Captains Fraser and Ponsonby were severely wounded, while the cowardly troopers suffered more severely than they would have done had they faced the handful of Afghan horse; two Native officers and two men being killed and twenty wounded. Captain Fraser

received a deep cut down his back and his right hand was severed; Captain Ponsonby had a ball through his left arm, the top of his left thumb was cut off, and he received a very severe sabre wound across his face, cutting his right cheek bone, dividing his nose and extending across the left cheek. His sword was nearly cut in two, his reins were severed, his jacket and the cantle of his saddle were cut. His charger, a fine powerful animal, to which he owed his life, as it lashed out fiercely knocking over three Afghans, was shot through the neck, and had both ears severed. The bodies of the three officers were recovered, but they were naked and headless. The two squadrons of the 2nd Cavalry which had disgraced themselves were sent to India and disbanded.

Captain Abbott writes of this disgraceful affair:—"As soon as Sale saw the cavalry advance in pursuit, he asked me whether my horses were fresh, as those of the 6-pounders, which formed part of the advance, were quite done up, and unable to move. I said, 'certainly they were,' when he directed me to send on two guns to support the cavalry who were nearly a mile ahead. I took two guns, and moved forward at a hand gallop, until a deep water-course stopped me. While looking for a place at

which the stream could be crossed, I saw a great many horses rushing back from the front, and soon afterwards, the remains of the two squadrons arrived. They were ordered to the rear, and the guns opened on the enemy, who, however, were so few in number, and in such loose order, that it was useless to fire many shots at them.

"A wing of the 37th Native Infantry advanced, covered by two of my 9-pounders, and carried the key of Dost Mahomed's position, which he abandoned during the night."

Sir Robert Sale says in his despatch—"The flank companies of the 37th Native Infantry and one company of the 29th Native Infantry, supported by two guns from Captain Abbott's battery, and followed by some of the Jaun Bazes, now ascended the hill overlooking the pass and valley of Purwan, which was crowded by the enemy's infantry, and cleared it in brilliant style, the enemy deserting their positions one after the other, and flying in the direction of the Punjshere valley, where they still cover the hill sides in great numbers." But Dost Mahomed had done all that honour required, and he rode straight to Cabul and surrendered his sword to the Envoy, Sir W. Macnaghten, who treated him with generosity, and, on the 12th of

December, sent him, with his family, to India, where he was pensioned until his return to his own country two years later. On the following day (the 3rd of November,) Sir R. Sale moved again to Chareekar, and as, owing to the surrender of Dost Mahomed, all danger for the present at least was over, the column returned to Cabul for the winter.

The following succinct account of the campaign in the Kohistan, by Captain Abbott, would appear to have been written for publication, as he omits all reference to himself.

"On the 24th of September, 1840, a force which included three 9-pounder guns, and the 24-pounder howitzer of No. 6 Field Battery, was sent under Brigadier Sale, to the Kohistan of Cabul. The march was easy, and the troops reached Chareekar on the 29th. The Brigadier made no halt there, but moved on at once to attack Ali Khan, a rebel chief, who held a fort and a village at Tootum-Durra, close to the Ghorebund Pass. The enemy were now driven from all their positions, and the fort, a pretty and quite new one, was destroyed by mines, after which the Brigadier moved back and encamped at Chareekar. Our loss in the attack was numerically speaking very small, but a most

amiable member of our Society, Lieutenant E. Conolly, was amongst the slain. A ball passed through his heart.

"It was reported to Sir A. Burnes, the Political Officer with the force, that a meeting of the rebel chiefs had occurred at Julgah, a fort about sixteen miles north-east of Chareekar, and it was resolved to surprise and capture them if possible. On the 3rd of October, the infantry started early, and were followed at daylight by the artillery and regular cavalry. There was no road at all, and the guns had to cross fields watered by canals and water-courses, which caused great delay and numberless accidents to horses and harness. These difficulties ceased at the end of five miles, after which the pace was rapid, and the guns reached Julgah immediately after the infantry, who, with some Afghan horsemen, had quite surrounded the place. Julgah was a very small fort, immediately above the high bank of the Ghorebund river. A wall, six feet thick at base, and three feet at crest, enclosed an area sixty yards square. The wall was thirty feet high, but had no ditch ; it was flanked by a round tower at each corner, and houses twelve feet high, built against the interior, answered the purpose of a rampart. It was loopholed at a height of three

feet above the roofs of the houses. The towers were solid to the height of twelve feet, above which they were hollow. The gate opened towards the river, and could not be touched by artillery. The plan of attack was to breach a bastion on its eastern side, and to occupy the chambers within it by the aid of ladders, for which the poles of our doolies supplied material. At half-past ten a.m. the guns opened fire, and at twelve had completely opened the bastion at the south-east angle; the Engineer officer, however, wished a portion of curtain adjoining the bastion to be also breached, a mistake which caused the attack to fail. At three p.m., the breach of the curtain appeared to be practicable, and the storming party moved to the assault. They planted the ladders, intending to escalade the bastion on the rubbish of the other breach, where they were worse than useless. No attempt was made to enter the bastion where the men would have been screened from the fire of the enemy within the walls; the storming party was repulsed with loss, and retired. The mortars, which had been sadly delayed by the canals and water-courses, now arrived on the ground, and were used without platforms; a few shells were thrown into the fort, which the enemy abandoned as soon as it

was dark, escaping through the treacherous Afghan horsemen, who allowed them to pass unmolested.

"On the 4th we recovered nearly all the shot that had been used in breaching, and moved to Suh Hadji, in the valley of the Ghorebund river, about three miles below Beghram.

"On the 8th we made an extremely difficult march across the country to Chareekar, damaging all the harness, and breaking nearly all the yokes of the mortar carts, which were drawn by bullocks. Two days later we heard, but did not believe, that Dost Mahomed had entered the Kohistan. On the 11th and 12th these reports were fully confirmed; it appeared, however, that he had scarcely any men with him, and was moving towards Nijrow, a valley north-east of the Kohistan, the chiefs of which were favourable to him.

"On the 15th the force marched to Karabagh, and on the 17th took possession of Baboo-Koosh-Ghur, and encamped amongst gardens and ravines near it.

"On the night of the 18th, at nine o'clock, about 1,000 men occupied the ravines and other cover, and fired into camp until half-past eleven p.m., when having expended their ammunition they retired. Our pickets at first returned the fire, but

were ordered to keep quiet, after which not a sound was heard in camp, save the ghurries striking the hours, the time being given by the quarter-guard of the 13th Light Infantry, and repeated in succession by every corps from the right to the left of the line. The enemy wasted much powder and lead, and killed only two men, a few beasts of various kinds, completely riddling the tents with their balls.

"On the 19th of October, the 37th Native Infantry, and two 9-pounder guns joined from Cabul, and on the 20th, the whole force advanced about four miles and encamped near Kardurrah, a village surrounded by vineyards and enclosures of different kinds. On the 21st we attacked the position, which was abandoned by the enemy. The grapes were quite ripe, and the soldiers carried off as much as they could of that beautiful fruit. The camp now removed to Karabagh, where the Brigadier awaited intelligence of the movements of Dost Mahomed. A portion of the Kohistan Regiment declared for the Dost, who had descended from Nijrow, and appeared to be endeavouring to reach Cabul by a circuitous route, avoiding Sale's force altogether. On the 1st of November, Sale advanced in the direction of Nijrow, and there ascertained that Dost Mahomed was at Purwan-Durra. On

the 2nd of November, the force moved on Purwan-Durra. The whole of the cavalry with the two 6-pounder guns of Shah Soojah's artillery, were in advance, the field battery and the rest of the force followed. The route was difficult, and the 6-pounders caused great delay; at length they fairly stuck on the ascent from the Purwan river, and the cavalry went on without them. Dost Mahomed was seen retreating along the rugged face of a mountain that reached from the Purwan to the Punjsheer river. He had about eighty ill-mounted troopers, who were leading their horses, and 3,000 or 3,500 riflemen on foot. The two squadrons of the 2nd Bengal Cavalry went forward at a good pace over the undulating, but not difficult, ground at the base of the mountain, and it was evident they would reach the Punjsheer river in time to intercept the fugitives. Seeing this, Dost Mahomed descended with his handful of cavalry, who confronted boldly our regular troopers, and made them run. In vain did the English officers set the most gallant example by charging the enemy; they did so almost alone, and the men fled shamefully from the field. As soon as the cavalry advanced, leaving their 6-pounders to be dragged up the steep bank of the Purwan river by working

parties of infantry, the General desired the officer commanding the 9-pounder battery to send on two 9-pounders to replace the sixes. The 9-pounder horses were quite fresh, and the two teams started at a gallop, but the cavalry were a mile ahead, and ere the guns had been five minutes in motion, they met the Native troopers running from the field. The whole battery went to the front, and formed for action, allowing the fugitives to pass to the rear, but the enemy would not face the guns, two of which only were employed, to drive them from the lower spurs of the mountain. Had the force then pushed on, the enemy would have fled like sheep; the cavalry would have followed valiantly, and nothing would have been said of the repulse. As it was, we halted and formed camp, allowing the enemy to hold the heights until night, after which they retired at leisure. Dost Mahomed went straight to Cabul, and gave himself up to the Envoy. The two squadrons of cavalry were afterwards sent to India and disbanded.

"Thus ended the Kohistan campaign of 1840. The troops went into quarters for the winter. The guns, with two teams only of horses, remained at Cabul, the remainder of the cattle being sent to Jellalabad. The new cantonment had been rendered

habitable at Cabul, Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, the 35th Native Infantry, and the battery were quartered in it, and were very comfortable. The season, which was not a very severe one, passed quietly away. Two 8-inch iron mortars, on carriages drawn by teams of good horses, were permanently attached to the battery, and a battering train of six iron 9-pounders was sent from India for the attack of the small forts with which the country abounded."

Captain Abbott passed the winter of 1840-1, in company with the 13th Light Infantry, and 35th Native Infantry, in the new cantonments, where barracks had been built for officers and men.

This cantonment was constructed as a place of residence during peace for the garrison of the citadel of Cabul. Lord Keane intended the upper citadel, or Bala Hissar, to hold his magazines, and the lower citadel to be garrisoned by the troops in case of an insurrection. It was necessary to surround the cantonments by a wall, as scarcely a night passed without some Afghan assassin firing into the camp, but the parapet was a mere mound of earth, with a ditch in front of it. The Shah objected to the occupation of the upper citadel by our troops, because his palace was overlooked from

that position, and the Envoy, acceding to his request in a weak moment, caused all the stores to be turned out in the spring of 1841. The powder was stored in a bastion at an angle of the cantonment, where any mischievous person might have exploded it; the other stores were piled in an orchard within the wall, and the commissariat stores were placed in a fort, outside the cantonment, and to their loss was largely attributable the disasters that befell the British force at Cabul in the winter of 1841.

Captain Abbott gives in a memorandum the following account of the origin of the cantonment and magazine fort at Cabul, which form such prominent features in the tragedy of 1841-42:—

"The proper post for the troops raised for the protection of Shah Soojah's person, in case of a general insurrection, and of their being unable to face them in the field, was the Bala Hissar or Citadel of Cabul.

"The Bala Hissar was an extensive fortress easily defensible against any irregular force. The lower fort contained the palace of the Shah, and the humbler dwellings of many other persons. The upper fort, which was not inhabited, was selected as the site of our magazine, and a better position

could not have been chosen. But the Bala Hissar, though an excellent position for troops standing on the defensive, would have been a most inconvenient abode for them under ordinary circumstances, and it was determined that they should reside in an open cantonment built on the nearest available spot; a strong guard being kept in the Upper Bala Hissar, to secure the magazine against any sudden attack. Shah Soojah offered one of his gardens for the accommodation of the troops, and no objections, on the score of health, being made to the spot, the barracks were built upon it in the course of the year 1840. It was not originally intended that the barracks should be enclosed by even a common wall, but the annoyance sustained by our men from small parties of Afghans, who prowled around the camp, night after night, occasionally shooting a soldier on his post, or in his bed, obliged the General to order that the troops in barracks should be protected against such petty hostilities. The Engineer proposed to surround the barracks by a slight field-work, which was accordingly thrown up. That no other purpose than the above could have been intended by Sir W. Cotton or his Engineer, will be belived when I add, that several Afghans were, at different times,

punished for walking over the parapet, and that in 1841, Captain Younghusband of the 35th Native Infantry, a heavy man, won a bet of two gold mohurs, by riding his pony across the ditch over the parapet, and fairly into the place, without much difficulty. No Engineer officer would have constructed such a work with any view to permanent defence, and no man in his senses would have placed, in such a position, a cantonment intended to be defensible; for, even if all the forts and other buildings around it had been destroyed, there would still have remained two deep canals running parallel and very close to the north-west and south-east faces of the place. These canals could not have been filled up, without ruin to many miles of cultivation which they watered. The heights of Bey-Maroo also, 1,000 yards to the north-west, afforded a position from which the lightest guns could throw their shot into the cantonment. The forts, and the heights, and the numerous gardens, however, afforded most grateful shelter from the cold blasts of a Cabul winter, and the canals were very convenient to our men and cattle.

"It is extremely improbable that General Elphinstone would have defended the cantonment, had all his supplies of ammunition remained in the Bala

Hissar, where Sir W. Cotton left them. They were however ejected in the spring of 1841 by Shah Soojah, in spite of every remonstrance that could be offered by the military authorities. The Shah would not even allow them to remain in the citadel until accommodation could be provided elsewhere, and the whole of the stores left by Lord Keane, together with a large supply taken up by Lieutenant Eyre, in 1841, were thrown down in an orchard in the cantonment. The erection of a magazine thus became absolutely necessary, and the foundation of a small fortified square was laid at a distance of 100 yards from the south-western face of the field-work. The magazine fort was never quite completed, but it became a very useful post during the siege, and the delivery of it into the hands of the Afghans, under the terms of the treaty, placed our troops entirely at their mercy, for it had been purposely built so as to command the whole cantonment.

"The above is a faithful account of the origin of the Cabul cantonment, and of the magazine fort, which figure so conspicuously in Captain Eyre's narrative, an excellent work, which describes in unexaggerated language all that the author intended, or had the means of knowing.

"The particulars which I now offer, are not very generally known, even by persons who were at Cabul in 1840-41, and some undeserved blame has been thrown upon Sir W. Cotton, and the excellent members of his staff, Captains Douglas, Paton, and Sturt, who fell in Afghanistan. The cantonment was not originally intended to be anything more than a large barrack-yard, the residence, during peace, of the garrison allowed to defend the city of Cabul, in case of an insurrection. That it ever became a more important post was owing to a combination of circumstances, for which neither Sir W. Cotton, nor any of his staff, can justly be considered responsible."

The winter of 1840-41 passed without any incident of importance. Sir W. Cotton gave place to Major-General Elphinstone, an amiable officer, but disqualified by physical infirmity, and, still more, by a fatal weakness and indecision of character, for the difficult task of keeping in check the turbulent and warlike people of Afghanistan, who chafed at the restraints imposed on them by British officers, and looked with contempt on the poor tool, Shah Soojah, whom they were told to consider their king. While proceeding up from Peshawur to Cabul, General Elphinstone detached,

on the 21st of February, a column under Brigadier Shelton, of the 44th Regiment, to chastise a refractory tribe in the Nazian valley, called the Sungho Khail, and the task was successfully effected, though with the loss of nine killed and twenty-four wounded, including Lieutenant Pigou, of the Engineers, and Captain Douglas, Assistant-Adjutant-General.

In the spring of 1841, Shah Soojah, accompanied by the Envoy and escorted by troops, returned to Cabul from his winter quarters in Jellalabad. But the quiet and order upon which Sir W. Macnaghten congratulated himself, was that of a volcano before it bursts into fresh activity, and there were not wanting signs to those who had eyes to see, and ears to hear, that denoted a deep feeling of restlessness and hatred of British rule. Major Pottinger, the political agent in the Kohistan, was the only one of Macnaghten's subordinates, who correctly measured the situation; and, in May 1841, he sent warnings to his chief of the state of feeling in his district. But, notwithstanding his great reputation for courage and sagacity, he was regarded in the light of an alarmist, and the optimist view was taken both by Macnaghten, who was in expectation of soon

returning to the provinces, and by his successor-elect, Sir A. Burnes, who had established his residence in the city of Cabul itself.

From motives of economy, the European portion of the troops in Afghanistan had been reduced to a point of dangerous weakness. General Nott's division at Candahar only included one British regiment, the 40th, and the division, whose head-quarters were at Cabul, had but two regiments, the 13th and 44th, of which the former was actually under orders to return to India. There was no European regiment of cavalry, in which arm both divisions were equally deficient, and only one troop of European horse-artillery in each division, though No. 6 Field Battery had proved itself not unworthy by its lengthened and gallant services to rank in efficiency with any battery of European gunners. The Native Infantry of the Cabul division, consisted of the 27th, 35th, 37th, and 54th Regiments, who were to be divided between Cabul, Ghuznee, and Jellalabad; and General Nott, who had the vast country lying to the south and west of the Suffeid Koh, including the garrison towns of Candahar, Quetta, and Khelat-i-Ghilzye, had under his command five regiments, the 2nd, 16th, 38th, 40th, and 43rd Regiments of Bengal Native Infantry.

Besides these troops, there was the Shah's contingent, under General Roberts, which included horse, foot, and artillery, fairly serviceable troops. Such was the military situation, immeasurably weakened by the characters of the leaders at Cabul, in the autumn of 1841, when Sale's brigade was under orders to return to India, and Sir W. Macnaghten was about to take up the high office of Governor of Bombay, to which he had been nominated as a reward for his labours and anxieties during the past three years. The disaffection, caused by dislike for Shah Soojah, who treated the native chiefs with hauteur, and openly manifested his dependence on British bayonets, together with the ill-judged reduction by one-half of the subsidy paid to the Eastern Ghilzye chiefs, since 1839, for keeping the Passes open between Jellalabad and Cabul, brought matters to a crisis, and the year 1841 closed in such disgrace and disaster as had never yet befallen British arms.

In September, 1841, intelligence arrived at Cabul, that Captain Hay, of the Shah's force, had been beaten off when attacking a fort at Zao, in the Zoormut country, and, accordingly, a column was detailed to proceed thither to chastise the refractory chiefs. It was the first time a force of

regular troops had been sent to this part of the country, which was known to be difficult, and Captain Abbott proceeded in command of the artillery detailed for the service, which included four guns of his battery. He writes in his Journal:—"By this time No. 6 Field Battery was in excellent condition. Each gun had twelve good horses for its draught, and six ponies for the carriage of its waggon ammunition. Two 8-inch mortars also, on double platform carts, with teams of twelve horses, had been added to the armament." Captain Abbott had repeatedly written for 18-pounders to be sent from India, for reducing the forts with which the country abounds, but the authorities only sent, besides two 8-inch iron mortars, six iron 9-pounders.

On the 28th of September, 1841, the force,* commanded by Colonel Oliver of the 5th Native Infantry, marched from Cabul, the infantry taking the direct road from Sia Sung, through the Pass by which the Logur river enters the valley of Cabul, and the guns pursuing the more circuitous road by

* Two hundred of Her Majesty's 44th Foot, 5th Native Infantry, Anderson's Horse, 6th Shah's Infantry, Captain Backhouse's mountain-train, four guns of No. 6 Battery, two 8-inch mortars, two iron 9-pounders, three companies of Shah's Sappers.

the city of Cabul and the village of Indikee. At the city of Cabul there is a steep ascent, and the road through the village of Indikee was impracticable, so that the guns had to pass over the steep rocky spur of the hill above the village. The view from this eminence was beautiful. "Orchards, vineyards, and groves covered the whole face of the valley, while innumerable canals and water-courses, which gave life to the vegetation, glittered like veins of silver amid the varied foliage of the trees." The remainder of the march was easy, and camp was pitched beyond the village of Char-Asya, a distance of twelve and a half miles from Sia Sung, but the 9-pounders did not arrive until sunset, having been long delayed by the difficult ascent at Indikee. On the following day the march was to Gomoran, by a good road for a distance of ten miles, with barren hills on the right, and cultivation on the left. The guns then crossed with difficulty the deep canals with muddy bottoms, and forded the Logur river, on the right bank of which were canals, where one of the mortar carts was broken. On the 30th they encamped at Dadhoo Khail. The change of climate now became very sensible, as they had been gradually ascending towards the source of the Logur river. On the 1st of October,

they quitted the valley of the Logur, and proceeded in a south-east direction over dreadful roads, "such as I could not have imagined to exist in Afghanistan," says Abbott, "to the village of Budkao, under a low range of hills."

This day's march covered about ten and a half miles, and that of the following day to Al-timour, thirteen and a quarter miles, for ten of which the road was excellent, crossing stony plains and one stream of water. Then the troops entered the Pass, which was easy as far as the encamping ground. After breakfast, Colonel Oliver and Captain Abbott rode on to examine the Pass, which becomes more difficult at every step, and immediately below its crest, for a distance of 600 yards, is quite impracticable for horses in draught. The road was the bed of a very steep torrent, and ran between rocks some three or four feet in height, over which the wheels of the carriages had to be alternately lifted. Captain Sturt, the Engineer officer—son-in-law of Sir R. Sale, who fell in the retreat from Cabul a few months later—set up his barometer, and found the crest of the Pass to be 9,600 feet in height.

During the 3rd and 4th of October, the guns were dragged over the Pass by 600 Afghans, when

the carriages were much shaken, and some were seriously damaged. He says:—"You may imagine the nature of the road when 100 Afghans were three and a half hours employed in taking each gun over 600 yards. I was out from five a.m. to four p.m." The descent beyond the Pass was easy, and on the evening of the 4th, the brigade encamped in a very bad position, with high rugged hills all around them.

On the 6th of October, they descended the bed of a rivulet to Soork Killa, about eight miles, where the country opens out, and the road enters the Zoormut Valley. Three more miles brought them to the village of Bala Deh, which stands on high ground, and six miles to the south rose the hill on which stood the ancient fort, Ghur-Duz, now a ruin, but having a deep wet ditch, which must have made it almost impregnable to any Afghan force. Captain Abbott, with other officers, rode out eight miles to see the forts of Zao, which had been abandoned by the enemy. The road would have been difficult for guns, owing to a river and some ravines, though the country is open, and the distance from Soork Killa on one side, to Zao on the other side of the valley, is about twelve miles. The soil is fertile and well watered, but imperfectly

cultivated; the villages are few in number and very small, and every field had a round tower for the defence of its owner. Zao itself, the most considerable of them, had a thick wall, and was defended by five small forts. The people had all fled to the hills, which, covered with pine trees, rise immediately behind the village, and as they obstinately refused to submit and acknowledge Shah Soojah, their property was doomed to destruction.

On the 7th, Colonel Oliver marched about eight miles northward, to Gurruck, the residence of robbers, who of course were "not at home." Their forts and smaller towers, intended to protect them, were destroyed, and, on the following day, the column marched five miles to the fort of Khoja Meer, a notorious freebooter, which was also destroyed.

On the 9th, they turned their faces towards Cabul, and, marching eleven and a half miles over very difficult ground encamped at Soork Killa. The next day they crossed the Pass amid a snow storm, with hail and rain, and encamped at Al-Timour. Abbott says, "only one tent was standing, and the ploughed land, in which the camp was pitched, was like a hasty pudding." After a halt of one day

they marched on the 12th, and the Cabul cantonment was reached on the 17th.

Captain Abbott gives the following account of this expedition to Zoormut, in letters to his brother Frederick. The first is dated, "twenty miles south of Cabul, Logur river, the 29th of September, 1841." He says:—

"Yesterday's march of twelve miles brought us to the pretty village of Char Asya. The road was difficult round Cabul, and, at a village half way, so perfectly impracticable, that we were obliged to drag our guns over a high, steep, rocky hill, which caused great delay, and we did not reach camp until half-past twelve o'clock. The heavy rains were out from five a.m. until sunset. The said hill, however, affords the most lovely view I have ever enjoyed. A valley of immense extent is completely covered with orchards and vineyards; numerous forts enlivened the landscape, and the hundreds of streams that give life to the vegetation, reflect the rays of the sun from every spot that is not hidden by the foliage of the trees. Char Asya is a pretty village watered by five 'kahreezes;' but nothing in Afghanistan can equal the valley of the Cabul river as viewed from the village of Indikee, a name of fear to horses and bullocks attached to

guns. This morning we came for six miles over as fine a road as ever I saw in India, and again, after slopping through a few scores of canals near the Logur, have got upon capital ground. The Logur is a nice little stream about forty yards broad and three feet deep, with large shingle for its bed. Captain Hay has been reconnoitring the forts and reports them to be newly repaired, and that their garrisons, which have been increased, all fired on his party. They will probably give us a good deal of trouble as we have no battering guns. I am glad that my repeated applications for 18-pounders are on record—with two such guns I should be certain of success—with 9-pounders I have twice failed, and of course am rather nervous. There is no shelter near the forts, which protect each other, and we shall require regular batteries for the guns, and a trench for the guard. Had we not come on this trip, I should have most likely been sent into Nijrow. There is such misrule here, that the country never can be quiet; people are sent out for the express purpose of getting up rows, and rendering the employment of our troops necessary.

October 1st., Budkao.—Yesterday and-to day's marches of twelve and a half and ten and a half miles, have been over such roads as I could not

have imagined to exist in Afghanistan. Plains of great extent, bounded east and west by rugged hills, are generally barren, but there is abundance of water and in some places the cultivation is considerable. We have just heard of Sir William Macnaghten's nomination to the Government of Bombay. Yesterday storms were raging all round us and the hills were covered with snow, which, however, will not lie at this season. To-day is mild again. The only late news from our front is, that the enemy have sent in petitions to the Shah explaining their conduct and begging pardon. Macnaghten will now be anxious to be off, and to leave all matters here in a quiet state, so I suspect there will be no fighting, and may add that I hope so, for there is no pleasure in seeing people killed, while one runs infinitely greater risk in attacking these paltry places, than would be incurred before an 'Antwerp.' No credit is ever obtained, and the most distinguished service is acknowledged by a few common place words in an "Order," and then forgotten altogether. If Sanders had been wounded at Ghuznee, instead of in an infinitely more dashing affair (as far as his conduct was concerned), he would be a major and C.B. now to a certainty; whereas he has only the scars of his wounds and

periodical pains in consequence of them, to remind him that his most gallant behaviour averted discredit from the British name. Yesterday we reached the entrance of a hill pass, and came two miles up it. A party rode on at two p.m. to inspect the crest, three and a half miles distant. Two and a half miles were tolerable, the ascent gradual and not very stony; but after that, a rocky nullah, very narrow, very steep, and with stones two or three feet high in the middle, conducted us to the crest, up which the road is made, but is so excessively steep that three out of five horses were floored and brought to a standstill, while mine, a very powerful beast, was much distressed. This ascent is about 400 yards long. The heavy guns have gone on this morning, preceded by the sappers, and attended by 800 Afghans to man the drag ropes. The enemy have bolted, and why we should incur all this trouble and damage, I cannot conceive, but the Envoy delights in giving trouble to the troops, and will keep us at this work another month if Elphinstone will allow him. It is horribly cold here at night the altitude being 8,500 feet."

On the 7th of October he continues his letter from Bala-Deh:

"I wrote to you from the other side of the Pass, as soon as we heard that our friends in the forts had bolted. We were two days employed in dragging the guns over the Kothul. The four guns and their two platform waggons were on the road all the first day, and enjoyed a snow storm. Sturt set up his thermometer on the pass and made the altitude 9,600 feet. We are here about thirteen miles from the Kothul and shall have a heavy fall on the way up, though it is nowhere steep. Ghurduz is a remarkable object in this valley, being built on an isolated table-hill, about forty feet above the plain, and having a sort of citadel, or rather the ruins of one, on a natural mound rising twenty or thirty feet higher. This valley is well watered and susceptible of great fertility; but the inhabitants are few in number, and not above half the available land is cultivated annually, the other half remains fallow. The hills are sprinkled with stunted firs, resembling the juniper in foliage. Yesterday I rode to see the forts eight miles distant. The road is much broken and flooded, and we should have had trouble in taking on the guns. The forts are most contemptible; all their gates completely exposed, their towers mere nutshells, and none of them shot proof. In fact resis-

tance would have been madness. The village has a thick wall, but much dilapidated. A few rounds from the 9-pounders would make a nice mess of such pepper-pots. The General will be angry, and with reason, at our having brought the guns over the Pass, after hearing that they were not required. I was not consulted in the matter."

CHAPTER III.

THE DEFENCE OF JELLALABAD.

Revolt of the Eastern Ghilzyes—Forcing the Passes of Jellalabad—The Fighting at Khoord-Cabul and Jugdulluck—The Camp at Gundamuck—Arrival at Jellalabad—Condition of the Defences—The Actions of the 14th of November and 1st of December—The Council of War—The Earthquake of the 19th of February—The Sorties of the 22nd of February and 11th March—The Action of the 7th of April—Arrival of General Pollock's Army.

DURING his absence on this *dour* through the Zoormut Valley, important events had occurred, and still more momentous incidents were on the eve of accomplishment. The storm that so soon was to overtake the devoted Cabul brigade with disaster and death, was already gathering, but Sir William Macnaghten affected to regard it with unconcern, and wrote flippant letters in which, speaking of the revolt of the Eastern Ghilzyes, and

their occupation of the Khoord-Cabul Pass, he talked of "the impudence of the rascals," and anticipating a speedy end to the insurrection, when "the country will be quieter than ever it was," described the name of Shah Soojah as "a tower of strength." Thus his official blindness remained to the last, and he turned a deaf ear to the warnings of Pottinger, who was of opinion that the Kohistanees, headed by Meer Musjidi, had formed a league with the Ghilzyes and Douranees against us.

On the 9th of October, General Elphinstone sent Colonel Monteith to clear the Khoord-Cabul Pass with his regiment, the 35th Native Infantry, a squadron of the 5th Cavalry, a rissalah of Irregular horse, the two guns of Captain Abbott's battery remaining at Cabul, under Lieutenant Dawes, and half of Broadfoot's Sappers. On reaching Boodhak, the first march from the city, Monteith found that the Khoord-Cabul Pass was occupied in force, upon which he halted and sent for reinforcements.

On the night of the 10th, his camp was attacked by the Ghilzyes from the Pass and volunteers from Cabul, and he sustained some loss. Upon receipt of this intelligence, Sir Robert Sale marched on the 11th with the 13th Light Infantry, which, in

company with Monteith's small brigade, cleared the Khoord-Cabul Pass in gallant style, when Sir R. Sale, who, with four other officers, had been wounded, returned with the 13th Light Infantry and Captain Oldfield's squadron of the 5th Cavalry to Boodhak.

Captain Abbott writes to a friend of this affair :—" As the advance guard, consisting of four companies of the 13th and 35th, and my two guns, approached the narrow gorge of the Pass, where a breastwork and turret had been erected, a heavy fire was opened. General Sale was shot in the ankle, and Colonel Dennie, who got command, actually ordered the guns in advance with some sappers. Dawes galloped over the breastwork which had been breached by the stream during the heavy rain of the preceding night. Here three of his horses were shot, and one man got a ball through the leg, and had not the sappers, laying aside their tools, ascended and drove off the enemy, the guns would have been entirely crippled. Meanwhile our infantry ascended the heights, and drove the enemy off. The column now went through, established the 35th and my guns beyond it, and then the 13th returned to Cabul."

Colonel Monteith remained encamped in the

small valley beyond the Khoord-Cabul Pass, with the 35th, Dawes' two guns, and a rissalah of Anderson's horse, our ally, Jan Fishan Khan, remaining on the heights with his force of 200 *juzailchees*. Captain Macgregor, the Political officer, who had accompanied Colonel Oliver's column to Zao, had hastened his return on the requisition of Sir W. Macnaghten, who placed the highest confidence in his ability and discretion, and started to join Monteith's camp, in order to negotiate with Humza Khan and the other Ghilzye chiefs for the restoration of tranquillity.

As some days elapsed without Captain Macgregor making any progress in his negotiations with the insurgents, the Envoy saw that a considerable force, with more guns, would be required to bring them to terms, and only awaited the arrival of Oliver's column to send a strong brigade under Sir R. Sale, with Captain Abbott's battery and Captain Backhouse's mountain-train. Meanwhile the plot was thickening.

The 13th was attacked every night by parties who went out from Cabul, but the 35th Native Infantry, at Khoord-Cabul, were unmolested until the 17th, when, at sunset, a messenger arrived from a Ghilzye chief at Kubber-i-Jubber, giving warning

of his intention to attack the camp in the course of two hours. The promised attack was made at eight p.m., and lasted for about three hours, during which Lieutenant Jenkins and thirteen men were killed, or mortally wounded, and owing to the treachery of some Afghans, supposed to be friendly to Shah Soojah, who were permitted to encamp near the 35th, eighty commissariat camels and much baggage were driven off.

On the 18th of October, Captain Backhouse's mountain-train and the Zoormut detachment of sappers joined Colonel Monteith, and, at noon of the 19th, within twenty-four hours of his return, Captain Abbott, having repaired the damages to his carriages caused by the recent march to Zao, and changed some of his armament, marched in company with the 37th Native Infantry to join Sir R. Sale, with the following guns:—Three brass 9-pounders, one 24-pounder howitzer, two 8-inch and two 5½-inch mortars. At Boodhak, besides the 13th Light Infantry, was one 5½-inch mortar, and on proceeding to Khoord-Cabul with Sir R. Sale on the following day, Captain Abbott's command was increased by his two guns, under Lieutenant Dawes, and Captain Backhouse's mountain-train battery.

The brigade halted at Khoord-Cabul on the 21st, to await the arrival of camels from Cabul, and, next morning, marched to Tezeen in the following order:—Advance guard, under Colonel Monteith: two companies Light Infantry leading, two companies each of the 35th Native Infantry and 37th Native Infantry, two guns, the mountain-train, three companies of the sappers. Main column, under Colonel Dennie: 13th Light Infantry, 35th Native Infantry, 37th Native Infantry, one troop of 5th Cavalry, one rissalah of Anderson's Irregular cavalry, two guns. Rear guard, under Captain Oldfield, 5th Cavalry: one company each of 35th Native Infantry and 37th Native Infantry, two companies sappers, two guns, and one troop of 5th Cavalry.

The march before the column was a long one of no less than sixteen miles, through the tremendous passes of the Huft Kotul, which could be defended by a few resolute men against an army; but, fortunately, no enemy barred their progress until late in the day, when, on entering the valley of Tezeen, the heights in every quarter were found to be occupied by *juzailchees*, while a body of men issued from the gardens and fort of Mohamed Afzul, a large work, and crowned a hill

immediately in rear of the fort. Colonel Monteith halted the advance guard, and the two guns cleared the hill in the course of a few minutes, when the infantry advanced; and, as they ascended, the enemy fell back, endeavouring to lead our men up the heights, but they were held back, and occupied the fort and the lower spurs of the mountains until half-past three p.m., when the advanced parties were recalled.

A little later, as the enemy occupied a position which commanded the ground on which Sir R. Sale had decided to encamp, some companies of the 13th, aided by the guns, advanced to disperse them, but ammunition failing the infantry, some little confusion ensued, and Lieutenant E. King of the 13th, described by Abbott, as "one of the finest young soldiers I ever knew," was killed. "The guns of No. 6 Field Battery, and three of Captain Backhouse's," he adds in his Journal, "were engaged throughout the day in supporting the attacks of the infantry. At sunset I placed my guns with the right flank picquet."

The rear guard, under Captain Oldfield, owing to want of carriage did not reach camp until ten p.m. The enemy withdrew during the night, and occupied positions covering another fort in the

hills. In Mohamed Alzul's fort was found forage enough for two days, but the country around was bare, and the 3,000 cattle of the brigade must have been without any fodder had the enemy destroyed this supply.

On the 23rd of October, Sir R. Sale warned a detachment for service, under Colonel Dennie, against the fort of Khoda Bux Khan, but messages of submission were sent by that chief and his confederates, and Captain Macgregor concluded a treaty whereby the Ghilzyes agreed to supply forage and keep open the road on condition of their former subsidy being restored to them.

On the 24th, the chiefs supplied forage to the starving cattle, and, on the following day, Sir Robert Sale, finding the carriage insufficient for the entire brigade, sent back a column lightly equipped, consisting of the 37th Native Infantry, half of Broadfoot's sappers, and half of Backhouse's mountain-train 3-pounder guns, to Kubber-i-Jubber, where they were directed to await the arrival of the Shah and Envoy on their way to Jellalabad, whence the 37th would accompany him to India. The Assistant Quartermaster-General, Captain J. Paton, accompanied this column in order to select a position from which they could, if

necessary, move on Cabul in one day, the Khoord-Cabul Pass being kept open by our ally, Jan Fishan Khan.

On the 26th, the brigade marched to Seh Baba, Captain Abbott, with four of his guns, being on the advanced guard. The column was followed by the Ghilzyes who made attacks on the baggage and on the rear guard, but the Pass, being wide, they effected little mischief; and the hostages informed the Political Agent that the collision was unavoidable in consequence of the breaking up of the Ghilzye force, the chiefs of which had little control over their followers. The camp was well protected during the night, the enemy firing occasionally; and, on the 27th, the brigade moved on to Kuttur Sung, through a narrow Pass.

On this day, Captain Abbott commanded the advanced guard, but saw no enemy until he nearly reached the summit of the Pass, above Bareek-Aub, when the vedettes were fired on by Ghilzyes, who immediately decamped. He left a company of the 13th, under Captain Wilkinson, at the crest of the Pass, to aid the rear guard, which had to fight throughout the march, inflicting severe loss on the enemy.

While encamped at Kuttur Sung, the General was warned to avoid the gun road through the Peri Durra Pass, as it was occupied by large bodies of the enemy, and to take the route over the hills. The march of the 28th from Kuttur Sung to the Peribagh (in the middle of the Jugdulluck Pass) was very difficult, but, although the Ghilzyes, disappointed of their anticipated booty, crossed the hills and attacked the rear guard, the camping ground was reached with little loss. But hot work was anticipated for the morrow, as throughout the day, the vedettes saw large parties of the enemy going forward to occupy the Jugdulluck Pass, about three miles in length, through which the force would have to march. The camp was pitched in and about a grove of mulberries, and, occasionally, two guns, posted on the steep hill above, fired at parties passing ahead to occupy the narrowest part of the defile. During the day, eighty camels, while foraging, were captured by the enemy, who, however, restored them on receiving 1,300 rupees.

At daylight on the 29th, the Brigade marched, Captain Abbott, with four of his guns, being placed in command of the advanced guard, which moved with strong flanking parties on the heights on either side. They proceeded about three miles before

meeting with serious resistance, and, at length, reached the point selected by the enemy for their stand—being the spot where the Afghans raised the barrier at which the Cabul troops were so remorselessly slaughtered on the succeeding 12th of January, when Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the Shah's troops, Colonel Chambers, of the 5th Cavalry, (Abbott's friend and correspondent), and many brave officers, died sword in hand. At this point, on the right, a stone breast-work, or *sungha*, with a steep ravine in front of it, obstructed the flankers, while large bodies of Ghilzyes held a high and steep hill on the left. This hill our soldiers could not climb, but they took post on the lower spurs of it, and prevented the Afghans from descending to the road. Captain Abbott sent Captain Wilkinson, of the 13th, a very fine officer, through the defile itself, to ascertain whether any barrier existed in advance; but as he found none, Captain Abbott moved on with the remainder of the advanced guard and his guns, and took the rebel defences in reverse, after which he posted parties to protect the baggage. The rear guard was attacked throughout the march, and at one time so furious was the assault by a large body of Afghans, who returned to the rear over the hills, that the column

was thrown into some confusion; the camel drivers abandoned their charges and fled to the front, and the camels, with their loads, were captured by the enemy. The small guard were heavily engaged on the heights, and it was not until Captain Backhouse, with his artillerymen, and Captain Fenwick, with a company of the 13th, showed a steady front that order was restored.

The Brigade reached Soorkhaub ("red river") late in the day, and passed a quiet night; but the losses had been very heavy during the day, thirty-one officers and men being killed, and ninety-one wounded. Captain Abbott says: "The officer killed was Captain Wyndham, 35th Native Infantry. He was lame, and having dismounted to assist a wounded soldier, was cut down by the enemy Lieutenants Holcombe and Rattray, of the 13th Light Infantry, were wounded; the former was one of the best skirmishers of the force. He used a rifle of very large bore, and made wonderfully correct practice with it. Amidst all the confusion that occurred in the Pass, Holcombe was standing, with one sergeant by his side, on the spur of a hill, loading and firing deliberately upon the masses of the enemy, who were scrambling for the abandoned

baggage. The sergeant was equally cool, and they had killed a great many Afghans, when Holcombe received a ball through his leg, and was obliged to retire, which he did unmolested, the enemy being too active in plunder to take any notice of him or his comrade."

On the 30th, the Brigade marched, with little opposition, from Soorkhaub to Gundamuck, a village situated upon table-land some thirty miles west of Jellalabad. Here they found cantoned the Khyber regiment, under Captain Burn; 250 Eusofzye *juzailchees*, under Captain Gerard; 300 Douranee horsemen (*jaunbazes*), under Captain Dawson; and two 6-pounder guns, drawn by bullocks. The Brigade remained in camp at Gundamuck until the 11th of November. Meanwhile terrible events had happened at Cabul, but so blind was Sir W. Macnaghten to the crisis that, on the 1st of November, the day before the outbreak of the insurrection, when Sir A. Burnes and other officers were murdered, we find him writing to Macgregor that he "hoped the business last reported was the expiring effort of the rebels," alluding to the severe fighting at Jugdulluck. To Major Rawlinson, the Political Agent with General Nott, he also wrote on

the same day, which was that fixed for his departure from Cabul, congratulating him on the tranquil aspect of affairs at Candahar.

Sir R. Sale wrote from Gundamuck on the 30th of October, regarding the gallantry displayed by his troops during the arduous march from Cabul: "Since leaving Cabul, they have been kept constantly on the alert by attacks night and day; from the time of their arrival at Tezeen they have invariably bivouacked, and the safety of our positions has only been secured by unremitting labour and throwing up entrenchments, and very severe outpost duty, whilst each succeeding morning has brought its affair with a bold and active enemy, eminently skilful in the species of warfare to which their attempts have been confined, and armed with *juzails*, which have enabled them to annoy us at a range at which they could only be reached by our artillery. I must bear my unequivocal testimony to the gallantry of officers and men on every occasion, and especially in scaling the tremendous heights above Jugdulluck. I beg to express my sense of the highly able assistance which I have received in all our attacks and skirmishes, and throughout the operations, from Colonels Dennie and Monteith, C.B. I have been much pleased with the address

and able arrangements of Captain Abbott, of the Artillery, who has twice commanded the advanced guard; and the exertions of Captain Wade, my brigade-major, and of Captain Havelock, Persian interpreter to General Elphinstone (temporarily attached to me), deserve my warmest commendations."

On the day after Sale's arrival at Gundamuck, Burkut Khan, an influential Ghilzye chief, paid Macgregor a visit, and brought with him two others, Saadad Meer and Sur Boland Khan, who offered their submission. Supplies were abundant, and *thannahs* (posts) for the protection of the road to Cabul were re-established, and matters began to look brighter. But there was one powerful chief who held aloof, and, on the 4th of November, the grass-cutters of Sale's force were attacked by men from Mammoo Khail, a fort situated in a difficult country, some three or four miles from camp, belonging to Afzul Khan Urzebegi, who had arrived from Cabul with orders from the insurgent chiefs to raise all the country against the Feringhees. Captain Macgregor sent a letter to this chief, requiring his presence in camp, but as he did not make his appearance, on the following day a column, including some artillery, under Captain Abbott,

marched against the fort, which was abandoned by the enemy and occupied by the British. A body of Irregular troops was ordered to garrison the fort, and the force returned to camp on the 6th.

After the hard marching and still harder fighting of the past few days, when the men had to be on the *qui vive*, day and night, the troops found the respite, for it was too brief to be called rest, most welcome. The valley of Gundamuck is one of the most beautiful in Afghanistan, and is remarkable for the profusion of the vegetables and fruit with which it abounds. The cantonment in which the Irregular troops, forming part of Shah Soojah's contingent, were quartered, was placed on a table-land, and the brigade pitched its tents close at hand. The utmost care was taken to guard against a surprise in which description of warfare the Afghans are such adepts, but after the recent severe lesson read them in the Passes they were not likely to try the effects of a "shub khoon."

Of the gardens at Mammoo Khail, Captain Abbott writes to a relative in England:—"The gardens and vineyards are of great beauty and extent, and so abundantly do the grapes grow, that during the month of August, while I have been here, they were given to the bullocks to eat. The

trees are most luxuriant and so numerous at the village, that some vines, which are allowed to wander over their branches, form a complete canopy protecting the whole of the force from the rays of the sun. These vines produce but poor grapes, the fine fruit growing in the vineyards, where the vine is cut down to the height of a small gooseberry bush."

He writes from Gundamuck, on the 7th of November: "I took one day only to repair my shattered carriages, and pay my men, and on the 19th, the guns came out to Boodhak at the northern extremity of the Khoord-Cabul Pass. On the 20th, all assembled at the camp of the 35th, and, on the 22nd, we advanced against Tezeen. The march of fifteen miles was clear of an enemy, but we found the heights around the Tezeen valley strongly occupied by *juzailchees*, while a small fort and a large orchard poured forth a host who would not face the troops on the plain, but took post on a steep hill close above the fort. Two shells, which killed seven men on the spot and wounded many others, cleared the brow of the hill, and the troops got up easily, but they had some fighting on the top. By the night, we had the orchard and fort, and as many of the heights as we required to secure

our position. Next day we were about to advance against the superior fort of Tezeen when the enemy sent in a civil message, and as our cattle were starving, we were glad to patch up a peace, when they supplied us with forage, and enabled us to move forward on the 26th. From that day until the 30th, when we reached Gundamuck, we had to fight our way. At the Jugdulluck Pass was the severest affair, and I will give you some account of it. Jugdulluck is an open space in the middle of a long pass. There are two roads by which you may reach it from Cabul, one through the Peri-Durra Pass, where a few children might destroy an army with stones; the other across the mountains, leaving the Peri-Durra about a mile to the left. The latter road, difficult as it was, we preferred, and we saw the inner Pass lined with Ghilzyes, who sat like foul vultures on the heights waiting for their prey. Not a camel of our's, however, entered that Pass, and the enemy then crossed our road and fought the rear guard. Foiled in this attempt, the Ghilzyes went forward and occupied the Pass ahead of us; they were about 1,000 strong, and added to the natural strength of the mountain, by building stone breastworks in commanding positions. At half-past seven of the 29th, we advanced to force the

Pass. I commanded the advanced guard, and my orders were to proceed steadily, securing the heights on either side as I advanced. All went well for two miles, our skirmishers driving the enemy before them, but at half a mile from the crest of the Pass, our people were checked on both sides at the same moment. On the left, a lofty mountain threw down three steep and rugged spurs into the Pass, while above the spurs it rose like a wall, and was fortified by three breastworks, one commanding the other. On the right, a deep chasm presented itself, with a breastwork beyond. After securing the spurs of the hill, the whole column pushed through the Pass, leaving the enemy on the heights checked by our skirmishers, who maintained their position on the lower part of the hill. Thus far, all went on well, but on the too early withdrawal of the people I had sent up, the enemy rushed down in force upon the rear guard. The whole affair cost us 126 men killed and wounded, including four officers, and the rear guard was so much shaken that the column was obliged to countermarch to their succour. We reached Gundamuck on the 30th, and remained there quiet until the 4th, when an attack was made on our grass-cutters by the men of Afzul Khan, one of the Shah's most trusted and indulged officers.

Next day, at two p.m., we marched on his fort, about four miles from camp, by a dreadful road, which was evidently reckoned as an obstacle to delay us all day. The horses, however, worked so well, and the men of the 13th gave such willing assistance, that we reached the fort at four o'clock. The enemy retreated, firing a few shots, and, when two of us went on, we found the fort quite empty. Cauldrons of broth were boiling on the fire, and troughs of dough about to be converted into bread, showing we had been rather sharp on our friends. The fort is a pretty, clean place, about 100 yards square, and surrounded by gardens and vineyards, with streams of clear water running from the hills in its rear, forming as nice a property as I have seen in the country. As rain had been falling for two hours, the men got under shelter, the cavalry and artillery, with an infantry guard, remaining outside. We returned to camp yesterday."

Of the superiority of the enemy's matchlocks, he says: "The long rifles of the Afghans kill at 800 yards, while our musket has not half that range, and we wage a most unequal war with the mountaineers, who never allow us to approach them within musket shot."

On the 6th of November, the day the column re-

turned from Mammoo Khail, rumours first became current that an insurrection had taken place in Cabul; that Sir A. Burnes and other officers had been murdered, and that our troops were besieged in their cantonment. Sir R. Sale immediately moved his camp to the cantonment occupied by the local levies, and precautionary measures were taken to meet the coming storm, anticipations of which not all the soft words of the Ghilzye chiefs could remove. During the night of the 10th of November, a messenger, who had travelled in company with a man who bore a missive for Noureddin Khan, the leader of the *jaunbazes*, from one of the rebel chiefs at the capital, arrived in camp bringing letters for Captain Macgregor from Sir W. Macnaghten, and for Sir R. Sale, from General Elphinstone, dated the 9th inst., peremptorily requiring the immediate return, "at all risks," of the brigade to Cabul.

But Sir Robert Sale declined to adopt a course which, he considered, would involve the destruction of his brigade, and resolved to continue his march on Jellalabad. His determination was bitterly resented by the officers of the Cabul force, who accused him of disobeying orders and abandoning them to their fate. But though, writing after the

event, it is manifest that the combined division could have easily maintained itself at Cabul against any number of Afghans; and that had such officers as Sale, Dennie, Monteith, Abbott, Havelock, and Broadfoot, been at Cabul, Elphinstone and Shelton would never have been permitted to surrender—yet on the whole, the reasons advanced by Sale for not obeying orders appear most cogent. In his reply, written within three days after his arrival at Jellalabad, he represents that, owing to the destruction of his camp equipage, he would have been compelled to abandon his sick and wounded, who now numbered over 300, that there were no depôts of provisions on the route, that his force was too weak to enable him to force the Passes leading to Cabul, which, he was given to understand, were held by hostile tribes, amounting to 30,000 or 40,000 men, and that his ammunition* was insufficient for protracted operations, while by holding Jellalabad he would establish a point on which the Cabul force could retreat.

* Captain Abbott notes in his Journal the following as his stock of ammunition on arriving at Jellalabad: 9-pounder shot 832; case, 76; segment shell, 98; howitzer segment shell, 40; common shell, 40; case, 16; carcasses, 4; 8-inch mortars, 300 shell and 8 light balls; $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch mortars, 385 shell and 18 light balls.

Captain Abbott, speaking of Sale's decision, says in his Journal: "I have no doubt whatever that this decision was a wise one, though persons hostile to the good general have expressed a different opinion. Lady Sale, his daughter, and his son-in-law were at Cabul, and Sir Robert would have gladly joined them, could he have done so without sacrificing his men. There were not two opinions at Cabul as to the sufficiency of the force there to suppress the *émeute* of the 2nd of November, had the General commanding adopted active and vigorous measures, instead of placing himself behind walls and thus encouraging the rebels while he damped the spirits of his own men."

As a further inducement to march on Jellalabad, Abdool Rahman, the governor in the interest of Shah Soojah, wrote urging the advance of the British to occupy the town which the rebels were about to seize. All the owners of hired cattle also carried off their beasts, and the camp-followers were ready to fly towards Peshawur rather than again enter the dreadful Passes.

In pursuance of his resolution, Sale moved on the 11th of November from Gundamuck, towards Jellalabad. The arrangements for the march

were not very good. Orders were sent to the garrison at Mammoo Khail, to retire from Afzool Khan's fort, after destroying it, but the *juzailchees* and *jaunbazes* were directed to stand fast at Gundamuck, and all the tents, baggage, and heavy stores, which could not be moved, owing to the desertion of the Afghan camel-drivers with their cattle, were left under their charge. The garrison, after firing the fort, took post in the orchard, upon which the enemy, assembled on the hills behind Mammoo Khail, descended and attacked the small party, who retired fighting and suffered severe loss.

The *jaunbazes* at Gundamuck were no sooner left to their own devices than they raised the Afghan standard, declared in favour of the Burukzye Sirdars and fired the cantonment, after plundering it of the baggage left under their charge. The Khyberrees, under Captain Burn, remained faithful, and effected their retreat with the loss of both the 6-pounder guns, (which, being drawn by bullocks, could not move quickly), and all their stores, and joined Sir R. Sale at Futtehabad, nearly fourteen miles from Gundamuck, at the entrance of the Jellalabad valley; arriving at midnight, they were mistaken for the enemy, and

were fired on by the sentries, but no harm was done.

The night passed without incident, but at nine a.m., when the brigade was preparing for the march, the enemy were seen crowding the surrounding hills in great masses, conspicuous among them being the *jaunbazes*. The advance guard and main body of the force, moved off quietly and were unmolested, but the rear guard, under Colonel Dennie, were furiously attacked by the villagers of the Jellalabad valley, who all took up arms against the retiring column, mistaking their orderly retreat for panic.

At length, when the rear guard gained the open plain, the cavalry, led by Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne, two very gallant officers, turned and charged in brilliant style, cutting down great numbers and driving the remainder under shelter, whence the infantry dislodged them. The check was not less severe than unexpected, and no further attack was made, though the inhabitants of all the villages mustered with the intention of cutting off baggage and stragglers.

On the 12th of November, the brigade arrived at Jellalabad and encamped under the walls, surrounded by the enemy, who, during the night,

burned the cantonment, consisting of grass huts, lying about a mile eastward of the town, which were erected, in 1840, for the winter quarters of the troops. On the following morning, the artillery and infantry, to the dismay and astonishment of the inhabitants, who expected that the brigade would continue its retreat on Peshawur, entered the town, leaving the cavalry for the present in an enclosed garden close to the walls.

"Our prospects," says Captain Abbott in his Journal, "are rather dismal. The defences of Jellalabad are in a miserable state, and there is cover for an enemy within pistol-shot of the walls in every direction. We have no supplies of food excepting a small store of barley, intended for the horses; we have about 2,060 men to hold a mile and a-half of dilapidated rampart, and the number of sick and wounded are so great, as to render any movement of retreat through the Khyber impossible. This force of 2,060 men is made up as follows:—Her Majesty's 13th Light Infantry, about 700 strong, who are armed with unserviceable flint muskets, which have been condemned by a committee, but were not exchanged because the regiment was on its way to India. More than half the men are recruits who have joined from England during the

summer. The 35th Native Infantry, 750 bayonets, a very efficient regiment, armed with serviceable flint muskets. Broadfoot's sappers, a corps of 150 bold, active men, Afghans, Huzaras, and Hindostanees, armed with fusils, rather loose in discipline, but always foremost in action. Also about 40 men of the Shah's infantry. The cavalry consist of one squadron of 5th Bengal Regulars, 130 men, under Captain Oldfield, and one rissalah of Shah Soojah's contingent, (Irregulars) 90 sabres. The artillery comprises my battery, 120 men, and Captain Backhouse's mountain-train, 60 men. The ordnance are five 9-pounders, one 24-pounder howitzer, three 3-pounders, two 8-inch and three 5½-inch mortars. We have about 200 rounds per gun, and 100 for the howitzer, and the infantry, about 130 rounds per man."

Sir Robert Sale expected to find large supplies of food collected at Jellalabad for the use of the troops waiting there, but there was none, and only a little barley for the horses. As he had no supplies with him, and the enemy, consisting of about 5,000 infantry with 300 cavalry (the *jaun bazes*) surrounded the place, immediate action was necessary. Accordingly, a sortie in force was determined on, and, on the morning of the 14th of

November, Colonel Monteith made a sally with a force of 1,100 men,* supported by two of Abbott's guns, the remainder of the artillery covering the advance from the walls. The sortie was completely successful. Under cover of the guns from the walls, the infantry, issuing from the Cabul gate, advanced upon the enemy, whom they quickly drove back, when the cavalry fell upon them, and the treacherous *jaun bazes* who attempted to cross sabres with Oldfield's and Anderson's troopers, were severely handled; meanwhile the guns kept well to the front, and by the accuracy of their fire, contributed greatly to the success of the day. On the following morning not an Afghan soldier was to be seen.

The important question now arose whether they should hold the town, or only the citadel, which, being of much smaller extent, was more easily defensible. A council of war was convened, which Captain Abbott attended as commandant of artillery, and it was decided to adopt the former course. Of the condition of the defences of Jellalabad at this time, Sir Robert Sale writes in his

* Three hundred of the 13th Light Infantry; 300 of the 35th Native Infantry; 100 Sappers; the whole of the cavalry; and 200 *juzailchees* belonging to the Regiment of Khyberrees.

official report:—"I found the walls in a state which might have justified despair as to the possibility of defending them. The *enceinte* was far too extensive for my small force, embracing a circumference of upwards of 2,300 yards. Its tracing was vicious in the extreme; it had no parapet excepting for a few hundred yards, while there was not more than two or three feet high earth, and rubbish had accumulated to such an extent about the ramparts, that there were roads in various directions across and over them into the country. There was a space of 400 yards together on which none of the garrison could show themselves excepting at one spot; the population within was disaffected, and the whole *enceinte* was surrounded by ruined forts, walls, mosques, tombs, and gardens, from which a fire could be opened on the defenders at twenty and thirty yards."

To place the town in a proper condition of defence, a committee of officers was constituted, of which Captains Abbott and Broadfoot were the leading spirits. The former was appointed commissary of ordnance, and superintended the mounting, in suitable places, of the guns, including some few Afghan pieces, for which he made carriages, and made up ammunition as best he

could from the materials procurable in the neighbourhood.

In his duties as commandant of artillery, Captain Abbott received cheerful and able assistance from Captain Backhouse, of the Shah's artillery, and from his subaltern, Lieutenant Michael Dawes, who proved themselves throughout the siege admirable artillery officers. Both have long since paid the debt of nature, and the Journal of the latter officer, kindly placed at my disposal by a relative, one of the survivors of the retreat from Cabul, breathes throughout the true spirit of a Christian soldier, and is a simple and unaffected record of the events of the defence of Jellalabad.

There being no Engineer officer with the brigade, the duties were undertaken by Captain George Broadfoot, of the Madras Infantry, attached to the Shah's artillery, an officer of rare acquirements, of whom Havelock said that he possessed an uncommon genius for war. It is not too much to say that no professional engineer could have better conducted the duties than this indefatigable and most capable officer.

On the day after the sortie, Sir Robert Sale received cheering accounts from his wife at Cabul, to the effect that they had beaten the enemy and

captured some guns, upon which tidings the General fired a royal salute, but as the event proved, it was an ill-timed act of jubilation. Captain Abbott says in his Journal:—"On this day we commenced work on the defences, and I was able to mount three 9-pounder guns on the left bastion at the Cabul gate, and on the 16th, the right bastion was ready to receive guns. On the 17th, I fixed the armament of the right bastion Cabul gate, at one 9-pounder gun and one howitzer, and that of the left bastion at two 9-pounders. I placed the "Cazi," a brass 16-pounder gun, on a bastion to the south, near the Gosein's garden. Captain Backhouse mounted a 3-pounder mountain-gun on the east face."

Supplies now came in from the surrounding villages, owing greatly to the exertions and influence of Captain Macgregor, who, having no political duties to perform, undertook the post of commissariat officer. On the 19th, the Khyber regiment was disbanded, many of the men having previously deserted, and food being too valuable to maintain any who were not trustworthy.

Again, on the 18th, letters were received from Lady Sale and Captain John Conolly, the former

giving a good account, and the other, a very gloomy one of affairs at Cabul. On this day, Captain Abbott mounted a 9-pounder and two 5½-inch mortars on the north-east bastion, and an 8-inch mortar on the "Cazi's" bastion. He writes in his Journal on the 19th, that orders were again received from Cabul, insisting on the return of the brigade. On this day he placed an 8-inch mortar on the right bastion, and a 5½-inch mortar on the left bastion Cabul gate. On the 20th, they received information that Azeez Khan and Gool Mahomed were about to attack, and a letter came from Mr. P. Mackeson (cousin of the famous Political officer, then British agent at Peshawur) that he was besieged by the Khyberrees in Ali Musjid, and that one of his bastions was blown up. On the 21st, Captain Abbott mounted a 9-pounder gun on the left centre battery on the river face.

Though the enemy had received a severe lesson and made no immediate attack on Jellalabad, the position of its gallant defenders daily became more serious. No news of an advance in force from the British provinces reached to cheer their spirits, while daily fearful rumours of reverses to the Cabul brigade, and scarcely more cheering scraps of authentic information from other parts heralded

the terrible disasters which so soon overtook our ill-fated countrymen.

General Nott could be trusted, with his force and his British tenacity of purpose, to hold his own at Candahar until relief could be despatched through Scinde and the Bolan Pass, but the position of the isolated garrisons at Khelat-i-Ghilzye and Ghuznee was one of extreme anxiety. On the 21st of November they learnt of the destruction of the Chareekar garrison, consisting of the Shah's 4th, or Ghoorka, regiment, and some artillery, when only Major Pottinger, Lieutenant (now Colonel) Houghton,* both severely wounded, and one Ghoorka escaped to the Cabul cantonment.

Next day came news of the evacuation of the post of Pesh Bolak, situated to the east of the Khyber Pass, about twenty-five miles from Jellalabad, and held by a small garrison, consisting of 250 *juzailchees*, under Captain Ferris, and 24 troopers of the 5th Cavalry, under Captain Ponsonby. On the 13th of November they were attacked by 5,000 Shinwarrees and other clansmen, and after spending all their ammunition, on the 16th cut their

* The writer of this work published in a Magazine an account of this memorable siege, and the extraordinary escape of these two officers, from the papers of Colonel Houghton.

way through the enemy and retreated to Lalpoora, the chief of which, Tora Baz Khan, who was friendly to the British, sent them under escort to Peshawur, where they arrived having lost twenty-two killed and twenty-six wounded.

The enemy now began to muster in force again. Supplies had continued to come in freely from the neighbouring villages since the victory of the 14th; but, on the 22nd of November, some of the camels, bringing in grain from the valley beyond the Cabul river, were captured by the Ghilzyes, who, however, were repulsed with loss on the following day, when trying to capture a convoy escorted by Captain (the late General Sir Thomas) Seaton of the 35th Native Infantry.

On the 25th the enemy cut off the canal which supplied the town, and on the following day began to collect in considerable force under Azeez Khan who took up a position two miles west of Jellalabad. A reconnaissance was made on the 28th, which caused the enemy to show themselves, and on the following day, Azeez Khan advanced in force and commenced an attack, firing all day from the ravines and disused buildings around the town, to which, however, no response was made by the English garrison, as Sir Robert Sale was anxious to husband his ammunition.

On the 30th of November the enemy occupied the buildings and broken ground near the north-west angle, and on the 1st of December, emboldened by the inaction of the garrison, the entire Afghan force, about 6,000 strong, advanced and occupied the low ground near the river, whence they kept up a heavy fire at short ranges. To this the General could not submit, and, accordingly, a sally was made at noon, by a column of 800 infantry, 200 cavalry, and two 9-pounder guns, the whole under the command of Colonel Dennie.

Captain Abbott gives the following account of the action of the 1st of December, in a letter to his brother Frederick, written three days later. "On the 23rd of November, the enemy came forward in great force, and their advanced parties were within 350 yards of our walls, when they were recalled and went into quarters two miles distant. On the 1st all moved down as if for a general attack, about 4,000 men, confining themselves to the low broken ground chiefly, near the river. Their skirmishers closed to within twenty yards of the wall, and no one could show his head over the parapet in that part. They even fired through our loopholes, abused us and dared us to come out, so at noon the Cabul gate was thrown

open, and out dashed 800 infantry followed by 200 cavalry and two guns. The enemy were seized with a panic and ran. The cavalry killed almost 100 on the plain to the left; on the right the infantry could not catch the fugitives, but the ground being good I took on my guns at a gallop, and crossed the enemy's columns with a fire that drove them all down to the river. Had the infantry now pushed on, the greater part of Azeez Khan's force would have been destroyed, but Sale halted them. I went on, however, with my guns as far as the head-quarters fort of Azeez Khan, and to the brink of the steep bank that falls into the river's bed, and made some good practice upon the dense masses that crowded the fords. Many were killed, and more drowned by missing the fords in their haste. A peremptory order now came to withdraw, and we returned towards Jellalabad, where the enemy showed some signs of rallying. A small body of horse hovered on our rear at a great distance, but the guns moving back got within 1,400 yards of them, and at that distance a round shot emptied two saddles and forced the whole to retire. Two or three more shot dispersed another party, and Azeez Khan's whole force decamped. Shah Newaz Khan, of Lughman, and

another chief were killed in the cannonade, and over 200 men shared their fate. Supplies are pouring in, and we are quite safe if the authorities in India have done their duty."

On the day after this affair not an enemy was visible, and as usual after a marked success, the country people brought in supplies.

On the 10th of December a letter was received from Captain John Conolly, reporting the severe defeat of the 23rd of November, which practically sealed the fate of the garrison, already reduced to great straits by the loss, early in the siege, of the commissariat fort.

On the 18th of December a letter arrived from Sir W. Macnaghten, saying that the troops had behaved ill and that the military authorities were urging him to come to terms with the Afghan chiefs. This intelligence leaked out and created a feeling of indignation among the garrison, who refused to give it credit. But it was too true, and, on the 23rd of December, the Envoy, who, whatever had been his faults and his mistakes, had protested against negotiations, and urged the military chiefs to renewed action, fell a victim to the treachery of Mahomed Akbar Khan, who, at an interview for the settlement of terms, shot him with his own

hand. Thus fell Sir William Macnaghten, who, notwithstanding a singular want of political foresight, was gifted in no ordinary degree; and as Marshman said of him, "though he was the only civilian at Cabul, he was one of the truest-hearted soldiers in the garrison."

The first authentic intelligence of the crime reached Jellalabad on the 2nd of January, in a letter from Major Pottinger, who had been called to the head of political affairs in this hour of disgrace and disaster. It created a feeling of horror, which deepened into one of consternation, when, at 10 a.m. on the 9th, three sowars arrived from Cabul bearing a sealed letter, dated 29th of December, and signed by Major Pottinger and General Elphinstone, requiring the immediate evacuation of Jellalabad as they had agreed to a convention with Akbar Khan by which the British were to leave the country.

Sir Robert Sale immediately convened a council of war, which was attended by the Political Agent and commandants of corps, and, after full consideration, it was resolved that a reply should be despatched, signed by the Political and Military Chiefs, in which occurs the following passage:—"We have positive information that Mahomed

Akbar Khan has sent a proclamation to all the chiefs in the neighbourhood, urging them to raise their followers for the purpose of intercepting and destroying the force at Jellalabad; under these circumstances, we have deemed it our duty to await a further communication from you, which we desire may point out the security which may be given for our safe march to Peshawur."

For a short period the Khyber Pass was opened for the passage of the dawk, and, on the 26th of December, a party of twenty-five troopers, in the pay of Tora Baz Khan, arrived, each man carrying at his saddle 1,000 rupees, a welcome addition to the garrison money-chest, which had run very low. But now again every day brought some fresh news of disaster.

On the 12th of January, they heard that the Cabul garrison had marched from the cantonment, and, on the following day, a solitary horseman arrived, who revealed in all its horrors the details of the retreat. It was Dr Brydon, who, wounded and exhausted, and carrying in his hand a broken sword, thrilled the hearts of his hearers with the fearful tale, announcing that the Cabul force of 4,500 fighting men and 10,000 camp-followers, had been annihilated, with the exception of some

few officers and soldiers. The army had marched on the 6th of January, their path lit by the conflagration of the cantonment, and, instead of pushing on at all hazards, as the only chance of safety, halted in the snow at Boodhak, thus giving time to the Ghilzyes to occupy the passes and effect their destruction.

On the 8th, the British force commenced to thread the Khoord-Cabul defile where a great slaughter ensued, the 44th and the troop of horse-artillery displaying a courage in facing fearful odds that merited a better fate. But all was in vain, and the remainder of the force, crippled by cold and hunger, and the vain attempt to guard an enormous baggage train and a vast herd of camp-followers, gradually became a disorganised mob. The carnage was fearful at Tezeen and at Jugdulluck, where General Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton, the two senior officers of the force, were retained as hostages by Akbar Khan. Here the European officers and soldiers made a gallant but ineffectual stand. On the evening of the 12th, the remainder pushed on, and at the Jugdulluck Pass found a barrier across their path, where Brigadier Anquetil, commanding the Shah's troops, Colonel Chambers, of the 5th Cavalry, the friend and correspondent of Captain Abbott, and

many other gallant officers and men, fell beneath the knives or *juzails* of the Ghilzyes. Some mounted officers and a party of Europeans managed to get as far as Gundamuck, when they took up a station on a hill; but the end soon came, and they were remorselessly shot down or hacked to pieces by the Afghan butchers. A few officers gained the valley of Jellalabad, but were killed in sight of the walls, and only Dr. Brydon, eluding his pursuers, managed to urge his wretched pony as far as the haven of rest. This officer, who was severely wounded on the head and in other places, fainted directly after his arrival, and on recovering his senses, his first words were, "feed my pony." But the poor animal was too far gone with wounds and fatigue, and it had died. Dr. Brydon told the author's brother (of whose regiment he was Medical officer) that this pony was the property of his Native assistant, who, being wounded and feeling his end near, entreated him to mount the animal and push on for Jellalabad. Brydon did so, and reached the plain in company with a small party of officers, who being all better mounted than he was, pushed on, leaving him in the rear. Seeing the horsemen, a party of villagers killed them, but Brydon, being alone, escaped observation. He was then attacked

by an Afghan horseman who wounded him in the head, the *tulwar* cutting away a bit of his skull, and he owed his life to a copy of Frazer's Magazine, which he had placed in his cap.

Beacons were kept burning all that night, and bugles were sounded three times every half-hour to attract stragglers, but there was no response, for like Sennacherib's Army in Holy Writ, "They were all dead men." The following morning, in the hope of rescuing some of their countrymen, a party of cavalry, accompanied by some officers, anxious for the fate of relatives and friends, patrolled four miles on the Cabul road, when they found three bodies, but no survivors were met with.

On the 23rd of January their worst fears as to relief were confirmed, by the receipt of information of the defeat of Colonel Wild's attempt, made four days before, to force the Khyber—not a surprising result considering that he had no European troops and only four guns, the ricketty carriages of which soon broke down. On this failure, the two Native regiments that held Ali Musjid, being short of provisions, abandoned the fort and cut their way back to Jumrood, with some loss. By this disaster the difficulties of a successful advance were vastly increased, the moral effect produced on the

Sepoys being very depressing. Events seemed to be hastening on the final catastrophe which was to overwhelm the garrison of Jellalabad.

Abbott notes in his Journal on the 14th of January:—"Burkut Khan informs us that he must join the enemy in order to save himself. Abdool Guffoor and the governor of Jellalabad retire for the same reason by Macgregor's desire."

The British garrison at Jellalabad were now thrown on their own resources without hope of relief. The Cabul force had ceased to exist, no help could be looked for from Candahar, the Peshawur relieving column was beaten, and there was no immediate prospect of succour from India, as General Pollock, who was marching through the Punjaub with reinforcements, could not move forward without cavalry and guns. Meanwhile Akbar Khan and the whole armed might of Afghanistan were free to make an onslaught upon them. Like the Thane of Cawdor, the Commandant of Jellalabad might have said:—

> "They have tied me to a stake; I cannot fly
> But bear-like, I must fight the course."

Every precaution was taken for the coming storm. All Afghans, including Captain Ferris's *juzailchees*,

were turned out of the town, and Sir Robert Sale commenced arming the camp-followers with pikes, which Captain Abbott set about making,* and foraging parties were sent out to collect a store of wood and grass for the cattle.

Captain Abbott suggested, in an official letter to the General, that a breach should be made in the curtains of the forts near the town, to prevent their being occupied by the enemy in the approaching investment, and that the bulrushes should be burnt to prevent their finding means to hut themselves during the winter, and also that a store of wood should be laid in from the *topes* near the town—all of which proposals were carried into effect.

On the 26th of January, an important dispatch was received from Shah Soojah, requiring the immediate abandonment of Jellalabad, according to the terms of the treaty.

Sir Robert Sale and Captain Macgregor immediately convened a council of war, consisting of the commandants of corps, to consider the nature and terms of the reply. The meeting was attended by Colonel Dennie, 13th Light Infantry; Colonel

* He writes in his Journal that, by the 20th, he had completed 100 pikes for his own camp-followers, and was busy making "pebble-grape" for close action.

Monteith, 35th Native Infantry; Captain Oldfield, commanding the cavalry; Captain Abbott, commanding the artillery; Captain Backhouse, commanding the Shah's artillery; and Captain Broadfoot, commanding the sappers and miners. The military and political chiefs laid their proposals before the council, which were to the following effect. That as the Shah, for whom they held Afghanistan, required them to abandon the country, and their remaining was of no service either to the Government, or to the Candahar force, who would retire on Scinde, or to the prisoners in Akbar's hands, they should be consulting the best interests of all parties by treating with the Shah for the evacuation of Jellalabad. There was much heated discussion on this proposal, and eventually, the council, on the motion of Captain Broadfoot, a man of fiery courage and iron will, adjourned to the following day. Again the question was argued with much warmth, and at length the terms of the capitulation, as set forth in the letter drafted by Sale and Macgregor, with the exception of a clause giving hostages, were carried, only Captains Broadfoot, Oldfield, and Backhouse, voting in the minority.

Captain Abbott writes in his Journal :—" The council met at ten a.m. and decided on replying

that as His Majesty no longer required the services of the British Army, he had only to give them a formal discharge as well as certain security that they should not be molested on the march. Sale and Macgregor were forced to reply thus, because a flat refusal would have caused the immediate execution of the hostages; but they required terms which Shah Soojah could not possibly grant, their object being merely to gain time and avoid doing anything decisive until the orders of Government might be received. Amongst other securities insisted on, was the surrender of Akbar Khan, to be held as an hostage by us until we arrived at Peshawur. This alone was sure to make the negotiations ineffectual, as there was no chance that Akbar, after having so foully murdered the Envoy, would place himself in the hands of the British."*

The letter was despatched to Shah Soojah, and on the 8th of February, a cossid arrived from

* On the 16th February, Captain Abbott makes an entry in his Journal: "Heard to-day that the despatch from Cabul stated regret at their inability to give us the securities demanded, owing to the disobedience of Akbar. The Shah wrote asking us to express *bona fide* our intentions, and offering to send Futteh Jung to escort us to Peshawur if we were desirous of going thither."

Cabul bringing the Shah's reply, which was not an actual acceptance of the terms, and calling upon the chief officers to affix their seals. The council was, accordingly, again convened on the 12th of February, when Captain Broadfoot, profiting by the tenour of the Shah's letter, moved a reply to the effect, that as their proposed terms had neither been rejected nor accepted, they were liberated from their objections, and that the Shah should be referred for a reply to the Governor-General. This letter, as also another, couched in more temperate terms, was rejected by the council, Sir Robert Sale vehemently denouncing the tactics of the opposition, and the council adjourned. An hour later the members reassembled, but a change had come over the opinions of some of those who had formed the majority. Colonel Dennie and Captain Abbott determined to oppose any evacuation, and Colonel Monteith brought forward a draft letter, expressing disinclination to negotiate, which, after some discussion, was adopted by the council.

A sense of relief was felt by the members of the council on the settlement of this matter. On the following day, the wisdom no less than the patriotism of the course they had adopted, became manifest, by the receipt of a letter from Mackeson,

stating that Pollock had arrived at Peshawur on the 5th of February, and that large reinforcements, including British cavalry and artillery, were making forced marches through the Punjaub, but, he added, that if desired, he could *purchase* their safe retreat from Jellalabad.

Captain Abbott writes to his brother Frederick, under date of the 23rd of December, 1841, of the state of affairs at Cabul, and there can be no doubt that had the troops not been mismanaged, and all enterprise departed from the councils of the military leaders, the brief gleam of success that shone on our arms in the affair of the 13th of November, if followed up, might have been the precursor of their deliverance: "We are all under extreme anxiety regarding the troops at Cabul. Our last letter thence was dated the 9th, when the cantonment people had only three days' supply remaining. The troops were completely paralysed, and some of them had misbehaved. This news came from the Envoy and Lady Sale on the 10th. Next day, we received a letter from our doubtful friend, Burkut Khan, saying that on the 13th we had gained a victory, and that the Douranees had gone over to the King, while Mahomed Akbar Khan had sought the protection of the Envoy. The

Urzebegi's son had certainly (on the receipt of a letter from his father) broken up a force of 1,500 men collected at Futtehabad, and had gone off, and this gave us some hope that there was truth in the report. After this, various people brought in reports of peace at Cabul, but none seemed to know on what terms. Yesterday the old story of a capitulation, or convention (or whatever the disgraceful act may be called), was revived. A chief at Bala Bagh received from his father at Cabul (Osman Khan, one of the most active of the rebels there) a letter, saying he had acceded to the terms of the enemy, and that hostages had been given on both sides, Mahomed Akbar Khan himself being made over to us to see our troops safe to Jumrood. This letter is said to be of the 17th or 18th, eight or nine days later than the Envoy's last received. It enters into various details as to the commissioners appointed to proceed to Ghuznee and Candahar to settle matters there. But all the names given are Barukzyes, which is very suspicious, and I suspect that the writer is premature in saying the terms had been accepted. The reinforcements from India are taking their time, I think. With one more regiment and a little more ammunition, Jellalabad would defy an Afghan force for two months. But the Cabul

arrangements would place our heavy artillery in the enemy's hands. We have some croakers amongst us also, who do much mischief in the lines. Old Dennie's face is enough to alarm a whole regiment. If the men do their duty, we cannot be touched here; the troops that dare not storm the miserable cantonment at Cabul will never attempt the walls of Jellalabad. With regard to the convention, I do not think the Envoy has power to make it, and I doubt whether the Government would ratify it. Whatever may be the result of this war, it is evident that we must retire eventually from the country, after the unmistakable display of popular feeling towards us. It were injustice to our troops to allow less than double the present force to remain, and even that would require strong fortresses at all its stations. The expense cannot be borne, and I really think by restoring Dost Mahomed, and affording him a small pecuniary assistance, we should more effectually establish a barrier against Russia than our own eminently expensive armament could afford. But if we get out of this scrape, we must punish all offenders, before any new line of policy can be adopted. Amongst the troops ordered to reinforce us, we hear nothing of cavalry, probably because a prejudice exists on account of a regiment

requiring so much commissariat carriage. Now we are much in need of good cavalry to face that of the Afghans. Khan Kureem Khan, chief of the Kuzzilbashes, has 200 most splendid sowars, and the retainers of other chiefs are nearly as good. Altogether they bring 6,000 into the field, and thus have had a superiority over our people in all their contests of late. Our handful of troopers have been of vital service to us here, and the people stand in great need of them and of the guns. Two o'clock having passed without any news whatever, I will close this for the post.

"P.S.—A Cossid from Cabul says provisions were very scarce in cantonments, and atta four seers per rupee in the Bala Hissar. That the Cabulees withdrew at night, and only invested the place by day—in fact, that there was little fighting. If common precautions had been observed as to supplies, all would have been right; nothing could have been more disgraceful than the inattention of the military authorities to these points. There was not a seer of atta in cantonments, save in regimental bazaars, last year, and I suppose the case was the same this season. The commissariat store-rooms were in a little fort half a mile from cantonments, and garrisoned by twenty Sepoys, but

Mainwaring says little grain was collected there. This fort, of course, fell into the enemy's hands the moment the insurrection broke out."

"Christmas Day.—Some Hindoos arrived last night from Cabul in eleven days, and say they left the people *in statu quo*—not much fighting, and all at long shots. Another Hindoo got a letter from Cabul, saying that all the chiefs had made peace with the Envoy, who was on his way down to Jellalabad. I give you these as specimens of the rumours that reach us—we believe none of them. This is the eighth day since I wrote, and my letter must go to dawk at three p.m. We are all holding up our hands at hearing that more horse-artillery are being sent here. Nothing short of the breaking down of all the troops will convince our commander-in-chief that the arm is unfit for service in this country. We hear also of three 9-pounders from Ferozepore; these we shall, however, be able to horse and turn to good account. Ponsonby writes (19th) from Peshawur, that the leading corps of the reinforcements were supposed to be near the Attock, but that Gholab Singh had broken up the bridge of boats. If matters are really settled at Cabul, we ought to employ our force in subduing the Punjaub, and we might take as many Afghans

as we pleased against the scoundrel Sikhs. They refused us the contingent they are bound to supply, and peace really is at an end whenever we find it convenient."

To a relative in England he writes on the 1st of January :—" The reports from Cabul are of the most dismal nature; our troops seem to have given up fighting, and now there is nothing but negotiation, which will never answer with such villains as they have to deal with. Our latest letter is dated the 9th, and we received it on the 18th. The country is so covered with snow, that the travellers are obliged to follow the beaten track which is easily watched by the enemy. I will not give you all the horrible reports we have from the Afghans, all we are sure of is, that on the 9th of December our men had only three days' food remaining, and must have obtained supplies on some terms, or else have been starved. That there was some convention is certain, for our enemies here all vanished on the 18th. However, we did not miss them, for they had not ventured within twelve miles since the sortie of the 1st of December. Our reinforcements were at Peshawur on the 28th, and ought to be here in three or four days more. We shall then be near 7,000 strong, with a good fort,

and plenty of cash and supplies. If the Cabul force should be annihilated before the season may arrive at which the road will be passable by an army, we shall have a great deal of work to do; but our means will be considerable, and we may fairly calculate on being able to move hence with 10,000 men, while an equally strong division will advance from Candahar. There seems to be no doubt that Sir William Macnaghten has been murdered at a conference to which Mahomed Akbar had invited him, and if the Afghan tale be true, our troops must have agreed to leave the country. But they must not calculate upon assistance from this quarter, for the road is covered by snow, and troops cannot traverse the 100 miles that intervene. The three regiments that marched from Candahar in the middle of November, by order of General Elphinstone, could not advance beyond Ghuznee, and the other two returned to Khelat-i-Ghilzye and Candahar. This is a vile place for politicals; they are the only people who never hear the truth. Every private in the service knew that the whole country was hostile to us. Many of our men received notice that our departure from Cabul would be the signal for an insurrection. But no one ever told the Envoy this, nor would he have

given credit to such a piece of information. It seems in this country to be a rule "never to tell a great man anything but good news." I lose about 4,000 rupees worth of property at Cabul, if all goes wrong there. My house, tent, guns, books, &c., and my coins,* (which alone cost 600 rupees) are all there; here I have just a few things absolutely necessary for service in camp."

"January 3rd. All doubt of the Envoy's murder was yesterday removed by a letter from Major Pottinger announcing the fact. He gives no particulars save that Captain Trever was killed at the same time, and Captains Lawrence and Mackenzie seized and carried off. Notwithstanding this treachery, the General still insisted on negotiation. A letter from Mahomed Akbar to the chiefs of this valley, urging them to rise, was also intercepted, and we may perhaps have another affair similar to those of the 14th of November and 1st of December, which will do us all the good possible. The regiments from India are moving at a snail's pace, and will suffer for their backwardness. Had they done their best to succour us, they would have found the whole country quiet from the effect of our victory, and the supposed

* These were saved by a friend at the sack of the cantonment.

peace at Cabul. Now they will certainly be much annoyed, for in this country any number of armed men may be collected at a day's notice, and though contemptible individually, and indeed collectively, will be able to annoy greatly a convoy of some thousands of camels. You may all be easy about my present safety. Jellalabad cannot be touched by an Afghan army even garrisoned as it now is, and when we do advance, we shall, I think, do so in irresistible force, for our whole Indian Empire would be shaken were this army to meet with a reverse."

On the 30th of January, a foraging party succeeded in capturing 175 bullocks, and, on the following day, the cavalry made a raid on the enemy's flocks and drove off 734 sheep, forming a welcome addition to the stock of provisions.

On the 1st of February, Captain Abbott notes that on counting the stock of ammunition in depot, he found it to consist of 18,000 rounds of musket and 4,000 rounds of fusil cartridges. The reserve ammunition was served out, 7,000 rounds of musket and 2,175 rounds of fusil cartridges, to each of the two infantry regiments, and 4,980 rounds to the artillery, who were armed with muskets, borrowed from the 35th Native Infantry. Mean-

time, Abbott was busily engaged making carriages for the Afghan guns found in the town, increasing the defensive power of the works, and manufacturing "pebble grape."

On the 15th of February, Akbar Khan's camp could be seen bearing a little north of west, and distant about ten miles, and some of his horsemen approached within two miles of the walls.

On the 18th, a letter was received from Major Leach at Khelat-i-Ghilzye, saying that the Candahar force was ready to march on Cabul as soon as the weather permitted, and that the garrisons of Khelat-i-Ghilzye, under Craigie, and Ghuznee, under Colonel Palmer, still held out. Sir Robert Sale also heard from General Pollock, who begged him to hold out for a month or six weeks, as a large force was marching from Ferozepore, and on the following day, a letter arrived from Government expressing approval of the retention of Jellalabad, the first intimation Sale had received that his conduct was approved of. On this day, Abbott notes that 300 of the camp-followers were armed with pikes, the remaining 700 being unarmed.

Writing from Jellalabad to a relative in England, under date of the 18th of January, Captain Abbott

gives a graphic account of the destruction of the Cabul force, and of their position, which is of special interest as giving an accurate and sober record of these events as they were regarded at the time by the Jellalabad garrison :—" This will be a Journal carried on from date to date until an opportunity may offer for its despatch, and perhaps it may prove more interesting than any former letters, for the events to be recorded already exceed in horror anything that the history of British India can exhibit.

" On the 9th instant, three horsemen arrived bearing a mandate, signed by General Elphinstone and Major Pottinger, for this garrison to retire to Peshawur. The date, however, showed that the document had been kept back for some purpose or other, and we knew that Mahomed Akbar had been issuing circulars calling on all the country to rise and destroy us. General Sale refused to retire, and sent one of the proclamations in question to the General at Cabul. We were in hopes this would have stopped the Cabul force, because the general order to march said that 'they would not march from Cabul until Sale's reply should arrive,' but we were soon undeceived by the arrival of letters saying that they were positively to

march on the 5th. Sturt, Sale's son-in-law, a very fine young fellow, (a son of the Blackheath family) wrote to this effect: — 'Dissensions run high amongst the rebels. The Shah's party gains ground, and must succeed, and yet we march to-morrow!!! We shall have a fight—but courage! Man will not help us—God only can!'

"On the 6th instant, General Elphinstone moved out of cantonments, and guided by Akbar, encamped only three miles distant in six inches of snow. The populace entered and burned cantonments immediately; they fired on the rear guard, and took away string after string of camels, unresisted. Such was the commencement of the march! The second march of four miles brought the column to the entrance of the Khoord-Cabul Pass, where they were stopped, and again encamped in the snow. The third march was through the Khoord-Cabul Pass. The enemy disputed the passage, but the troops crowned the heights and freed the Pass, though with great loss. Sturt was killed, with some others, and many were left behind to be murdered. At a little Pass, further on, where the troops neglected to secure the heights, there was a check, and Mahomed Akbar persuaded General Elphinstone to surrender the ladies.

The Sepoys were quite helpless, and, after five nights' exposure to cold could not fight.

"On the Huft-Kothul, only twenty-eight miles from Cabul, nearly all the Native Infantry was destroyed unresistingly. After this the column pushed on more rapidly, and reached Jugdulluck, where the men halted for a day under the fire of the surrounding hills. Here Mahomed Akbar received notice of our refusal to quit Jellalabad, and here he found himself strong enough to avow his treachery. He detained General Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton. The former, however, was able to send a note, saying, 'March to-night at all risks for there is treachery.'

"At about seven p.m. of the 12th of January the column started; they found the road barricaded with felled trees, but met no enemy until they were near the summit, when the rear of the 44th was furiously attacked. The men got into confusion and fired in the air, scrambling forward as fast as they could to clear the Pass. All was here lost. Many officers reached the Jellalabad valley, but the ride of fifty miles had exhausted their horses, and they were all but one destroyed. The one fugitive, a Dr. Brydon, arrived about noon

on the 13th, on a wretched pony, wounded, and with his sword broken.

"Next morning, the cavalry patrolled four miles on the Cabul road, and brought in three bodies, believed to be those of Dr. Harpur, Captain Hopkins, and Lieutenant Collyer, but the features could not be distinguished. General Elphinstone and Brigadier Shelton, with all the ladies, and three European women, have been taken to Lughman, to the strong fort of Mahomed Shah Khan, Ghilzye. The above is a detail of the greatest calamity that has ever befallen a British force in India, where the catastrophe will cause a greater sensation than it has amongst us, as the men, accustomed as we have been to horrors of all sorts, are not easily excited.

"We shall have hard work to defend our position with so few troops, and have sent out all our Afghans, even including the *juzailchees*, who have hitherto fought well, but of whom some have been tampered with by the enemy. Our strength is about 2,060 soldiers, and about 500 camp-followers. Of the Cabul calamity, it may be said that it has been occasioned entirely by the inefficiency of the General who mismanaged the troops from the first, and ended by allowing

himself to be led from one trap to another until his force was destroyed.

"Mahomed Akbar, you will observe, (1) kept our people close to Cabul for two days, because he knew that until the populace had plundered cantonments they would not come out to annoy the retreating. (2) By making short marches he kept the men five nights, at altitudes 6,500 to 8,000 feet, where the cold completely crippled them. (3) He arranged so as to have a fresh enemy ready in each Pass to annoy the troops, and until he had destroyed all but 300 men, his wretched victim did not become sensible of the treachery that was practised. The surrender of the ladies in the Khoord-Cabul Pass, early in the retreat, was the immediate cause of the disorganization of the troops. A note has just been received from Lieutenant Souter, of the 44th, from Gundamuck, saying that the remains of his regiment were destroyed in a sanguinary fight about six days ago, and that he fears no other officer has survived it. That he himself is wounded and stripped, and will be murdered unless 1,000 rupees be sent as his ransom. Another letter, signed C. Griffiths, Major 37th Native Infantry, has come to hand asking the same sum. A letter from the Khyberrees to

Mahomed Akbar complains of his not assisting them, and says that the Feringhees are in great force, and that General Avitabile is sending all the Sikhs to assist them !"

Gradually, the horrible details of the sanguinary events of the second week in January came to light by the statements of the few survivors, or the letters of the captives confined in a fort near a neighbouring valley. Nothing could exceed the impressions of horror and indignation that filled the minds and nerved the hearts of the Jellalabad garrison as the direful story was revealed to them, of the relentless massacre of their countrymen on the bleak hill-sides and sunless gorges of the Passes between Cabul and Gundamuck. It was felt that no terms could be expected and no conditions be accepted at the hands of a foe who violated all the principles of good faith with an audacity exceeding even the bounds of Afghan treachery.

Continuing his letter on the 20th of January, Captain Abbott says :—" A letter from a Lughman chief received this morning says that the ladies are all there in a fort of Mahomed Shah Khan, Ghilzye, and are well treated; that eleven officers, five or six Europeans. and three women, are also

there, and that Mahomed Akbar is intending to attack us after the 'Ead' (to-morrow), but has no great force as yet, and only three guns taken from the Cabul force.

"January 20th. Yesterday two natives, escaped from the massacre of the Cabul force, arrived here, one a risseldar of Anderson's horse, and the other an officer's servant. They only add to our former store of information, by detailing the names of officers and men whom they saw killed. Burkut Khan, a friendly Ghilzye, writes, begging us not to put any faith in Mahomed Akbar, and on no account to quit the fortress. He cautions us against the *juzailchees*, whom we, however, had turned out the evening before his advice reached us. We are endeavouring to form a corps of armed camp-followers, but the difficulty lies in finding arms. I have 100 good stout men whom I am arming with pikes, a really formidable weapon anywhere, having a staff six feet long, with eight inches of iron head, as sharp as a needle. My forge and carpenters make up twenty per diem. The arrival of the risseldar has done good. He tells the men that the enemy at Cabul were very contemptible, and never dared approach the cantonment unless under cover. He says that nothing but cruel mis-

management caused any difficulty at all, but that at Cabul, all was terror on the part of the Envoy and General from the very first, and the men lost confidence when they saw the inefficiency of their superiors.

"January 25th. We are now in a nice dilemma. Colonel Wild, after delaying at Peshawur, and losing the opportunity of coming on unopposed, took a sudden freak of dividing his force. Two regiments came on one night to Ali Musjid without meeting an enemy, but the remainder of the force, on attempting to follow, was repulsed, with 120 killed and wounded. The repulse was owing partly to the vile Sikh guns which broke down at the first round, partly to the viler Sikh regiments which ran away without firing at all, and partly to the want of spirit in our own troops. The moral effect of this will be so bad for us, both as encouraging our enemies and alarming our own troops, that I do not think General Pollock ought to advance with less than 10,000 men to force the Khyber. Those who have seen the Pass, declare it is not worse than many parts of the road between this and Cabul, all of which we forced in October last. I have an interesting letter in French, from War-

burton, one of my old subs of the camel battery, who is a hostage at Cabul."

The following is a copy of the letter, dated 16th of January, which is so interesting that we give it almost *in extenso*, merely premising that the gallant writer, the late Colonel Warburton, only died a few months ago :—

"I have been very anxious to know how all goes on with you, and how and where your force is quartered. You have no doubt heard of the sad events which have taken place here, how the Envoy was brutally assassinated by Mahomed Akbar, on the 23rd ultimo, at an interview near the river. After that, the General and Pottinger made a treaty with the chiefs, by the terms of which our troops were to march to Jellalabad without opposition. They were, however, delayed from day to day until the 6th, when the troops quitted cantonments, (which were immediately pillaged) and reached with ease their first camp at Boodhak, though their rear-guard had to fight the whole way. Mahomed Akbar while at Cabul, swore that he would not allow a single officer or lady to escape from his hands. We did all in our power to let the General know this, but were unable to do so. On the next day, we heard that Pottinger,

Lawrence, and Mackenzie had been given to Mahomed Akbar as security for the Jellalabad force having marched before the Cabul force should reach Jellalabad. Akbar said that, for this reason, he wished the Cabul force to halt at Tezeen. It was a mere pretence to give him time for the assembly of people in the Passes to attack the retreating force. These attacks were made all the way from Cabul to Jugdulluck, at which place the force was finally destroyed. A letter was received at Boodhak, by Pottinger, informing him that Mahomed Akbar had sworn to destroy the Feringhees, and to gain possession of their ladies. I told poor Sturt that he would probably act thus, but had no idea that he would so fully succeed. I hope that the authorities at Jellalabad will not be deceived by him. I forewarn you that nothing is too villainous for him. No oath can bind him. He will stick at nothing. Macgregor is not a man to be readily deceived, and I hope that he or whoever is your head, will not trust to such a scoundrel as he is. Our Sepoys return to Cabul in great numbers, in a sad state from cold. The camp-followers are sold in the bazaar for one rupee each. The daughter of an officer (I believe Anderson's) has been brought into the city. We are trying to

obtain the child, and hope to succeed, as the Nawaub has sworn to get her for us.* I believe him because he is a good man, and although made King, has done all in his power to give matters a turn in our favour. He is a weak man, and was forced to become King, and at present he is our friend, but I believe he has no head-piece. Ameenoolah Khan is a scoundrel, whom I hope to see hanged. The politics of this place are extraordinary. The Nawaub and principal men here have made terms with Shah Soojah, to the effect that he shall be king, with the Nawaub as prime minister, and Ameenoolah Khan, chief of affairs. It was proposed at one of the councils that the King should kill two of us, in order to establish a feud between him and our Government. The terms on which he was to be king were:—The payment of 300,000 rupees, to give up all his partisans and all his guns, and to take no share in the management of the State or of the Army. The King is playing a good game. He gains power daily, and has sent to-day to assure us that he will soon entrap them all. There is no govern-

* This child, aged four, which was carried off by the Ghilzyes at Khoord-Cabul, was afterwards rescued by Zemaun Khan, generally known as "the Good Nawaub."

ment, every man is king in his own house. The cantonment was pillaged and totally destroyed, your house among the rest. I have saved your books, gun, *juzail*, and one table. I hope one day to see Cabul like the cantonments, not one brick upon another. A letter has been received from the Khyber from Alla-dad Khan, (son of Khan Bahadoor Khan) by the Nawaub, saying that four regiments have arrived at Peshawur, and 4,000 Sikhs at Jumrood, and begging him to send against you an army headed by some chief of note. I hope that no terms will be granted to these rascals. I do not think that an army can arrive at Cabul without fighting, for the Afghans have gained courage since our soldiers have been defeated, and they have secured pillage. One of my friends has promised to send this letter as far as Jellalabad. His name is Taj Mahomed Khan, a man in whom I can place confidence, and he tells me that he will send letters for us to any quarter. The Nawaub has gone to-day to pay his respects to the King, together with the other notables. If you write, do so in French, or in the Greek character. If you write in French, write the proper names in Greek. There are people stationed to intercept letters."

Captain Abbott continues his letter, under date 26th of January:—"Yesterday letters came from ladies and officers at Lughman, asking for clothes and all sorts of things which the wardrobe of a bachelor is rather deficient in. Our people are beginning to be discouraged here, I mean the officers, and there are not wanting those who advise a retreat to Lalpoora. I, however, trust that until Government avow their intention of not assisting us, we shall not quit the very important position we now hold. We could, I think, hold out for a long time against a large Afghan force.

"January 29th. A council of war was held yesterday to consider the reply to be given to a letter from Shah Soojah, inquiring whether we intend to quit the country. We were, of course, indulged with a sight of all documents bearing on the subject, and to my utter astonishment, a letter from the Governor-General was produced, desiring that in the event of Cabul falling, all the other stations should be immediately evacuated by our troops. Pollock's and Wild's brigades, it seems, are merely intended to show a front to assist our retreat, if they can do so without risk to themselves. We have, therefore, nothing to expect

from India, and although we have four months' supplies, we must fall back on Peshawur, provided our safe conduct thither can be guaranteed, which I scarcely think probable. Letters were also read from Mackeson and Henry Lawrence, reporting the defeat of Wild's regiments, and the panic created thereby. Also an intercepted report from the Khyberrees stating that Mackeson had retired from Ali Musjid, and that Tor Abbaz Khan had bolted, burning all the tents and destroying all the ammunition sent on by Mackeson. The messenger, who brought the Shah's letters, told us that a large force was preparing to come down with twelve guns to besiege us, under the Shah's son, Futteh Jung. We should laugh at the Shahzada and his army, were there any chance of eventual relief, but this seems to have been decided against by Government, and what the end will be no one can tell. We have demanded hostages who will not be given.

"February 1st. Nothing seems to improve our position, we see people daily going up to Lughman to salaam to Mahomed Akbar; yesterday and today they have fired long shots across the river at our grass-cutters. We have commenced laying violent hands on cattle for the use of the garrison;

175 bullocks, and 734 sheep have already been seized. Yesterday, the serjeant-major of the 37th Native Infantry, arrived from the Urzebegi's fort, where he had been a prisoner; he describes dreadful mismanagement on the part of the General at Cabul. Small parties, it seems, were sent out to fight the whole army at Cabul; the result was inevitable, and the men were at length completely discouraged. The Urzebegi's son continually taunted his captives with the folly of General Elphinstone in halting at the entrance of the Passes, and allowing Mahomed Akbar time to secure them with his troops. He declared that had the troops marched straight from Cabul by the usual stages, they would have met with no opposition.

"February 3rd. The Peshawur route seems to be completely closed against English letters, but notes in Persian have arrived and give us hope that we may yet be relieved, as Captain Mackeson was on the 29th negotiating with the Khyberrees, and Ali Musjid had not been given up to Mahomed Akbar's people. Our ally, Meer Guffoor Khan, came back from Lughman yesterday, and brought letters mentioning in high terms the kind treatment our captive friends there experienced.

The *juzailchees* went over to the enemy some days ago, with all their fine rifles furnished by our Government.

"12th February. Our communication is improving, and we have two notes from Peshawur, smuggled in walking sticks. The birth of the heir to the throne, H.R.H. Prince of Wales, was announced last night; and we fire a Royal Salute to-day. The Afghans will think we are destroying our powder preparatory to a run. Another council of war is to meet to-day. Our political and military chiefs have been in what the Americans would call a 'fix,' since the arrival of a messenger from Cabul, assenting to all the terms on which we agreed to retreat. Shah Soojah has sent orders to his son Timour, at Candahar, to take that force out of the country as soon as possible. If General Nott goes, we shall thus be in a fair way of losing Afghanistan, just at the moment when Government, by using very slight exertion, might redeem their lost honour, and have the option of retaining the country or quitting it with credit."

A great calamity, and one against which no human precautions could provide, befell Jellalabad garrison on the 19th of February, and in a minute levelled the defences that had taken three months of

unremitting labour to construct. At this time the following were the works completed as appears by Sale's official report:—"Generally, they consisted in the destruction of an immense quantity of cover for the enemy, extending to the demolition of forts and old walls, filling up ravines and destroying gardens, and cutting down groves, raising the parapets to 6 or 7 feet high, repairing and widening the ramparts, extending the bastions, retrenching three of the gates, covering the fourth with an outwork, and excavating a ditch 10 feet in depth and 12 feet in width round the whole of the walls."

In the course of a minute an earthquake nearly destroyed the town, threw down the greater part of the parapets, the Cabul gate with two adjoining bastions, and a part of the new bastion that flanked it; nearly destroyed three other bastions, made several large breaches in the curtain, that on the Peshawur side being 80 feet long, and filled the ditch, thus making an ascent quite easy. Fortunately Akbar Khan and his army, who had removed to Amukhail, within seven miles of the town, were too much horror-struck at the calamity, which levelled their forts and dwellings, to take advantage of the helpless state to which the Jellalabad garrison was reduced.

Not an hour was lost in repairing the damages. The whole garrison were told off into working parties, and, says Captain Broadfoot, the Acting-Engineer, "before night the breaches were scarped, the rubbish cleared away, and the ditches before them dug out, whilst the front one on the Peshawur side was surrounded by a good gabion parapet. A parapet was erected on the remains of the north-west bastion, with an embrasure allowing the guns to flank the approach of the ruined Cabul gate; the parapet of the new bastion was restored so as to give a flanking fire to the north-west bastion, whilst the ruined gate was rendered inaccessible by a trench in front of it, and in every bastion round the place a temporary parapet was raised." This was not a bad day's work, and it was an earnest of many such that were to follow. All the troops off duty were employed unremittingly all day, and such was the energy and perseverance of officers and men, that by the end of the month the parapets were entirely restored, and the curtain filled in where this was impracticable. The breaches were also built up, with the ramparts doubled in thickness, the whole of the gates were retrenched and every battery was re-established. In this duty the chief responsi-

bility devolved on Captains Abbott and Backhouse as Commandant of Artillery and Chief Engineer.

Captain Abbott gives the following account of this visitation in a letter dated 20th of February:—"The last week has been an eventful one. We have been gratified by intelligence of strong reinforcements marching to our aid, but the very day which brought us the news, witnessed a most extraordinary calamity. I was walking round the place yesterday, about noon, when the ground trembled under my feet, and I was sensible of the shock of an earthquake. The oscillation increased, and as the ground actually undulated, I sat down to avoid falling. Before me was a lofty bastion three stories high, on which stood a Sepoy sentry. This high building began nodding in a strange manner, and I fully expected it to fall at full length outwards, but only the thin parapet was shaken off, and the sentry remained unhurt at his post. All the parapets along the face commenced falling in like manner, and several large breaches were made in the bastions and the curtains. Within the works a confusion of cries arose, and a dense cloud of dust denoted that great injury had been sustained. The whole of the town was more or less injured, and two-thirds of the houses were totally

destroyed. Our house had not escaped; my room is the only one now habitable, and that has its walls and roof in such a state, that last night I was more than once about to desert it, for we had eight or ten shocks between nine a.m. and daylight this morning. The aspect of the town is now most wretched, but fortunately few lives were lost. The working parties were all out, and only four men were killed of all our force. Colonel Monteith, of the 35th Native Infantry, was buried in the *débris* of a curtain, which fell under him, but the men speedily dug him out, and he is doing well. The whole country has suffered dreadfully. The bastions and curtains of many forts have been thrown down, and the clouds of dust that arose from every fort and village denoted that we were by no means the only sufferers. The market people tell us that women and children have been killed by dozens, the waters of the river were twice thrown from their bed during the shock, and I had no idea that such mischief could be done in a minute and a half. To see the solid bastions of this fort, on which my guns looked like toys, split and thrown down by invisible agency, to see a mile and a half of parapet, the work of all hands during three months, in the same short time shaken down in

their whole circuit, was equally awful and vexatious. The first great shock lasted only a minute and a half, but at short intervals we have ever since had slight shocks, which invariably sends all hands scampering into the open air. All night our men slept at their posts for fear of an attack, and to-day they are working away at a capital rate on the repairs."

On the 21st of February, a body of the enemy's cavalry attacked the foraging party, when the small escort retired slowly until the former came within gun-shot, when one of Abbott's 9-pounders made them draw off. On the following day the escort was increased to ninety sabres, under Lieutenant Mayne of the 5th Cavalry, a particularly gallant officer. At eleven a.m. a large body of the enemy's horsemen moved unobserved down the bed of the Cabul river and made a dash on the grass-cutters. Mayne charged twice, but being overpowered, was compelled to retire, when Captain Oldfield moved out to his support, and Captain Abbott, taking down two of his guns from the bastion, proceeded at a gallop, and, opening fire on the enemy with great effect, drove them beyond the brow of a hill. The Afghan horsemen refused to take up the gauge of battle offered by the small British force, which was

about to follow them up, when the General sent peremptory orders to them to return.

Captain Abbott notes in his Journal, "That after the action of the 22nd February, the sowars of the 5th Cavalry begged to be allowed to use their own *tulwars*, as they can do nothing with their English cavalry swords."

On the following day the foraging parties were again driven in by Afghan horsemen, and, on the 25th, Akbar Khan quitted Amukhail, and established his camp two miles to the westward of Jellalabad. Next morning he reconnoitred with all his cavalry, and Captain Abbott commanded a party of the three arms sent out to protect the grass-cutters.*

* He says in his Journal:—"Their cavalry took post on the heights beyond the range of our guns; and their infantry occupied the broken ground around us, and fired incessantly, but to no purpose. They had four standards, two red, one white with blue stripes, and another white. An old Moollah of their party, as if in derision of such vanities, displayed a dirty turban at the end of a bamboo. Towards evening the whole drew off, having lost some six or seven by the fire of amateur riflemen, who alone were allowed to fire. Thus ended the first day of the siege, in which the enemy expended much ammunition. We collected their balls and thus obtained a welcome supply of ammunition." On the 28th he notes the arrival of a *cossid* who had his hands and ears cut off by the enemy.

On the first day of March, Akbar established a second camp to the westward, within one mile of the town, beyond Meer Aga Jauns' fort, with his left on the Cabul river; and a party of his men ascended the rocks, 300 yards south-west of the place, and fired into the cavalry lines. Again, on the following day, he made another attack which lasted from eleven a.m. till sunset, but the result was only a profuse expenditure of ammunition, and, in the evening, a party sallied out from the town and drove his skirmishers away. On the 4th Akbar posted a strong detachment two miles east of Jellalabad, and it became evident that the Afghan Chief, fearful of trying an assault, determined to invest the place, and starve the garrison out. But Abbott opened fire with his battery on this detachment, and so accurate was his practice that he speedily forced the enemy to retire. Two days later there was a skirmish between the British foraging party and the detachment posted on the east side of the town, and again, on the 8th, when Akbar received considerable reinforcements.

"Our spies," writes Abbott in his Journal, "estimated the Afghan army at 3,500 cavalry, and

14,000 infantry, the latter number much exaggerated."*

Early on the 9th March, about 2,000 of the enemy approached the walls, and planted standards in all the ravines near the north-west angle. There was heavy firing throughout the day, and Captain Abbott mentions that a blind for the protection of an embrasure, in the north-west bastion, composed of 2-inch planks, was riddled with balls, and they had to double its thickness, proving that the penetration, no less than the range of the Afghan *juzail*, was far greater than that of the antiquated flint musket, forming the arm of the British infantry.

He writes in his Journal :—" The enemy having come down in force brought with them a gun for which they commenced a battery on Piper's Hill, but

* Abbott notes in his Journal :—" An official letter received from Shah Soojah asking whether we intend to evacuate Jellalabad, and threatening that a large army will be sent against us if we refuse to go. The Shah also sent a private note saying that he cannot much longer delay the despatch of an army against us, and inquiring what our intentions really are? The General replies officially by referring the Shah to General Pollock, under whose orders we are now serving." On the 9th a *cossid* arrived from Colonel Palmer, commanding at Ghuznee, with a message that his water being cut off, he is forced to capitulate.

a 9-pounder shell killed ten of the working party and the gun was taken back to camp. Our loss was small, but we heard that the enemy had 120 killed and wounded."

On the 10th of March, when the Afghans continued firing all day, the investment was so close that the foraging parties could not go out, and, as the spies reported that Akbar was busy mining, a sortie was resolved upon. Accordingly, on the morning of the 11th, Colonel Dennie sallied out with 600 men drawn equally from the 13th and 35th, and 200 of Broadfoot's sappers, while the cavalry formed in the plain, and the artillery manned the ramparts. The guns first opened a destructive fire, and, says Abbott, "compelled the enemy, who were about 8,000 strong and crowded the ground behind Piper's Hill, to fall back, when the infantry pushed forward and carried the breastwork."

Having ascertained that there were no mines, Colonel Dennie retired without loss, the enemy having suffered considerably.

On the following day the Afghans returned to their breastworks, and, nothing daunted by their reverse, made an attack that lasted from noon till sunset. Whilst standing in the banquette of the south-west bastion to observe the flight of shells

he was pitching among the enemy behind Piper's Hill, Captain Abbott was wounded by a musket ball in the breast. Fortunately the force of the ball, which was fired from a mosque 240 yards distant, was somewhat spent, but it penetrated deep enough to cause a troublesome wound, which required the attention of the doctor for some weeks, though he refused to absent himself from duty for a day.*

* To a correspondent in India he writes on the 12th of March:—"You will no doubt have attributed my long silence to its true cause, the cessation of all intercourse by dawk between Jellalabad and Peshawur. The Political Agent continues to smuggle a few lines in a quill or some other disguise, but the *cossids*, when taken, are so cruelly treated, that they are afraid to undertake the conveyance of private letters. Macgregor sent one note for me enclosed in a quill addressed to my brother Frederick. We are now in a state of siege; our works are strong enough to resist any Afghan force, but there is cover within eighty yards of the walls, and the enemy hem us in daily. Akbar Khan at length finding that he had no chance of deceiving us to surrender Jellalabad, and that his force of cavalry was sufficiently large to enable him to act, came down to the village of Amukhail, twelve miles north-west, and sent out large parties of horse to cut off our forage. On the 22nd of February, Lieutenant Mayne was in command of the forage party, and had with him forty-five troopers of the 5th and forty-five of the Shah's cavalry, when 700 sowars appeared so suddenly, that the grass-cutters could not reach the walls in time to avoid them.

On the 13th, the working parties were driven in by the enemy. On the following day the Afghans established a fortified post 1,100 yards north-west of the Cabul gate, and there was skirmishing in front of the position, and, on the 17th, they made

Mayne drew up his men about 500 yards from the fort, and charged the head of the column, which recoiled and halted. He then resumed his course towards the gate, but being again pursued, he charged again with the same success, and got all the grass-cutters in. His men were now overpowered, and Sale now thought of sending him support, which he had withheld in defiance of the opinion of everyone; Oldfield moved out with the rest of the cavalry, and made up the whole party to 220, who offered battle to the enemy. I feared he would be overpowered, and taking down two guns from the bastion, went off at a gallop to his aid. The guns drove in the skirmishers that covered the front of the main body, and then advancing, opened upon the dense 'gole' with considerable effect. They were about to retire, when we were recalled by repeated orders from Sale, and left the affair undecided. Mayne got no thanks for his gallantry, but was blamed for fighting, when he could not have avoided doing so unless by abandoning his charge. After this the General obliged our foragers to run in on the slightest attack, and our cattle were in danger of being starved, when our urgent remonstrances induced him to force his forage, and strong parties went out with orders not to retire unless the enemy should come upon them in force. Akbar now came nearer, and on the 26th again attacked, placing all his 1,500 cavalry on the heights, one and a quarter miles distant, and sending his infantry to fire at us from some rocks at the south-west angle, and from

another attack with the usual result. At three p.m. they fired a salute, and Abbott records a grim joke on the part of Akbar Khan, who, when Saadut Khan sent to him for aid against General Pollock, sent him a Koran and told him to rely on that.

On the 18th the Afghans seized the rocks called Piper's Hill, (from an Afghan piper having been seen in the first action of the 14th of November,

the ravines at the north-west. Our reply was merely a shell now and then, and a few shots fired by amateurs. On the 2nd of March another attack was attended by similar results. Akbar now began to gather strength, and on the 9th he came down again. His people planted their standards in all the hollows near the place. On the 10th our foraging was entirely stopped. At daylight the enemy were around us, and there was much firing all day. It was reported they had commenced mines, and Sale ordered out a party on the morning of the 11th to examine the ground, which was done without loss on our side, though the enemy suffered a good deal, for their skirmishers were overpowered, and when their reinforcements come down from camp, the guns killed a great many. At 10 o'clock a.m. we saw a gun moving down from camp towards two hills at our south-west angle, and soon perceived a rascally soobadar, who had deserted from the Shah's artillery, directing a working party to make a battery on the top of the hill. One shell from a 9-pounder however changed the soobadar's opinion as to the eligibility of the spot, and the gun was soon seen toddling back to camp without having fired a shot."

playing his bagpipe thereon amid a storm of bullets) but were soon dislodged.

Ever since the catastrophe of the 19th of February, slight shocks of earthquake continued almost daily, and on the 20th of March, there was so severe a shock that the left centre battery, on the river face, was cracked, and the parapets were damaged. Letters were received from General Pollock discouraging any idea of an immediate advance from Peshawur, owing to the non-arrival of reinforcements, and, on the 23rd, at Abbott's suggestion, orders were issued to destroy the camels which had been consuming forage, required for the half starved horses of the cavalry and artillery, whose allowance was reduced on the 27th, from two to three seers (four pounds) of gram, and five seers (ten pounds) of grass. Abbott remonstrated against this, stating in his letter that, to be effective, an artillery horse required twenty-five seers of grass. The rations of the ammunition ponies was four seers of grass and one of gram daily.

The enemy drove in the grass-cutters on the 19th and two following days, but, on the 24th, when they were following the guard too closely, Broadfoot, who was in command, suddenly turned

upon them and charged with the bayonet, driving them back with much loss. In the hand-to-hand *mêlée* that ensued, this gallant officer was severely wounded,* and four of his men were killed. But the Afghans were very persistent, and a party of horse attacked the grass-cutters on the 4th, when some dismounted troopers, armed with carbines, drove them off. Provisions and forage now began to run short, but, by a well-timed sortie, the garrison were put in possession of a supply of animal food for ten days.

Akbar, in order to diminish the supply of grass near the walls, which was already very small, or to entice Sir R. Sale to despatch a weak detachment to secure them, had, during the past few days, sent several flocks of sheep to graze within half-a-mile of the town, a guard being placed in concealment. Watching his opportunity, Sale ordered a

*Kaye, borrowing from Gleig's work, "Sale's Brigade in Afghanistan," places the date of the wound by which Broadfoot was incapacitated from further fighting during the siege, as the 11th of March, when Captain Abbott was wounded, but we have adopted the date given by this officer in his Journal for this and many other incidents of the siege, though at variance with those narratives. The 24th March is also the date of Broadfoot's wound given in Sir R. Sale's Official Report of the 16th of April.

sudden sally of all the cavalry, supported by a strong detachment of 650 infantry. Issuing out of the south gate, and being concealed by the walls until they reached the south-west bastion, they were able to make a dash before Akbar could bring forward his main body, and, in a short time, three flocks, numbering 520 sheep, were driven within the gates, Captain Abbott playing upon the heavy masses of the enemy, who now hurried up, with his guns from the ramparts. The garrison were jubilant at this great success, and the good feeling that existed between the component parts of the force, was intensified by the generosity of the 35th Native Infantry, in giving up their share of the sheep to their European comrades of the 13th, and this though they had been upon half rations throughout the siege.

Abbott gives the credit of this *coup* to a young officer of the 5th Cavalry. He says in his Journal:—"Lieutenant Plowden, a very bold and good officer, persuaded Sir Robert Sale to seize the flocks of sheep grazing near the town, and volunteered to lead a small party of cavalry to make the attempt, although he knew that 300 or 400 of the enemy's horsemen were in ambush behind an old fort which he must pass. The General assented and ordered the

remainder of the cavalry and 650 infantry to follow in support. Plowden, with twenty troopers, dashed forward at full speed, cut down the shepherds and began to drive the sheep and goats, above 500 in number, towards the town. The enemy turned out so slowly that the sheep were close to the walls and were guarded by the whole detachment before any attempt was made to recover them. Akbar's whole force came forward and suffered severely from the fire of the guns."

On the 4th of April the enemy attacked the grass-cutters but were driven off. "It seems," says Abbott, "that Kyroola Khan, who commanded the party, was much quizzed for his failure."

But the jubilations of the garrison were short-lived, for on the 6th of April, two spies reported that General Pollock had been defeated in the Khyber Pass, the fact being that he had forced that defile on the previous day, by a masterly series of operations. Akbar had been strengthening his investing lines during the past few days, and the question that arose for consideration on the receipt of this disastrous intelligence, was as to the course that should now be pursued when succour appeared to be

indefinitely postponed by the defeat of the relieving force.

Captain Abbott writes to a correspondent of the events since the earthquake :—

"On the 22nd of February we had a skirmish with 750 of Akbar's cavalry, who fairly declined the combat when offered them by our 220 troopers. The grass-cutters were at work on some heights one mile and a half to the south, when a cloud of horsemen approached and they all began to run in. The escort of ninety troopers, under Lieutenant Mayne, covered the retreat, and made two or three charges on the enemy's column, which recoiled each time, but pursued again when our men continued their route, until at length our troopers were in some confusion. The remainder of the cavalry moved out, and the enemy drew off to the heights, when I took out two guns to dislodge them. They were evidently about to run when the General called us all in, so that nothing was decided as it should have been. We found four bodies on the ground where the enemy stood the few rounds I fired, and there were large pools of blood in several places. The General was annoyed at our going out at all, as he had positively forbidden it; but in fact, he behaved ill in allowing Mayne to be overpowered,

when he might so easily have aided him, for our working parties always have their arms and accoutrements piled beside them, and all were most anxious for a fight. Akbar's cavalry commander, Mahomed Shah Khan, Ghilzye, was wounded in the hand; he is a first cousin and a great friend of Akbar's. The chief himself viewed the battle from a distant hill, and was much disgusted at seeing his men take to the hill. They took him two heads of the troopers they killed, and showing him bloody swords, declared they had done wonders, but he was not to be imposed upon, and rated them soundly for their cowardice. Akbar has to-day advanced his camp four or five miles, and has taken up a position about three miles from us, and will be able to annoy our forage parties very much.

"February 26th. Our forage parties were out early this morning, and I held 200 infantry, all the cavalry, and two guns ready at the rocks, near the south-west angle of the place to cover their retreat. At eight a.m., the enemy began to form their 'goles' of horse, and I recalled the foragers, and got all safe in before they advanced in force. At near noon they came on, about 1,400 cavalry, taking post on the hills, while another detachment,

about 1,200 or 1,500, sent forward parties to all the old walls and hollows around, as well as to the rocks at the south-west angle. The guns and mortars fired twelve or fifteen rounds.

"March 13th. From the 26th of February to the 1st instant, all was quiet; but, on the 2nd, Akbar made another attack.

"On the 4th, he divided his force, placing a portion of it two miles east of us, and on the 6th, they attacked in force from this point. The guns upset a few horsemen and all the rest were dispersed by a great storm from the west.

"On the 9th, all Akbar's force came down again at 11 a.m., and planted standards in the ravines close to the north-west angle. There were plenty of volunteers to capture them, but the General refused them leave to go out.

"On the 11th, a sally was made to examine the ground by our people, who drove off the enemy's posts and effected their object, destroying all the works commenced by the Afghans. The whole mass of the enemy then came forward, when our troops were called in, and the artillery played upon the masses with good effect, killing and wounding 120. At 10 a.m., they brought up a gun, and

were making a battery on the heights at our south-west angle, when a shell killed ten of the working party, and we now saw the gun moving quietly back to camp.

"On this day, the enemy received a strong reinforcement, at least 2,000 men. Heavy rain fell on the night of the 11th, and the enemy did not attack us till noon yesterday, when they came forward about 8,000 strong, but were very cautious. The men had crowded the heights south-west of us, and I was pitching shells amongst them, when one of their riflemen put his ball into my right breast; it rebounded from the bones and made only a trifling wound about an inch deep. The doctor says it will take some time to heal, but it does not take me from my duty. One shutter of an embrasure at the north-west angle, which is always the point of attack, had thirty-four balls put into it during the 11th instant, and though it was originally made of two-inch planks, I was obliged to add two more planks, making it near five inches thick 'ere it resisted the balls.

"April 4th. Little has occurred since my last entry. The enemy for some time drove in our foragers regularly, General Sale having ordered the

covering parties not to fight. At length, our cattle began to starve, and the General ventured to send out some men and allow them to stand until threatened by a large force.

"On the 24th of March, the enemy attacked as usual, and the party of about 150 men remained out until the collection of the Ghilzyes amounted to 1,000, and were closely pressed as they retired. In this position they turned and charged with the bayonet, a manœuvre which confounded the Ghilzyes, who were driven down a steep bank, and suffered afterwards from the musketry. They had several killed and wounded; we lost four killed and a like number wounded, amongst the latter, Captain Broadfoot, of the Shah's sappers, who led the charge, and cut down two men himself. This check somewhat dispirited the enemy, and we foraged with better success afterwards. Rain fell, and gave life to great quantities of grass which thrives in sandy soil, and spreads like a strawberry plant over a great extent of surface.

"On the 1st of April we made a fool of Akbar. He had ordered the shepherds to pasture their sheep round the fort, and three flocks came within a thousand yards, but well within Akbar's advanced

posts. A few cavalry and skirmishers dashed at the sheep and seized them, when the enemy rushed to the rescue, but were met by all the rest of the cavalry, supported by 550 bayonets. These easily drove off all the advanced parties, and before Akbar's whole force could turn out, all the sheep were safely lodged within our walls, so that when the horsemen came pouring down, they were too late to do any good, and merely exposed themselves to a fire from my guns. Akbar is furious at the loss, and vows vengeance against us; however, we have 500 sheep and can afford to laugh at him. His camp is rather too distant for a surprise, and it is strongly situated, with a dry nullah in front, a very deep one in rear, a fort and gardens on the right, and an unfordable stream on the left. We could force the position, and the affair would, if well conducted, be a very glorious one. I had been urging it warmly until I heard that Pollock had actually marched, which altered the case very much, as failure on our part would involve his force in great difficulties. We have no confidence in Sale, who is a very good fellow, but a very inefficient General, as our affairs at Julgah and Purwan-Durra clearly demonstrated.

"April 6th. We have just heard of Pollock's

defeat in the Khyber, and it is decided that we attack Akbar's camp to-morrow, as our only chance of deliverance. We shall have rough work, and I may not survive the affair, so this letter shall, for the present, be closed."

The false news as to Pollock's defeat appeared confirmed by a royal salute, which Akbar Khan fired in honour of the event, and it seemed to some of the officers of the garrison that the only course to pursue in this desperate state of affairs, was to sally forth and break the investment by a general attack on Akbar's position and camp. Sir R. Sale was averse to this measure, but Abbott, Oldfield, and other fiery spirits in the camp, insisted upon it with so much urgency, that at length, the gallant old chief, who, though he loved fighting for fighting's sake, was fearful of incurring responsibility, (as Sir George Pollock himself told the author,) consented to make a sally in force and gave the necessary orders.

Thus, in fact, it was by something very like a mutiny—Abbott going the length of proposing to the heads of corps that they should act without him—that Sir R. Sale was induced to make the famous sortie which constituted the chief claim of the garrison to the historic title of "illustrious."

The enemy, during the past month, had been busily engaged entrenching his position and strengthening his works, and starvation for themselves and the horses stared the garrison in the face, unless they broke through the lines. The entire brigade, with the exception of the ordinary guards at each of the city gates, and the camp-followers who manned the walls, was formed into three columns. The centre, 500 strong, consisted of the 13th, under Colonel Dennie; the left, of the 35th, under Colonel Monteith, 500 men; and the right, 360 bayonets, of the sappers, with one company from each of the two regiments, under Captain Havelock, Broadfoot not being sufficiently recovered from his wound to take the field. These columns were to be supported by Captain Abbott with the guns of his battery, and by the handful of cavalry, under the command of Captain Oldfield and Lieutenant Mayne.

The troops issued from the Cabul and Peshawur gates at daylight on the 7th of April, and found Akbar Khan with his army of 6,000 men, supported by four guns, drawn up in battle array. The columns advanced on the enemy, Havelock along the river's bank, and Monteith on the left of Dennie, when the General deviated from his plan

of attack, by ordering Colonel Dennie to attack a fort, the inner keep of which had not been breached, while the only means of ingress was through a doorway half way up the wall. In making a futile attempt to carry this work, (which was evacuated at the conclusion of the action) the gallant Dennie and some men were killed and several wounded. At this time the other columns were in a critical position, owing to the overwhelming force of the enemy, and a disaster was only averted by the centre column abandoning the attempt on the fort, and rapidly pushing on to the support of Monteith's and Havelock's columns, when the combined force made a determined attack, which Captain Abbott supported by bringing up his guns at the gallop, and opening fire in his usual brilliant and effective style.

The Afghans made a gallant attempt to check the British advance, by throwing forward large bodies of horse, and a masked battery of three guns opened fire under the personal command of the Sirdar. But the British infantry would not be denied, and the fire of the guns was overwhelming. The advance was uninterrupted, and soon the enemy were dislodged from their position, their cannon and standards captured, and their camp

stormed and involved in a general conflagration. By seven a,m., all was over, and Akbar Khan in full retreat in the direction of Lughman.

Every officer and man of the brigade well performed their duty on this glorious day, including the artillery, which fired with their usual precision, a shot directed by Abbott killing the horses of one of the enemy's guns, which the Afghans were endeavouring to carry off. Besides his own subaltern, Lieutenant Dawes, Captain Abbott had the services of Captain Macgregor, the Political Agent, himself an artillery officer, who volunteered for the occasion. Not the least satisfactory feature in the results of the victory was the capture of four guns, lost by the Cabul division during their retreat.

The following is a brief account of the action from Abbott's Journal:—

"Officers commanding corps waited on the General and entreated him to attack Akbar at once. The 13th Light Infantry and the Battery were ready for action. The General was very angry and drove the officers from his presence, but, in the course of the day he changed his mind, and gave orders for an attack at daylight. On the 7th, 1,350 infantry, 210 cavalry, and the 9-pounder battery

advanced to the attack at a quarter to five a.m. The infantry were divided into three bodies, commanded by Havelock, Dennie, and Monteith. The two latter commanded their own regiments, but Havelock had a mixed detachment of one company each of the 13th Light Infantry and 35th Native Infantry and the sappers, in all about 350 men. He pushed forward along the river's bank, while Monteith advanced on his left. The 13th and the battery were detained by a small fort which the enemy held within half a mile of the town. Thus the force was separated, and while the guns were wasting shot and losing time, Monteith and Havelock were hard pressed by the whole of the enemy's cavalry, and were forced to send for assistance. The General then allowed the battery to go forward and followed at a quick pace with the 13th. The enemy, unable to face the fire of the guns, retreated from the battery, leaving the camp to the mercy of the assailants, who recovered some ordnance and ammunition that had been taken from the Cabul force."

The total loss in achieving this great success, was only thirteen killed and seventy-one wounded. Of these, Captain Abbott's battery had one man killed and eleven wounded; five horses were

wounded, and the expenditure of ammunition had been thirty-three rounds per gun.

Captain Abbott writes to a relative in England, on the 26th of April, an animated account of the action of the 7th of April, which raised the siege:—"On the 5th of April, our spies brought us news that General Pollock had been repulsed in the Khyber Pass with great loss, and a royal salute in Akbar's camp confirmed the sad intelligence. It was now necessary to attack Akbar and beat him in order to obtain supplies for a further siege. Oldfield and I went round to all the heads of corps, and we all determined to go in a body to the General and beg to be allowed to fight. We talked for an hour, using every argument in vain, but he dismissed us with a positive refusal. I proposed that we should quietly parade our men at four a.m. on the 7th, and go out before he was out of his bed, but of all the party only three supported me, and the plan was abandoned. After two hours' consideration, Sale sent for Oldfield and me, and agreed to go out. The plan of attack was fixed. The gates were closed to prevent the exit of every spy, and all was prepared for the next morning's work. At ten p.m. we received the cheering intelligence that our troops had forced the Khyber, and

that the salute in Akbar's camp had been fired in celebration of Shah Soojah's murder at Cabul. Sale, however, happily did not change his mind, and, at daylight, all the troops advanced against the force by which we had so long been besieged. The infantry were formed in three columns, two of 500, and one of 350 men. The cavalry numbered 210, and I had all my six guns in the field. Our plan was to advance directly upon Akbar's camp, avoiding any fortified posts that might intervene, and directing all our efforts to the capture of the main position, in which were all his guns, ammunition, and stores. The camp was two miles and a half west of Jellalabad. Its rear was upon the Cabul river, which by a sudden bend secured its left also. The right was secured by a fort and gardens. In front was a deep sandy nullah. The river did not extend beyond his right, but a nullah, with high steep banks flowing from south to north, was a serious obstacle to a retreat, and the position, though strong, was very dangerous. Sale, however, had not moved 800 yards before he made a blunder that might have caused a defeat. The enemy had prepared an old fort, and had placed in it an advanced picket of 150 men, while behind it were concealed about 200 sowars. A few shots

made the sowars run, but instead of our advancing, Sale took away the 13th Light Infantry, and all my guns to attack the fort, allowing the other columns to go on unsupported. Before I had fired thirty shots, Colonel Monteith, commanding the left column, sent word that all Akbar's cavalry were upon him. I was then allowed to gallop on, and opened fire upon several dense 'goles' of horse, who suffered severely and were soon broken, so that when the 13th came up we were all ready to advance again. We now went all right. The guns kept well ahead and cleared the way, supported by the compact masses of infantry. At 800 yards from camp, Akbar's guns opened, but were soon silenced, and then we rushed upon his camp which the enemy abandoned.

"We took four guns, great numbers of tents and much valuable property, and I cannonaded the retreating column until it was a mile distant. Sale burned the tents, which was a great pity. I purchased for 600 rupees, a beautiful MacCabe's gold repeater, found in Akbar's tent, and shall keep it as a memento of the 7th of April, 1842. Akbar fled to Tezeen, taking all his prisoners. He has sent in Captain Mackenzie* (one of them) to nego-

* Now General Colin Mackenzie, C B., who was assistant to

tiate with us. Mackenzie says that Akbar never ceases to talk of the gallant manner in which our troops behaved on the 7th."

On the 16th of April, General Pollock arrived with his victorious army at Jellalabad. Since leaving Cabul in the preceding October, Sale's brigade had lost 4 officers and 110 men killed, and 16 officers and 384 men wounded.

Sir W. Macnaghten, and accompanied him on the occasion of his murder, when he owed his safety to Akbar Khan, who carried him off on his horse. Captain Mackenzie was prominent during the disastrous retreat from Cabul, for his gallantry, and his *juzailchees* were almost all killed before he was surrendered as a hostage on the 8th of January with Pottinger and Lawrence.

CHAPTER IV.

THE ADVANCE ON CABUL.

The Expedition to the Shinwarree Valley—Advance from Jellalabad—Affair at Mammoo Khail—Action of Jugdulluck—Battle of Tezeen—Occupation of Cabul—Return March to India—Arrival at Ferozepore—Conclusion.

GENERAL POLLOCK was condemned to remain at Jellalabad for some months, until he had collected sufficient cattle and supplies for the advance on Cabul, and Lord Ellenborough had made up his mind whether there should be an advance at all, or whether, the relief of the Jellalabad garrison being accomplished, the army should return to India, alike leaving unredeemed the captives in the hands of Akbar Khan, and British honour, sullied by our recent reverses. But his lordship was not slow in recognising the services of the defenders of Jellalabad, and, on learning the famous victory they had achieved on the 7th of April, issued the

following Proclamation, in which he applied a term to the garrison which has become historic.

"Secret department, Benares, 21st of April.

"The Govenor-General feels assured that every subject of the British Government will peruse with the deepest interest and satisfaction the report he now communicates of the entire defeat of the Afghan troops, under Mahomed Akbar Khan, by the garrison of Jellalabad. That illustrious garrison, which, by its constancy in enduring privation, and by its valour in action, has already obtained for itself the sympathy and respect of every true soldier, has now, sallying forth from its walls, under the command of its gallant leader, Major-General Sir Robert Sale, thoroughly beaten in open field an enemy of more than three times its numbers, taken the standards of their boasted cavalry, destroyed their camp, and recaptured four guns, which, under circumstances which can never again occur, had during the last winter fallen into their hands. The Governor-General cordially congratulates the Army upon the return of victory to its ranks. He is convinced that there, as in all former times, it will be found, while, as at Jellalabad, the European and Native troops, mutually supporting each other,

and evincing equal discipline and valour, are led into action by officers in whom they justly confide. The Governor-General directs that the substance of this notification and of Major-General Sir Robert Sale's report be carefully made known to all troops, and that a salute of twenty-one guns be fired at every principal station of the army."

Lord Ellenborough also issued an order directing that Captain Abbott's battery, the 5th Cavalry and 35th Native Infantry should bear upon their colours and appointments "a mural crown, superscribed Jellalabad, as a memorial of the fortitude, perseverance and enterprise evinced by these several corps during the blockade of Jellalabad." In this order, he also directed the issue of a medal to every officer and man engaged, bearing, "on one side, a mural crown, superscribed Jellalabad, and on the other side, 7th April, 1842;" and ordered a donation of six months' batta, and directed that "the several corps composing the garrison, should be received, on their return to India, at all stations on the route to their cantonments, by all the troops at such cantonments in review order with presented arms."

On the 18th of May, Captain Abbott writes to a friend:—"We cannot advance, because 9,000 camels are wanting, and far from getting any addition to

our present stock, we are daily losing from ten to twelve by death. We could not even retire without leaving much property on the ground. Akbar is a strange character; a singular mixture of savage cruelty and almost chivalrous generosity. Instead of being enraged by the beating we gave him on the 7th of April, he went to Lughman and told the ladies the story with great good-humour, praising the gallantry of our soldiers."

On the 5th of May, Captain Abbott had the happiness of meeting his brother Frederick, who had been appointed Chief Engineer of General Pollock's army, and proceeded up from Peshawur with a column under Colonel Bolton, of the 31st Regiment.

Writing from Jellalabad on the 19th of May, Frederick gives some details of the decisive action of the 7th of April, and of his brother's conduct during the siege, gathered from officers of the garrison. He says:—"On the 6th of April, Augustus and one or two others, collecting the heads of corps and departments, went to Sale, and stated the necessity of sallying upon the enemy, either relieving themselves of the investment or dying like soldiers with arms in their hands. Sale was obstinately resolved not to go out, declaring the enemy to be too strong. The debate was strong and some took

Sale's view. Augustus declared that he would have his battery ready at the gate the next morning, and beat up for recruits; Colonel Dennie said Her Majesty's 13th should be there likewise, and all the rest followed in the same strain. Sale dismissed the assembly, but soon after sent for a few of them, and declared his intention of making a sally on the following morning. The enemy were encamped about two and a half miles west of Jellalabad in one line, with their right on a mud-fort, and their left on the river; a small party also occupied a mud-fort within a few hundred yards of Jellalabad. The garrison, about 1,400 strong, were divided into three columns, and it had been fully agreed to advance directly upon Akbar Khan's camp, without taking the least notice of the intervening fort, which must fall afterwards. Out they sallied, but no sooner did Sale come within fire of the fort than, forgetting all his lesson, he ordered Dennie's column at it."

"Augustus was directed to make a breach, which was impossible. After some firing, Dennie assaulted the place, was shot dead, and his party beaten back. In the meantime, the two other columns advanced without a check, and soon found themselves about to be surrounded by heavy bodies of the enemy's

horse. They sent back for the guns. Augustus limbered up and went off at a gallop, and joining one of the columns, opened fire on the three masses at once, and kept it up so smartly and precisely, each shot rolling over a heap of cavaliers, that before his ammunition was expended, the enemy's three masses dissolved, and each individual sought safety in flight. The infantry and guns were advanced, and burned the encampment. The enemy were in numbers as four to one, and by Sale's blunder they had an opportunity of uniting their forces against two weak columns.

"We joined Pollock on the 5th instant, when Augustus rode out to meet me. I would have passed him by, not recognising him. He is in excellent spirits, and appears to have been the life of the garrison in their worst times, when most were desponding and giving up all for lost. I was much gratified by the honest testimony of the Sepoys of the 35th Native Infantry, who were shut up all the time in Jellalabad. Pollock sent them to meet us in the Khyber and assist in bringing on the stores. Some of these men found out that I was Augustus's brother, and they launched out forthwith in praises of their hero. Sale, they said, was their General, but Abbott Sahib was their Preserver. If

it had not been for his guns, they would all have been lost. He walked about the ramparts all day in the sun, and all night in the cold. Whenever the enemy came in force, he used to say, 'Don't be afraid; see what I will give them,' then bang went a gun, and over rolled the enemy, horse and men. One man said, 'He is such a shot that if you set up a needle, Abbott Sahib will send a ball through its eye.' 'In the fight of the 7th,' said another, 'his guns seemed to be everywhere, and whenever he came, the enemy's horsemen disappeared.' All this was genuine effervescence of love and admiration. The men as they marched would take up his praises, and it was amusing to see some fat soobadar getting angry at a nimble-tongued Sepoy taking the story out of his very mouth. Augustus is living in an old native house, in which he has a small cabin and a nook for his bed. He messes with a small party of cavalry, the remains of the ill-fated 5th.

"Jellalabad is one of the least defensible places I could have imagined, and when the little band of gallant hearts first reached it, followed by a numerous enemy, it must have been a most hopeless-looking resting-place. The town is about 600 yards long by 400 broad, a collection of mud huts with a few houses and gateways. Around it was the

ruin of a mud wall, over which the enemy could run or ride. North was the broken bank of the river, affording cover for an enemy within pistol shot; east was the British cantonment, close under the walls; south and west was broken ground, with walls and mud forts, all affording cover, and within 400 yards of the south-west angle stands a rock called Piper's Hill, which commands a view of a good portion of the interior. The hard work the men had to undergo, combined with the fine cold climate of Jellalabad in winter and the abstinence from spirituous liquors, has been the means, under Providence, of making the garrison wonderfully healthy; the soldiers look as if fresh from Europe."

Of the position of affairs at Jellalabad, and the prospect of a march on Cabul, Frederick Abbott writes, under date of the 19th of May, to a relative in England:—"When Pollock forced the Khyber, his sole instructions were to relieve Sale and bring him back to Peshawur, the attack of Cabul by this side being deemed impracticable. The news of Shah Soojah's murder, arriving at the same time with the defeat of Akbar Khan, raised in General Pollock's breast a hope of being able to strike a blow upon Cabul during the confusion and panic of the Afghans, and had Lord Auckland's Government

behaved like men at the first outbreak of the insurrection at Cabul, our Army might have been prepared to take advantage of the opportunity thus presented. But we are entirely destitute of three essentials, money, siege-guns, and carriage; of coin we are in want, but that may be rectified, though to acquire the rest will be a matter of much time, and the opportunity will slip by. To march effectually against Cabul, we should act in concert with the Candahar force under General Nott. To move even with one month's provisions we want 10,000 camels, and Nott wants about the same number. I see little hope of either army being supplied, yet Pollock is sanguine, and trusts to Mr. Clerk's exertions and interest with the Lahore Government to provide our army. In the meantime we are exposed in tents in a very hot valley. It is proposed to move up by degrees to Gundamuck, where the climate is more temperate. The distance is forty miles on the road to Cabul, and this can only be done by moving one brigade at a time, sending back its camels for the second and so on. This I think a false military step, for should we be recalled or obliged to retire by force of circumstances, we should have to leave our stores and tents on the ground, and make a dis-

graceful retreat. Government gives Pollock no instructions. Akbar Khan, on his defeat, fled to Lughman, and told his prisoners, very good humouredly, that their friends at Jellalabad had given him a great beating, and left him neither clothes nor money. He then took them on to Tezeen, half, or more than half-way to Cabul, and seeing Lady Sale and Lady Macnaghten on horseback, the day being rainy, he gave them his litter, and gallantly mounted a horse, although suffering severely from his wound. From Tezeen he sent in one of the prisoners, Captain Mackenzie of the Madras Army, to treat with General Pollock, but the terms were too vague to lead to anything but an opening. Mackenzie had parole to remain two days in Jellalabad, and set out again with wonderful firmness for his prison-house. In the meantime, Akbar's clan, the Barukzyes, had met a severe defeat from the Douranees at Cabul. Mackenzie was allowed a rest of only three hours, when the chief sent him off again with a letter to Pollock, saying, his (Akbar's) star was in the ascendant, that he had beaten his opponents, and was the dictator of the Empire, and he proposed to become a friend of the British upon a large annuity; the other terms are not divulged, but they are said to

be quite preposterous. Pollock has offered him two lacs of rupees, or £20,000, for the prisoners, but I much fear he will not give them up. Being now in fear of his rivals, the Douranee tribe, he has placed his captives in a strong fort about twelve miles from Tezeen. Whilst Sale was relieving himself, Pollock forcing the Khyber, and General Nott gaining a victory, two adverse circumstances occurred to throw a cloud upon our military renown. Ghuznee, the fortress over whose capture all England went mad with rejoicing, garrisoned by a single regiment of Sepoys, the 27th, left to its fate amidst snow and enemies, was forced to capitulate, and Brigadier England, advancing from Quetta with treasure and stores to the relief of Candahar, was beaten by a rabble enemy in the Passes, leaving a heavy number of Europeans and Natives on the field. He has fallen back upon Quetta, and it is feared his ill success will raise the whole of Scinde."

During his enforced idleness General Pollock despatched a column into the Shinwarree valley, to punish the inhabitants who held a gun and some property belonging to the Cabul force. The column, which was placed under the command of Brigadier Monteith, numbered 2,300 men, exclusively drawn from the newly-arrived troops, with the ex-

ception of Captain Abbott's battery, which the Brigadier, as a Jellalabad officer, appeared to think indispensable to the completeness of a column.

At Ali Boghan, our troops, infuriated by the sight of some plundered property, began to set fire to the village, but were restrained by their officers.

The plundered property was restored, and the money that had been taken, was returned to the inhabitants. As explained by General Pollock in a letter to the address of the Governor-General, dated the 2nd of April, 1843, refuting the charge of excesses having been committed by his troops during the advance upon Cabul, though it was to be regretted that the village of Ali Boghan was burnt, there were extenuating circumstances, owing to the discovery of some portions of the dress of our soldiers massacred in the previous January. "The destruction of Ali Boghan," he says, "was caused by one of those sudden bursts of feeling which being wholly unexpected, no precautions were considered necessary;" and he adds, "the Brigadier immediately took steps to prevent the occurrence of such scenes, and subsequently, during the whole time the Brigadier was detached, I heard of no more excesses."

The report of the violence that had been committed at Ali Boghan spread through the valley. The people believed that the British troops were about to fire all the villages, so they began at once to remove their property, and to fly in every direction from their houses. Captain Macgregor, the Political Officer, exerted himself to restore confidence among them, by explaining the real designs of his Government, and the people began to return to their dwellings. But, although indiscriminate plunder and destruction were not the objects of the Expedition, the brigade had been sent out to do certain work, and it soon became evident that it could not be accomplished without inflicting some injury upon the people. The captured gun and the plundered property were to be recovered. It was known that two of the principal chiefs of a place called Goolai were in possession of a portion of the treasure that had fallen into the hands of our enemies. It was known, too, that the captured gun was at Deh-Surruk; so it was determined that the brigade should march against the two places.

On the morning of the 20th June, Monteith moved upon Goolai. In his report, Macgregor, writing of this place, said:—"It presented all the appearance of a flourishing little settlement. Several

of the forts were extensive and in good repair. They were shaded by clusters of mulberry and willow trees. Flowing water passed close to the forts, and served to irrigate the neighbouring fields of cotton, rice, and jewarree. The summer harvest had just been collected, and was stocked outside the forts in its unwinnowed state. The inhabitants had evidently only time to escape with their portable property before the troops reached Goolai. In fact, our visit was most timely. Three or four days' delay would have enabled them to carry off their grain." Monteith pitched his camp on some rising ground near the village, and demanded the restitution of the plundered treasure.

On the following day evasive answers were received; there was no prospect of obtaining, by peaceful negotiation, the concession that was demanded from the chiefs—so the work of destruction commenced. Their forts and houses were destroyed; their walls were blown up; and their beautiful trees were injured and left to perish. The retribution was thorough and enduring in its effects.

Regarding the extreme measure of the destruction of the trees, which, in Eastern countries, are essential to render habitable the villages, built

beneath their grateful shade, Macgregor says in his report:—"All the injury we could do their forts and houses, could, with facility, in a short time be repaired by them. From their proximity to the hills they could always obtain timber in abundance; and where water is plentiful they could rebuild easily the bastions we might blow up, and therefore a greater degree of punishment than this seemed to be necessary, and was completely within our power if we destroyed their trees—a measure which seems barbarous to a civilized mind; but in no other way can the Afghans be made to feel equally the weight of our power, for they delight in the shade of their trees. They are to be seen under them in groups during the summer, all day long, talking, reading, weaving, and sleeping. Even women and children seek the shade of their trees. The Afghan mountaineer is not tangible to us in any other way, He removes his herds, flocks, and property to the hills on the shortest notice, and flies before our troops to places where he is inaccessible to them. The Goolai people, moreover, were deserving of no mercy. The amount of treasure they had plundered (viz. 18,000 or 20,000 rupees) was considerable. They had been very pertinacious in attacking Captain Ferris's canton-

ment; and equally so, subsequently, our troops at Jellalabad. Therefore the Brigadier determined at once to commence the work of destruction, desired that neither fort, house, tree, grain, nor boosa should be spared them. This assuredly was the best plan for preventing the necessities of harsh measures in future. Working parties from the brigade were accordingly appointed for this purpose."

The work of destruction went on for some days. In the meantime the captured gun had been given up, and the people of Deh-Surruk were willing to restore the treasure they had taken; but could not easily recover it from the real possessors. However, after some difficulty, upwards of 10,000 rupees, besides other property, were recovered from the Shinwarrees. A large quantity of grain, timber, boosa, and other requisites, was appropriated at Goolai; and it was supposed that the declared objects of the Expedition had now been fully accomplished. But the Shinwarrees had not been thoroughly coerced. They had always been a refractory people—unwilling to pay revenue either to the Barukzye Chief or Suddozye Prince. It was thought advisable, therefore, to read them a lesson.

"On the 8th of July," writes Captain Abbott, "having completed the work of demolition, we marched south-west to a very pretty village amongst the spurs of the Suffeid Koh, inhabited by Tajiks, a poor class of people whom we did not molest.

"On the 10th we came on to the valley of Kote, said to contain much of the property taken at Pesh Bolak. We have commenced unroofing a few villages. The valley is some miles in length from north to south, but is very narrow, though highly cultivated."

On the 20th of July he notes:—"We have only moved five miles since I last wrote, but the course being uphill, we have got into a fine climate. Yesterday we took a small party and reconnoitred the Shinwarree valley which we are to attack. We went six miles from camp. The road is perfectly impracticable for guns, and I have proposed carrying them on elephants along a low ridge that bounds the valley to the south-east. The ride led us through fine groves of trees and over much cultivation for four miles, when the narrow valley commenced, down which a fine river pours its waters, rendering it impassable for camels. We

found all the forts deserted, as far as we went up the valley."

On the 22nd of July, the Brigadier, with one or two other officers, including Captain Abbott, made a wide reconnaissance, and found a practicable path to the entrance of the Shinwarree Valley, by which it was decided an immediate advance should be made, twenty-four elephants having been received from Jellalabad to help in case of need. Brigadier Monteith entered the valley on the 23rd of July, and, at daylight of the 26th, he left his camp with a strong force, including Captain Abbott's battery, and seven companies each from Her Majesty's 31st Regiment, and the 33rd and 53rd Native Infantry. On arriving in the valley he detached the sappers and miners, under Lieutenant John Becher,* to set fire to all the forts, which was done in succession, thirty-five being ablaze at one time, while the troops moved parallel along the left ridge for the protection of the party. The Brigadier now advanced to attack the enemy, who were drawn up on the heights, and, as the infantry drove them from their position, Captain Abbott, he says in his report, "opened a fire of shrapnel upon them which did considerable execution, and so disconcerted them

* Now Lieutenant-General Becher, C.B.

that parties left the field altogether, and never returned." Having completed the work of destruction, the column retired, the Brigadier's arrangements, as detailed in his despatch, being most judicious, and the return march of seven miles and a half was made, as he says, "over as bad a road as can well be supposed without loss or injury of any kind." The casualties during the day were only one officer and two men killed and twenty-three wounded.

The expedition into the Shinwarree country was a complete success, and Captain Macgregor states in his report, "that from the 17th of June to the 3rd of August, both men and cattle had entirely subsisted on the resources of the country; the cattle especially," he added in conclusion, "will be found to have greatly improved in condition while employed on this service. Indeed, in whatever way it may be viewed, it will be found that the expedition has been highly beneficial to British interests."

On the 3rd of August, the brigade arrived at Jellalabad. Captain Abbott writes of this Expedition to a correspondent in England from Jellalabad on the 17th of August:—"I told you that I was

about to march on the 17th of June for Pesh Bolak. We had a precious hot trip, destroyed twenty-five forts there, and then turned towards the Suffeid Koh, and crossed valley after valley, bounded by the low spurs of the mountains. Some of these spots were very pretty, and our course was not marked by any warlike operation until we arrived at the Hissaruck country, about twenty-five miles south of Jellalabad. The approach to the valley was difficult, and all the ground was completely flooded, this being the season for the cultivation of rice. We arrived at the entrance of the Shinwarree valley on the 23rd, and in the evening, I proceeded with 200 *juzailchees*, and made a reconnaissance of the road up the ridge of hills which bound the valley to the south-east. The enemy's picquets fell back, and after proceeding as far as prudent, I returned to camp.

"Next morning, the Engineer officer, Captain Robertson, made his reconnaissance with an escort of 700, including two companies of Europeans, but having advanced a mile beyond the point where I turned back, had an affair with the enemy, who killed and wounded thirty of our men. As the reconnoitring party of course came back to camp, the Shinwarrees claimed a victory, and said they

had repulsed our whole brigade. We therefore determined to give them a lesson, and on the 6th of July, leaving 1,000 men to guard our camp, the main body advanced to the attack.

"The valley of this tribe of Shinwarrees is bounded on either side by a low ridge of rocky heights, whose summits are 1,000 yards apart. A fine clear river runs down the centre of the valley, watering the rice fields, and giving life to numerous orchards and gardens and fine chenar* trees which shade the level space between the hills. The forts and villages stand on high ground above the cultivation. I had ascertained that guns placed on the crest of the ridge on our left of the valley, could, without much difficulty, move along it, commanding all the low ground, and the heights on the opposite side. The ascent was, however, impracticable for draught cattle, and the soldiers took up my six guns by the hand. Once established on the ridge, we moved slowly along, sending parties to burn all the forts and villages below, which they accomplished for three miles without meeting opposition, but on approaching the forts of Secunder Khan, the chief whom we particularly wished to punish, we found all the force of the enemy assembled to

* The Oriental plane.

oppose us. The forts of Secunder Khan stand just where two valleys branch off right and left from that of the river. The ridge of course terminates here, and my guns were at a stand, but the position was excellent, and a few shells soon sent all the rabble to the right about.

"The advanced guard took up positions to protect our incendiaries, who burned everything combustible in the forts and then we thought we had done enough. We collected our men and returned slowly to camp, which we reached at a quarter past three p.m., having been out eleven hours on a terribly hot day. The thermometer rose to 145° on the heights, and we were all much scorched as you may suppose. Next day, submissive messages came in from the Shinwarrees, and we retraced our steps one march to relieve them of their fears. Thence, by a short cut across a dreadful country for guns, we returned to Jellalabad on the 3rd of August.

"All my wheels were sadly shaken, and I have not yet completed their repairs. The horse-artillery have their cattle in bad condition, and are obliged to send back one third of their guns, keeping all the horses for the remainder. My cattle are still in good order, and the battery is in great favour as it seldom gives the infantry any trouble. Two

days ago, General Pollock proclaimed his intention to advance to Cabul, General Nott having marched with 7,000 men from Candahar on the 7th instant; we are badly off for carriage, but anything is better than being excluded from the honour of revisiting the capital. General Pollock's orders are positive to be here again before the 15th of October."

No one at Jellalabad knew till the last moment what the intentions of the Government were. On the 29th of April, Sir Jasper Nicolls, the commander-in-chief, instructed General Pollock that he was "to withdraw every British soldier from Afghanistan;" but Pollock was averse from this pusillanimous course so long as the prisoners and hostages were still in Akbar Khan's hands, and made the want of cattle a pretext for delaying his return.

On the 4th of July, the Governor-General wrote to General Nott, giving him the option to "retire by way of Ghuznee, Cabul, and Jellalabad," and directed General Pollock to "combine his movements" with Nott, should he desire to retire by a route which was, in effect, an advance through the country. Pollock sent five messengers to the Candahar General, asking him what course he intended to pursue, and Nott, not less eager for an advance,

despatched a letter on the 27th of July, expressing his determination to take the route by Cabul, for which he commenced his march on the 7th of August.

Sir Robert Sale had been encamped for some little time at Futtehabad, two marches on the Cabul road, and, on the 20th of August, General Pollock left Jellalabad with head-quarters and the 2nd Brigade, including Captain Abbott's battery, and, halting the first day at Sultanpore, passed Sale at Futtehabad, and encamped in the valley of Neemlah on the 22nd of August, near the celebrated garden planted by the Emperor Baber. On the following day, the column pushed up the hill to Gundamuck, and formed the camp on the table-land.

Hearing that the enemy were in force at the fort and village of Mammoo Khail, three miles in advance, General Pollock, at four a.m. on the 24th of September, moved to attack them. He divided his force into two columns, with a wing of Her Majesty's 9th in front of each, and directed Captain Broadfoot to proceed with a third to the right of Colonel Taylor's* column, where, as usual, he did

* Colonel Taylor, of the 9th Regiment, a very gallant officer, who fell in the Punjaub.

good service. Captain Abbott accompanied the main column, and opened the ball with his guns, when the enemy retired and the village was occupied.

The left column, under Brigadier Tulloch, then advanced against the fort of Mammoo Khail, which was evacuated, and the right, or Taylor's, column, which was accompanied by Generals Pollock and McCaskill, drove the Ooloos from the peaks of the Suffeid Koh, and proceeded to Koochlee Khail, two miles in advance. Here some sharp skirmishing took place, and after the village had been destroyed by fire, the columns retired to Mammoo Khail, to which the camp was brought up from Gundamuck on the following day.

Captain Abbott writes on the 28th, from Mammoo Khail, of this affair:—"While in the act of dismissing our men on encamping at Gundamuck, we observed that a considerable body of Afghans occupied the village of Mammoo Khail, some four miles to the south. Some sowars came down to reconnoitre us, and our cavalry gave them a chase, but without overtaking them. The enemy proved to be a body of some 1,200 men, commanded by Khyroolla Khan (brother to Zemaun Khan, whom the rebels made King), Golam Jaun, son of the Chief

of Mammoo Khail, and a rascal named Hadji Khan. In my letters of November last, I must have described this place which we occupied on the 5th of November, the enemy flying before us. It stands about five miles south of the Cabul road, and about two miles from the foot of a lofty range of hills. There is a very considerable ascent the whole way, and the road is rugged and stony until it reaches the cultivated land where it becomes a huge flight of steps, the narrow fields rising one above the other with banks from two to four feet high between them. At daylight on the 24th, we advanced and soon came in contact with the enemy's outposts, whom I drove in easily at the expense of a few shells, and then advancing, again commenced a cannonade on the main body, when they decamped into the dense groves of the village. The guns could not move beyond the fort of Mammoo Khail, but our Light Infantry and Cavalry pursued, though the latter were stopped by flooded rice fields, which covered all the ground ahead of us, and the infantry had the skirmish all to themselves."

This first success on the march to Cabul, was achieved with the loss of only seven killed and forty-five wounded, including four officers. The division returned to Gundamuck on the 30th of

August, having first inflicted punishment on the treacherous villagers.

Abbott says:—"We destroyed all the vineyards, and cut deep rings round trees of two centuries' growth. It is lamentable to see the mischief done, but the example was quite necessary. We treated them well in November, and they attacked our rear the moment we moved from Gundamuck."

Having obtained a sufficiency of supplies, General Pollock marched on the 7th of September for Cabul, with the first division of his army, including Captain Abbott's battery, under the command of Sir Robert Sale. The second division, under General Mc Caskill and Brigadier Tulloch, marched on the following day from Gundamuck, where a strong detachment was left behind in an entrenched camp.*

* The first Division consisted of two guns horse-artillery; Captain Abbott's battery; three guns of Captain Backhouse's mountain-train; Her Majesty's 3rd Dragoons; one squadron 1st Cavalry; three Rissalahs (Tait's) Irregular Cavalry; Her Majesty's 9th and 13th Foot; 26th and 35th Native Infantry; five companies Sappers; Captain Broadfoot's Sappers; and Mr. Mackeson's Pioneers. The second Division consisted of four guns horse-artillery; two squadrons 1st Cavalry; three Rissalahs 3rd Irregulars; Her Majesty's 31st Foot; right wings of 33rd and 60th Native

On the 8th of September, as he approached the Jugdulluck Pass, General Pollock found the enemy occupying in great force the hills guarding the Pass, and the *sungas*, or breastworks, they had thrown up to defend them. Captain Abbott's battery was in advance, and opened a heavy fire, scattering the stones of the breastwork among the defenders, when the infantry advanced in three columns, under Colonel Taylor, Captain Broadfoot, and Major Wilkinson. The latter column, which was headed by the 13th Light Infantry, was led in person by the gallant chief of the Jellalabad garrison, ever foremost where fighting was on the *tapis*, and his usual fortune did not desert him on this occasion, for he was wounded, being the third time since the storm of Ghuznee. After a severe struggle, the Ghilzyes fled to the precipitous heights above the Pass, whither they were pursued by two columns, under Broadfoot and Wilkinson, which, advancing under cover of Abbott's and Backhouse's guns, drove them thence in ignominious flight. "Seldom," wrote General Pollock, "have soldiers had a more arduous task to perform, and never was an undertaking of the kind surpassed in

Infantry; and a portion of the Sikh Contingent, under Captain H. Lawrence.

execution." This great success, which was achieved with one division of the army, only cost the loss of six killed and fifty-eight wounded.

General Pollock followed up his victory, and pushing on, encamped that night at Kuttur Sung, but the labour was severe in dragging the guns over such a road.

On the 10th he reached Seh Baba, and on the 11th arrived at Tezeen, where he was joined by General McCaskill's division. Here a halt was necessary to rest the draught cattle. Captain Abbott dated a letter from here on the following day, giving interesting details of the march from Gundamuck, and the action at Jugdulluck.

He writes to a relative in England from the camp at Tezeen, under date of the 12th of September :—

"We left Gundamuck at daylight on the 7th, and at three miles reached a conical hill, where our unfortunate Cabul force made its last hopeless and desperate stand. The hill is literally covered with skeletons, most of them blanched by exposure to the rain and the sun, but many having hair of a colour which enabled us to recognise the remains of our own countrymen. From thence to the Soorkaub, we saw but few bones, but at the ford of

the river there was a considerable heap, and some caves contained the bodies of Hindoostani people recently murdered. The whole road from Soorkaub to Jugdulluck was similarly marked, and it is useless to attempt any account of the horrible sight. Suffice it to say, we passed skeletons thrown into heaps of eighty and a hundred.

"At the crest of the Jugdulluck Pass, the whole of the Ghilzye chiefs drew up their forces to oppose us, about 4,000 men, who held admirable positions covering the Pass. Our course lay up the spur of a mountain, and was completely enfiladed by a stone breastwork, on which the road led directly. On parallel spurs of the mountain, the enemy held positions flanking us on either side, and their main force was on the crest of the range of hills over which we wished to pass. It was really a pretty sight; numerous standards, amongst which we recognised some Jellalabad friends, were displayed, and the enemy seemed conscious of their strength, and confident in their ability to repulse our force. Our column consisted of two regiments of infantry, some sappers, and nine guns, four of my battery being in advance; we had also a good many cavalry, who could be of no use on such ground. After a good deal of delay, General Pollock allowed my guns

to advance and drive the enemy out of the stone breastwork, which was easily done, as the shot went right through the work, sending the stones right and left amongst the party that held it. Our sappers attacked the principal flanking column of the enemy, and our infantry rushed on with cheers, which were too much for the nerves of the Ghilzyes. Gool Mahomed, who was on the right of the enemy, was the first to fly, and the remainder abandoned the defence of the Pass, and took post on a very steep and lofty mountain, which they thought our men would never be able to ascend. On the height they again raised their standards, and again set up their yell of defiance. General Pollock now ordered Sale's brigade to ascend the hill and complete the victory by dislodging the enemy, and this work was beautifully done by the old garrison of Jellalabad, who ascended with little loss, supported by the fire of my battery and the mountain-train. The victory was now complete, and the Ghilzye chiefs dispersed.

"Yesterday we arrived here, having had a slight skirmish on the road, and the rear division having joined us at the expense of much labour and of much baggage, a halt became necessary. We are surrounded by marauders awaiting our movement to attack our baggage, and the firing at our picquets

is almost incessant. We got a little forage from the lower fort of Tezeen, which was evacuated on our approach, but my horses have none to-day. However, I hope they will still go on well to Cabul."

Before night fell on the 12th September, it became evident that Akbar Khan intended to make his final stand at Tezeen. He had sent away the greater portion of the ladies and officers he held as prisoners to the Hindoo Khoosh, and taking with him Captains Troup and Bygrave, proceeded to Khoord-Cabul, where he proposed to fight. But mistaking the halt of the British army at Tezeen for indecision on the part of its leaders, he hastily moved on that position, and, on the evening of the 12th, attacked the picquets on the left flank, which brought on a sharp skirmish with a detachment of the 9th Regiment, sent by Pollock, under Colonel Taylor, to drive the Afghans back. The enemy now attacked on the right flank, and the attempts on the picquets continued throughout the night, giving an earnest of what might be expected on the morrow, when the General had resolved to force the Pass, a formidable defile about four miles in length, defended by an army of not less than 16,000 men, under Akbar Khan and other redoubtable leaders,

including Mahomed Shah Khan, and Ameenoollah Khan.

On the morning of the 13th of September, General Pollock advanced to force the Tezeen Pass. He divided his army into three columns. The advance, which he accompanied, was under Sir Robert Sale; the main column, which included four of Abbott's guns, was commanded by General McCaskill; and the rear guard, with the two remaining guns of No. 6 Field Battery, was placed under Colonel Richmond, of the 33rd Native Infantry. The British troops at once commenced to scale the heights, three companies from each of the three European regiments (the 9th, 13th, and 31st), leading the two columns, under the protection of the fire of the guns. After a conflict, in which the Afghans, almost for the first time, waited for the bayonet, the British infantry, closely followed by the Goorkhas and Sepoys, drove them from crag to crag until they took refuge on the summits of the Huft Kothul, nearly 8,000 feet above the level of the sea. But even these almost inaccessible peaks did not shelter them, and at length the Huft Kothul itself was crowned, and a 24-pounder howitzer captured. A second gun was captured by a squadron of 3rd Dragoons, led by Captain Tritton,

and two horse-artillery guns of Major Delafosse's troop, and the former cut up the fugitives handsomely. Major Skinner, of the 31st, who had been detached with a column, operated on the right flank with considerable success, and Colonel Richmond, in command of the rear guard, was equally successful in guarding the baggage, owing to his admirable arrangements. Having dispersed the enemy with great slaughter, his own loss being 23 killed and 140 wounded, General Pollock advanced through the Pass, and encamped at Khoord-Cabul. In passing through that terrible defile, 3,000 soldiers and camp-followers had been slaughtered during the retreat in the preceding January, and the skeletons still lay so thick that the artillerymen had to move them on one side to prevent the guns passing over them.

Of the action at Tezeen, Captain Abbott writes:

"On the afternoon of the 12th of September, we saw large bodies of the enemy closing around us. A party of the 9th Foot attacked one of these bodies and handled it severely, but during the night a picquet of the 60th Native Infantry was driven from its position with great loss. Next morning, a strong advanced guard entered the narrow Pass, and a strong rear guard remained in

the valley until all the camels had filed into the Pass. The enemy allowed us to proceed two miles unmolested, and then we came upon their force, so posted as to bring us for a short time to a halt. Our men ascended the heights gallantly. The enemy resisted desperately, so that the conflict was often hand to hand. The bayonet, however, aided by the guns, prevailed, and we drove the Ghilzyes from one position to another until at length they were all in full flight. We captured two howitzers on the road above the Huft Kothul, and the dragoons cut up some of the fugitive horsemen of the enemy. Meanwhile the rear guard was furiously attacked, but a charge of cavalry drove the assailants before it, and the Afghan horse, though amounting to near 4,000, would never again venture within reach of the guns of the guard. Akbar's whole force of 16,000 men dispersed in all directions, and he himself next day fled to the Kohistan, and thence to Ghorebund."

Taking his usual precaution to crown the heights on either flank, General Pollock marched on the 14th from Khoord-Cabul to Boodhak, without meeting with any opposition, and on the following day encamped on the race-course before Cabul. On the 16th of September, he proceeded into the city,

accompanied by a strong escort of troops, and the British flag, from which all stains of dishonour had been washed out by this brilliant campaign, was once more hoisted on the Bala Hissar, amid the cheers of the troops and under a royal salute.

On the same day, the few captives who had been left at Cabul by Akbar Khan, arrived in the camp, and the remainder on the 21st. These latter, including Ladies Sale and Macnaghten, had proceeded as far as Bamian, in the Hindoo Khoosh, and all hope of escape seemed at an end, when they succeeded in effecting their own liberation by bribing their custodian, Saleh Mohamed, formerly of Captain Hopkins's Afghan Regiment. While on their return march, they were met by a body of 700 Kuzzilbash* Horse, led by Sir Richmond Shakespear, (one of Captain Abbott's subalterns up to the time of his accompanying Major D'Arcy Todd's mission to Herat in 1839, and now Military Secretary to General Pollock,) who had volunteered to proceed to their rescue.

While at Jellalabad, Captain Abbott had received a letter from Lord Ellenborough, nominating him

* Kuzzilbash, which means "red head," was the name by which the Persian colony, established by Nadir Shah in Cabul, was known. They were always friendly to the English.

Honorary Aide-de-camp,* and he was further promised the command of a troop of horse-artillery. On the 4th of October, he received a second very handsome letter from his Lordship, conferring on him the post of Gun-Carriage Agent at Futtehgurh, the emoluments being 1,350 rupees per mensem, and quarters.

General Nott arrived at Cabul on the 17th of September, and, on the 12th of October—after summary punishment had been inflicted by a column, under General McCaskill, on Istaliff, in the Kohistan, the residence of that arch-traitor and assassin, Ameenoollah Khan, and the great bazaar of Cabul had been destroyed by gunpowder, under Frederick Abbott's direction, as a mark of vengeance for the treachery of its inhabitants—the British army commenced its return march to India.

Captain Abbott's battery formed part of the main column, under General Pollock's immediate command, which, owing to the General's admirable arrangements, threaded the Passes with its baggage, and reached Jellalabad, without sustaining any loss. As the Sikhs had previously declined to accept of the town, the defences were demolished, and on the

* The only other officer of the Jellalabad garrison on whom this honour was conferred, was Captain Oldfield, of the 5th Cavalry.

27th of October, Generals Pollock and McCaskill moved towards the Khyber with two divisions, while Nott brought up the rear. On his arrival at Dakka, forty-two miles east of Jellalabad, General Pollock led the advance column, consisting of the 1st and 4th Brigades, including Abbott's battery, and General McCaskill followed with the 2nd and 3rd Brigades. On the 1st of November, Pollock's Division arrived at Ali Musjid, and, at length, emerging from the gloomy portals of the Khyber Pass—familiarly known to the Army of Afghanistan as the "Good Old Trap"—encamped at Jumrood.

General McCaskill cleared the Pass on the 4th of November, and General Nott, who destroyed Ali Musjid, on the 6th, both divisions having been furiously attacked by the Afreedees, and suffered considerable loss in men and baggage.

The march through the Passes between Cabul and Jumrood was very harassing to the troops, owing to the enormous convoy of baggage, camp-followers, guns, fugitive Hindoos (from Ghuznee and Cabul, some 2,000 in number, who attached themselves to Pollock's column), warlike stores, and lastly, the gates of Somnauth,* which Lord

* It has since been conclusively shown that these gates never were in the temple of Somnauth.

Ellenborough, in a childish freak, directed General Nott to bring with him from Ghuznee.

Captain Abbott writes from Ali Musjid on the 1st of November :—" On one march of eight miles our rear-guard did not arrive till daylight the following morning, and I was once out on a lofty ridge with all my guns until nine p.m., waiting while the whole infantry of the rear-guard dragged a number of useless carriages up a difficult Pass. We made a week's halt at Jellalabad, and I was sorry to see the old walls destroyed, and our quarters burnt. The great length of the Khyber would call for a vast body of troops to keep up communications, if menaced by a determined enemy. Yesterday evening we came up a tremendous ascent of three miles (the Lundikhana), and the artillery remained all night on its crest, awaiting the advance this morning of the army, which came twelve and a half miles farther to this camp. We found Ali Musjid two miles short of our camp, and have before us another difficult hill, which will terminate our troubles. Ali Musjid is a very paltry fort, commanding the most difficult part of the Khyber, and its possession is essential to an army forcing the Pass. A fine spring of water gushes from the hill side, 800 yards above the fort, and another wells from the ground im-

mediately under it, but the garrison cannot command a supply of water, and Mr. Mackeson, when defending the place, used to make the Afreedees ransom the bodies of those killed near the walls, by the payment of so many skins of water."

On the 12th of November, General Pollock marched from the camp, four miles from Peshawur, (where he, Nott, Sale, and their officers had been handsomely entertained by General Avitabile) across the Punjaub, to Ferozepore, where the Governor-General had assembled an army of 25,000 men, under the command of Sir Jasper Nicolls, and made grand preparations for the reception of the successful warriors.

The first to cross the Sutlej by the bridge of boats, on the 17th of December, was the Jellalabad Brigade, headed by their gallant chief, and Lord Ellenborough, desirous of showing them especial honour, met the "illustrious" garrison at the foot of the bridge, while the army of reserve, formed in one line extending two miles and a half, received them in review order with presented arms, and the artillery saluted with nineteen guns, and the bands played.

It was a brilliant and suggestive spectacle, and

every pulse beat high as the small band of heroes—who had rendered the memory of Jellalabad one which every Englishman must regard with pride—swept past the regiments of the noble army assembled to do them honour. General Pollock crossed the Sutlej with his army on the 19th of December, and General Nott, dragging the Somnauth gates, on the 23rd, but they were not received with presented arms and salutes, an invidious distinction, due to the orders of Lord Ellenborough, which was in bad taste, to say the least of it.

Now succeeded a saturnalia of banquets and balls, varied by military reviews and receptions, and the war-worn heroes of Jellalabad, Candahar, and Tezeen might have said:—

> "Now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths;
> Our bruised arms hung up for monuments;
> Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings,
> Our dreadful marches to delightful measures."

But Captain Abbott had no relish for such gaieties, and his only anxiety was to reach Calcutta before the 20th of January, when his children, who had lost their mother during his absence in Afghanistan, sailed for England. He writes to a relative:—

"I have no fancy for such vanities, and would rather avoid the call for full-dress coats, &c."

And so, amid a scene of revelry and military display, the great Afghan war was brought to a conclusion.

That eminent critic and literary authority, Dr. Johnson, inspired by his veneration for the classic "unities," closes his commentary of Shakespeare's play of Othello, by the expression of his opinion that had the scene opened, as it closed, at Cyprus, there had been little wanting to a drama "of the most exact and scrupulous regularity." This criticism cannot be applied to the great Afghan tragedy. In 1838, amid a scene of festivity and martial display, the curtain rose on the vast plain of Ferozepore—a scene fitted for historic events, for here, as some suppose, Alexander, twenty-one centuries before, had erected altars to commemorate the limits of his conquest; and here, only three years after the close of the Afghan *imbroglio*, the Sikh army crossed the Sutlej for the invasion of British territory——and again, in 1842, the curtain fell on a repetition of balls, banquets, and reviews. Thus the "unities" of the drama were preserved in their integrity.

But what a change these four short years had

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wrought among the *dramatis personæ* of the mighty tragedy in which the destinies of nations and the lives of armies had formed the stakes. Runjeet Singh was dead. Shah Soojah, the *teterrima causa belli*, Macnaghten, and Burnes, lay in unknown graves in that land whither ambition had led them; while a holocaust of officers and men had been sacrificed at the shrine of the insane policy for which the sponsors, Lord Auckland and Sir John Hobhouse, were rewarded, the one with an earldom, and the other with a barony! But the memory of the brave men whose bones lay bleaching in Afghan Passes, was not suffered to detract from the gaiety of the show at Ferozepore, where all, once more, "went merry as a marriage bell."

Thus it was acknowledged by the world, which formed the audience before whom the curtain was quickly descending at that Christmas of 1842, that the last act of this tremendous drama, like the first, and the interlude of Jellalabad, was a decided success.

THE END.

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