THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

H. CHARLES WOODS, F.R.G.S.
THE CRADLE OF THE WAR
Other Works by the Same Author

THE DANGER ZONE OF EUROPE
WASHED BY FOUR SEAS
LA TURQUIE ET SES VOISINS
WAR AND DIPLOMACY IN THE BALKANS
THE

CRADLE OF THE WAR

THE NEAR EAST AND PAN-GERMANISM

BY

H. CHARLES WOODS, F.R.G.S.
(Lecturer before the Lowell Institute 1917-1918)

WITH FOREWORD BY A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
PRESIDENT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY

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To

MY MOTHER AND FATHER

WHOSE DEVOTED ENCOURAGEMENT

HAS BEEN MY CONSTANT SUPPORT

IN A STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS

HEREIN DISCUSSED
FOREWORD

AMERICANS regard the Balkan question much as Lincoln in his Second Inaugural Address described their view of slavery. "All know", he said, "that this interest was somehow the cause of the war. . . . Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease when, or even before, the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph and a result less fundamental and astounding."

There is, however, this difference between slavery and the Balkan question, that slavery, as we now see, was the real and only cause of the Civil War. Without the difference in social institutions the North and South would never have been in armed conflict, and in spite of the blunders of reconstruction the abolition of slavery has removed all danger, and suspicion of a danger, of war between the two sections of the country. Whereas the Balkan question, in its narrower sense, was rather the occasion than the cause of the struggle that is now raging. Nevertheless, the Near East has long been a source of anxiety to European statesmen, a storehouse of explosive material that
might at any time start a general conflagration. It will so remain until its problems are settled upon a rational and permanent basis and until the danger of Teutonic domination has been removed.

The United States will be compelled to take part in the settlement of these problems. But at present its people are, in most cases, wholly unfamiliar with the racial, religious, political and geographical factors that lie beneath the questions to be solved. They ought, therefore, to welcome a book which portrays the recent history and condition of the peninsula and of its component nationalities, by a writer who has studied his subject on the spot.

A. LAWRENCE LOWELL.

Harvard University, Cambridge
June 12, 1918
PREFACE

A PRELIMINARY duty of the author of a modern volume, and especially of one dealing almost exclusively with events which have led up to, or taken place during, the world's greatest war, seems to be to explain the reasons for which the book has been written, to state the methods by which the information contained in it has been acquired, and to assist the reader, who has neither time nor desire to make close acquaintance with the whole of its pages, to discover at a glance what particular sections will be of the greatest interest to him.

Before performing this duty, I will, however, give the reasons which have prompted me to call this book "The Cradle of the War." For many years, and more especially since the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, the numerous problems connected with the Near East have been a source of continual danger to the world's peace. This was due in part to the fact that the Balkan Peninsula and Asia Minor might at any time be the scenes of insurrection, massacre, or local conflict, and in part—a larger part—to the international rivalry which has existed for years concerning a future domination over many of the areas in question.

These localities, together with the waterways which they control, form the great and only corridor from
west to east and from north to south, and they constitute the natural highway from Central Europe to Asia and from Russia to the Mediterranean. Thus, ever since the birth of her Mittel-Europa scheme, Germany has been determined to push open the Near-Eastern door, in order to be able to strike a deadly blow at the very vitals of the British Empire, and at the same time automatically to prevent Russia from expanding towards warm water. As I shall endeavour to show, therefore, it is not so much the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, as the developments preceding and following that occurrence which make the Near East the region of primary existence of the present conflict—the area in which many of its most important events have been sheltered and nurtured.

In the manner that a little cot is made ready for the expected child, so did the enemy prepare for the war which he was designing. This preparation, in progress from the time of the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888, was carried out by the gradual development of Germanic influence and power in Turkey, and by a constant and determined opposition to the establishment of stable conditions in the Near East. From the moment of the birth of his war child, too, the Kaiser has been an ever vigilant mother, for instead of allowing the real primary cause of the world conflict to be forgotten, he has consistently rocked the "cradle" in the apparent hope that she who performs this task rules the world.

My most important object in publishing this volume is to explain to the wide public, now interested in the
subject, the importance of a situation which is not always clearly understood by those who have not had the opportunity of visiting the Near East. In particular I hope to prove that, as the enemy has consistently worked for the establishment of Germanic control throughout the East, any peace which failed to put an end to the danger of the success of such an object, and any arrangement which would be ineffecti ve in setting up an anti-Germanic barrier there, must be considered as entirely unsatisfactory from the Allied and American standpoint.

The book itself, which is based upon the manuscript from which I drew the notes for my course of lectures upon "War and Diplomacy in the Balkans", delivered before the Lowell Institute at Boston during the winter of 1917–1918, makes no pretension to be a continuous account of all the events which have taken place during the period which it covers. It claims merely to point out the meaning of some of the questions which have led up to and influenced the present situation. Moreover, whilst I have been a constant visitor to the countries about which I am writing, and whilst I have had numerous conversations with many of the most prominent men mentioned in the text, I have endeavoured to bring my local knowledge of the countries and of their peoples to bear instead of depending upon information furnished by statesmen, political chiefs, or historians, who, however honest they may wish to be, are almost invariably possessed of some national prejudice or personal feeling which prevents them from seeing this great world question with that fairness which is so necessary if we are to be in a position to grasp its true present
and future significance. As far as possible, too, I have attempted to produce facts in preference to expressions of personal opinion, for, under existing circumstances, it is a clear and impartial judgment by the public rather than the verdict of a particular man which will lead to the amelioration of conditions which must be terminated by the present War.

Of the twelve chapters of which the volume is composed the first is given up to a summary of the events which occurred during the sixty years preceding the outbreak of the War—a summary in course of which I have sought to point out that the so-called settlement, which followed the Balkan Wars, was of such an unsatisfactory nature as merely to prepare the way for a renewed conflagration. Chapters II to VII inclusive are devoted to accounts of recent developments, in the various Balkan States and in Turkey, and in particular to reviews of the causes which have led the different countries in question to assume their individual war policies. In the course of these sections I have alluded to the value of the Serbo-Montenegrin resistance of 1914–1915, to the meaning and importance of the Mesopotamian and Syrian campaigns, and to the reasons responsible for the Roumanian defeat and for the situation existing in Greece during the greater part of the War.

Chapters VIII and XI, which respectively contain accounts of the Military Highways of the Balkans and of the Bagdad Railway, accounts founded upon recent papers which I have read before The Royal Geographical Society, are in some ways more detailed and more comprehensive than are certain other sections of the book, and this because the war importance
of these communications is such as specially to merit their careful and attentive study.

In Chapters IX and X no attempt is made to provide detailed accounts of the progress of the Dardanelles and Salonica campaigns. Here my principal idea has been to suggest the objects and results of those undertakings, and to utilize my personal knowledge of the areas in question for the purpose of trying to make clear the numerous geographical and military difficulties with which these operations were or are beset.

Throughout these pages repeated reference is made to the fact that, for years, the Central Powers have worked not for stable government but for unrest in the East. Nevertheless I have devoted my last chapter to the subject of the Mittel-Europa scheme, for the importance of that question and especially of its latest developments in Roumania and Russia is such as to necessitate its individual and separate consideration. In this section, too, I have included a few pages about the future — a future which must entail the establishment of conditions likely to result in local peace and accord, and therefore in a guarantee that no excuse will exist for outside interference on the part of those possessed of aggressive and tyrannical designs.

Among other reasons the fact that they are far too numerous prevents me from tendering my thanks by name to all those, belonging to the countries about which I have written, in England and in America, who have given me their valuable assistance during the years I have followed the development of events in the Near East. I wish, however, to signify my
appreciation to those, who, by their attendance at
and by their interest shown in my lectures at home
and in America, have stimulated me, an Englishman,
far from home, to undertake the difficult task of the
preparation of such a book as this in war time. I
must also take this opportunity of expressing my
thanks to The Royal Geographical Society for the
permission given to reproduce the several maps, pre-
pared for my original papers, by that Society, to the
American Board of Foreign Missions for the many
courtesies shown to me by its representatives in the
East and in America, and to the British Pictorial
Service for the provision of certain of the illustrations
included in this volume.

H. Charles Woods.

New York, July 11, 1918.
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THE CRADLE OF THE WAR

I

THE NEAR EAST BEFORE THE GREAT WAR

History has proved that in the past the Near East has been both the scene of and the reason for war after war. Consequently throughout the last few decades, and especially from the time of the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution in the year 1908, the political and military situations in the Balkan Peninsula and in Asiatic Turkey have been questions of all-preponderating importance. This has been due in part to the continued state of unrest prevailing there, in part to the rivalry existing in Europe concerning the futures of these areas, and in part—a greater part—to the intrigues of the Central Powers, who finally brought about the present war. In short the Near East, which was the immediate cause and, when coupled with the Pan-German desire for domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf, to a great extent the actual reason of the present conflagration, has been for many years "The Danger Zone of Europe"—a "danger zone" which in its turn has played an all-important rôle in events which have taken place since the summer of 1914.
In order to be able to arrive at a proper understanding of the problems existing there immediately prior to the outbreak of the present war, it is necessary very briefly to refer to various historical events which have taken place in connection with that area during the last half-century. The Crimean War, undertaken as it was in support of Turkey against Russia, constituted the substitution of the anti-Russian and pro-Turkish policy of Lord Palmerston for the opposite programme advocated by Mr. Bright, who championed the cause of peace and of the Oriental Christians. During the ensuing twenty years, with the exception of the constitution of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 and the consequent spiritual independence of the Bulgarian from the Orthodox Greek Church, no developments of far-reaching significance occurred. In 1875, however, when a revolution against Turkish authority broke out in Herzegovina and to a certain extent in Bosnia, it appeared probable that the explosion would spread throughout the Balkans. That revolution was, however, localised, and it was not until 1877, as a result of the massacre of Bulgarians in the present kingdom of Bulgaria in 1876, that Russia took up arms to protect the Slavs of the south and waged a war which constitutes an event of far-reaching importance.

Whilst the actual results of that war were that the Sultan lost a considerable area of his European dominions, that the Principality of Bulgaria and the Province of Eastern Roumelia were created, that the independence of Serbia and of Roumania from Turkish suzerainty was recognised, and that part of Armenia was annexed to Russia, the real bearing of that cam-
paign upon the future history of this part of the world is bound up not so much with these results as with what would have been its consequences had Russia been left undisturbed to settle her differences with Turkey. A preliminary treaty was signed between the representatives of the Tsar on the one hand and those of the Sultan on the other on March 17, 1878. Known as the Treaty of San Stefano, in Europe it created a large Bulgaria and in Asia it practically freed the Armenians from Turkish yoke. But that agreement did not meet with the approval of the British Government, which feared that Bulgaria would become a puppet state of Russia, and that the expansion of Muscovite power in Asia would constitute a menace to the British position in the East. The results were that a convention, known as the Cyprus Convention, by which Great Britain guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, in exchange for the Sultan’s promise to introduce the necessary reforms in his dominions, and for the lease of the Island of Cyprus, was signed between the British and Turkish governments, and that a European Congress was summoned at Berlin in June, 1878. The Treaty of Berlin, which was the outcome of that Congress, handed back large districts of what is known as Macedonia in European Turkey, inhabited almost exclusively by Bulgarians, to Turkey, and, although nominally insisting upon reforms in that area and in Armenia, in fact left the people of those unhappy districts at the mercy of the Ottoman authorities. In short, whilst the Russo-Turkish Campaign of 1877–1878 was really the first war fought for the independence of Macedonia and Armenia, its results and the manner in which the
Great Powers allowed Turkey to ignore her obligations of reform were the direct causes of the events which led up to the Balkan conflagrations of 1912 and 1913 — conflagrations which in their turn left the way ready for the present war.

With the British support of Bulgaria in 1885, when Eastern Roumelia was incorporated in that country, with the attitude taken up by the British Government during the Armenian Massacre crisis of 1894-1896, and with the granting to Crete of an autonomous régime in 1897, there occurred a nominal change of policy. But even after that no serious attempts were made by Europe to prevent the prolongation of a reign of terror in Macedonia and Armenia — a reign of terror which was rapidly becoming unbearable. In 1903 there came the massacres in Macedonia — massacres which, be it known, were accepted as constituting the slaughter of a Bulgarian and not of a Serbian population — and the beginning of a new British policy arising not from Russian but from German danger. Later in that year there was formulated an arrangement known as the Murztesg Scheme of Reforms — a scheme which gave Austria and Russia the predominating share in the control of Macedonia but which admitted the presence and support of the other Great Powers. By it and by the agreements subsequently made, all sorts of reforms were promised. Civil assessors were provided, and European officers, representing all the Great Powers except Germany, who did not participate, were appointed for the purpose of seeing that these reforms were actually carried out by the Ottoman Government. This scheme, which constituted a tardy effort on the part of Europe to see that the treaty
obligations of Turkey were actually fulfilled, was however treated as a scrap of paper; the hands of the international officials were tied, and the state of Macedonia daily grew worse and worse. In Armenia, too, the lot of the people gradually became more dreadful, for whilst reforms were discussed and proposed, Turkey, profiting by the differences always existing between the Great Powers, endeavoured slowly to annihilate this unhappy race.

It was during this troublous period that the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, which has its headquarters in Boston, established numerous posts, hospitals, and schools in Asia Minor, and began to perform such indefatigable work for the amelioration of the Ottoman Christians. The representatives of this organisation, many of whom I have been privileged to meet, and much of whose work I have been able to watch, have devoted themselves with untiring devotion and under conditions of complete self-denial, to the task of bettering the lives of and educating the peoples who, as a consequence, have grown to realise the true meaning of Western cultivation and civilisation. In short, the existence of the Robert College at Constantinople and of the College for Girls in the same city, which are not directly under the control of the above-mentioned Board, together with the judgment and the high-mindedness of the American missionaries, are largely responsible for the facts that the name of the United States has grown to be spoken of with reverence, and that America is respected throughout Armenia, Bulgaria, and Albania.

Whilst the policies of England and Russia during the thirty years following the signature of the Treaty
of Berlin may be described as those of procrastination, the Central Powers and particularly Germany were working and intriguing for the maintenance of a state of unrest in the East destined to prepare the way for the eventual realisation of their policies. Indeed, ever since the accession of the present Emperor to the throne in 1888 that ruler has been carefully developing his influence in the East. One year later, and in 1889, His Majesty paid his first visit to Constantinople—a visit more or less connected with the then recent grabbing of the Scutari-Ismid railway and with the concession for the prolongation of that line to Angora as a German concern. Directly afterwards, early in 1890, by the “Dropping of the Pilot” there was in the retirement of Bismarck a clear reversal of the policy based upon the assertions of that statesman to the effect that the whole Eastern question was “not worth the bones of a Pomeranian Grenadier.” Before and particularly after the appointment of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein, who had then been a personal friend of the Kaiser’s for many years, as Ambassador in Constantinople in 1897, Germanic policy was run with the sole object of securing concessions in and gaining the favour of Turkey. Indeed although so far as the Balkan States were concerned the Kaiser at this time endeavoured to screen his intentions behind a nominally Austrian programme, he was really preparing the way for the realisation of his Pan-German dreams in the Near and Middle Easts. Thus the power of Von der Goltz Pasha, who introduced the present military system into Turkey in 1886, and of his pupils was greatly increased until the Ottoman army was finally completely under Germanic control.
After the Turco-Greek War of 1897, the Government of Berlin favoured Turkey in the settlement. In 1898 the Emperor paid his second visit to the Ottoman Empire—a visit nominally undertaken as a peaceful pilgrimage to Jerusalem but an excursion really decided upon as an elaborately arranged coup de théâtre. It was during that visit that the German ruler even went so far as to proclaim himself the friend of the Sultan and of all the Moslems who venerated him "for always"—a declaration no doubt in part responsible for the Bagdad Railway concession which almost immediately followed. In the later nineties, too, whilst reserving their right to a voice in its final settlement, Germany and Austria withdrew from the Concert of Europe, so far as concerned the Cretan question, thereby, of course, securing the good will of the ex-Sultan. Abdul Hamid's refusal to introduce reforms in his administration, continued unrest in his European dominions, and the appointment of European officers to the Macedonian gendarmerie in 1906, were all in their turns utilised to further the enemy's cause. In short, whilst divergencies of opinion among the Great Powers in regard to the Eastern question would, in any case, have rendered combined action in favour of reforms most difficult, the definite support given by Germany to the Sultan, with the express purpose of securing a powerful ally when "The Day" came, actually encouraged that ruler in the maintenance of a régime which finally became an actual disgrace to the whole civilised world.

So much for the events which took place during the period preceding the developments which immediately led to the Young Turkish Revolution of July, 1908.
The way for that revolution was made ready by the fact that the atrocities and misgovernment permitted by the Sultan had created a state of things which was not only intolerable to all the subject races of the Empire, but also to the more liberal-minded Turks themselves. The actual outbreak of 1908 resulted indirectly from the existence of the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes, which came into being respectively in 1904 and 1907, and directly from the meeting of King Edward with the ex-Tsar at Reval, on June 9, 1908. It was that meeting which decided the Committee of Union and Progress, then still a secret organisation, to take immediate action. That action was rendered possible by the spreading of untrue propaganda in the Ottoman army to the effect that the British policy bound up with the Crimean War had been reversed, and that England and Russia had now united with the object of bringing about the dismemberment of Turkey. In addition, the Albanians, who were holding a Congress at Ferisovitch in the following month, were utilised by the Young Turks to demand from Abdul Hamid a constitution, the meaning of which they did not understand. This demand, which was embodied in a telegram, nominally from the Albanians, but really concocted by the Committee of Union and Progress assembled at Uskub, and addressed to the Sultan, finally convinced His Majesty, who depended upon but none the less feared his Albanian Guard, that a constitution must be granted. The decree actually establishing the New Régime was signed at the end of July, 1908.

Internationally and locally the Young Turkish Revolution, the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by
Austria-Hungary, and the declaration of independence by Bulgaria which followed that revolution, mark an all-important epoch in the development of affairs in the Balkans, and in European history, which for years has been so closely bound up with the situation in the Near East. Internationally speaking, whilst the revolution in Turkey for a time caused the Ottoman Government to turn towards England instead of towards Germany, the annexation of Bosnia and the independence of Bulgaria are of primary importance, and therefore I will begin by a brief reference to the meaning of these events.

As a result of a cabinet council held at Rustchuk during the night of October 4–5, the actual declaration of Bulgarian independence was made by King Ferdinand at Turnovo, the ancient capital of Bulgaria, on October 5, 1908. Prior to this whether or not any formal agreement had been arrived at between the Austro-Hungarian Government and Prince Ferdinand concerning the annexation of the then only “occupied” provinces and the declaration of Bulgarian independence has always been far from clear. However this may be, and however vehemently both the parties who tore up the Treaty of Berlin in October, 1908, may deny that any arrangement was made, it is certain that when Prince Ferdinand arrived at Budapest on September 23, he was received by the Emperor Francis Joseph with royal honours. There is no doubt, too, that the proclamation of Bulgarian independence, at an early date, was actually decided upon by Prince Ferdinand during his visit to Vienna at the end of September. The question whether, and if so when, Count Aehrenthal was actually
officially informed of the Bulgarian programme is extremely delicate. Although, on October 3, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister officially denied to the British Ambassador at Vienna all knowledge of the impending declaration of Bulgarian independence, yet the Ambassador of the Dual Monarchy in Paris, when presenting the letter announcing the forthcoming annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to President Fallières on October 3, actually informed His Excellency of the imminent declaration of Bulgarian independence. Whatever may have been the knowledge officially possessed by the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the imminence of the Bulgarian declaration of independence it is therefore probable that Prince Ferdinand, possibly even in possession of Austro-Hungarian assurances that a declaration of independence would subsequently be permitted if the Bulgarian people remained calm during what was expected would only be formalities concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, may have considered it advisable to make good his opportunity, and effect his national coup d'état, while the statesmen of the Dual Monarchy were still putting the finishing touches upon their arrangements for the formal annexation of the already "occupied" provinces.

By far the most important international results of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina on October 7, 1908, were what may be described as the throwing back of the Dual Monarchy into the arms of Germany, and the accentuation of the division already becoming clearly marked between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. The policy of Count Aehrenthal, which seems to have been framed with the idea that
the annexation of the two already "occupied" provinces would be a mere formality, will probably be handed down in history as one of the greatest mistakes ever made in statesmanship. Instead of strengthening the European position of the Austro-Hungarian Government, the annexation, apparently made in ignorance of its immediate and far-reaching consequences, forced the Government of the late Emperor to turn to Germany for diplomatic assistance — assistance which was given but only at the expense of Austria once more becoming the mere puppet of her northern neighbour, instead of being able to develop her own independent existence. Moreover, as I shall show elsewhere, the policy of Count Aehrenthal went a long way towards increasing the tension already existing between Austria-Hungary and Serbia — a tension as a result of which it was certain that, at the given moment, Russia would come to the support of her little Slav brothers. It was these consequences which so greatly enhanced the difficulties accruing between Austro-Hungary and Russia during the Balkan Wars — difficulties which were in part responsible for the unsatisfactory arrangement of 1913.

The settlement between Turkey and Bulgaria, following the declaration of independence by King Ferdinand on October 5, 1908, in a way constituted a set-off to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because, whilst the Russian Government lost prestige at home and abroad as the result of its inability to come to the assistance of Serbia, it gained international reputation and strengthened its position in both directions by stepping into the breach between Bulgaria and Turkey. In February, 1909, and therefore when
the crisis between these two countries had been in progress for four months, a deadlock in the negotiations had been reached. Russia then addressed a circular Note to the Great Powers, signifying her willingness to come to some arrangement with the two parties concerned — an arrangement which would make good to Turkey the difference between the sum already tendered to and that claimed by her. Finally, and about a month later, the Muscovite Government cancelled part of the then remaining seventy-four instalments of the 1878 war indemnity due to her from Turkey, and accepted in exchange the approximately 82,000,000 francs already tendered to Turkey by Bulgaria. By this arrangement Russia may have been temporarily and materially the loser, but she thereby gained credit in the arena of European diplomacy by preventing an outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans — an outbreak which in all probability it would have been impossible to localise.

To summarise and to give any comprehensive idea of the meaning of the Young Turkish Revolution in what was then the Ottoman Empire itself, or to describe the effect of that movement in the countries bordering upon Turkey, are questions of the utmost difficulty. In July, 1908, as I have already said, the Young Turks successfully brought about a coup d'état, which, though it endowed the people with a nominal constitution, in fact created, in the form of the Committee of Union and Progress, a hidden and secret government even more autocratic than that of Abdul Hamid. Much has been written upon the subject of the organisation and work of that Committee, and though many be the conversations which I have had
with its prominent members, I can assert here, without fear of contradiction, that but very few, except the inner and secret ring of Young Turks themselves, even now understand more than the vaguest details of the manner in which this mysterious organisation attained its power, spread its influence, and, from the moment of the change of régime in 1908, kept the entire government of the country in its hands. All that need be said here, therefore, is that this body, which on various occasions has made a pretence of coming out into the open and becoming an official organisation, has nevertheless really existed as a secret group of individuals, the exact rôles and power of whom nobody has ever been able to discern with certainty. Thus whilst we have all heard a great deal about the influence and prestige of men like Enver and Talaat Pashas, the outside world knows but little of others, such as Doctor Nazim, who really constitute and are the secret influence behind the throne. This all-important politician scarcely ever appears in public, his name rarely figures in the papers, and he has never taken a governmental post. In conversation he appears most moderate, most liberal, and quite honest. But his never changing one-sidedness, his secret chauvinism, and his determination to ignore the true meaning of Liberalism, render him absolutely typical of the Young Turk mentality, and in fact make him the personification and the actual backbone of the Committee of Union and Progress itself.

The outstanding feature of the situation in the Ottoman Empire is the fact that its ruling nation, the Turks, constitutes only a minority of the inhabitants, and that they have formed, and do form, an army
of occupation in the country which they purport to govern. This means either that there can be no Liberalism or Constitutionalism in the country, or that its ruling caste would be outnumbered and outvoted by the various alien races of which the population is so largely composed. When the Young Turks came into power, they proclaimed as their motto "Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality", and asserted that what they wished to bring about was a state of feeling by which the former differences between Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, Arabs, etc. should be obliterated—a state of feeling in which there would only be "Ottomans." But the so-called "Ottomanisation" of the Empire really meant the attempted "Turcification" of the subject races—an attempted "Turcification" which has constituted and still constitutes the fundamental basis of the struggle which has been and is in progress in the dominions of the Sultan.

The historical events of the years 1908–1912 are so closely bound up with the internal situation in Turkey that I propose to discuss them all in connection with that situation, and to divide my remarks into three sections, each devoted to a more or less clearly defined stage in the development of Near-Eastern affairs. The first stage is that which may be said to have lasted for approximately a year from the time of the advent to power of the Young Turks. During it the instigators of the New Régime did something to improve the everyday conditions of life by bringing about the downfall of many of Abdul Hamid’s spies, by increasing personal security, and, up to a point, by allowing freedom of speech and of the press. These changes, together with the promise of equality for all
Ottomans, created in the minds of the non-Turkish inhabitants feelings of expectancy for the future. The leaders of the bands came in from the mountains and, on receiving a guarantee of a general amnesty, decided to throw in their lot with the so-called reformers. At first a kind of millennium seemed to have come. As a result of this, when I visited Macedonia in the summer of 1909, I found that everybody hoped that some real reforms would be introduced, that the Government would take the leaders of the various races into its confidence, and that the Christian populations would be permitted to play their part in the direction of the country, and to work out the manner in which reform should be executed in the best interests of the Empire as a whole.

The Committee not only refrained from living up to these hopes, but, having obtained an enormous majority in the Chamber, it openly filled the whole Ministry and all the government appointments with men recruited from its ranks. No endeavours were made to devote adequate sums of money to the construction of roads or railways other than those required for strategical purposes. In spite of the early and undoubted loyalty of the leaders of the various Christian races, the Armenians of the Cilician Plain were butchered in thousands in April, 1909, and a determined policy destined to withdraw many of the privileges, possessed in a greater or lesser degree by all the Christian races of the Empire, was inaugurated. Educational and religious freedom were curtailed, a brigandage law was put into operation in Macedonia before it was even passed by the Chamber, and the enforced surrender of arms was so brutally carried out that a reign
of terror was soon created, as terrible as that which existed prior to 1908. The Bulgarians were oppressed because of the fear of the support which might accrue to them from their already freed brethren of the kingdom of Bulgaria; the Greeks were persecuted on account of the then state of the Cretan question, and the Albanians were maltreated because of their desire to proclaim the existence of their nationality and to improve their education. In short, so rapidly and so disastrously did things develop that when I returned to Macedonia, early in 1910, I found the condition of things much worse than it had been only six months previously. Instead of expectancy there was hopelessness, and in place of loyalty there was natural distrust.

The second stage in the development of the internal situation in Turkey extended approximately from the beginning of the year 1910 until the end of 1911. When I was in Turkey in the winter of 1909–1910, as I have already explained, the non-Turkish elements of the population were not slow to abuse the New Régime. Albanians, Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs alike complained, and with reason, that the elections had been gerrymandered, and that the Young Turks had not fulfilled their promises made in 1908. But in 1909 these people did not assert that the Moslem population was being armed by the Government, that men were being illegally arrested, that Turkish bands were being secretly formed for the purpose of exterminating people believed to be in relation with revolutionaries, and that Christians, marked down for death, were being assassinated by order of the Committee of Union and Progress. During a tour in Macedonia and
Albania after the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War, men of all nationalities informed me, I have every reason to believe correctly, that the Turkish Government or, perhaps more correctly, the predominating clique of the Committee was actually sanctioning, or at least conniving at, this state of things.

At that time the situation in Macedonia was therefore as bad, if not worse, than that existing prior to the Constitution. Instead of the promised equality for all nationalities, the non-Turkish elements of the population had, so to speak, been placed beyond the pale of common justice. Christians were expelled from their farms in order to be replaced by Mouhaggirs (Moslem emigrants) from Bosnia and Bulgaria. A systematic and organised campaign for the murder of a large number of Bulgarians was instituted. In short, the Constitution had been reduced to nothing but a name. Moreover, whereas under the Old Régime the people enjoyed a certain protection from Europe under various schemes of reform sanctioned and undertaken by the Great Powers, and whereas their religious chiefs were then treated with a certain deference by the Constantinople Government, two years after the establishment of the Constitution these advantages had been done away with and instead no amelioration in the actual system of government had been introduced. Upon this point the feeling of the population seems to have been well expressed in a memorandum, drawn up by the Committee of the Bulgarian Internal Organisation, and handed to the Consuls of Great Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and France, on October 31, 1911. After discussing various aspects of the situation in Macedonia, this
document declared that: "Comparing the present state of things to that which existed during the last four years of the reign of Abdul Hamid, when there was in Macedonia a European Control, and when the country enjoyed a certain financial autonomy, the people find the present situation much more abominable and much more insupportable."

In Albania the fundamental causes of unrest — the attempted denationalisation of the people — were the same as in Macedonia. The system employed by the authorities and the attitude adopted by the inhabitants were, however, somewhat different. The Young Turks, in place of the secret persecution adopted in Macedonia, almost immediately took open measures to endeavour to reduce these warlike mountaineers, who had always enjoyed a sort of semi-independence, to a state of humble obedience to the Central Government. The result of this was that the Albanian question, which was perhaps the most important problem for solution by the Government, at once became a burning question, and that the attitude of the Turkish chauvinists brought about an almost immediate and continuous revolution. In the summer of 1910 an insurrection, which had for its causes the above-mentioned policy of the Young Turks and also the brutal measures taken by Djavid Pasha in Albania in 1908 and 1909, broke out in the vilayets of Scutari and Uskub. That insurrection, which was rife almost from end to end of Northern Albania, necessitated the sending of a considerable Turkish expeditionary force which, although partially successful, carried out its work with such brutality that the seeds were sown for the Malissori Revolution which took place during
the summer of the following year. That revolution, which began early in 1911 and lasted until the autumn, was really the beginning of the end so far as the Young Turks were concerned, for it proved that the Albanians, disorganised and divided as they were, could wring from the Government concessions — concessions which though never honestly carried out, nevertheless showed to Europe and to the neighbouring Balkan States that nothing could be accomplished in Turkey otherwise than by force.

This was the situation in the Ottoman Empire itself at the time of the outbreak and during the early months of the Turco-Italian War. Beyond its European frontiers, the neighbours of Turkey were waiting with anxiety the development of events in the Balkan Peninsula and elsewhere. The governments responsible for the foreign policies of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, all of whose Leaders I saw at the time, whilst professedly anxious for the immediate reestablishment of peace and for the maintenance of the "Status Quo", were still more concerned in making certain that, in view of the attitude of Europe, their particular country should not be the first to disturb the peace of this ever Danger Zone of Europe. The positions of all these Ministers were extremely difficult, for they were each threatened by a like danger — a danger due to the fact that the more chauvinistic politicians of each country were in favour of a forward policy drawn up with the object of endeavouring immediately to better the lot of their brothers domiciled across the Ottoman frontier. In Greece the Government was faced by the complications of and consequent upon the Cretan question.
At Belgrade the situation was particularly intricate, because the Serbian Administration was forced either quietly to witness the ill-treatment of the Serbs in Turkey by their Moslem fellow countrymen or else to draw the attention of Europe to a situation of disorder in the Ottoman Empire, by way of which alone Serbia could gain access to the sea. At Cetinje the Montenegrin authorities were in daily danger of finding themselves in the awkward dilemma of either refusing readmission to the discontented Albanians, or of facing the dangerous situation to be created by a fresh Albanian immigration. At Sofia the King and his advisers were not only compelled to study the feelings of the powerful section of the population which interests itself almost exclusively in the welfare of the Macedonian Bulgars, but they were also menaced by the attitude of the people who thought that the time had come for the employment of the powerful Bulgarian army, in order to solve once and for all the Macedonian question. Thanks, however, to the far-seeing and moderate attitudes adopted by M. Venezelos, by the late M. Milovanovitch, by M. Gregovitch, and by M. Gueshoff, the policies of Greece, Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria were so shaped that none of those countries rushed into war in the autumn of 1911, and they therefore had time adequately to prepare for and to make the arrangements necessary for the first Balkan campaign.

We now come to the third stage — the negotiations and events actually bound up with the formation of the Balkan League — negotiations which partially overlapped the second stage and to which I will allude in their chronological order. M. Gueshoff became
Bulgarian Premier in March, 1911. Shortly afterwards and in May, tentative overtures were made to him through the medium of Mr. James D. Bourchier — the well-known correspondent of The Times in the Balkans — who was then in Athens. From that time onwards, whilst relations between Bulgaria and Greece were certainly improved, nothing was done until October, when the Greek Minister at Sofia informed M. Gueshoff that Greece would be prepared to support Bulgaria in case she were attacked by Turkey, provided the latter country were willing to enter into a corresponding undertaking. The Government of Bulgaria, then threatened by the mobilisation of the Ottoman army which took place on the outbreak of the Turco-Italian War, agreed to those proposals, but nothing definite was then done to incorporate them in treaty form.

The beginning of that war found M. Gueshoff at Vichy, but he returned immediately to Bulgaria, holding a conference with M. Milovanovitch, then Serbian Premier, in the train and on his way through that country. That conference established a basis for the ensuing negotiations which were conducted between M. Gueshoff and M. Spalaikovitch, who was appointed to represent Serbia. These negotiations, which took the form of proposals and counter proposals upon the subject of the future of Macedonia and other matters of importance, continued in Sofia, Belgrade, and Paris, to which latter place M. Milovanovitch went with the King of Serbia, until the two countries finally signed a definite Treaty of Alliance and a Secret Annex — which are published in full by M. Gueshoff in his book entitled “The Balkan League” — on March
14, 1912. That Treaty, which was defensive in character, definitely guaranteed the support of each party to the other in the event of one of them being attacked by one or more States, or in the event of any Great Power attempting to invade or annex any part of then Turkey in Europe in a manner contrary to the vital interests of either party. Over and above these stipulations, undertakings were entered into binding the two signatories not to conclude peace independently and arranging for the immediate formulation of a military convention which was signed about six weeks later.

The Secret Annex, which has turned out to be really more important than the Treaty itself, foresaw the probability that internal or external difficulties in Turkey itself might render the maintenance of the Status Quo impossible and fixed the terms upon which action might then be taken. In addition it definitely decided the future distribution of any areas acquired either as a result of the defensive treaty or of what may be called the offensive annex. Whilst all territorial gains were to constitute common property, their repartition was to take place upon a definite basis. Serbia recognised the right of Bulgaria to the territory east of the Rhodopes and the River Struma, whilst Bulgaria recognised the similar right of Serbia to the territory north and west of the Schar Mountains. With regard to the area lying between these two boundaries, if the two governments became convinced that the formation of an autonomous province were impossible, then Serbia undertook to ask for nothing beyond a line drawn from Mount Golem on the northeast to Lake Ochrida on the southwest. Bulgaria
promised to accept this line, if His Majesty the Tsar, who was to be requested to arbitrate, decided in its favour. As autonomy was not then possible, the meaning of this agreement was that the Serbs were to claim nothing beyond the Mount Golem–Lake Ochrida line, that the Bulgarians were to claim nothing to the north and west of the Schar Mountains, and that all disputes concerning the district between these two lines, known as the "Contested Zone", were "to be submitted to the final decision of Russia as soon as one of the contracting parties declared that, in his opinion, an agreement by direct negotiations is impossible."

The military convention subsequently signed between Bulgaria and Serbia—a convention later followed by various agreements between the respective General Staffs—defined the military liabilities of the two countries towards one another in case of a defensive or offensive war and laid down the obligations of the respective parties in the case of a declaration of war upon Bulgaria by Roumania, and of Austrian or Turkish attacks upon Serbia. The number of troops to be furnished by the respective countries and certain arrangements as to their distribution were foreseen. All manner of arrangements were made to endeavour to secure the smooth working of the Alliance and to prevent the development of any friction between the commands or between the armies themselves. In fact, had it not been for the inherent rivalry existing between the two peoples and for their almost irreconcilable aspirations, the arrangements made upon paper were so little short of perfect that one might have expected that they would operate in war almost as
smoothly as the most formal arrangement governing the relations of two countries in peace time.

During the period of the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations, conversations were in progress between the Bulgarian Government and the Hellenic representative at Sofia. These conversations failed to materialise until after the signature of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty largely because the Greeks were slow to accept the principle of autonomy for Macedonia advocated by Bulgaria—a principle based on the Twenty-third Article of the Treaty of Berlin. However, in May, 1912, the Hellenic Government agreed to the Bulgarian proposals, and a definite Treaty was signed at Sofia on the twenty-ninth of that month. That Treaty, also published by M. Gueshoff, guaranteed to each of its signatories the support of the other in case of war with Turkey, but it made no arrangement whatever as to the future distribution of the territories to be acquired in a common war. It was followed three months later by a military convention which set out the respective liabilities of the two countries—a convention signed immediately before the outbreak of the first Balkan War.

There now remains only the question of the relations between Montenegro and her neighbours. That country, which had been on very strained terms with Serbia for some years, greatly improved her relations with Bulgaria as a result of the personal visit paid by King Ferdinand to King Nicholas on the occasion of the latter proclaiming himself king of his country in August, 1910, and as a consequence of the ability displayed by M. Kolousheff—the Bulgarian Minister at Cettinje. Notwithstanding this, there was no
written undertaking between Bulgaria and Montenegro at the time of the outbreak of the war, and the agreement between the two countries, which is possessed of no far-reaching political importance, consisted in an oral undertaking between the Bulgarian Minister at Cetinje and King Nicholas, who concluded it during September, 1912.

It is impossible and unnecessary here to enter into details concerning the events which immediately preceded or took place during the first Balkan campaign. By the middle of August the situation in the Ottoman Empire had become so critical that the Austrian Government proposed a scheme of administrative decentralisation for European Turkey. About a month later the Turks ordered a general mobilisation—a mobilisation replied to by the four Balkan States. Diplomatic correspondence passed between the Great Powers and Turkey and Bulgaria, and between the two last-named countries. Montenegro declared war on October 8—a declaration which was followed ten days later by the other three States. Thenceforward the war may be considered as having been divided into four more or less independent campaigns—those in Thrace, in Central and Northern Macedonia, in Northern Albania and the sanjak of Novibazar, and in Southern Albania and Southern Macedonia. In the first of these areas, where the fighting was far more severe than anywhere else, the Bulgarians contained the fortress of Adrianople and made a rapid advance to the Chatalja Lines, which they reached in less than a month. In the second the Serbians moved by way of the Vardar valley and across the Turco-Serbian frontier lying to the west of it, fought a great
and successful battle at Komanovo on October 24, reached the seacoast early in November and entered Monastir on the eighteenth of that month. In the third the Montenegrins advanced into the sanjak of Novibazaar and into Northern Albania, moving upon Scutari along the northeastern and southwestern shores of the lake of that name. And lastly the Greeks, while detaching a force to attack Janina, struck across the Tureo-Greek frontier in the direction of Salonica — a city which they entered on November 9, thereby becoming the victors in the race in progress between them and the Serbian army coming by way of the Vardar valley and the Bulgarian forces advancing through Ishtib and across the Rhodope Balkans. Early in December, when Adrianople, Scutari, and Janina — the three great fortresses of Turkey in Europe — still remained in Ottoman hands, an armistice was concluded — an armistice which led to the first peace congress of London, which assembled on the thirteenth of that month. That congress which sat intermittently for about a month proved abortive, primarily because the Turks, partly as a result of a coup d'état in Constantinople, refused to agree to the allied demands for the cession of Adrianople and for the establishment of a frontier satisfactory to Bulgaria in Thrace, and to a lesser degree because the Ottoman Government was loath to agree to a fair settlement in regard to the futures of the Aegean Islands and of Crete.

During the first phase of the Balkan struggle two important developments had taken place which were destined greatly to influence the future trend of events in Southeastern Europe. I refer to the international
crisis arising out of the attitude of the Dual Monarchy, secretly supported by Germany, upon the Adriatic question, and to the differences already existing between Serbia and Bulgaria. In regard to the first of these questions, Austria had taken up the attitude that on no account would she permit the permanent occupation by Serbia of the territories which she had conquered on the east of the Adriatic. The adoption of this policy resulted in the convocation of the London Ambassadorial Conference which in its turn agreed to the principle of autonomy for Albania. This naturally constituted a great disappointment for Serbia—a disappointment which in part led to her bad relations with Bulgaria, and to her subsequent attempts to secure compensation at the expense of that country. Serbia, in face of Russian advice, bowed her head to the inevitable, but instead of recognising that her disappointment was due to the international situation, she endeavoured to suggest that it resulted from the attitude assumed by Bulgaria. Hard as was her case, this contention was not justified, for whilst the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty definitely bound Bulgaria to support Serbia in case she were attacked by Austria, it made no mention of assistance in securing for her a port on the Adriatic or of any obligation to render diplomatic support to Serbia, who in fact evacuated and was not militarily driven back from the Adriatic coast.

Early in February, 1913, when the second phase of the first Balkan war began, the relations existing between Bulgaria and Serbia were therefore far from satisfactory. Militarily speaking, the ensuing events, during which once more the heaviest share of the
fighting fell to the Bulgarians, were for the most part concerned with the capture of Adrianople and Janina — which were taken respectively at the end and at the beginning of March — and with the siege of Scutari, which fell into Montenegrin hands under somewhat mysterious circumstances, towards the end of April. During this time, however, diplomatic conditions were going from bad to worse. The assassination of the King of Greece on March 18 had removed from the arena of Balkan politics a man whose influence had always been used in favour of moderation. The position as between Serbia and Bulgaria had also become considerably aggravated, for instead of the more or less secret and unofficial claims already made by the former country, the Government of King Peter, which was justified in making a point of the fact that Serbia had voluntarily furnished an important contingent for the operations at Adrianople, now officially urged that the Treaty of 1912 “must undergo an amicable revision.” So early as March, too, Serbia began to negotiate with Greece for the purpose of concluding a defensive treaty against Bulgaria.

The second Peace Congress which sat in London in May therefore met in an atmosphere bristling with difficulties and uncertainty. No secret was made of the fact that the relations existing between the Bulgarians on the one side and the Serbs and the Greeks on the other were far from cordial. The international and local situations were also greatly complicated by the facts that the Serbs and Greeks hesitated to sign the terms of peace prepared by the Ambassadorial Conference and by the highly dangerous situation which then existed in regard to the future possession
of Scutari. After a great deal of delay, Sir Edward Grey, probably knowing that Serbia and Greece were retarding matters in order to perfect their own agreement against Bulgaria, made a communication to the peace delegates which necessitated their either coming to terms at once or preparing to leave London. Finally the definite treaty of peace, known as the Treaty of London, was signed on May 30 on the basis of the terms proposed by the Great Powers some six weeks earlier.

By this time the relations existing between the allies had become extremely critical. Serbia was openly demanding the revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty because she contended that circumstances unforeseen in it had arisen, and that she had mobilised a larger army than was incumbent upon her, and because she urged that it was due to her assistance that Adrianople had fallen. Greece, with whom there was no agreement upon the subject, was also pegging out claims in Macedonia. But the real fact of importance was that early in 1913, before the conclusion of the first war and on the initiative of Greece, that country and Serbia entered into a secret arrangement in regard to the division of spoils secured from Turkey. The basis of that arrangement was that the Greeks would raise no objection to the Serbian retention of Monastir — allotted to Bulgaria by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 — provided the Government of King Peter were willing to sanction the incorporation of Salonica in the Hellenic Kingdom. That arrangement was followed by the more formal Graeco-Serbian Treaty, which we now know to have been signed on June 1, 1913, and therefore two days after the con-
clusion of the London Peace Conference—a treaty which obviously strengthened the hands of Serbia and enabled her to make claims from Bulgaria—claims which otherwise she would never have been in a position to formulate.

It is not possible here to discuss in detail the arguments put forward by the various Balkan claimants prior to the outbreak of the second war. There probably were conditions justifying Serbia in thinking that she was entitled to suggest modifications in her treaty with Bulgaria. But even if the spirit of that treaty had not been fully acted up to by the latter country, even if Serbia had performed more than her legal obligations, and even if she had been compelled to accept a European decision which constituted a great setback to her national aspirations, the Government of King Peter was still bound by the letter of a document to which it had agreed. In other words, whilst Serbia would certainly have been reasonable in making amicable suggestions to Bulgaria, she had no right to formulate actual demands even as a result of gratuitous assistance concerning which she had made no preliminary bargain. Moreover, as I have already said, one of the most important clauses in the 1912 agreement specially foresaw the danger of a dispute between the allies and decided that, in such a case, both parties should submit to the arbitration of the Tsar. M. Gueshoff, the Bulgarian Premier, who resigned on May 30, up to that time repeatedly expressed the willingness of his Government to adopt this course which was not then accepted by Serbia. Subsequently, when both parties had agreed to arbitration, but when things had already gone too far for recourse to this
method of settling the dispute, an attack was made, contrary to the decision of the Sofia Government and without the consent of the Cabinet, by part of the Bulgarian army, acting by the order of General Savoff or of some superior War-Lord, upon the forces of its still nominal allies. Whilst no condemnation of those responsible for this attack can be too severe, the fact that Serbia, supported by Greece, refused to listen to the calming telegrams despatched by M. Sazonoff, then Russian Foreign Minister, and declared war on Bulgaria, clearly proves that these two new allies were not averse to accepting a challenge for which they were by this time prepared—a challenge in which they were supported by a military contingent supplied by Montenegro.

During the first Balkan war, Roumania played no military part, contenting herself by claiming and securing compensation at the expense of Bulgaria. In the second campaign, however, that country, no longer withheld by Russia, invaded the territory of her Balkan neighbour, nominally with the object of maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans, but really for the purpose of wresting from Bulgaria an area of territory, the possession of which she had deeply coveted for years. This action was largely responsible for the subsequent bad relations between the two countries—bad relations which, as I shall show elsewhere, constituted the fundamental reason of the downfall of Roumania during the European conflagration.

The second Balkan war was terminated by the Treaty of Bucharest, signed in that city on August 10, 1913. That Treaty robbed Bulgaria of a large part of Macedonia, which went to her under the Serbo-Bul-
garian Agreement of 1912, and allotted to Greece, Kavala and Salonica, besides the large districts lying respectively to the south and immediately to the north of the Salonica-Monastir Railway. It also gave to Serbia and Greece a contiguous frontier and allowed to Bulgaria only a stretch of the Aegean coast which possessed no practicable port and towards which there was no adequate or suitable line of communication. Moreover, on the north Bulgaria lost not only Silistria and the district which would have gone to Roumania under the frontier rectification arranged by the Protocol of Petrograd, but also a further area of territory on the south of the Dobrudja (including the towns of Turtukenie and Dobric), thereby establishing the frontier as running from the more or less immediate neighbourhood of Rustchuk on the Danube to that of Varna on the Black Sea. These divisions—unnatural and unfair as they were—are those which made the Treaty of Bucharest not an instrument of peace but of future war.

During the second Balkan war, the Treaty of London, signed between the former allies and Turkey, was torn up by the latter country, who reoccupied Adrianople whilst the Bulgarians were engaged elsewhere, and therefore practically without opposition. This “scrap of paper” action by the Ottoman Government created an entirely new situation so far as Turkey and Bulgaria were concerned, and left those two countries to negotiate independent terms of peace after the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucharest. Those terms were embodied in the Treaty of Constantinople, signed on September twenty-fifth. They substituted for the Enos-Midia line, agreed to in London, a boundary
which practically followed the old Turco-Bulgarian frontier from the Black Sea to Mustafa Pasha, turning thence in a southerly direction, and subsequently hugging the bank of the Maritza as far as its mouth and the Aegean coast. In addition to the fact that the Bulgarians thereby lost Kirk Kilissa, Adrianople, and Demotika and a large part of Thrace, the great significance of this frontier was that it left Dede Agatch — the only Aegean port possessed by Bulgaria — unprovided with railway connection with the remainder of that country except by a line which ran for some miles through Turkish territory. An arrangement was subsequently made between the two Governments as to the use of this line, but that arrangement obviously proved unsatisfactory to Bulgaria, and as I shall show elsewhere, it was subsequently abrogated by the cession of the territory in question to Bulgaria just before the entry of that country into the present war.

During much of this time and throughout the winter of 1912–1913 and the spring and summer of the latter year, the international situations and the actual position in the Balkans were highly critical as the result of events in and connected with the new Principality of Albania. I have already said that, as a consequence of the attitude of Austria, the autonomy of that State was recognised in principle by the Ambassadorsial Conference in December, 1912. Four months later, and during the second stage of the first Balkan war, Scutari, the most important town in the whole country, fell into the hands of the Montenegrins, who at first absolutely declined to leave it. The policy thus taken up by King Nicholas was in entire opposition
to the programme of the Central Powers, and for a moment it seemed destined to lead to a European war. Subsequently, however, it was agreed by the Great Powers that certain other areas, the population of which is predominatingly Albanian, should be included in Serbia or Montenegro, and that Scutari should remain Albanian. Following upon this agreement that city was occupied by contingents landed from the international blockading fleets under the command of a British admiral—Sir Cecil Burney—and these contingents remained in occupation of the city and its immediate surroundings up to the very eve of the outbreak of the present war.

Over and above the Scutari question the position and future of Albania were of predominating importance, for it was during and immediately after this period that Europe was called upon to choose a ruler for the State which she had created and to fix the positions of her northern and southern frontiers, which run through areas, the nationality of whose inhabitants it is not easy to decide. Indeed so difficult was the delimitation of the southern frontier, where Italy voiced the legitimate aspirations of the Albanians almost as fervently as did Austria in the north, that the problem was only settled by the decision of the Powers to the effect that the questions of the southern Albanian frontier and of the future ownership of the Aegean Islands, both of which were in their hands, should be interdependent. The result of this decision was that Greece, whose claims in the Aegean were as reasonable as her demands in Southern Albania were unjustifiable, secured all the Aegean Islands occupied by her during the Balkan Wars, except Imbros, Tene-
dos, and Castellorizzo, which, owing to their proximity to the Dardanelles, were allotted to Turkey, and that she (Greece) was practically compelled to accept an Epirus frontier, with which she has remained as dissatisfied as have the Turks with the distribution of the Aegean Islands.

From an international standpoint the development of events in the Balkans, between the summer of 1908 and the close of the Balkan Wars, is of far-reaching significance. The Young Turkish Revolution of 1908, which at first seemed destined greatly to minimise Germanic prestige and power at Constantinople, really resulted in an opposite effect, for in spite of the support of England for Turkey during the Bosnian and Bulgarian crises of 1908 and 1909 a gradual reaction subsequently set in. This was due in part to the cleverness and regardlessness of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein and in part to the circumstances arising out of the policy adopted by the Young Turks. For instance, whilst the Germans ignored the necessity for reforms in the Ottoman Empire, so long as the Turks favoured a Teutonic programme, it was impossible for the British Government or the British public to look with favour upon a régime which worked to maintain the privileged position of Moslems throughout the Empire, which did nothing to punish those who instigated the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909, and which was intent upon disturbing the “Status Quo” in the Persian Gulf and upon changing the situation of Egypt to the Turkish advantage. Such indeed became the position that even the Turco-Italian War, which might well have been expected to shake the confidence of the Ottoman Government in the
bona fides of Italy’s ally, did not seriously disturb the intimate relations which were gradually developing between Berlin and Constantinople. Here again enemy foresight was displayed, for in addition to the Austrian objection to the inauguration of any Italian operations in the Balkans, the German Government, when the position of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein had become seriously compromised as a result of the Italian annexation of Tripoli, which he could not prevent, suddenly found it convenient to transfer that diplomatist to London and to replace him by another, perhaps less able, but certainly none the less successful in retaining a grasp over everything which took place in the Ottoman Capital.

This brings us to the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Balkan Wars — wars which for different reasons all Europe primarily desired to prevent and subsequently to localise. The Central Powers, on their side, naturally feared the disruption of the Ottoman Empire, before they were ready to derive the full advantages from such an event, and, acting through the mouthpiece of the Austrian Government, took the lead in proposing decentralisation for European Turkey in August, 1912. On the other hand, no doubt representing the Triple Entente, which was honestly in favour of the maintenance of the “Status Quo” and of peace, Russia repeatedly counselled the Balkan allies not to push matters to extremes. Later and after the Turks had ordered a general mobilisation — a mobilisation replied to by the Balkan States — the Great Powers addressed Notes to the Governments of Turkey and of the Balkan States advocating, in the first direction, the introduction of reforms, and stating,
in the second, that should war break out they would "tolerate at the end of the conflict no modifications of the present Status Quo in the Balkans."

These Notes were subsequently treated as mere scraps of paper both by the senders and the recipients. Moreover, whilst as a result of the ensuing campaigns the area of Turkey in Europe was in fact reduced in size from 65,350 square miles to 10,880 square miles, the Balkan Wars at one time seemed destined to terminate in a manner even more disadvantageous to Germany. Thus, if the four States — Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia — who fought in the first war had continued on good terms with one another, the whole Balance of Power in Europe would almost certainly have been changed. Instead of the Ottoman Empire, which prior to the outbreak of those hostilities was held by competent authorities to be able to provide a vast army, then calculated to number approximately a million and a quarter men, there would have sprung up a friendly group of countries which in the near future could easily have placed in the field a combined army approximately amounting to at least a million all told. As the interests of such a confederation, which might well have been joined by Roumania, would have been on the side of the then Triple Entente, the Central Powers at once realised that its formation or its continued existence would mean for them not only the loss of Turkey, but also the gain for their enemies of four or five allies, most of whom had already proved their power in war.

The Kaiser was not then prepared to make war, his fleet was not ready, his Zeppelins were not perfected, and the enlargement of his Kiel Canal was not com-
pleted. In exerting a restraining influence in Austria, Germany therefore then contented herself by creating a favorable situation for the future. The Ambassadorial Conference, under the chairmanship of Sir Edward Grey, succeeded in temporarily maintaining the so-called Balance of Power in Europe, and it may also have been the means of localising the Balkan conflict. But Germany, acting through the mouthpiece of Vienna, encouraged the rivalry which existed between Bulgaria and her former allies—a rivalry which ended in the second Balkan war. That war, and particularly the fatal Treaty of Bucharest, favoured as it was by Germany, led not to a settlement, but simply to a holding in suspense of the numerous Near-Eastern questions which had been the means of shaking the European concert to its very foundation. In short, whilst Germany did not manage to preserve the integrity and to protect the interests of her friend Turkey, by separating the former allies she did bring about the establishment of a state of things enabling her in this present war to utilise the support of the Ottoman Government to almost as great an advantage as if there had been no Balkan campaign at all.

To summarise and to recapitulate the causes and the results of the Balkan Wars it may be said that the first campaign would probably not have occurred had the Young Turks made any endeavours to introduce in Macedonia and Albania even some of the reforms by the promise of which they at first secured not only the good will of Europe but also that of the subject races of the Ottoman Empire. As far as the second war is concerned, that would certainly not have taken place had it not been for German intrigue which en-
couraged rivalry between the Balkan States, and had the former allies, one and all, displayed a greater spirit of moderation towards one another. With regard to the results of these campaigns, over and above those to which I have already referred, the entry of Roumania into the arena of Balkan politics and the birth of the autonomous Albanian State, were events of primary significance.

From a local standpoint, Turkey, reduced from the position of a European power of high importance to that of an Asiatic State, possessed only an outpost on the European side of the Straits. Bulgaria, who undoubtedly accomplished very much the hardest work in and provided the greatest number of troops for the first war, gained but relatively little from a campaign which never could have been thought of, begun, or carried out without her co-operation. Serbia, although achieving success on the south and east, was left still without a free access to the sea — an access for the purpose of obtaining which she really joined the Balkan League. Montenegro, who had secured big gains, obtained neither Scutari nor a port to replace Antivari, commanded as it is by the Austrian fortress of Spitza. Greece, who made the smallest sacrifice in, but gained the greatest benefit from, the war, did not secure possession of all the territory which she coveted in Southern Albania, and she remained face to face with a continued Turkish menace as a result of her acquisition of the Aegean Islands. For these reasons it was certain that Bulgaria would seize the first opportunity of endeavouring to redeem her position, that war between Serbia and her most hated neighbour — Austria — could not long be post-
poned, and that Turkey would intrigue in Europe and threaten the Greeks with the object of trying to regain possession of the Aegean Islands. In short, the so-called settlement of 1913 really left the situation in the Balkans more unnatural and more beset by dangers than had been the case even during the worst years of the reign of Abdul Hamid.
II

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR

Although the European Concert prevented an immediate outbreak of war as a result of the Balkan campaigns, the facts, which I have already given, must be sufficient to prove that the events of the years 1912–1913 created a merely temporary situation, the dangers and complications of which it is impossible to exaggerate. Almost all the numerous and important questions which had previously existed remained unsettled. Moreover, whilst a sort of a new Balkan alliance, composed of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Roumania, was supposed to have sprung into existence, the interests of these countries were so diverse that it was impossible to hope that they would be of mutual and immediate assistance to one another in case of a fresh upheaval brought by certain of the questions still unsettled. Thus although the long-talked-of war cloud had burst, although two of the most wonderful campaigns of modern history had been fought, and although the much-desired hostilities had been localised, little if anything had really been done to solve the countless problems which for years had not only endangered the peace of the Near East but also that of all Europe.
With regard to Serbia the question of an outlet to the Adriatic has been the foundation of everything which has taken place for the last ten years. This is the case because, being an agricultural country in which large numbers of cattle and pigs are reared, she must have a free and continuous means of exporting her livestock without being placed in ever recurring danger of the imposition of an embargo rather for political than for commercial or sanitary purposes. The crisis of the years 1908–1909, concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, entirely resulted from the justifiable claim made by the little Slav State, namely, that she should receive compensation for what she felt was a blow to her great aspiration — the creation of a Greater Serbia with its own access to the sea. Again whilst in 1912 Serbia was undoubtedly led to risk her national existence and, for the moment, to forget her rivalry with Bulgaria, with the avowed object of improving the lot of the Serbs then domiciled in Turkey, the fact that she hoped to secure a seaport at that time was certainly possessed of a far-reaching influence upon her policy. Consequently although the Balkan Wars resulted in the dominions of King Peter being nearly doubled in size, yet as that object was not realised, these wars ended in a way which was at bottom completely unfavourable to a people who have played such a valiant part in the European conflict. Thus when I visited Belgrade in the late autumn of 1913, I noticed, instead of the blissful joy which one would have expected to find existing among a people who had then fought two victorious campaigns and added such enormous territories to their country, that a kind of mysterious gloom seemed to
The Serbian Parliament House at Belgrade

The Old Turkish Palace at Nish

From a Photograph by the Author
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prevail in all directions. Whilst no Serbian denied it, none could or would explain its real reason. It was that everybody knew it would be impossible to pursue and to develop the national policy of the country, and especially to make an advance towards the sea, without a serious conflict with the most important and the strongest of Serbian enemies — Austria.

So far as Serbia was concerned after the Balkan Wars the real source of danger therefore grew more than ever to be the daily increasing difficulties between the then Triple Alliance and Triple Entente and particularly between Austria-Hungary and Russia. Indeed it was almost certain that the Ministers of the Dual Monarchy would not continue long to look with favour upon a peace which, so long as it lasted, had upset their whole recent policy. Thus whilst Austria-Hungary had prevented Serbia from obtaining an outlet upon the Adriatic and whilst she had created Albania, she had not succeeded in avoiding the establishment of a common frontier between Serbia and Montenegro — a common frontier which was to be one of the reasons for the improvement in the relations between those two countries. These changes were entirely opposed to the interests of the Dual Monarchy, for in addition to the fact that they established a Slav barrier, though not a sufficient barrier, to an Austro-German advance towards the southeast, they increased the prestige and power of Serbia and Montenegro among the Austro-Hungarian Slavs in a manner destined still further to complicate the task of the government of the Emperor Francis Joseph. With regard to Russia, who lost a considerable amount of influence in the Balkans and particularly in Serbia, as a result of her inability
to champion the Adriatic interests of that country during the crisis of 1912–1913, it was apparent that at any given moment the Ministers of the Tsar might find (as they subsequently did find) themselves in a position in which it would be quite impossible for them quietly to witness any further interference with the national development of the "Little States", who certainly did not receive all the support which they expected would be forthcoming from Petrograd during the negotiations of 1913.

That Austria was at once opposed to the benefits secured by Serbia during the second Balkan war is now proved, for we know, from the speech made by Signor Giolitti in the Italian Chamber in December, 1914, that the day before the signature of the Treaty of Bucharest and on August 9, 1913, the Government of the Dual Monarchy communicated to Italy and to Germany its intention of taking action against Serbia. This action was, however, prevented by the opposition of Italy and presumably also by that of Germany, who, believing the time to be unfavourable, opposed a forward policy on the part of her ally throughout the Balkan Wars. The result was that whilst the policies of Germanic Powers certainly received a certain setback by the defeat of Turkey, Count Berchtold was entitled to claim a temporary diplomatic success as consequences of the destruction of the original Balkan League and of the creation of a situation, in which, when the supposedly proper time for action had arrived, it would require a mere spark to ignite not only the Balkan but also the European fire. That spark was the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his consort at Sarajevo on Sunday, June 28, 1914. But
that event, dangerous as in any case it would have been from a local standpoint and so far as the relations between Austria and Serbia were concerned, was really inflammatory because it fell at a moment when the Emperor William and his advisers, who were not ready for war during the Bosnian annexation crisis or the Balkan Wars, thought that Great Britain was fully occupied with the situation in Ireland, that the internal situation in Russia was such as to prevent that country from effectively supporting Serbia, and that Italy would at least maintain her neutrality.

The Kaiser, who had just performed the opening ceremony of the enlargement of the Kiel Canal—a ceremony at which the British fleet was represented—returned immediately to Berlin, in which city I arrived two days after the murder. Ignoring altogether various subsequently published accounts of ensuing events, such as that which appeared in The Times on July 28, 1917, and particularly that excellent narrative of Mr. Morgenthau, formerly American ambassador to Turkey, which constitute absolute proof that war was definitely decided upon at an Imperial Conference held at Potsdam on July 5—I was always convinced that some such decision was taken in Berlin at that time. The atmosphere which then prevailed—an atmosphere which was deliberately created—was represented by such statements as the necessity for the "chastisement of Serbia"—statements made in the press, in the cafés, and in the trains. Thus whilst later an artificial feeling of calm was in its turn promoted, and whilst the Emperor left Berlin on July 6 for a yachting cruise, purposely to throw dust in the eyes of Europe, no doubt has ever existed in my mind that the Austrian ultimatum, delivered
at Belgrade on July 23, was actually concocted in Berlin within a week of the murder of the Archduke, and that no amends on the part of Serbia for an atrocity for which her Government at least was not responsible would have affected the course of events which were definitely planned in Berlin two or three weeks before any mobilisation measures were taken in France, Russia, or Great Britain. If any further proof of the above suggestions be required, it may perhaps be found, at least in part, in the fact that to the student of European affairs it was obvious, as soon as the notorious ultimatum had been delivered, that its conditions were so irrevocable as to show that Austria this time was not acting alone or in opposition to the will of Germany.

Moreover, whilst it was equally certain from the outset that, whatever were the organisations which brought about the death of the heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, the Government of the Dual Monarchy would surely seize the opportunity of demanding an explanation from Serbia, the wording of the document which gave birth to the War was so harsh and so unreasonable as to make Vienna unlikely to have been its birthplace. Thus when Serbia, within the specified time, accepted "in principle" (only with the reservations to be expected from the Government of a Sovereign State) the demands of her enemy, and when Austria immediately broke off diplomatic relations, it was perfectly clear that the latter country acted not upon her own initiative but at the instigation and with the direct support of Germany. This being the case, all that need be said here is that within five days from the time of the delivery of the original
ultimatum, Serbia and Austria were at war, and that nothing which was or was not done by England, France, or Russia would have been likely to avoid the explosion in which all the Great Powers, except Italy, immediately became involved.

From the time of the outbreak of the hostilities between Austria and Serbia on July 28, until the subjugation of that country by the enemy in the late autumn of 1915, events in the dominions of King Peter may be said to have been divided into three stages. The first lasted from the beginning of the war approximately until the end of 1914. The Austrians directed their first efforts against Belgrade, only separated from enemy territory by the Save and Danube, hostilities being practically confined during the first ten days to a bombardment of that city and to the partial destruction of the Save bridge by the Serbians. On or about August 12, however, the enemy began a real attack—an attack delivered upon the capital and also against the northern and western frontiers of Serbia protected by the above-mentioned rivers and by the Drina. The attack from across the Danube never seriously developed, and Belgrade was not then taken. The Austrians, on the other hand, having entered Serbia in the northwestern corner of that country, were eventually defeated between Shabatz and Losnitza in an engagement known as the Battle of Jadar, which took place about the middle of August. Partly as an indirect result of this Serbian victory, and partly as a consequence of the situation in Russia, the invading armies were then driven back or withdrew into Bosnia and Herzegovina. Early in September the forces of Serbia and Montenegro united in these prov-
inces, the first-mentioned occupying Vishegrad on the Serbo-Bosnian frontier and contingents of the two countries ultimately advancing to the immediate neighbourhood of Sarajevo.

During the first half of September a second invasion of Serbia took place. This time the Austrians, who had brought up reinforcements, moved across the River Drina. The left or northern flank of this force was defeated, the right subsequently being driven back in every district save one during very hard fighting which occurred in the second week of September. For the two following months the position was practically one of stalemate, neither side seriously advancing or retiring across the Austro-Serbian frontier. But in November, and after the entry of Turkey into the war, the Austrians came on in great force and shelled the Serbians out of their trenches, compelling them to retire from their frontier and from Valievo and to remove their headquarters from that town to Kraguyevatz. The Serbians then took up positions along a range of hills extending in a more or less southerly direction from Belgrade, later surrendering that city, from which the Government had removed to Nish directly after the outbreak of hostilities. On December 8, however, when fresh troops had been brought up and more ammunition become available, the gallant old King, who in spite of his age and physical condition took the field himself, made a fiery and patriotic speech, which cheered on the army to victory. The Austrian centre was pierced and the right or southern flank was completely routed. At first the enemy's left or north flank was only frustrated in its endeavours to drive home its attacks upon the
Serbian right. But this latter section of his line, which had advanced too slowly, soon suffered the fate of the right, and the Austrian rout became general about December tenth. The Serbians took up the pursuit immediately and, as the distances are short, Valievo was regained on the eighth, and Belgrade re-taken, after a desperate battle, on December fourteenth. In short, within a fortnight from the time of the loss of the capital, that city was not only once more in Serbian hands but the army of King Peter had won a victory which, it was said, had cost the enemy some sixty thousand in killed and wounded.

The second stage in the development of affairs in Serbia is that concerned with the events which occurred between the enemy defeat in December, 1914, and the Austro-Bulgarian advance which took place in the autumn of the following year. Whilst this was a period of almost complete military quiescence, it was an epoch during which events of far-reaching importance took place in and connected with Serbia. To begin with, it was then that the country, the sanitary conditions in which were quite impossible, was afflicted by a scourge of typhus. So severe indeed was the epidemic and so terrible were the sufferings of the army and people that this may be called the typhus phase of the war—a phase during which, if credible eyewitnesses can be believed, some two hundred thousand victims perished in the course of a few months. Indeed the fact that the whole nation was not blotted out and that it did not practically cease to exist was largely due to the medical assistance sent to Serbia by America and by Great Britain. The Serbian army was not equipped with proper hospital arrangements and sup-
plies, and facilities for the maintenance of the necessary cleanliness were non-existent. In short, it was only after the arrival of foreign Red Cross missions, especially that of Lady Paget and those accompanied by Doctors Strong, Jackson, and their colleagues, many of whom came from Boston, that some sort of sanitary conditions were established and that Serbia was practically cleaned up. Among other measures taken by these gentlemen was the establishment of a system of wash-trains. People undressed in tents, carried their clothes to one car, got washed and inspected in another, and then went back to receive their clean bundle of garments. When the work had been completed in one district, the train was moved on to another.

Throughout the greater part of this period most important diplomatic negotiations were in progress with regard to the Balkans. In February, Italy, whose attitude towards the Adriatic problem has often been resented by the Serbs almost if not quite as keenly as is that of Austria-Hungary towards the Southern Slav question, once again took measures which materially influenced the Balkan situation to the advantage of Serbia. More than three months before that country entered the war, the Government of King Victor Emanuel informed Austria that it would regard any further action in the Balkans by the Dual Monarchy as an unfriendly act. Though this may not have been the object, the effect of such an action was to prevent a renewed attack against the Serbs, when they were in the throes of the typhus scourge.

During the first nine months of 1915, and particularly during the summer and early autumn of that year, the Serbians were passing through a most critical
period in their history. This was due, on the one hand, to the internal disaffection which prevailed in large parts of Southern Serbia, and which resulted from the attitude of the Government towards the alien population of the districts annexed after the Balkan Wars, and on the other to the negotiations then in progress between the Allies and the Balkan States in regard to the provision of concessions for Bulgaria — concessions almost certainly destined to have brought that country into the War against Turkey and the Central Powers. Serbia, instead of recognising that her future prosperity and even her independent existence can be assured only by the defeat of Austria and of Germany, and not by the success of her own arms alone, failed to see the necessity for subordinating her immediate interests to the good of the Allied cause. In other words, for months the Serbian Government, or more correctly the Military Party, exalted by temporary victory, turned a deaf ear to the suggestions that they should concede to Bulgaria at least some of the disputed areas of Macedonia — areas which that country was determined to try to secure, by peace or by war, during the present conflagration. The result of this attitude, together with the policies of the then neutral Greece and Roumania, was that, in place of accepting the necessity for what would certainly have been difficult and disagreeable sacrifices, other and less wise counsels were followed — counsels which have been largely responsible for the almost immediate subjugation of Serbia and for the condition in which that country now finds herself.

As I shall show, when I come to discuss the above-mentioned negotiations at greater length in connec-
tion with Bulgaria, there were faults not only in the attitudes of the Balkan States but also in the Allied diplomacy. These faults do not, however, justify the wholesale criticisms of those who have never realised the difficulties of the Balkan situation, and in particular they do not make reasonable the contention that the Allies tried to or did sacrifice Serbia in 1915. Once Bulgaria entered or was on the point of entering the War on the other side, no measures which could have then been taken would have saved the army of King Peter from total defeat. Thus even did Serbia propose, as her advocates state that she did propose, to attack Bulgaria before the army of that country was fully mobilised, and even had the Allies advised her (Serbia) not to take these measures, which has been denied officially, such would have been good advice, for had the Serbian army advanced towards the east at the time in question, nothing could have saved it from defeat at the hands of Austria and of Bulgaria — defeat in an area where, instead of being able to be evacuated from the Albanian coast, the Allies would have been powerless to come to its assistance. In short, as it was not feasible for Great Britain and for France to undertake a Balkan expedition and to land troops in neutral Greece, as Serbia suggested, during the complicated negotiations preceding the entry of Bulgaria into the War, the failure to save Serbia was not due to any military fault on the part of the Allies, but to the strategic position of our enemies, to their overwhelming strength, and to the enormous geographical and political difficulties which then existed in the Balkans.

The third stage in the development of events in
Serbia begins from the entry of Bulgaria into the War in October, 1915. Prior to and at that time the Austro-Germans concentrated in strength on the west bank of the River Drina and to the north of the Save and Danube. Immediately after the rupture of relations between the Allies and Bulgaria, Von Mackensen advanced from the first-mentioned area, whilst other enemy forces crossed into Serbian territory to the southwest of Belgrade and in the immediate vicinity of the point where the Morava flows into the Danube. A few days later, and on October 14, two more or less independent Bulgarian forces advanced into Serbia, the one directed on Nish and Pirot and into the north, or old part, of that country, and the other aimed at Uskub and at the areas of Macedonia coveted by the Bulgarians. The Austro-German-Bulgarian armies operating in the north soon established connection, and Belgrade having been taken on October 10, the arsenal town of Kraguyevatz as well as Nish—the temporary capital—were in enemy hands by the end of the first week in November. The Allied forces based upon Salonica were unable seriously to influence the situation, and by the middle of that month the whole of the Serbian army which had not already been captured was in retreat towards the Adriatic. The Government, temporarily established at Prisrend, was subsequently forced to move to Scutari, where it remained until the evacuation of that town in the face of the enemy. Finally during the closing weeks of 1915, and after passing through hardships which it is impossible to describe, all that remained of the Serbian army was transferred by the Allied fleets from the Albanian coast to Corfu, where it was re-equipped and
reclathed in order to prepare it for its future and valiant rôle in the Salonica campaign. Thus, with the occupation of all old Serbia by Austro-Bulgarian forces and with the capture by the Bulgarians of almost all the areas, including Monastir, which they had coveted for years, temporarily ended the independence of Serbia—an independence, the re-establishment of which is still one of the fundamental aims for which the Allies are waging war.

With the exception of Monaco, San Marino, and Andorra, Montenegro is the smallest independent State in Europe. This independence was formally recognised by Turkey and the other Great Powers who signed the Treaty of Berlin in the year 1878. The kingdom now has an area of approximately 5600 square miles and a population of about 516,000 souls. Although the country possesses a House of Assembly, the rule of King Nicholas has, for all practical purposes, always been absolute. In his own words, His Majesty is both ruler of Montenegro and father of its inhabitants. Elsewhere Cettinje—the capital—would be little more than a village. Its population only numbers about four thousand. The country is poor, and derives most of its revenue from land taxes, customs, and monopolies. During the reign of King Nicholas, who ascended the throne of Montenegro in the year 1860, several wars have even threatened to blot out the country from the map of Europe. Thus in 1862 the campaign against Turkey was attended by disastrous results for Montenegro. In 1878, by the non-acceptance of the Treaty of San Stefano by the Great Powers, Montenegro lost advantages which would otherwise have been hers.
Indeed, in that year and by the Treaty of Berlin, Prince Nicholas was compelled to hand over Dulcigno to Turkey, to cede Spitza, which dominates the port of Antivari, to Austria, and to accept the condition imposed upon him by which the port of Antivari and all the waters of Montenegro should remain closed to ships of war, and that certain police functions, along the coast of Montenegro, should be carried out by Austria-Hungary. Whilst Dulcigno was returned to Prince Nicholas in 1880, the disadvantageous position created by the remaining clauses of the 29th Article of the Treaty of Berlin were not only never forgotten by the people, but they were also the reason largely responsible for the Austro-Montenegrin crises which arose between 1878 and 1909. In this latter year, however, although no changes were made in regard to Spitza, it was arranged between King Nicholas and the Austrian Government, through the medium of Italy, that all restrictions formerly placed upon the sovereign rights of Montenegro along her coast should be removed, and that, although Antivari was to retain the character of a commercial and unfortified port, yet it was to be open to ships of war. It is to this change, made directly after the Bosnian crisis of 1908–1909, that reference was made in the published version of the original Treaty, reported to have been made between Italy on the one side and Great Britain, France, and Russia on the other, just before the entry of Italy into the War when it said,¹ in speaking of the neutralisation of parts of the eastern coast of the Adriatic, that

¹ This Treaty, now reported to have been replaced by another, was printed in Current History—a monthly magazine of the New York Times for March, 1918.
"Montenegro rights are not to be infringed in so far as they are based on the declaration exchanged between the contracting parties in April and May, 1909."

Although the Balkan Wars brought about the annexation of an area of territory which more or less doubled Montenegro in size, yet the result of these wars was not entirely favourable to that country. Amongst other reasons, this was due to the facts that the Montenegrins then failed to realise their great national aspiration — the permanent possession of Scutari — and that the prestige of the Serbian royal family and of the Serbians as fighters was so greatly increased that everything Serbian became extremely popular in Montenegro. Whilst prior to these wars the relationship existing between the two countries was often far from cordial, subsequently the position was so changed that the shortcomings of the Montenegrin dynasty and the probability of a union between the two States were openly discussed in Cettinje. The formation of a common diplomatic service and of a combined army was already under consideration during the early months of 1914. Under such circumstances, even had not the War broken out, it was unlikely that Montenegro could long have continued to maintain an independent existence. These conditions, together with a long-standing hatred of Austria, prompted the Montenegrins to throw in their lot with Serbia almost directly after the outbreak of hostilities between that country and the Dual Monarchy. From that time until the end of 1915 the rôle of King Nicholas' army consisted in the defence of his frontiers and in making raids into Herze-govina and Bosnia — raids which at first occupied a certain number of enemy troops. In June, 1915, King
Nicholas once more took possession of and annexed Scutari, from which he had been compelled to retire at the time of the Balkan Wars. Prior to the month of December, however, there was no important fighting, for it was only when Serbia had been subjugated that the enemy made any real endeavour to conquer a country, the importance of which was due rather to the strategical strength of its position and particularly to that of the Lovtchen Mountain, which dominates and commands the Austrian naval base at Cattaro, than to the efficiency or power of resistance of its army. It was, therefore, only during the early days of January, 1916, when the enemy was compelled to clear up the situation in Montenegro, in order to be able to develop to the full the advantages he had gained in Serbia, and to be in a position to advance into Albania, that the Austrians seriously bombarded Mount Lovtchen. Partly owing to the fact that its defenders possessed no heavy artillery, which was necessary in order to make full use of the great natural strength of this position, and partly as a result of circumstances, which were not clear, the resistance of the Montenegrins was soon at an end, and on January 11 the great national stronghold fell into the hands of the enemy, who actually entered Cettinje three days later. King Nicholas, accompanied by some of his Ministers and by part of his army, fled to Albania, His Majesty himself ultimately taking refuge in France. Other members of the royal family and of the Government remained behind, capitulating to the enemy under conditions to which it is better to make no reference here. Thus temporarily ended the independent existence of a country, the personal bravery of whose inhabitants is above all reproach.
The great importance of the earlier rôle of Serbia, and to a lesser degree of Montenegro, in the War is that these countries contained and occupied Austrian forces which would otherwise have been available for use against Russia before the army of that country was effectively mobilised and at a time when every available Allied man in the east was of value, in that his presence necessitated the detachment of Germans from the west, where the situation in France was highly critical for months. Serbia, having suffered in the two Balkan campaigns casualties amounting to over seventy-six thousand of all ranks (of whom more than thirty thousand were killed or died of wounds or from disease), put into the field at least three hundred thousand men on the outbreak of this war. Montenegro, who lost about ten thousand in killed and wounded during the events of 1912–1913, furnished the Allies with approximately thirty thousand men on the outbreak of the European conflagration. For this and for the gallant way in which the two little Slav States fought during the first eighteen months of the present war, they deserve credit, almost if not equal, to that which must be bestowed upon the Serbians for their subsequent valour at Salonica—a valour which I shall discuss in connection with that campaign.
III

TURKEY AND THE WAR

To describe the existing state of things in Turkey or to outline the reasons for them is always an extremely difficult task. This is particularly the case in regard to the period which intervened between the close of the Balkan Wars, that is to say, between the signature of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of Constantinople in September, 1913, and the outbreak of the European War.¹ In general, all that can be said, therefore, is that the Committee of Union and Progress, which has constituted the only real power in the country ever since 1908, occupied a stronger position than that which it had held at any time after the months which immediately followed the re-establishment of the Constitution. Not only was the Government completely in its hands, but for the moment, at least, all practical opposition had disappeared. Indeed that Enver Pasha and his supporters had “reconquered” Adrianople, and thus broken the time-honoured rule that territory once taken from Turkey by a Christian State shall never again pass under Ottoman rule, regained for the Committee all the prestige which it would otherwise have

¹ The developments of this period and those connected with the entry of Turkey into the War, besides events which followed it, are ably and fully chronicled by the ex-American Ambassador at Constantinople under the title “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story.”
lost, as a result of the losses suffered during the first Balkan war. In short, the army, always the backbone of the New Régime, was more completely in the hands of the Young Turks than had ever been the case before.

In spite of the effect of the reoccupation of Adrianople and of the amicable arrangements made between the two countries as to the position of the Turco-Bulgarian frontier, the Turks were smarting under losses suffered in a war during which the Great Powers had said that there should be no modifications in the Balkan "Status Quo" existing in 1912. This was particularly the case in regard to the results of the decision of the London Ambassadorial Conference as to the future ownership of the Aegean Islands captured by Greece during the first Balkan war. In order to realise the meaning of this question to Turkey and to Greece, it is necessary to remember what has happened in the Aegean during the last few years. The Turco-Italian War of 1911–1912 terminated by the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on October 15 of the latter year, resulted in the—nominally temporary—retention of about twelve of the islands, including Rhodes, situated off the southwestern corner of Asia Minor. These were not, therefore, conquerable by Greece in 1912 or 1913, and that country was only able to occupy the islands actually under Turkish rule. Whilst leaving the question of the Dodecanese Islands (those in the hands of Italy) still undecided, it was therefore in regard to those which changed hands during the Balkan Wars that the Turco-Greek crisis of 1913–1914 arose.

The Ambassadorial Conference decided that all the islands occupied by Greece, except Imbros, Tenedos, and Castellorizzo, which are located close to the outer
entrance of the Dardanelles, should be retained by Greece. Turkey, who was not satisfied with that decision, by which she lost the important islands of Chios, Mitylene, and Samos, situated only just off the coast of Asia Minor, never really accepted it and continued to agitate both at home and abroad for the possession of territories without which she said that the Asiatic power of the Ottoman Empire would be endangered. Greece, on the other hand, naturally refused to listen to arguments entirely opposed to the principle of nationality, and not only retained the islands allotted to her, but never really vacated those which were to be Turkish.

This situation existed up to and after the outbreak of the European War. In the early summer of 1914, the Turks instituted a systematic persecution and massacre of the Greeks domiciled in Ottoman territory, a massacre which greatly inflamed the sentiments of the Greeks throughout the civilised world. On and after the month of June, the Turco-Greek crisis was rendered more acute by the annexation of Chios and Mitylene by Greece and by the purchase by the same country of two good and modern battleships, Lemnos and Kilkis (formerly Idaho and Mississippi), which they secured from America during the summer. Launched in the year 1905 and completed in the year 1908, these ships, which are each of fourteen thousand tons, forestalled the arrival of the two Turkish dreadnoughts then being built in England for the Ottoman Government, and thus enabled the Greeks to assume an attitude which would not otherwise have been possible. As a consequence of these events, the outbreak of the war found the relations
existing between the two countries so strained that the policies of each of them were temporarily influenced by a desire that the European conflagration should be utilised in order to favour the national aspirations of the parties concerned.

From a semi-internal point of view, the three all-important questions connected with Turkey during this period were the gradually improving relations between that country and Bulgaria, the augmentation of Germanic influence at Constantinople, and the negotiations in progress between Europe and the Ottoman Government in reference to reforms for Armenia. In regard to the first of these, it is sufficient to say that as a result of the Balkan Wars, both Turkey and Bulgaria had suffered in a manner which naturally made these countries of greater importance to and brought them into closer sympathy with one another. Moreover, as for different reasons they were both the most ardent enemies of Greece, it was obvious that they would work for the development of a policy likely, sooner or later, to enable each of them to reacquire territories which they coveted. In this connection, too, it is necessary to remember that early in 1914, Enver Pasha, a former military attaché at Berlin and an ardent pro-German, was appointed Turkish Minister of War, and that, at about the same time, General Liman von Sanders, a German general, was nominated to the command of the 1st Turkish Army Corps with powers and with a staff which made him practically Commander-in-Chief of the Ottoman army. In short, the secret influence of Germany, ever present at Constantinople, once more lost no opportunity of developing the already favourable
ground, partly created by the protests of the British and Russian Government against the Turkish re-occupation of Adrianople, to an advantage of which she was to reap the benefit soon after the outbreak of the European War.

Between the Balkan Wars and the outbreak of the European conflagration, there occurred in Turkey one other development which, though it never really materialised, is none the less possessed of significance. I refer to the arrangements made between Russia, acting on behalf of the Great Powers, and the Ottoman Government concerning the introduction of reforms in Armenia. This agreement, which was arrived at in February, 1914, and which was based on the arrangements nominally made in 1878, recognised the special position of the Armenians in six vilayets (provinces) of Eastern Asia Minor, and placed those districts which were to be divided into two groups, under two inspectors general, chosen from the subjects of two European States and appointed by the Ottoman Government on the recommendation of the Powers. There was to be a mixed gendarmerie, Christians and Moslems were to enjoy the same privileges in regard to representation in the local government, and the interests of the Armenians were to be properly voiced in the Ottoman Parliament by an adequate number of deputies.

According to this arrangement the inspectors general, whose powers and duties constituted the key to the question, were to be named for a period of ten years, and their engagement was not to be revocable during that period. When the appointments were made, the Turks, however, ignored this and added a
clause in the final agreements with the so-called inspectors, one of whom was Dutch and the other Norwegian, stating that the Government could terminate its contract at any time by the payment of one year's salary, thereby once more turning a scheme for Armenian reform into a mere farce. In the end, after the employees in question had been detained for some time at Constantinople, they went to their posts, but on the outbreak of the War, which occurred directly after their arrival, their appointments were cancelled, the Armenians being left to look forward and to anticipate a reign of terror, which, when inaugurated, proved worse than anything which had previously taken place in the annals of their history.

On the outbreak of the War, therefore, there existed in Turkey a state of uncertainty and of unrest which made Constantinople the most important neutral centre in Europe,—a centre where for three months a great diplomatic battle was in progress between the representatives of the Central Powers on the one side and those of the Allies on the other. To understand the nature of this struggle it is necessary once more to remember that for years Germany had left no stone unturned in preparing the way to secure Ottoman support at the crucial moment. She had ignored the necessity for and stood in the way of reforms in Macedonia and Armenia. She had provided the money and constructed railways which at the same time appealed to the Turkish imagination and furthered the policy of the "Turcification" of the various subject races of the Empire. And lastly, both before as during and after the Balkan Wars, she had planned and done her utmost to increase
the general and perhaps not unnatural Turkish fear
and hatred of Russia — fear and hatred which I have
already shown were directly responsible for the Revolu-
tion of 1908, and which constitute the governing fea-
ture of the foreign policy pursued alike by the Old
and by the Young Turks. These factors in the situa-
tion were responsible for the existence of an extremely
favourable ground for the intrigues of the enemy, who
scorned no methods, however underhand, provided
he could secure the support of a country whose as-
sistance he realised would be invaluable to him.

The position of the Allies was far more difficult than
that of the Central Powers. Instead of a policy run
by one man — the Kaiser — for one object — German
aggression — they were compelled to endeavour to
create a position which would react not only in their
own favour, but also in that of those most closely
concerned in it. The task of allies, too, is always
complicated by the fact that whilst they are obliged
to act in common agreement, each is naturally pos-
sessed of her own vital interests and special friend-
ships. In Turkey this had its effect in various stages
of the development of events, and the Germans, never
slow to profit by our difficulties and especially by the
fact that no Turk, Old or New, would wish to support
the cause of Russia, persuaded the Ottoman Govern-
ment that were the Allies to win the war, sooner or
later the Empire would be split up, and that no promise
made to it would be of any avail. Thus whilst the
accuracy of published statements to the effect that a
definite and absolute Treaty of Alliance was signed
between Germany and Turkey on or before August 4,
1914, seems open to great doubt, there is good reason
to believe that there was a concrete understanding between Germany and certain of the more important members of the Committee of Union and Progress—an understanding about which the Sultan, the then Grand Vizier, and such men as Ahmed Djemal Pasha, then Minister of Marine, knew nothing. From the moment of the outbreak of the European War, therefore, the Allies might have foreseen, even if that treaty had not been concluded in a definite form, that the circumstances were such as to prevent them from being able to provide Turkey with concessions or guarantees which would prevent her from being enticed by the Germanic promises concerning the reconquest of Egypt and of other territories which she had lost, from throwing in her lot ultimately with the enemy. The principal reasons which made this eventuality so probable were not that the people disliked England and France or that they admired Germany, but because the more chauvinistic elements of the population, such as Talaat and Enver Pashas, were undoubtedly anxious, as they believed, to rid themselves of the Russian danger, and because they seemed to think that to side with Germany would enable them to inflict some damage upon Greece, from whom they were anxious to regain the Aegean Islands. Upon neither of these two vital questions was the position of the Allies a favourable one, for whilst at that time they were bound to treat with respect any claims or propositions made by Russia, they were almost equally powerless to support the reversal of a decision for which they themselves were principally responsible.

Throughout the first three months of the War the
Germans, who were thus provided with advantageous ground upon which to work, spared no pains to drag Turkey into the War. The legitimate confiscation by England of the two Turkish dreadnoughts in building in British yards was badly handled, and its reasons were so inadequately explained, that the Germans were able to utilise this measure to inflame public opinion among the people who had actually subscribed a large proportion of the funds to pay for these vessels. Soon after this, Admiral Limpus and all the officers of the British Naval Mission were re-placed in their executive command by Turkish officers, being ordered to continue work at the Ministry of Marine, should they remain in Turkey. As this measure was obviously part of the enemy’s plan of intrigue—an intrigue destined to give the German officers who arrived with and subsequent to Goeben full control of the Ottoman fleet—the British Government subsequently withdrew its representatives, who thus left Constantinople under circumstances which can hardly have added to Allied prestige. Later on the capitulations which date back for centuries, and which alone were responsible for the safety of Europeans domiciled in Turkey, were abolished. The foreign ambassadors, including those of the Central Powers, protested, but considering the relations then and subsequently existing between the Germanic and Ottoman Governments, there can be no doubt that the representative of the Kaiser knew full well that even the nominal breaking loose of the Turkish Government from a system of control, which was vital to the whole civilised world, was but a part of the game in which he was actually the chief actor. As
a matter of fact, at the end of April, 1916, it was formally announced that Turkey had taken the place of Italy in the Triple Alliance, and that she “had regained her independence by entering upon equal terms” into that alliance. In spite of this declaration and of the explanation then given that in none of the minor agreements concluded was there any trace of the old capitulation rights, it is obvious, as matters of consular jurisdiction and of the right of residence were dealt with, that the Germans secured in fact, if not in name, the privileges which they had lost just prior to the intervention of Turkey. During this period, too, Ottoman intrigue became rife from end to end of Albania, and Turkey was persuaded to mobilise—a measure which she was not in a financial position to undertake, and a measure which could only have been directed against the Allies.

But, though it happened earlier than some of the above-mentioned events, the all-important feature and the real turning point in the whole situation was the arrival at Constantinople of the German Goeben and Breslau in the middle of August. The so-called purchase of these vessels placed the Turks in a position which naturally justified them in thinking that they were a match for any naval force which they were likely to meet in the Black Sea. From then, and until the outbreak of war, the entire attention of the German representative at Constantinople and of the Turkish Government was directed towards the rapid conveyance of German men and war material to the

1 Mr. Morgenthau says that the German Ambassador at Constantinople never made any secret of the fact that the ships still remained German property.
shores of the Bosphorus. As a matter of fact, shortly after Turkey entered the war arena, there were at least twelve thousand Germans and Austrians in the Ottoman dominions. This vast army of supporters and instructors was collected largely owing to the fact that men, who should have returned to their own countries for military service, either remained in or went to Constantinople, it being understood that their presence there would ultimately be more valuable to the common cause than would have been their return home.

It is this weighty question of Goeben and Breslau and above all the manner in which it was treated by the Allies, which constituted the greatest mistake made in connection with the then situation at Constantinople. Leaving out of account the reasons for which these ships were able to escape from their place of refuge in Sicily—reasons the real nature of which we do not even now know—the Allies, instead of grasping the fact then and there in the month of August, 1914, that the then arrival of Goeben would enable Germany to rush Turkey into the War, and instead of immediately following her into the Dardanelles, not as the enemies of Turkey, but as a peaceful precaution and as the protectors and friends of the true Ottoman people, continued to ignore the fact that the so-called purchase of these vessels was a purely bogus and prearranged matter, destined not only to give the enemy complete control of the direction of affairs in Constantinople but also to provide the Turks with ships of a type and possessed of a fighting power which entirely altered and influenced what might otherwise have been the course of the Dardanelles operations.
Space is too short to enable me to describe the details of the manner in which Germany actually rushed Turkey into war. Sufficient be it, therefore, to say that the Germans finally endeavoured to telegraph instructions to the Turkish staff at Erzerum without consulting all, or even most, of the members of the Ottoman Government, and that the outbreak of hostilities was postponed owing to the fact that the telegram was intercepted by a vigilant post-office clerk. Later, and on October 28, the Turks made an incursion into the Sinai Peninsula, and the Germans succeeded, on the same day, in launching a naval attack upon Odessa, and upon other of the Russian Black Sea ports — an attack which was the immediate cause of war. That attack, which was carried out without the knowledge of several members of the cabinet and certainly without the consent of Ahmed Djemal Pasha, resulted in the immediate demand of their passports by the Allied ambassadors and in the open establishment of a state of war with Turkey.

Before approaching an account of the military events dealt with in this chapter, brief mention must be made of the shocking and atrocious Armenian massacres in progress during the year 1915. These massacres were more prolonged and more systematic than, and, in many ways, entirely different to, those which took place in the late nineties in Armenia and in Constantinople, or in the Adana neighbourhood in 1909. In former years, on the occasion of a massacre, it was the men and the male children who were for the most part butchered, and the outbreaks, whilst beginning and ending almost by clockwork and at
fixed hours, took the form of killing people in their homes. This was dreadful, more dreadful than can be imagined by any one who has not seen it, but it was not so terrible as what took place in 1915. At that time, instead of murdering the people where they happened to be, and then destroying or stealing their property, a regular campaign for the purpose of exterminating the Armenian race was inaugurated. The leading men of each town or village were first seized, tortured, and killed. Later the whole population, in many cases made up of well-to-do people possessed of good houses, and including the women, the feeble, and the young, were forced to leave their homes and belongings, and to march on foot towards the south and into the desert, going they knew not where. These people, unprovided with clothing or food, were ill treated by their guards, and abused by the Moslem inhabitants of the districts through which they passed. The consequence was that, exposed to the cold and to the heat, some fell by the roadside, perishing where they lay, and others, during transportation down the rivers Euphrates and Tigris, were pushed, dead or alive, from the rafts on which they had already suffered from privation for days.

From an internal standpoint, these massacres meant that the Turks ridded themselves of approximately one million, that is to say, one half of the Armenians formerly estimated to have lived in the Ottoman Empire, and that they thereby temporarily went a long way towards accomplishing their object of solving the Armenian question, by massacre. Externally and internally these atrocities, carried out in a manner different to the system formerly employed, prove two
things. First, they show that the Germans, whose attention was drawn to the matter both in America and in Constantinople, not only took no steps to prevent a slaughter of innocents, but that they must have been actually the moving spirit in events so outrageous that they would not have been perpetrated by even the Turks alone. Secondly, they indicate the necessity, when the proper time comes, of bringing home the responsibility for this atrocious conduct to the quarter where it rests, and of seeing that, on the declaration of peace, arrangements are made concerning the future status of Armenia and of the Armenians which will for ever prevent the recurrence of such an outbreak.

As the operations at the Dardanelles are dealt with in a special section of this volume, I will turn at once to the three other principal campaigns in which Turkey has been engaged since the beginning of the War. Partly owing to the fact that her frontier is no longer contiguous to that of Greece, and partly because the Ottoman fleet has never been able to leave the Dardanelles, Turkey could make no endeavour to reconquer the Aegean Islands, which, I have already said, was one of her great aspirations at the beginning of the War. For the same reason, that is, because its communications by sea were completely interrupted, the Ottoman Government has been compelled to undertake operations in areas with which it could maintain connection by land—areas which for obvious reasons were those situated in Northeastern Asia Minor, at the head of the Persian Gulf, and in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Egyptian frontier.

At the beginning of the Caucasian campaign the
Russians advanced into Turkey by three practically distinct routes, namely, those which led upon Erzerum, that running past Mount Ararat and through Bayazid, and that leading across the Persian frontier and towards the lake and town of Van. Three weeks after the entry of Turkey into the War, the Russians secured possession of Kuprukeuie, situated about halfway between the Turkish frontier and Erzerum. Immediately after that, acting on the usual German rule of taking the offensive at the first possible moment, the Turks began to advance from the direction of Erzerum, and continued to do so until the Ottoman forces were defeated during the early part of January, 1915, at and near Sarikamish, near the borders of, but within, Russian territory. This victory, however, cost the Russians something elsewhere, for they were obliged temporarily to withdraw from Tabriz, which they soon recaptured, and from certain rich districts of Persia. From that time onwards, up to the appointment of the Grand Duke Nicholas as Commander-in-Chief in the Caucasus in the late summer of 1915, there was a lull in Eastern Asia Minor, for it was not until considerably after the arrival of that General that operations in this area began to assume proportions of serious importance.

Nevertheless the Russian Generalissimo, who was responsible for the military plan of campaign not only in Armenia but also on the Persian frontier, began at once carefully to prepare the way for his main advance upon Erzerum by consolidating his position and pushing forward his line between lakes Van and Urumiah during the closing months of 1915. Early in January of the following year, and therefore in the
depth of winter, a definite and determined blow was struck in the direction of Erzerum. After a large Ottoman army had been defeated in the field, the Russian commander brought up heavy guns by way of mountain roads which had always been considered to be well-nigh unpassable in winter. Such was his skill that the actual attacks upon Erzerum having begun about the twentieth of January, the greatest Ottoman fortress in Asia Minor actually fell into Muscovite hands on February 16, and therefore after a bombardment of little over three weeks. This capture was one of the biggest military and political victories which had then been won by the Allies in the East since the beginning of the War.

After the fall of Erzerum a Russian force advanced through extremely difficult country and along the Black Sea coast towards Trebizond, which port was taken after a week's severe fighting about the middle of April. This, too, constituted a gain of some significance, for in addition to the fact that the loss of Trebizond was a great moral blow to Turkey, its possession by Russia enormously facilitated her means of communication. Thus, instead of being compelled to rely entirely upon the road which passes through Erzerum to Trebizond, — a road the whole of which was not in their hands until considerably after the capture of that city, — she was able to utilise the port as a means of connection between her bases on the north and east of the Black Sea and her forces engaged in Northeastern Asia Minor.

Slightly before the capture of Trebizond, the left of the Russian line, which at the time of the fall of Erzerum ran approximately from that place to a
point just to the northeast of Mush and from there to lakes Van and Urumiah and on to the Persian frontier, was advanced in such a way as to include the towns of Bitlis and Mush, which were taken respectively early and late in March, 1916. With the capture of Baiburt on the post road from Erzerum to Trebizond in June, of Erzengan, the great military centre, in July, and of Gumushhane in August, 1916, the high-water mark of the Russian advance was reached. It resulted in the occupation of the whole of the route from Erzerum to Trebizond, which is one of the most important roads in this part of the Ottoman Empire, and in the establishment of a line running from a point on the Black Sea coast, located a few miles to the west of Trebizond, through Erzengan, Kighi, Mush, the Bitlis Gap, thence round to south of Lake Van to Lake Urumiah — a line which though it was never actually continuous was nevertheless a definite and well-connected front in the possession of the army of the ex-Tsar.

Although the Russians withdrew along certain portions of this front during 1917, with the following modifications they held approximately the above-mentioned line until about the time of the peace developments with Germany. Between the Black Sea coast and Kighi, lying about halfway between Erzengan and Mush, there was no material modification. To the southwest of that town, however, the Russians lost certain mountain positions. In May, 1917, too, they withdrew from Mush, thereby sacrificing a place of considerable significance. Moreover, further to the southeast they retired from the head of the Bitlis Gap, through which an all-important
road runs to Diarbekr. Part of the area between this place and Lake Van, however, remained in Russian hands, as did also the city of Van, from which point the line ran in a southeasterly direction to and across the Turco-Persian frontier, near which it turned, finally reaching the neighbourhood of Kermanshah. Thus, whilst the earlier changes which took place resulted in the loss of certain points and areas of strategical importance, and whilst the Russian and British forces based on Mesopotamia, instead of being in actual touch as they were at one time, were now separated by a considerable distance, the position of the Muscovite front in Asia at first suffered proportionately less as a result of the Russian Revolution than did that of the Russian army in Europe. In short, it was only at the time of the signature of the so-called peace with Germany that the definite evacuation of the conquered districts of Asia Minor began to make itself so painfully apparent.

Events are changing so rapidly that it is impossible to chronicle exactly what has taken place in the neighbourhood of the Russo-Turkish frontier during the last few months. Sufficient therefore be it to say that by the Treaty signed between these two countries at Brest-Litovsk on March 3d—a Treaty which is rightly not acknowledged by the Allies—Russia undertook to withdraw from the Ottoman territory which she occupied and also to evacuate the districts of Erivan, Kars and Batum. The meaning of this is that the areas annexed by Russia after the war of 1877–1878 are handed back to their former owner, that their population is left practically at the mercy of the Turks, and that once these new possessions were really subdued by
Bitlis, an Important Town in Eastern Asia Minor

From a Photograph by Walter Heathcote
the enemy he would have gone a long way towards the establishment of a new route into Persia and in the direction of the Indian frontier. Armenian and Georgian contingents, formed from the local population and from the native elements of the Russian Army still loyal to the Allied Cause, have done their utmost to resist this subjugation. If it can be maintained that resistance, which is obviously worthy of encouragement by the Allies, is of the highest importance, for it might be the means of preventing or at least of delaying the realisation of Germanic designs in this direction. On the other hand, should this be impossible, owing to the difficulty of combating organised and well armed forces with irregulars, not adequately provided with guns and war materials, then the future of the area situated between the Black Sea and the Caspian—an area which cannot be left under German domination—will remain to be decided, not by the temporary arrangement made between the Central Powers and Russia, but by the terms of an ultimate and fair peace.

The second area of Turkish operations is that situated between the head of the Persian Gulf and Bagdad—that is, the theatre of the Mesopotamian campaign.\(^1\) Here, as in the Caucasus and on the Egyptian frontier, the Turkish policy, aggressive as it was or would have been, was directed with the object of threatening the British position on the Persian Gulf, of seizing Koweit and of pushing forward into Southern Persia with the principal purpose of occupying the oil fields. These Persian oil fields,

\(^1\) A great many aspects of this campaign are discussed in the Report of the Mesopotamia Commission presented to Parliament in 1917 and published as a Blue Book numbered Cd 8610.
which are of great value, lie in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz and Shustar, and therefore within about eighty miles of the Turco-Persian frontier. They are connected with Muhammera—actually on the Shat-el-Arab—by a pipe line belonging to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The destruction of this line was one of the most important Turkish objectives in this locality.

Before reviewing the actual operations which have taken place in this area, it may be well to indicate the geography of the country in question. The southeastern part of Mesopotamia (it is more correct to call this district Babylonia) lies between the lower reaches of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. In shape this area may be compared to that of an old-fashioned pointed bottomed, soda-water bottle, lying half over towards the left-hand side. The neck of that bottle, which measures about thirty-five miles in width, is situated between Bagdad on the Tigris and Feluja on the Euphrates. Its pointed base is at Kurna—the town at which the two rivers unite their waters—waters which flow thence for a distance of about one hundred miles to the Persian Gulf under the name of the Shat-el-Arab. As a sort of label line extending practically across the thickest part of the bottle, where it measures about one hundred and ten miles, there is the Shat-el-Hai Canal, which leaves the Tigris at Kut-el-Amara and meets the Euphrates at Nasrieh. This canal is navigable for small boats.

If we accept this rough analogy, it is possible to utilise it in order to explain the various stages into which the campaign has been practically divided. They are:
(1) The British advance by way of Basra to Kurna and the consequent seizure of the base of the bottle. This stage was rapidly accomplished, for Basra was occupied on November 22, 1914, approximately three weeks after the entry of Turkey into the war, and Kurna fell on the ninth of the following month.

(2) The pushing forward by way of the Euphrates to Nasrich at the southern end of the "label", or Shat-el-Hai Canal, and by way of the Tigris to Kut-el-Amara at the northern end of the same waterway. The former place was taken on July 25, and the latter was reached on September 28, 1915.

(3) The further attempted push up the neck of the bottle towards Bagdad, the retreat from Ctesiphon in November, 1915, and the siege of Kut which lasted from December 7, 1915, until its fall on April 29, 1916.

(4) The operations which followed the surrender of General Townshend, including the taking of Bagdad, and the advance which has taken place since the capture of that town in March, 1917.

Whilst from the first the British were obliged to assume what may be called a tactical offensive, they were acting, so to speak, strategically on the defensive so long as they were only trying to block the Turkish advance into areas which were and are of vital importance to them. By those who can only look at maps it is argued that the British object would have been achieved and that they should have contented themselves with the accomplishment of the first stage and with the occupation of Kurna. But militarily this would not have been sufficient. Owing to its position at the junction of the two rivers, this place
would have been open to an attack from the north by way of the Tigris and from the west along the Euphrates. Moreover as was proved by the determined Turkish thrust into Persia and upon Ahwaz — a thrust the effects of which were put an end to by the operations conducted by General Gorringe in Persian territory during May, 1915 — the enemy would still have been able to attack the Persian oil fields. In addition, so long as Nasirich, on the Euphrates, was not occupied, not only Kurna but Basra itself were and would have been open to the danger of an attack from the direction of that place, which in nonflooded times is the starting point of a land route towards the southeast. This means that the accomplishment of the first stage in the campaign would not have been sufficient under the circumstances.

The second stage began with an advance up the Tigris to Amara, which fell into General Gorringe's hands on June 4, 1915, and with the subsequent attack upon Nasirich, which was occupied on July twenty-fifth. It continued with the further advance from Amara to Kut-el-Amara — an advance entailing a forward movement of one hundred and fifty miles measured along the banks of the Tigris. The whole of these operations were accomplished under conditions of the utmost difficulty, for, in addition to the heavy opposition put up by the Turks and to the geographical obstacles, to which I will refer again later on, light-draft river boats had to be collected, prepared, and armoured to carry the expedition through an area where railways were then nonexistent.

Thus far the operations in Mesopotamia went fairly well, at least from the purely military standpoint.
Then came the third stage in the campaign, the fatal dash for Bagdad—a dash which with the forces available and the inadequate preparations was not warrantable. Moreover, in addition to its being un-justifiable for these reasons, it was in any case a mis-take because the holding and the properly defending of Kut-el-Amara would probably have prevented any serious Turkish incursions into Southern Persia, and because, even had the advance of the winter of 1915 resulted in the occupation of Bagdad, the British expeditionary force might well have been unable to hold a place having so large a population with a force numbering only from fifteen to seventeen thousand men. The net consequences of this error were that the retirement to and the fall of Kut resulted in a serious setback to British prestige in the East, that the losses incurred in endeavouring to relieve that place immediately prior to April 29, 1916, had no corresponding advantage, and that reinforcements, which could otherwise have been brought up fresh from the base for an advance upon Bagdad during the spring and summer of that year, were compelled to retake the Sanaiyat and other positions, lying to the southeast of Kut and to which the Turks had advanced, before once more inaugurating our final and successful advance upon Bagdad.

At the beginning of the fourth stage and during the hot season after the fall of Kut in 1916, the British Army suffered much from sickness, and the transport arrangements, though improving, were still inade-quate. From May, therefore, when the surrender of General Townshend made it unnecessary immediately to push forward on the Tigris, the British policy in
Mesopotamia was defensive. Sir Percy Lake, acting on orders from home, was directed to maintain as forward a position as could be made tactically secure and to be ready to take advantage of any weakening on the Turkish front. These instructions were strictly adhered to, and he and his successor, Sir Stanley Maude, confined themselves during the summer and autumn of that year to developing their river and railway communications and to improving their general supply organisation. As a result of this, when active operations were resumed very early in 1917, the advance to and the capture of Bagdad on March 11 were accomplished in a highly satisfactory manner. These operations and those which took place subsequent to the British entry into the city have gone a long way towards redeeming the effect of the mistakes which were made earlier in the campaign. Indeed, in spite of every effort to minimise its importance, the fact that the British under General Sir W. R. Marshall have now pushed up the Tigris for miles beyond Bagdad, in addition to establishing themselves to the northeast and to the west and northwest of that city, must have had an influence in Turkey, only surpassed by the capture of Jerusalem.

There is no space or reason here to enter into a discussion of the manner in which the Mesopotamian operations, and particularly the earlier operations, were conducted. The accounts which have appeared in the press and the report of the British Mesopotamia Commission, appointed to inquire into those operations, are sufficient to prove that political and military miscalculations occurred, that inadequate preparations were made, and that the scope of the expedition was
never sufficiently defined in advance. These are shortcomings for which severe condemnation is deserved. Nevertheless whilst it is not my intention to try to make excuses for such mistakes, if we are only to apportion blame where blame be due, and in fairness to those concerned, we must recognise that the difficulties to be overcome in Mesopotamia were and are enormous. The treacherous climate and the alternation of sweltering heat and bitter cold made the regular supply of warm clothing, double tents, mosquito nets, and other requisites an absolute necessity. Moreover the same conditions, which had for their result a large amount of sickness, were responsible for the desirability of the provision of an abnormal amount of hospital accommodation — accommodation which in its turn depended upon the adequate organisation of a sufficient transport — transport which included not only the provision and equipment of river steamers but the conversion of Basra into such a port as would make it an adequate base of operations for a large inland military operation.

Ignoring altogether the immense burden of the tonnage question, and of transporting troops from England or other parts of the British Empire to the Persian Gulf, once arrived there the difficulties to be overcome were enormous. Bagdad is distant from the sea five hundred and seventy miles. Until the construction of railways, which did not exist during the earlier stages of the operations, the sole means of communication was by way of the Shat-el-Arab and the Tigris. Below Basra, which is situated on the former channel and about seventy miles from the sea, vessels drawing up to nineteen feet of water can navi-
gate. Above that town, where in 1914 there were practically no quays or warehouses, transport is dependent upon river boats, the draft of which must not exceed seven and a half feet for the trip to Kurna and three and a half for Amara and beyond. Over and above a few vessels owned by Messrs. Lynch, these river steamers did not exist, and many of them had to be collected from the rivers Hoogli and Irawadi. The Tigris twists and turns with sharp bends and hairpin corners, leaving in places little or no room for vessels, and particularly for those towing barges, to pass one another. The stream runs at about four knots an hour, and it is difficult for steamers without independent paddles to avoid striking the banks when going round the corners. No proper charts are or can be available for the Tigris, because the channel is constantly changing, owing to the shifting of the sand. Indeed, so marked is this that in peace time, when there was a regular bi-weekly service up and down the river, the ships were always either navigated by different local pilots or by men who were compelled upon each journey to make inquiries at the various stations as to the ever-changing conditions.

The influence of the floods, which would in any case have interfered with the movement of troops in the neighbourhood of the Tigris, was rendered far greater because of the existence of "deep cuts" (irrigation ditches) which in peace time are used for watering the areas situated near the banks of the river. Some of these ditches naturally became automatically filled by the rise of the river, but others were able to be put into operation by those who held the key of the system by which they were worked.
Throughout the earlier operations, therefore, the Turks, who could choose their own positions for defence, were possessed of an enormous advantage over the British who at times had to push forward at all costs. In addition, as I shall show elsewhere, whilst our difficulties grew greater and greater as our communications became longer and longer, the obstacles to be overcome by the enemy were daily decreasing, owing to the existence and continued improvement in the Bagdad Railway, by means of which he was able to convey troops across a considerable length of the area which separates Constantinople from Bagdad.

If we ignore the Arabian Independentist Movement and the proclamation and attitude of the Grand Shereef of Mecca, which are more important politically than militarily, we now come to the last theatre of war in which the Turks have been engaged, namely, the area lying to the east of the Egyptian frontier and in Palestine. Here we were at first presented with an example of what is practically a new feature of warfare — namely the necessity for the conveyance of a force of considerable size across a practically waterless desert which has an average width of about one hundred and forty miles. The operations in this area began directly after the entry of Turkey into the War, by the shelling, by H. M. S. Minerva, of the fort and troops at Akaba where preparations were being made for an advance upon Egypt. Subsequently the British abandoned the Turco-Egyptian frontier, withdrawing to the line of the Suez Canal, where entrenchments were dug. The Turks, who had loudly proclaimed the reconquest of their lost
territory, then (that is to say, early in 1915) advanced across the desert by several different routes, and with a force of about twelve thousand men ultimately reached the immediate neighbourhood of the canal during the opening days of February, 1915. Allowed to approach the very bank of this water line, and to bring up their bridging material, the enemy was, however, completely routed on February second and third (leaving about five hundred dead and over six hundred prisoners), as a result of an attack delivered by mixed British troops and of the fire of British and French warships stationed in the canal itself.

For more than a year there was no important development on the Egyptian frontier, but in April, 1916, the British once more advanced into the desert, fighting actions with the Turks in various areas — actions which ended in no decision of far-reaching importance for either side. About four months later, the enemy took the offensive, making a general attack in the neighbourhood of Katia, near the Mediterranean coast early in August. He was, however, decisively defeated, losing four thousand prisoners and thirteen hundred killed out of a total force of eighteen thousand men. The consequence of this was that, during the rest of the year, the British were able gradually to reconquer Egyptian territory, finally occupying El-Arish on the Mediterranean and other places to the south of it at the end of December. As a result of this success an advance was made into Southern Palestine early in 1917, but that advance was not carried out in sufficient strength to enable it to be permanently maintained and the attempts to capture Gaza, in March, failed. From that time onwards,
particularly during the hot weather, the campaign lapsed into stagnancy, and it was only in November that Beersheba, Gaza, and Jaffa were captured, with the result that the way was made ready for an advance upon Jerusalem, which fell into British hands early in December.

That event undoubtedly constitutes the most important Allied success gained in the East since the beginning of the War. From a military standpoint the occupation of the Holy City gives the British a base of operations on the east of the Egyptian desert and thus enables them to pursue with greater facility their further campaign towards the north and east. In the former direction, we can now look upon an advance to Damascus or even Aleppo, and the consequent cutting of the Bagdad Railway, near the latter place, as a matter of practical consideration. In the latter area, that is, just across the Jordan, is the Hedjaz Railway—a line which for years has been the only connecting link between Arabia and the remainder of Turkey. Its protection by the Turks, or even its partial occupation by the British, are obviously questions of far-reaching importance to the respective parties.

The moral effect of the capture of Jerusalem must be as great, if not greater, than the military, for the occupation of that city, following upon that of Bagdad, cannot fail to affect the mentality of the Turks, who have always regarded these places as of great importance. Moreover, although Moslems consider Mecca and Medina as their two most Holy Cities, Jerusalem is also held by them as a sacred place, for they reverence Christ, Moses, and Abraham only
after Mohammed. In addition, and over and above this, the British success in Palestine must have a further influence because one of the strongest claims of the Sultans of Turkey to the position of Caliph, or head of the Moslem religion, is due to the fact that for years they have been the guardians of the three Holy Cities. The King of Hedjaz is in undisputed possession of Mecca and Medina; therefore, with the fall of Jerusalem, which had been in Mohammedan hands since 1243, the Turks lose a place which they recognise to be of significance from numerous stand-points.
IV

BULGARIA AND THE WAR

Although the object of this account is neither to summarise the history of Bulgaria nor to describe the rapid development of that country during the last forty years, yet it is interesting to recall the fact that modern Bulgaria is the youngest independent State, except Albania, in the Balkan Peninsula. Thus it was only in the year 1878, after, and as a result of, the Russo-Turkish War, that Northern Bulgaria was created a principality under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and that Eastern Roumelia was formed into an autonomous province under a Christian governor-general. From the time of the union of the two States in 1885 until the declaration of their final independence in 1908, the prosperity of the country gradually increased. Again from that moment until the outbreak of the first Balkan war in October, 1912, the Bulgarians continued to work for the development of their national power and for the realisation of their great aspiration—the union of the Macedonian Bulgars under the rule of King Ferdinand.

Prior to the Balkan Wars the area of the kingdom of Bulgaria was approximately 38,000 square miles, and the population numbered about 4,337,000 souls. As a result of these wars, an area roughly including
8600 square miles was taken from Turkey, but Bulgaria was compelled to sacrifice 2687 square miles of territory to Roumania. Consequently the net change was that the size of the country was only increased in such a way that it now has an area of about 43,300 square miles and a population of somewhat over 4,750,000 souls. This means that Bulgaria, who provided the largest army for the first war, gained by far the least from a campaign which could never have been carried out without her co-operation.

As a result of the so-called settlement of the year 1913, Bulgaria, deprived of the legitimate fruits of her original and all-important victories in Thrace, where she met and defeated the greater part of the Turkish Army, naturally continued to remain on the most strained terms with Serbia and Greece. The Treaty of London, signed between the Balkan allies and Turkey in 1913, was torn up by the latter country, who, in spite of protests from both the British and the Russian Governments, reoccupied Adrianople during the second Balkan war. Notwithstanding this, it was claimed by some that the formation of the then so-called new Balkan Alliance, made up of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Roumania, was as favourable, if not more favourable, to the cause of the then Triple Entente than would have been the continued existence of the original League, formed of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro. Others, and amongst them the Austrians and the Germans, were not slow to realise that however friendly to Serbia her new allies might be, with the exception of Montenegro those so-called allies were not likely immediately to engage in a war in which they had no direct interest.
From the moment of the outbreak of the War, and particularly after the entry of Turkey, until Bulgaria threw in her lot on the side of the Central Powers, the key to the situation in the latter country lay in the fact that King Ferdinand and his Government were determined to utilise the present conflagration in order to try to regain at least some of the losses suffered in 1913. For them this was not so much a European as a third Balkan war for the independence of the Bulgars, subject to alien, this time principally Serbian and Greek, rules. It was certain, therefore, that they would not throw in their lot with any side or countries which did not promise to give them a large section of Southern Macedonia and also as secondary conditions to restore to them a section of the Dobrudja and at least part of Turkish Thrace. In other words, the bitter antagonism felt by Bulgaria towards Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, and particularly towards the first-mentioned country, outweighed the traditional hostility towards Turkey and weakened the ties of friendship with Russia, whose attitude towards the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute of 1913 was far from popular at Sofia. Consequently so long as her future was not adequately secured elsewhere, Bulgaria was unlikely to take up arms against Turkey because her only accesses to the sea were by way of her Black Sea ports — rendered useless owing to the closing of the Dardanelles — and through Dede Agatch, the railway to which port, according to the Treaty of Constantinople of September, 1913, ran for some miles through Ottoman territory. From the moment of the outbreak of the War the great question, therefore, was whether Serbia, Greece, and Roumania would or
could be persuaded to restore to Bulgaria areas of territory which she considered should be hers, and whether the Allies would guarantee her possession of districts of now Ottoman territory, which they actually agreed should be allotted to her during the negotiations of the year 1913.

Whilst, so far as I know, no detailed official statement was published on the subject, the conditions required by Bulgaria soon became pretty clear. On the west the Government of King Ferdinand was intent upon the recognition of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of March, 1912, as a basis for discussion — a basis which would have meant the cession by Serbia of considerable areas of her southern territory annexed after the Balkan Wars. On the south, whilst claims were made to all the district lying between the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier, the Struma Valley, and the Aegean, satisfaction would probably have been provided by a rectification of that frontier in such a manner as to give to Bulgaria at least the whole of the Mesta Valley and the port of Kavala. On the north, where Roumania had claimed, secured, and afterwards seized territory on the south of the Dobrudja, the Bulgarian Government would undoubtedly have agreed to leave to that country the territory, including the town of Silistria, ceded to her by the Petrograd Protocol of May, 1913, provided the more southerly area actually seized by Roumania during the second Balkan war had been restored to its former owners. With regard to the East and in Turkey, there was obviously no question of negotiation with the Allies, and there the only arrangement which could therefore have been expected by Bulgaria was the giving to her of a free
hand to occupy and retain a part of Thrace, say that situated northwest of the Enos-Midia line.

The enormous war importance of Bulgaria is bound up largely with her geographical position. As a result of the Balkan campaigns she became the only State with a frontier contiguous to that of Turkey in Europe. She was, therefore, the sole country which could attack or through which a land attack could be made upon the European dominions of the Sultan. Equally well, it was through Bulgaria alone that officers, technical experts, and supplies could be sent as they were sent, from Central Europe to Constantinople. To the Allies, this meant that in 1915 the support of “Fox” Ferdinand would have carried with it an immediate Bulgarian advance into Thrace, which in itself would probably have resulted in an immediate collapse of Turkish resistance on the Peninsula of Gallipoli. In addition, with the entry of Bulgaria into the War upon our side, we could not only have utilised Dede Agatch and Porto Lagos for the disembarkation of armies destined to be able to impose terms of peace at the very gates of the Ottoman capital, but arrangements would then undoubtedly have been arrived at by which Allied or Greek troops could have advanced from Salonica or Kavala by way of the territory of Tsar Ferdinand.

Owing to her central position, Bulgaria’s value was, therefore, out of all proportion even to the high fighting efficiency of her military machine. Thus we have already seen that the rapid subjugation of Serbia was largely due to her action. Equally well, had Roumania entered the War against Austria or Germany during the first year of the European conflagra-
tion and consequently sent the greater part of her forces to undertake a campaign in Transylvania or in the Bukovina, the Bulgarians would have been able, as they subsequently were able, to make their influence most unpleasantly felt along both banks of the Danube. And lastly, had Greece either provided a force for the support of Serbia, or inaugurated war-like operations at the Dardanelles or elsewhere, the Bulgarians always could, as they did, easily advance to Kavala and into the Greek district which lies between the rivers Mesta and Struma.

The above remarks are sufficient to indicate not only what was the importance of Bulgaria in reference to the Dardanelles, but also that her position enabled her practically to immobilise the military forces of her neighbours and to be the means of providing or of preventing the establishment of through communication between Central Europe and Constantinople. The arrival at an understanding between the Allies and the Government of Sofia, during the first year of the War, would therefore probably have meant an augmentation of the Allied armies by at least one million two hundred thousand men and that the armies composed of these men would have been in a position to act in exactly the areas where their presence would have been most valuable against the enemy. Four hundred thousand Bulgarians would have advanced into Turkey, with the result already indicated. In spite of the attitude of King Constantine, M. Venezelos, then Prime Minister, could at that time have carried the people of Greece with him in favour of a mobilisation of an army of at least two hundred thousand to be employed in some cam-
campaign. Five hundred thousand Roumanians could have immediately crossed the Austrian frontier. By occupying the Bukovina and Transylvania, under circumstances in which there would have been no danger of Bulgarian aggression from the rear, they would not only have furthered the cause of the Allies, and particularly that of Russia, but they might well have formed an effective link between the Muscovite and the Serbian forces.

So much for the value of Bulgaria to the Allies—a value which on its side naturally made her attitude of great significance to the enemy. Indeed by the maintenance of the neutrality, but still more by the support of that country, which rendered the conquest of her neighbours a feasible proposition, the Central Powers gained one of their greatest assets in the War. It enabled them to develop to the full advantage the utility of Turkey and thus to threaten the British positions in Mesopotamia and in Egypt. It enormously expedited the sending of submarines overland to be put together in Constantinople or elsewhere, and it facilitated the establishment of bases, without which the work of these underwater craft would have been greatly curtailed in the Eastern Mediterranean. When coupled with the consequent necessity for the British withdrawal from the Dardanelles, it constituted a moral victory of far-reaching importance at home and abroad. And last but not least it resulted in the inauguration of the Salonica campaign and the consequent employment of troops which would otherwise have been available elsewhere.

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the importance of Bulgaria to both groups of belligerents
and to indicate the lines along which alone she might have been brought into the War upon the Allied side. Whilst there are some who state, I have reason to believe without foundation, that an arrangement was arrived at between the Central Powers and Bulgaria so early that even such concessions as I have outlined would not have brought her into the War upon our side, there are others who say that in any case such concessions were out of proportion to the value of King Ferdinand's position and army in the War, and that they would have reacted too unfairly upon his neighbours to be feasible of arrangement. In discussing the matter quite openly, therefore, I must ask my readers to believe that my sole object is to explain, that in addition to the real interest of all our Balkan friends being the achievement of a general Allied success, rather than a local victory, each of the Balkan States would have furthered her own immediate objects and stood to gain by the making of sacrifices which for the moment would and might have been most difficult.

Our little ally, Serbia, who in 1915 had already fought so well and so bravely, would have been far more than repaid for any sacrifices of territory rendered necessary by the recognition of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty and Conventions signed before the outbreak of the first Balkan war, by the earlier and certain acquisition and annexation of territory which we still contend will be hers in Bosnia and Herzegovina and by the possession of a proper outlet upon the Adriatic. Greece, to whom the retention of Kavala was always largely a question of amour propre, could have been supplied with more than an equivalent amount of
territory elsewhere, had she ceded, as M. Venezelos was at one time willing to cede, an area, the possession of which was and is vital to the whole future prosperity of Bulgaria. Roumania would have been amply compensated for any losses which she might have suffered in the Dobrudja by the fact that she would have been free to undertake and safe in undertaking operations which later on proved at least temporarily disastrous to her.

From the moment of the outbreak of the War, and particularly from the time of the entry of Turkey into the theatre of hostilities, Bulgaria was therefore in possession of "goods" which were worth a high price alike to the Central Powers and to the Allies. The former, who realised the necessity of preparing the way for military action, from the first left no stone unturned to develop an already advantageous situation in order at least to maintain the neutrality and, if possible, to secure the support of Bulgaria. The situation was favourable for Germanic intrigue, because, as a result of the events of 1913, the relations between Bulgaria and Turkey had rapidly improved, and because, whilst the former country had aspirations, both across her eastern and southeastern frontiers and beyond her western and southwestern boundaries, her claims in Thrace were of much less importance to her than those in Macedonia. What happened therefore was that, although Germany devoted herself to endeavouring to secure the good will of Bulgaria, she (Germany) also did what was equally important, and wrung from Turkey concessions of the greatest value to the Government of King Ferdinand. Thus whilst many arguments and statements have been
used and made to the contrary, and whilst the visit of Prince Hohenlohe and of the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin to Sofia in the summer of 1915 had a most important effect, I have reason to believe that no definite agreement existed between the Government of King Ferdinand and the Central Powers until the very eve of the entry of Bulgaria into the War. Indeed, friendly as the relations gradually became between Turkey and Bulgaria, it was really only the cession by the former country of the area of Thrace through which the railway runs from Mustafa Pasha to Dede Agatch, the preliminary agreement which was arrived at in July, that made it practically impossible for the Allies to expect to be able to bring Bulgaria into the War against Turkey.

The position of the Allies originally was and it gradually became far more difficult than that of the enemy. To begin with, there was always Russia in the background, who, whilst supporting Serbia on the one hand, was regarded with actual suspicion by Bulgaria on the other. Moreover, instead of, like Germany, being able to negotiate with one party — Turkey — for concessions to Bulgaria, England, France, Russia, and later Italy, were compelled to approach Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, against all of which countries, as I have already shown, the Government of Sofia had far-reaching claims. Moreover, King Ferdinand, who had never forgiven Russia for her attitude towards him during the years which elapsed directly after his arrival in Bulgaria, was not sorry to be able to utilise the enemy victories in Poland, as an argument in favouring a pro-German policy. The net results, therefore, were that when tardily
and too late the Allies recognised the necessity of endeavouring to secure the neutrality, if not the active support of Bulgaria, the ground for negotiation was extremely unfavourable and that country had already set a price upon herself which it was far from easy to pay.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1915, a constant exchange of ideas was in progress. Early in May the Bulgarian Government outlined the conditions upon which it would be prepared to join the Allies — conditions which were more or less in accordance with those which I have already suggested. On May 29, the Triple Entente, supported by Italy, replied to these proposals but were unable to provide full satisfaction, owing to the attitude of Serbia, Greece, and Roumania, who were in possession of the most important areas in question. On June 15 the Bulgarian Premier called upon the diplomatic representatives of the Entente Powers at Sofia and presented to them a Note in which his Government asked for further particulars regarding these proposals.

A definite and fatal hitch then ensued, and it was not until a month later and in July, that really determined efforts were made, and that pressure was brought to bear upon Serbia to accede to at least part of the Bulgarian demands. In August this pressure had the result of making that country give serious consideration to the suggestions of the Allies and particularly to those of Great Britain, and, after a secret session in the Chamber, certain concessions were agreed to by the Government of King Peter. But satisfactory as might these concessions have been, had they been suggested voluntarily and many months earlier, they
proved useless at the time at which they were made. To begin with, they did not satisfy the full claims of Bulgaria from an actual territorial standpoint and, instead of carrying with them the immediate handing over of at least part of the areas in dispute, they only made conditional promises as to the future — promises which the Bulgarians contended would be less likely to be fulfilled by a victorious than by a hard-pressed Serbia. Moreover, although the claims against Greece and Roumania were less vital, the fact that Bulgaria’s northern and southern neighbours made no sign of following the tardy example of Serbia certainly had an adverse effect upon the policy of the Sofia Government. And, last but not least, as I have already said, by this time Bulgaria had already arrived at the preliminary, if not the final, agreement as to the concessions of the above-mentioned area by Turkey — a concession which not only gave the former country free and unhindered access to Dede Agatch, but also put Sofia in railway connection with Southern or new Bulgaria with which communication had formerly to be maintained either by a railway passing through Ottoman territory or by roads running right across the Rhodope Balkans.

It is unnecessary here to discuss the details of the manner in which Bulgaria entered the War, or to try to arrive at conclusions as to the exact moment at which a definite agreement was made between that country and the Central Powers. Orders for a general mobilisation were given on September 19, and it was subsequently reported, though the correctness of this report is open to doubt, that German officers were arriving in Bulgaria to take over the direction of
various departments and to play the same kind of rôle as their fellow countrymen had played in Turkey prior to the entry of that country into the War. The result of this mobilisation, which was claimed by Bulgaria to mean only the maintenance of an armed neutrality, was that on October 4 the Government of Petrograd delivered an ultimatum at Sofia, and that immediately afterwards the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, France, and Russia left that city.

From the time of the entry of Bulgaria into the War, the only historical events connected with that country, which are possessed of European importance, are these bound up with the subjugation of Serbia, with the Salonica campaign, and with the conquest of Roumania. As most of those events took place beyond the frontiers of Bulgaria, they are discussed in other sections of this volume. All that remains to be said here, therefore, is that whilst Bulgaria has shown herself a faithful follower and a powerful supporter of Kaiserism, signs have often not been wanting to prove that she has played her game not so much to further the cause of the Central Powers as to conquer and to hold the territories which she covets at the smallest loss to herself in men and money. Thus whilst reports have appeared to the effect that Bulgarians have arrived at various parts situated beyond the confines of the Balkans, no confirmation of these reports, the truth of which is highly unlikely, has ever been forthcoming. In short, as various statesmen of Bulgaria have often suggested, that country entered the War not because she wished to support the policy of the Central Powers or to oppose that of the Allies,
but solely with the object of realising her national aspirations — aspirations which had been temporarily frustrated by the second Balkan war and by the Treaty of Bucharest which terminated it.

I have endeavoured to enumerate as impartially as is possible the events which led to the entry of Bulgaria into the War. In so doing, whilst recognising the difficulties which existed, I have tried to make no secret of the faults in Allied statesmanship — faults which resulted in what is one of the greatest diplomatic defeats suffered during the War. To summarise these faults, it may be said that the importance of Bulgaria and of the re-formation of a Balkan alliance favourable to the Allies was not recognised until so late that the demands of the Sofia Government had been augmented to a point making them exceedingly difficult of gratification. When the desirability for action had been realised, instead of accepting the fact that the price for "the delivery of valuable goods" is always high, no definite line of policy appears to have been followed. Two courses were open. It was feasible, first, to approach Serbia, Greece, and Roumania in order either to ascertain what concessions they were willing to provide or to tell them the nature of the concessions insisted upon by the Allies. With something definite in hand, conversations might then have been entered into with Bulgaria, who would thereby have been forced to disclose her attitude one way or the other. And second, it was practicable to ascertain from Bulgaria her conditions, and then to decide whether these conditions should be forced upon her neighbours. Instead of the adoption of these alternatives, a sort of halfway course of negotiating first with
one party and then with the other seems to have been adopted—a system which in the end permitted the running out of the sands and gave the enemy time to bring about a definite arrangement between Turkey and Bulgaria.

The fundamental basis of the whole question was, and is, that no Balkan statesman, be he Roumanian, Greek, Serbian, or Bulgarian, can or will make sacrifices until he finds himself compelled to do so. Equally well no Balkan Government can or will accept less than it demands until the necessity for the adoption of such a course arises. This is the case, because were they to do so they would lay themselves open to a charge by the military and chauvinistic parties,—a charge which would result in their fall. On the other hand, once the leader of a government is in a position to affirm to his followers and supporters that external pressure has forced him to concede a point, however important, then and only then can he hope to pass through an internal crisis unscathed. For example, in 1912 and very soon after the most explicit statements by the Belgrade Government upon the necessity for a port upon the Adriatic, orders were given for the withdrawal of its army from that coast, and this because of the influence which came from abroad and particularly from Russia. It is this state of things—this mentality—which made it so necessary for the Allies in 1914–1915 to adopt a policy so firm, so uncompromising, and on the face of it so even brutal towards all the Balkan States that it would probably have enabled each of the Cabinets to accept a programme destined to further the real and ultimate interests of countries, which, were an enemy victory
to be realised, would sooner or later be face to face with the Austro-German danger—a danger which has ruined the prosperity of Serbia for years. In short, whilst she must now be ranked among and treated as one of our enemies, we are compelled to recognise that the policy adopted by Bulgaria resulted not only from her illegitimate claims, but also from the obduracy of her neighbours—obduracy which has unfortunately been largely responsible for disasters which all of them have now suffered to a greater or a lesser degree.
ROUMANIA AND THE WAR

ROUMANIA — the largest country in or immediately connected with the Balkan Peninsula — is made up of the provinces of Wallachia and Moldavia, formally united under the name Roumania in December, 1861. She occupies a position of immense strategical importance, for the most part on the north of the Danube and, so to speak, wedged in between Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Bulgaria, because, being composed of two arms or horns, she controls the routes to the south and east. The province of Wallachia, which runs in a more or less easterly and westerly direction, together with the Dobrudja, bars the way from Central Europe into Bulgaria. Moldavia, which spreads out practically north and south, constitutes a bridge between Austria-Hungary and Southern Russia.

For these reasons Roumania forms a sort of link between East and West. Geographically, it is usual to consider the country as situated without and to the north of the Balkan Peninsula, and therefore her interests may be called semi-international and semi-Balkan. As far as the first of these is concerned, the policy of Roumania has been and is bound up with the fact that it is practically necessary for her to maintain good relations either with the Central Powers
or with Russia, and that it was and is obviously desirable that her friends should be those destined to be the victors in the War. This is the case principally because single-handed she is not in a position to wage war with a Great Power, and because for years she has been desirous of securing possession either of the Austro-Hungarian districts inhabited by Roumanians or of the area of Russian Bessarabia which she covets. The real key of what has taken place since the outbreak of the European War therefore lies in the fact that Roumania, like all the other Balkan countries and peoples, wished to utilise the occasion to realise one or perhaps both the aspirations which rest so close to the heart of every patriotic citizen. From a Balkan standpoint, on the other hand, the most important thing is that nothing should take place which would in any way threaten the general interests of Roumania or so strengthen the positions of her Balkan neighbours as to affect these interests.

In order to understand the position of Roumania, it is necessary therefore to realise the full meaning to her of the Bessarabian, the Transylvanian, and the Dobrudjan questions. So far as the first of these is concerned, as Bessarabia contains a Roumanian population of only somewhat under a million, the aspirations of Roumania to acquire at least a part of that province were based upon historical grounds, and upon the manner in which this area has changed hands since Napoleonic times. By the Peace of Bucharest, signed in 1812, the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were restored to the Sultan with the exception of Bessarabia, which was added to Russia. In 1856, that is to say after the Crimean War, the southern portion
of Bessarabia was restored to Moldavia, and the two principalities, still under the suzerainty of the Sultan, were placed under the collective guarantee of the European Powers. Thus matters stood until after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 and 1878, when Roumania, who had been of the most material assistance to the former country, anticipated that she would secure compensation at the expense of Turkey, and that she would also retain at least the Bessarabian area allotted to her Moldavian province in 1856. Not so, however, for the Russians not only prevented the Roumanians from being represented at the signing of the preliminary treaty of San Stefano in March, 1878, but they also secured the exclusion of their delegates from the sittings of the Berlin Conference until the representatives of the Great Powers responsible for the final Treaty of Berlin, signed in July, 1878, had already decided in favour of the Russian claim and recognised the independence of Roumania from Turkey only on the condition that the former country restored to Russia that portion of Bessarabia which had been given to Moldavia in 1856. Since that time the ownership of this area has therefore been a very burning question in Roumania.

The Roumanian dislike of Austria-Hungary and the aspiration to acquire areas now belonging to that country depend upon the fact that there are domiciled near but outside their frontier and in the Dual Monarchy almost four million Roumanians. The great majority of these people live in Transylvania, but there are also a considerable number in the Bukovina and some in what is known as the Banat, situated across the Danube from the northern frontier of Ser-
bia. The treatment of these people by their alien government and the natural desire for the union of the Roumanian race has been the keystone of the foreign policy of those Roumanian statesmen such as M. Také Jonescu, who formerly advocated a policy of friendship for Russia and who, from the moment of the outbreak of the War, advocated a definite pro-allied policy on the part of their country. In other words, whilst the case is much less strong than that of France in regard to Alsace Lorraine, the sentiments of every patriotic Roumanian have been bound up with the position in Transylvania for many a year. As I will explain later on, it is largely these sentiments which prompted the Roumanian Government to adopt a strategically wrong policy in advancing across its northern and western frontiers in the autumn of 1916, and it is these sentiments which must make the peace terms imposed by the Central Powers so very bitter of acceptance by every patriotic Roumanian.

So much for the questions which for years have influenced the policy of Roumania towards Russia and Austria-Hungary. Turning to her attitude towards the Balkans, although her final independence of Turkish suzerainty was recognised by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Roumania played but little part in Balkan affairs until 1910, when she was supposed to have entered into some kind of treaty arrangement with Turkey concerning her attitude in case of war in the Near East. However this may be, and whatever may have been this arrangement, the army of the late King Carol did not take the field during the first Balkan war, Roumania at that time contenting herself by seizing the opportunity of securing compensation from
M. Také Jonescu, who is one of Roumania's leading statesmen, has always been well known for his moderate and far-seeing opinions. A great lawyer by profession, at a very early stage in the War he expressed himself openly in favor of Roumania's support of the Allies and of a good understanding between Serbia and Bulgaria.
Bulgaria in the Dobrudja, thus once more raising the question of that province.

The Dobrudja is the district which lies between the Black Sea and the lower reaches of the Danube, which separate it from Russia and from the remainder of Roumania. The northern section of the province is mostly made up of an alluvial tract of country produced by the action of this river, whilst the southern part is more barren, being composed largely of steppe and treeless territory. The whole district is strategically of great importance because of its relations with the Danube, because it constitutes a sort of gateway into the Balkans, and because it now contains the port of Constanza (Kustendji) and a railway completed since the beginning of the War. As early as Roman times forts were built from the Danube, near Cerna Voda (Tchernavoda), to the Black Sea, near Constanza. As a result of constant invasion, the population is mixed, being composed of the remnants of the races which have passed through it at various periods.

From the point of view of present-day politics, the Dobrudja question depends upon events which have taken place since the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878. After that war, its northern part was given to Roumania as compensation for the loss of Bessarabia. The Bulgaro-Roumanian frontier was delimited by a European Commission which, in spite of protests from Russia, fixed a boundary running from just to the east of Silistria on the Danube to near Mangalia on the Black Sea and thus treated comparatively favourably the claims of Roumania. This settlement led to ill feeling, for whilst Roumania contended that her frontier was not strategically such as to enable
her to defend her port at Constanza and the great Cerna Voda bridge across the Danube, which was subsequently constructed, Bulgaria rightly argued that the population of the Dobrudja was largely Bulgarian in nationality. This state of things was in part responsible for the fact that Roumania did not throw in her lot with the Balkan States against Turkey in 1912. Indeed, instead of so doing, it was during this period that she entered the diplomatic arena and claimed the cession by Bulgaria of a stretch of territory on the south of the Dobrudja. As Bulgaria naturally resented these concessions, the question was referred to an Ambassadors' Conference at Petrograd, which decided that Bulgaria should cede the town of Silistria to Roumania, and that the frontier of the two countries should once more be delimited by a commission. This settlement, embodied in what is known as the Protocol of Petrograd, was arrived at early in May, 1913.

But as the claims of Roumania were not thereby satisfied, and as the wringing of this concession from Bulgaria naturally created great resentment among Bulgarians, the relations existing between the two countries at the time of the outbreak of the second Balkan war were far from cordial. The result was that Roumania, then no longer withheld by Russia, invaded Bulgaria, nominally with the object of maintaining the balance of power in the Balkans, but really for the purpose of wresting from Bulgaria a still further area of territory on the south of the Dobrudja. This action on the part of Roumania, who was easily able to cross the Danube and to advance to the very gates of Sofia, whilst the Bulgarian army was occupied elsewhere, resulted in the fact that the country was in-
creased in size from an area of just over 50,700 square miles to one of just under 53,500 square miles, and that her population of just over 7,230,000 souls was added to by about 280,000 inhabitants.

Geographically, politically, and militarily, this gave to Roumania more than that rectification of her Dobrudja frontier, which she had wanted ever since the signing of the Treaty of Berlin, for it secured for her a boundary running in a northwesterly direction from the immediate vicinity of Varna on the Black Sea to a point on the Danube located about halfway between Silistria and Rustchuk. Endorsed by the fatal Treaty of Bucharest, which terminated the second Balkan campaign, this change, which was supposed to be going to enable Roumania to defend herself against an attack from the south, was in its turn responsible for the bad relations which existed between Roumania and Bulgaria prior to and after the beginning of the European conflagration.

From the moment of the outbreak of the War, therefore, the position of Roumania was an extremely difficult one. On the one hand that country could not afford to take sides with Russia or Austria-Hungary unless she were absolutely guaranteed the strongest material assistance from the group of belligerents which she supported. On the other, the statesmen of Bucharest recognised that so long as the attitude of Bulgaria remained undecided, any war move by Roumania might lay that country open to an attack on the part of her southern neighbour—an attack prompted by the events of 1913. Moreover, to add to the above-mentioned international difficulties, it is now known that some thirty years ago Roumania
joined Germany in a defensive alliance which was almost identical in form to that which existed between Italy and the Central Powers.

The late King Carol, who belonged to the House of Hohenzollern, and who was pro-German, was firmly convinced that the obligations and interests of his country placed her on the side of the Central Powers. Strengthened, however, by the declaration of neutrality by Italy, and really knowing that Germany and Austria were the aggressors, the Crown Council assembled at Sinaia, directly the War began, to discuss the future attitude of the country, refused to support the expressed opinion of the King, and decided that Roumania should remain a peaceful spectator of events in progress around her. Later on and after the death of King Carol in October, 1914, most far-seeing statesmen, particularly M. Také Jonescu, who had always believed in friendship with Bulgaria and who from the beginning had been in favour of war upon the side of the Allies, began to see that, if Roumania were to be in a position to realise her larger aspirations, she must also be prepared to adopt a definite policy and to make sacrifices in the south, as a result of which she would secure a free hand in the north and west.

It was during the time preceding the Muscovite retreat, which began in May, 1915, that Russia, who could then have minimized the difficulties in any case besetting Roumania, should have made agreements with that country which would have induced her to enter the War and at the same time have compensated her for concessions to Bulgaria in the Dobrudja. Such a Muscovite policy would have strengthened the hands of the Roumanian statesmen who then recognised
that the maintenance of the Treaty of Bucharest had become or was becoming no longer necessary. Had it been adopted by the Government of Petrograd, it is probable that Roumania, instead of remaining a more or less disinterested spectator, during the Allied negotiations with Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria of the summer of 1915, might well have utilised her all-important influence with Serbia and Greece in favour of the reconstitution of the Balkan League, and that she might even have taken the initiative and openly proved the *bona fides* of her attitude by giving up at least part of the territory which she acquired as a result of the Balkan Wars. The result of such action would have been far-reaching, for it would not only have definitely and permanently secured the neutrality of Bulgaria, at least so far as Roumania was concerned, but it would have compelled Serbia and Greece to see the necessity for the adoption of policies destined most likely actually to have brought Bulgaria into the War on the side of the Allies.

From the time of the entry of Bulgaria into the War a new position was created in Europe and particularly in the Balkans—a position so advantageous to the enemy that it remained only essential for him to bring about its military consolidation by the defeat of Serbia and by the shaping of the policies of Greece and of Roumania to suit his strategical plan. The Germans recognised that the key of the situation then lay in Roumania, owing to her geographical position and particularly to the fact of her being practically in control of the Lower Danube. Indeed, if any definite proof were required, the terms of peace imposed upon Roumania, particularly those by which that
country is to be compelled to facilitate the transport of enemy troops to the Black Sea coast, constitute absolute proof that, from the moment she had gained Bulgaria, Germany was determined, owing to the importance of Roumania as a corridor toward the south and east, to bring about her entry into the War on one side or the other. She bullied in the hope of securing her support. When success in this direction proved impossible, the Central Powers played their cards to achieve not the continued neutrality, but the actual hostility, of Roumania, and, as there is little reason to doubt, utilized the influence which they possessed in Russia for the purpose of persuading that country to bring nominally friendly pressure to bear upon the desired opponent. The object of this policy was that the enemy realised the significance of Roumania as a route to the south and east, and that he believed the strength required for the subjugation of that country would be well expended, considering the results to be achieved. From an initial standpoint and so far as the south was concerned, the Central Powers could not get control of the Danube and of the approaches to Bulgaria across and by way of it except by the occupation of at least Wallachia and the Dobrudja—a control which at once gave them a partially alternative route eastward to that provided by the main railway from Belgrade to Constantinople, the whole of which fell into their hands with the entry of Bulgaria and the subjugation of Serbia in the autumn of 1915. More indirectly and probably looking ahead, the enemy no doubt realised that the full benefits of the defeat of Russia or of her exit from the War could not be achieved so long as
Roumania remained neutral and so long as the communications running towards the south and east through Moldavia could not be utilised for the transport of his men and material.

So much for the events connected with the entry of Roumania into the War which took place on August 27, 1916. In order to understand the events which followed — events very fully described by John Buchan in Nelson's "History of the War", Volume 17 — it is necessary once more to refer to the nature and position of the northwestern frontier of the country. Starting from the north, that frontier makes a semicircular sweep round the crests of the Carpathians and Transylvanian Alps in such a way that Transylvania juts out into Roumanian territory in the form of a sharp salient. This frontier, which has a length of about four hundred miles, is crossed by six important passes — the Vulcan, the Rotherturm, the Torsburg, the Predeal, the Buzeu, and the Gyimes. Of these the Rotherturm, the Predeal, and the Gyimes passes are traversed by railways, whilst roads run through the remainder and through other mountain gaps of lesser significance.

Directly after Roumania threw in her lot with the Allies, her army advanced into enemy territory by way of many of these routes. The Austrians, recognising the weakness of their position — weakness due to the above-mentioned salient — performed what was really and not only nominally a strategic retreat and for about three weeks continued to withdraw, contenting themselves only by delaying the militarily unsound and far too rapid Roumanian advance. By the end of the third week in September, therefore, the
Roumanians had occupied a band or belt of enemy territory running right across Transylvania, their centre having pushed forward about sixty miles, whilst their right and left flanks had advanced respectively about twenty-five and about ten miles.

During this time events on the south and on the Danube front had begun to take a serious turn. A Bulgarian force, augmented by two Turkish divisions and supported by a German contingent, acting under the command of Von Mackensen, had been collected on the south of that river. During the opening days of September, that force advanced across the Roumanian frontier and into the area of the Dobrudja annexed by that country after the Balkan Wars. No serious Roumanian resistance was encountered and by the ninth of that month not only Turtukeuie but also Silistria, together with a large number of prisoners and a great deal of booty, were in Bulgarian hands. A few days later, the German general, whose advance was greatly furthered by the Bulgarian railways which exist in this area, had pushed forward to a line from which the railway from Cerna Voda to Constanza was immediately threatened. The Roumanians, realising their danger, hurried troops from the Carpathian front to the Dobrudja, and after a battle, in which they were supported by Russian and Serbian contingents (these latter composed, according to Colonel Buchan, of Jugo-Slavs taken prisoner by Russia), and commanded by a Muscovite general, the enemy was temporarily thrown back for a distance of about ten miles.

By approximately September 20, when the Roumanians found themselves held up in Transylvania, their
position in the Dobrudja had therefore become highly precarious. But what was more important and more disastrous was that by that time, too, a great Austro-Germanic force, under the command of Von Falkenhayn, had been concentrated in the East by the direction of Von Hindenburg, who became the Kaiser’s Chief of the General Staff during the closing days of August. That drive began a few days later with an enemy attack against the Roumanian left centre near Hermannstadt — an attack which more or less penetrated, encircled, or turned the Roumanian position and compelled the forces of that country hastily to retreat towards the east, for the Rotherturm Pass, upon which they depended for their communications with Wallachia, fell into enemy hands on the twenty-sixth.

From that time onwards things moved apace, partly because the Roumanians were ill provided with guns and munitions, partly because success is necessary to the maintenance of the morale of such an army, and partly because the task besetting Roumania was altogether too great for her. Early in October the forces of King Ferdinand were defeated on the centre of their position, and by the end of the first week in that month Kronstadt was re-taken by the Austro-Germans. These enemy successes were followed by a very rapid advance towards the Carpathians, especially in the area lying to the south and southwest of Kronstadt — an advance which gave to the enemy the Torsburg Pass by October 14, Predeal being bombarded and destroyed about the same time. The Roumanians, however, were able to offer serious resistance at this latter point, and the enemy was
considerably delayed in his attempt to reach Bucharest by means of the main line which passes through Sinaia and Ploiesti. Farther north too, and on the Moldavian frontier, the Roumanians managed to hold up the enemy, and their resistance was furthered by the extension of the Russian battle line in a southerly direction and by the handing over of the defence of the northern frontier of Moldavia to the Russians, who took over the area lying to the north of the Gyimes Pass.

By October 20 the position in the south had once more become very serious, for, whilst attempts had previously taken place by both sides to effect crossings of the Danube, it was only at about that time that Von Mackensen inaugurated a further serious drive in the Dobrudja. Constanza — the great Roumanian port on the Black Sea — was occupied two days later, and Cerna Voda and its long bridge, which was not adequately destroyed by the Roumanians during their hasty retreat, fell into Bulgarian hands almost immediately. This, together with the enemy's subsequent advance towards the north, greatly strengthened his position, for it gave him the practical command of a long stretch of the Lower Danube and also facilities for the passage of that river which he did not previously possess.

These events constituted the beginning of the end. During the closing days of October and the first half of November, the Austro-Germans advanced from the north with a semi-encircling movement, and, pushing forward their right wing into Western Wallachia, Craiova, an important railway junction, was occupied on the twenty-first, thus practically isolating the
Roumanian forces which were still holding Orsova, consequently making their successful retreat impossible. At about this time Von Falkenhayn was beginning to push forward through the more easterly passes and on the twenty-seventh Von Mackensen, coming from the south, occupied Giurgevo, on the left bank of the Danube, thereby having made it unsafe for the Roumanians to take up a defensive line along the River Aluta.

A glance at the map therefore will show that although Bucharest has always been described as an entrenched camp, and although it was defended by a girdle of forts which run round the city, it was powerless to resist an encircling movement which had successfully hemmed it in on every side except the northeast. The resistance attempted on the line of the Arjish River, which runs across the southwest front of the city, proved useless, and Bucharest and Ploestii fell into enemy hands on December sixth. From that time onwards the retreat became a rout, and the Government, Allied Legations, and banks having been removed to Jassy, which became the temporary capital, no resistance was made until the Roumanians reached the line of the Lower Sereth, which flows into the Danube at Galatz. The enemy, on the other hand, made no serious attempt to penetrate that line, for he had already achieved his primary object of securing the control of the whole of the Lower Danube as far as Braila—a control which gave him free access to Bulgaria and by way of that country to Turkey. Thus matters stood, with the Allied front extending along the Carpathians and the Rivers Trotush, Sereth, and Danube, from the Gyimes Pass on the northwest
to a point just to the north of Sulina on the Black Sea on the southeast, until the events which immediately preceded the fatal and brutal peace finally imposed upon Roumania by the Central Powers in May, 1918.

The above-described developments were partly the result of events which had taken place prior to the entry of Roumania into the War and partly the consequence of local and international causes, the nature of which are worthy of brief examination here. Locally speaking, the fundamental question consists not so much in what the Roumanians did or did not do, but in the fact that those who remembered their magnificent conduct and the great part which they played in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 expected far too much from them in the European War. Thus, whilst the Bulgarians began to form a modern army directly after the liberation of the principality in 1878, and whilst the Serbs commenced to bring their fighting machine up to date during the early years of this century, the Roumanians did not introduce the regulations necessary for the creation of an efficient military force until 1908. By the law of that year, which constitutes the basis of the present organisation, service in the semi-permanent army, where men only served for intermittent periods and then passed into the reserve, instead of spending at least two continuous years with the colours, was finally abolished, except in the case of certain cavalry units. Helpful and necessary as was this reform, it is markedly apparent, as the military liability of a Roumanian lasts for twenty-one years, that eight years had been all too little for the adequate development of a system without which
the safety of such a country could never be assured. It was the existence of this state of things, together with the methods of recruitment and training of the officers, who are separated by a wide social gulf from the masses of the country, and together with the fact that, during the neutrality of Roumania, the Government did not take and could not take the measures necessary to secure an adequate amount of war material, which affected the power of an army which was nominally much stronger than that of either Serbia or Bulgaria.

From a military standpoint, the plan of campaign adopted by Roumania was undoubtedly a mistake. The Government, which for a moment appeared to think that the rupture of relations with Bulgaria could be avoided, ought to have known that, for reasons already given, such a desirable object could not then be achieved, and that therefore the Roumanian army would be compelled to fight on the northern and north-western frontiers as well as on the line of the Danube. Instead of taking the magnitude of her task into account, of recognising that her railway system leading up to the Austro-Hungarian frontier was much less adequate than that possessed by the enemy, and therefore of contenting herself by endeavouring to block the passes of the Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps and devoting herself more closely to the situation on the other side of the Danube, Roumania immediately took the offensive on the north and west and pushed forward into enemy territory. Even the strategical advantages to have been gained by a successful advance as far as the line of the Middle Maros did not justify such an undertaking, for the passive
defence of the Carpathians and the Transylvanian Alps would certainly have been all that could have been safely undertaken, bearing always in mind that the Turks were in a position to send forces to Bulgaria, that the Bulgarian army itself was in no way immobilised at Salonica, and that once Roumania had entered the War, Germany would spare no pains to insure her annihilation.

Nevertheless in this connection, it is always necessary to remember certain circumstances which mitigate, if they do not altogether remove, the blame which would otherwise rest upon those responsible for the inauguration of the plan adopted by Roumania. To begin with, it is asserted, on good authority, that Russia definitely promised to attack Bulgaria and to immobilise her army. Moreover, we have to recognise that the Roumanian Government may not have been able to render political motives subservient to military necessities. Indeed as the people favoured war largely with the object of bringing about the liberation of their co-nationals domiciled in enemy territory, and as it would have been almost impossible for any leader to persuade them that this aspiration could be realized better by an Allied than by a local Roumanian victory, the King and his advisers were at once placed in the position of being obliged either to adopt measures in total discord with military tenets, or to risk the dangers of a policy which would not have been clearly understood by a people who for years have turned their attention towards Transylvania.

Turning to the international reasons for the Roumanian disaster, if we dismiss, as we certainly must dismiss the suggestion that there was any want of
loyalty on the part of the Western Allies, then we find that the first and primary cause of the defeat of that country was due to the fact that she entered the War at the wrong time. The enemy had already achieved far-reaching successes in the East; Bulgaria had been ranged on the side of the Central Powers for nearly a year; and the power of King Constantine had so increased that the attitude of the Greek Government was a continual menace to the safety of the Salonica expedition—a menace which prevented the objects of Roumania being furthered by an attack which might otherwise have been made from the direction of the Aegean. But what was far more important was that whether or not Roumania was actually forced to come into the War, the Government of the ex-Tsar certainly promised her strong support in men and war material, and, as I have just said, encouraged her to think that she would only have to fight on her northern and western frontiers against Austria and Germany, since Russia intended to deal with Bulgaria by means of an expedition landed on the Black Sea coast. Not only were none of these promises fulfilled, but Russia actually held up supplies destined by the other Allies for Roumania and did nothing whatever even to threaten the Bulgarians from the direction of the Black Sea. This bad faith was largely responsible for the Roumanian defeat. It is as a consequence of it, and of the way in which for years Roumania has been treated by Russia, that our sympathy must go out to a people whose treatment by the enemy is an example of what Germany means by so-called justice.

At the moment of writing, it is too early and it is unnecessary to discuss in detail the local consequences
of the peace terms brutally imposed upon Roumania, terms which it would have been worse than useless for her temporarily to refuse to accept. To begin with, it can hardly be admitted that these terms are otherwise than temporary, for they should be subjected to revision when the moment for peace comes. Sufficient therefore be it to say that the worst consequences of the new situation in Southeastern Europe, so far as it concerns Roumania herself, are bound up with the facts that that country has not only failed to secure any part of Transylvania but that she has lost the Dobrudja and been compelled to agree to an actual rectification of Austro-Hungarian frontier. So far as the Dobrudja be concerned, whilst that area, conquered by Roumania during the second Balkan war, is to revert to Bulgaria, the more northerly part is to go to the enemy under conditions which are not plain, Roumania merely being assured of a trade route to the Black Sea by way of Czerna Voda and Constanza.

Such a settlement carrying with it the moral strangulation of Roumania, when coupled with the fact that she also now seems practically to have ceded her sovereignty, so far as her oil fields are concerned, are such as to make her position about as disastrous a one as it is possible to imagine. In addition, that country has been forced to give up other areas which, unless they be restored when the time of peace comes, will make her future position almost entirely negligible from a military standpoint. On the Danube the Austro-Hungarian frontier is to be extended in a southeasterly direction so as to include the Iron Gates, a strip of territory and a wharf is to be compulsorily leased to the Government of the Dual Monarchy at Turnu Severin, and
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certain Danubian islands are to be acquired by that
country. On the north and west of Roumania—
that is, on the line followed by the Transylvanian Alps
and by the Carpathians—and at all the passes of
importance "the new Roumanian frontier has been so
far removed to Roumanian ground as military reasons
require."

In exchange for these losses, if exchange it may be
called, Roumania is apparently to be allowed to annex
all or at least part of the Russian Province of Bes-
sarabia. If this annexation be permitted by the Cen-
tral Powers, it will certainly carry with it considerable
satisfaction in Roumania. But from the international
standpoint it will constitute proof positive of the
enemy's confidence in his power to establish and to
maintain control over the whole of Central Europe, and
of his consequent preference that Bessarabia should be
incorporated in Roumania rather than that it should
remain part of Russia where he must know that the
whole future is uncertain. Once more, therefore, an
apparent concession, actuated for purely Pan-Germanic
reasons, seems in progress of employment for the sole
purpose of developing and consolidating the Kaiser's
dream for domination in the East.

These disasters, and they are local disasters, are
such as in many ways to make the present position
of Roumania as worthy of sympathy as is that of
Serbia. But whereas, in spite of diplomatic mistakes,
the latter country has fought for the Allies since the
beginning of the War, it is impossible to forget not
only that Roumania was herself largely responsible
for her bad relations with Bulgaria, but that she post-
poned her entry into the theatre of hostilities until
long after the time at which her assistance would have been of special value to the Allies, notably the period of the Bulgarian mobilisation, and until no other alternative was open to her. These facts must somewhat lessen the intense feeling which would otherwise be forthcoming for her as a victim of Germanism, and make that which remains largely dependent upon the exceedingly difficult position in which Roumania has been placed by the War, and upon the manner in which she was treated by Russia before and after her adhesion to the cause of the Allies.
VI

GREECE AND THE WAR

In order to understand the Greek attitude towards and rôle in the War, it is necessary first to realise the meaning of some of the events which have occurred in Athens during the last few years and to examine the several ways in which the position of that country is an entirely special one. After many years of misgovernment — misgovernment which resulted in consequences which were temporarily fatal to the prosperity of Greece — a peaceful revolution took place in August, 1909. This revolution established the power of the Military League which completely and absolutely controlled the affairs of the country until the spring of 1910. Early in that year M. Venezelos, having been summoned to Athens, proposed that a National Assembly should be convoked in order that the League should be able to retire into the background, whilst at the same time avoiding an ordinary general election, which could not take place at that time owing to the then state of the Cretan question and particularly to the fact that the deputies who would have been elected by the Cretans to represent them in the Greek Parliament could not have been permitted to take their seats in view of the attitude of the Pro-
tecting Powers of Crete and of the Ottoman Government.

The meeting of this National Assembly in September, 1910, practically saved Greece from complications, the disastrous nature of which it is impossible to overestimate. M. Venezelos — already the saviour of modern Greece — actually formed his Ministry in October of that year. In the spring of 1912, when an election took place, he was returned with one hundred and forty-seven supporters in a Parliament then composed of one hundred and eighty-one members. Since that time this patriotic, far-seeing, and sagacious statesman has not only been in part responsible for the creation of the original Balkan League, but he has steered his country successfully through the two Balkan Wars and saved her from utter disaster in a manner which should have won him the gratitude and the esteem of every patriotic Greek. Indeed sufficient be it here to say that as a result of the Balkan Wars, Greece, which made the smallest sacrifices except Roumania and Montenegro in those campaigns, was increased by about one third of its size. Instead of being made up of just over 25,000 square miles and containing a population of about 2,760,000 souls, immediately before the War she had an area of about 42,000 square miles and a population of over 4,821,000 souls.

The outstanding feature in the earlier part of M. Venezelos' régime, that is to say, during the period intervening between his arrival at Athens early in 1910 and the assassination of the late King George at Salonica after the first Balkan War and in March, 1913, was the striking way in which His Majesty and the new Premier
forgot their former differences and worked together for the regeneration and good of their country. In 1910 the King, whose tact, wisdom, and moderation undoubtedly saved Greece from the serious consequences which would most certainly have resulted from an aggressive policy towards Turkey during the earlier years which followed the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, faced by the alternative of either sanctioning the continued rule of the Military League or of summoning the somewhat unconstitutional National Assembly recommended by M. Venezelos, finally and wisely decided to adopt the latter course. From that time onwards until his death, His Majesty, knowing that the Cretan leader was the one man in whom the Greek nation then placed its confidence, put all his personal feelings on one side and consistently utilised the capacity of a man without whose assistance and presence one of the most rapid regenerations in modern history could never have been effected.

M. Venezelos, whose relations with the royal family prior to 1910 had been far from cordial, owing to his consistent opposition to the policy of Prince George whilst His Royal Highness was High Commissioner of Crete (1898–1906), also made up his mind to forget the past and to devote himself untiringly to the good of the Hellenic cause. Thus, instead of advocating the extreme measures suggested by the Military League and instead of utilising his influence against the royal princes — particularly the Crown Prince, afterwards King Constantine — the Prime Minister actually furthered the establishment of the prestige of the dynasty and the reappointment of Prince Constantine as
Inspector General or Commander-in-Chief of the army — a reappointment in fact largely responsible for the great popularity which the future King gained during the Balkan Wars. In short, M. Venezelos, whose downfall as an Island leader had been one of the primary objects of Prince George in Crete, obliterated himself and worked loyally with a ruler who, if he were weak and sometimes shortsighted, in the end proved that he was sufficiently far-seeing to understand that the prosperity of his country could not be developed without the assistance of the one great man of modern Greece.

In order to realise the position of Greece in the War, it is necessary to recognise that it is an entirely special one, and that her attitude and that of the Allies towards her have been influenced by various historical events, by the mentality of the people, and by the internal struggle which was in progress at Athens from the time of the accession until the abdication of King Constantine. In the first place, as is clearly shown by Thomas Erskine Holland in his book entitled "The European Concert in the Eastern Question", Greece owes her very existence to the good will and to the protection of England, France, and Russia. Thus, as early as 1826, Great Britain and Russia signed a protocol by which they were to negotiate with the Sublime Porte on behalf of the Greeks, whose independence from Turkey had not then been brought about. In the following year, when the mediation thus offered had been refused by Turkey, and when the Governments of Austria and Prussia had declined to accede to that protocol, the three Powers (France had by this time joined England and Russia) entered into a treaty for the object of re-establishing peace between the con-
tending parties — the Greeks and the Ottoman Government.

In 1830 the Conference of London decided that Greece should be entirely independent of Turkey, and two years later agreed to offer the throne of that country to Prince Otho of Bavaria, and by a convention then signed between the representatives of England, France, and Russia on the one side, and that of Bavaria on the other, that country was placed "under the guarantee" of the above-mentioned three Powers. By a treaty signed by the representatives of the said Protecting Powers with Denmark in 1863 — that is, the year following the expulsion of King Otho — it was further arranged that "Greece under the sovereignty of Prince William of Denmark and the guarantee of the three Courts forms a monarchical, independent, and constitutional State." Again, when it was agreed at the same time, that the Ionian Islands were to be united with the Hellenic Kingdom, it was settled that those islands were also to be comprised in the above-mentioned guarantee. Once more, in 1881, when the frontiers of Greece were greatly extended by a convention signed between the Great Powers and Turkey, it was expressly stated that "they (the inhabitants of the then new Greek territory) will enjoy exactly the same civil and political rights as subjects of Hellenic origin." Ever since that time the Protecting Powers — England, France, and Russia — and particularly England who ceded the Ionian Islands, have therefore had special privileges in and obligations towards Greece, and they have had the right to intervene either to protect that country from her foreign foes or to defend her people from an unconstitutional
régime against which they (the Powers) are the guar-
antors.

The second direction in which the position of Greece is a special one is bound up with the Graeco-Serbian relations depending upon events which preceded and immediately followed the second Balkan war. The treaty between the two countries, which followed other less formal agreements, was actually concluded on June 1, 1913, and therefore two days after the signa-
ture of the document which formally terminated the first Balkan War. Whilst so far as I know its full text has never been published, it undoubtedly bound the parties concerned to come to the support of one another and to provide a given force — believed to number one hundred and fifty thousand men — should either country be attacked by Bulgaria. This being the case, it is obvious, directly Bulgaria entered the War on the side of the enemy and attacked Serbia, that the said treaty came into force. It was argued at the time and subsequently by the neutralists in Greece and by the supporters of the policy of King Constantine, that this treaty had become inoperative, because Serbia had refused to support Greece during her difficulties with Turkey in the summer of 1914, because in 1915 she (Serbia) had tardily and with reserves agreed to cede to Bulgaria territory in the ownership of which she (Greece) held herself to have an interest, and lastly because Bulgaria was acting not alone in a purely Balkan war but in conjunction with the Central Powers. The answer to these con-
tentions is that, whilst the Graeco-Serbian Treaty may have been of a generally defensive nature, it was aimed not against Turkey but against Bulgaria, and
that as it certainly did not actually specify that it was intended as a measure in case of a purely Balkan war, it must have been valid in the circumstances which arose in 1915. Moreover, whereas an attempt was made by the opposition, after the return to power of M. Venezelos in the summer of that year, to qualify the force of that arrangement in such a way that it was only to be operative in case of a Bulgarian and not in the eventuality of a European war, no suggestion to this effect was ever made prior to the triumph of The Great Man of modern Greece, who clearly secured a mandate for his war and pro-Serbian policies at that election.

Turning to questions connected with the mentality of the Greeks and with the internal situation in Greece as it has influenced the War, it must be remembered that outstanding among the Greek national characteristics are the exaggerated patriotism, which amounts to chauvinism, the love of political strife, and the individualism of the people. Every Greek is a politician, not only during an electoral campaign, but on each day through the year. He loves the strife involved in politics because it leads to opposition, and because it therefore carries with it a sort of excitement or pleasure corresponding to that which used to be felt in the Olympic Games by the Greeks of old. Patriotic though he be, every Greek, therefore, spends all his spare time in his accustomed café, discussing in vehement language topics of which he often has no real knowledge. Again the individualism of the people, who for the most part fail to recognise the value of combination and of co-operation, means that in Greece the question of peace or war is largely governed by the
individual views of the majority. Moreover, whereas
the Bulgarian army fights as a well-organised machine,
and whereas the Turk lives his life as fate may direct
it, the Greek, full of dash as he is, is practically useless
as a fighter if he be engaged in an unpopular way.

This means that in war as in peace the policy of
every Greek Government must of necessity be influ-
enced by the individual feelings of the people, and that
from the moment of the outbreak of the European con-
flagration the whole history of the country has really
been bound up with a great struggle in progress between
all the old political chiefs on the one side and a new
Liberal Party on the other. Thus, if for nearly three
years this struggle happened to be connected with the
proper foreign policy of adoption by the Hellenic Gov-
ernment, that struggle was as much a political and in-
ternal one, between the anti-Venezelists supported
and voiced by the ex-King, and the Venezelists, as it
was an international and external tussle between
non-Interventionists and Interventionists.

In spite of the fact that, when Crown Prince, he
was practically dismissed from his position of Com-
mander-in-Chief, owing to his lack of prestige with
the Military League, the ex-King was immensely
popular during his four years' reign. His military
reputation, which was principally due to the credit
given to him for the Greek successes in the Balkan
Wars, became increased by his appointment as a
Field Marshal in the German army—an appointment
which, together with the blatant efforts made by the
Kaiser to secure his good will, certainly greatly flattered
His Majesty. Moreover, the democratic ways of the
sovereign, and the fact that he—a Constantine—
had married a Sophia, and that by such a matrimonial union he had thus rendered possible the realisation of the ancient legend that when this happened the Byzantine Empire would be re-established, played their part in securing for the King the love and respect of his subjects. Thus, whilst he certainly played the rôle of a "Roi de Grèce"—the title conferred by the Powers upon Prince Otho in 1832—His Majesty still remained truly identified with the sentiments of his people, a large number of whom did not wish to go to war on either side. Moreover, the many Greeks who idolised the King, but who also sympathised with the Allies, resented the suggestion that His Majesty had pledged himself and his country to Germany. Indeed, whilst the King certainly furthered Germanic objects, there seems good reason to suppose that his feelings were influenced, not so much by the identity of his royal consort, but by his military education in the German army, by the attitude of the Kaiser towards the retention of Kavala by Greece in 1913, and last but not least by his firm conviction that the enemy would be the victors and that at all costs, therefore, he must not allow his country, which could not protect itself, to become involved in war with Bulgaria and the Central Powers.

These sentiments, together with the fact that King Constantine never attempted to follow the good example set by his father and to forget the former career of M. Venezelos, prompted the Sovereign to do all in his power to maintain the neutrality of Greece with the object of avoiding what he may perhaps have believed to have been a dangerous undertaking and still more of opposing the policy advocated by a man
whom he detested. In other words the King failed to realise that the salvation of Greece depended upon the union of qualities which were interdependent, and that his own prestige, reputation, and personality could only be developed to the full advantage when acting as the constitutional mouth-piece of his people. It was probably this failure and this inability to forget his personal feelings as much as his actual pro-Germanism which made possible the disastrous régime which has constituted and will constitute a great setback to that new spirit of Hellenism which began to develop after 1910 and particularly after the Balkan Wars.

M. Venezelos, who is much more stolid, more serious, and more far-seeing than any other Greek whom I have met, stands out alone among public men in his country, because he is primarily a statesman rather than a politician. Recognising the wider interests of Hellenism, he has always played the rôle of a “Roi des Hellènes”, the title especially conferred upon the late King George by the Protecting Powers at the time of his election to the Greek throne in the year 1863. A patriot above and before everything else, His Excellency, who has constantly demonstrated his entire loyalty to the dynasty, was therefore ready to try to work with King Constantine as he had done with his father. It was with this object in view that, until the time of his first dismissal in March, 1915, the leader of the Liberal Party, which voiced Imperialism rather than Parochialism, always disguised his disagreements with the King and furthered the increase of the royal prestige which would never have attained its final zenith had the Premier originally played for his own hand instead of for the good of the country.
M. VENEZELOS

(On his left is the Greek Minister in London)
Thus, if the popularity and power of M. Venezelos greatly declined in Greece between the time of his re-election of June, 1915, and his return to power after the abdication of the King in 1917, this decline is due to the fact that His Excellency was subjected to attacks fostered by German propaganda and carried out by his political and lifelong adversaries — the leaders of the Old Parties in Greece — that he was believed to have sanctioned a foreign landing on Greek soil, and that he favoured war, in which the majority of Greeks did not want to engage on either side, rather than that he advocated a programme destined to further the cause of the Allies.

Turning to the attitude of Greece towards the War, the events which have taken place since 1914 may conveniently be discussed as having occurred in four more or less distinct stages, the first of which lasted until the entry of Turkey into the arena of hostilities. That phase began, however, not in August, 1914, but from the termination of the Balkan Wars, and this largely because before as immediately after the outbreak of the European conflagration the Aegean Island question, to which I have referred elsewhere, was of all-preponderating importance to Greece. Indeed this question, together with the scandalous and brutal way in which the Greeks of Turkey were treated by the Ottoman Government during 1914, brought the two countries to the verge of hostilities upon several different occasions. Thus the fact that the Island question is one of those to be settled by the present War has always made and still makes it impossible for Greece directly or indirectly to further the re-establishment of Ottoman power in the Eastern Mediterranean —
power which would mean not only that Greece would lose Chios, Mitylene, and Samos, but that many other important islands would immediately be wrested from her.

The second historical war stage in Greece was principally bound up with the first struggle which took place between M. Venezelos and the King, with the question of Graeco-Serbian concessions to Bulgaria, and with the election which took place in June, 1915. Here it must be recalled to mind that the retirement of M. Venezelos in March, 1915, was due to the fact that His Excellency was then already in favour of the entry of Greece into the War after, and as a result of, Macedonian concessions to Bulgaria — concessions for which he rightly felt that his country would have been repaid by the fact that the cause of Hellenism would have been furthered elsewhere. So strong, indeed, was the feeling of the ex-Prime Minister upon these subjects that after his retirement from office he made known the contents of a memorandum which he had addressed to his Sovereign in the previous January. M. Venezelos, having stated that the King originally approved of the contents of this memorandum, an official communiqué was subsequently issued in Athens denying that His Majesty ever authorized anybody to pursue negotiations destined to result in the cession of any Hellenic territory.

M. Zaïmis having refused office, largely because he did not consider that an election ought then to be held in Greece, M. Gounaris, who is practically the leader of the relics of all the former political parties in Greece, assumed the reins of the Government and occupied the position of Prime Minister from March until after
the election in June, 1915. That election, at which for the first time the districts annexed by Greece as a consequence of the Balkan Wars sent representatives to Athens, constituted a triumph for M. Venezelos, for he secured the return of one hundred and ninety deputies out of a total of three hundred and sixteen, of which the chamber is now composed.

The result was, however, a disappointment to those who expected that the return to power of M. Venezelos would mean the entry of Greece into the War upon the side of the Allies. In any case, such an expectation was unjustified, but in view of the modifications which took place in the European situation between the original proposals made by His Excellency in January and his re-election in June, it was perfectly obvious that no change in the foreign policy of the country could then be anticipated. During this period it became evident that the Dardanelles campaign, which was naturally watched with breathless excitement throughout the Near East, was not developing in a manner favourable to the Allies. The Greek General Staff, who knew the strength of the defences of the Narrows, must have looked with apparent astonishment at the attempts which were made to force the Straits by the British and French fleets between the latter half of the month of February and the naval setback of March eighteenth. They knew that these attempts ought never to have been made without the assistance to the fleet which could have been given by a force disembarked upon the northwestern coast of the Peninsula of Gallipoli. They knew the advantage to the Turks of the delay which occurred between the original naval bombardment and the first determined
landing in April; and last, but not least, they realised, when it was finally collected, that the expeditionary force available in April was made up of contingents, the strength of which was insufficient. The King and General Staff undoubtedly knew of the reasons for the inauguration of the Dardanelles Campaign and of the Russian attitude towards it — questions explained elsewhere. But profiting by the ignorance of the General Public, they were able to increase their power by contending that they were always right in condemning the manner in which the Dardanelles campaign was undertaken, if not actually in opposing the inauguration of that campaign at all.

The second direction in which the European situation was modified before, and particularly just after, the return to power of M. Venezelos is connected with the Allied proposals made with the object of securing the co-operation of Bulgaria. So far as Greece was concerned, these suggested concessions, which were desirable, took the form that her Ally — Serbia — was asked to cede to Bulgaria areas to the reversion of which she (Greece) thought that she was entitled, particularly the Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave, and that the Hellenic Government would have given up Kavala and at least a portion of the territory situated between the rivers Vardar and Mesta. Greece, like Serbia, could and would have been fully compensated for these proposed concessions by the acquisition of far more than a corresponding amount of territory elsewhere. Whatever may be accepted as the reason of the failure of these negotiations, their initiation and their abortive result certainly increased the prestige of the Court and of the neutralist party in Greece,
for that party contended that futile attempts had been made at the expense of Greece to secure the support of Bulgaria—a country which almost every Hellenic considered to be his traditional enemy.

The third war stage in Greece begins from the original Allied landing at Salonica on October 1, from the resignation of M. Venezelos on October 5, and from the actual entry of Bulgaria into the War during the first half of October, 1915. It therefore covers the period during which the Allies endeavoured to come to the direct assistance of Serbia, and in which they subsequently retreated to the more or less immediate vicinity of Salonica. It is connected with the later negotiations concerning the treaty obligations of Greece towards Serbia. It includes the further development of the unconstitutional rule, which had already begun in Greece during the second historical stage, and the measures which were taken by the Allies to prevent the prolongation of that rule. In short, the historical phase which intervened between the beginning of October, 1915, and the abdication of King Constantine in June, 1917, is probably destined to be the most important period through which Greece has ever passed.

It is impossible here to discuss in detail all the events which led up to the second resignation of M. Venezelos and which occurred during his absence from power, or even to touch upon all the negotiations between the Allies and the various Governments which held the reins of power during this third historical phase. Sufficient therefore be it to say that whatever may have been his final attitude towards the question of Serbian concessions to Bulgaria and especially towards the cession of the Doiran-Ghevgeli Enclave by the
former country, His Excellency was in favour of an honourable interpretation of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty and of Greek support for her ally. Whilst the exact trend of events at this time is still far from clear, what seems to have happened is that, whether or not the Premier actually invited the Allies to disembark an expeditionary force upon Greek territory, he certainly made suggestions in his view destined to enable Greece to keep her treaty obligations, should the necessity for so doing arise. That contingency, of course, occurred when Bulgaria actually entered the War. Consequently, as M. Venezelos had already asked the Protecting Powers if, in case of need, they could furnish a force in substitution of that which would have been forthcoming from Serbia had that country not been fully occupied on her northern and western frontiers, the Allies, as the protectors of Greece, were certainly entitled to take that question as a sanction for that campaign. Subsequently, although he issued a formal protest against a military passage through Hellenic territory—a protest which there is reason to believe resulted from the pre-intended withdrawal of the King's consent—the fact that M. Venezelos refused to take any active steps to prevent such a passage was made pretext for his fall. That fall, that enforced retirement on October 5, of a Prime Minister who, two days after the original landing at Salonica had secured a vote of confidence in the historic and stormy meeting of the Chamber, which took place on October 3, in connection with the question of the Allied disembarkation, constituted a breach of the spirit, if not of the letter, of the Hellenic Constitution—a breach which would have entitled the Allies then and there to step
in to enforce constitutionalism, and a breach which justified not only the perseverance in an operation, which in effect had been sanctioned by the Legal Premier and by Parliament, but also their future attitude towards a series of governments which in reality were all unconstitutional.

Thenceforward the relationship between the Allies and the Hellenic Government was influenced by the necessity of subjugating political to military considerations, and the history of internal events was bound up with the great struggle which was in progress between liberalism and imperialism on the one side and reaction and parochialism on the other. The King, who undoubtedly remained truly identified with the sentiments of a large section of his people, but who certainly had leanings towards and admired Germany, believed in a policy of neutrality at all costs and utilised the anti-Venezelists for the purposes of that policy and in order to keep out of office a man whom he personally hated. The result was that the many Greeks who idolised His Majesty, but who wished to support the Allies, resented the suggestion that he had pledged himself to the Central Powers, and therefore refrained from throwing in their lot with a man who was not in royal favour. It was here that the position and task of the Allies were so complicated, for whilst no adequate measures seem to have been taken to distinguish between "Constantinism" and "Pro-Germanism", it was extremely difficult for them to do otherwise than to embrace the policy of M. Venezelos, who had left no stone unturned to further the defeat of the Central Powers. In short, it was in part the inability to discover a formula, not necessi-
tating the combination of "Pro-Allyism" with "Vene-
zelism", which at the same time increased the magni-
tude of our task and added to the strength and power
of the King — a strength and power which for months
paralysed Allied diplomacy at Athens.

It is unnecessary here to enter into or even to men-
tion all the numerous developments which occurred
between the Allied landing at Salonica in October,
1915, and the abdication of the King in June, 1917.
During that period, the reins of the Greek Government
were in the hands of various statesmen, who openly
supported the policy of neutrality advocated by the
King, not because they were pro-Germans, but be-
cause they believed they were acting in the interests
of their own country, and because they were opposed
to M. Venezelos and to everything which he advocated.
M. Zaïmis, who took office in October, 1915, and whose
government existed purely as a result of the patriot-
ism of M. Venezelos — his friend from Cretan times —
remained in power until he was defeated in the Cham-
ber nominally upon a purely internal question. He
was succeeded early in November by M. Skouloudis
—a very far-seeing man — who played the pro-
German game, not because he wished to further the
interests of the Kaiser, but rather because he feared
the consequences of resistance to enemy aggression
and therefore of intervention in the War. This ex-
banker of Constantinople, who is one of the best-
informed men in the Balkan Peninsula, and who recog-
nised the terrible fate which would await the Ottoman
Hellenes were Greece to throw in her lot against Tur-
key, held office until June 21, 1916.

During that time, as the mouthpiece of the Crown,
he was responsible for the election of December—an election which, though it resulted in a very large majority for the policy of M. Gounaris and for the Government, really constituted a victory for Liberalism, and this because M. Venezelos was able to prevent nearly two thirds of the voters from taking any part in it. This attitude of abstention by M. Venezelos may or may not have been in the ultimate interests of Greece, but in its result there lies a proof that, in spite of all and every intrigue, the popular Cretan leader then still enjoyed the confidence of the great proportion of his people. During the Skouloudis régime, too, we know that while the Hellenic Government placed numerous difficulties in the way of the transport of the Serbian army across Greek territory, it countenanced the surrender of Fort Rupel in the Struma Valley on May 25, 1916—a surrender followed by the Allied blockade of the Greek coast, and by the delivery of a Note demanding the complete demobilisation of the Hellenic army, the appointment of a business and nonparty Government, and the immediate dissolution of the Chamber which had been illegally elected in the previous December. This Note resulted in the retirement of M. Skouloudis and the return to power of M. Zaïmis. His task was too difficult of accomplishment, for owing to the treacherous surrender of Kavala, to the Bulgarian advance on the east of the Struma, and to the flagrant support given by the military authorities to the Reservists' leagues, it was impossible to hold the suggested elections, and His Excellency once more retired when he had been in office about two months.

Passing over the disturbances which occurred at
Salonica in August, 1916, between the Venezelist and anti-Venezelist troops, and the attitude taken up by the King, who publicly thanked certain officers of the latter party for their loyalty, the next important event was the departure of M. Venezelos from Athens on September 24 and the formation by him of an Independent Cabinet at Salonica about a fortnight later. This development constituted a sort of dividing of ways, for whilst the Allies did not openly embrace the policy of M. Venezelos, it at once became evident that their only alternative was either to repudiate the step taken by their protégé, which was obviously impossible under the circumstances, or to work for the augmentation of his power and for the increase of the size of the sphere of country which acknowledged him.

From October onwards events marched apace. In that month Admiral de Fournet demanded the cession of the whole of the Greek fleet except three vessels—a demand which was agreed to by the Lambros Ministry. The demobilisation of the Army, however, proceeded very slowly, and in November, the French Commander-in-Chief insisted upon the immediate surrender of ten Greek mountain batteries and the subsequent handing over of the remaining war material. This peremptory request was not complied with, and on December 1, Allied troops were landed at the Piraeus. The exact nature of the assurances given by the King as to the likelihood of the occurrence of disturbances resulting from this landing is uncertain, but the fact remains, as a result of some kind of undertaking in this direction, that the Allied contingents disembarked were so inadequate in size that
it became necessary ignominiously to withdraw them, on the understanding that six batteries instead of ten would be surrendered. The Allied Legations having been insulted and the Royalist party having maltreated, imprisoned, and murdered a large number of Venezelists, a renewed blockade was declared, — a blockade which was accompanied by a demand for reparation for the events of December 1 and 2, and for the transference of a large proportion of the Greek army to the Peloponnesus.

Although the King subsequently agreed to the transfer of his forces to the Peloponnesus, and although a formal apology was made for the events of December, it was obvious that after the occurrence of these events, it was impossible for the Allies to look with favour upon the continuance of a régime which was responsible for endangering their whole position in the Balkans. The removal of the Hellenic forces proceeded unsatisfactorily, the reign of terror instituted against Venezelists was prolonged, and for a time the Allies temporised in the hope of being able to accomplish their objects without finally resorting to drastic measures. But on June 7, 1917, when the question of the distribution of the Thessalian harvest had become a matter of the utmost urgency, and when it was necessary to prevent its being handed over in its entirety to the anti-Venezelist section of the country, M. Jonnart reached Athens as the High Commissioner of the Protecting Powers. Immediately after his arrival, he claimed from M. Zaïmis, who was once again Prime Minister, more complete guarantees for the safety of the Allied army in Macedonia, the restoration of the unity of the kingdom, and the working of the constitution in its
true spirit. Five days later, when Allied troops had been landed at the Piraeus, and when various places in Thessaly had been occupied, the King, as a result of the demand of the High Commissioner, abdicated, designating as his successor his second son, Prince Alexander—a young man of twenty-four years of age, who had previously played no political rôle in the affairs of his country.

The policy adopted by the Allies at Athens was pursued under such difficulties and in such circumstances that unless the whole situation be viewed in its broader and proper light, the way may be left open for some critics to suggest that their attitude towards the King was so short-sighted that they played directly into the hands of the enemy, and for others to say that Greece was bullied and that in the end the abdication of her ruler was brought about for causes which were not reasonable.

The answer to such suggestions is that as the wish of the great majority of Greeks was to avoid war on either side, the fact that England, France, and Russia naturally supported M. Venezelos, who advocated the endorsement of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, which meant war, they could not help strengthening the hands of his royal and other opponents who stood for peace. Moreover whilst they (the Allies) may have taken the necessary measures for their self-preservation in the wrong way and too late, there can rest in the mind of the real student no doubt that as a result of their special duties and rights of protection, and as a consequence of the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, they were entitled to undertake the measures which they actually employed. Thus the position was
entirely unlike that of Belgium, for whilst Germany had actually guaranteed the neutrality of that country, and whilst she was therefore under a direct obligation not to violate that neutrality, the Protecting Powers of Greece, who happened to be three of the Allies, had a well-defined right to intervene, either to defend that country against her foreign foes or to protect her people from a régime against which they (the Protecting Powers) were and are the guarantors.

The developments which occurred at Athens during the period immediately preceding the resignation of the King were neither the only nor I think the principal cause justifying the Allies in bringing about the abdication of His Majesty. Their attitude was legitimatised by events which had taken place much earlier in the War — events which certainly prove that the King had not governed in accordance with the spirit and letter of the constitution by which he was bound. For example, even if we ignore the reasons for which M. Venezelos was compelled, in March, 1915, to leave office when he had nearly one hundred and fifty supporters out of a total of one hundred and eighty-four deputies — reasons which, to say the least of it, must be in opposition to the spirit of the Greek constitution — we find that various events took place subsequently which were contrary to the actual letter of that document. The elections of both June and December, 1915, were held during a mobilisation, and many men serving with the colours were allowed to vote, which is illegal. Moreover, the old Chamber, having been dissolved on May 1, 1915, according to the constitution, the new Parliament should have met within three months and not on August 16, which
was actually the case. Once more, as M. Venezelos secured a vote of confidence at the time of the Allied disembarkation at Salonica, it is impossible to justify the attitude of the King in refusing to agree to the policy advocated by his then Prime Minister or to see by what right His Majesty dissolved the Chamber on November 11 and therefore on a second occasion in the same year. There seems no reason to doubt, too, that the secrecy of letters, which is guaranteed by the constitution, did not remain inviolable during the régime of King Constantine. These are some of the facts, which even if they were more or less condoned at the time, subsequently entitled the Allies to make the demands and to take the measures necessary for the establishment and maintenance of their national safety — demands which, though more or less backed up by force of arms, were none the less demands really made in support of M. Venezelos, who, constitutionally speaking, should have been and had been the constitutional Premier ever since the mandate received from the country in June, 1915.

The fourth stage in the war attitude of Greece begins from the abdication of the King on June 12, 1917, and from the return to power of M. Venezelos, who succeeded M. Zaïmis and arrived in Athens towards the end of that month. Even now it is too early to summarise or to forecast what will be the effects of the changes from the local Greek or from the larger European standpoints. Internally speaking, the disappearance of the King and the reappointment of the one great statesman of modern Greece as her Prime Minister have already meant at least the nominal
reunion of that country under one government, the consequent avoidance or at any rate the postponement of an outbreak of civil war, and the creation of a new atmosphere in the country. Reorganisation of the Government departments and of the army are in progress, and endeavours are being made to obliterate the effect of the chaos which had existed for nearly two years. But although M. Venezelos has recalled the last legally elected Chamber, in which he was returned to power in June, 1915, and although startling disclosures have been made, it is impossible to ignore the difficulties which beset a premier who is undoubtedly much less popular with the people than he was prior to his resignation early in 1915.

From an external or international point of view the above-mentioned events have carried with them the breaking off of the relations between the Central Powers and Greece and a consequent demonstration by the Hellenic Government of open friendship for the Allies. That friendship is now being proved by the active support of Greek contingents on the Salonica front. These results are so far satisfactory in that the Allies—the Protecting Powers—have been the means of re-establishing constitutionalism in Greece, whilst at the same time they have created a situation which has removed some of the difficulties and complications of their position in the Balkans. In short, the future depends not so much upon the fighting value or importance of the Greek army, as upon the statesmanship, the moderation, and the good will of a man who has already saved his country in more than one time of crisis, and upon the capacity and ability of the Allies to help and to allow this man to work out the destiny
of his country in such a way as to regain his prestige at home and to further the interests of his own people and also those of a group of countries who are fighting for the protection of small nationalities, and for the overthrow of militarism.
VII

ALBANIA AND THE ALBANIANS

Although her people have obviously not been able to play any direct part in the War, the geographical and political importance of Albania is such that the history of and conditions prevailing in that country are worthy of serious consideration to-day. Geographically this importance is due to the fact that Albania occupies a position which makes it the natural means of entry into and exit from a large part of the Western Balkans. It is for these reasons that the northern area of the country, together with the ports of San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo, are coveted by the Serbs, who desire, by securing possession of them, to obtain free access to the sea. Equally well, situated as it is on the Lower Adriatic, Albania practically commands the Straits of Otranto, and the government in control there can therefore influence the whole position in the Adriatic Sea to which they lead. It is this which makes Italy particularly interested in the future of Europe's latest principality and especially in that of its southern port Avlona, for that Power cannot afford to be menaced by the establishment there of a régime hostile to her natural development, her safety, and her very existence.
Closely bound up with these conditions are the facts that, for years, Austria has been working untiringly to bring about the augmentation of her influence in Albania, and that Greece has been striving to denationalise the people domiciled across her frontier. The first country, actuated by the intense rivalry existing between her and Italy upon all questions connected with the Western Balkans and the Adriatic, has acted as the instrument of Germany and with the object of preparing the way for the realisation of the Mittel-Europa scheme. The Hellenic Government, on the other hand, whilst nominally animated by religious objects, has really directed its policy for nationalistic motives. The result is therefore that the Albanian question, which was nominally settled by the creation of an autonomous principality during the Balkan Wars, still remains one of the most important problems for solution at the end of the present conflagration. It is for this reason, and particularly because the Allies and the United States of America are pledged to the principle of "Government with the consent of the Governed" or of "nationality", that we are bound to consider how this principle applies to Albania, whose people are entitled to expect the same consideration of their claims as are those belonging to any other smaller nationality.

Prior to the Balkan Wars, and to the loss of territory which was then suffered by Turkey, it was difficult accurately to describe what was meant by the geographical term "Albania." Whilst an official of the Turkish Government always refused to acknowledge the existence of a district known by the name, an Albanian, a Greek, a Bulgarian, and a Serbian would
each define the boundaries of Albania in accordance with his own national aspirations. Lord Fitzmaurice (then Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice) in a despatch addressed to Earl Granville in the year 1880 described the district covered by the geographical expression Albania as that territory "which falls mainly within the two vilayets of Scutari and Janina, but extends also in an easterly direction beyond the watershed of the mountains dividing the streams which fall into the Adriatic from those which fall into the Aegean Sea, and includes portions of the vilayets of Monastir and of Kossovo."

The Principality of Albania, if principality it can still be called, contains more or less the area which is thus indicated. Situated as it is on the eastern side of the Adriatic and wedged in between Montenegro, Serbia, Greece, and the sea, this unhappy country is the child not of love but of hatred, for its creation was brought about by the rivalry which existed between the Great Powers, and particularly between Austria and Italy, rather than as a result of any feelings of friendship for the Albanians. Whilst the independence of the country was decided upon by the London Ambassadorial Conference in December, 1912, the frontiers have never been definitely fixed, or, more correctly, they have never been observed by the neighbouring countries, and especially Greece. At the present time, therefore, it is impossible to say whether, in discussing Albania, we should include or exclude the large southern areas which are in dispute with Greece and parts of which have been in Italian hands since an earlier period of the War. If we include these in Albania and consider that country as it was established by the Great Powers, then it has an area of about
11,000 square miles and a population of approximately 800,000 souls. Measured from north to south it has a length of about one hundred and eighty miles, and from west to east an approximate width, at its broadest part, of only eighty-five miles.

The greater part of the country is mountainous. In the neighbourhood of Scutari, in areas of Central Albania, and in the south, there are, however, fertile plains watered by various rivers which wend their way to the Adriatic. The people devote themselves almost entirely to agriculture, which is carried on with primitive implements, such as wooden ploughs, and there are no home manufactures. Goat and sheep skins, which are exported, are dried by pegging them down upon the ground with wooden pegs. One of the most important of the exports from the country is the bitumen which is found at Selenitza near Avlona. The mine is worked by a French company or syndicate, and the bitumen, which is of one of the best qualities known, is transported from the pit’s mouth to the port on donkeys and pack animals, who wend their way across the hills for a distance of some twelve miles.

Towns properly so called are few and far between, for Scutari, with a population of about thirty-two thousand souls, and the capital of the north, is the only city which boasts of more than fifteen thousand inhabitants. Durazzo, the so-called capital of the country, and the former seat of the Prince’s Government, is built upon the site of the ancient Dyrrachion. It has a population of but five thousand. The city, which is located on the northern shore of a commodious bay, where it is almost always safe for ships to lie, is
Durazzo from the Sea

From a Photograph by the Author
practically surrounded by rocks and by the sea, except upon the side where the promontory upon which it is built is joined to the mainland. Avlona, now occupied by the Italians, is possessed of a fine bay. Its population is about six thousand souls. Elbasan (El Bassan), situated as it is in the heart of the country and in the Scumbi Valley, is the proper capital of the country, not only on account of its central position, but also because its inhabitants are known to be those who possess the most moderate political ideas, and therefore those who voice what should be the general policy of a united Albania.

From a local as well as from a national point of view, one of the most important questions connected with Albania to-day is that which concerns the nationality of its inhabitants. In order to understand this aright it is necessary to remember that in Turkish times these people, unlike the other alien races which went to make up the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, were not formed into a “millet” or a religious “community.” In other words, whilst the nationality of the Bulgarians and the Greeks was recognised, as the result of the existence of the Bulgarian and Greek Churches, the Albanians had no such binding link, and they were classed in the making of a census entirely according to their religion. Thus, if an Albanian belonged to the Orthodox Church he was called a Greek; if he were a Moslem, he was put down as a Turk. This meant not only that the gallant Shkypetars, as the Albanians call themselves, were never supported by intrigue adroitly hatched in various capitals, but that their territory has been and is subject to the aspirations of their neighbours. This is a
question of supreme importance, for whilst up to a point Abdul Hamid encouraged the Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Serbians of Turkey in their nationalistic and religious ideas, with the express purpose of causing strife between these elements of the population, the Turks — Old and New — never left a stone unturned to subdue the Albanians, whose sentiments of nationalism and of patriotism are probably older, stronger, and deeper than those of any of the Balkan race.

The Albanians are generally and probably accurately identified by impartial observers as the descendants of the ancient Illyrians, who were simply the inhabitants of Illyria, and who in their turn were the offspring of the Pelasgeans — the first people to come to Europe. It was therefore to their forefathers that the Albanians allege St. Paul referred, when he said “Round about into Illyricum I have fully preached the gospel of Christ.” But little is known about these Illyrians except that they were slow to accept the civilisation of the Greeks and Romans, and that subsequently they were driven westwards towards the shores of the Adriatic by the advancing hordes of Slavs. From the time of the Turkish Conquest, which may be said finally to have taken place about the year 1478 and soon after the death of the famous Albanian hero — Scanderbeg — until the Balkan Wars, Albania formed part of the Ottoman Empire, and it was nominally ruled from Constantinople. But such were the strength and the feelings of nationalism of the people, that throughout this period they really enjoyed a considerable amount of independence, being governed largely by unwritten laws administered by
the local chieftains. In short, for centuries the Albanians occupied in Europe towards the Government the same kind of position as that held in Asia Minor by the Kurds. Both races are religiously unorthodox; both races have been utilised by the Turks to support them in times of need, and prior to the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution in 1908, the attitudes of both races towards European interference in the Turkish Empire were made use of by the Central Government as a threat to the Great Powers as each new programme for reform was suggested at Constantinople.

The Shkypetars are today a wild, warlike, lawless people, but nevertheless they have their own—a very strict—code of honour, and they are faithful even unto death. An Arnaout once engaged is not only the most trusty servant and loyal follower in the Near East, but he is the most useful protector of his employer in whatever difficulty may arise. Indeed, the honour of the people is such that if once they have entertained you in their houses, or if once they have given you a promise, you may be absolutely sure that not a sacrifice will be too great for them to make in order that their promise may be fulfilled. In this connection I well remember that on one occasion, when I was travelling in Albania, it was necessary to accomplish an extremely long journey in the course of one day. My guides and horsemen protested against my wish to do what they said was almost impossible. The matter was, however, finally settled, and we started out on the morrow. These men walked hour after hour over the roughest of country, and we eventually accomplished my object in spite of almost insurmountable difficulties. But that object was only
realised because they went far beyond their legal bargain, even carrying me across rivers in the dark and protecting me against wild dogs, in order that we should reach the house of friends by night. Compensation they got, but even compensation is not always sufficient recompense for a promise which is more than honourably carried out.

The Albanians are divided into two main groups—the Ghegs and the Tosks. The River Scumbi, which enters the Adriatic halfway between the towns of Durazzo and Avlona, and its picturesque valley, may be said to separate the country inhabited by the former from that populated by the latter. The Ghegs, or Northern Albanians, are, in their turn, made up of a number of warlike tribes, many of whom still live a feudal life. The Tosks, or Southern Albanians, are more civilised and perhaps less warlike than their northern brothers. Their tribal system is much less well defined, but they owe their allegiance to local beys or chiefs, to whom they turn for guidance in all matters of importance.

Whilst foreign propaganda has done a good deal to aggravate the religious feelings of the people, the Albanians are not for the most part fanatical from an actual religious standpoint. At the present time about two thirds of the Albanian population is Moslem. Of the remaining one third, the Christians of the north are believers in Roman Catholicism, whilst those of the south belong to the Orthodox Church. This religious division is due to several historical facts. Originally the people were all Christians, many of them having been converted as early as the first century. In earlier times the Albanians belonged to
the Orthodox faith, but about the middle of the thirteenth century many of the Catholic Ghëgs of the north abandoned the Eastern for the Western Church, and at the time of Scanderbeg there was a further secession. After the arrival of the Turks, when the people were Christian in little but name, large numbers embraced Islam, rather from secular than from spiritual reasons, that is to say, because the position of a Moslem was in many ways a more privileged one than that of a Christian. There was a further secession in the seventeenth century for similar causes. But whilst there is strife between the different religious elements, owing generally to misunderstandings, the people are in principle and at bottom Albanians before they are either Moslems or Christians. Consequently, when disputes take place, they occur rather as a result of some political or local squabble than because of any innate religious feeling. There are districts where the inhabitants are entirely Christian, and there are others where the population is exclusively Moslem. But in the greater part of the country it is more or less mixed. In the south there is less religious strife than in the north. This has become particularly the case during the recent years, for as the Nationalistic Movement has increased, the Orthodox Albanians have grown to understand that their religion has been exploited by the Greek Church for political purposes, and therefore, the power of that Church is greatly decreasing, and the people are slowly getting to understand that they need not fear the attitude of their Moslem fellow countrymen.

The Albanians have their own language. It is held by most authorities to be of Aryan origin, and it prob-
ably formed the original speech of the people of large parts, if not the whole, of the Balkan Peninsula. Although the groundwork and grammar of the language are supposed to be Indo-European, a large number of words have been taken from the Turkish, Latin, Greek, Slav, and Italian tongues, which means that there are distinct dialects in different parts of the country. The people of the various regions have borrowed words from the language of the country to which their homes are nearest. Thus the ignorant Tosk of the south makes use of many more Greek words than a Gheg of the north, whom he would only understand with a certain difficulty. The fact, too, that Albanian was only reduced to writing in comparatively modern times, and that no general form of alphabet was decided upon until after the advent of the Turkish Constitution, is largely responsible for the differences of the dialect which exist to-day.

Prior to the seventeenth century there is no trace of the Albanians reading or writing their own language, and the large majority of the people cannot read or write to-day. The earliest books which contained printed examples of Albanian were published about three hundred years ago. These volumes consisted of religious works, dictionaries, and textbooks. Much later the Roman Catholic clergy furthered the language movement by providing the people with books, many of which were published in Scutari by the Jesuits, who began their work in Albania about the middle of the nineteenth century. But it is largely due to the religious work undertaken by the British and Foreign Bible Society that the people have been provided with literature printed in Albanian. As early as 1824 the
gospel of St. Matthew was printed in Tosk-Albanian at Corfu by the Ionian Bible Society—a Society promoted and subsidised by the British and Foreign Bible Society. Three years later the whole of the New Testament was published under the same auspices in the same language, but on this occasion the modified Greek alphabet, used in the printing, was included in order to enable the illiterate people to read its contents. Between the years 1860 and 1870 a large portion of the Bible was translated by an Albanian, and as a result, a volume containing the four Gospels, the Book of The Acts, and an alphabet was published for the Ghegs in Latin characters, with certain minor alterations, in 1866. This publication was followed by others printed in the Greek characters for the people of the south and in the Latin for those of the north and published in Constantinople between the years 1868 and 1879.

Ten years later, under the direction of Gerasim Kyrias, a patriotic Albanian who had studied in the American School at Samakov, the Book of Genesis and the Gospel of St. Matthew were printed in the new national alphabet (i.e. Latin alphabet with modifications), which had been adopted by an Albanian Committee which met to discuss the development of literature in 1879. So strong, however, was the Turkish opposition to the introduction of these characters that various publications subsequently made were not allowed to be printed in them. It was only, therefore, after the re-establishment of the Constitution in 1908 that the question of the method of writing the language was again taken up seriously, and that the new national characters (namely, Latin characters with one or two
modifications) were finally adopted. Their employment was as fervently opposed by the Young Turks as it had been by their predecessors.

The present political conditions prevailing in Albania are largely the outcome of what has taken place there during the last few years. Prior to the advent to power of the Young Turks, every endeavour was made to hinder the Nationalistic Movement. At the same time, during the reign of Abdul Hamid, the Albanians were treated with the utmost deference, and His Majesty did everything in his power to make certain of their support in time of need. The Albanian Imperial Guard, recruited from the south, was always well and regularly paid, and these soldiers were allowed to return to their villages as soon as their time had expired, instead of being retained with the colours for months or years in excess of their proper period of service. During the days of the Old Régime, too, the Albanians, especially the tribes of the north, were permitted to manage their own internal affairs, practically without the interference of the Constantinople Government. It was only when the northeastern Ghegs — always actuated by feelings of antagonism towards their Slav brothers — seemed inclined to jeopardise the policy of their spiritual and temporal master at Constantinople that troops were despatched to Albania to quiet the country, either by bombarding the malefactors with shell, or by bribing their leaders with decorations or with money.

After the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution the Young Turks, instead of recognising that the Albanians could be of valuable support to them, immediately antagonised them by endeavouring to abro-
gate many of the privileges which they had previously enjoyed. In the north these endeavours took the form of striving to disarm the people, of attempting to do away with the tribal and feudal system of government by which the people had formerly been ruled, and of trying to introduce compulsory military service which had previously never been enforced. Throughout the country, too, and particularly in the south, another grievance common to the Moslem and Christian Albanians was the attitude of the Sublime Porte towards the educational question. Not only did the Government fail to establish Albanian schools, but it actually opposed their opening and even insisted upon the closing of several such establishments run by the Albanians themselves. The result of this policy was that from the summer of 1909 right up to the time of the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, large areas of the country were in an almost continuous state of insurrection — a state of insurrection which in the end was indirectly if not directly responsible for hastening the downfall of Turkey as a European Power.

The Albanians took no active part in the Balkan Wars, and this because they hated both the Balkan Allies and the Turks with an equal hatred. On the one side they knew that the Serbians, Montenegrins, Greeks, and to a lesser degree the Bulgarians, all coveted areas of territory which were dear to them. On the other hand they recognised that an Ottoman victory would result in further attempts to denationalise and to subjugate them. The consequence was, that as the Turkish hold over Albania existed only in name, practically the whole country was overrun by the Serbians, Montenegrins, and Greeks, many of the
farms and houses being burned, and large portions of the population being put to flight. The Balkan Wars were, however, an epoch-making period for the people, because it was during the first campaign and at the end of November, 1912, that Ismail Kemal Bey—a former member of the Ottoman Chamber and a leading Albanian—proclaimed an independent Government at Avlona and that, some three weeks later, the London Ambassadorial Conference decided to establish an autonomous Albanian State. That decision, which was followed by prolonged negotiations between the Great Powers as to the status of and to the position of the frontiers of the new principality, was finally carried out in a manner which made the adopted boundaries of the country a sort of compromise between those suggested by the Balkan Allies, who worked for a very small Albania, and those advocated by Austria and Italy, who, whilst claiming less than did the Albanian Provisional Government, none the less proposed a settlement too much in accordance with the basis of nationality to be acceptable to Serbia, to Montenegro, or to Greece. In short, whilst the Albanians finally got Scutari in the north and Korcha and Santi Quaranta in the south, they did not secure Ipek, Jacova, Prisrend, and Dibra—places which by their allotment to Montenegro and to Serbia robbed the people of Northern Albania of market towns with which they had always been wont to trade.

In addition to the fact that it did something to make known to Europe the claims of the Albanians, the provisional Government of Ismail Kemal Bey, which in a way was the father of the State, together with others afterwards set up in districts not occupied by or from
which the Balkan armies had withdrawn, maintained order and did wonders to preserve peace from the moment of their establishment until long after the arrival of the European Commission of Control (the appointment of which was decided upon by the Ambassadorial Conference), in the early autumn of 1913. Indeed, when I was in Albania immediately after this, although I found the international forces in possession of Scutari and three or four entirely independent governments in different parts of the country, such was the state of things that I travelled with perfect safety through the greater part of it without any guard other than that provided by a native policeman, whose presence was necessary to enable a stranger to find the way in areas which were almost nowhere possessed of better means of communication than those provided by the most primitive bridle paths.

Prince William of Wied, a Major in the German Guards, who was nominated to rule Albania by the Great Powers in November, 1913, arrived at Durazzo, which he constituted his capital, on March 7 of the following year. The fact that his régime was a total failure is due in part to the international conditions then prevailing and in part to the rôle personally played by His Royal Highness. From an international standpoint the basis of the whole question was that Albania having been constituted largely in order to relieve European tension, ever-recurring difficulties arose between the Great Powers really responsible for its government. Moreover, whilst Europe had nominally fixed the northern and southern frontiers, she took no effective measures to hand over to the Prince territory which was his. In the south, the Greeks remained
in possession of large areas of Albania until the end of March, 1914. Most, if not all, of these districts were then officially evacuated. But, instead of the Greek regular army, there came the Epirote insurgents and the Epirote Independent Government, who, secretly supported from Athens, maintained a reign of terror in an area actually allotted to Albania. Thus throughout the stay of the “Mpret”, as the Albanians called their ruler, the European Concert, if Concert it can be called, ignored the necessity for taking the measures necessary for the protection of the country and looked on pacifically whilst the Greeks infringed the frontiers already delimited in the south, and whilst the insurgents threatened and practically besieged Durazzo in a manner which finally confined the powers of the Prince almost to the very precincts of his palace.

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the enormous difficulties which would have in any case beset any ruler of Albania. His Royal Highness, whose shortcomings were apparent from the first, made little endeavour to overcome them. Ignoring altogether his attitude towards the southern frontier question, concerning which he should have made some stipulation with the Great Powers before he ever entered upon his new task, the Prince made at least two fundamental mistakes. By arriving at Durazzo, instead of entering his new country by way of Scutari, which was still in the hands of the international forces which occupied it in the first Balkan war, and which was therefore more or less neutral country, the new ruler seemed to show his partiality towards Essad Pasha and thus offended all the enemies of a man who, if then powerful in the centre of the country, was certainly not be-
loved beyond the confines of his own particular district. Subsequently, and before it was too late, in place of trying to take the people into his confidence and of endeavouring to travel among them, the Prince appeared to think that he could maintain his authority by encouraging one section of the community to support him against the other, and that he could succeed in Albania without any display of courage. Thus on May 24, a few days after the banishment of Essad Pasha, at a time when Durazzo was threatened by the insurgents, the Prince and his family took refuge on an Italian warship—an action which, though he only remained there for one night, was sufficient to seal his fate in a country where, to say the least of it, cowardice is not one of the faults of the people. As time wore on, things went from bad to worse until the outbreak of the War, immediately before which the international contingents vacated Scutari and immediately after which the Prince and the International Commission of Control left Durazzo.

Prior to the departure of the Prince on September 11, Turkish insurgents, having occupied Avlona, advanced upon Durazzo. From that time onwards, therefore, the country, once more left without even the vestige of a central Government, was ruled by various self-constituted administrations, all practically independent of one another. At first Prince Burhan Eddin, son of the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid, was the nominal chief of an administration which owed any force which it possessed to the local power of Essad Pasha. After the subjugation of Serbia and Montenegro, in the winter of 1914–1915, when a large number of Serbians retreated to the Adriatic coast through Albania, the
northern and central districts of the country were overrun by the Austro-Germans, who finally occupied and still hold about three quarters of the principality. Over and above the fact that a proclamation was issued by the enemy in 1917 to the effect that he proposes to create of Albania some kind of autonomous province, closely allied to if not constituting an integral part of Austria-Hungary, we therefore have no reliable information concerning the conditions prevailing in an area which is entirely cut off from communication with the Allied world.

In the south, where the Italians occupied Avlona on December 25, 1914, and therefore before the entry of that country into the War, events have been bound up with the attitude of the Hellenic Government towards the Epirus question, with the relations existing between Greece and Italy upon that subject, and with the developments in the zone actually held by the forces of King Victor Emanuel. With regard to the first two questions, sufficient be it to say that in December, 1916, shortly after the capture of Monastir by the Allies, Colonel Desco'n, acting on behalf of the French Government, proclaimed the establishment of a small autonomous Albanian State, to include Korcha and the area immediately surrounding that town. Further to the south, where the Greeks had evacuated large areas previously held by them, the Italians took over a large section of Epirus and occupied Janina, actually in Greek territory, during the spring of 1917. After the abdication of King Constantine in June, 1917, and the return to office of M. Venezelos, it was however arranged at the Paris Conference of the following month that the Italians should
withdraw from all but the triangular area of Greek territory through which the road from Santi Quaranta to Korcha runs. This arrangement, together with the fact that M. Venezelos has always endeavoured to adopt a moderate attitude upon the Southern Albanian frontier question, has, it must be hoped, created a new atmosphere—an atmosphere in which this highly complicated problem may be able to be solved at the same time in accordance with the principle of nationalities and without serious detriment to the interests of the two countries most closely affected by this ever-vexed question.

Whilst, prior to her adhesion to the side of the Allies, Italy contented herself by the occupation of the port of Avlona, later she extended her front so that it ran along the lower reaches of the River Viosa, which constitutes the natural defensive line for that city. Subsequently, too, she disembarked another force at Santi Quaranta, which, acting with the army already at Avlona, advanced into the interior and ultimately established connection, near the village of Colognana, with the Allied forces based upon Salonica. Since that time Italy has been in occupation of approximately a quarter of the whole country—a quarter in which she has done a great deal to improve the conditions previously prevailing. Considerable lengths of road have been built, thereby not only facilitating means of communication, but also providing the native population with work for which a fair rate of pay has been given. Agricultural colleges have been established, and the farmers, now able to obtain machinery, are being encouraged to cultivate their ground systematically. Numerous schools have been opened, and the
children are thus educated in a manner which has never previously been possible. And, last but not least, the Italians, realising that the way to win the people is to leave the direction of local affairs as far as possible in Albanian hands, have established Courts of Justice, some of which are presided over by natives brought over from the large Albanian colony in Italy, and have formed a local police corps under the supervision of Italian officers.

I have said sufficient briefly to explain the past and present situations in Albania. With regard to the future, there are two questions of outstanding importance. The first is the problem bound up with the frontiers of the country, — a problem with which I shall deal elsewhere. The second concerns the future status of the principality. On account of the aspirations of her neighbours, of the lack of development of the country, and of the inexperience of the vast majority of the people in all matters appertaining to Government, I do not think that, for the present at least, Albania can exist or manage her affairs entirely alone. Consequently, as a return to the state of things existing after the Balkan Wars is impossible, only two alternatives appear possible. The first is some form of autonomy under all or perhaps a group of the Allied Great Powers, an arrangement carrying with it the difficulties always arising from combined control. The second is the protection of only one of the countries who are now fighting for the interests of smaller nationalities. If this latter alternative be adopted, unless the United States of America or Great Britain were willing to undertake the task, it would naturally fall to Italy who has already proclaimed "the unity and independence of all Albania
under the aegis and protection of the Kingdom of Italy"), and who has, as I have said, shown her good will towards the Albanians. Such a solution might not at once be acceptable to many of the inhabitants who desire to be entirely independent or at least to be under the protection of America or England who have no direct interests in Albania. But patriots as they are, these men will do well to remember that in addition to helping them to establish good government and to develop their country, the protection of Italy would provide them with a powerful friend—a friend without whom they might be helpless not only to enlarge, but even to maintain their present frontiers.
VIII

MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS

My object in this chapter is to examine a few of the geographical and semi-geographical problems which have influenced and do influence the situation in the Balkan Peninsula, and in particular to enumerate some of the military highways which of necessity have governed and still govern the operations in this area—highways for the possession of which a great deal of fighting has been done. In so doing, although I have walked, ridden, or driven through most of the districts about which I am now writing, I cannot attempt to indicate the military importance or the actual rôle played by many of the railways, rivers, or roads under discussion. To do so or to consider the highways of the Balkans otherwise than as belonging to the countries to which they belonged prior to the outbreak of the War would not only be to deal with questions discussed elsewhere, but it would also necessitate the devotion of a whole volume (such as that entitled "Geographical Aspects of Balkan Problems" by Doctor Marion Newbigin) instead of only one chapter to this all-important aspect of the Balkan question.

From a geographical standpoint, the contents of the peninsula are extremely difficult to define. I
propose, however, to consider it as bounded on the north by a line roughly drawn from the Port of Constanza on the Black Sea to Pola on the Adriatic, or, practically speaking, by the line of 45° N. Lat. This being so, we have to consider the highways of Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Albania, and Greece — countries which all lie to the south of the Danube and of the Save which flows into that river at Belgrade, in addition to those of Roumania, to which only brief reference will be made, owing to the fact that, geographically speaking, most of that country lies without the area under discussion.

The greater part of the peninsula is mountainous, but with few exceptions the mountains form chaotic masses rather than regular ranges. The two great chains, or so-called chains, are the Balkan Range and the Rhodope Balkans. The Balkan Range extends from Cape Emine on the Black Sea to the River Timok on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier, thus dividing Bulgaria into two main sections, northern and southern. In places these mountains attain an elevation of about eight thousand feet above the sea level. The Rhodopes used approximately to form a good part of the frontier between Bulgaria and Turkey, and they still constitute a natural barrier between what may be called Old Bulgaria and that area which lies between this range and the Aegean — an area the eastern part of which was annexed by the Government of King Ferdinand as a result of the Balkan Wars. The elevations attained at the eastern end of the range are considerably less than those upon the west. Whilst in the former district we have nothing higher than the
Katal Dagh which rises to six thousand feet above the sea, in the latter there is the Musa Alla peak, which reaches a height of nine thousand feet. The Sredna Gora — an offshoot of the main Balkan Range — juts forward towards the south almost to meet the Rhodopes at Trajan's Gateway between Sofia and Philippopolis, and the two ranges, or a prolongation of the two ranges, are more or less united at their western end by a mountainous area through which the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier runs.

Partly as a result of a generally very confused mountain system, the rivers run from various points in unexpected directions. Streams which one would think should flow east turn suddenly north or west, or vice versa. Thus the great Maritza, which rises on the Musa Alla group of peaks, after flowing eastward across the broad plain of Eastern Roumelia, instead of continuing its course towards the Black Sea, turns suddenly southwards at Adrianople and empties its vast volume of water into the Aegean near the port of Dede Agatch. Again, the Vardar and the Morava, the former emptying itself into the Gulf of Salonica and the latter into the Danube, respectively run down valleys the common summit of which may be said to be near Uskub. The Drin and the Scumbi — the two most important rivers of Albania — wend their ways to the sea by valleys, one or both of which may sometime constitute the route to be followed by a great railway leading down to the shores of the Adriatic.

The Balkan Peninsula is essentially the meeting-place of East with West. Whilst after the wars of 1912 and 1913 the European dominions of the Sultan
THE MILITARY HIGHWAYS OF THE BALKANS

SKETCH MAP OF THE BALKAN RAILWAYS

Scale of Miles

From a map prepared by The Royal Geographical Society
were enormously reduced, so large a part of the entire peninsula belonged to Turkey until comparatively recent times that almost the whole area still shows signs of Ottoman misrule. This partly accounts for the extraordinary surprises by which the traveller is met in various parts of the peninsula. In places the whole country appears to be perfectly European. In others the traveller passes for miles across bare country, the soil of which is of a brown-red colour—country which almost reminds one of the veldt of South Africa. Again, as one wends one's way by road or path through the Balkans, and particularly through Turkey, one finds that places which from the map would appear to be centres of importance are made up of only a few houses located in the valley or halfway up some forbidding hillside. Thus the prevailing impression left upon one's mind is that Turkish misrule has been responsible for the creation of a state of rack and ruin and for the existence of conditions which can only be improved when a long period of peace has enabled the Balkan States as a whole to introduce those reforms and that good government which have existed in Bulgaria since her liberation in the year 1878.

In this connection it has always been interesting to note the enormous differences which become markedly apparent as soon as one leaves Turkey and enters Bulgaria. The Bulgarian road is not only well laid out but it is maintained in a good state of repair. Carriages may roll along without jolting the traveller much more than would be the case on an English country road. The fields are well cultivated. The ground, which much resembles heavy rich English soil, is made the best use of. Animals of all kinds are contentedly
grazing in the pastures, instead of, as in Turkey, being allowed to wander in all directions, thereby tramping down the standing corn or crossing the newly ploughed fallows. Hay and corn crops are carefully collected in small, round, thatched ricks. The forests are systematically cut, and trees are planted in place of those removed for sale or everyday use.

The Near East is therefore a land of contrasts. Although we have some of the monotonous scenery to which I have already referred, one also comes upon the unexpected in the opposite direction. For instance, the magnificent land-locked Bocche di Cattaro is a gem of beauty, the like of which it would be difficult, if not impossible, to surpass in Europe. Again, there are places such as Sofia or Serajevo where civilisation has advanced by leaps and bounds. The capital of Bulgaria, in 1878 little more than a collection of mud huts, is now a prosperous modern city. Equally, whilst the Austrians may not have given political satisfaction to the Slav population of Bosnia, they have undoubtedly made of its capital a city in which picturesque beauty is combined with modern comfort. Composed partly of modern and partly of Turkish houses and nestled on both sides of the narrow valley of the river Miljacka, Serajevo is a place in which East certainly meets West.

In view of the influence of climatic conditions upon communications no apology is needed for making a brief reference to the question of the weather in the Balkan Peninsula. In the north and northeast of the peninsula the climate is largely governed by the extremely cold winds which blow from those directions,
by the considerable amount of snow which therefore falls in many districts, and by the length and severity of the frosts. In the south and southwest, partly owing to the protection given by the mountains and high table-lands, the climate is much milder and the rain comes usually with a south or southwest wind. In many districts there are very sudden changes in the weather, and there is a great contrast between the temperature of the day and of the night. For instance, at the end of October there comes an almost annual short spell of very cold weather at Constantinople—a spell in which there are always biting cold winds and sometimes falls of snow or sleet. From then, often until the end of December, the days are generally brilliantly fine and warm. Again, even in the early autumn the visitor to the interior will find that very little exercise will make him warm by day, whilst at night, and even when rough shelter is available, he will gladly coil up in all the fur garments which he may be lucky enough to possess. Both the heavy downpours of rain and the melting of the snows create conditions which the traveller and the engineer have to be prepared to meet. Thus it is no uncommon thing for routes which are perfectly passable in summer to be completely impassable during times of rain and flood. It is this factor which often accounts for the existence of alternative roads, used at different seasons of the year, and it is this contingency which often leads to mistakes in information as to the utility or inutility of various communications for military purposes.

Although Turkey now forms but a very small part of the Balkan Peninsula, the question of the existing
communications in the whole area under discussion has been largely influenced by the attitude of the Ottoman Government. For years much of the politics of the Near East has turned upon railroad questions, and therefore, whilst considerable parts of the peninsula had already passed out of Turkish hands before the construction of railways was practicable in such an area, yet up to the time of the Balkan Wars the geographical distribution of the European dominions of the Sultan was such as to give the Ottoman Government the deciding voice as to the construction of numerous lines leading through Turkey to the seacoast. The building of roads and railways would have carried with it economical as well as political advantages to the State, but their construction was opposed alike by Abdul Hamid and by the Young Turks. This opposition was sometimes due to internal political reasons, and sometimes it resulted from the existence of rival schemes supported by different Governments, or by concession hunters who were directly or indirectly interested in them. Again, as large numbers of railways in Turkey were built under a kilometric guarantee from the Government—a guarantee which assured the company in question a fixed gross income every year—it is well known that the Turkish authorities agreed to what was often a most extravagant sum, but only when the line in question was required for some strategical purpose, or when its construction was forced upon the Sublime Porte by some more than usually active diplomatic representative at Constantinople.

One result of this inadequate provision of railways is that the Near East has always been but little under-
stood by those who have only been able to pass hurriedly through it, and that once off the beaten track, many parts of the Balkan Peninsula are stranger to the ordinary outsider than are the wilds of Central Africa. Indeed the methods of travel are so diverse that whilst in peace time Constantinople can be reached in the luxurious Orient Express, once off the great international route, one might almost as well be in the heart of some unexplored continent. Thus to approach the Peninsula of Gallipoli by land, or to get into the heart of Macedonia, you must rely upon some fourth-rate carriage, whilst to penetrate the rocky valleys of Albania you are compelled to content yourself with a pack horse, a mule or even a donkey. Again, arrived in the interior, accommodation, which is distinctly primitive even in many of the larger Balkan towns, must either be provided by the transportation of camping arrangements or sought in buildings so dirty and so unpleasant that it is much easier to pass the night than actually to sleep.

Before approaching a discussion of the actual military routes within the real peninsula, I will briefly refer to two international highways, which if they be not properly in the Balkans themselves are certainly controlled by one or more of the rulers in this “Danger Zone” of Europe. Ignoring here the numerous interesting facts connected with the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus I will refer very briefly to the enormous importance of Europe’s second largest river. Although it is impossible without entering into countless details to discuss its evervarying breadth and depth, it may be interesting to remember that at Belgrade the Danube is nearly one mile wide, and that with certain exceptions its gen-
eral width between Vienna and the Iron Gates is from six hundred and fifty to two thousand yards at low river. From the Iron Gates, where the channel is only about eighty yards broad, the river widens out, and throughout its course to Braila its average breadth, when the water is low, is about half a mile. On the Upper Danube, that is, on the part above the Iron Gates, traffic is maintained by barges and by special river steamers drawing, I believe, up to five or six feet of water. So far as one is able to ascertain, such vessels can now navigate the stretch between Vienna and Turnu Severin at practically all times except when the river is stopped by the presence of ice. Below Turnu Severin and between there and Braila there are about twelve feet of water, and small sea-going vessels can therefore pass up and down. Between Braila and the Black Sea, by way of the Sulina branch, there is a minimum depth of about eighteen feet of water. This last-named section of the river is under the control of the Danubian Commission.

The above details are sufficient to prove the enormous importance of the Danube, not only as a thoroughfare for traffic but also as an obstacle to through communication between the north and south. No bridges span the river between Peterwardein — a Hungarian town situated about forty miles to the northwest of Belgrade — and Cerna Voda in Roumania, that is, for a distance of nearly six hundred miles. This means that the greater part of Roumania — a country the communications in which cannot really be considered as part of those in the peninsula — is separated from the Balkan States by a natural barrier, the width of which is in many places much greater than that of
either the Bosphorus or the Dardanelles. Thus whilst, as I shall show below, eight more or less independent Roumanian railways run down to the northern bank of the Danube at seven different places, and whilst six Bulgarian lines approach its southern bank near five different towns, connection between the Roumanian and Bulgarian termini, which are for the most part situated almost opposite to each other, is maintained solely by ferry boats which do not carry trains. Indeed, the only route by which the railway systems of the two countries are actually connected is by way of a new line through the Dobrudja, a line which I shall discuss later on in this chapter.

Cerna Voda is on the main line from Bucharest to Constanza, and therefore upon the route which in peace time is followed by the Orient Express upon certain days in the week. Here a great viaduct, or more correctly, a series of viaducts, cross the river and the lower ground and marshes which border upon it. In addition to the supplementary sections, which have a length of nearly two miles, the bridge over the river alone is not only more than eight hundred yards long but the roadway is one hundred feet above the level of the water. Built by Roumanian engineers at a cost of about £1,400,000, and opened in September, 1895, it constitutes a possession of which the Roumanians may be justly proud. Indeed, as I have said elsewhere, its existence, as also that of the port of Constanza, which is now one of the most important on the Black Sea, are the fundamental causes for which the Roumanians desired to secure a properly defensible frontier on the south of the Dobrudja, and therefore one of the most important reasons for which
they insisted upon the acquisition of the areas they obtained during and as a result of the two Balkan wars.

The international status of the Danube depends upon various treaties and arrangements which date back as far as 1814 and 1815. In the former year, and by the Treaty of Paris, it was arranged that the navigation of the Rhine should be free and that it should not be prohibited by any one. In 1815 the Congress of Vienna confirmed this arrangement. In 1856, and by the Treaty of Paris, it was agreed that the Danube, the navigation upon which up till that time had been regulated by a treaty between Austria and Russia, should be placed under the same rules as those which had already been made for international water highways which traverse more than one State.

This brings us to a point at which it is necessary to consider under more or less separate headings the work which has been carried out by the Danube Commission, and the larger political position of the Danube. This international Commission, which was instituted by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, was created with the special object of executing the works necessary to put the lower part of the river and its mouths into the best possible state for navigation. Its powers have been prolonged by various periods, and in 1878, and by the Treaty of Berlin, a Roumanian delegate was added. At the same time the work of the Commission was extended as far west as Galatz. Its jurisdiction having been again prolonged in the year 1883, as far as Braila, the Commission has continued to exist since 1904 under a three years' agreement made under the Treaty of London signed in 1883.
The Commission is possessed of extra-territorial powers, and it is not in any way under the control of the Roumanian Government. It has the right to levy tolls, to carry out public works, and to institute regulations for the navigation on the part of the river which it controls. All members and employees, besides its works and its establishments, and particularly those at Sulina, are to be considered neutral, and in case of war they are to be equally respected by all the belligerents. The Commission has its own flag and badge, and it holds general meetings and committees in order to carry out the necessary regulations for river traffic.

It is only possible here very briefly to consider the larger political status of the Danube, that is, the status of the river from its mouth as far as the Iron Gates. By the Treaty of Berlin, it was determined that all the fortifications on the river between its mouth and the Iron Gates should be razed, and that no new ones should be created. At the same time it was settled that no vessel of war, with the exception of those light ones in the service of the river police and of the "Stationnaires" of the Powers, which were to be allowed to ascend as far as Galatz, should navigate this stretch of the river. These regulations, and especially those connected with the presence of war vessels, have not been carried out to their letter, for Roumania certainly possessed river monitors which could hardly be necessary for police work.

Many of the numerous international arrangements connected with the Danube have been "interpreted" by the various enemy belligerents in a manner which would certainly not have been accepted by international
lawyers. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say here that as no riverian State possesses the right of searching ships which do not stop in her ports, and as no ships of war may legally navigate the river, there are undecided problems connected with such questions as the freedom of the Danube "in respect to commerce", as to the definition of the term "vessel of war", and as to the possible difference in status between the once entirely Roumanian and the joint Roumanian and Serbo-Bulgarian (now Austro-German Bulgarian) sections. In war these questions were obviously destined to be decided only according to the circumstances of the moment and to the power which any particular party possessed to support its own point of view.

I will now proceed to a more detailed description of the actual routes which exist or the construction of which is in progress or proposed. With only a few exceptions I shall say but little in regard to roads, because for the most part they follow the general lines of, or act as feeders to, railways. Moreover, in modern days the movements of large armies are so influenced by the necessity for the transportation of heavy guns and of vast quantities of munitions and of supplies, that these armies are usually compelled to take the lines of least resistance and to follow railway routes. In order to make my remarks as brief and as clear as possible I have divided them into three distinct sections.

1. An account of what may be called the main lines of railway in the peninsula.

2. A summary of the more important secondary lines — a summary in which those lines are grouped
as far as possible in accordance with the countries through which they run.

3. An outline of various routes which are not followed by railways and a brief explanation of some of the lines the construction of which has often been proposed.

By far the most important railway in the Balkan Peninsula is that which connects Belgrade with Constantinople and which follows a route traversed at various historical periods by Turks, Crusaders, and Slavs. It constitutes the Balkan section of the great trunk route from west to east and therefore its domination forms a prominent feature in the German “Drang nach Osten” scheme. Of its total length of six hundred and fifty-nine miles, two hundred and twelve miles are in Serbia, two hundred and seventy-one miles are in Bulgaria, and the remaining one hundred and seventy-six miles are in Turkey. The line, which has no kilometre guarantee, was built during the period between 1869 and 1888, when it was opened to through traffic. In the former year Baron Hirsch obtained a concession to construct certain railways in Turkey. Amongst other important lines contracted for under that arrangement was one to pass through, or more correctly near to, Adrianople, and to connect Constantinople with the northwestern frontier of what was then Eastern Roumelia. This line was opened to traffic about the year 1872. The original Bulgarian section, that is the stretch extending from the above-mentioned frontier to Tsaribrod, and the Serbian section, namely the length from Tsaribrod to Belgrade, were built as a result of several conferences which were held under Article X. of the
Treaty of Berlin. Owing to various political delays these sections were not completed until 1888. The Turkish section is still worked under an arrangement by which Baron Hirsch entered into a formal agreement with the Sublime Porte, and under which he formed a company or syndicate, now called the Oriental Railway Company, to exploit the line on behalf of the Ottoman Government. The Bulgarian part, which now includes the whole section between Luleh Burgas and Tsaribrod, and, until the defeat of that country, the Serbian part extending from there to Belgrade, are worked by the State railways of the respective countries. In peace time this route is followed by the Orient Express, and through communication is maintained by at least one daily passenger train in each direction—a train which has become familiarly known as the "Conventionnel", probably because its existence depends upon a Convention originally signed by Austria, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Turkey.

After crossing the Save by an iron bridge, the length of which is over four hundred yards at Belgrade, which lies at the junction of that river with the Danube, the line runs through hilly country to Veliko Plana. On this section, and near a place called Ripany, situated about fifteen miles to the south of Belgrade, there is a tunnel about a mile and a quarter long. From Veliko Plana, where it enters the valley of the Morava, and for a distance of some ninety-five miles the line follows the banks of that river almost to Nish, whence it turns in a more easterly direction and hugs the bank of the Nishava, subsequently crossing the Dragoman Pass and the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. After crossing the Sofia plateau the line enters the valley of the great
Maritza, not by Trajan's Gate, through which the historical road to the East ran, but by a pass situated just to the southwest of it. Thence it traverses the plain of Eastern Roumelia, flanked on the north by the Balkan Range and on the south by the Rhodopes, until, after leaving Bulgarian territory at Luleh Burgas, it enters the valley of the Erkene, by which it continues its ever-winding way until it reaches the northwestern end of what is known as the Peninsula of Constantinople. After passing through the Chatalja Lines and the ancient walls of the Ottoman capital it finally arrives at its terminus on the southwestern side of the Golden Horn.

Second only in significance to this line is the railway which connects Nish with Salonica. The length of this line is two hundred and seventy-eight miles. The northern section, that is, the section from Nish to Ristovats, was built by the Serbians and opened in the year 1888. Its length is seventy miles. The remaining two hundred and eight miles were built for the Ottoman Government by Baron Hirsch, the greater part being opened in 1872. The Turkish section, which had no kilometric guarantee, was worked by the Oriental Railway Company until the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. As a result of these wars the Serbians secured, and subsequently took over the working of, the line between Ristovats and Ghevgeli—a section which has a length of just over one hundred and fifty miles. The rest of this line, that is, the part between Ghevgeli and Salonica, has been in Greek territory since these wars, but the Hellenic section continued to be worked by the Oriental Railway Company until after the order for Greek mobilisa-
tion issued at the end of September, 1915, when it was taken over by the Government, and more or less since which time it has been practically in the hands of the Allies.

Following the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar this line takes the great highroad from north to south across the Balkan Peninsula. If seriously improved or rebuilt, and if better harbour facilities were available at Salonica, this line would constitute the shortest and the most direct route from Europe to Egypt, India, and the Far East. Since the outbreak of the War, it has been most important partly because it was by way of it that Serbia was at first able to com- municate with the sea and partly because it constitutes the natural line of advance from Salonica into the interior. But as it runs more or less parallel to the Bulgarian frontier, and as it passes through one or more narrow gorges, it was easy of attack by the army of that country, which secured possession of considerable sections directly after the Bulgarian entry into the arena of the War.

There remains one other railway of very considerable importance. It leaves the main Belgrade-Constantinople route at Luleh Burgas, a junction situated on the right bank of the River Maritza, and lying at a distance of about eighteen miles to the south of Adrianople. This line forms the connecting link between the Constantinople-Adrianople Railway and Salonica. The first section—that part between Luleh Burgas and Dede Agatch, which runs down the valley of the Maritza—was originally constructed and worked with and by the Oriental railways. Its length is approximately sixty miles. The second section, that
is, the part between Dede Agatch and Salonica, was built and exploited up to the time of the Balkan Wars by a French company. With a very large kilometric guarantee — the highest guarantee ever given for a railway built on this system — this line, including two short branches, has a length of two hundred and sixty-five miles. Of these about ninety miles are now in Bulgaria and the remainder nominally in Greece. The main line from Dede Agatch to Salonica runs practically parallel to and at an average distance of some fifteen miles from the Aegean coast, and it traverses the plain which lies between that coast and the Rhodope Balkans. Passing Gumuljina in Bulgaria and Drama, Seres, and Demir Hissar in Greece, it approaches within a distance of about twenty miles of Kavala, but it touches the seacoast only at Dede Agatch and near Porto Lagos. As the geographical position of this railway is one of extreme importance it is advisable to remember that a loop or branch line connects the Maritza Valley Railway with the line to Salonica without passing through Dede Agatch, and that big ships cannot enter the arm of the sea which lies to the north of Porto Lagos. The loop at Dede Agatch has its strategical significance, for instead of absolutely approaching the coast, it follows a route which lies behind the hills and at a distance of nearly nine miles from the shore.

As a result of the Balkan Wars the ownership and the working of the Bulgarian sections of these railways — parts which were at once seized by the Bulgarian Government — became most unsatisfactory. This was the case because the only means of railway communication between the main part of Bulgaria and the Bul-
garian port of Dede Agatch was by way of a line considerable parts of which were in Ottoman territory. In other words, as the Turks owned the railway between a point situated just to the southeast of Mustapha Pasha and Mandra, lying to the southwest of Demotika, this line could only be used by the Bulgarians on the strength of an arrangement made by them with Turkey after the second Balkan war. Whilst in peace it was open to countless disadvantages, in war it was possessed of complications, the nature of which it is impossible to exaggerate. It was for this reason that the Germans, as I have explained elsewhere, compelled the Turks to agree to the Turco-Bulgarian Convention, by which the formerly Ottoman areas situated on the west, or right banks, of the rivers Tunja and Maritza were handed over to Bulgaria. As a result of this arrangement, the Bulgarians secured possession of the whole line from Mustapha Pasha to Dede Agatch, and they therefore became the owners of the railway from the former place as far as Okjilar on the Dede Agatch-Salonica line. The Greeks on their part are the nominal owners of the section from Okjilar to Salonica. As in the cases of other railways running through now Hellenic territory, this line was worked under the old arrangements until it was taken over by the Greek Government after the promulgation of the 1915 order for mobilisation, since which time a considerable area of the country through which it runs has been occupied by the Bulgarians.

1 At the time of writing it is reported that all or part of this area, including the Station of Adrianople, situated on the right bank of the Maritza, and known as Karagatch, has been restored to Turkey by Bulgaria. The accuracy of this report and the real reason for a second transference of this area, however, still remain to be proved.
Although it is not strictly speaking a main line, its geographical position, partly in Greece and partly in Serbia, makes it convenient here very briefly to refer to the railway which connects Salonica with Monastir. This railway, with a total length of one hundred and thirty-six miles, was opened in the year 1890. With a kilometric guarantee of £572 per mile, it was worked by the Oriental Railway Company until the Balkan Wars. After that the Serbian, or northern section, the length of which is only about fifteen miles, was taken over by the Serbian Government. The remainder of the line, administered more or less under the former arrangements until the 1915 Greek mobilisation, was then taken over by the Hellenic Government. The railway is of considerable importance because it serves an area of country which would otherwise be far from accessible — the proposed line from Kuprulu (Veles) to Monastir running entirely through Serbian territory was not constructed before the enemy occupation of this area — and because for years it has been part of the programme of Balkan railway construction to prolong it through Albania to some point on the Adriatic. Moreover as it runs through Gidia, Veria, and Florina, it provides through communication with Athens by a line which now connects Larissa with Gidia — a line concerning which I will give further particulars below.

Having thus briefly outlined the positions and importance of the main lines of railway in the Balkan Peninsula, I will now proceed to a summary of what may be called the secondary and for the most part

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1 It is reported that the Germans or the Bulgarians have now built at least a considerable section of this line.
internal communications—that is, communications which, important as they are in themselves, do not with certain exceptions (particularly in Roumania) maintain any connection with those of a foreign country. Let us begin with Roumania, which lying as it does for the most part to the north of the Danube, has only one linking railway with those of the remainder of the peninsula.

Ignoring the roads, which are national and for the most part good, the railways of Roumania, which have a length of nearly two thousand four hundred miles and all of which are either State owned or worked, may for the present purposes be discussed under two headings—firstly the main line which runs more or less east and west across the country together with its feeders, and secondly that which runs approximately in a northerly and southerly direction through the northern horn of the kingdom together with its tributaries. The great east and west line starts from Constanza, on the Black Sea, crosses the Cerna Voda bridge and passing through Bucharest, goes to Verciorova on the frontier, whence it turns in a northerly direction and continues its way to Budapest and Vienna. This line has numerous feeders which run up to it from the south. The first, which joins it at Medgidia in the Dobrudja, is the only railway (except the trunk line passing through Belgrade) by which through communication exists between the Balkan Peninsula and the remainder of Europe. Meeting the Bulgarian system at Oborishte on the Roumano-Bulgarian frontier, it was constructed by the Roumanians after the Balkan Wars, only being completed subsequent to the outbreak of the European conflagra-
tion. With a length of about seventy miles it is highly important commercially because it enables goods and passengers to be conveyed from Bucharest to Sofia or vice versa without the necessity for any transshipment on the banks of the Danube. It has played a significant strategic part in the War, for it greatly furthered the Bulgarian advance into Roumania. Since the enemy occupation of the Dobrudja this line is believed to have been prolonged in a northerly direction from Medgidia as far as Babadagh or Tultanca or some other point on the south of the Danube.

Ignoring the great international routes going through Moldavia and running up to the Predeal Pass, which must be considered separately, this East and West Line is approached from the south and from the north by several railways which have played a prominent part in the War. On the south and running down to the Danube, there are six railways, four of which approach the northern bank of the river opposite or nearly opposite to Bulgarian railway termini.

On the north, ignoring several lines of more or less local significance, the Constanza-Verciorova Railway is approached by two important highways. The first is the Fateshti-Buzeu line, which constituted the route followed by the Berlin-Breslau-Cracow-Lemberg-Constanza Express, run prior to the War in competition to the Orient Express. Passing over the Chiulnitz-Slobodzie-Ployesti branch, and the two lines to the west of Bucharest which run up towards but not across the Roumanian frontier from Pitesti, we come to the Riatra-Cainen Railway which passes through the Rotherturm Pass and connects with the Hungarian railway system.
What I have described as the south and north railway system of Roumania starts from Bucharest and runs by way of Ploiesti-Buzeu-Adjud and Pashkani to Suczawa on the frontier of the Bukovina. This railway, which traverses Moldavia, is met at Ploiesti, in the heart of the oil country, by the international line which goes to Sinaia, the great summer resort of fashionable Roumanians, and subsequently passes through the Predeal Pass into Hungary. The Bucharest-Suczawa line also has branches respectively running towards the west and east. Whilst the most significant leading in the former direction is that which runs from Adjud through the Gyimes Pass and into Hungary, the most important running to the east are those which connect Buzeu with Fateshti near Cerna Voda, Buzeu with Braila, Moresesti with Tecuciu (on the independent Russian frontier line from Galatz to Jassy) and Pashkani with Jassy and the Russian frontier.

The above remarks, if studied in conjunction with a map, are intended to prove four things. Firstly, the communications existing in Roumania are of vital importance as giving access to the Danube from the north and of considerable significance as providing the shortest routes from southeastern Hungary into Russia. It was for these reasons, as I have already explained, that Germany desired the entry of Roumania into the War on one side or the other. Secondly, the railways of Southern Roumania were such as to facilitate a military concentration by that country on the northern bank of the Danube and therefore against Bulgaria, or to further a Bulgarian advance into Roumania once a crossing of the river were ef-
fected, as it was effected at the end of 1916. Thirdly, whilst the enemy had an effective system of railways running more or less parallel to his Transylvanian frontier, the Roumanians had only the one semi-circular line from Suczawa by way of Ploiesti, Bucharest, and Pitesti to Verciorova—a line which was very inadequately connected with the frontier. And fourthly, if, and so far as the Roumanian railways had been constructed for strategical purposes at all, this had been done with a view to war against Russia rather than as a preparation for hostilities against Austria-Hungary.

Turning to Serbia, during the years which preceded the outbreak of the War, and particularly since the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, the Government had been devoting large sums of money to railway construction. The Serbian lines are of two distinct categories—normal and narrow-gauge lines.

All the railways in Serbia, except two, really constitute branches of or feeders to the main trunk line from Belgrade to Constantinople. I will deal first with those which run from the main line in a more or less westerly direction. Of these there are three. The first and last—both narrow-gauge lines—are important because they jut out towards the Bosnian frontier and therefore towards the railways of that province, with which ere now they may well have been connected by the enemy and with which they are destined to be united should Bosnia go to Serbia, as we hope that it will as a result of the present War. On the east or northeast of the main trunk route there are three Serbian railways of considerable and two of
only local significance. The first important one runs from Veliko Plana to Semendria, and follows the valley of the Morava. It was used by the Austro-German forces when they advanced into Serbia in the autumn of 1915. The second connects Nish with Prahov on the Danube. The whole of this line was not open to passenger traffic before Serbia was overrun by the enemy, but it has certainly been completed by now. Between these two lines there is an important narrow-gauge railway, which unites the main trunk route with the one from Nish to Prahov. These latter lines facilitated the Bulgarian advance and occupation of northeastern Serbia.

As already stated, there are only two railways in Serbia which have no connection with the main trunk route from Belgrade to Constantinople. The first of these unites Shabatz on the Save with Loznitza on the Drina. The second is that which runs through the district best known as the Sanjak of Novibazar—that narrow tongue of formerly Turkish territory which up to the time of the Balkan Wars separated Serbia from Montenegro. This line now forms a branch of the main route from Nish to Salonica. Leaving that railway at Uskub, it runs in a northwesterly direction to Mitrovitza and has a length of seventy-four miles. It was constructed for the Ottoman Government under the arrangements made with Baron Hirsch, and it actually formed part of the original line from Salonica, for the section from Uskub to the then Serbian frontier was not built until afterwards. Of the famous and long-proposed railway from Mitrovitza to the Austro-Hungarian frontier I will say more later on.
Turning to Bulgaria we have the Balkan country in which by far the greatest amount of attention has been paid to the construction of railways and roads. Whilst in the year 1887 there were no railways in Bulgaria proper, only some two hundred miles, constructed under the auspices of the Turkish Government, were open to traffic in Eastern Roumelia. After the Balkan Wars, the Bulgarian State, including Eastern Roumelia, had over fourteen hundred miles of railway open, besides several lines under construction. The railways, which are all State owned, are well equipped and efficiently run and managed. Indeed the visitor who takes the principal routes is so well accommodated in sleeping and restaurant cars that it is difficult for him to believe that he is really travelling on a Balkan branch line at all. Moreover the districts which are not yet effectively provided with railways are well served with roads which are maintained in a state of repair which far surpasses that of any other highways existing in the Balkans.

Whilst some of them are so important that they can hardly be considered as branches of the main line, it is convenient for the present purposes to consider the railways of Bulgaria as feeders of the great trunk route from Belgrade to Constantinople. A line runs from Sofia up the gorgelike valley of the Isker and then across the plains of Northern Bulgaria to Varna on the Black Sea. In its turn it has what may be called six distinct branches running toward the North, five of which approach the Danube at five different places, opposite to most of which, as I have already said, there are Roumanian railway towns from which connection is made with the interior of that country.
All these lines running up to and towards the Danube, together with the trans-Balkan line described below, have been most important since 1914. During the neutrality of Bulgaria, as since the entry of that country into the War, they have been utilised for the transportation of men and goods coming from Central Europe across or by way of the Danube, to Turkey. This has relieved the traffic pressure on the main line from Belgrade to Constantinople. Moreover, after the adhesion of Bulgaria to the cause of the enemy, these railways and especially the more easterly lines were utilised to facilitate the Bulgarian advance into the Dobrudja and Southern Roumania.

The Sofia-Varna line is connected with the Philippopolis-Burgas railway, to which I will refer in detail later, by one which traverses the Balkan Range. This line, which is obviously of the greatest importance, was only opened quite recently. Instead of following the old road from Turnovo to Kazanlik by way of the Shipka Pass, it takes a more easterly route and passes through the Travna Gap. By so doing a climb of nearly 1000 feet is saved, for, whilst the altitude of the Shipka is 4378 feet, that of the Travna is only 3359 feet. The use of this line enables merchandise or troops to be rapidly conveyed by railway from Northern to Southern Bulgaria, or vice versa, without being compelled as formerly to pass through Sofia. As a matter of fact it played a considerable rôle even before the entry of Bulgaria into the War, for it was by it that munitions destined for Turkey were for the most part forwarded from the Danube to the Ottoman frontier.

At Sofia and from the main trunk route a railway
branches off in a southwesterly direction, and runs to Gyuveshevo absolutely on the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. It is important because of the facilities which it gives for a military concentration in this part of Bulgaria, and therefore for a Bulgarian advance upon Uskub, and also because it was intended as the Bulgarian section of line finally to link Sofia with that town and perhaps to form part of a great line from the Danube to the Adriatic. Had the second Balkan war not occurred, the Bulgarians would then have constructed another line from Radomir, by way of Dubnitza and the Struma Valley, to the shores of the Aegean. As a matter of fact since their entry into the War they have built the northern section of this line, which is believed to be open in the form of a light railway as far as Lipnitza just to the north of the former Graeco-Bulgarian frontier.

Between Sofia and the Turco-Bulgarian frontier there are only two railways which branch from the main line. They both run in a northeasterly direction. The first is by far the most important. It connects Philippopolis with Burgas. The second branch leaves the main line at Turnovo Siemenli (Sejmen). It runs in an almost due northerly direction to Nova Zagora, where it meets the above-described Philippopolis-Burgas railway. Its importance has been considerably decreased of late, for since the construction of the section Philippopolis-Cirpan it no longer forms the only line connecting Burgas with the remainder of Europe, and through traffic from Sofia to Burgas goes now by Philippopolis and Cirpan instead of by Turnovo Siemenli. According to some reports a line has recently been constructed from Jamboli on the Burgas
Railway to Adrianople. Others deny these, and having regard to all the circumstances it seems very likely that they are not authentic.

In Turkish Thrace the means of communication are still extremely indifferent, and this not only because of the lack of railways, but also on account of the bad state of repair in which Turkish roads are always maintained. Whilst the construction of several railways has been under discussion for years, unless the Germans have recently constructed others, the only one actually open is that which runs in a northerly direction to Kirk Kilissa. It is important because it facilitates the means of communication between Turkey and Southeastern Bulgaria by shortening the distance to be covered by road.

With regard to the roads, if we ignore all minor routes, there are at least three which lead from railways in a northerly or northeasterly direction. The first unites Adrianople in Turkey with Jamboli in Bulgaria, and follows the route possibly now taken by the above-mentioned railway. The second runs in a northerly direction from Kirk Kilissa towards the frontier. Both these were used by the Bulgarians in their advance during the first Balkan war. There is also a road from near Tchorlu to Midia on the Black Sea.

On the south there are several roads connecting the coast of the Sea of Marmora with the railway from Constantinople to Adrianople. Without discussing those located in the more or less immediate neighbourhood of the Ottoman capital, we have four so-called thoroughfares which are worthy of mention. The first two connect Rodosto with the railway. Their
importance is that they enable troops, landed from Asia Minor at Rodosto, to be marched into the interior and towards Adrianople. The third runs from Rodosto by way of Malgara to Keshan where it meets the main route by which land communication is maintained between Uzun Kupru on the railway and the Peninsula of Gallipoli. This last-named road, which was practically rebuilt a few years ago, is certainly passable for all arms. Even before its completion about the year 1910 it was feasible for vehicles to travel by it without any danger of being stuck in the mud, and without any serious inconvenience to their occupants.

Having thus very briefly described practically all the railways existing in the Balkan Peninsula except those in Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Greece, I will now proceed to a discussion of a few of the great international routes which are partly or entirely devoid of railways. In order to make the discussion the more clear I will divide it into three main sections. They are —

(1) Some of the possible means of advancing into the interior from the Adriatic.

(2) The routes which lead from what may be called Old Greece into the area united to that country after the Balkan Wars.

(3) The roads or communications by which it is possible to enter the main part of Bulgaria from the Aegean, from Greece, and from Serbia.

Although at the present time, and when the future ownership of large areas of the Balkan Peninsula is uncertain, it is useless to enter into a long and detailed account of the railways whose construction has been proposed at various times, that question is so closely
bound up with the various existing lines of communication that a brief reference to it may not be out of place. In order to understand it aright, and particularly to grasp what has been done or what may be done in the western part of the peninsula, it is necessary first to give a brief description of the lines leading to and already existing in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Since the occupation of those provinces in 1878, the Austro-Hungarian Government has adopted a policy of peaceful penetration — a policy furthered and supported by the construction of hotels, of public buildings, of roads, and of railways. A line of great importance extends from India on the main Belgrade-Vienna Railway to Fiume on the Adriatic. That railway and others coming from Vienna and Budapest give access to a main-line (narrow gauge) railway, which runs from north to south of the annexed provinces and connects Bosnian Brod on the southern bank of the Save with Zelenika on the northern shore of the Bocche di Cattaro. On the west this line is fed by branches which connect it with Jajce in Central Bosnia and with Gravosa on the Dalmatian coast. On the east, in addition to several short and therefore comparatively unimportant lines, there are branches which run towards the Serbian and Montenegrin frontiers.

The natural routes by which two of these railways could be connected with those of Serbia would be by the construction of lines from Siminhan to Valievo, and from Vardishte to Ujitse. The advantage of the adoption of one or both of these plans would be that as the Bosnian railways are of the same gauge as those of Western Serbia no alteration or reconstruction
would be required on any of the existing lines. Further to the south it will be remembered that prior to the Balkan Wars the Austrians had for years been desirous of constructing a line through the Sanjak of Novi-bazar from Uvats on their frontier to Mitrovitza — the terminus of the railway from Uskub. Shortly before the re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution and when the route still lay across Ottoman territory, Abdul Hamid actually signed an Itrade granting permission for the making of the preliminary surveys for its construction. With a length of about one hundred and forty miles it would provide an alternative route to Salonica. But as there could be no through communication on railways of different gauges, it is clear that the sole object of this scheme was a strategical one — an object which formed part of Austria’s attempt to push her way down to the Aegean. The narrow-gauge lines of Bosnia might be relaid — a work entailing enormous expense owing to the mountainous nature of the country — or the present existing line to Banjaluka — a line which is of the normal gauge — might be prolonged by way of Jajce and Sarajevo to the Bosnian frontier, but as things stand at present it is difficult to foresee the existence of a political situation in which such an undertaking is likely to become one of practical politics.

For many years there have been two more or less rival schemes for uniting the Danube with the Adriatic. First, a great Slav railway to run through Serbia and either Montenegro or Albania; and, second, a line through Bulgaria and thence to the seacoast. In view of the present political and military situations, it is impossible to forecast the considerations which may
influence the ultimate construction of one or both of these lines. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say that the Serbian scheme is by no means a new one. It would provide connection with Roumania by a bridge across the Danube somewhere near Prahov, and it would run, via Nish and Mitrovitza, probably to San Giovanni di Medua or to Antivari. The Bulgarian plan has always been to establish through communication from Roumania to Salonica or to the Adriatic by way of Sofia. The construction of a bridge across the Danube has been proposed at Vidin, Sistova, or Rustchuk. The missing links are therefore the section from Gyuveshevo to Komanovo, and from Uskub or Monastir to the Adriatic.

In approaching a discussion of the communications between the lower part of the Adriatic coast, it will be convenient to classify the routes existing prior to the enemy advance of 1915–1916 into sections devoted respectively to descriptions of the roads then running through Montenegro alone, through Albania and Montenegro, and through Albania alone. Since that time it is probable that the Austro-Germans have done a great deal to improve the communications in these two countries.

The only line of advance through Montenegro alone runs from the port of Antivari and by way of the Antivari-Virbazar railway — a short stretch of narrow-gauge line which, with the port of Antivari, was constructed by an Italian company. In Montenegro an excellent road connects the Austrian port of Cattaro with Cettinje, Podgoritza, and Niksics. As branches of this main route there are roads from Riyeka to Virbazar and thence to Antivari, and from Podgoritza
to Plavnitza, a port on Lake Scutari. For some time prior to the war the Montenegrins had planned to build a road from Podgoritza to Andriyevitza and to prolong it by two routes running to the frontier. It has also been suggested that these roads should be extended across the frontier to Novibazar and to Mitrovitza respectively. Political conditions and, above all, the jealousy existing between Serbia and Montenegro had, however, prevented the realisation of this latter idea. As things stood at the time of the Montenegrin defeat, a road actually existed from Podgoritza to Andriyevitza. The most direct and easy route to be followed by a possible future railway is that by way of Andriyevitza, Berane, and thence to Novibazar and up the valley of the River Ibar to the railway town of Kralievo in Serbia.

In order to use routes for passing through Albania and Montenegro one would land at San Giovanni di Medua, and go from there to Scutari by road, or else go up the River Boyana to the capital of Northern Albania. The port of San Giovanni di Medua consists of a few houses located on the northern side of a small bay. That bay is more or less sheltered, but no facilities exist for the disembarkation or embarkation of men or war material. The road to Scutari was made passable for wheeled traffic and for motors during the summer of the year 1914 when the new bridge over the River Drinitza and near Scutari was opened. To use the Boyana, men and goods would have to be trans-shipped to small steamers at San Giovanni di Medua or at the mouth of the river and again at Oboti. From Scutari, lake boats would be used as far as Virbazar, Riyeka, or Plavnitza in Montenegro.
Through Albania alone there are three possible general lines of communication between the coast and the interior. The first follows the above-mentioned route to Scutari and from there, after running up the Drin Valley for some miles, crosses the mountains to Prisrend—a town allotted to Serbia by the London Ambassadorial Conference. This route, which dates from Roman times, continues to Ferisovitch on the Uskub-Mitrovitza railway, and was used by the Serbian Government and by the French Aeroplane Mission when they retreated to Scutari at the end of 1915.

The second route, which runs from Durazzo into the interior, follows the line of the celebrated Via Egnatia for about one hundred and twenty miles, reaching the head of the Salonica-Monastir railway at the last-named place. Of these one hundred and twenty-five miles not more than the section from Monastir to Struga—which is about forty-five miles—was passable for wheeled traffic, prior to the enemy occupation of Northern Albania. The remainder of the road consisted of nothing better than an extremely bad and ill-kept path, and unless it has been improved it could not be utilised by a European force made up of all arms and accompanied by the big guns and by the transport required in modern warfare.

As a northern alternative to this route, there is a road which connects Durazzo with Tirana and a path leading from the latter place to Dibra. In the south there is a road from Avlona to Berat and to Elbasan, but owing to its greater length and to the fact that the plains are practically impassable in bad weather it possesses little claim to be considered as of equal
Berat, a Picturesque Town in Southern Albania

From a Photograph by the Author
importance to that which follows the Scumbi Valley. Since their occupation of Southern Albania, the Italians, as I have said elsewhere, have constructed several lengths of road in the area which they hold.

The third and most southerly route through Albania is by far the best road in that country. Throughout its length it is passable for wheeled traffic, and it must now have been greatly improved by the Italians who are in occupation of the greater part of it. Starting from Santi Quaranta, a port situated almost immediately opposite to the northern end of the Island of Corfu, it connects that place with Korcha and with Monastir. The first section of the road is part of that originally built by the Turks to connect Janina with the coast. A part of this route (roughly twenty miles) runs through territory which officially belongs to Greece. This is the case, because when Santi Quaranta and Korcha were given by Europe to Albania, the natural and existing means of communication between these two most important places was interrupted by a frontier delimitation in the neighbourhood of Dolian, a delimitation in which the practical conditions of life were completely and unfairly ignored at the expense of Albania, and in order to put off international dangers which were then looming in the distance.

Before discussing the communications which are available between Old Greece, that is, the area which formed part of the Hellenic monarchy before the Balkan Wars, and the remainder of the peninsula, it may be well to remind my readers that whilst that country possessed a fairly effective railway system, that system was not until after those Wars connected
with the railways of the remainder of Europe. For years two more or less rival schemes, each destined to accomplish this object, had been under consideration. The Turkish proposal was for the construction of a line to join Larissa in Greece with Veria on the Salonica-Monastir line. This line would have run parallel to but well away from the coast. The Greeks, on the other hand, favoured the provision of a line extending almost along the shore of the Gulf of Salonica from Karate Derven, their terminus, to Gidia on the above-mentioned line. As a matter of fact, in January, 1914, a contract was signed between the Hellenic Government and a French company for the building of a line to follow this the original Greek route, and the line is now available for traffic.

With regard to roads, there are three principal routes by which Greece maintains communication with her new provinces. To begin with there is a good road from Prevesa, at the entrance to the Gulf of Arta, to Janina. Further to the northeast there is a route which connects Kalabaka — a Greek railway terminus — with Janina by way of Metsovo. Again, from Larissa it is possible to travel by way of Elasona to Kozani and thence to the Salonica-Monastir railway by several different roads.

In approaching a discussion of the last question to be dealt with here, namely, the routes leading into the heart of Bulgaria from the south and southwest, it may be said that there are three principal lines, none of which is followed by a completed railway, and all of which are practicable for wheeled traffic. Two of these traverse or practically traverse the Rhodope Balkans and the third runs from Northern Macedonia
up to the Serbo-Bulgarian frontier. Of the first pair the most easterly route is that which connects Gutuljina on the Dede-Agatch line with Haskovo in Old Bulgaria. The greater part of the road, which now lies wholly in Bulgaria, was constructed by the Turks for military purposes during the closing years of the reign of Abdul Hamid. After the Balkan Wars it was greatly improved by the Bulgarians, who foresaw its enormous importance as a means of communication with the coast. Always well engineered and laid out, this road is certainly now practicable for motor traffic, for before the entry of Bulgaria into the War it was easy to make the whole journey in a day, and by the use of motor cars for hire in Haskovo or even in a motor diligence which maintained a daily service.

At the end of 1913 when it became necessary for the Bulgarians to turn their attention to the provision of some satisfactory port upon the Aegean, and to connect that port with the interior by a line not passing through Turkish territory, the preliminary surveys for a railway to follow more or less the above route were undertaken. Owing to the engineering difficulties and to the necessity for two important tunnels, the construction of this line would have taken three or four years, and nothing further was done to realise the project before the entry of Bulgaria into the present War.

If we ignore the road which leads into but, unless it has just been prolonged, not right across the Rhodopes from Drama, and which runs up the Mesta Valley, the next route by which it is possible to advance right into the interior is that which takes the valley
of the Struma, and therefore hugs the banks of the river of that name. This line constitutes the natural outlet for Bulgaria towards the Aegean, and particularly by way of the port of Kavala. It is for this reason that the Government of Sofia was particularly anxious to obtain possession of that port, and to secure a frontier which gave to Bulgaria the whole Struma Valley.

A good and thoroughly passable Struma Valley road, which has now been supplemented by a light railway for the greater part of its length, connects Demir Hissar with Radomir. For some years prior to the Balkan Wars the construction of a railway by way of this route was under discussion. That the scheme was not executed was due to military and political rather than to economic considerations. For obvious reasons the Turks were anxious for its construction as an alternative to the proposed Bulgarian line from Gyuveshevo to Komanovo, and this because it would have been easy of attack from the west and from the east, and because it would not have given to Bulgaria those political advantages possessed by a line leading direct from Sofia into Bulgarian Macedonia. The idea was also favoured by the French Salonica-Dede Agatch Railway Company because the line in question would have constituted an important feeder to their system. But the Bulgarians were willing to build their section only on the condition that the Turks agreed to construct the Gyuveshevo-Komanovo line. The permanent realisation of this idea, as of many others connected with the Balkan Peninsula, will now entirely depend upon the territorial changes brought about by the war.
As the means of communication between the valleys of the Vardar and the Struma are bad, the only other route into Bulgaria which is worthy of consideration here is that from Northern Macedonia and that which connects Komanovo on the Uskub-Nish railway with Gyuveshevo, the Bulgarian frontier terminus. The road is certainly passable for wheeled traffic, and it is probable that ere now it has been rendered practicable for motors. For some years it has always been considered that this route might be the one to be followed by the first line to establish through connection between the Danube and the Adriatic. No serious engineering difficulties exist, and the only portion of the line that would be costly to construct is the tunnel piercing the Deve Bair Mountain. It is therefore probable that since their occupation of this part of the country the Bulgarians have built or are building at least the section of this line where no tunnels are required.

Partly owing to the great difference between the amount of water in most of the rivers after the melting of the snows and after the dry season, and partly owing to the lack of public works, the rivers of the Balkan Peninsula, except the Danube, the Save, and the Boyana, are not systematically navigated. I have already referred to the importance of the Danube. The Save, which more or less forms the western section of the northern frontier of the peninsula, has a length of about four hundred and forty miles, but of these only about three hundred and fifty are navigable. The Boyana, which constitutes an outlet for Lake Scutari, flows into the Adriatic between the towns of Dulcigno and San Giovanni di Medua. In its lower
course it forms the boundary of Montenegro and Albania. When the river is full, and when there is enough water to get over the bar at its mouth, it is navigable for small vessels as far as Oboți. Thence to the port of Scutari there is only sufficient water for small stern-wheeled vessels or for boats whose owners make their livelihoods by conveying passengers from lake and river vessels to the quay. Small barges or flat-bottomed boats may be seen drifting down the lower reaches of the Maritza, and the rivers of the Rhodope Balkans are utilised for floating logs and trees to the plain which skirts the Aegean Sea; but the rivers have not really been used for the furtherance of trade.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to give some idea of the military highways of the Balkans. In so doing I have not attempted fully to discuss the various parts played by these communications in the present war, and I have purposely considered the position of the frontiers and the ownership of the railways to be as they were before the War. To have done otherwise would have meant that I must still further have burdened my readers with countless details, and that I must either have gone into particulars which it were better should not be published, or else that I should have been compelled to treat the whole question so superficially that my remarks would have been worthy of no serious attention. Consequently, if I have only dealt indirectly with military questions, which are now of vital interest to all, I trust that I may have been able to do something to make clearer various geographical and other questions possessed of far-reaching strategical influence upon a situation which is rapidly changing from day to day.
IX

THE DARDANELLES CAMPAIGN

In the previous chapter, I have endeavoured to show that for years the situation in the East has been closely bound up with the fact that the Balkan Peninsula — the Balkan States and Turkey in Europe — constituted and constitute not the Germanic goal but the corridor towards a goal, and that Germany has been and is determined, by means of the "Drang nach Osten", to strike a deadly blow at the very vitals of the British Empire and to prevent Russia from pushing forward actually or morally towards warm water. Thus, whilst by a temporary military penetration across the Balkans and right into Asiatic Turkey, the Central Powers have greatly increased the strength of their strategic position, still more by the driving of a permanent wedge through the same areas would they have triumphed by endangering the Allied position throughout the East. By the same means they would have postponed indefinitely a change in the status of the Straits, — the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. On the other hand, were good relations to be established between the Balkan States, and were Allied influence to increase there, at Constantinople and in Asia Minor, then an Allied wedge would prevent Germanic expansion towards the East. From the moment of the out-
break of the War, therefore, and particularly from October 31, 1914, when Turkey threw in her lot upon the side of the Central Powers, it was the question of this Germanic wedge, or rather of the preventing of it, which constituted the real *raison d'être* and the cause of the Allied operations both at the Dardanelles and at Salonica.

For centuries Constantinople, covering as it does the great land route from Europe to Asia as well as the water highway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, has been the object of many aspirations. From earliest times the reigning monarch in this city has been able to control these two great thoroughfares as a result of the fortifications constructed to protect his capital from attack by land and sea. In the past the defences of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus have not only safeguarded the position of the Turkish capital, but they have also protected the Sea of Marmora. Thus so long as these two channels remain impregnable the Ottoman Government can not only bring troops from Asia Minor and land them in Europe, but the Sultan and his Allies can pour armies into Asia Minor, thence to send them by railway and by road to areas from which they can threaten the Egyptian frontier and the British positions in the Persian Gulf and even in India.

Without entering into details, and ignoring a question of all-preponderating importance to which I will proceed below, it must therefore be apparent that a successful campaign against the forts defending the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus would have been possessed of consequences the far-reaching results of which it is impossible to exaggerate. To begin with, the
presence of an Allied fleet in the Sea of Marmora would have placed Constantinople — the key of the Ottoman Empire — at our mercy. Knowing the Turks and their leaders as I do, I think that this would have meant immediate overtures for peace on their part. But, had this not been the case, there seems every reason to believe that the arrival of an Allied fleet off Constantinople would have strengthened the hands of the peace party and consequently that it would have brought about a revolution. This belief is supported by the opinions of such men as Lord Kitchener and Lord Grey, who, according to the report of the Dardanelles Commissioners, "confidently looked forward to a revolution taking place in Constantinople if once the British Fleet appeared in the Sea of Marmora." In addition, had these highly desirable objects been achieved, their immediate effect would have been the entry into the War then and there upon our side of the at that time neutral Balkan States, — Bulgaria, Greece, and Roumania, — thereby creating a situation the meaning of which must be obvious to the least well-informed student of the War.

Provided adequate preparations had been made, and provided the operations had been inaugurated as a combined naval and military campaign, instead of being begun by the fleet alone, these objectives might in themselves have been well worth the risks and the cost of an undertaking, which, however it were carried out, would certainly have been costly. This being the case, the question of a possible attack upon the Dardanelles was naturally discussed by the British Cabinet directly after the entry of Turkey into the War. Nevertheless nothing definite was done until
early in January, 1915, when the attitude of the Allied Governments was of necessity suddenly changed by the receipt, on January 2, of a very important telegram from the British Ambassador at Petrograd, expressing a hope, on behalf of the Russian Government, that a demonstration against the Turks would be made.¹ Whilst we do not know the exact contents of this telegram — contents which were probably far more pressing and far more dictatorial than one is sometimes allowed to believe — we are told in the Dardanelles Report that they "materially affected the situation" and that "The British Government considered that something must be done in response to it." In other words, an operation which might or might not have been a justifiable "gamble" was suddenly forced forward into a position in which it had to be considered not only in reference to its direct military importance but also in proportion to its indirect political and military consequences — consequences which might have ensued had the Western Allies taken up an attitude based solely upon their own strategical and military positions at that time. Under these circumstances I propose therefore to ask my readers to accept the opinion that the undertaking itself was rendered practically unavoidable by the above-mentioned Russian demand and that its failure was the result not merely of shortcomings in the conduct of the campaign, but that it was due largely on the one hand to the necessity of doing something to relieve the pressure upon Russia,

¹ That telegram and many other details connected with the inauguration of the Dardanelles campaign are referred to in the "Dardanelles Commission — First Report" which was presented to Parliament by command of His Majesty and published in 1917 as an official document numbered Cd 8490.
when England and France were already fully occupied elsewhere, and on the other to the enormous geographical difficulties which I will now endeavour to describe.

Before doing this, I must, however, explain that as various journeys in Turkey in Europe and in Asia Minor have led me, under different pretexts, to wander over most of the ground about which I am writing, my task is a particularly difficult one. Not only am I obliged to consider how much or how little of my knowledge I am justified in imparting to the public, but I am also compelled for obvious reasons to withhold the dates and the methods by which I obtained my information. To do otherwise might be not only to endanger the property but perhaps even the lives of some of those who may still be in, or who after the War may be returning to Turkey.

Picnics and shooting expeditions may not have excited the suspicions of certain local officials, but even so it would be impossible to disclose the localities in which these pleasurable excursions took place, or to reveal the identities of the different kinds of people with whom they were organised. Consequently, if any of my descriptions seem somewhat disjointed and confused, and if I leave out altogether any references to the routes and methods by which I reached the Peninsula of Gallipoli, I hope that my readers will bear with me and believe that I am endeavouring so far as is possible under the circumstances and in the available space to give them an outline of the nature of the defences of Constantinople and to bring my knowledge of the country to bear in describing a campaign which was probably more difficult than any which has ever been inaugurated in modern times.
Owing to its geographical position, Constantinople is easy to defend by land and sea. The city is situated at the southeastern extremity of a sort of peninsula, which is bounded on the north by the Black Sea, on the east by the Bosphorus, and on the south by the Sea of Marmora. Thus by land the capital has only to be protected on one, its western front. On the sea side Constantinople is also extremely strong, because the Marmora can only be approached by way of the Bosphorus on the north and through the Dardanelles on the southwest. In order to make my account of these three series of defences the more clear, I will divide it into three sections devoted respectively to descriptions of:

(1) The land defences including the Chatalja Lines,
(2) The Bosphorus forts,
(3) The Dardanelles forts.

(1) The land defences of the city are divided into two sections: the Constantinople and the Chatalja Lines. The Constantinople Lines are made up of an outer and an inner ring of earthen forts, which extend from the village of Makri Keuie on the Sea of Marmora, and about two and a half miles west of the ancient city walls, to Buyukdere, on the Bosphorus, and at a distance of about twelve miles from Constantinople. For some years these forts have been said to be out of repair and unarmed, and their power of resistance is but very small when compared to that of the Chatalja Lines.

(2) The Chatalja Lines, which constitute the real land defences of the capital, extend across the Constantinople Peninsula, at a distance of about twenty-five miles to the west of the city. Designed by Von Bluhm
Pasha, when the Russian army was advancing on Constantinople in 1878, they cover a front of about sixteen miles, a front which is flanked on the south by Lake Buyuk Chekmedche—an inlet of the Sea of Marmora, and on the north by Derkos Gol. The forts, which number about thirty, are constructed on a ridge of hills about five hundred feet above the level of the sea. A small stream runs across practically their entire front. The position is therefore extremely strong, for its flanks rest upon the sea and upon these impassable lakes and therefore they cannot be turned. The forts had always been maintained in an effective state, but during and since the Balkan Wars no stone had been left unturned to render up-to-date land defences which rank only second in importance to the forts situated on the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It is therefore argued, even in well-informed circles, that had the Peninsula of Gallipoli once been conquered by the Allies, or had an Allied fleet made its way into the Marmora, it might still have remained necessary to undertake land operations on a large scale in order to penetrate the Chatalja Lines, and therefore actually to advance upon Constantinople. Militarily speaking, there may be something in this point of view, but I am convinced that, had a fleet once arrived off the Golden Horn, the Turks would either have voluntarily surrendered the city, or a revolution would have taken place which would have rendered it unnecessary for that fleet either to shell the town or for the city to be attacked from the land as well as from the sea side.

Turning to the Bosphorus, which is important in connection with the Dardanelles campaign because it was possible that Russian assistance might be forth-
coming from that direction, assistance which it would seem that the Western Allies were entitled to expect, the length of that channel, measured from the Serağlio Point at Constantinople to the mouth of the Black Sea, is about nineteen miles. The breadth varies from about seven hundred and fifty yards, just above Rumeli Hissar, to a little over two miles in Buyukdere Bay. Except when the wind is exceedingly strong from the south and southwest, the current runs from the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmora with an average speed of two and a half miles per hour, but opposite Rumeli Hissar a speed of five miles per hour is occasionally obtained. The winds are changeable, at times blowing from one direction at one end of the Bosphorus and from another direction at the opposite end. Unlike the Dardanelles, the Bosphorus, which resembles a winding river, is bordered by picturesque wooden houses and by fine and stately palaces. Indeed, both sides of this miraculous, wonderful water highway are so thickly populated that two continuous towns, or more correctly two long series of villages, run practically all the way from Galata to Buyukdere on the European side, and from Scutari to Beikos on the Asiatic Coast. Almost throughout the length of the Bosphorus both shores rise immediately from the water’s edge. In some places the coasts ascend to a height of a little more than low hills, but in others their elevation reaches that of hundreds of feet, the highest levels being attained on the borders of the northern end. Many small valleys intersect these hills, and countless bays add picturesqueness to the scene.

The most important forts which defend the Bosphorus nearly all lie between Buyukdere in Europe
and Beikos in Asia and the Black Sea entrance to the channel — thus leaving the southern and thickly populated parts of the coast almost entirely undefended. The forts are extremely well hidden, many of them being so carefully placed that it is easy to pass up or down the channel without becoming aware of their existence. Some are placed close to the water’s edge, and some are on the slopes of the hills. Moreover, the defences are so arranged as to cover the various more or less straight lengths, in such a way as to be able to fire upon ships alike before they reach, as they pass, and after they have passed them. But although during recent years much work has been done on the Bosphorus, there is no doubt, even if they had to be attacked only from the north, that the defences of this area are much less strong and far less numerous than are those situated on the Dardanelles.

As in the case of the Dardanelles, the passage of a hostile fleet through the Bosphorus could be furthered by the landing of a force on one or both of its shores. Owing, however, to the existence of the Chatalja Lines, it would be difficult to take the forts on the European coast in the rear, or more correctly it would be necessary for a landing party to be disembarked somewhere within, that is, to the east of, these lines. The places suitable for such a landing are naturally strictly limited, but the best is Kelia Bay, which, I believe, is provided with a fort to guard the main defences from any attack in rear, or at least to form a lookout station. On the Asiatic coast, on the other hand, a landing from the Black Sea was always more feasible. Troops, disembarked at or near Riva on the Black Sea, would only have had to advance for
a very few miles in order to occupy the high ground lying at the back of and commanding the Asiatic forts of the Bosphorus, forts which are practically at no point situated on the summit of the hills. The existence of a road from Riva to Beikos would have assisted a force moving from this direction, and such a force might have been able to get guns on to the above-mentioned high ground had a landing been effected, either as a surprise or when the Turks were not in a position adequately to defend this area. More or less the same difficulties would have occurred as in the attack on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, but, knowing the ground in both areas, I consider that that situated at the back of the Bosphorus forts is the easier, and that even a threatened attack in this direction would have greatly minimised the magnitude of our task at the Dardanelles.

The northeastern end of the Dardanelles is distant from Constantinople one hundred and thirty miles. The length of the Straits, which are winding and extremely difficult to navigate, is some thirty-three miles. The breadth varies from about thirteen hundred yards when measured between the towns of Chanak, on the Asiatic coast, and Kilid Bahr, on the European shore, to four miles or five miles shortly after the entrance to the Straits from the Aegean Sea. A strong current runs from the Marmora towards the Mediterranean. When the wind blows from the northeast, that is, more or less straight down the channel, the difficulties of navigation and the speed of the current are considerably increased.

The Peninsula of Gallipoli, which bounds the Dardanelles on the northwest, is a long, narrow tongue of
land, some thirty-five miles in length. Its width is only three miles, when measured across the Isthmus of Bulair, lying as it does to the northeast of the town of Gallipoli. More to the southwest it widens out, only to narrow again to a breadth of about four miles in rear of the town of Mados. The northwestern and western shores of the peninsula are washed by the waters of the Gulf of Saros and of the Aegean Sea. The coast rises in many places precipitously from the water’s edge. Nearly the whole of the country in rear of Mados and of Kilid Bahr consists of hills which, in many places, attain a height of six or seven hundred feet above the level of the sea. These hills are intersected by small rocky valleys, with steep, almost precipitous sides, up which I have climbed often on my hands and knees. Much of the country, and especially these valleys, which run for the most part across, and not up and down, the peninsula, are covered with scrubby bushes about two or three feet high. These bushes tear one’s boots and clothes and person, and thus, even in peace time, make walking through them a highly difficult and disagreeable experience. The hills immediately to the west and southwest of Kilid Bahr are prettily wooded, the trees extending almost to the seashore. Except where the Turks and the Germans had recently improved them, the roads along and across the peninsula were very bad, for before the War communication had usually been maintained by sea. As a matter of fact, one of the most unpleasant tasks imposed upon the Allied troops on the peninsula was that of making and improving roads, a task of necessity performed under the shell- if not the rifle-fire of the enemy.
The most important town on the peninsula is Gallipoli, at the northeastern entrance to the Dardanelles. Its population is about fourteen thousand souls. The place is essentially Turkish, and was the first to fall into the hands of the Osmanlis, soon after Sulieman Pasha crossed the Dardanelles and planted the standard of the Crescent in Europe in the year 1356. The only other towns of any importance are Mados and Kilid Bahr, lying much lower down the peninsula. Like the remainder of the peninsula, which is but sparsely populated, both these places would be practically unknown were it not for the strategic value of the country which surrounds them. As a matter of fact, they are hardly ever visited by a foreigner, for, in addition to the actual difficulties of communication, obstacles are placed in the way of every stranger both before and during his visit to this all-important area.

The modern defences of the Peninsula of Gallipoli may practically be divided into four groups:

(1) The two forts built to protect the outer entrance to the channel and lying in the immediate neighbourhood of Cape Helles and of Sedd-el-Bahr. Whilst these forts were armed with fairly big guns, their importance and power of resistance have always been insignificant when compared with those guarding the Narrows. In this first group, too, there should be included two forts, or batteries, which are situated respectively about seven and a half miles and about nine and a half miles from the south-western extremity of the Dardanelles. They are both placed close to the water's edge.

(2) The forts in rear of, and near, Kilid Bahr, and therefore on, or immediately below or above, the nar-
SOUTHERN PART OF THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

rowest part of the Straits. These forts, which are at least eleven in number, constitute by far the strongest portion of the defences of the Straits. Here the shore literally bristles with redoubts, some being hidden amongst the trees which cover the hills, whilst others are dotted about right down to the water’s edge. Yildiz, or Tekeh Fort, which has always been considered one of the most important of these defences, lies at the extreme outer end of the group, and a little to the southwest of Kilid Bahr. It owes its strength to its height above the water, to its field of fire, and to the consequent difficulty of damaging it from the sea.

(3) The forts built to the north and northeast of Maidos—forts which, therefore, lie within or above the narrowest part of the channel. These defences, of which there are six, are built upon the summits of the various hills which border this part of the Straits. They are so constructed as to be able to fire across the channel towards Nagara Point, up the Dardanelles in the direction of Gallipoli, and down the Straits towards Chanak.

(4) The Bulair Lines. These defences run across the Isthmus of Bulair, and thus defend the Peninsula of Gallipoli from an attack by a force endeavouring to advance from the land side. They consist of three or four redoubts, connected by trenches constructed to cover the only road running into the peninsula from the remainder of European Turkey.

There is a great contrast between the two shores of the Dardanelles. The Asiatic coast is for the most part lower, and the appearance of the country is greener and more fertile than that of the Peninsula of Gallipoli.
Communication by land is also bad, but a passable road connects Lamsaki (just opposite Gallipoli) with Chanak, and thence runs on down the coast towards the entrance of the Straits. The only centre of any importance is Chanak or Dardanelles, situated opposite Kilid Bahr, and united with that place by a submarine cable, which was reported destroyed early in the campaign. The town, which possesses a population of some ten thousand people, is prettily located on the water's edge. There is an anchorage for ships, both below and above it, and prior to the War the little bay immediately to the north of the village was usually occupied by some of the ships which go to make up the Turkish fleet. As a matter of fact, it was here that Messudiyeh — which was the flagship of Admiral Limpus until he left Constantinople prior to the outbreak of war — was torpedoed by the British submarine B 11 in December, 1914. In connection with this event, there are two interesting stories, so interesting indeed that they would be unbelievable had I not received them from entirely reliable sources. According to the first, when the vessel was struck, there was a dull boom, and a high cloud of smoke and water rose from the surface of the sea. Within five minutes she turned turtle, but as the water was shallow, a section of the hull rested on the bottom whilst the remainder projected above the sea. Nearly all the crew were drowned, the only exceptions, as it was thought at the time, being a few men who were picked up. However, when the ship had settled down, bottom upwards, knocks were heard on a part of the vessel which was not under water. Men were set to work to cut a hole, and after the rescuers had been engaged
for three days and nights, twenty-three men were
got out alive. The second anecdote gives an insight
into the mentality of the Turks. Anxious to prove
that although Messudiyeh had been lost they had
secured a prize of no mean importance: they rigged
up a motor boat to look like a submarine, and towed it
past the town of Chanak and up to Nagara Point in
order to make the inhabitants believe that the British
submarine, which in fact had made good its escape,
had been downed as a result of the vigilance of the
Ottoman defence.

Partly owing to their positions, situated generally
more or less upon the level of the sea, the defences of
the Asiatic coast are, from a natural point of view,
decidedly less strong than are those built upon the
Peninsula of Gallipoli. The Asiatic forts may, how-
ever, also be divided into three main or principal groups:

(1) The two forts built to protect the outer entrance
of the channel, which lie in the more or less immedi-
ate vicinity of Kum Kale. These forts were armed
with guns of a considerable size, but they have always
been considered, like those corresponding to them upon
the European shore, as a sort of advanced guard to
the main defences of the Straits. In this outer group,
too, there are three other forts, namely, those located
at and just to the southwest of Kephez Point.

(2) The forts at and near the town of Chanak, and
therefore on or near the narrowest part of the channel.
One of these, Hamidieh I Tabia, is placed rather under
a mile to the south of the town; another, Hamidieh III
Tabia, lies at Chanak, and two more are located above
but within a distance of about one mile from the Nar-
rows themselves.
(3) The three forts built on or in the neighbourhood of Nagara Point, and therefore at a distance of about three and a half miles above the Narrows. These forts occupy a very strong position, owing to the way in which this cape and also Cape Abydos run out into the channel, thus giving two of them good fields of fire in more than one direction.

The above details are sufficient to prove the greatness of the task undertaken by the Allies at the Dardanelles. Throughout the last few years, especially since the Turco-Italian and the Balkan wars, and particularly since the entry of Turkey into this War, the Turks and the Germans had made preparations to defend an area which is of vital importance to them. Moreover, the whole situation is such as to react almost entirely against belligerents who are compelled to depend on the fire of ships and in favour of those in occupation of the shores. The Dardanelles are so narrow that throughout their greater part the power of real manoeuvring is denied to all ships except those of a very small size. For the same reasons — that is, owing to the narrowness and to the winding nature of the channel — the great guns on ships, the range of which is many miles, cannot be utilised to the fullest advantage. Again, the Turks were able to employ all kinds of weapons which would have been valueless had the range been greater. Mobile batteries of guns and howitzers were placed in countless and secluded valleys, in which it was difficult to discover their position and to rain lead upon them from the sea. These guns, having made their presence unpleasantly felt, were moved by road or on railway lines to places of safety even before our fire could be brought to bear
upon them. The existence of these conditions was extremely detrimental and dangerous, not only for the smaller vessels endeavouring to penetrate the Dardanelles, but also for the Allied troops on the Peninsula of Gallipoli, whose lines and positions could be completely raked and enfiladed by fire from Asia Minor.

The enemy was also able to make the fullest use of mines, and to fire land torpedoes in the Dardanelles. These latter weapons could either be sent on their way from proper torpedo tubes, or by other methods of a more impromptu nature. From the time of the arrival of enemy submarines in the Aegean our difficulties were enormously increased, for ships which might otherwise have been employed to protect the flank of our armies were open to the continuous danger of being torpedoed. Again, the presence of these underwater craft made it impracticable to utilise transports and larger ships for the purpose of the conveyance of troops to and from the peninsula. Reliance had therefore to be placed upon all manner of smaller craft, and the position of each and every new landing was influenced by the difficulties and dangers of utilising these smaller craft for a passage of more than a few brief hours in length.

The extremely unfavourable position of a fleet desirous of entering the Sea of Marmora thus rendered it highly desirable that a land attack upon the forts should have been inaugurated at the very beginning of the operations. Such an attack, made by a force landed on the northwestern coast of the Peninsula of Gallipoli, where in places the shore is low and sandy, would probably have been destined greatly to further
the task of the fleet. Indeed, an army once having gained possession of the hills which lie in rear of Maidos and Kilid Bahr and which command the forts, would have been in control of the whole situation, for, from various points on these hills, it is possible, as I have done, to look down upon and into some of the European redoubts of which we all heard so much during the campaign.

The disembarkment of such a force, even quite at the beginning of the operations and before the enemy was fully prepared, would have been a matter of considerable difficulty, especially as some years ago, I believe in 1905 or in 1906, the Turks, in an endeavour to guard against a surprise of this nature, built a small lookout station on Gaba Tepe—a little promontory situated on the western shore of the Peninsula of Gallipoli and lying at a distance of about seven miles to the northwest of Kilid Bahr. But having regard to the fact that most of the forts were constructed to fire only towards the Straits and to the enormous importance of striking immediately from the land as well as from the sea, that this was not attempted or, more correctly, that it could not be attempted constitutes the fatal and most far-reaching mistake made at the Dardanelles. It meant, when land operations were finally undertaken, that instead of these operations being of a subsidiary nature and instead of landing parties threatening the rear of the forts whilst the fleet was endeavouring to force a passage, a land campaign of great magnitude had to be undertaken. In other words, after April 25, 1915, the ever-increasing interest in the Dardanelles operations was transferred from events on the sea to those on the land,
where the Allied armies were called upon to fight a series of great battles with the object of taking the forts by means of siege operations instead of more or less by surprise as might have been the case earlier in the War.

Turning to the actual operations, into which I will not go in detail, as whole books have been written upon the subject, it may be said that the campaign was divided into three stages:

1. The original naval attack upon the Straits, which began on February nineteenth. From that time onwards until the sinking of Bouvet, Irresistible, and Ocean and the damaging of Inflexible and Gaulois on March 18, a series of attacks were made upon the forts by ships which entered the Dardanelles and by others stationed in the Gulf of Saros. Queen Elizabeth and other vessels made use of indirect fire and threw shells right over the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Mine-sweeping operations were carried out, and certain of the forts which defended the extreme southwestern end of the Straits were practically, if not absolutely, destroyed. The net results of these operations were that indirect fire, even when employed with the assistance of air observation, proved to be little more than a waste of ammunition; that the Dardanelles forts were much stronger than seems to have been supposed; and that the Turks, by the use of mines, possessed a deadly advantage, the magnitude of which it is impossible to exaggerate.

The second stage is that connected with the landing operations which began on Sunday, April 25, and with the terrible fighting of the three months which followed them. On that day landings were made at numerous
points at and near the extreme southwestern end of the peninsula, and on the beach immediately to the north of Gaba Tepe, afterwards known as Anzac Beach. The general plan was that these two more or less distinct forces, the one composed of a British Division and the other made up of the Australian and New Zealand contingents, were to work respectively up and across the peninsula with the object of joining hands and of sweeping right up and across the peninsula to the Narrows. During the whole of these three months the forces landed at the southwestern end of the peninsula were fighting for the possession of Achi Baba, a height which attains an elevation of about seven hundred feet above the sea level. This all-important position, which extends practically from sea to sea, not only dominates the whole area of country lying to the southwest of it, but also forms the southwestern extremity of the line of hills which traverse practically the whole length of the peninsula. Further north the operations based on Anzac were practically all undertaken with the object of endeavouring to capture the crests of Sari Bair and of Khoja Chemen Dagh, both of which command this part of the peninsula, and the latter of which attains an elevation of nine hundred and fifty feet above the level of the sea.

The third stage in the campaign is that connected with the Suvla Bay fighting, which began in August. On the sixth of that month a large force was disembarked at Suvla Bay, located about five miles to the north of the Anzac Beach. The plan of operations was that this force should advance in an easterly and southeasterly, whilst the Australasians pushed forward in a northeasterly, direction towards Sari Bair and
Chunuk Bair Ridges. Our overseas troops actually seized the summits, but the new attack from the north did not make the progress which was counted upon, and it was not developed quickly enough. The result was that it came to a standstill after an advance of some two and one half miles, and that the Australasians were compelled to withdraw from the positions which they had actually seized. After the arrival of reinforcements on August 21 further attempts were made to push forward in an easterly direction from the Anzac and Suvla areas. Certain tactical features were captured, but these last operations left things very much as they were before August 21, and the net result of the Suvla Bay landings was that we consolidated our position and secured possession of a connected line extending along a front of about twelve miles.

Before making a few general remarks upon the Dardanelles campaign there are three questions worthy of brief explanation. The first concerns the theory, entertained in some quarters, that had the British been prepared to make the necessary naval sacrifices in February, they could have pushed through the Dardanelles then without even attempting to occupy and to subjugate the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Militarily unsound as this might have been, considering the fact that the door could have been slammed behind such ships and that their means of supply might therefore have been cut off, there would have been at least a good argument in favour of such an attempt had it not been for the existence of Goeben in the Sea of Marmora. The presence of that ship and of Breslau, however, rendered the idea of such a raid—for it only would have been a raid upon a large scale—worse
than useless, for in view of the then strength of the Allied fleets, that undertaking could have been hazarded only with at best second-class ships—ships the power of which, had they even once entered the Sea of Marmora, might well have been outmatched by the Ottoman fleet, then augmented by a German dreadnought and a fast cruiser.

The second criticism sometimes made by those who are not _au courant_ with the situation concerns the suggestion that if the Peninsula of Gallipoli were so difficult of occupation, it would have been better to undertake land operations on the Asiatic instead of upon the European side of the Straits. This suggestion is not worthy of the attention which it would seem to merit at first sight. To begin with, whilst the disembarkation of troops and their advance across the northwestern corner of Asia Minor would have been nearly as difficult as were the operations on the peninsula, the distance to be covered, as the crow flies, instead of only amounting to six or seven miles from Anzac and to about twelve from Cape Helles, would have been about twenty-five miles. Moreover, owing to the topography of the ground—the Gallipoli coast is much higher than the Asiatic shore—and to the greater strength of the European forts, once in possession of Chanak and the neighbourhood, even then we should not have been in a position safely and surely to dominate the Straits and their surroundings.

We now come to the third and constantly repeated suggestion that a landing at or near Bulair would have been an enormous advantage to the Allies, because it would have cut the Turkish communications and because the distance to be covered by an army landed at
THE ROCK-LIKE COAST OF THE GALLIPOLI PENINSULA

The buildings are in the outskirts of the town of Gallipoli, and the Light House, on the right of the picture, may be said to mark the northeastern end of the Dardanelles.

THE VILLAGE OF BULAIR

From Photographs by the Author
that point would have been less than elsewhere. Both these suggestions are largely erroneous. In regard to the first this is the case because, whilst communication with the Peninsula of Gallipoli is maintained to some extent by land, it is principally carried on by sea. It is true, however, as I have explained elsewhere, that a good road runs from Uzun Kupru on the Constantinople-Adrianople railway to Gallipoli. This road traverses the Isthmus of Bulair, following a line which runs on its eastern or Dardanelles side. The road was well within the range of the guns of ships lying in the Gulf of Saros, but even so it could be utilised with comparative safety at night. An Allied landing might, therefore, have resulted in the occupation of this road, but, if so, it would have had to be undertaken by a very large force, for not only would the initial disembarkation have had to be carried out in the teeth of the fire of the big guns in the Bulair Lines, but, once in occupation of the isthmus, such a force would have been compelled to be prepared to meet an attack delivered both by the Turkish army on the peninsula and by troops endeavouring to come to its assistance from the remainder of Turkey in Europe. Moreover, even had we cut this line of communication by an occupation of the territory in question, the Turks would still have been able to send reinforcements across the Straits from Chanak or elsewhere—a route which they in fact did employ in order to substitute for the long and dangerous passage by way of the Sea of Marmora, where British submarines were operating, a passage of only thirteen or fourteen hundred yards which could be covered in vessels so small that they constituted a most difficult target for in-
direct fire, for bombardment from the air, or for submarines. So far as the second point, that is to say, the argument in regard to the desirability of attacking the forts from the direction of Bulair be concerned, sufficient be it to say that although that village lies practically at the narrowest part of the peninsula, the area in question is located about thirty miles to the northeast of the Narrows and therefore of the district the possession of which was vital to the Allied cause.

After what may be described as the final failure of the Suvla Bay attack at the end of August, 1915, the Dardanelles campaign entered upon a new phase. From that moment it became obvious that the Allies would be compelled to give up the undertaking altogether, to endeavour simply to maintain their positions upon the Peninsula of Gallipoli or to make the preparations necessary for the despatch to and maintenance of a vast army in the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean. Even now we do not know all the various considerations which governed Allied policy at that time. But it is certain that the entry of Bulgaria into the War upon the side of the enemy in October, the continued neutrality of Roumania, and the then attitude of Greece created an entirely new situation—a situation which in addition to other difficulties led to our withdrawal from the Dardanelles in December, 1915, and January, 1916.

It would be useless to conceal the fact that that withdrawal, which constituted an admission of failure, must have resulted in a loss of Allied prestige throughout the East, and particularly the Moslem East, where even a necessary cutting of losses is not realised some-
times to be the strongest policy. But having regard to all the circumstances, there can be no doubt that Sir Charles Monro, who had already then shown himself worthy of the highest confidence of the British people, was correct when he said, soon after after he took over the command, that the evacuation of Gallipoli should be taken in hand at once. The position there was unique in history. We held merely a fringe of coast line, dominated from the hills occupied by the Turks. Communications were insecure and difficult, owing to the weather and to the fact that landing places could be raked by the enemy’s fire. Officers and men, who could not, as in other theatres of war, be withdrawn from the shell-swept area, had suffered seriously from the consequent nerve strain and from diseases which are so common in that part of the world. Moreover, had we merely held on to the ground already occupied, or had we even endeavoured to push forward, the number of Turks in future to be immobilised would have been comparatively small, and the large proportion of the Ottoman army would soon have been left free for undertakings in Mesopotamia and against Egypt. Consequently, as there was no longer any hope of achieving a useful purpose by remaining on the peninsula, it would have been worse than foolish to continue to involve the British Empire in the appalling cost resulting from an expedition possessed of every military defect—an expedition from which no possible strategic or tactical advantages could at that time be anticipated.

To summarise and to recapitulate, I think that in order to review the Dardanelles operations in their proper light, we must realise not only the mistakes
which were made but also the enormous difficulties which existed. True it is and true it will ever remain that there was no military justification for the way in which the campaign was conducted. It is now perfectly clear that those responsible did not recognise the real strength of the defences; for had they done so they would have known that an attempt to force the Straits without the assistance of an army landed upon the Peninsula of Gallipoli was almost doomed to failure. The net result of this mistake was that the original attack upon the Dardanelles — an attack lasting on and off for a month — so put the enemy upon his guard and showed him the weak spots in his own defence, that during a further five weeks he had ample opportunity to turn the whole peninsula into a veritable entrenched camp. Again it is apparent that at the time of and after the landings on April 25, the military contingents available and the reinforcements sent out were entirely inadequate. For example, the Twenty-ninth Division, depleted by casualties suffered during the original landing at the southwestern end of the peninsula, was entirely unable to maintain the successes which it originally achieved. The result was that the Turks, who even then were not really prepared, and who probably did not number more than thirty thousand men on the peninsula itself, brought up their reinforcements, large numbers of whom arrived about a week later, and the Germans, who were not at first present in great strength, had plenty of time to put in an appearance and to take over the complete direction of affairs in Gallipoli. Even subsequently, when large numbers of men were despatched to the Mediterranean, with the exception of the August
landings, the forces available were entirely insufficient to insure success in an area which is more difficult than any which I have visited during my travels in the Near East.

To set against all this, if we are to do justice to those responsible for this great effort, and it was a great effort, we must visualise what was the then position in Europe. The newly formed British army was not ready, and the larger number of units then available were urgently required in France. It was this state of things which made Lord Kitchener demur and delay in sending an expeditionary force to the Eastern Mediterranean. Under ordinary circumstances, therefore, there can be no doubt that the War Cabinet should have definitely abandoned the idea of an attack upon the Dardanelles until their military member and adviser — The Minister of War — was in a position to provide a force and its reinforcements sufficient at least to further the task of a fleet endeavouring to force its way into the Sea of Marmora. But when the question was already under discussion in January, 1915, there came the communication from the Russian Government to which I have already referred. That communication introduced a new element into the position — an element which, though its importance is often minimised, must, I consider, be held as having been the deciding factor in the situation. The Russians, who had mobilised their forces much more rapidly than was anticipated, and who had greatly influenced the situation in Western Europe by their advance into East Prussia early in the autumn of 1914, appealed for our assistance. The British Government had then two alternatives before it. It could,
and perhaps it should, have declared that it was not and would not be in a position to make a demonstration against Turkey in the immediate future. Or it could, as it did, consider that something must be done in response to an appeal from an Ally who then certainly seemed to be playing a prominent part in the War. The adoption of the latter course may have been ill advised, but as loyalty to Allies comes only second to the necessity for the defeat of the enemy, whatever our personal opinions may be, it would appear that the Dardanelles campaign became a practical if not an actual necessity.

So far as the main objective was concerned, that campaign, in which British soldiers and sailors accomplished tasks the magnitude of which it is impossible to realise unless one has been to Gallipoli, proved a failure. But even so, looking at things in their true perspective, and to some extent we are now able to do this, as the operations were originally undertaken in order to create a diversion in Turkey, it may be said, without fear of contradiction, that a good deal was accomplished. Thus a large Ottoman force which would otherwise have been employed in the Caucasus, against Egypt, or in Mesopotamia, was certainly immobilised at Gallipoli. Moreover, it is stated, though no evidence has been produced in support of the theory, that the expedition had considerable influence upon the attitude of the Balkan States. This latter contention may or may not be true, and the question as to whether these supposed advantages were or were not commensurate with the loss of valuable lives and treasure incurred must remain a matter of opinion. In conclusion therefore let me say that
the more one knows of the Allied difficulties existing at that time and the more one has seen of the areas in question, the less one is inclined to criticise, and that where criticism is due, it is justified not so much in regard to the actual undertaking of the campaign, but rather as a result of the manner in which almost insurmountable difficulties were underestimated by those at home and on the spot.
X

THE RIDDLE OF SALONICA

Although the original Allied landing at Salonica took place during the early days of October, 1915, the expedition which since then has been based upon that port may really be considered as having followed and to some extent resulted from the British lack of success at the Dardanelles—a lack of success which became evident directly after the failure of the Suvla Bay operations. At about that time, too, the whole position in Southeastern Europe obviously became modified by the practical certainty that the enemy would ere long undertake a great drive across Serbia, by the probability that, unless she secured concessions at the hands of the Allies, Bulgaria would throw in her lot with the Central Powers, and by the new situation created in Greece resulting from the necessity of that country either standing by or repudiating her treaty obligations with Serbia.

To consider in somewhat fuller detail the reasons of the Salonica expedition, it may be said that whilst a successful Dardanelles campaign would incidentally have had the effect of counteracting and forestalling the dangers of a German drive towards the East, the Salonica operations were inaugurated with the definite object of either preventing the establishment of through
connection between Central Europe and the Bosphorus, or at least of threatening the enemy's lines of communication were they once established. Thus, whereas the occupation of Constantinople earlier in the War would have definitely frustrated Germanic designs in the East, an Anglo-French advance from Salonica to Nish or even to Uskub would either have prevented a successful penetration along the whole length of the Belgrade-Constantinople railway or at least have so threatened that railway that communication by way of it would have continued insecure.

These were obviously the fundamental objects of the Salonica expedition. But closely bound up and connected with them were other objects, some of which, if they were less directly military, are still almost if not equally important. To begin with, if and when Bulgaria entered the War upon the German side, it was obvious that the Serbians, even had they been supported by Greece, at once became powerless to defend any large section of their country, and that Bulgaria, acting in conjunction with the Central Powers, would be in a position to overrun the whole of the Western Balkans. Consequently, although the Serbs, during the summer of 1915, had turned a deaf ear to the advice of the Allies — advice which, had it been taken at once, would probably have secured at least the neutrality and perhaps even the support of Bulgaria — it was almost impossible for sentimental as well as for military reasons to leave to her fate a little country whose army had fought most gallantly during the opening months of the War. In addition, as Greece claimed that Serbia was not then able to provide the contingent (150,000 men) promised by her
under the Graeco-Serbian Treaty, she (Greece) would have been more or less justified in refusing to come to the assistance of her ally had England and France not undertaken to do their best to furnish contingents to take the place of that which was not available at the hands of the Government of King Peter. And lastly, once it was evident that the Austro-Bulgaro-Germanic armies would be in a position to act as one force and that the future policy of Greece was to hang in the balance, it became advisable for the Allies to establish and to maintain a pied-à-terre in the Balkans — a pied-à-terre without which the whole peninsula would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and failing which the then neutrals, Greece and Roumania, would almost undoubtedly have thrown in their lot with the Central Powers.

The unjustifiable optimists, who contended that we should reach Nish or even Uskub before our enemies, who believed that our arrival at Salonica would immediately bring Greece into war on the Allied side, and who thought that the Bulgarians would be easy of defeat, were doomed to meet with disappointment. But this does not justify their whole-hearted criticism of our policy in the Balkans — a policy the framing of which has been beset by difficulties on every side. Faults, grievous faults there have been, but these faults are not bound up with what is stated in some quarters to have been Allied influence in restraining Serbia from attacking Bulgaria before the latter country's overt adhesion to the enemy cause, or with what is sometimes argued to have been unjustifiable delay in going to the Western Balkans. As I have already said, even had we so advised Serbia, who in suggesting
an immediate attack by her against Bulgaria also insisted upon the earlier sending of an allied force to Salonica, such would have been good advice, for the Serbian position could not thus have been ameliorated. In other words, as it was not feasible for the Allies to undertake a Balkan expedition during the complicated negotiations which were in progress in the summer of 1915, or to disembark in Greece without her consent or without then infringing the neutrality of that country, the failure to save Serbia was not due to Allied fault but to the strategic position of our enemies, to their overwhelming strength, to the enormous geographical difficulties, and to the continued situation in Greece—a situation the complications and the effect of which it was impossible to foresee.

In the short space which is here available, it would not be possible and I do not propose to try to go into the details of all that has taken place in connection with the Salonica operations since their original inauguration in October, 1915. My sole object, therefore, is to provide my readers with a description of the country connected with these operations, to indicate the enormous geographical difficulties which beset a force based upon that port, and to outline very briefly the three stages into which that campaign may be said to have been divided. On account of the very different nature of the country which has grown to be called Macedonia and of its diverse peoples, nobody who has ever travelled in that unhappy district is able to consider it as a concrete whole. He thinks of it as an area which is divided politically and geographically into water-tight compartments; as a place inhabited by diverse populations, and as a locality
possessed of well-defined routes, which constitute natural if not adequately developed lines of communication. Consequently, if I seem to be disjointed in my description, this is due not to any want of forethought, but because I feel constrained to write of what I have seen rather than to try to produce a concise description of something which really does not exist.

Bulgaria, against which the Allied expedition was to operate, and especially Southwestern Bulgaria, is shut off from the Aegean by a strip of Hellenic territory annexed by Greece after the Balkan Wars. Measured from the Vardar Valley on the west to the Graeco-Bulgarian frontier on the east, it has a length of about one hundred and fifteen miles. With an average depth, from the Aegean on the south to the Rhodope Balkans on the north, of about fifty miles, this district contains the port of Kavala, the towns of Drama and Demir Hissar and some of the best tobacco-growing areas in the whole Balkan Peninsula. For these reasons it is not only rich but also strategically important to both Greece and Bulgaria. On the west of the Vardar, the territory added to Greece after the Balkan Wars extends in the north up to the Moglena Mountains and the Serbian frontier and on the west to the Albanian boundary and the Adriatic. That these two areas are part of Greece meant that, until the attitude of the Hellenic Government became certain, the Allied position not only at Salonica and in the immediate neighbourhood, but also in both the above-mentioned districts was extremely complicated and difficult.

The position of Salonica is favourable as a port be-
cause it is located about halfway along the European coast of the Aegean, and because it occupies a fine site at the head of a bay, measuring approximately twelve and one half miles from northeast to southwest—a bay connected with the sea by the Gulf of Salonica, which has a length of nearly ninety miles. Both shores of the gulf are mountainous, Mount Olympus on the west attaining an elevation of nearly ten thousand feet above the level of the sea. On the east the bay is also flanked by hills which extend to the immediate neighbourhood of the town, but on the west the country is low and swampy. Throughout the gulf there is deep water, but parts of the bay, through which there is an adequate channel, are blocked by mud brought down by the Galiko and Vardar. The presence of this mud, which is constantly increasing and moving, has for a result that the depth of the water is always changing and that sections of the bay, especially the northwestern corner, which within the memory of living man were navigable for small boats, are now almost entirely silted up.

Salonica harbour is of modern construction. It consists of a quay measuring about four hundred and forty yards long with moles of just over two hundred yards long at each end. An island breakwater protects it, and ships enter by the southeastern opening. Served by a railway and built to have twenty-four feet of water, before the War it was impossible for ships drawing more than at most twenty-two feet of water to get alongside the quays. Further deepening beyond twenty-four feet was difficult, owing to the fact that the foundations were upon mud. Enlarge-

ment of this basin, which in ordinary times only pro-
vides accommodation for at most eight ships of any size, has often been under discussion, but prior to the War it was never attempted; for, whilst the expense of dredging and digging on the northwest was prohibitive, an extension to the southeast was thought to be detrimental to the sites occupied by the best buildings in the city. The result of the inadequacy of the accommodation and of the high dock dues was that, before the War, many ships never entered the harbour and discharged their passengers whilst lying out in the bay. The quays running from the harbour to the White Tower are available for small craft and barges, but owing to the south wind, which always springs up in the afternoon, and to the then choppy state of the water, their utility is considerably minimised.

The town of Salonica occupies a magnificent position at the head of the bay. Rising from the water’s edge and built in a horseshoe shape on the slopes of the hills, prior to the recent fire it was extremely picturesque. But with the exception of the comparatively new street, which runs along the quay from the harbour on the northwest to the residential quarter on the southeast, the city was dirty and squalid, and its thoroughfares were narrow and winding. Indeed, the outstanding impression left upon one’s mind was that the town constituted something isolated, something different from that which exists elsewhere in Europe. In one sense it seemed to be completely modern, materialistic, and vulgar, whilst in another it had the appearance of being a sort of relic of the past. This may be accounted for partly by the fact that the nature of the population of Salonica is something quite unique. Out of a total of about one hundred
THE ARCH OF GALERIUS AT SALONICA

From a Photograph by the Author

The above picture shows a near-Eastern contrast—an archway supposed to date from the third century, and the line followed by an electric tram.
and twenty-five thousand souls roughly seventy-five thousand are Jews. These Jews, who are the descendants of those expelled from Spain by Ferdinand and Isabella, control the business of the city and surpass the Greeks in their commercial ability and also in society. Besides these Hebrews there are about fifteen thousand Dounmés—a sect the real beliefs of whom are not properly known to the outer world. Distrusted by both Jews and Mohammedans, they live a life apart and never marry with the outer world. It is from among their number that the Young Turks recruited some of the ablest members of the Committee of Union and Progress. The remainder of the population is made up of about twenty-five thousand Greeks, five thousand Turks, four thousand Bulgars, and of a European colony, all of whom, so to speak, exist as a result of the sufferance of the Jews, who dominate everything from the most menial work to that of banking. It was partly owing to the Oriental plan of the city and partly as a consequence of the houses being built largely of wood and mud and of there having been no rain for three months, that the fire of August, 1917, which was probably due to incendiary causes, did such terrible damage. Indeed, such was that damage, that half the area inside the ancient walls, which still encompass a great part of the business area of the town, including all the more important stores, hotels, and banks, was destroyed, thereby leaving approximately sixty thousand of the inhabitants homeless and destitute, and therefore dependent upon the Allies either for subsistence in Salonica or for means of transportation to areas where they could start life at least temporarily anew.
Before discussing the geography of this part of the Balkans, a few words should be said about the climate of this area of Europe. Partly owing to its enclosed position, the heat in Salonica itself is intense during June, July, August, and the first part of September, after which the atmosphere is cooled by the heavy rain which invariably falls between the tenth and fifteenth of that month. The heat, which is mitigated by the fresh sea breeze which always blows in the afternoon, is particularly trying at night, and mosquitoes are so numerous that, in many parts of the town, it is advisable to sleep under nets almost throughout the year. In spite of this, unlike Constantinople and Athens, there is no summer resort, and the inhabitants therefore remain in the city throughout the year. The first winter spent by the Allies at Salonica was an unusually severe one; for, whilst it is generally wet in January and February, there is seldom a heavy fall of snow in the city itself. In the interior where the heat in the valleys is very intense, the climate, and particularly the temperature at night, naturally depends upon the elevation of the district in question. In winter snow is prevalent in the hills, and traffic on many of the roads is often entirely stopped by it and by the immense amount of water brought down from the mountains at the time of the spring thaw.

The geographical relations of Salonica with the interior and the whole of the military operations which are based upon that port are governed largely by the presence of the Vardar Valley and River which flows into the sea at a distance of about twelve miles to the southwest of the town. It divides East from West
and forms with the valley of the Morava the great highroad from north to south across the peninsula, and makes Salonica the natural point of entry into and exit from a large area of the Western Balkans. Indeed the importance of the valley and of the port are interdependent, and it is for this reason that Salonica and its surroundings ought either to belong to the owners of the hinterland, or that the hinterland ought to be annexed by the owners of the port. It is this, together with the fact that Salonica is a good starting point for various routes and roads into the interior, which have always made its collecting and distributing radii very wide. Thus so long ago as the Great War, when Napoleon closed the accustomed routes into Germany, the port of Salonica formed one of the new channels of commerce — commerce carried into the heart of the interior by three more or less independent routes. The first of these ran up the Vardar Valley and through Bosnia. The second went by Seres, the Struma Valley, Sofia, and Vidin and thus through Hungary and Budapest to Vienna. The third deviated from the second at Sofia, turning in a northwesterly direction and continuing its course into the heart of Europe by way of Nish and Belgrade and along the present great trunk route from east to west.

In order to make my description of the geography of the country and of the military operations more clear, I am going to base it almost entirely upon this division of country formed by the Vardar. Thus, although the actual valley of that river can hardly be said to extend much to the south of the Serbo-Greek frontier, it is convenient to consider even the
area closely surrounding Salonica in its bearing to that river. On the west bank, and on both banks in the immediate vicinity of its mouths and of the mouth of the torrential Galiko, the country is marshy, intersected by small streams and dikes, and covered largely by reeds. This area is therefore practically impassable especially in wet weather, and after the melting of the snows when the volume of every important Balkan river is so enormously increased. The same kind of country, growing gradually drier and less marshy as one gets away from the river and its mouths, extends as far as Yenidje Vardar — a village situated on the road to Vodena, and at the foot of the Pajak Planina. To the north and northeast of that place as far as Karasulu, and particularly between there and the frontier, there are hills the slopes of which approach nearer and nearer to the right bank of the Vardar.

On the east or left bank of the river the whole character of the country is different, for in general it is hilly if not mountainous. Even between the railways, to which I will refer in greater detail below, there are summits which attain elevations of well over one thousand feet above the level of the sea. On the east of the Salonica-Doiran line, and particularly on the east and southeast of the River Galiko, the whole area is mountainous as far as the Valley of the Struma on the east and right down into the Chalkis Peninsula on the south. Here are detached mountains and groups of mountains, such as the Krusha Balkan and the Beshik Dagh which respectively attain elevations of about three thousand feet and of nearly three thousand five hundred feet above the sea. Large parts of this area, which has always been very
inaccessible from the outer world, are covered with oak scrub. The population is mixed, but with the exception of the Chalkis Peninsula, where the Greeks predominate, it is largely made up of Turks.

A line of hills and positions, immediately defending Salonica on the northeast, east, and southeast, runs from the Galiko River along the Duad Baba and Derbend Hills to the Hortach Dagh, located at a distance of about nine miles to the east of the port. From this mountain group the obvious line of defence for Salonica turns in an easterly direction and runs across the Chalkis Peninsula in rear of Lakes Langaza and Beshik. This position, which in certain ways resembles that occupied by the Chatalja Lines outside Constantinople, is one of very considerable natural strength, for its front is almost entirely protected by the above-mentioned lakes and by the swamps which lie between and to the east of them. Moreover, the Hortach Dagh, with an elevation of over three thousand five hundred feet above the sea, and the Koloconda Dagh, which is nearly as high, command and dominate the whole of the country which lies to the north and northeast of them.

In regard to the communications available in these areas, for obvious reasons it is impossible to do more than to indicate those which existed prior to the arrival of the Allies. On the west of the Vardar sufficient therefore be it to say that over and above the road and railway to Monastir, the country is so marshy and difficult that there are few, if any, routes which are worthy of our attention here. The centre of the position is well served, for it is possessed of the Vardar Valley line and of the Salonica Junction Rail-
way, which are entirely independent of one another throughout their length. To make matters better, these two lines are joined by a branch which runs from Karasulu on the former to Kilindir on the latter railway. Before the War these were all single lines, but there can be no doubt that since the Allied occupation they have been doubled at least for part of their length and that they have been supplemented by other railways leading to various parts of the Allied front.

Prior to the international occupation of Salonica only two so-called roads united that place with the hinterland situated to the northeast and southeast. The first ran from Salonica to Seres and thence northwards to Demir Hissar and into the Struma Valley. This road crosses the northern end of the Beshik Dagh by a pass, the highest point of which is just over two thousand feet above the level of the sea, and the River Struma by a bridge at Hadrie. This route was nominally passable for wheeled traffic, but long after the Greek annexation its condition was such as to render it quite unfit for ordinary motors. The second road ran in a southeasterly direction from Salonica towards and into the Chalkis Peninsula. Its condition was extremely bad, and it was not passable for vehicles for more than a few miles beyond the borders of the city. As in the case of the railways since the international occupation, there can be no doubt that the Allies have greatly improved these two roads, especially the latter, and that they have constructed numerous routes leading towards and up to the positions which they have occupied.

Turning to a discussion of the more distant hinter-
land of Salonica, the country is made up of three distinct areas—the Vardar Valley district and the districts respectively situated to the east and west of it. The Vardar Valley is the most important existing line of communication in all Macedonia. With an approximate length of one hundred and fifty miles, if measured from Salonica to Uskub, large parts of it are so gorge-like that for some miles, in the neighbourhood and to the north of the Graeco-Serbian frontier, it is not followed by a road, and only by a railway upon which traffic is therefore entirely dependent. That railway may be said to enter the actual valley near Karasulu Junction. From there as far as Kuprulu, and therefore for a distance of about seventy-seven miles, the valley is so narrow, except at one point, that the line crosses and re-crosses the river three times. Leaving the Vardar at Uskub it passes through Komanovo and crosses an area made up of bare uncultivated hills subsequently to enter the Valley of the Morava near the old Serbo-Turkish frontier.

During recent years this line has become of great commercial and military importance. Prior and subsequent to the Balkan Wars, it was used by Serbia (under an arrangement first with Turkey and then with Greece) as her principal route to the coast, and special quays, warehouses, etc., were allotted to her at Salonica—quays and warehouses which were practically ex-territorial—for her merchandise and live stock. Between August, 1914, and October, 1915, the significance of the Vardar line became enormous because it was by way of it alone that Serbia was able effectively to communicate with the sea. After
our arrival at Salonica, it was by this route that we endeavoured to go to the assistance of Serbia and to force our way into the heart of that country. The valley and the line were, however, easy of attack, and are easy of defence by Bulgaria because of the numerous gorges, and because they run more or less parallel to and at no great distance from the frontier of that country—a frontier which approaches to within about five miles of it on the northeast of the station of Strumnitza.

To the east of the Vardar Valley the principal feature affecting the relations of Salonica to the interior and governing the direction of an advance from the Aegean coast into the heart of old Bulgaria are the Rhodope Balkans. That range is, however, so to speak, skirted and partially avoided by one or two routes extending from the Vardar Valley towards and across the Bulgarian frontier—lines which though influenced by the Rhodopes and their off-shoots do not actually penetrate that range. Between the Graeco-Serbian frontier and Uskub two roads run toward the Struma Valley. Though prior to the outbreak of the War they were in bad condition, both have undoubtedly been improved by the Bulgarians since their advance into Macedonia. But the most important road, running in an easterly direction from the Vardar Valley, is that which connects Komanovo, situated a few miles to the north of Uskub, with Gyumeshevo—a road already fully described elsewhere.

Turn to the Rhodopes themselves, the western and central sections of which, known respectively as the Dospat Dagh and the Kara Balkan, form one more or less continuous line. But to the east of the
Kara Balkan this line practically divides into two long off-shoots which enclose the valley of the Arda, the northern branch following the old Bulgarian frontier and the southern arm skirting the plain adjacent to the sea. Practically no important rivers drain the range towards the south, for ignoring the Struma, the principal is the Mesta, which enters the Aegean about thirty miles to the east of Kavala. Leaving on one side the Maritza, the largest rivers which flow towards the north and east are the Krishim and the Arda, the waters of which latter are augmented by those of the Seugudulu River and the Burgas Chai.

In order to penetrate the Rhodopes from the south it would be necessary either to approach and to occupy the plain which borders the Aegean from the west, and therefore from the direction of Salonica, or to effect fresh landings somewhere along the coast, between that port and Dede Agatch, which is located just to the west of the mouth of the Maritza. The former operation would be dangerous and require a large force, for it would entail an advance by way of the Salonica-Dede Agatch Railway which runs practically parallel to the real front of the enemy—a front which in case of such an Allied attempt he would undoubtedly establish more or less along the line of the Rhodopes. Fresh landings on the other hand would not only be beset by the heavy losses and the enormous difficulties which always go with such undertakings in hostile country, but they would also be accompanied by dangers due to the fact that, except at Kavala, which has now no doubt been strongly fortified by the enemy, good landing places are not available.
We now come to the section of country located on the west of the Vardar Valley, and lying more or less between Salonica and Monastir or between the former town and the southern part of the Albanian frontier. The geographical and other conditions prevailing here were and are, in some ways more and in some ways less favourable to the Allies than are those existing on the other side of the Vardar. On the one hand, whilst there are the Moglena and other mountains on the Graeco-Serbian frontier and whilst the country to the north and northeast of Monastir is very difficult, there are no barriers lying to the south and southeast of that town which compare in their strength to the Rhodopes. Moreover, Salonica is connected with Monastir by a road and a railway. The road, which is passable for motors, approximately follows the railway, but it avoids two great detours made by the line. The railway crosses the plain to Veria, where, at the southern point of its first bend, it begins to enter the hills. No serious gradients are, however, encountered until it reaches Vodena. This railway is of very great importance, not only because it gives access to Monastir, but because it runs more or less parallel to and therefore serves the Allied front.

So much for the favourable conditions in this area. From the opposite point of view it was here, during the period of her uncertainty, that the attitude of Greece so greatly complicated the Allied plan of campaign. On the east of the Vardar and in the Greek district enclosed by that river, the Rhodopes, the Bulgarian frontier, and the Aegean, there was the danger that the Greek forces stationed there would, as they did, make no effort to resist an enemy advance.
But their strength was known, and the sacrifice of that territory was not vital to the whole Allied position. Not so, however, with the area to the south of Monastir and to the west of Salonica. There the distribution of the Hellenic Kingdom is such that, had King Constantine thrown in his lot with the enemy, he was in a position so favourable as to enable him to jeopardize the entire British and French plan. During the earlier stages of the campaign, in addition to the facts that the Allies could not know when and how far the Greeks would allow the enemy to advance into Hellenic territory, that their position was always endangered by the presence of spies, whose movements and actions they could not control, they were also face to face with the ever-present danger of an attack upon their left rear delivered from the Greek army, the fighting value of which was uncertain, by routes particularly suitable for that purpose. The railway from Larissa meets the Salonica-Monastir Line at Gidia, roads run up from the south to Veria, to Lake Ostrovo, and to Florina. It was these dangers and particularly that connected with the left rear of the Allied front at Salonica—dangers to meet which no adequate or open precautions could at first be taken—which made political events, or more correctly the Allied handling of political events in the Greek capital, matters possessed of such immense influence upon the Salonica campaign.

To consider very briefly the three stages into which the actual military operations have been divided it may be said that the first was connected with the original Anglo-French attempts to force their way into the interior and to reach Nish or Uskub or at
least to prevent the complete conquest of Serbia. These endeavours began as soon as sufficient Allied troops had been disembarked to render possible an advance into the interior. The French, on the left, pushed forward up the Vardar Valley and to the west of it and towards the Babuna Pass. The British on the right moved forward to the north of Lake Doiran. The Serbian retreat on the one hand and the Bulgarian advance on the other were, however, so rapid that the Allies, unable to effect a junction with the Serbs, were compelled to withdraw to Greek territory and to the immediate vicinity of Salonica, where for months they occupied more or less the positions which I have already indicated as constituting the natural defensive line of the port.

The second stage in the campaign lasted from December, 1915, until the following September. During it the Allies remained practically entirely on the defensive, occupying themselves with the improvement of their communications and with the political situation in Greece. It was during this stage, however, that the western part of the district lying between the Rhodope Balkans and the sea, and particularly the area in the vicinity of both banks of the Struma, figured prominently in the campaign. In January, the Allies destroyed the Great Bridge across the Struma near Demir Hissar, later demolishing others located in the neighbourhood of Seres. Subsequently and in May, the Greeks handed over to the enemy Fort Rupel — a position which so to speak constitutes the key to the entrance of the Struma Valley. As a consequence of this, the Bulgarians were able, during the summer, to advance towards the sea, finally occupy-
ing Kavala, the bulk of the garrison of which place surrendered without any resistance in September. The then Greek Government repudiated the conduct of its commander at Kavala, but the greater part of the Army Corps in question was transported to Germany as the "guests" of the German Government. It was therefore evident that even if the then Greek Premier — Mr. Zaïmis — was not himself responsible, there were influences at work which proved that the attitude of the Hellenic Government was far from reliable. About the same time General Milne — the British commander — pushed forward across the Struma, thereby making an effective demonstration in force with the object of attracting and immobilising Bulgarian forces which would otherwise have been available for the defence of the area on the west of the Vardar. Subsequently, however, owing to the difficulty of the ground, to the floods of the Struma, and to the strength of the enemy, the British were unable to undertake any extended operations in this area, and they withdrew to the west of the Struma and to areas which are more easily defensible and in which the climate is better than that of the swamps which border upon the river.

The third stage in the campaign began with the Allied push in the direction of Monastir in the late summer of 1916. I have said sufficient already to prove that that city is so situated and that the communications passing through it are such that the place is of considerable military importance. But its political significance and meaning are even more far-reaching. For years the possession of the city has been coveted by the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Serbians, and
for years it has been a centre in which Bulgarian, Greek, and, to a lesser extent, Serbian propaganda has been in full swing. The fact that prior to the Balkan Wars the largest element of the population was either Bulgarian or Greek partly accounted for the Serbian desire to capture the city during the first Balkan campaign. The same fact was in part responsible for the second war—a war which left in the heart of every Bulgarian an outstanding longing to recapture the city at the earliest possible opportunity. It was really this longing which brought Bulgaria into the War against Serbia—a longing which was temporarily gratified when it fell into the hands of the enemy soon after Bulgaria threw in her lot with the Central Powers.

When it became obvious, during the early autumn of 1916, that we could not advance either across the Rhodope Balkans or by way of the Vardar Valley, over and above the fact that except for the Greek danger, a campaign in the direction of Monastir was by way of the line of least resistance, there was therefore the additional object of recapturing from Bulgaria her most coveted and cherished war gain, and of restoring to Serbia a city, for the possession of which she had already fought two wars. Consequently it was these factors which led to the developments which began at the end of August, 1916.

Up to that time the Bulgarians, who had been gradually advancing from Monastir, had reached the northern shores of Lake Ostrovo, where there was severe fighting. The Allied advance was inaugurated early in September, the French and Russians on the left moving on Florina, the Serbians under General Mishitch advancing from the line Vodena-Lake Ostrovo
against the Moglena Ridge, topped as it is by Mount Kaimakchalan which rises to an elevation of nearly eight thousand feet above the level of the sea. After approximately a fortnight’s fighting, the Franco-Russian forces took Florina and reached the southern entrance to the Monastir Plain, whilst the Serbs stormed Kaimakchalan, thereby reconquering a corner of their former territory. Thenceforth the plan was that the left of the Allied line was to demonstrate and to hold the enemy first on his defensive line, running north of Florina and south of the frontier, and then on the Kenali front, whilst the Serbs outflanked these positions by advancing across the River Tcherna and took the hills in the Tcherna Bend. Mishitch’s first big attack failed, but a few days later he pushed his way well into this most difficult country. For the ensuing month (October 21 till November 19) the weather was extremely bad, but the Serbian Commander-in-Chief held his ground against repeated counter attacks, and by the middle of November had advanced to positions from which the Kenali line was so hopelessly outflanked that the Bulgarians retired from it to the River Bistritza, which runs east and west at a distance of only some four miles from Monastir. A few days afterwards, and early in the morning of Sunday, the nineteenth, the Franco-Russian forces entered Monastir, followed a few hours later by the Serbians, who crossed the Tcherna. Thus, largely due to the skill of General Mishitch and to the intense bravery of the Serbians, who had to advance over by far the most difficult area of country, and who were responsible for the taking of Kaimakchalan and the Tcherna Bend, Monastir fell into the hands
of the Allies on the fourth anniversary of its conquest by the Serbians during the first Balkan war.

The capture of what may almost be described as the capital of Macedonia was important both politically and militarily. Over and above the reasons already given, this is the case because the city would be a good jumping-off ground were it decided to increase the forces at Salonica in such a way as to enable them to deliver a determined blow in the Balkans. Thus from Monastir there run routes into Albania and into Western Serbia and also a road — if not now a railway — through Prilep and the Babuna Pass to Kuprulu. Moreover the Allied advance in Western Macedonia was responsible for bringing about the junction of the Salonica forces with those of Italy based upon the Adriatic, and therefore for enabling that country to further the Allied cause in this area. The Italians, having occupied Avlona in December, 1914, subsequently extended their sphere of control roughly as far as the River Viosa, and later on, as I have shown elsewhere, established connection with the Salonica army. No full details are available concerning the work and difficulties of this Italian force, but its original presence and particularly the fact that it now prolongs the Allied line from the neighbourhood of Cologna near which place the French left rests, to the Adriatic has been and is of great importance. Had it not been for this expedition on the east of the Adriatic, during the régime of King Constantine, the dangers of the enemy's pushing forward through Albania and Greece and therefore of his out-flanking the Allies, and of the junction of Bulgaro-Germanic forces with regular and irregular Hellenic contingents would have been
even greater than they were. Equally well, the fact that Italy now holds Southern Albania does a good deal to strengthen our strategic position in the Near East—a strategic position which has its direct as well as its indirect influence upon the War.

Since the late autumn of 1916, whilst there has been occasional and intermittent fighting, there have been no far-reaching changes in the Salonica battle front. Starting from a point on the Adriatic situated a few miles to the north of Avlona, our line now extends roughly across Albania in such a way as to leave Berat to the enemy and Korcha to the Allies. After passing round the north of Monastir, it runs in an almost due easterly direction to Lake Doiran where it soon turns southeast, approaching the Aegean near and presumably on the west of the mouth of the Struma. This means that the Allies now hold approximately one quarter of Albania, that they are in possession of the extreme southern corner of Serbia, and that only the northeastern section of New Greece is in the hands of the enemy.

The foregoing remarks will be sufficient to prove that the Salonica campaign is quite unlike, and that the country is far more difficult than anything else in Europe, except perhaps that on the Italian front. With the exception of the plain lying to the west of the town and of the one which borders upon the Aegean, almost the whole of Macedonia is made up of mountains or disjointed rocky hills. The winding valleys which often narrow down to mere gorges are shut in by sloping hills so forbidding that advance across them seems to be well-nigh impossible. In other districts, which are somewhat more open, there is
hardly a single locality where a forward movement is not rendered extremely arduous by the existence of defensive positions, the merits of which it is impossible to exaggerate. When the Allies went to Salonica, the whole of the railways were single lines, built not for the purpose of heavy and numerous trains, but simply to meet the requirements of the very meagre traffic of peace time. The gradients are steep, the curves are sharp, and the passing places were few and far between. Many of the railways and especially the Vardar and the Salonica Junction lines pass through defiles and over numerous bridges which are easily defensible by an enemy in possession of the hills which command the valleys of the Vardar and of the Mesta. With the exception of very few roads, the paths consisted of the merest tracks strewn with rocky stones so numerous that one had to ride, to stumble, or to clamber along them as best one might. The native bridges were so narrow, so shaky, and so steep, that one crossed them only at the greatest risk. Moreover the winter rains and snows, which in the mountains are very heavy, make the roads — where roads exist — and the fords well-nigh, if not quite, impossible.

This all means, except where the country has been occupied for some time and where the methods of communication have been improved, that the utility of motor vehicles, transport waggons, and big guns upon which a modern army depends, is greatly minimised, and that special transport and mountain guns must be provided for service upon the numerous tracks which are not passable for wheeled traffic. The drought of the summer, which makes water, except in the actual valleys, a difficulty for travellers,
places upon the supply sections of the army a burden
the magnitude of which it is difficult to exaggerate. And
lastly the climatic and other conditions are such
that it was and is impossible to expect that the health
of the troops engaged would or will be comparable
to that of those fighting in more healthy theatres of
war — theatres in which, when contingents are with-
drawn for rest, measures can be taken, in a way im-
possible at Salonica, to insure the counteraction of
what must always be hard and arduous fighting at the
actual front.

These are some of the factors which make it im-
possible to exaggerate the military difficulties sur-
rounding the conduct of a campaign in this part of
the Balkan Peninsula — difficulties which when coupled
with the central and therefore strategically strong
position of Bulgaria and with the effects of the earlier
attitude of Greece are responsible for the original
Allied failure to advance into the interior of Serbia
and for our subsequent inability in any way seriously
to defeat the army of King Ferdinand or to threaten
the enemy's line of communications by way of the
Belgrade-Constantinople Railway. But if we admit,
as we must admit, that the Salonica campaign, like
the operations at the Dardanelles, has not accom-
plished its primary objects, the undertaking has served
and is serving certain purposes in the War. It has
demonstrated the Anglo-French desire to come to the
support of Serbia. Moreover, what is much more
important, the existence of the Salonica expedition
was probably at least partially responsible for pre-
venting Greece from entering the War upon the side
of the enemy, and its presence certainly prevented
the still further success of the secret intrigues and propaganda carried out in that country by German agents during the régime of King Constantine. These results, when coupled with the fact that England and France, two of the Protecting Powers of Greece, have been able to defend the greater part of that country from invasion and thus to carry out their treaty obligations, are of significance; for, whilst the fighting value of the Hellenic army is not of any great importance to either group of belligerents, the unhindered and unhampered use of all the Greek ports, harbours, and bays, by enemy submarines, would have carried with it danger to the whole Allied position in the East — danger so great that it cannot be estimated here. For these reasons and for many others, among them the fact that the Allies have maintained a foothold in the Balkans, the Salonica campaign will be possessed of a historical interest and importance the true meaning of which may not become apparent before or even immediately after the final termination of hostilities.
The Bagdad Railway and its Tributaries

From a map prepared by The Royal Geographical Society
XI

THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AND THE WAR

My object in this chapter is to examine the importance of the Bagdad Railway and its tributaries in the War and to give a brief outline of the political and geographical conditions which have influenced the construction of these lines. So far as the first of these points be concerned, it must be obvious to any reader who makes the most superficial study of the subject, that this railway, together with the main route across the Balkans, constitute the great line of Germanic communication from west to east, and that the Bagdad Railway alone is, so to speak, the backbone of Turkish utility and power in the War. Thus were it not for its existence, the Ottoman resistance in Mesopotamia and in Syria could have been discounted as a practical consideration in the War, and the sending of Turkish reinforcements to the Caucasus would have been even more materially delayed than has in fact been the case.

That these facilities were intended by Germany to be the war conditions in case of an outbreak of hostilities with England was natural and obvious, in fact so natural and so obvious that had the enemy ignored the precaution of preparation in Turkey, it would have meant the pursuit of a policy which certainly
was not adopted by him elsewhere. Indeed to those who have travelled in the East, and who have watched the gradual development of the Pan-German scheme there, it was always markedly apparent that the objects of the Bagdad Railway were military rather than commercial. Were any proof of this required it is provided, as I shall endeavour to show below, by the facts that the Government of the Kaiser insisted upon a railway from the Bosphorus and not from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, and that it objected, when a modification of the original route was proposed, to the suggestion that the line should pass through Alexandretta and therefore absolutely along the seashore, at the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean, instead of, as it now does, never coming within a distance of about ten miles of the coast.

The present Bagdad line is by no means the first that has been under consideration. The idea of connecting the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf by an overland route, and therefore of shortening the journey round the Cape or across the Isthmus of Suez, was first suggested about the year 1835. Under discussion for many years, the original plan—a plan largely based upon the detailed survey made by Colonel Chesney in 1835–1837—was to avoid Asia Minor altogether, and to start the proposed railway not from the Bosphorus but from some point on the Eastern Mediterranean. One proposal was for a railway from Alexandretta via Aleppo to the Euphrates and thence down the right bank of that river to Koweit; or, for a line starting from the same point, but crossing the Euphrates near Belis and subsequently following either the left bank of that river or the right bank of
the Tigris to Bagdad and thence to the Gulf. Another idea was a line from Tripoli or Beirut through the desert via Palmyra to the Euphrates, and thence down the valley of that river to the sea. A third suggestion, about which but little is known, was to connect Ismailia with Koweit by a line which would have run practically due east and west.

Negotiations and pourparlers on the merits of these various lines were in progress for many years, a company being formed for the purpose of realising Colonel Chesney's plan in the early fifties. This company being unable to raise the necessary funds, and the British Government having refused its support to the scheme in 1857, the question lapsed until 1872, when it was referred to a Parliamentary Commission, which approved of the construction of a line by the route advocated by Colonel Chesney. Subsequently, however, the idea was dropped in favour of one by which early in 1876 England purchased shares to the value of £4,000,000 in the Suez Canal, which had been open to traffic since 1869.

From this time onwards two reasons gradually led up to the idea of connecting not the Mediterranean but the Bosphorus with the Persian Gulf. The first of these was that, whilst in earlier times there was no railway nearer than Brindisi on the overland route to India, from the opening of the through line to Constantinople in 1888 it was natural, if there was to be an overland route to the Persian Gulf at all, that such a route would follow a line which would necessitate the shortest sea passage. The other and from political and military points of view far more important reason for the change of plan was that German influence,
gradually developed in Turkey since the accession of
the present Emperor to the throne, has been entirely
directed towards the construction of railways which
would not be easy of attack and communications which
could not be cut by a group of Powers with the com-
mand of the sea. Thus, whilst a line starting from the
Mediterranean would have been quite useless to Turkey
or Germany as a means of through connection between
the East and West, a railway broken only at the south-
ern end of the Bosphorus gives to the enemy an iron
road the importance of which it is impossible to over-
estimate. Indeed, so long as the forts of the Darda-
nelles and of the Bosphorus remain intact, the Sultan
and his allies enjoy the advantages of naval power in
a limited area — the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora,
and the Dardanelles — without the possession of a
fleet.

Before entering into a discussion of the history,
geoigraphy, and construction of the great trunk line,
I will endeavour to show in a general way the ac-
tual meaning and the military and political impor-
tance of the railways of Asiatic Turkey as they exist
to-day. Starting from Haidar Pasha, opposite to
Constantinople, it is now possible to travel by train
or by water across the greater part of the areas which
lie between the Ottoman capital and Bagdad on the
one hand and the Egyptian frontier on the other.
The Taurus tunnels were pierced in November, 1916,
and they are now open to traffic maintained at least
by a narrow-gauge railway. More or less through
communication has therefore been established right
across the Anatolian Plateau, along the Plain of Cilicia,
and through the Amanus Range to a junction about
ten miles to the north of Aleppo. From here the northern prong, or Bagdad Railway proper, continues its way in an easterly direction as far as Hélif and probably to Nisibin. At the other or Bagdad end the railway has been completed in a northerly direction up to Samarra. If we take it that the respective termini are at Hélif and at Samarra, this means that out of the total distance of approximately fifteen hundred miles from Constantinople to Bagdad, about twelve hundred miles can be accomplished by train.

The portion of the journey which cannot be performed by train is made up of two parts, the first of about one hundred and thirty miles across the desert from Hélif to Mosul. From here the stage to Samarra, about one hundred and seventy miles, can be accomplished in boats and rafts floated or sailed down the Tigris. In addition, what is almost equally important is that, since the completion of the Taurus and Amanus tunnels, the railway thus constructed approaches and crosses the Euphrates at Jerablus. From that place there is an alternative means of communication with Mesopotamia by way of the Euphrates as far as Feluja, now connected by a light railway with Bagdad only about thirty-five miles to the east. The progress of the construction of the Bagdad line has therefore had its direct military advantages to Turkey in the Mesopotamian campaign. It also provides an easier and quicker means of communication between Constantinople and Eastern Asia Minor than would otherwise have existed so long as the Black Sea route was closed to traffic. For instance, the distances to be covered by road between Hélif and the Bitlis district, or between the head of the rail-
way and Kharput—a centre of the utmost importance—are considerably less than those which would otherwise have had to be traversed by road from Angora—formerly the nearest point in railway connection with Constantinople. These facilities are of the greatest importance to-day because they must further the Turco-Germanic objects of reconquering Northeastern Asia Minor and of overcoming Armenian resistance there and in the areas of the Russian Caucasus now ceded to Turkey by Russia under her terms of peace with the Central Powers.

Up to Aleppo, about eight hundred and forty miles from Constantinople, the Anatolian and Bagdad railways serve as a means of communication with the south as well as with the east. From Aleppo the southern prong, before the War owned partly by French companies and partly by the Turks themselves (I must obviously speak here of the pre-War ownership of the railways, for the Turks are believed to have seized all those which properly belong to companies of Allied nationality), runs by way of Damascus to Deraia. From this point there are two routes. The first is by the Hedjaz line, which continues its way in a southerly direction as far as Medina. The second bends from Deraia in a westerly direction towards Haifa, but before reaching that port turns south near Nazareth, ultimately extending as far as Bir Auja, about thirty-five miles to the southwest of Beersheba.¹ Although there is at least one break of gauge at Rayak, not at Aleppo as is sometimes stated, the strategical

¹ Presumably ere now the Egyptian railway system has been united with that of Palestine, but no detailed reference can be made here or in the accompanying maps to lines constructed by the British for war purposes.
importance of these southern prongs is enormous. They have rendered possible the threatened attack upon Egypt, an attack which, although it never materialised, at one time had a certain effect upon the general plan of the Allied operations.

The story of the numerous and various arrangements which have led up to the existing extension of railways in Asia Minor is closely connected with the gradual development of Germanic influence in the Near East. In 1888, the only railways existing in Asia Minor were the Smyrna-Aidin, the Smyrna-Cassaba, the Mersina-Adana, and the Haidar Pasha (Scutari)-Ismid lines. All these railways were completely, or at least practically, in the hands of English capitalists. The Scutari-Ismid line, which now constitutes the first section of the Anatolian Railway and which has a length of about fifty-six miles, was built by the Turkish Government in 1871. In 1880 it was leased to a British company for a period of twenty years. In 1888, however, the Turks, influenced by the Germans, dispossessed the British Company and handed the line over to a German syndicate financed by the Deutsche Bank of Berlin, which then became the moving spirit in all the schemes of Germanic railway construction in the Asiatic dominions of the Sultan. Moreover, the Germans secured two Imperial Iradés, the one giving them the control of this line for a period of ninety-nine years, and the other granting them the right of extending it to Angora, and therefore for a further three hundred and one miles.

At the same time, the Turks first accepted the idea of providing kilometric guarantees for railways, the principle of those guarantees being that the Gov-
ernment promises to the company a fixed sum as the gross annual receipts per kilometre of line open to traffic. This sum is handed over to the railway by the Ottoman Public Debt before that organisation passes on its surplus to the Government. In the case of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid section the kilometric guarantee is 10,300 francs per kilometre, and in that of the Ismid-Angora section 15,000 francs per kilometre. The Anatolian Railway Company, which came into being in 1889, completed the railway to Angora, which was opened to traffic in 1892.

In the following year, which constitutes a very important epoch, the Germans were granted two further concessions. The first gave them the right of prolonging the railway from Angora to Kaisariya and thence through Sivas and Diarbeik and down the Tigris to Bagdad. This proposal was not carried out, ostensibly on account of the engineering difficulties, but really because of the hostility which it created in Russia. The idea of this line has, however, never been completely given up, and, if we are to believe various authoritative publications in Germany, the existence of a concession for the construction of lines from Adabazar to Bolu, and from Angora by way of Kaisariya to Sivas on the north, and to Nigde and Ulu Kushlar on the south, is still held to be valid. Indeed, according to Mehrmann’s “Diplomatischer Krieg in Vorder Asien”, published in 1916, some fifty miles of a railway from Angora towards Sivas and Erzerum had actually been completed in November of that year. There is also good reason to suppose that part of the line from Adabazar to Bolu, following a route fully described in my book, “Washed by Four Seas”, and for which a
concession exists, has been completed since the beginning of the War.

The second and all-important concession granted to the Germans in 1893 provided for the construction of what was then considered to be a branch line from Eskishehr to Konia. This line, which has a length of two hundred and sixty-nine miles and a kilometic guarantee (I believe amounting to about 12,500 francs per kilometre), was opened to traffic in 1896. Its completion was most important, not only because it laid the foundation for the construction of the Bagdad railway by its present route, but because one hundred miles to the south of Eskishehr it passes through Afiun Karahissar and thus establishes railway connection between Smyrna and Constantinople by what is still known as the Smyrna-Cassaba Railway.

That line owes its existence to an English company, which obtained a concession for its construction in 1863. Thirty years later, having no kilometic guarantee, the main line extended for a distance of one hundred and five miles to Alashehr, and its northern arm went only to Soma. In 1893 the Turks handed over these lines to a French company, which undertook to work them under a special arrangement with the Government (its details, as also a great deal of other useful information concerning railways in Asiatic Turkey, are to be found in “Corps de Droit Ottoman”, by George Young) and to prolong the main line as far as Afiun Karahissar, this latter stretch having a kilometic guarantee amounting to nearly 19,000 francs per kilometre. For some years the rivalry which existed between the French and the German companies prevented the actual junction of the two lines, and
when I was at Afiun Karahissar in 1905 I found the two railway systems separated by a distance of a few hundred yards and running their trains in such a way that the passenger was doomed to miss his connection. Subsequently, and I believe after the re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution in 1908, the two companies arrived at a working arrangement, and the trains of the French company started from the German station. After that time, too, the French company secured the concession to prolong, as far as Panderma on the Sea of Marmora, the branch which ran from Magnesia to Soma, and thus to open a subsidiary line, the total length of which is one hundred and thirteen miles. This prolongation, which has no kilometric guarantee, has played a most important part in the War, for it was on account of its existence that the Turks were able to convey troops to districts which lie in the immediate vicinity of the Asiatic coast of the Dardanelles.

Although they form no part of the Bagdad system, and have no connection with it, in order to make this chapter as complete an account as possible of the railways of Asiatic Turkey I will refer here very briefly to the Mudania-Brusa Line and to what is known as the Smyrna-Aidin Railway. The first of these, which unites the ancient capital of the Turkish Empire with its port upon the Sea of Marmora, has a length of about twenty-six miles. There is no kilometric guarantee, and its gauge is three feet three and four-tenths inches (one metre), instead of the normal Continental gauge of four feet eight and one half inches. By a firman of 1891 the company has the right to prolong its line to meet the Anatolian railway system, but the schemes for the establishment of connection either between
Brusa and the Germanic system near Eskishehr or between Brusa and the Smyrna-Panderma line never having been realized, this short section has little political or military importance.

The concession for the Smyrna-Aidin Line was given to a group of British capitalists in 1856 without the provision of a kilometric guarantee. Since the year 1866, when these first eighty miles of railway were opened to traffic, the system has been gradually extended to Egerdir, which lies at a distance of two hundred and ninety-four miles to the east of Smyrna. Possessed of four short branches, this line has always managed to prosper without a kilometric guarantee. But unless the War reverses the whole position of railways in Asia Minor, it is obvious that the dream once entertained by its promoters—that it should be prolonged to Konia and thus form the first section of the route to Bagdad—is doomed to meet with disappointment.

From the moment of the opening of the railway to Konia the German plans for the prolongation of that line to the Persian Gulf became more definite and precise. The Kaiser, who had paid his first visit to Constantinople in 1889—a visit more or less connected with the then recent grabbing of the Haidar Pasha-Ismid Railway by the Germans and with its prolongation to Angora, to which I have already referred—went to Turkey again in the year 1898. It was this, his second visit, and the appointment of Baron Marshal von Bieberstein as German Ambassador in Constantinople in 1897, that led to the promise of a concession for the present railway—a promise which I believe was made verbally in 1898.
There is no reason here to enter into the details of the negotiations which intervened between that time and the signature of the final agreement five years later. These negotiations have been admirably reviewed, among others, by Sir Valentine Chirol in his "Middle Eastern Question", and by M. André Chéradame in various works and papers which he has published on the subject. Suffice it, therefore, to say that in 1899 a preliminary Convention was signed between Doctor Siemens — then Director of the Deutsche Bank — and the Porte. That Convention gave to the Anatolian Railway Company, in principle, the right of constructing a line from Konia to the Persian Gulf. In 1902 a formal Convention was approved by the Sultan — a Convention which in its turn served as the basis of the final agreement of March 5, 1903. This agreement, which constitutes the real charter of the Bagdad Railway, was actually signed between representatives of the Ottoman Government on the one hand and those of the Anatolian Railway Company on the other. But as the Anatolian Railway Company was so blatantly German, and as the Deutsche Bank, at that time, wished to cater for international financial support, it was carefully arranged before the signature of the Convention that a new company, to be known as the "Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway Company", should take over the concession actually given to men who acted as nominees of the Deutsche Bank and of the Anatolian Company when they signed the agreement. The new company, with a capital of £600,000, was formed on the very day on which the concession was signed.

Although my primary object here is to discuss the
military and geographical aspects of the Bagdad Railway, the financial and political details of the Convention of 1903 (published in England as a Parliamentary Paper on the Bagdad Railway in 1911) are such that it seems advisable very briefly to refer to some of their principal features. That Convention ensured to the company not only the power of building a line from Konia to Basra, more or less, though not exactly, by the route which it so far follows, but it also gave the right to construct branches, the most important of which were those from Sadjieh to Khanikin, and from Basra to a point on the Persian Gulf to be subsequently agreed upon, thus totalling nearly two thousand miles. The duration of the arrangement was to be for ninety-nine years, the existing concessions for the lines to Angora and Konia being prolonged for a like period. The first section had to be begun at once and completed in two years. All sorts of facilities and rights were guaranteed and given to the company, including the power of constructing ports at Bagdad, Basra, and on the Persian Gulf. It was also to have the use of the rivers, Shatt-el-Arab, Tigris, and Euphrates for the conveyance of material and workmen required for constructional purposes. In addition the concession outlined almost unlimited directions in which the power of the company could be increased from time to time.

The financial arrangements between the Government and the company depend partly upon the Convention and partly upon the subsidiary documents which it was thereby agreed should be signed before the commencement of each section or group of sections. Thus whilst the original concession constitutes
the promise of the Government to pay the company and defines the amount of the kilometric guarantee, the subsequent loan contracts, the first three series of which are published in the above-mentioned Blue Book, actually provide the money for the payment of the guarantee, which in fact totals 15,500 francs per year per kilometre when each section begins to work. That sum is made up of two parts, the first being 11,000 francs per kilometre for construction provided by the Government, and the second being 4500 francs per year per kilometre for working expenses. If the gross kilometric receipts of the line exceed 4500 francs per annum, provision is made as to the distribution of the surplus, and further sums were guaranteed for the improvement of the line between Haidar Pasha and Konia and for the subsequent running of express trains.

The Bagdad Railway Four Per Cent. Loan Contract, First Series, to cover the expense of the construction of the first section of the line from Konia to Bulgurlu, was signed at the same time as the original Convention. It put into force, so far as that section was concerned, the arrangements made by the concession itself. The company sold bonds, issued by the Government, on the market, and secured a sum amounting to about £1,800,000, which was ample for the construction of a stretch of line on which there were no engineering difficulties. As a matter of fact, after the opening of that section, which took place in 1904, the company was left with a considerable surplus (sometimes estimated at over £1,000,000), to be placed towards the expense of building the much more costly sections which were to traverse the Taurus and Amanus ranges.
From Konia to Eregli the railway wanders over a sparsely populated plain. For the whole distance, and particularly between Karaman and Eregli, one sees nothing but miles upon miles of country, only very small parts of which are cultivated. The first section does not, however, end at Eregli, which would have been its natural terminus. In order to comply with the terms of the concession, which states that sections must be one hundred and twenty-five miles in length, the railway was prolonged to a point a few hundred yards beyond Bulgurlu. Here, for years, a pair of rails laid upon a low embankment were left to jut out into space, and to demonstrate that things in Turkey are not conducted in a normal manner.

Although strictly speaking it does not form part of the Bagdad Railway, I will briefly refer here to the scheme for the irrigation of the plain of Konia, which is in the hands of a German company, formed in 1907, as an offshoot of the Anatolian and Bagdad railway companies and which I have described in detail in my book, "The Danger Zone of Europe." The task of that company is to bring the waters of Lakes Beyshehr and Karaviran through the gorges of the Charshembe River in order to irrigate a large district which surrounds Chumla station. If this has been or can be successfully done—a great deal of work had actually been carried out in the year 1909—some one hundred and thirty thousand acres of arid plain will have been effectively watered. To accomplish this object more than two hundred million cubic yards of water will be required every year. The Turks hope to be able to recover the money spent in building the necessary canals, etc.—money advanced by the Germans—
by selling portions of the land irrigated, by raising the rents upon the tenants, and by decreasing if not by doing away altogether with the balance to be paid on the kilometric guarantees of at least this section of the Bagdad Railway.

The completion of the first section of the line was followed by a prolonged delay. This was due partly to geographical and partly to political and international conditions. From the first of these standpoints the difficulty lay in the fact that the second section, which enters the Taurus area directly it leaves Bulgurlu, was the most costly of construction upon the whole line. This meant that as the company would be compelled to disburse the handsome surplus left over from the first section, it refused to agree to build the Taurus length unless it were given, at the same time, the money for at least two sections located to the east of that range. From a political point of view the question was complicated, for, whilst the Turks had difficulty in providing and guaranteeing the interest on the necessary funds, there arose once more the problem as to whether international consent could be secured for the raising of these funds, and whether there was or was not to be international co-operation in the scheme.

After a great deal of difficulty, in June, 1908 — that is, two months before the re-establishment of the Ottoman Constitution — an additional Convention and an agreement for the second and third series of the Bagdad Loan Contract (published in the above-mentioned Parliamentary Paper) were signed between the company and the Government. The first of these documents slightly modified the original Convention,
and arranged for the construction of four sections to measure not eight hundred but eight hundred and forty kilometres and to extend as far as Héléif. The second provided for the money necessary for constructional purposes. The signature of these documents was in its turn followed by a further delay, this time caused by the temporarily changed conditions in Turkey itself. The revolution of July, 1908, so shook the position of the Germans that for a time they did not know where they were. Moreover, for a limited period the power of the Ottoman Parliament became stronger and stronger, and the influence of the true Liberals, who desired to avoid the heavy financial burdens placed upon Turkey by the railway contract, became greater and greater. The results of this were that there intervened a great struggle between the opponents of the scheme and those who desired to modify the railway route on the one hand, and the Germans together with the corrupt elements of the Ottoman population on the other, and that the line was only open as far as Karapunar (about ninety miles by railway to the southeast of Eregli) at the time of the outbreak of the War.

On leaving Bulgurlu, at an elevation of about three thousand seven hundred feet above the sea, the railway immediately begins to wind its way up the northern slopes of the Taurus. Following more or less the line of the old post-road the gradients are steep, but as the country is open and rolling, engineers have been able to choose their own route, thus avoiding any serious constructional difficulties. Arrived at the watershed, known as the Karndash Bel (height 5070 feet), the railway continues its way for two or
three miles and as far as Ulu Kushlar — the highest station on the whole line at an altitude of four thousand nine hundred feet. Near Ulu Kushlar the traveller who follows this route by road or train enters a valley at first followed by the Tabaz and subsequently by the Bozanti Su. That valley, the sides of which are bedecked with scattered trees, grows narrower and narrower until it becomes a mere gorge, in places so narrow that the river flows through a deep rocky crevice, where before the construction of the railway there was barely room for the road. On the south and west one has distant views of the snow-covered Bulghar Dagh, whilst on the north and east one has occasional glimpses up side valleys which reveal distant mountain-tops in winter covered in snow. The result of the limitations due to the existence of this gorge is that the construction of this stretch of line, about thirty-five miles in length, was very costly, for it entailed the provision of numerous bridges and lengthy embankments and a great deal of rock hewing to render it secure against floods and washouts.

At Ak Kupru (altitude 2985 feet) this gorge suddenly debouches upon the Vale of Bozanti (Podandus) — a fertile district about four miles long by one mile wide, in the midst of the Taurus Mountains. In this valley the railway and the new road constructed by the company diverge from the ancient trade route, which takes a more westerly line and passes through the Cilician Gates. Bearing off in a southeasterly direction, the railway and new road follow the valley of the Chakra Su, which flows to the east of the Cilician Gates. This river runs from the Vale of Bozanti into the heart of the mountains and finally dives into
a dark, cavelike opening, to emerge again on the southern slopes of the range after a subterranean course of some three hundred yards. Prior to the construction of the railway the approaches to the places where this curious river enters and emerges from its subterranean course were, I believe, almost entirely unexplored.

The line was opened as far as Karapunar in December, 1913. About a year and a half earlier (April, 1912) it had been completed from the south to Dorak, on the southern slopes of the range. It was therefore the short section (roughly about thirty miles in length) lying between these two places which blocked through traffic from December, 1913, until that section was actually opened at the end of 1916 or early in 1917.¹ But the construction of this piece of line constituted by far the most difficult engineering task on the whole railway. In addition to four tunnels, which have a total length of about eleven miles, there was an immense amount of earthwork, cutting, and bridge building to be done. Some of the bridges over mountain streams have piers fifty to one hundred feet high, and in one place alone there is a cutting for a distance of some two miles. The new road itself, which was constructed entirely for railway purposes, is a very fine piece of work, for it required an immense amount of undercutting in the cliffs which rise sheer above and fall vertically below it in such a way that wooden balustrades had to be provided to ensure against accident. From Dorak the line sweeps down the southern slopes

¹ For some time after the opening of this section it was run as a narrow gauge line. Ere now, however, it may possibly have been finished on the normal system.
of the range, and after about fifteen miles meets the old Mersina-Adana Railway at Yenije, about halfway between Tarsus and Adana.

After leaving the Bozanti Vale the old post road winds its way up to the Tekir Plateau or summit (altitude about 4500 feet). Thence, passing through scenery of the most magnificent beauty, it approaches the Cilician Gates. Here at three thousand six hundred feet the gorge is so narrow that the road is supported by a revetted embankment over the stream. After leaving this historic gateway one continues down the valley of one of the tributaries of the Tarsus Chai (Cydnus), and after passing over the low foothills of the Taurus finally reaches the Mersina-Adana Railway at Gulek Boghaz—a station three or four miles to the east of Tarsus. It is this road, for years passable for strong vehicles, and recently, I believe, considerably improved, which was used by the Turks as a means of communication before the opening of the Karapunar-Dorak section of the railway. If we take it that troops coming from the north would have been detrained at Bozanti Han, and that they would have joined the railway again at Gulek Boghaz, the distance to be covered on foot would be about forty miles—a distance which took me about fourteen hours in a carriage.

Once at Gulek Boghaz by road, or at Yenije by train, the traveller has reached the Cilician Plain—a very fertile district which is practically cut off from the remainder of Asia Minor by mountains. The scene of the terrible massacres which took place in the year 1909, when some twenty-five thousand Armenians were brutally murdered without any adequate protest by the Young Turks, it is watered by the rivers Tarsus
Chai, Seihun, and Djehun. These rivers, which were once navigable in their lower reaches, are now only muddy channels which serve to conduct vast volumes of water from the mountains, in which they rise, to the seacoast. This plain, which is cultivated for cotton, wheat, and barley, is traversed by the Mersina-Adana and the Bagdad railways. The former line, which was originally built with English capital, was taken over by the Germans in 1908. Forming a branch of the Bagdad Railway, between that time and the outbreak of the War, it was utilised for the transport of railway material and rolling stock for the new line. Though Mersina could not in any case have competed with Alexandretta as a port, the acquisition of this short section removed the possibility of any competition with the Bagdad Railway in this area.

Although the concession for their construction was not granted until the signature of the agreement made between the Government and the company on March 19, 1911 — an agreement the main details of which, so far as they concerned Alexandretta, were published in the Stamboul, a French newspaper issued in Constantinople, and also by the late Mr. H. F. B. Lynch in The Fortnightly Review for May, 1911 — it is convenient to refer to the significance of the branch built to and of the port at Alexandretta before leaving the Cilician Plain. That concession constitutes the most important arrangement made with the company since its foundation in 1903. In the first place it finally disposed of the idea of a modification in the original route — a highly desirable modification which would have taken the main line by way of Alexandretta to Aleppo instead of by the present more
northerly route. These negotiations were partially responsible for the delay which occurred before the commencement of the construction of the second and third sections of the line. The fact that this modification was not accepted and that the line now follows (with certain changes to which I will refer below) the route originally defined by the concession, means that in place of running absolutely along the seacoast for a good many miles, the railway now approaches the coast nowhere within a distance of less than ten miles. Under German influence the Turks have thereby avoided what would have been a continual menace to their communications from the sea; for, whilst the section of the railway in the neighbourhood of the Gulf of Alexandretta is still the one most easy of attack, that attack would now constitute a far larger undertaking than were the line to have run close to the water's edge.

Politically and commercially the right given to the company to construct the branch to and the port at Alexandretta went far beyond anything foreseen in the original concession. The Turks were already committed by that arrangement not to grant concessions for railways running to the coast between Mersina and Tripoli to any group except the Bagdad company. But this did not anticipate the giving to it rights to be enjoyed for a period of ninety-nine years from the time of the completion of the railway to Hélif, rights which really amounted to a lease, and facilities which might almost be compared to those formerly enjoyed by the Germans at Kiao-Chao. The concessionaires obtained the power to build quays, docks, and warehouses, and to police a port which, unlike Haidar Pasha
within closed Turkish waters, is situated in an area over which the Turks could have no direct control so long as they did not possess the command of the sea. Commercially speaking, too, the acquisition of such a prize was of supreme value to Germany, for the possession of Alexandretta once and for all removed any danger of competition for the Bagdad Railway.

The branch to Alexandretta which leaves the main route at Toprak Kale on the Cilician Plain and for which there is no kilometric guarantee has a length of about thirty-seven miles. After passing through the Amanian Gates, which are only about three hundred yards wide, the railway enters the Plain of Issus, subsequently following the seacoast for the remainder of its length. Had this section formed part of the main line, the Bagdad Railway would probably have proceeded from Alexandretta by way of the Beilan Pass to Antioch, running thence in an easterly direction to Aleppo. As things stand at present, it is obvious that the Alexandretta line can have no significance, for it traverses an area which can be directly commanded from the sea. It is for this reason that it seems highly probable that the enemy may have actually taken up the rails in order to utilise them for railway construction somewhere upon the through route.

The Cilician Plain practically ends at Osmaniya, to the east of which place the railway plunges into the mountains in order to force its way through the Amanus Range. The passage of this range entails a rise from about five hundred to seventeen hundred and fifty feet above the sea. After passing over several steel bridges, and through a number of small tunnels, the railway
enters the great Bagche tunnel, five thousand three hundred yards in length, which is still, I believe, the longest in Turkey. Thus, whilst the passage of the Amanus Range is much shorter than that of the Taurus, the engineering difficulties were such that there is no wonder that the completion, which took place during the late summer of 1915, delayed the opening of the section which lies between Mamoure and Rajan for a period of nearly three years from the time when it was possible to reach these temporary termini by train.

In and immediately to the east of the Amanus Range the line follows a trace which is somewhat different to that foreseen in the original concession. In place of running from Bagche to Kazanali, thence across the Kurd Dagh and through Killis and Tel Habesch to the Euphrates, the line now turns in a southerly direction near Bagche. Passing through Islahiya it subsequently follows the valley of the Kara Su and runs round the southwestern end of the Kurd Dagh. Instead of making Killis, or more correctly Tel Habesch, the junction for Aleppo, and of constructing a branch, as foreseen in the original concession from Tel Habesch to Aleppo, this means that the main line passes close to Aleppo itself. The result, for such as it is worth, is that in place of an Aleppo branch, about forty miles in length, the actual junction is made at Muslimiya—a place located only ten miles to the north of Aleppo.

To the northeast of Aleppo the next important landmark on the railway is the Jerablus bridge which spans the Euphrates. With a length of eight hundred and fifty yards its non-completion delayed effective through communication from December, 1913 (when the sec-
tion to the west of the Euphrates was opened); for although a temporary wooden structure was ready in 1913, the steel bridge, made up of many spans, was not reported finished until 1915. To the east of the Euphrates the railway now continues its way at least as far as Hélif and probably to Nisibin or beyond. If Hélif be the point, it means that all the work on the main line arranged for in the agreements of 1908 has actually been completed, and that it is now possible to travel by train, perhaps still with a break of gauge in the Taurus, for a distance of over eleven hundred miles from Constantinople. According to recent reports too, as a result of orders given by the German General Staff, a branch is now being built from Ras-el-Ain to Diabekr, the rails on the French line from Homs to Tripoli having been taken up for that purpose.

We come now to the new Conventions signed between the Ottoman Government and the company on March 19, 1911, and to the sections of the railway which have or have not been constructed since the arrival of these agreements. Over and above the rights given to the Germans for the construction of the Alexandretta branch and of the port of Alexandretta (Conventions 2 and 3) to which I have referred above, we have in these arrangements firstly the provision for the building of the line from Hélif to Bagdad, and secondly some sort of German undertaking in regard to the ownership and control of the section to be built from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. The arrangements made for the prolongation of the line to Bagdad are given in the Stamboul for March 20, 1911, but no reference is made there to the agreements about the last section, concerning the general sense of which
we have certain information, but the definite details of which, so far as I am aware, have never been published.

With regard to the first of these questions, sufficient be it to say that the railway has been planned to take the original trace by way of Nisibin to Mosul. Between the last two places it follows, not the usual route by way of Jezire, but strikes southeast, first across a plain on which there are a few villages, and then into the desert, which is almost entirely unpopulated and where there is but little water. From Hélim to Mosul, a journey reckoned to take at least thirty hours by road, the distance is approximately one hundred and fifty miles. There is no reason to know that any part of this section or of the proposed branch from Mosul to Erbil (length sixty-two miles) has yet been constructed. From Mosul, from which point river transport can be utilised, the railway is planned to cover the length of two hundred and forty miles to Bagdad by way of the regular trade route, which follows the right bank of the Tigris and passes through Hammam Ali, Tekrit, and Samarra. So far as we know, no work has been done from the northern end of this section or upon the branch from Sadijeh to Khanikin; but the piece from Bagdad to Samarra, built from the southern end and having a length of about seventy-five miles, has been open to traffic since October, 1914. That the Turks were unable to extend the line to Tekrit or beyond is largely due to the fact that when the British occupied Basra on November 21, 1914, they seized a considerable amount of railway material and rolling stock — material which would have been of great value to the enemy had he been left the opportunity of utilising it either for con-
structional purposes on the main line or for the building of the intended branch from Sadijeh to Khanikin.

In addition, by the agreements of 1911, the company is believed more or less to have renounced its right to the construction of the section from Bagdad to the Persian Gulf. From a geographical standpoint all that need therefore be said upon this question is that the line, as originally proposed, was to leave the Tigris near Bagdad, and after crossing the Euphrates, to run through Kerbela and Nedjef to Zobeir and Basra. There was to be a branch from Zobeir "to a point on the Persian Gulf to be agreed upon between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Concessionaires." It is unnecessary to say here that the locality of that point constitutes one of the most important factors in the whole scheme, and that no decision upon the subject has ever been published. As things stand at present it seems open to doubt whether the route suggested for this last section will be adopted or whether the permanent line will consist of an improvement of the military railway which we believe has been constructed by the British from the Persian Gulf up to or almost up to Bagdad.

Were it not that the War, and particularly the British advance in Mesopotamia, cannot fail to obliterate many of the more important results of the events which preceded and followed the signing of the new agreements between the Turkish Government and the company in March, 1911, those events might be of political consequence, the far-reaching significance of which it would be impossible to exaggerate. The signature of this agreement almost immediately followed the meeting of the Tsar with the Emperor at
Potsdam in November, 1910, a meeting during which the relations existing between Russia and Germany were temporarily adjusted. Though the exact nature of that arrangement was not known until afterwards it is now certain that Russia agreed no longer to oppose the construction of the Bagdad Railway, and either herself to build or allow the Germans to build a line from Khanikin — the terminus of a branch already agreed upon between Turkey and the Bagdad Company — to Tehran. As compensation for this, the Russian position in Northern Persia was recognised by Germany. It remained then for Berlin to treat with England and France for agreements concerning future developments in their respective spheres. The Tripoli War of 1911 and the Balkan War of 1912 were not, however, favourable periods for negotiation, and it was thus only in 1913 that Turkey, in agreement with Germany, despatched to London the ex-Grand Vizier — Hakki Pasha — to try to bring about agreements to be drawn up between the Foreign Office, the German Embassy, and the Ottoman Embassy — agreements to settle the outstanding differences as regards the Bagdad-Persian Gulf section and other cognate matters of river transport in these regions. These agreements presumably presupposed a continuance of friendly and peaceful relations between Turkey, Germany, and Great Britain, and it is believed that they were practically already concluded when, in August, 1914, Great Britain found herself compelled to declare war on Germany, Turkey subsequently throwing in her lot with our enemies.\(^1\)

\(^1\) These are the Agreements to which Prince Lichnowsky refers in his famous memorandum.
Before passing to a brief description of the Syrian railways there are still two questions which must be mentioned in connection with the Bagdad line. The first concerns the facilities which it provides, or which it might provide, for travel. The agreement for the railway stipulates for the provision of a fortnightly express between Constantinople and the Persian Gulf and vice versa. This train was to run at an average speed of about twenty-eight miles per hour, including stops, for the first five years from the opening to traffic of the whole of the main line, that speed subsequently to be increased to thirty-seven miles per hour, including stops. This means, were the said express train to run at its lower speed, that the journey from Constantinople to Bagdad would be accomplished in about fifty-four hours, and from the Turkish capital to Basra in about sixty-six hours. Taking the pre-War time necessary for the journey from London to Constantinople by Orient Express, and allowing for a very short delay at the latter place, theoretically it would be possible to travel from London to Basra in one hundred and forty-four hours, that is, in six days. From Basra to Bombay the distance is just over nineteen hundred miles—a distance which at, say, twenty knots per hour could be accomplished in about eighty-four hours. Thus, taking all the conditions at their most favourable value, and allowing a margin of only five hours at Basra, travellers and mails could be conveyed from London to Bombay by that route in about nine days seventeen hours, instead of, as before the War, in between thirteen and fourteen days.

This, of course, shows a considerable nominal saving in time—a saving which might even be increased
by running fast ships from Basra to Karachi and by improving the train service between the latter place and Bombay. But against the advantages of that nominal saving must be set the facts that the journey by way of Brindisi and the Suez Canal could be speeded up, and that on the great cross-country journey, from Constantinople to the Gulf, there would be bound to be considerable delays and irregularities in the running of the trains, delays due among other things to the conditions prevailing in the areas through which the line would pass.

Prior to the outbreak of the War, the tourist desirous of travelling by the Anatolian and Bagdad railways was certainly not provided with the comforts which would have led him to choose such a route in preference to one followed by a first-class ocean steamer. Leaving the Bridge at Constantinople at an early hour in the morning, one traversed the Bosphorus in a steamer run in connection with the train. From Haidar Pasha to Eskishehr the first stage of the journey took ten and one-half hours. As there were no night trains, one was compelled to sleep at the latter place, starting at 5 A.M. on the morrow for Konia, which is reached after a journey of fifteen hours. At Konia the company has built a new hotel which, though much cleaner and better than those which ordinarily exist in the interior of Turkey, is still less comfortable than one would suppose from its pretentious appearance. Starting again at 6.30 A.M. one could go on for the subsequent one hundred and ninety miles to Karapunar — a place which in its turn was reached after eleven hours. The speed on all these sections only averaged about eighteen miles per hour. The first time I went to
Eregli, soon after the opening of the railway, one travelled in old-fashioned, non-corridor carriages which were neither heated nor provided with the ordinary comforts available on long journeys. On a subsequent occasion I found first-class rolling stock which compared quite favourably with that run on express lines in Europe. Practically nobody except Ambassadors, high officials of the State, and those provided with passes, travel first class, and, as the majority of the passengers are natives, who cannot afford anything better than third, the second-class passenger when he gets well into the interior is generally the sole occupant of a carriage. The trains are mixed (of passenger coaches and baggage cars), and therefore at all the larger stations one stops for a sufficient time to allow for the loading and unloading of goods.

As to the actual financial cost to Turkey of a line like the Bagdad Railway it is difficult to form any reliable estimate. In addition to the fact that only short disconnected lengths were open before the War, those lengths had not been completed for a sufficient time to render possible a consequent development of trade. The distance from Konia to Bagdad being sixteen hundred and fifty kilometres, the maximum possible cost per annum to the Government, if the railway had no receipts whatever, would be about 25,575,000 francs per annum. But against this sum must be set not only the actual receipts of the line, receipts which for the first section between Konia and Eregli amounted to about 514,350 francs in the year 1910, but also other and more indirect advantages accruing to the Government. Commercially speaking these advantages are primarily due to the fact
that in railway districts the peasants, instead of only cultivating what they require for their own use and for the local markets, develop their land to much fuller advantage as soon as they are able easily to send away their goods. This results not only in the increased prosperity of the people, but also in a great augmentation in the traffic and in the tithes to be collected by the Government. The change is shown by the fact that, whilst the receipts of the Anatolian Company amounted in 1907 to 10,428,475 francs, in 1913 they had risen to 20,549,875 francs, thereby of course bringing an enormous reduction in the sum due from the Government for kilometric guarantees. This change is also shown by the fact that the peasants began to trade in gold instead of in silver, with the result that a vast quantity of gold coin has disappeared into the interior during the last few years.

From a military point of view, over and above the advantages of railway communication to which I have already referred, the opening up of the country has enabled the Ottoman Government to quell more than one insurrection in distant parts of the empire. In recent years this facility has been particularly valuable in the case of the Hedjaz, where there have been several rebellions. Moreover, the existence of railways renders possible a comparatively rapid mobilisation of at least parts of the army. But this in its turn has rather a curious effect, for it means that military service is not only much more strictly enforced among the sections of the population domiciled near to railways, but that the reserves furnished from these districts are often called out long before much younger men, recruited from more remote districts, have per-
formed their military obligations. During the last six years of almost continuous war the consequences of this are that a very unfair burden, which is greatly resented by those who have had to bear it, has been placed upon the men who come from easily accessible areas, and that the Ottoman first-line army, instead of being composed of all the younger men of the country, often contains units made up of those who ought to be utilised only in the second line of the Turkish fighting machine.

Turning to the Syrian railways, which geographically speaking form a sort of southern prong of the Bagdad Railway, I will discuss those lines in their relation to the German system, and therefore from north to south rather than in the order in which they were constructed. To begin with, since the end of 1906, when the section between Aleppo and Hama was opened to traffic, a French line, owned by a company known as the “Damas Hama et Prolongements”, has united the former town with Rayak on the line from Beirut to Damascus. With a total length of two hundred and six miles, the railway, built on the normal continental gauge, has a kilometic guarantee amounting, I think, to 13,600 francs per kilometre. Its existence depends upon various arrangements made between the Government and the company in and subsequent to the year 1893 — arrangements the details of which are very fully set out by Mr. George Young in his “Corps de Droit Ottoman.” The whole line was of easy construction, for it follows the plain and passes through fine cornland, which is not liable to floods, as the rivers run in deep trenches. There is one big bridge over the Orontes at Hama, but elsewhere no other struc-
tures of any engineering significance. The normal-gauge branch from Homs to Tripoli, with its length of about sixty-five miles, which belongs to the same company and which was built without a kilometrical guarantee after the re-establishment of the Turkish Constitution, is believed to have been taken up in order that the material might be utilised for construction elsewhere.

Unless it has been widened since the beginning of the War, which is very unlikely owing to the great length of line which would have had to be altered, there is a break at Rayak, all the railways to the south of which point being of a narrow gauge. Here we meet the French system, known as the company of the “Chemin de Fer Beyrouth-Damas-Hauran”, which owns the line (one hundred and fifty-five miles in length) connecting Beirut with Damascus and Mezerib, the latter about six miles to the west of Deraia. This railway, which has been open to through traffic since 1895, and which has no kilometrical guarantee, is built upon the somewhat exceptional gauge of 3 feet 5.34 inches (1.05 metres).

Starting from Beirut harbour the railway, which is on the Abt system (an engine that can work either by adhesion or by cogwheels and central rail), climbs up the Lebanon for about five thousand feet to a point just above Ain Safar. Thence it winds down to the valley of the Bekaa, in which is Rayak Junction. The gradients are very steep, and therefore even with the rack and pinion system short trains are obliged to go very slowly. To the east of Rayak the railway continues over the plain, until it is compelled to cross the Anti-Lebanon, where the gradients, heavy enough
THE RAILWAYS OF SYRIA AND PALESTINE

From a map prepared by The Royal Geographical Society
to limit the load very closely, are not sufficient to necessitate at any point the use of the cogwheel system. To the south of Damascus the French line, which is believed to have been taken up since the War in order that the material might be utilised for construction elsewhere, ran practically parallel to and on the west of the Hedjaz line.

We now come to the Hedjaz Railway, which is of the 1.05-metre gauge (adopted in order to correspond with that of the Beirut-Damascus line, by which rolling stock, etc., had to be imported). Built by the Turks themselves with the assistance of foreign engineers, and particularly with that of Meissner Pasha—a very able German—the railway, which starts from Damascus and which is eight hundred and twenty miles long, was first opened as far as Medina towards the end of the year 1908. Though it was often broken by raiding parties, from that time until the outbreak of the War it was available for military transport purposes to and from the Hedjaz, and for the pilgrims for whose use it was largely constructed. Never completed to Mecca or prolonged to the coast of the Red Sea as proposed, the railway runs through districts in which for years the Turkish position has been so far from stable that since the beginning of the War it could probably not be safely used beyond even if as far as Maan. In addition to the line to Haifa, to which I will refer in greater detail below, the Hedjaz Railway has a branch (twenty-two miles in length) which connects Bosra with Deraia. According to Petermanns Mitteilungen, July, 1915, it also has a French feeder (twenty-five miles in length) running from Amman to Es Salt, a feeder which it
was no doubt intended should be prolonged across the Jordan Valley to Jerusalem. It is in this last mentioned neighbourhood that the British, based upon Jerusalem, have attached the Hedjaz line in order subsequently to be able to utilise it for their further advance towards Damascus and the north.

There now remain only two Syrian lines which were open to traffic before the outbreak of the War. The concession for the first of these — the Haifa Railway — having been given in 1890, that line was partly built by a British company. The then existing works were purchased by the Government in 1902, and the railway, which now has an extension from Haifa to Acre, and which is built on the 1.05-metre gauge, was finally opened to traffic in May, 1906, as a branch of the Hedjaz line. The second, to which no special reference is necessary, is the Jaffa-Jerusalem line, the concession for which was acquired by a French company in 1889. Built on the one-metre gauge, with a length of fifty-four miles, the line was opened to traffic in 1892.¹

Such was the condition of things in Syria on the outbreak of the War. Before that time, however, it had been often proposed that a normal-gauge railway should be constructed on the west of the Jordan in order to prolong the line from Rayak at least as far as Jerusalem. I believe that a concession had been actually granted to the French for a line from the former place to Ramle on the route already open from Jaffa to Jerusalem. Needless to say work upon this section was never begun, and its place was taken by

¹ The north-western part of this line was taken up by the Turks early in the war, but doubtless it has now been relaid by the British.
a line built by the Turks themselves. That line (presumably constructed upon the 1.05-metre gauge, in order to correspond with the Hedjaz and Damascus-Beirut systems) starts at El Fule on the Deraia-Haifa branch. Keeping well inland, it runs in a southerly direction (there is a considerable detour near Nablus) to Lydda on the Jaffa-Jerusalem Railway. From this point the new line follows the old route (the gauge has probably been changed) to Lydda, where it leaves the branch to Jerusalem and continues its way via Beersheba at least to Bir Anja. No details are available concerning this section, the length of which must be about one hundred and sixty miles. But it is obvious that its completion rendered possible the threatened attacks upon Egypt during the earlier stages of the War, and that its existence played a considerable rôle in enabling the Turks to bring up the reinforcements with which they so determinately resisted the British advance upon Jerusalem.

Although in passing I have mentioned the improvements and extensions made upon the Bagdad and Syrian railways since the entry of Turkey into the War, the knowledge of these coming improvements must have played such a prominent part in the Allied plan of operations, that it may be advisable here to draw the attention of my readers to their meaning and effect. In November, 1914, when the Ottoman Government threw in its lot with the Central Powers, so far as the Bagdad Railway was concerned, there was a gap of thirty miles in the Taurus, the Amanus tunnels were not completed, the permanent bridge across the Euphrates was not in position, and the terminus was at Tel-el-Abiad, only about sixty miles to the
east of that river. This meant not only that Turkish reinforcements and material destined to perform as much as possible of the eastern journey by train, were compelled to be detrained at least twice (in the Taurus and Amanus sections) but that the enemy was unable to derive the full benefits provided by the Euphrates route for water transport.

Under the above circumstances, it is obvious that the constantly increasing Turkish facilities of transport must have influenced those responsible for originally pushing forward in Mesopotamia for a distance and in a manner otherwise entirely unjustified considering the forces available, the inadequate preparations, and the difficulty of the country. Thus, the necessity for forestalling the Turks before they could effectively improve the Bagdad line must be considered as one reason for the inauguration of the Mesopotamian campaign directly after the entry of Turkey into the War. Moreover, had the Turks been left a free hand and had the finished parts of the line therefore been available for the transportation of railway material instead of being required for military purposes, there can be no doubt that much further progress could have been made both on the main route and with its several branches. Equally well, in regard to the Syrian campaign, had we waited to establish a line of adequate defences in an area situated at a safe distance to the east of the Canal, until the opening of the Taurus and Amanus tunnels and until the completion of the new railway on the west of the Jordan, it is obvious that the magnitude of our task and the dangers of the situation would have been enormously increased. As in the case of Mesopotamia,
it is these conditions which make it safe to assert that the taking of measures required for the protection of a vital section of the British Empire were necessary from the outset, and that having regard to what may be the intended future of this part of the world these measures may well have entailed a bigger campaign than was at first intended.

The present is a moment at which it is difficult, if not undesirable, to make a detailed forecast as to the future of the Bagdad Railway, and of the other lines in Asiatic Turkey. The only alternative is therefore to say that two things seem certain — firstly, that sooner or later the Bagdad or some other line from the Bosphorus to the Persian Gulf will be completed; and secondly, that its ownership and control must depend not so much upon any agreements already made as upon the results of the War and particularly upon the fate of Turkey. In regard to this latter, the Allies must leave no stone unturned to prevent the conclusion of a peace which would leave the enemy still possessed of the predominating control in an undertaking which, once it is robbed of its political significance, can easily be established upon an international basis and controlled as a result of the adoption of some scheme of internationalisation. That scheme must depend upon the future status of the now Asiatic dominions of the Sultan.
MITTEL EUROPÄ

To a Britisher who has followed the trend of events in the Near East, and who has witnessed the gradual development of German intrigues in that area, there has never been published a document so important and so condemnatory of Germany as the disclosures of Prince Lichnowsky. On the one hand the memorandum of the Kaiser’s ex-Ambassador in London, coming from an authoritative enemy pen, proves that practically ever since the Russo-Turkish War and particularly from the time of the accession of the present Emperor to the throne, the Germans have carefully prepared the way for the present War, and for the development of the Mittel Europa scheme. And on the other side it indicates, if indeed any indication were still required, that the so-called rivalry existing between England and Germany prior to the War arose not from any desire on the part of Great Britain to stand in the way of the development of legitimate German interests in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, but from the unwillingness of the Government of Berlin to agree to any reasonable settlement of the many all-important questions connected with those regions.

Although for years the Germans had been intriguing against the Triple Entente, Prince Lichnowsky,
The late Baron Marshal von Bieberstein was German Ambassador in Constantinople from 1897 until his transference to London in the spring of 1912. It was largely to him that the earlier development of German influence in Turkey was due, and he was one of the Kaiser’s most important instruments in furthering the growth of the Mittel Europa scheme.
a man possessed of personally friendly feelings for England, was sent to London in order to camouflage the real designs of the enemy and to secure representation by a diplomatist who was intended to make good, and who, in fact, did make a high position for himself in British official and social circles. The appointment itself therefore raises two interesting questions. In the first place, while this is not stated in the memorandum, it is clear that, whereas Baron Marshal von Bieberstein, who had been recalled from Constantinople partly as a consequence of the Turco-Italian War, was definitely instructed to endeavour to make friends with England and to detach her from France and Russia, or, if this were impossible, to bring about war at a convenient time for Germany, Prince Lichnowsky's task was somewhat different. Kept at least more or less in the dark as to German objects, the Ambassador, who arrived in London when the Morocco crisis was considered at an end, instead of being intrusted with the dual objects of his predecessor, was clearly told to do, and did in fact do, his utmost to establish friendly relations with England. The Berlin Government, on the other hand, this time maintained in its own hands the larger question of the making of war at what it believed, happily wrongly, to be a convenient time for the Central Empires. In the second place, although this too is not explained, various references made by Prince Lichnowsky leave little doubt in the mind of the reader, who knows the situation existing at the German Embassy prior to the outbreak of war, that the Ambassador himself was aware that von Kühlmann — the Counsellor of Embassy — was, in fact, the representative of Pan-Germanism in
England, and that to this very able and expert intriguer was left the work of trying to develop a situation which, in peace or in war, would be favourable to the ruler and to the class whose views he voiced.

I have already dealt so fully with the question of German intrigues in the East prior to the outbreak of the War, that I propose here only briefly to refer to one or two points raised in the “Revelations of Prince Lichnowsky”, published in pamphlet form by The New York Times. To begin with, no doubt whatever is left upon the mind of the reader that Germany, and not Austria, made this War, largely with the object of improving her position in the East. Indeed from the time of the Congress of Berlin of 1878, when Prince Lichnowsky says his country began the Triple Alliance Policy, “The goal of our [German] political ambition was to dominate in the Bosphorus”, and “instead of encouraging a powerful development in the Balkan States, we [Germany] placed ourselves on the side of the Turkish and Magyar oppressors.”

These words contain in essence and in tabulated form an explanation of the Pan-German policy in progress during the period covered by this book—a policy the existence of which has often been refuted and denied by those who refused to see that, from the first, the Kaiser was obsessed by a desire for domination from Hamburg to the Persian Gulf. What is even more striking, too, is the fact that, in speaking of the Balkan War period, Prince Lichnowsky says, that “two possibilities for settling the question remained.” Either Germany left the Near-Eastern problem to the peoples themselves or she supported her allies “and carried out a Triple Alliance policy
in the East, thereby giving up the rôle of mediator.” Once more, in the words of the Prince himself, “The German Foreign Office very much preferred the latter,” and as a result supported Austria on the one hand in her desire for the establishment of an independent Albania, and on the other in her successful attempts to draw Bulgaria into the second war and to prevent that country from providing the concessions which at that time would have satisfied Roumania. So far as the first of these questions is concerned, while the ex-Ambassador admits the policy of Austria was actuated by the fact that she “would not allow Serbia to reach the Adriatic”, the actual creation of Albania was justified by the existence of the Albanians as a nationality and by their desire for independent government.

The second direction in which the enemy devoted his energy was an even larger, more German and more far-reaching one. “The first Balkan war led to the collapse of Turkey and with it the defeat of our policy, which has been identified with Turkey for many years,” says the memorandum. This, as I have already explained, at one time seemed destined to carry with it results entirely disadvantageous to Germany. The Central Powers realized the situation, and having encouraged the Balkan rivalry leading to the second war, which brought about not a settlement but simply a holding in suspense of the numerous Near-Eastern questions of which a settlement was so necessary, turned their attention toward the improvement of their relations with Turkey more definitely and more determinately than had ever been the case before. Their policy was carried out by two distinct methods.
The first, which is mentioned by Prince Lichnowsky, was the appointment of General Liman von Sanders as practical Commander in Chief of the Turkish Army — an appointment which, when coupled with the fact that Enver Pasha — an out and out pro-German — became Minister of War about the same time, resulted in enormous improvement in the efficiency of the Ottoman army and in a far-reaching increase of Pan-German influence at Constantinople. The second lever employed by the enemy was connected with the Aegean Islands question. Germany, having first utilized her diplomatic influence in favour of Turkey, later on inspired the Government of that country in its continued protests against the decision upon that question arrived at by the Great Powers. Not content, however, with this, the Kaiser, who has now adopted the policy of deportations in Belgium, in Poland, and in Serbia, definitely encouraged the Turks in a like measure in regard to the Greeks of Asia Minor, in order thereby to be rid themselves of a hostile and Christian population when the time for action arrived. That this encouragement was given was always apparent to those who followed the course of events in 1914, but that it was subsequently admitted by the German Admiral Uzidon, to Mr. Morgenthau, constitutes a condemnation the damning nature of which it is difficult to exaggerate.

Turning to the larger aspects of the European situation as it existed immediately prior to the outbreak of the War, there are two questions discussed by Prince Lichnowsky which are worthy of brief comment here. The first concerns the ambassadorial admissions as to the conciliatory attitude adopted by the British
Government and by the then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who sought “to achieve a more friendly rapprochement with Germany and to bring the two groups nearer together”, and whose sincerity in its efforts to respect German rights was proved by the fact that Sir Edward Grey, before the Bagdad Railway Treaty was even completed, called German attention to English men of business who were seeking opportunities to invest capital in territories to be included in the German sphere of interest. These admissions prove the absolute falseness of all such statements as those sometimes made to the effect that Russia and France have consistently co-operated with England in preventing the completion of the Bagdad Railway.

The terms of this practically concluded Bagdad Railway arrangement, to which I have referred elsewhere, were such that, whilst, had they been known, they might have aroused criticism in England, they certainly left no cause for complaint by Germany. For instance, among other things, that agreement, the details of which so far as I know are now published for the first time, sanctioned the continuation of the Bagdad line to Basra, which right had been foregone by Germany in order to secure Alexandretta, and also recognized the whole of Mesopotamia up to Basra, that is to say, to the north of Basra, as a German zone of influence. In exchange for this British, French, and Russian economic interests were acknowledged respectively on the coasts of the Persian Gulf and in the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, in Syria, and in Armenia. That such an arrangement was virtually concluded clearly proves that the Allies never stood in the way of the realization of German economic penetration
in the Near East and that no concessions, however favourable, would have been sufficient to give satisfaction to a country determined to establish not its economic but its military domination.

Turning to the events connected with the crisis arising out of the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Consort on June 28, absolute proofs are provided from two German pens — those of Prince Lichnowsky and of Doctor Mühlon, a former member of the Krupp Directorate — that Berlin, no longer acting through the mouthpiece of Vienna, promoted the War, merely utilizing these murders as an excuse for what was hoped would be the successful development of Germanic policy. So early as the spring of 1914, the late Herr von Tschirschky (then German Ambassador in Vienna) "declared that war must soon come." In view of subsequent events this declaration is far more important than is apparent at first sight, for Von Tschirschky, before his appointment to Vienna in 1907, had been, for some years, the confidential representative of the Foreign Office attached to the Private Council and Cabinet of the Kaiser. This, coupled with the facts that even Prince Lichnowsky admits the decisive nature of the Potsdam Meeting of July 5th, that soon afterward Herr von Jagow (the German Foreign Secretary) was in Vienna to discuss everything with Count Berchtold, (Austrian Foreign Minister), and that Count Mensdorff (Austrian Ambassador in London) received a protocol stating "that it would not matter if war with Russia resulted" constitute a highly probable explanation of what actually occurred. It is that drastic steps were decided upon in Berlin a week after the murders, that as Doctor
Helfferich (then Director of the Deutsche Bank) told Doctor Mühlon the Kaiser went on “his northern cruise only as a ‘blind’ . . . remaining close at hand and keeping in constant touch”, and that the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, concocted either in Berlin or by Von Tchirschky in Vienna, was purposely delayed in order to enable Germany to put the finishing touches upon her military preparations, and particularly, as Mr. Morgenthau explains (upon the authority of the German Ambassador at Constantinople), to allow the time necessary for the bankers to readjust their finances for the coming War.

Up to the outbreak of the War and therefore during what may be called the “initiation” stage of German intrigues in the East, there seems every reason to believe that the enemy was working for the development of his Mittel Europa plan in a manner destined not at once to bring him into open conflict with Great Britain, or more correctly in a way intended to keep England out of the first war and to leave her for proposed defeat in a subsequent and early conflagration. When Great Britain came to the support of France and Russia, however, it became necessary to modify, or rather to speed up this plan. Instead of being able to utilize the present War as a preparatory measure for the actual realization of the Mittel Europa scheme, Germany was compelled either to give up that programme or to endeavour to achieve it during the present conflagration. It was this change which resulted in the substitution of the “consummation” for the “initiation” stage in Pan-German intrigues. The “consummation” policy in its turn entailed the ranging of Turkey and all the Balkan States, except
perhaps Greece, on one side or the other, in order that the enemy might secure a free run across the Balkans, which constitute the one and only corridor toward his real goal — the Bosphorus, Asiatic Turkey, Egypt, Persia, and India.

It is only necessary here briefly to remind my readers of the developments during the "consummation" stage of enemy policy in the East — a stage which must be subdivided into three phases. The first lasted from the outbreak of hostilities until after the entry of Turkey into the War. That event was of supreme importance, for in addition to giving Germany the actual military support of that country, it provided her with a sort of "island" or "jumping off" place for the development of her future plans. This was, however, a situation only partially satisfactory to the enemy, for owing to the resolute defence sustained by Serbia and to the continued neutrality of Bulgaria and Roumania, the lack of direct and unhindered communication with the East prevented him from being able to develop to full advantage the support of Turkey. Consequently after the entry of that country into the War and during the second "consummation" phase, the Germans devoted themselves to the situation in Bulgaria. The acquisition of that country meant the opening of the German door towards the East and the certain and early possession by the enemy of the whole of the main line from Belgrade to Constantinople.

From this time onwards, and during the third "consummation" phase, it therefore only remained for the Central Powers to bring about the consolidation of their position by the actual defeat of Serbia and by
either the maintenance of the neutrality of Greece and of Roumania or by the crushing of these countries should they enter the War upon the side of the Allies. Here they appear to have adopted two different policies. In the case of Greece, I believe that the Germanic object was to play for continued neutrality and not for friendly participation in the War. This may well have been the case, because, by her actual co-operation, that country could have been of little use to the Central Powers. Indeed, had Greece actually thrown in her lot with them during the reign of King Constantine, her long and extremely vulnerable seaboard would have placed her in a position in which the Allies, by the establishment of a blockade and by seapower alone, could either have brought her to her knees or forced her into a position in which she would have been a heavier economic and military burden to the enemy than would have been recompensed by the actual fighting support which she was in a position to give. The case of Roumania, however, was entirely different, for so long as she remained neutral, Germany was compelled to depend upon the single line of railway running through Serbia and Bulgaria and to forego the advantages of the full use of the Danube and of the numerous railways leading respectively to its northern and southern banks. As already explained, it was these advantages, coupled with the great oil wealth of Roumania and with the ultimate facilities of communication with Southern Russia and the Middle East, which have actuated the enemy in his policy toward a country even the temporary subjugation of which is of great importance to him.

The above remarks are sufficient to prove the methods
by and the attention with which the Germans have developed their plans for conquest in the East. "Their objective," as President Wilson said in his address delivered at Baltimore on April 6, 1918, "is undoubtedly to make all the Slavic peoples, all the free and ambitious nations of the Balkan Peninsula, all the lands that Turkey has dominated and misruled, subject to their will and ambition and build upon that dominion an empire of force upon which they fancy that they can erect an empire of gain and commercial supremacy,—an empire as hostile to the Americas as to the Europe which it will overawe,—an empire which will ultimately master Persia, India, and the peoples of the Far East."

To summarize the extent to which this purpose has been realized, and we have to admit its considerable success if we are to appreciate the task of the Allies, who must prevent the permanency of those successes, it has first to be remembered that, whilst the relations between Germany and Austria had gradually become more intimate from the time of the Bosnian annexation, it is only since the outbreak of the War that the direction of affairs, within the Dual Monarchy, has been practically controlled by Berlin. In addition the enemy has established his domination over or conquered Poland, large sections of Russia, and all the Balkan Peninsula (except Southern Albania and the greater part of Greece), besides the larger part of Asiatic Turkey. He is now preparing to overrun Persia. This means that the Central Powers have gone a long way towards the temporary establishment of their position in the East and that, by the exit of Russia from the War, they have rid themselves of a
formerly existing danger to their "Drang nach Osten" policy. It is this indirect result of the Peace of Brest Litovsk, this removal of the greatest menace to Germany's Eastern dreams, which is possessed of consequences almost if not quite as far-reaching as are those connected with the vast enemy forces freed for service in the West.

The peace recently imposed upon Roumania, when coupled with other developments which preceded it, and particularly with the situation in Russia, constitutes a definite Pan-Germanic development — probably a new development — for it means the opening of a fresh door toward the East. The domination of Germany in Southern Russia itself gives her routes to the northern shore of the Black Sea, the importance of which is so obvious that it requires no comment here. But those routes could not have been used to full advantage and with adequate security so long as the Roumanian army, however small and isolated, remained a military force in being and so long as it held even a section of Northern Moldavia. Thus whilst prior to the arrangements made by the Treaties of Brest Litovsk and Bucharest the Central Powers were already in possession of a direct connection with Constantinople and the Black Sea, now that Russia and Roumania are both out of the War, the enemy has secured a route or routes between Central Europe and the East, not only partially but entirely alternative to that provided by the railway from Belgrade to Constantinople. By going overland to Odessa or Constanza, communication will be available by way of the Black Sea with Constantinople. The employment of these routes will necessitate little if any delay,
for, in peace time, whereas the journey from Berlin to Constantinople via Odessa required approximately sixty hours, by direct train it took about fifty-five hours. That the difference will be even less by way of Constanza is proved by the fact that, some years before the War, the Germans arranged for a special express train to run from Berlin by way of Breslau, Cracow, Lemberg, and Roumania to Constanza, a train so rapid and well arranged that the whole journey could be accomplished more quickly and more cheaply than by any other ordinary route across Europe.

It is not, however, only with Constantinople, but also in the direction of the Middle East and Central Asia that Germany has secured or may now secure new facilities for communication. Thus if the enemy continues to dominate Roumania and Southern Russia, his troops and war material can be conveyed to Constanza and Odessa, thence to be shipped by way of the Black Sea to the ports of Northern Asia Minor and to Batum in the Caucasian area, surrendered to Turkey. This means, when coupled with the fact that the Russian Black Sea Fleet (consisting of two dreadnoughts and several older battleships and cruisers and a number of torpedo boats and submarines) is unlikely, to say the least of it, to act in a manner hostile to Germany, that the enemy has before him a wholly new route from Europe to Asia — a route which does not depend upon and which can be used in place of the Bagdad Railway. Batum is connected by a railway with Tiflis. From this point one line goes to Baku on the Caspian, and another runs in a more or less southerly direction to Julfa, on the Turco-Persian frontier, from which point, since the beginning of the
War, it has been extended at least to Tabriz, situated only about three hundred and thirty miles to the north-east of Bagdad. Baku, too, is in railway connection with the remainder of Russia. These are conditions and developments which affect the whole situation.

The Germano-Roumano-Russian peace therefore indicates the attempted foundation for a policy not of German domination from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf, but from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Over and above the already mentioned communications and ignoring the Trans-Siberian Railway, the development of this policy is furthered by lines constructed by Russia in areas often held in England to be a menace by that country to India. Thus starting from Krasnovodsk, on the east of the Caspian, opposite to Baku, a line runs through Merv, Bokara and Samarcand towards the Chinese frontier. A little to the east of Samarcand this line is met by another coming from Petrograd by way of Moscow, Samara, Orenburg, and Tashkend—a line which, were it to fall into German hands, could be employed to further her world domination schemes without the necessity for the one hundred and ninety miles' passage across the Caspian. From the above-mentioned junction it was reported, prior to the exit of Russia from the War, that that country was building a railway towards the frontier of Afghanistan. The progress made by that line is uncertain, but even if it be not great, the distance left unbridged between the completed Russian railways of Central Asia and the terminus of the Indian system at Peshawar cannot amount to more than between four hundred and five hundred miles. Whilst happily, at the moment of writing, the enemy
is not in possession of the railways of all Russia or of the Trans-Caspian areas, and whilst equally happily the Hindu Kush Range constitutes a natural barrier between the termini in question, in considering the larger aspects of the situation in Russia, the existence of these railways constitutes a question the far-reaching importance of which it is impossible to ignore.

Events are moving so rapidly and the situation has to be viewed from so many standpoints that it is impossible to indicate the war measures necessary of adoption to counter the enemy's designs in the East. Nevertheless it is desirable briefly to discuss two conditions which must be realized after the War — conditions in a way interdependent and conditions which must be brought about if the danger of prolonged Teutonic domination in the East is to be averted. I refer to the necessity for the establishment of an anti-German barrier and to the distribution of Near-Eastern territories upon a basis sufficiently fair and just to be a safeguard against future wars. In regard to the first of these conditions there were or there are two schools of thought. According to the first, whilst some form of government with the consent of the governed should be inaugurated in favour of the various nationalities of Austria-Hungary who have not heretofore had an adequate voice in the direction of their own affairs, the Dual Monarchy should remain more or less intact or even be strengthened in certain directions with the object of enabling its rulers to withstand Germanic influence and of creating of it an anti-Prussian barrier. This sounds satisfactory and it might at one time have been satisfactory. But in view of recent events it seems difficult to believe that the adoption of such a
course would in itself bring about the necessary security. This is the case because no guarantees would exist that the Austro-Hungarian Government would or could break away from the domination of Berlin or that it would introduce or still more maintain a régime acceptable to all or many of its present subject peoples.

As an alternative or as a supplementary course we are therefore compelled to look to the setting up of safeguards only partly in and largely to the East of the Dual Monarchy. I refer to a Balkan Barrier. It is said by some, as it was said in 1913, that an enlarged and strengthened Serbia, or a Balkan League composed of a satisfied Serbia, Roumania, and Greece would be a sufficient assurance. This theory is without a sound basis, for I am convinced that no one Balkan country or no group of countries which left out one or more of the neighbouring States, would constitute an adequate precaution against a further Germanic effort to dominate the East or against a renewed outbreak of war as a result of conditions prevailing in this ever “Danger Zone of Europe.” Thus were Serbia, Roumania, or Greece to be increased in size by the inclusion of all the areas which they covet, and were the name of Bulgaria to be entirely or practically blotted off the map of Europe, so long as the Bulgarian race existed under Bulgarian or alien rule, so long would there be a certainty of unrest in the Balkans — unrest which in its turn would be an excuse for foreign intrigue. Equally well were Serbia and Greece allowed practically to divide Albania, this would not only be an injustice to the people of the areas so divided but it would leave the way open for renewed European and local difficulties. Consequently it is only by a fair
and equitable distribution of Balkan territories, that there can be established a state of things, which if it be not at once acceptable to all the parties concerned, will none the less form a basis of a stable peace, a peace which will ultimately encourage good Balkan relations destined automatically, in the end, to help to bar the gate in face of German domination in the East.

To consider first the kind of arrangement which should be substituted for the fatal Treaty of Bucharest of 1913, whilst I do not agree with its every detail and whilst I do not base the following remarks entirely upon it, I cannot do better than to refer my readers to a potent, well-informed, and comprehensive article which appeared under the title “The Final Settlement in the Balkans” in *The Quarterly Review* (Number 453) for October, 1917.¹ Though the writer of that article speaks of five, it seems to me preferable to say that there are three all-important principles which must be taken into account in endeavouring to solve the Balkan Question. Undoubtedly the first is the basis of nationality, which should always be accepted unless it be made impossible of adoption by one of the other two conditions. Coming next in order are economic and commercial considerations, that is to say, the provision for each country of adequate and natural access to the sea. In certain cases the realization of this consideration may clash with and must take precedence over the basis of nationality, for in various instances the seaports are not inhabited in majority by the same nationality as the interior. Thirdly, in view of the complicated nature of the geography of the

¹ The author of this article is Mr. James D. Borchier, the famous Balkan correspondent of *The Times*. 
peninsula, due weight and consideration must be given to the existence of certain natural frontiers and strategic requirements, the overlooking of which is not possible. In addition to these principles, though not upon the same level of importance with them, there are certain pre-War European decisions which might well be taken as guiding factors and which should not therefore be treated as mere "scraps of paper."

To attempt to apply these principles in detail would mean the expansion of this volume far beyond its available capacity and therefore the only course left open to me is very briefly to allude to the general conditions to be created by their adoption. Beginning with Roumania, her natural southern frontier with Serbia and Bulgaria would be the Danube, but that river cannot be taken as the boundary right to its mouth as special arrangements must be made for the Dobrudja in order to allow Roumania adequate access to the sea. Near Silistria the Danube frontier should therefore be replaced by that arranged under the Protocol of Petrograd of May, 1913, by which the town of Silistria went to Roumania. On the west and northwest the Roumanian frontiers should be extended in a manner to give the Banat and large areas of Transylvania and of the Bukovina to that country. The inclusion of the Banat in Roumania will constitute a hardship for Serbia in that Belgrade would still remain on the frontier and that a considerable Serb population exists in the southwestern portion of that area. On her eastern frontier there should certainly be a modification in favour of Roumania which would give to that country at least a portion of Bessarabia.

Coming to Bulgaria, I think that the Enos-Midia
line, arranged by the Balkan Allies and sanctioned by the Great Powers at the time of the signature of the Treaty of London (May, 1913) should be taken as a basis in deciding the position of Bulgaria's southeastern frontier. The delimitation of the southwestern and western boundaries of the dominions of King Ferdinand, and therefore the drawing of the Bulgaro-Greek and the Bulgaro-Serbian frontiers will be much more complicated. Here no doubt rests in my mind that Bulgaria must be assured adequate access to the Aegean and that her frontier should be extended so as to include Kavala together with adequate means of approach to the coast at that point. With regard to the Bulgaro-Serbian and to what may be a future Bulgaro-Greek frontier in the neighbourhood or on the west of the Vardar Valley, any solution is beset by the ever-present difficulty of the Macedonian question and of the arrival at a decision as to the nationality of the inhabitants of doubtful or disputed areas. That question which concerns Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria could be decided in one of three ways — according to language, by taking a plebiscite, or upon the basis of the arrangements made between the parties concerned in 1912. If the first of these means were adopted the necessary measures would have to be taken to ascertain the areas in which Greek and Slav are spoken and to discover where the forms of speech particular to Bulgars or Serbs are employed. In theory the taking of a plebiscite would be a satisfactory manner of arriving at a solution of the problem. But to enable the people to vote freely, a plebiscite would have to be conducted under the direct auspices of the Allies, or better still under the control of America.
Whilst some other means would have to be found for dealing with the areas not already specially mentioned and in dispute between Bulgaria and Greece, the third and last suggestion for a solution of the Serbo-Bulgarian part of the question would seem to be the one the simplest and fairest of adoption. It is the simplest because the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty and its annex of 1912 were arranged by the two contracting parties, without foreign interference, only five years ago, and when the question was looming not in the distance, but at a moment when a redistribution of territory was actually foreseen. To take that agreement as the basis for, though not necessarily the actual text of, a future arrangement would be the fairest settlement of the problem because Bulgaria would thereby secure much less than she now holds (she would have to vacate all the districts of Serbia which were Serbian before the Balkan Wars, and also the Macedonian areas which went to the latter country by the Treaty) and because she would obtain probably only a section of the territory to be acquired by her under a plebiscite or upon the language basis.

One of the most important problems connected with this part of the peninsula concerns the future of Salonica. That question can hardly be decided primarily on the basis of nationality, for the Jewish element of the population predominates. Consequently it would seem that the allotment of this all-important city should be governed largely by the condition that ports ought not to be separated from the hinterland which they serve and therefore by what may be the future distribution of the hinterland in question. Under these circumstances all that can be said here is that
three solutions are feasible. Firstly the city might be left to Greece. This would have the advantage of avoiding a loss of prestige for M. Venezelos and a disappointment for the Greeks. But on the other hand Greece, which has plenty of ports, does not require Salonica, and the Jews of that city would certainly prefer almost any régime to Hellenic rule. Secondly, if Central and Western Macedonia accrue to Bulgaria, then Salonica might go with them. This settlement, possessed of many advantages, would, however, be greatly resented alike by the Greeks and the Serbs. And thirdly Salonica, by itself, might be constituted a free port under the protection of the Powers, or it might form the capital and port of an autonomous Macedonia, foreseen by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912 and now to be created under the protection of the Powers in order temporarily to get over the difficulties concerning the future of areas disputed between Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria.

Turning to Albania, whilst upon ethnical grounds the frontiers might be considerably extended, the decisions of the London Ambassadorial Conference might well be taken as a basis in fixing future boundaries. In justice to Albania herself and in the interest of future peace, however, there should be certain minor rectifications in favour of that country. The principal directions in which attention should be turned are towards a change in the south, which would bring the whole of the road from Santi Quaranta to Korcha within Albania, instead of leaving it to pass through a triangular area of Greece, towards the inclusion in Albania of Dibra, Prisrend, and Jacova—towns which are absolutely essential as market centres, and
towards the regaining of the tribes of Hoti and Gruda, which are so absolutely Albanian in sentiment that they will never peacefully accept any form of alien rule. With such modifications Albania would be constituted on a basis which would make her national existence practicable instead of impossible, as it was prior to the War.

As Montenegro and Serbia seem destined sooner or later to be united either as one kingdom or at least on terms so intimate as to make any serious rivalry out of the question, I will consider the gains which should be assured to those countries as common and discuss them all under one heading. Here the most important developments recently arising are the friendly understanding said now to have been arrived at between Italy and the Slavs and the reported replacement of the original Treaty between Italy, England, France, and Russia by a new agreement. As the nature of neither of these arrangements is known, I will merely endeavour approximately to sketch the acquisitions which should be secured by Montenegro-Serbia. The Bocche di Cattaro and the coastal area of Dalmatia, lying to the southeast of it, should be Slav. Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with a length of the Adriatic Coast on the north of the Bocche di Cattaro, sufficient to give a proper Serbian access to the sea, ought to be allotted to that country or to Montenegro. With regard to Croatia and to Slavonia, which should be considered separately to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the remainder of Dalmatia, the futures of these areas are bound up with many questions which do not fall within the limits of this volume. Sufficient therefore be it to say that a friendly agreement between
Italy and the Southern Slavs is essential to the interests of both parties and that, when the time for a decision comes and when it be possible to ascertain the true sentiments of the inhabitants, these sentiments must be treated with all possible deference in any solution of the Jugo-Slav and Adriatic Questions decided upon by the Allies.

From the foregoing remarks it would seem that Greece is the country destined to lose the most and to gain the least by any feasible settlement of the Balkan Question. This is the case because the claims of that country are most difficult of satisfaction in that the Hellenic element of the population is for the most part scattered and that, where it exists in preponderating numbers, especially in numerous coastal regions, the futures of those regions cannot, for reasons already given, be decided solely upon the nationality basis. This was of course foreseen by M. Venezelos, when he proposed, early in the War, to make concessions to Bulgaria and to come to the support of the Allies, presumably on the understanding that his country should receive compensation without the Balkan Peninsula. Had the Premier been able to secure the adoption of his point of view at that time, and had the support of Greece then been available against Turkey, she might well have secured valuable gains at the expense of that country. As things stand at present, however, unless Greece were to be given Monastir, to which she has better racial claims than has Serbia, it is difficult to see where her aspirations, at any rate on the mainland, can be gratified. But whilst we do not know the nature of the arrangement reported to have taken the place of the Treaty said to
have been signed with Italy on her entry into the War, it is possible that this arrangement has foreseen the desirability of rewarding Greece by the acquisition of at least some of the Aegean Islands, now in possession of Italy, and that Cyprus, offered to her by Great Britain in 1915, might be ceded under some arrangement at the end of the War. These are concessions which would be justified on ethnical grounds and which would certainly do something to make up for losses possibly to be suffered by Greece in other directions.

In placing the above suggestions before my readers I make no claim that their adoption, as a basis for the future settlement of the Balkans, would be entirely popular in any of the countries concerned or that it would lead to the immediate cessation of unrest in the areas in question. Neither of these results is possible until sufficient time has elapsed to enable tranquillity and prosperity to do something to blot out the memories of the past. Those conditions, which can only be realized by a justifiable distribution of territory, can hardly be brought about by local arrangement. When the proper time comes, therefore, it is still for the Allies to adopt the policy defined by Sir Edward Grey on September 28, 1915, namely, to further "the national aspirations of the Balkan States without sacrificing the independence of any of them." The continued pursuit of such a policy, which may have to be firmly imposed upon the chauvinistic elements of the various nationalities, will tend to put an end to a state of things largely responsible for rendering possible the present War and for many of the events which have taken place since August, 1914.

The last subject for discussion here is that which
concerns the futures of what would remain of Turkey in Europe — Constantinople and its surroundings — and of the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan. With so many factors still undecided, it is too early yet even to make any definite suggestions upon these complicated and all-important questions. To begin with, it is impossible to forecast whether Turkey will be allowed to continue her independent existence as a Great Power, or whether the Ottoman Empire as a whole or in part is to be placed directly under European control. In either case, however, although the arrangements would be somewhat different, it is safe to say that the present status of Constantinople and of the Straits must be changed, and that the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus should in the future be unfortified and open not only to the ships of war of Turkey but to those of all nations. If these conditions be realized there are then two alternatives. By the first Turkey would continue to be the nominal sovereign power at Constantinople, but the city, together with its European and Asiatic surroundings, whilst remaining under the Turkish flag, would be definitely controlled under some form of international arrangement hereafter to be decided. By the second, Turkish rule would cease altogether in the European area situated to the southeast of the Enos-Midia line and in a band of Asiatic territory bordering on the southeastern shores of the Bosphorus, the Marmora, and the Dardanelles — a band sufficiently wide to safeguard the neutrality of those waterways. In that case these areas would pass under the direct and absolute control of the Powers or of some country or countries nominated by them.
As in the case of Constantinople so with regard to the Asiatic Dominions of the Sultan the primary and absolute necessity is that Germanic domination must cease and that measures must be taken to prevent the further butchery and oppression of the non-Turkish elements of the population, and particularly to assure the safety of the Armenians who remain. This state of things might conceivably be brought about whilst the Turkish flag still flew over large areas of what are now Asiatic Turkey, but in that case, in addition to the above suggested safeguards, local autonomy would have to be granted to the various now subject peoples. On the other hand if a policy of disintegration or of complete control be adopted by the Allies, then we shall see either the birth of a number of new states in Western Asia or the establishment of several autonomous regions each probably directly or indirectly under some kind of foreign supervision. That supervision might take the form of a Governor General nominated by the Great Powers and assisted by an Ambassadorial Council at Constantinople, possessed of direct control over that city and of only the indirect supervisal of several semi-independent States, each possessed of their own Governments. Or it might be carried out by means of separate and independent régimes for Constantinople and for the different areas of the interior. These and many other problems are destined for the moment to remain unsettled and to be decided, when the time for decision comes, upon the basis of factors many of which cannot be discussed under existing circumstances.

Throughout this volume I have endeavoured to review the situation in the East as it actually was and
is and to admit enemy successes where successes have been achieved. At the time of writing, judging from the map, those successes are considerable and far-reaching. But if the Germans have been generally correct in their diagnosis of the "trees", of the details of the War, they have been and are almost universally wrong in their appreciation of the "woods", the larger aspects of the situation. Such mistakes as those concerning their misinterpretation of the original attitude of Great Britain, their opinion of what they called "the contemptible little British Army" and their optimism in regard to the policy of Italy, together with their fatal error in miscalculating the sentiments, the determination, and the power of the people of the United States, have already caused them to be swept from the sea, to lose their colonies, and to be compelled to play for a draw or even to be ready to make sacrifices in the West in order to maintain and keep the door open for their intrigues and schemes of conquest in the East. We may be Westerners or we may be Easterners in military policy, but in either case it must be clear to every member of the thinking public that no terms can be made and that no peace will be lasting which does not free the East "from the impudent and alien domination of the Prussian military and commercial autocracy." To fail to achieve this object would be to prolong the existence of the Near East as "The Danger Zone of Europe" and to leave that area the ready "Cradle" for yet another war.
POSTSCRIPT

Readers of the foregoing pages will have discovered that they include a review of many of the conditions influencing the developments which began on the Balkan front on July 6, 1918. In considering those developments, and especially the events in the more or less immediate vicinity of the Adriatic, the first condition to be remembered is that we have no information as to the progress of events in Northern and Central Albania since the enemy occupation of those areas early in 1916. Thus whilst we know that the Italians have built roads, and I believe one or more sections of railway, in the districts which they held, we are in total ignorance as to the facilities of communication established by the Austrians. All that can be said, therefore, is that, up to the time of the enemy advance in 1916, there were no railways in Albania and that the so-called roads consisted almost exclusively of mere tracks not passable for wheeled traffic.

Consequently, knowing the country as I do, I think that the initial Allied goal must be the occupation of a line situated to the north of and running more or less parallel to the Scumbi Valley. An advance to such a line, if it included the capture of the Krabe Mountains, lying to the north of Elbasan, would mean the occupation and the freeing of at least half Albania and the
almost certain capture of Durazzo and perhaps of Tirana. It would place in our hands the natural line of communication from the Adriatic into the interior — a line which follows the ancient Via Egnatia and the Scumbi Valley and a line along which, if it has not already been built, a modern road could easily be constructed.

By such an advance the Allies would have gained the larger part of the plains of Central Albania, the western section of the Balkan front would have been straightened out in a manner greatly to our advantage, and we should be in possession of the section of Albania inhabited by the more enlightened element of the population. Moreover the occupation of Durazzo and of the Scumbi Valley would wrest from the enemy a port, which has probably played its part in enabling him to threaten the Allied routes across the Lower Adriatic, and it would give to us a new point of entry into and means of communication with the Western Balkans. Whether those facilities would be utilised for provisioning the Allied forces on all or parts of the Salonica front or whether they would lead to a far-reaching advance in the Balkans are questions which cannot be discussed here. Sufficient, therefore, be it to say that developments taking place at the time of writing these few lines (July 15) once more thrust the Near East into the forefront of the War and that they justify our continued attention to the progress of events in an area which becomes ever more and more important.
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