CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTIONS.

VITA · SINE · LITERIS · MORS · EST

Yours sincerely
Demetrius Boulger

CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTIONS

Essays on

AFGHANISTAN, CHINA, AND CENTRAL ASIA

BY

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AUTHOR OF

"THE HISTORY OF CHINA," "ENGLAND AND RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA," ETC., ETC.

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THIS COLLECTION OF ESSAYS

ON QUESTIONS,

IN WHICH HE HAS TAKEN A PROMINENT PART,

Is Dedicated to

SIR LEPEL GRIFFIN, K.C.S.I.

(*Agent to the Governor-General in Central India*),

IN WHOM ARE COMBINED

THE GREAT QUALITIES WHICH HAVE ESTABLISHED

AND

PRESERVED ENGLISH SUPREMACY

IN INDIA,

A BRILLIANCE OF INTELLECT RARE AMONG

HIS CONTEMPORARIES,

AND A STRENGTH OF CHARACTER WHICH IN A TIME

OF EXTREME DANGER

WILL ENABLE HIM TO RENDER PRICELESS SERVICE

TO THE STATE.

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN Alexander the Great at the beginning of his conquering career reached Gordium, he was shown the knot which no one had succeeded in untying, and with which the empire of the world was believed to be associated. His solution of the difficulty is well known. The Central Asian question is the Gordian knot of English foreign policy, and it will be settled only by the sword.

During the last twelve years increasing interest has been felt in the progress of events in Central Asia, and, although the subject is still too much the property of specialists, a great advance has taken place in the state of public knowledge as to the menacing position of Russia, while we have also a clearer perception than formerly about the essential outworks of our Indian Empire. The part which the Chinese Government, slowly increasing in power and self-confidence, is destined to play in the development of the problem is also more fully appreciated. It is for this reason that I have ventured to republish some of the many articles which it has been my privilege to write during the

last eight years on the burning questions in which England, Russia, and China are so directly concerned. It is possible that some information may be found in these pages placed, by means of a copious index of subjects, in a more convenient and accessible form than if any one branch of the subject were treated after a more direct and systematic manner; but I attach greater importance to their being the expression of views which have already been to a large extent vindicated by the results. When most of the following lines on Russia were written they were deemed—except by a limited circle of educated and experienced persons, among whom let me save myself from the charge of egotism by saying that these views were common enough—exaggerated pictures of a danger which was declared to be highly improbable of occurrence in our time. Yet within a very short space this criticism had to be modified, and the Government, which owed its origin to a disbelief in Russian aggressiveness and Russian perfidy, has found itself compelled, by the force of circumstances, to provide against the one and to proclaim the other. We have to thank the late General Scobeleff for this result. His victory, as I wrote two years ago, "did more than vanquish the Turcomans; it overthrew the last bulwarks of masterly inactivity."

The subsequent stages of awakened interest and sustained public effort may be briefly recorded here. It was in August, 1880, that Mr. Gladstone's Government recognized Abdurrahman as Ameer of Afghanistan, at the same time that the campaign against Ayoob Khan was sanctioned for the purpose of retrieving Maiwand and relieving Candahar. Eight months later not a British soldier was left in Afghanistan, but the Russians had made in the interval their most important advance since the capture of Samarcand. They

had broken the military power and confidence of the Turcomans, and their outposts had reached places half way between the Caspian and Herat. It was no longer possible to deny that Russia had acquired a position directly menacing to the integrity of Afghanistan, and convenient for undermining English influence in the states adjacent to India.

No English Government could afford to treat so important a change in the relative position of Russia and India with indifference, or without taking some steps to restore, in favour of the latter, the altered balance of power and prestige. It was only a question of what was to be done, and the Government resolved, as the easiest way out of the difficulty, to bestow a subsidy on the Ameer. In discussing that question at the time, I ventured to point out the mistake in conferring a subsidy upon Abdurrahman without requiring any corresponding concessions from him in return, and I am glad to find myself fortified in that opinion by my friend Sir Lepel Griffin.[1] At that time Russia had fixed the limit of her new province of Askabad at Babadoorma. The Russians were still far distant from the borders of Afghanistan. Then was the moment to have demarcated the Ameer's dominions, and to have named those places which we would not allow Russia to touch. Nothing of this kind was done. We simply made the Ameer a present of £120,000 a year.

Russia gave us but little time to repair the mistakes of a policy, which for the last five years has only aimed at "putting off the evil day." Eight months after we had subsidised the Ameer the Russians were in Merv, and their agents and explorers were preparing the way for the appearance of the Czar's troops on the Heri Rud, and the

[1] See his paper in the *Fortnightly Review* for May, 1885.

upper course of the Murghab. The difficulty of defining what was Afghan and what was not was immeasurably increased by the proximity of the Russian forces, and by the remoteness of the scene from our base of operations in India. The question was one of the gravest possible nature, and so many favourable opportunities of useful action had been neglected, that prudent men would have hesitated before taking precipitate action in the very crisis of the relations between England and Russia. In the article entitled "Merv! What next?"—of which I am exceptionally proud, as all its statements have been verified and borne out almost to the letter, during the twelve months that have elapsed since it was written—I ventured to insist that the only reply to the Russian occupation of Merv was to invite the Ameer to India, in order to ascertain his views, and to give a definite form to our alliance. And with regard to the proposed delimitation of the Afghan frontier, I wrote that, "if attempted by direct negotiation with Russia it will certainly lead to disagreement and come to nothing." In a later passage of the same essay I said, "So far as the question of the point on the Murghab where the Ameer's authority will be held to stop, it cannot be too strongly insisted upon that the only way to effect a satisfactory solution will be by an act of assertion on the part of the Ameer's lieutenant in Herat, and not by the abortive and lingering movements of an international Frontier Commission." I went on to name Ak Tepeh, or better still Sary Yazy, as the most suitable place where Abdurrahman could station a garrison. At the very moment that I was writing those lines the Viceroy [1]

[1] In his letter of March 11, 1884. I have quoted above what I wrote in March on the subject of Ak Tepeh and Penjdeh, because an article in *The Times* of 9th June, on "The Northern and North-western

was addressing the Ameer in complimentary terms upon the measures which he had taken to consolidate his position at Penjdeh. I do not think that any one will at this moment impugn the prudence of these recommendations or the accuracy of these predictions. The Government, however, reversed the mode of proceeding. They did *not* invite the Ameer, and they did enter upon "direct negotiation with Russia." The consequences are now patent to every one. The Frontier Commission can only end in the signing away of Afghan rights north of the Paropamisus, and in placing Russia in a position to take the fullest advantage of the first symptoms of disturbance in Herat. The hope that the signature of a treaty—if the Russian Government can be induced to conclude one, which is admitted to be improbable—forbidding Russia to cross the newly-defined limits of Afghanistan will suffice to give peace to the western provinces of the Ameer's kingdom, can only be destined to the same disappointment which has attended every other expectation based upon the pledges or declarations of Russian statesmen.

The immediate prospect is as gloomy as it well could be, not because Russia is in a position to assail the Indian Empire with any chance of success, but because the English Government have shown themselves unable to make good their own declarations. Pledged to preserve the integrity of Afghanistan, they have tolerated its violation after they had shown in the most conclusive manner that Penjdeh

Frontier of Afghanistan," was made the subject of a remonstrance by M. de Giers, who seemed to think that the importance of Penjdeh was only discovered after the Joint Commission had been agreed upon. The authorship of that article, which has been attributed to different distinguished persons who had nothing at all to do with either its conception or execution, will not be obscure to those who read the paper in which the passages quoted above occur.

was an Afghan possession. The loss of Penjdeh is small in comparison with the loss of character entailed by the surrender of all Russia's pretensions, and by the apathetic indifference with which the slaughter of our Afghan allies at Pul-i-Khisti has been received. The Government have now to pay the penalty of having hastily entered upon a negotiation without having any definite object, and without knowing what the Ameer would do, or what he expected. If the Russian Government show sufficient moderation in language to allow of the present negotiations having a successful termination it will be found that the Government of England are once more willing to sign away tangible advantages for the verbal or written assurances of Russia. The only possible chance of redeeming the national honour and sustaining the reputation of England lies in the possibility of the Russian Government insisting upon getting more than the whole of the zone which was to be submitted to the Commission, or in the repetition of the act of aggression for which General Komaroff has been so publicly rewarded. Failing those two contingencies, both of which are, I hope, exceedingly probable, the first round in the inevitable struggle for supremacy in Southern Asia will have ended in the triumph of Russia, and in our personal discomfiture, and the discouragement of our friends and allies.

The latter and larger portion of this volume deals exclusively with the Chinese Empire, with its position in the past as well as its present condition. China not less than England is interested in Russia's policy, and immediately affected by her action. Whether in Kashgaria or in Corea, on the Amour or the Ili, the Chinese have as much to apprehend from Russian force and fraud as England has at Herat and in Afghan Turkestan. The Chinese cannot

be reproached with any of the apathy or indifference to Imperial necessities that must be laid to the charge of the present responsible governors of England. They still believe that the true way to meet an enemy is to show a bold front to his advances, to take their own measures, and to scorn to ask promises from him which they know must be unmeaning and will never be kept. They also know their own mind. The power of China is not yet equal to the vastness of her pretensions, but it will some day enable her to make them good in face of every rival. When England and Russia have reached the limit of their resources and authority in Asia, China will still be developing the power to hold her own and to exercise on the future history of the world that influence which cannot yet be measured with any degree of accuracy. China is now the least powerful factor in the Central Asian problem ; but unless her rulers are extremely apathetic, she is the Power that will acquire material strength in the greatest degree. The day of hostile collision between England and Russia will not wait until China is ready to take her proper share in the struggle, but when both combatants have retired exhausted from the fray or have reconciled themselves to the new conditions which may have been created, China will be ready not merely to hold her own, but to benefit by the blunders and shortcomings of her neighbours.

In conclusion, I have only to express my grateful acknowledgments to the editors and proprietors of the periodicals in which these papers were originally published for their kind permission to reproduce them. I am under a double obligation to them—firstly, for having so often extended the hospitality of their pages to me under the arduous conditions of limited space and what is termed an

unpopular subject, for which I cannot feel too much their debtor; and, secondly, for the leave so freely and courteously bestowed to place before the public in what may prove a permanent form the views of one specialist as to some of the most interesting phases of the great Central Asian problem.

DEMETRIUS BOULGER.

May 25, 1885.

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I.

RUSSIA'S EMPIRE IN CENTRAL ASIA.[1]

THE progress of events in Asia is beginning to attract wider and more general attention than at any former period, and the actual condition and relative positions of the great empires of that continent have become the object of close scrutiny and political calculation. There is a common desire to ascertain what Russia has absolutely acquired in Central Asia, and how far she is disposed to rest satisfied with the territory and influence she possesses there. The want of the necessary knowledge has prevented the forming of the definite and well-founded opinion that is desirable on this subject, and it is infinitely better that we should realize the true state of the case, and be prepared for movements yet to take place which are absolutely inevitable, than that we should receive every fresh step on the part of Russia with expressions of disapproval and ill-concealed apprehension. It is only by mastering the necessary details that we shall be in a position to judge when Russia leaves a policy in support of which she can plead her necessities and the force of circumstances for one of wilful aggression. The time has, therefore, arrived when it will be of public advantage to define the exact extent of Russia's empire in Central Asia, to explain the character of her relations with her neighbours and the states dependent on her, and to denote the authority she wields as a Government, with the accompanying influence she exercises by right both of her position and of her superior moral pretensions.

The original cause of Russia's appearance in Central Asia or

[1] *The Times*, March 30, 1883.

Turkestan may be considered either the turbulence of the Kirghiz tribes, or the ambitious and clearly-defined policy of Peter the Great. Undoubtedly the rapid conquest of Siberia a century before the time of that Czar had created the impression that the easiest solution of a difficulty with an unsettled and possibly irreclaimable neighbour was to conquer and occupy his territory. In this view Peter was a strong believer, and he transmitted to his successors a tradition of implacable war with the Kirghiz tribes of the steppe intervening between the Ural and the Jaxartes.

While denouncing the national enemy, Peter was not less clear and emphatic in pointing out what were to be the rewards and consequences of his overthrow and subjection. The Kirghiz were described "as a fickle and light-thinking people;" but the only reason of their being of any importance to Russia was that they formed the barrier between her and "the rich commerce of China and India." The movement of Russia towards the East, which began in the 16th century, was also the counterpart of the great Mongol irruption westward in the 13th and 14th centuries; but when Russia herself had been delivered from the Tartar yoke, this national reaction rapidly acquired all the consistency and durability of a distinct policy. From the first the Czars laid claim to pretensions greatly in excess of their real power, and so far back as the year 1600, the Czar Feodor Ivanovitch declared that the Khanates of Khiva and Bokhara were subject to his authority.

The Kirghiz did not prove very formidable antagonists; but the remoteness and natural difficulty of their region stood them in almost as good stead as if they had been valiant and well-equipped. Although the Czarina Anne received in 1734 the formal surrender of all the Kirghiz hordes, it was not until the present century had far advanced that the Russian Government could so much as flatter itself that it had effectually coerced them. Subsequent insurrections, particularly that of 1869–70, seemed to show that these tribes, despite their protestations, were not thoroughly subdued; but General Peroffsky's successes against them in 1848 had resulted in their being practically removed as an obstacle to Russia's further progress into Central Asia. When the Kirghiz were subjugated Russia found no difficulty in reaching the lower course of the Jaxartes, on which thirty-four years ago[1]

[1] In the year 1849.

she established her advanced post at Kazala, or Fort No 1. With her ultimate task thus simplified, nothing but the Crimean War prevented Russia's immediate advance up the Jaxartes into Turkestan, and, even before that struggle came to hamper her movements, she had obtained a further success by the capture in 1853 of the strong fort of Ak Musjid, which, in her hands, became known as Fort Peroffsky. The first stage in the history of Russia's empire in Central Asia closed thirty years ago with the capture of that place.

The succeeding stages marked by the overthrow of the Khanates may be briefly summarized. The conquest of the Khanate of Turkestan began with the siege and capture of the forts Chulak Kurgan and Yani Kurgan in 1859; its successful progress was shown by the fall of the fortified towns of Turkestan and Auliata in 1864; and it was brought to a conclusion with the storming of Tashkent in 1865. The conquest of this Khanate, which had been united early in the century with that of Khokand, was thus speedily achieved, and this rapid and remarkable triumph is identified with the name of General Tchernaieff. In 1865 war began with the Khanate of Bokhara, and, after three years' desultory fighting, it resulted in the incorporation of the Samarcand district and the Zerafshan valley with the Russian Empire. In 1870 the territory of Kuldja, which had been severed from China by a rebellion of the Mahomedan population, was occupied by a Russian force, of which the last detachment was only withdrawn a few months ago in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty of St. Petersburg. In 1873 the campaign against Khiva began, and concluded with the annexation of the Amou Darya district, and with the imposition of crushing terms on the Khan. In 1875 a rebellion broke out in Khokand, and this popular rising terminated after a few months with the addition of that Khanate to the Czar's dominions. During the years following the capture of Samarcand the Russian authorities in the Caucasus had established a few settlements on the eastern shores of the Caspian. Their prospects long seemed uninviting in this quarter, but their naval posts at Krasnovodsk and Tchikishlar have proved the thin end of the wedge. The Turcoman tribes have been vanquished and disheartened, much of their territory has been annexed, and within twelve years Russia now finds herself established, after only one serious repulse, at a point more than

300 miles in advance of the Caspian. Russia's empire in Central Asia, extending from Issik Kul to the Caspian, consists of these conquests,[1] the course of which has been thus briefly recorded.

The Government of Turkestan, which was first formed in 1867, in consequence of the recommendations of the Steppe Commission, is charged with the administration of the greater portion of this extensive region. The authority of Tashkent decides all matters from the Aral to the Chinese frontier, and while it has to regulate the affairs of this vast territory, it has also to supervise the external relations of the Czar with Bokhara, Khiva, China, and—it must be added—Afghanistan. When the post of Governor-General was first created the territory of the new functionary was very much more limited than at present, and, in order to give him greater importance, the district of Semiretchinsk was taken from Siberia and attached to his province. Semiretchinsk, or "the country of the seven rivers," is that part of Asia lying between Semipalatinsk and the Irtish on the one side, and the Khokandian frontier on the other. It continues[2] to form part of the Governor-General's administration, notwithstanding that the extent of his territory has been so widely spread as to leave him little leisure to devote any great attention to its requirements. In its present extent, therefore, Tashkent regulates the affairs of an area of about 800,000 square miles, and of a population exceeding three and a half millions; but the Turkestan bureau lays claim to the capacity to undertake a still more onerous charge.

The present limits of the Turkestan dependency may be defined as follows. Commencing to the north of Lake Balkash, on the borders of Semipalatinsk, the frontier follows an almost southerly direction past Sergiopol and across the Tarbagatai ridge to the Ala Tau, whence it is now drawn under the provisions of the last treaty with China through Borohoudsir to the Tian Shan. The Tian Shan divides it from Kashgaria to as far west as the Terek Pass; but, although the mountain range may be said to continue under the name of the Great Alai, the Russians have not availed themselves of it as their frontier. They have preferred to cross that range, and to establish their limits on the Pamir itself, beyond

[1] To them has now to be added the whole of Turcomania. Less than twelve months after these lines were written Russia had occupied Merv without resistance, and established her outposts on the Murgab and Heri Rud.

[2] Since this it has been detached and re-joined to West Siberia.

the lake Kara Kul, and near that known as Ran Kul. Their advanced posts, therefore, touch the two little-known mountain states of Shignan and Darwaz.[1] It is at this point that the Russians have most nearly approached the frontier of India, the distance from Ran Kul to Gilgit being no more than 200 miles, although it must be remembered that the whole of the intervening tract is most elevated, consisting of a succession of mountain ranges over which the few passes that exist are impracticable during some months of the year and difficult of passage at all times. To return to the Russian frontier, after overlapping the great Alai range it continues westward through Karategin—which has been absorbed as a whilom troublesome dependency of Khokand—to the beautifully-situated lake, Iskander Kul, and to the mountains that look down on Kitab and Shahr-i-Sebz; and then, casting a loop round Samarcand and crossing the Zerafshan river, near Katti Kurgan, proceeds northwards to the Kara Tau mountains. From this range the frontier is traced across the Kizil Kum desert to the Oxus, which it reaches sixty miles south of Fort Petro-Alexandrovsk. The main stream of the Oxus, in its upper course through the Khivan oasis, and the most western branch—the Ulkun Darya—in its lower, mark the limits of the Governor-Generalship of Turkestan. The Aral Sea, with its small marine, is also included within its jurisdiction, which extends northwards as far as that of Orenburg on the one hand, and that of West Siberia on the other. More than three-fifths of this extensive region consists of desert or waste land, and of the remainder not more than one-twentieth is under cultivation. Only a few favoured districts can boast a greater productiveness and a higher utility. The valleys of the Syr Darya, Zerafshan, Narym, Chu, and a few other streams are justly famous for their fertility, while some travellers have expatiated on the beauties of the mountain and river scenery. The most thickly-peopled places are those bordering these rivers, and the principal towns lie in close proximity to one or other of them. The three and a half millions of inhabitants are scattered over a seemingly vast surface; but the great majority of them are really to be found in a few places, of which Tashkent, Samarcand, Marghilan, Turkestan, and Vernoe are the central points and administrative capitals.

[1] Over which the Ameer Abdurrahman more than twelve months ago established his rights of suzerainty.

From this description of the Russian frontier it will be perceived that, except in the mountain boundary with the Chinese Empire in the east, and for a short distance of the course of the Oxus in the west, it is an irregular and arbitrary line, rather than a well-defined and natural barrier. It is, therefore, in its nature one that is not calculated to prove permanent. Beyond the recognized Russian frontier, but on the northern side of the Oxus, which is so much the object of Russian solicitude that the monopoly of its navigation has been secured, there still remain in the enjoyment of nominal independence the large Khanate of Bokhara and the small states of the Pamir slopes. Russia's relations with the latter do not stand in need of exact definition; they are based on the law of the stronger. But with the former they are of a formal diplomatic character, which has endured during more than fourteen years. After the capture of Samarcand, in 1868, the Ameer of Bokhara continued the war with Russia for some months, but personally he had little hope of success. After his defeat at Zera Bulak, however, he gave in, and notified to General Kaufmann his willingness to accept the terms imposed by the Russian commander. The principal of these were the surrender of Samarcand and Katti Kurgan; the payment of an indemnity of more than £200,000 (125,000 tillas); the opening of Bokhara to Russian commerce at a *maximum* tariff of 2½ per cent. *ad valorem;* the right of passage for merchants and troops through Bokhara to other states; and lastly, the permission to establish, when necessary, cantonments and other military buildings at Kermina, Karshi, and Charjui. After the capital itself those three places are the most important strategical points in the Khanate; and the last-named is situated at the principal passage over the Oxus. Strange as it may appear, Charjui, like Kerkhi and Khoja Saleh, higher up, lies on the southern bank of the river. At first the last, and in some respects the most important, of these clauses did not possess much significance, but the growing power of Russia, as demonstrated by the successful campaigns in Khiva and Khokand, served to give it weight and reality, which found expression in the second treaty of September, 1873.

When the Khan of Khiva transferred in that year his sovereign rights over the Oxus to Russia, the practical use of Charjui became clear. The gunboats of the Aral flotilla carried the Czar's flag up the Oxus, and Charjui has been made their princi-

pal rendezvous on a stream which it was supposed presented insuperable difficulties to navigation. Karshi has also been visited on numerous occasions by Russian officers and their escorts; and if Russian troops have not yet absolutely taken up their station there it is not because any difficulty stands in the way. The road between it and the frontier post of Djam has been improved by the Ameer himself for the benefit of his friends and neighbours. The right to occupy Kermina remains in reserve until a less complaisant ruler than Mozaffur Eddin is seated on the cushion of Bokhara. Thus gradually but surely have the toils been cast round the last independent State of Turkestan; but, although Russia enjoys a practical predominance in its affairs, it appears doubtful whether this will be held sufficient, after the present Ameer's death, in the case of a state occupying so important a position in Russia's onward path. Moreover, Bokhara possesses some great natural advantages. Its population alone exceeds two millions, although it is not much more than one-twentieth of the size of the great Russian province by which it is girt in. It is also the centre and headquarters of a silk trade which seems capable of enormous development. Whenever Russia occupies Bokhara, and the northern Pamir States, which have altogether a computed population of a quarter of a million, her frontier line will be brought down to the Oxus, and on the east the Kizil Yart will divide her from the Chinese in Kashgaria, as the Tian Shan does elsewhere. She will then possess a well-defined and advantageous frontier beyond which she can give no valid reason for transgressing. As things are at present ordered, she holds, however, everything north of that river, with the exception of Bokhara and the northern parts of the States of Roshan, Shignan, and Darwaz.

Unfortunately, Russia's eagles have not been restricted to the northern banks of the Oxus. There is a dangerous precedent for her interference on the southern side of that river, while her advance from the Caspian has turned the flank of the policy that would confine her sphere of action and usefulness to the Mawaranahar of the Hindoos. The Khanate of Khiva has been relegated to a position of still more marked dependence than even that of Bokhara. In 1873, after a brief and feeble struggle, its capital surrendered, and the Khan, who, as described by Colonel Burnaby, appears to be a man of an easy-going temperament,

placed himself at the complete disposal of his conqueror. The terms of the treaty by which General Kaufmann consented to withdraw his army of occupation were rigorous in the extreme, and were not abated in consequence of the amiability of the vanquished. The Khan had, in the first place, to disband his armed forces, and to trust to Russian friendship for protection against his turbulent nomadic subjects and neighbours; and, in the second, he gave up all right to conclude any treaty or commercial arrangement. He surrendered his territory on the right bank of the Amou, as well as that to the west of the Uzboi, an ancient bed of the Oxus in the desert and leading to the Caspian. He also resigned all his rights over the navigation of his great river, which became the Czar's exclusive possession. Nor were these all the concessions he had to make. Khiva was required to pay a fine of £300,000 (2,200,000 roubles), with interest, by instalments. Only a small part of this sum has been paid, and the balance is held *in terrorem* over the Khan's head. The Khanate was also thrown open to Russian trade free of all import and transit duties; but the ruler was allowed, and indeed encouraged, to place as high a duty as he liked on any merchandise coming from other countries. The natural consequence has followed, and there has been none to tax. His relations with the Russian officers in the opposite district of the Amou Darya have since been those of complete dependence and subordination. The latter have several times laid claim to the credit of having saved him from the perils entailed by the unarmed state in which they left him. The claim is hardly one to make a great impression as a proof of generosity. The area of independent Khiva is about 23,000 square miles, with a population of 700,000, and there is no doubt that, under a provident and intelligent government, it could be made one of the most prosperous countries of Central Asia.

With this Khanate we arrive at the end of the jurisdiction of Tashkent, though not at that of the Czar's authority in Central Asia. The more recent movement east of the Caspian, carried out under the auspices of Tiflis, has resulted in the extension of the Czar's empire in a new direction. In 1869 the station of Krasnovodsk was founded at the extremity of Balkan Bay. A few years later Tchikishlar, near the mouth of the Atrek, was turned into a landing-place for troops, and a blockhouse was erected there for their protection. Expeditions into the interior immediately

followed. The Aidin Wells and Kizil Arvat formed the object of attack in the one direction; the Turcoman camps on the Atrek and the Kuren Dagh in the other. The failure of Colonel Markozof's column to reach Khiva at the time of the war, and its retreat to the Caspian with serious loss and in confusion, inflicted a check on the progress of Russia in this quarter. It was some time before the disaster was effectually retrieved; but within less than five years Chat on the one side and Kizil Arvat on the other were occupied by a Russian force. In 1879 all was ready for a final advance into the country of the Akhal Turcomans, who refused to accept the flattering terms held out to them by the Russian officers; but when decisive success seemed to be within their grasp, the valiant defence of Geok Tepe, followed by the retreat of General Lomakine, disappointed their hopes. It is a matter of recent knowledge how the late General Skobeleff retrieved that defeat, and broke up the Akhal confederacy. In consequence of his victory, the Russian authority was established on the verge of the Kopet Dagh, and its advanced post is considered to be Babadoorma, a village forty-five miles east of Askabad, the capital of the new province. It was thought possible to supplement this achievement of the sword with another by diplomacy. Negotiations were accordingly commenced at Teheran for the settlement of the Akhal-Persian frontier, and Russia boldly claimed the line of the Atrek. Fortunately the Shah and his advisers felt themselves strong enough to resist this pretension, and M. Zinovieff had to rest content with the acquisition of some of the districts within the Kopet Dagh, which, as a matter of right, were undoubtedly Persian. By this treaty the communication between Askabad and the Caspian, through the valley of the Sumbar, was rendered perfectly safe. The area of this new dependency of the Caucasus is about 146,000 square miles, with a population of nearly 400,000 persons.

Here, as in Turkestan, it is only too evident that the existing limits of Russian authority are nothing more than temporary. Russia has certainly not the desire to remain passive behind her post at Babadoorma, and there is no compulsion available to keep her there. It is more difficult to assign a limit, suitable in itself and clearly recognizable, in this quarter of Russia's progress in Asia than it is in Turkestan, where the Oxus seems to solve a very troublesome question. Russian official writers, among whom the

late Professor Grigorieff and M. Martens enjoy pre-eminence, have several times declared that Russia will have obtained everything she wants when she has connected her possessions beyond the Oxus with those on the Caspian. Already her opposite posts at Charjui and Babadoorma seem to invite each other to establish the one link still missing. The conquest of a coveted possession is often more easy and agreeable than the task of retaining it and of turning it to a useful purpose. Even assuming that the Turcomans of Merv do not have recourse to any further open resistance —a point about which, considering their recent attacks on parties of Russian travellers, notwithstanding the death of their fiery chief, Makdum Kuli, there will be difference of opinion—the expense of occupying their territory would be immense, and, if appreciated, not likely to find favour with a Government that remembers the cost of the last Turcoman war with intelligible apprehension. Financial considerations will always prove the strongest bar to Russia's progress, and they seem likely to become more pressing in the future than they have been in the past. The character of Russia's position beyond the Caspian, in the vicinity of a warlike and fanatical race, which will in time recover from the impression produced by recent defeat, will compel Russia either to take a further stride forward or to withdraw from an untenable position. There is little doubt which she will do, but she will probably defer her advance until her preparations on the Oxus are so far completed that she can count on the most effectual blow against Merv being dealt from the side of Charjui.

The commercial outlook for Russia beyond the Caspian is more hopeful with regard to Persia than it can be considered to be with reference to the countries of the Oxus region. The best trade route from Europe to Northern Persia appears to pass through the limits of this new possession, and a considerable commerce should without difficulty be established between Meshed and Russia. The waterway down the Volga from the centre of the empire and across the Caspian to Krasnovodsk, seems to supply the cheap route and the admirable facilities needed to develop mercantile enterprise within the Czar's dominions. The Government has not been wholly blind to the advantages it might secure in this quarter, and the energy it has shown here will favourably contrast with that exhibited anywhere else. Under the control of Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff it is unlikely that any

prudent measure will be neglected, or suffer for want of timely encouragement, for the benefit of the Caucasus or its dependencies. Although the Tiflis authorities are fully occupied in completing their own railway system between the Black Sea on the one hand, and the Caspian on the other, a line of railway has been laid down across the desert from Balkan Bay to Bami, and it is proposed in due course to continue it to Askabad. This railroad is probably very imperfect in the manner of its construction,[1] but it already simplifies the work of garrisoning a region deficient in the necessaries for European troops. It is susceptible of indefinite improvement and extension; and should the oil wells of the Caspian realize the sanguine expectations the mere knowledge of their existence has sufficed to raise, it will no doubt be both improved and extended within the next few years.

The country through which this line would pass was surveyed by M. Lessar, an experienced engineer, during last summer; and the opinion which he formed on the spot was that there were no engineering difficulties to prevent its early completion to as far as the Persian town of Sarakhs. But although this statement may appear satisfactory for the execution of Russian designs in Khorasan, M. Lessar expressed a gloomy opinion as to the prospects of commerce in this region; and if the Russian Government undertakes this line of railway it will be without any reasonable hope of its proving a remunerative enterprise. Lieutenant Alikhanoff, who accompanied the first caravan of the merchant Koushin to Merv in February last year, formed, indeed, much more favourable conclusions on the subject, and affirmed that Merv must in the future become the principal mart in Central Asia for Russian and European manufactures. Moreover, until some better harbour has been discovered on the eastern shore of the Caspian, than either Krasnovodsk or Tchikishlar, commerce must always exist under a very considerable disadvantage; and although sanguine persons may declare that the prospects of the Trans-Caspian district are not devoid of promise, the known facts hardly warrant the anticipations expressed on this point. It remains, indeed, an open question whether its own prospects would be improved, or whether the work of the Government would be simplified by the incorporation in the empire of the remaining Turcoman desert

[1] The gauge is 2 ft. 4 in., and the rolling-stock is exceedingly limited.

and the oasis on the Murgab. The independent Turcoman territory extends from the Tejend to the Oxus, and it is bordered on the south by the Persian and Afghan dominions. The area is computed to be about 80,000 square miles, with a population of 450,000. It is probable that the inhabitants are more numerous, as the settled Turcomans on the Oxus form many colonies; and the addition of this vast and, for the most part, irreclaimable region to the Czar's dominions must add greatly to the labours of the administration.

To sum up, the Russian Empire in Central Asia consists of the military province of Turkestan and of the administrative district beyond the Caspian. The Khanates of Bokhara and Khiva, and the region occupied by the Turcomans, are alone wanting to make it a solid dominion from Balkash to the Upper Oxus, and from the immediate neighbourhood of Balkh and Maimena to the Caspian. In short, it would include the whole of Western Asia, with the exception of Afghanistan, Persia, and Asiatic Turkey. The total population of the states already conquered amounts to nearly four millions, and a fair estimate of those remaining outside Russia's authority would return them at as many more.

Several subjects present themselves for consideration in connection with the interior administration of this empire. In the first place, the lines of communication and the means of locomotion, are of prime interest and importance in the case of a foreign dominion established at a great distance from the centre of the empire. Russia enjoys the inestimable advantage of having her communications altogether within her power. There is none to dispute or in any way to hinder her right of way. She has been slow, indeed, to draw all the advantage that might have been derived from this fact. Twelve years ago it was proclaimed, as with a flourish of trumpets, that the Russian railway system would be extended beyond Samara, on the Volga, to Tashkent. With great difficulty it has been continued as far as Orenburg—not one-fourth of the total distance to be accomplished. Compared with the progress made by this line, which was to have been the much-vaunted Central Asian Railway, the rapidity with which the Trans-Caspian Railway has been constructed appears very creditable and rather remarkable. Numerous suggestions have been made for carrying the line beyond Orenburg. Some would carry it straight across the steppe to the Aral, and others would continue it through

Orsk; while another school of engineers and politicians would tap the Central Asian region by a branch line from the Siberian railway system, although that system exists only in name. The latest proposition appears to be the one most likely to be realized; and this is to construct a line by the most direct way from Orenburg to the Aral—viz., that passing through the valleys of the Ilek and the Emba. A more copious supply of water and timber is procurable along this route, and the surrounding region is well peopled for that part of the world. This design is more likely to succeed because it is less ambitious than some of those that have preceded it, and appears to take some account of natural difficulties. In connection with this project a company has been formed for the purpose of starting river steamers on the Syr Darya, and of conveying passengers, merchandise, and troops from Kazala, near the mouth of the river, to Khodjent, a town high up its course, and lying on the main road from Khokand to Samarcand. As the navigation of the Jaxartes has been greatly improved during the last few years by irrigation works at the Bakali marsh, and by the construction of several much-needed canals, this enterprize is very likely to succeed; and with the completion of the Ilek Valley Railway, Turkestan would be brought within a reasonably short distance of Europe. There are several places on the Syr conveniently situated with regard to the interior, which would answer the purpose of river ports admirably; and Chinaz, it may be remarked, would be the harbour for Tashkent. When Russia shows herself able to derive all possible advantage from the rivers Syr and Amou, she will have done much towards the removal of the difficulties which at present cripple her political action; but some of these schemes, which look so well on paper, will have first to be carried into effect.

The administrative work in this extensive region is carried out by districts, which are again portioned off into sub-districts. Ferghana, for instance, forms one district under the control of a general, who is also vested with civil authority; and it is apportioned into seven sub-districts—Marghilan, Khokand, Andijan, Wadil, Ush, Namangan, and Chu. Marghilan has been chosen as the administrative capital on account of its being conveniently situated for regulating the affairs of the nomads. Uralsk, Syr Darya, Zerafshan, Amou Darya, and Semiretchinsk are the principal of the other administrative districts. The form of govern-

ment is essentially military, all reports being transmitted from Tashkent to the War Office at St. Petersburg; but the people are left very much to their own ways in regulating their domestic matters and their affairs with one another. The Russians have found the simplest mode of governing a great Mahomedan dependency to be to leave the conduct and instruction of the people in the hands of their Aksakals and Mollahs. All civil cases are still tried by the Shariat, as under the old rule of the Khans, and it is only in cases of crime that the Russian authorities step in and apply what may be called the code of Europe. Possibly it is due to this general laxity of system, as much as to any settled purpose, that the official accounts are very imperfect and unsatisfactory.

Whatever the cause, the fact is unquestionable, and it is only possible to approximate to the revenue and expenditure of the Tashkent Government. A high estimate places the total revenue at four millions of roubles, while the expenditure never falls below nine millions, thus leaving a deficit in the most favourable years of not less than five million roubles, about £600,000.[1] The principal tax is that on the land of the settled inhabitants, and on the tents of the nomads. In 1879, the last financial year of which we have any official account, this tax was computed to pay into the exchequer the sum of 2,624,500 roubles, and of this amount the district of Zerafshan—proving that it deserves its name of "Gold Distributor"—contributed one-sixth. In addition to the land tax, the most important items of the revenue are the excise, drawn almost exclusively from the pockets of the Russians themselves, the tax on fruit, and the customs. In the Trans-Caspian region as yet practically no revenue is raised; and, of course, official returns take no cognizance of the vast sums that have been expended in the campaigns of several generations, for which the only return beyond the territorial acquisition has been such pecuniary fines as those paid by Bokhara and promised by Khiva. The revenue easily raised in the native State of Bokhara, which is said to amount to a quarter of a million ster-

[1] This was an under-estimate. *The Turkestan Gazette* of 6th (18th) Dec., 1883, published a statement showing that the deficit of the revenue of Turkestan for the fourteen years 1868 to 1882 amounted to not less than eighty million roubles, or at the rate of more than one million sterling per annum, taking the rouble at its average value.

ling, will compare very favourably with the sum laboriously collected in Turkestan by the Russian officials.

Not less difficulty is experienced in ascertaining the present state of Russian trade, although the assertion that it has taken a marked stride forward during the last few years appears to be based upon some fact. The production of native cotton, which Professor Vambéry has declared to be finer than any other, with the exception, of course, of that of America, has been greatly developed, and at present shows no signs of having reached its limits. The export of Russian home manufactures has also steadily increased, although the Muscovite cover very often conceals the handiwork of Birmingham and Manchester. A recent official report gave the total importation of Russian manufactured goods into the province of Ferghana alone at the equivalent in roubles of £370,000. In some directions, however, the progress does not seem to have been so great as was anticipated, for two recent travellers, MM. Bonvalot and Capus, who travelled in Central Asia in the latter part of the year before last,[1] report that they did not meet a creature on their journey from Khiva to Krasnovodsk, between which it was thought that a considerable trade would be carried on. These French travellers also enjoy the distinction of having been the first Europeans who were not Russians to visit Charjui since Dr. Wolfe; but, unfortunately, the laws of hospitality have forbidden their divulging much information as to the present state of the Russian naval station at that place. Besides the cotton of Turkestan and Khiva, and the silk of Bokhara, Central Asia supplies Astrakhan with large quantities of the wool for which that town is famous. As much as £90,000 worth of wool is conveyed across the steppe to Orenburg in the course of the year. Fifty thousand tons of cotton and two and a half million pounds of silk also figure among the annual productions and exports of Turkestan. Cereals and fruits are grown over five and a half millions of acres, and contribute to the support of a thrifty and not unamiable population. Nor is the capital stock of this region to be overlooked. The value of the live stock has been computed at eighteen millions sterling; and it is made up of eleven millions of sheep, one and a half million horses, 1,200,000 head of cattle, and 390,000 camels. For a country so thinly peopled, these avail-

[1] *l.c.*, 1881.

able sources of wealth are not inconsiderable, and the large number of horses supplies the Government with the means of mounting a numerous cavalry. When to the resources already possessed in this respect are added those of the Turcomans, it will become more evident how valuable this branch of wealth may yet prove to the Czar's Government. It is too soon to detect all the results of the clause in Russia's last treaty with China allowing the importation of inferior tea at a lower duty; but the hope is indulged that by this means Indian tea will be driven out of the markets of Central Asia. That something of this expectation has been realized would appear probable from the latest reports [1] from the Amritsur market, where business in the export of Indian tea was stated to be at a complete standstill. The efforts recently made by Russian officers to increase our geographical knowledge must not be ignored, and the names of Prejevalsky, Regel, Potanin, Grodekoff, Severtsof, and Matvaieff have become known outside their own country.

There remains, in conclusion, only to say a few words on the subject of Russia's military resources in her great dependency. In 1873 the total force at the disposal of General Kaufmann on the eve of the Khivan campaign, amounted to no more than 36,000 men and 64 guns. The reinforcements which it received for the purpose of prosecuting that undertaking were never withdrawn, and became part of the regular garrison. In 1875 there was some intention of recalling several regiments, but it was not carried out. Indeed, the rebellion in Khokand strained the available resources of the Governor-General to the utmost, and in 1877 the official roll of the Turkestan army from Amou Darya to Semiretchinsk had risen to a muster of 55,000 men. It does not appear that any further increase [2] of this army has been

[1] This supposition has unfortunately been confirmed by the latest trade returns of British India.

[2] An Imperial ordinance of the 10th (22nd) of November sanctioned important changes in the organization of the troops stationed in Turkestan and in their command. All the line battalions, except Nos. 5, 13, 17, were henceforth to be grouped in brigades, each of which has a commanding general, instead of remaining separate units. The first Turkestan Line Brigade will include the Turkestan line battalions Nos. 1, 10, and 12, and will have its headquarters' staff stationed at Tashkent. The second Turkestan Line Brigade will have its headquarters in Samarcand, and will include Nos. 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 19 line battalions. The third Line Brigade, with its headquarters at Andijan, will

Map showing the
ACQUISITIONS OF RUSSIA
TOWARDS INDIA
Principality of Moscow 1462
At the Accession of Peter the Great 1689
At the Death of Peter the Great 1725
At the Death of Katherine II. 1796
At the close of the Crimean War 1856
Since 1856
BLACK SEA
CIRCASSIA
GEORGIA
TURKEY IN ASIA
PERSIA
AFGHANISTAN
BOKHARA
KHIVA
TURKESTAN
SIR DARIA
Desert of Kizil Koom
Desert of Kara Koom
Great Salt Desert
Khorasan
Kirghiz Middle Horde
Kirghiz Little Horde
TURGAI
URALSK
SEMIPALATINSK
SEMIPALATINSK
Bek pak dala Desert
Moscow
Kazan
Tula
Simbirsk
Penza
Samara
Tambov
Kursk
Voronezh
Sarepta
Astrakhan
Orenburg
Ufa
Tobolsk
Omsk
Tomsk
Tashkent
Chimkent
Khokan
Samarcand
Bokhara
Khiva
Tiflis
Erzerum
Tabriz
Teheran
Herat
Cabool
Kashgar
Yarkand
Khotan
Kuen Lun Mts
Thian Shan Nan Lu
EASTERN TURKESTAN
Takla Makan Desert
CHINESE EMPIRE
INDIA
Kaschan
Ispahan
Meshed
Kuldja
Ili or Kuldja
Aral Sea
Caspian Sea
Sea of Azov
Kulali I.
Petrovsk
Tarku
Derbent
Baku
Kinderli B.
Alexander B.
Kizil Urgan
Kizil Arvat
Bami
Chikishliar
Asharada
Lenkoran
Erzeli
Lahijan
Ardabil
Tiflis
Kutais
Sukhum Kaleh
Anacria
Pitzunda
Soukhum Kaleh
Trebizond
Erzerum
Kars
Ararat
Bayazid
Van
Mosul
Hamadan
Kashan
Yezd
Meshed
Herat
Cabool
Kandahar
Balkh
Bokhara
Samarcand
Khiva
Tashkent
Chimkent
Khokan
Kashgar
Yarkand
Khotan
Kuldja
Ili or Kuldja
Tomsk
Omsk
Tobolsk
Astrakhan
Sarepta
Orenburg
Samara
Penza
Tambov
Voronezh
Kursk
Moscow
Kazan
Tula
Simbirsk
Ufa
Sevastopol
Kertsch
Taganrog
Rostov
Stavropol
Tiflis
Erzerum
Trebizond
Sinope
Constantinople
Sea of Azov
Black Sea
Caspian Sea
Aral Sea
Lake Balkash
Lake Issyk Kul
Lake Baikal
Lake Ala Kul
Lake Zaisan
Lake Tengiz
Lake Ebi Nor
Lake Lop Nor
Lake Tsaidam
Lake Kokonor
Lake Tchaka
Lake Van
Lake Urmia
Lake Sevan
Lake Ladoga
Lake Onega
Lake Peipus
Lake Ilmen
Lake Baikal
Lake Balkash
Lake Issyk Kul

made, although some steps were taken a few years ago towards creating a reserve for it by establishing Cossack and other colonies round Lake Issik Kul. General Tchernaieff, who, since his return to Tashkent, has devoted himself with characteristic energy to the reform and purification of the public service, has drawn up a definite scheme for the formation of regular military colonies in the district of Turkestan; and what he has already accomplished in this direction more than justifies the anticipation that, if he remains sufficiently long in power,[1] he will add a new element of strength to the Russian position in Central Asia. In the Trans-Caspian district more than 10,000 men of the Army of the Caucasus are employed as the garrison of the Turcoman territory, and this is only the advanced force of an independent army numbering more than 200,000 men and 350 guns. The Tashkent army is deficient in artillery, and its cavalry is not very numerous. The greater number of the infantry regiments are, however, accustomed to march, and even to fight on horseback. These soldiers consist entirely of Russians or Russianized races, such as the Cossacks, Bashkirs, &c.

There is no native army[2] like ours in India, notwithstanding that several of the subdued peoples are of martial disposition, and would supply admirable material for soldiers. But although the recruiting sergeant does not concern himself with the inhabitants of the country, and notwithstanding that there are no regiments of Tashkent and Marghilan in which the young Turkestani or Khokandi would be proud to serve, there is no law against any member of these races entering a Russian regiment and serving his father the Czar. The sole condition is that he should enter one of the regular regiments, and share alike with European or Cossack comrades, which it is hoped would prove a Russianizing process. As yet very few have been attracted into the service; and to all appearance the Government does not seem

include battalions Nos. 4, 7, 16, and 18. The fourth Line Brigade will have its headquarters in the city of Marghilan, and will include battalions Nos. 2, 14, 15, and 20. The battalions Nos. 5, 13, 17, which are not included in this brigade organization, are stationed along the Amou Darya, and will remain directly under the command of the governor of that district. The local command in the Syr Darya district will be attached to the first brigade.

[1] General Tchernaieff was recalled in 1884, and succeeded as Governor-General of Turkestan by General Rosenbach.

[2] Some of the Turcomans have since been formed into a militia.

to care whether they come forward or not. A more vigorous measure is indeed about to be taken with the Kirghiz, who are to be compelled to send one member from each family; but doubts have been cast on the Government's insisting on what is sure to be a very unpopular proceeding. It may possibly prove to be only a mode of raising the revenue by obliging the Kirghiz to purchase exemption from an unpleasant duty. In some ways Russia benefits by performing her own military service; but, on the other hand, and as some counterpoise to the sense of security against mutiny, it must be remembered that she refuses to avail herself of one of her most obvious sources of strength at the same time that she incurs the discontent of having put an end to the most popular of all careers in the East. The Aral flotilla, which provides the gunboats that navigate the Syr and Amou Daryas, has to be added to complete the means for warlike operations at the disposal of Russia in Central Asia. Some of these vessels have performed the remarkable inland voyage of travelling from Chinaz, on the Syr Darya, to Charjui, on the Oxus.

The responsibility entailed by the administration of this extensive region is indeed very heavy, and the manner in which Russia will be held to have discharged the duties she has voluntarily accepted will not be judged by reference to the state of Turkestan at the time when her rule displaced that of effete and tyrannical Khans. It rests with Russia herself to show whether she has occupied Central Asia with the conscientious resolve to meet her obligations there, and to apply the lessons of good government in a region long the prey of bloodthirsty and unscrupulous tyrants. The greater the natural difficulties the higher will be her meed of praise if she do so with success; but although the Khanates are now in a backward condition, we cannot forget that they were once among the most flourishing kingdoms of the earth. Russia may never succeed in restoring their ancient splendour; she can demonstrate, however, her good faith and the integrity of her intentions by resolutely making the attempt. The truth is not to be obscured, and disappointments carry much weight in the world of practical politics. Russia has carried out much of the traditional policy of the great Peter; but she has not secured the trade of either China or India. She appears to be as far off as ever from attaining the monopoly of the one or the other; and she cannot even lay the satisfaction to her heart that what she has

won is in the smallest degree worth the sacrifices she has made during the better part of two centuries. Turkestan is, and must long be, a drain on her limited resources and a clog on her movements in other directions. Her Central Asian empire has given her the feverish longings of a great ambition without having simplified the task or provided the smallest necessaries towards realizing it. There is danger from such disappointment as hers, as there is from despair; yet the plain truth remains obvious to all impartial observers that the most prudent course for Russia, as it would prove the most remunerative in the long run, would be to curtail her military expenditure and to devote all her energies to the improvement and development of that vast northern region which Providence has entrusted to her guidance, and which only awaits careful government to well repay the hand that supplies its wants and cherishes its interests.

II.

PETER THE GREAT AND THE POLICY OF RUSSIA.[1]

HISTORY contains no more striking instance of a nation's growth and the formation of an empire being identified with a single individual, than the manner in which Russia is, and always will be associated with the name of Peter. Other peoples and countries have had their great sovereigns and conquerors, and some of them enjoyed a much larger share of success than this Russian ruler. His fame also is not due to his having delivered his people from a foreign yoke, for the Tartars had been defeated and driven out more than a century before his birth, while it cannot be attributed altogether to his conquests, which were surpassed in both extent and importance by those of the Empress Catherine the Second and the late Czar Alexander. Still, although he was neither a national deliverer nor the greatest of conquerors, Peter was undoubtedly the true author of the present power and position of Russia. He was also the originator of most of those plans which have been adopted as constituting the national policy, and of which some have been carried out, while others yet await realization. He found his country in the possession of the bigoted ecclesiastics of the most superstitious and semi-idolatrous of Christian churches, and of a self-styled aristocratic class of almost in-

[1] *The Calcutta Review*, October, 1884.

credible ignorance; while the small share left to the sovereign in such government as there was could be performed with difficulty during the brief intervals snatched from public praying and the other ceremonies of devotion to which the tyranny of the Greek Church bound him. Peter left Russia with the monarch restored to his legitimate position, the Church excluded from interference in secular affairs, the nobility reformed if not civilized, and the nation entitled to take its place among European Powers. Long before Peter, the Russians had won their right to independence by expelling the Tartars, but apparently they had exhausted themselves in the effort. Certainly they did not show themselves capable of converting to the attainment of national greatness the remarkable popular effort which had restored their liberty. The fruits of success promised to be dissipated in the long dynastic struggles that followed the death of Ivan the Terrible. The conquest of Siberia achieved without an effort had given Russia the name of a vast dominion in Asia, but it possessed little or no real importance; while at home the Russians could be hardly said at any point to touch the sea, for their one harbour of Archangel was closed throughout the greater portion of the year. Surrounded by a vigorous Poland, an active and aggressive Sweden, and the powerful Empire of the Sultan with his formidable armies and many posts of vantage on the Pruth and the Euxine, it seemed as if the young state would be hard pressed to retain the position and the liberty which it had won from the Tartars and defended against the Poles. It was at this critical moment that Peter appeared with his vigorous mind, and still more vigorous frame, to repair the blunders of the past, and to restore the credit of a family which had latterly been represented by cripples and imbeciles.

Our present object is not to follow the biographical details of Peter's life. We wish to show what influence he exerted on the policy of Russia, and the form which he desired that policy to take. But with regard to Mr. Schuyler's work,[1] it may be said that he has laboured under some peculiar difficulties not wholly of his own creation. In the first place, so little is generally known of the history of the period, and the information placed in his hands was so voluminous, that he could not resist the temptation

[1] "Peter the Great, Emperor of Russia" (a study of historical biography). By Eugene Schuyler, LL.D. London, 1884.

to be diffuse. A very large portion of the first volume is taken up with the exhaustive description of matters in which Peter had no share, and the necessary consequence is, that the central figure throughout the work is obscured and sometimes thrust quite out of sight. Mr. Schuyler has failed to realize the character of the inspired biographer, but he has certainly made a vast quantity of information accessible to the English reader, and it is not at all certain that in this particular case this is not the greater service. Mr. Schuyler had already proved himself a diligent, painstaking, and trustworthy collector and recorder of facts, and this work will certainly confirm his reputation on that ground.

The Czar Alexis married in 1671 *en secondes noces* Natalia Naryshkin, the ward of his minister Matveief, and the descendant of a noble but little known family of Tartar origin. By his first wife, a Miloslavsky, the Czar had still two sons living. The elder, Theodore, was always weak and sickly, the younger, Ivan, was "almost blind, had a defect of speech, and lacked little of being an idiot." Natalia Naryshkin was not like the women of Russia at that time. She had been accustomed to mix with men on a footing of equality, she had been educated after the manner of foreigners, and she used to dress "in what were called German clothes." She seems to have had much good sense, and she was as healthy and vigorous in her body as in her mind. The whole Court declared against Natalia, and her guardian was accused of having resorted to witchcraft to infatuate the Czar, but still the schemes of jealousy and prejudice were ultimately baffled and the marriage was celebrated. The offspring of this alliance—which had not been in accordance with the traditional practice of either the Romanoffs or their predecessors—was a boy born on 9th of June, 1672, who was christened by the name of Peter. It very soon became evident that whatever the young prince might prove intellectually, he was going to be, unlike his half-brothers, physically strong. He could walk at six months old, and at every age appeared bigger and more active than other children and boys of the same year. When Alexis died his eldest son Theodore became Czar, and the Miloslavskys coming into power employed their opportunities by banishing Matveief, and Natalia, with her son Peter, was placed in a kind of honourable confinement in the country-house of Preobrazhensky. What seemed a misfortune proved a benefit. Peter escaped from the close and

confined routine of the Kremlin, and in the fresher and free-er life of the country his health became assured, and his intelligence developed under the most favourable circumstances. If the education he received was calculated to awake ideas rather than to supply sound information, it was still a better one than any other Russian youth of the time could boast.

The reign of Theodore closed in 1682 after six years. Personal considerations, rather than any strong conviction in the excellence of the choice, led to the proclamation, after what was called a public election, of Peter as Czar. His half-brother Ivan was thus completely set on one side. It is possible that Peter's minority, under the regency of his mother, would not have been disturbed by any serious event, but for his ambitious and aggressive half-sister the Princess Sophia, whose real ambition, while working in the name of her brother Ivan, seems to have been to place the crown at the disposal of her lover, Prince Basil Golitzin. She found the instruments of her policy in the Streltsi or archers—a kind of national guard—who had lately manifested some symptoms of discontent and insubordination in consequence of their officers having defrauded them of their pay. The ready compliance with their requests shown by those in power encouraged them to believe that they were masters of the situation, while the skill with which the Princess Sophia worked upon their feelings made them the enemies of the Naryshkins and the avowed supporters of the young prince Ivan. On the 25th of May, 1682, they broke into open mutiny, and invaded the sacred precincts of the Kremlin. They murdered Matveief, several of the Naryshkins, and all who had excited their suspicion or dislike. Intoxicated by their success, it looked for a moment as if the Streltsi meditated stirring up a popular war. They declared the abolition of serfdom, and exhorted the slaves to turn upon and defy their masters. It seemed as if the Princess Sophia had roused a demon which she would find it difficult to exorcise. A week after the terrible scenes which accompanied this military revolt, the Streltsi presented a petition that Ivan should be associated with Peter as Czar. They also required that Ivan should be the first Czar, that Natalia should be excluded from the Government, and that the Princess Sophia should be appointed Regent. What they wished was for the moment law, and thus Peter was relegated to a secondary position, while the reality of power passed into the hands of the Princess

Sophia. Peter, who had been in the midst of these scenes, and who had beheld with his own eyes the murder of his relatives, had no reason to remember the Streltsi with affection.

Peter, relieved from much of the irksome routine of filling the throne alone by the success of Sophia's machinations, again returned to the rural life which he liked best at Preobrazhensky. By this time he had grown so big and strong, that when he was only eleven a foreigner took him for sixteen. His tastes were now confirmed in favour of military exercises, and his country home became the headquarters of a force which, at first only calculated to provide boyish amusement, was destined to become historically famous and to form the nucleus of Peter's subsequent power. Seeing that he was already pronounced to be "a youth of great expectancy, prudence, and vigour," it is strange that his inclination was not discouraged, and that he was allowed everything he asked for out of the arsenals and military stores. There were some who already looked for definite result from this confirmed taste for martial pursuits, although the most that was hoped from him was that he would one day "better restrain the attacks of the Krim Tartars." Mr. Schuyler gives a very interesting description of how devotedly Peter applied himself to his soldier's duties, and it is not surprising to learn that under the tuition of German and other foreign officers, he made himself an adept in his exercises and attempted some of the higher duties of a commander. Mr. Schuyler is not disposed to give Peter the credit of having any definite object in all these proceedings, and treats them as merely the gratification of a boy's taste for amusement. In this opinion we do not think Mr. Schuyler will find many to agree with him. In a similar manner, when his attention was turned to boat-building, Peter threw himself with all the energy of his nature into the subject, but it will be hard for his biographer to convince any one that these early proclivities and amusements did not lead him to ponder on the necessity of his possessing, as Czar, a military force to make him independent of the Streltsi, and of Russia having for her external development a fleet, and with that fleet harbours and a free way to the sea. The germ of Peter's later policy is to be discovered during the period of his second residence at Preobrazhensky when he was Czar in name, but excluded from all share in the government by the ambitious Sophia.

The first step of independence and self-assertion which Peter

took was on the return of Prince Basil Golitzin from his second abortive, and almost disastrous, invasion of the Crimea. His consent to the liberal rewards conferred on the officers and men was only obtained with the greatest difficulty, and when they went to present their respects to him at Preobrazhensky, he bluntly refused to receive them. Peter was then seventeen, and it was clear that he would not consent much longer to be effaced. His attitude also signified that he did not see why defeated generals should be rewarded like conquerors, and that he could not believe that disastrous campaigns should be regarded as military triumphs and as beneficial to the interests of the state. Only a few weeks after this affair open war was declared between Peter and Sophia. The collision occurred in connection with the latter insisting on her right to accompany a religious procession from the Kremlin to the Kazan Cathedral, when Peter had publicly ordered her to retire. She had replied by taking in her hands the picture of the Virgin, and walking after the crosses and banners while he hastened off to his country seat at Kolomenskoe to mature his plans. In this crisis while Peter had the support of his self-trained regiments and of the great mass of the aristocracy, Sophia could only look for aid to the Streltsi, who were in doubt as to their best policy, and undecided how to act. The Regent spared neither exhortation nor promises to ensure their devotion; but although she received assurances of fidelity, the Streltsi vacillated and were possessed by no resolution similar to that which had seized them seven years before. In consequence of an alarming report that the Streltsi were about to attack Preobrazhensky, Peter fled during the night, and it must be added in a very undignified and rather ignominious manner, from that place to the monastery of Troïtsa, where his friends and supporters began to rally some hours later. Peter's principal stroke of strategy was to summon the colonels of the different regiments of the Streltsi to Troïtsa, and notwithstanding all Sophia's efforts to deter them, the summons was eventually obeyed. The struggle closed with Peter's complete triumph. The Streltsi abandoned Sophia, and she had to surrender her favourites and chief supporters to be either tortured or banished to Siberia. Sophia herself was dismissed from all share in the government, and very shortly afterwards placed in the Novodevitchy convent.

One of the first matters to which Peter turned his attention was how to develop his external trade and increase the national marine.

With infinite pains he had constructed more than one war vessel, and he had navigated some of the inner lakes of the country. But this did not satisfy him, and indeed his labours as a shipwright would never have gained him much fame had they stopped at this point. Peter, therefore, hastened off at the earliest opportunity to Archangel, where he found his yacht waiting for him, and in this he took his first cruise on the open sea for 200 miles towards the extremity of the White Sea. The experience thus acquired confirmed his partiality for the sea, and rendered him more than ever determined in his resolve to attain naval power. At one moment he meditated placing a fleet on the Caspian, and at another nothing less than an opening to the Baltic would satisfy him. While the young ruler was credited with these schemes, he had really determined on another and still bolder one, seeing that it involved a direct attack on his powerful neighbour the Sultan. With the view of opening the navigation of the Don, and of making his way to the Black Sea, Peter had resolved to attack and take the fortified town of Azof at the mouth of that river. He made the attempt in 1695, and failed partly through the badness of his troops, but chiefly on account of the incompetency of his commanders and his own impetuosity. He renewed it in the following year with fresh troops, and although the result remained some time in doubt through the military inexperience of the Russian army, Azof at last surrendered and received Peter's garrison. The success was of great importance, and fully justified the rejoicings to which it gave rise. In the first place, the possession of Azof provided Russia with the means of restraining the Krim Tartars, and in the second, it gave Russia that access to the sea which was necessary to her development. Peter at once began to make arrangements for the construction of a large fleet, and the Russian merchants, clergy, and landed proprietors were called upon to give under compulsion sums of money, in proportion to their wealth, towards the completion of the good work. The most striking incident in connection with the Czar's firm resolve to collect a strong fleet, was his determination to go and learn the craft of ship-building for himself in the ship-yards of England and Holland. The death of his brother Ivan had already left him in possession of sole power, and the journey could be performed in safety, for at that moment there was internal peace, and no serious complication had arisen with his neighbours.

Peter's foreign tour was cut short by the receipt of bad news from Russia, where his enemies took advantage of his absence. Perhaps the fact that most impressed Peter himself was the outbreak of a fresh spirit of insubordination among the Streltsi. Before Peter could return, however, the Streltsi had thrown off the bonds of discipline, marched in the direction of Moscow, and had been defeated by General Gordon. The survivors were captured. More than 100 were executed and nearly 2,000 imprisoned. The scenes which followed on the Czar's arrival were worthy of a barbarous society, but while they reveal the personal cruelty of the man, they tended to secure Peter's position by destroying the power of the Streltsi, the only military force that could dispute his authority. Then, for the first time, Peter was able to turn his attention seriously to questions of foreign policy. While one of his envoys took a certain part in the negotiations that preceded the Treaty of Carlovitz, and another went to Constantinople to arrange a truce with the Porte, Peter had bound himself, by the terms of an alliance with Augustus of Poland, to declare war upon Sweden. That country had retained possession of the coast provinces of Livonia, Esthonia, and Carelia which had been Russian, and the Russian Government had on more than one occasion recognized the fact and admitted its inability to recover the Baltic provinces. The Princess Sophia, as Regent, had concluded a formal treaty with Sweden, accepting the conditions of the Treaty of Kardis. The capture of Azof had not given Peter all he hoped. He had followed it up by the rapid construction of a war-fleet, but the outlet from the sea of Azof depended on the favour of the Khan of Kertch, and the navigation of the Euxine could only be secured with the assent of Turkey. A good commencement had been made, but Peter not feeling strong enough to cope alone with the Sultan, suspended his operations on the Don, and devoted his attention to the coming contest with Sweden. The year 1699 was employed in the despatch of embassies and missions for the express purpose of deceiving Sweden as to the secret alliance just concluded against her between Russia and Poland. At the very time that this momentous decision had been come to, Peter went through the farce and the fraud of ratifying the Treaty of Kardis, which bound Russia to waive all her claims to the province of Livonia. Ustrialof, described as "the official historian of Peter," wrote on this subject—

"Peter was not afraid either of the taunts of his contemporaries, or of the judgment of posterity. Advantages gained to his country were for him higher than all considerations, and he regarded nothing in a matter which tended to increase the greatness of his beloved Russia."

Although his allies the Poles and the Danes took the field against the young king Charles the Twelfth, Peter was compelled to further delay and dissemble by the report that Turkey was preparing for war and by ignorance of what his ambassador was doing at Constantinople. Peter could find no stronger argument in support of his good faith than to ask how it was possible for him to "consent to begin an unjust war and to break an eternal peace that I have just confirmed?" It was only when the news arrived of the conclusion of peace with Turkey that he threw off the mask, and declared war upon Sweden, regardless of the moral protestations to which he had just given renewed expression.

The Polish campaign against Riga had not succeeded, but it did not seem possible that the young king of Sweden would be able to hold his own against his numerous enemies, when Peter formally declared war from the Bedchamber Porch, and followed up the declaration by moving the greater portion of the army, which he had recently organized on the Preobrazhensky model, to the frontier of Ingria. Those who had hoped to profit by his youth had not calculated correctly as to the character of Charles the Twelfth. While his lieutenants more than held their own against the Poles, he had himself crossed over to Denmark, placed Copenhagen at his mercy, and imposed a humiliating peace. When Peter's first act of overt war was made, Charles's hands happened to be free to deal with him alone. The Czar would have been wise to have dissembled a little longer. Peter's plan of campaign was, by the capture of Narva, which is in Livonia, to cripple the power of Sweden on the eastern side of the Baltic, and thus acquire unopposed possession of the coveted provinces. The Russian army laid siege to Narva, but through deficiencies in military supplies and the badness of the powder, little damage was done by a protracted bombardment, and several assaults were repulsed with heavy loss. By this time Charles had completed his own preparations, and he hastened to Pernau with an army of 12,000 men. While Peter was absent from the camp procuring

the services as generalissimo of the Duke de Croy, and generally hurrying up supplies, Charles had completed his arrangements to attack the Russians, and effect the relief of his garrison. The battle was fought on the 30th November, 1700, and although some of the Russian troops fought with ill-directed gallantry, their defeat was complete. At the very moment when Peter thought he had made his success morally certain, he learnt that his principal army had been routed and overwhelmed. Peter did not allow himself to seem in the least disheartened. He threw all his energies into the formation of new armies, the construction of fresh artillery from the bells of the churches, and to collecting in his own hands, for purposes of war, all the treasure of the state. He had his reward when Sheremetief defeated a Swedish general at Erestfer with heavy loss little more than twelve months after Narva. Six months later the same commander won a still more brilliant victory at Hummelshof. Despite the inauspicious commencement of the war, the campaign of the year 1702 closed with the capture, by Peter in person, of Noteborg on the Neva.

The capture of Noteborg was most important. It placed Peter on the Neva and within a short distance of the sea. It was then possible to employ some of his naval force on the great lake Ladoga, and to bring it within reach of the Baltic. The capture of Noteborg was followed by that of the other forts on the Neva. A relieving Swedish flotilla was driven off with the loss of two vessels; and notwithstanding the unpromising commencement of the war, the defeat of Narva was avenged, and Peter was in possession of what he wanted—a free Russian way to the Baltic. It showed the self-confidence of the man and the importance he attached to his acquisitions that he at once resolved to build a new city and to make his capital on this strip of land which had just been gained from the Swedes. In 1704 the stability of the Russian success was rendered assured by the capture of Narva by storm. The impression produced by these Russian successes was very great throughout Europe, and they gave point to the apprehension expressed by the famous Duke of Alva, nearly a century before, that it was "inexcusable to provide Russia with cannon and other arms, and to initiate the Russians into the way war was carried on in Western Europe because, in this way, a dangerous neighbour was being educated." During this period the Swedish monarch had left the Russians undisturbed, while he concentrated

all his forces for the purpose of overrunning Poland and deposing Augustus. The conclusion of that campaign brought the two great enemies again face to face, but this time not on the Neva but on the Niemen.

The energy and promptitude of Charles enabled him to secure several successes, and to shut up the Russian army under Ogilvy in Grodno. But he failed to prevent its retreat, and the season of the year, as well as the difficulty of the country, soon compelled the king to abandon a vain pursuit. There would be no advantage in following the details of the negotiations that ensued and that went on down to the year 1707. Charles himself declared that "the Czar is not yet humiliated enough to accept the conditions of peace which I intend to prescribe." But Peter showed unexpected moderation, and declared that he would yield everything to Sweden except Noteborg, St. Petersburg, and a narrow strip of territory on both sides of the Neva. Charles was not animated by any similar desire for peace, and declared that he would "sacrifice the last Swedish soldier rather than cede Noteborg." With such resolution in the cause of war on the part of the king of Sweden based, let it be said, on the conviction that Peter would not observe the obligations to which he bound himself by treaty, it was impossible to suppose that peace would endure longer than for the interval required to prepare for a bitter and decisive struggle. The campaign in Lithuania proved of a desultory character, and although Charles had under his orders an excellent army of more than 40,000 men, he was unable to achieve any decisive success, or to overcome the difficulties of a wild and wooded region. It was then that Charles conceived the brilliant but really impracticable idea of carrying the war into the Ukraine, of forming an alliance with the Cossacks, and of attacking Peter from a new and unexpected quarter. Intent upon effecting his junction with Mazeppa, and a promised army of 20,000 Cossacks, Charles, who had already fought two doubtful battles in which his losses were heavy, left his lieutenant Lewenhaupt with invaluable stores and a fresh force of 11,000 men to be overwhelmed by the whole Russian army. Peter wrote upon the subject of Lewenhaupt's defeat as follows—

"This victory may be called our first, for we have never had such an one over regular troops. In very truth it was the cause of all the subsequent good fortune of Russia, for it was the first

proof of our soldiers, and it put hearts into our men, and was the mother of the battle of Pultawa."

The alliance of Mazeppa with a portion of the Cossacks of the Ukraine could not compensate Charles for the loss of so many good Swedish soldiers and the discouragement of those who remained. The promptness with which Peter acted also deprived the treachery of the Cossack Hetman of almost all its importance. He carried his capital Baturin by storm, put every man in it to the sword, and destroyed the buildings and fortifications. The details of the fighting during the terrible winter of 1708–9 made it plain that Charles had placed himself in a trap, and given himself over into the hands of his enemy. In sheer despite or obstinacy Charles, when he should have been retreating towards Poland, laid siege to Pultawa, and allowed many precious weeks to pass by in vain attempts to overcome the obstinate Russian defence, while Peter himself was employed in bringing up all the troops he could to relieve the place and oppose the Swedes. In complete despair Charles found himself compelled with 12,500 men to make an attack on the Russian army of four times that number encamped in a strong position. The result was the decisive victory of Pultawa. All the principal Swedish generals and several thousand soldiers were captured. It was followed five days later by the surrender of Lewenhaupt and 15,000 men, while Charles escaped by the devotion of his companions into Turkey. Thus terminated the most memorable of Russia's many campaigns with Sweden. The event has excited many different comments and opinions, but Peter's admirable directness of purpose was shown in his rendering of its significance, "The last stone has been laid of the foundation of St. Petersburg." Russia had reached the Baltic, and she would not easily again relax her hold upon it.

The victory at Pultawa made Russia a European Power. Great statesmen saw in the Russian army a force that might assist their views in the settlement of the questions then at issue in Western Europe. The Emperor offered the Czar's son Alexis the hand of his sister. The king of Prussia proposed an alliance for the partition of Poland; and there were innumerable overtures of a less direct character from other quarters. But Peter was not to be so easily drawn out. He showed himself cool, haughty, and

that he felt himself master of the situation. But while he proved himself very cautious not to be drawn into engagements which could in the main only benefit other states, he also carefully surveyed his own position, and began to consider more carefully than ever what policy would be most advantageous for Russia. On the subject of the great benefits that would accrue to Russia from having a port accessible throughout the year, Peter was never in doubt. "The riches of Europe would thus be able to find an entrance into Russia, and Archangel can no longer boast of being the only port." Peter's agents were active in intrigue in several of the great capitals, particularly that of Turkey, and even before Pultawa, the sympathies of Russia with her co-religionists of the Greek Church had been proclaimed. The members of that Church, as anxious to possess the guardianship of the holy places as to recover their independence, began to look and appeal to the Czar as their most natural and powerful protector, and he seeing an opportunity of creating a diversion among the Ottomans, was not unwilling to pose in the character of Christian champion and to extend some support to those who, like the Montenegrins, had defended and made good their own independence. When, on the rupture of the peace by the Turks under the instigation of the French and Charles, who had been living at Bender since Pultawa, Peter saw that war was inevitable, he resolved to make some general appeal to the Greeks and other Christians who were living under "the barbarian yoke." On 8th of March, 1711, "war against the enemies of Christ" was solemnly proclaimed in Moscow, and the guards carried on their banners a cross with the motto, *In hoc signo vinces.* Although Peter had prepared the way for war by successful treaties and arrangements with the Hospodars of Moldavia and Wallachia, he was not very pleased that the war should have commenced as soon as it did. Still he made up his mind to the fact, impressed on his generals the necessity of reaching the Danube without delay, and issued a proclamation to "all who love God and are friends of the Christians," which, if words could kill, would then and there have annihilated the whole fabric of Turkish power. Some of the passages are so characteristic as to deserve quotation: "You know how the Turks have trampled into the mire our faith, have seized by treachery all the holy places, have ravaged and destroyed many churches and monasteries, have practised much deceit, and what wretchedness

they have caused, and how many widows and orphans they have seized upon and dispersed as wolves do the sheep. Now I come to your aid. If your heart wishes, do not run away from my great empire, for it is just. Let not the Turks deceive you, and do not run away from my word. Shake off fear, and fight for the faith, for the Church for which we shall shed our last drop of blood."

At this point in his career Peter was destined to experience a rude reversal of the good fortunes which had hitherto attended his movements. At first his plans worked well, and the Grand Vizier hesitated to cross the Danube. But the Russian army could not itself advance beyond the Pruth. There was jealousy and a keen rivalry between the two Hospodars, and when Peter's favour was seen to be wholly won over by the ruler of Moldavia, his neighbour of Wallachia, or Roumania, declared for the Turks, and placed at the Vizier's disposal the vast supplies by means of which Peter had hoped to carry on a war on the Danube. The Russians were greatly outnumbered, and they were further weakened by the despatch of the cavalry on a separate expedition. At Stanilesti the Czar, his wife the Empress Catherine, and the greater part of the Russian army were shut up in their camp and surrounded by the Turks, and although they repulsed one assault of the Janissaries, it was evident to them that they were completely at the mercy of their enemy. The only thing to be done was to obtain and accept the very best terms which the Vizier would grant. Mr. Schuyler can find no evidence in support of, and therefore dismisses as untrue, the story that Catherine gave her jewels to appease the greed of the Pashas. But Peter had to surrender some of the most cherished points of his policy as well as conquests on which he had set the greatest value. The Grand Vizier made it a *sine quâ non* that Azof, Peter's first conquest, should be restored. This was indeed a bitter disappointment, and threatened to shipwreck all the plans which had been so far advanced towards completion. Peter's hopes of establishing a great commerce and a powerful marine on the Black Sea were thus rudely dispelled. The Sultan had triumphed in his resolve "sooner to open his harem to the Russians than the Black Sea to their ships." Peter, in his distress at the loss of Azof and the breaking up of the Don fleet, could only turn with greater vigour to his plans in the Baltic—to that, as he expressed it, "other side which is incomparably of greater gain to us."

On the other side he acted with singular decision and not less good fortune. He cleared Pomerania of the Swedes, and he secured the hearty alliance of Prussia by resigning all claim to it in her favour. He then prepared to drive the same enemy out of Finland, declaring that if he could only "get as far as Abo the Swedish neck will become easier to bend;" and his success equalled his expectation. The later campaigns on the Baltic shores, when the Swedes were continually worsted and gradually expelled from all the possessions won by Gustavus and his successors, need not detain us. Nor is there any necessity to stop to describe how for a time the Czar resided more in the cities of Germany and in Paris than in his own country, or why Russian soldiers marched for the first time as far westwards as Mecklenberg. Suffice it to say, that the Swedish war flickered on, and that the return of Charles from his Turkish confinement threatened to impart fresh vigour to the struggle. But although the Aland Congress came to nothing, the fortune of war had set in so decidedly against the Swedes, that even the death of Charles himself while laying siege to a small town in Norway was regarded as a relief rather than as a disaster. The Russian Commander Lacey burnt several towns on the Swedish coast, and as his descents were repeated annually, an enormous quantity of damage was inflicted on the old enemy of Russia. On one occasion the Cossacks advanced to within half a mile of Stockholm itself. A termination was at last put to the strife by the Treaty of Nystadt, by which Russia retained her conquests, and fulfilled her promises to her allies, Poland, Prussia, and Denmark. Peter throughout took particular care in conforming to his engagements, and after the original deception practised on the young king of Sweden, he pursued a straightforward policy. He was especially desirous of conforming with the military code of honour prevalent throughout Europe, in order to prove that he was not to be considered as in any way outside the pale of civilization. On more than one occasion his policy appeared, in comparison with that of the other European Powers, singularly direct and disinterested. Peter's policy in Europe had availed to give Russia a secure frontier and an ally in Prussia, a position among the Powers, and much of the coast of the Baltic, in which sea her navy became practically supreme.

It was after the disastrous return from the Pruth, when it was

clear that for the time schemes in the Black Sea would have to be abandoned, that Peter turned much of his attention to the affairs in Asia wherein the sovereignty of Siberia gave him the position of a great potentate. The contact of their frontiers had necessitated relations of some kind between Russia and China. Their vagueness had caused troubles and absolute war. During the regency of Sophia, the Chinese had vanquished the Russian colonists and destroyed their forts, and one of Peter's first acts of recovered authority had been to ratify the Treaty of Nipchu, which promised to ensure peace by the curtailment of rival pretensions. As early as 1688, Branki, the son of the Governor of Eastern Siberia, visited Pekin; and although their journeys were at irregular intervals and of an informal character, Branki had many successors. During this very period there had been several suggestions on the part of Galdan, the Eleuth prince, whose long wars with Kanghi made him in some sense famous, that the Russians would gain much by concluding an alliance with him. Mr. Schuyler does not allude to these early instigations to Russia to encroach, at the expense of China, by means of the many turbulent races which form the fringe of that great empire. These projects assumed more definite form when Galdan's successor and nephew, Tse Wang Rabdan, established on a better basis the power of the Jungarian monarchy. Although Peter is said by his biographer to have "gradually come to see that the key to all dealings in Asia was a good understanding with the Jungarians," it was not until 1722 that he sent Captain Unkofsky to make some inquiries into their strength and condition. He was the more induced to take this step by the failure of his second embassy under Ismaloff to obtain any concessions at Pekin. With regard to his direct policy towards the Celestial Empire, Peter desired to be cautious and circumspect in his mode of proceeding. He feared the adverse influence of the Jesuit missionaries in the Chinese capital, and his observations on this point deserve quotation—

"That affair is all very well, but only, for God's sake, act carefully and not hastily, so as not to indispose the Chinese officials, as well as the Jesuits, who have made their nest there since a long time. Wherefore we should have priests there not so learned as sensible and subtle, lest through some overpride all this holy business will go to the utmost ruin."

But the Czar had in his mind some nearer objects than the more remote and intangible plan of securing the trade of China. We have just quoted what he said on the subject of the advantages to be derived from a good understanding with the Chief of Jungaria, and from the possession of part of the Irtish, which provided his lieutenants with some facilities for reaching the wild region in the midst of which Tse Wang Rabdan had erected his throne. Rumour had long dwelt upon the hidden wealth to be found in parts of Asia. Prince Gagarin, Governor of Siberia, confirmed the rumour and gave it a direct signification. Gold sand, he said, was to be found near the town of Erket, Erken, or Yerken, supposed to be Yarkand, and although no one could say exactly where the place was, or how it would be possible to get there, still Peter at once ordered an expedition to proceed thither and occupy the places where the gold was found. This was in the year 1714. Colonel Buchholz was appointed to the command, and an expedition of 3,000 men was placed at his disposal. Mr. Schuyler thus describes the fate of this expedition—

"Buchholz reported two years afterwards that he had built the fort, but that it was dangerous to go to Erket on account of the small number of soldiers he then had, for many of them had run away to Siberia where they found a free life. Subsequently more than ten thousand Calmucks besieged Buchholz in his fort. Many soldiers died of disease, and finally in May, 1716, he accepted the terms offered by the Calmucks, razed his fort, and withdrew down the Irtish to the mouth of the Om, where he constructed a new fort Omsk. General Likharef, who was sent to Siberia in 1719 to investigate the maladministration of Prince Gagarin, was also instructed to ascertain the truth about the gold sand at Erket and, if true, to advance if he could without too much danger to Lake Zaizan to establish a fort there, to explore the country and the road from Zaizan to Erket, and especially to investigate the question whether there were any rivers running from Lake Zaizan into the Darya on the Aral Sea, but not to run any risk."

None of these expeditions to discover Erket could succeed, "partly on account of the physical difficulties of the country—for the geography of the region about Yarkand was not known in that day—and partly because not enough gold exists in the upper waters of the rivers of Central Asia to pay for washing the sands."

But this rather wild search for gold in a part of Asia where Russia has been wisely content ever since to stand still, showed how keen Peter was in the search of national gain and advantage, and how little he recked of natural difficulties in the attainment of his object. It was no marvel, therefore, that at a time when the great trading nations of the West were separated from the marts of India by wide and dangerous seas, the Czar should think of the many advantages he ought to derive from the short and seemingly secure land-route that lay at his disposal to the dominions of the Mogul. Schemes of doubtful wisdom and practicability for the discovery of the gold of Erket could no longer be considered as worthy of the attention of the Russian ruler; but any plan to divert the whole or any portion of the trade of India to Russia, became at once a matter of urgent policy. Peter had received envoys and even embassies from Khiva, and he knew that both that state and the neighbouring one of Bokhara held commercial relations with India. There seemed no great violation of probability in supposing that trade routes could be established through the countries of the Oxus and the Jaxartes to the plains of Hindostan.

Other stories of the gold to be found in Central Asia reached Peter besides that which centred round the semi-mythical Erket. A renegade Turcoman declared that gold was to be found in abundance along the banks of the Amou Darya, and he found a ready belief in his legends among the merchants of Astrakhan, not over well pleased with their lot and disappointed with their opportunities. Peter, too, whether he believed the tale or not, resolved to take some vigorous measure towards realizing the prospect held out to him, and hoped that trade between the Caspian and the Amou would prove no worthless possession, if the more brilliant dreams of golden harvests had to be abandoned. The Turcoman Hadji Nefes was appointed in the character of guide to a large expedition which Peter fitted out and entrusted to the command of a Circassian, who had become a Christian, named Prince Beckovitch Tcherkasky. The history of the Beckovitch expedition is well known. We need not repeat the story of how it crossed the Caspian, built a fort at the old mouth of the Amou, crossed the steppe, and defeated the Khivan troops on the borders of their territory. Then Beckovitch concluded peace, and took up his residence in the midst of the people with whom he had only just been engaged in mortal encounter. Prince Beckovitch

showed himself singularly confiding and unsuspicious. He consented to distribute his force in small detachments throughout the Khanate; and, of course, in a very short time they were attacked in detail and overpowered by superior numbers. The four thousand Russian soldiers and the Cossack contingent were sold into slavery, but the officers were executed, and Beckovitch's own head was sent as an acceptable present to Bokhara, where the Czar had just been trying to obtain a foothold by means of commercial agents. Thus was destroyed, almost to the last man, another Russian force employed for the special purpose of opening a trade route to India, for although the Khan gave some promise to restore the captives, he refused all atonement on learning that his own envoy had been imprisoned, and he stamped the Russian letter under his foot and gave it to his children to play with. The practical result was that while Peter indicated the perception of two things, the necessity of a safe trade route between the Caspian and the Oxus, and also that Khiva and Bokhara were half-way houses as it were to India, he failed to attain any practical success, leaving to his descendants the late, and the present, Czar the achievement of these designs among others towards the realization of which he himself gave freely his intelligence, and treasure, and some of the best blood of Russia.

While Peter felt so strongly and acted so vigorously about matters which were more or less remote, he was not blind to affairs at his own doors. The trade of Persia was at that time far from inconsiderable. Its silk had a European reputation and constituted the chief support of the declining prosperity of Genoa. But Russia had neither share nor part in it. The silk traders were principally Armenians, and the trade route lay through Tabriz, Erzeroum, and Trebizonde. Peter at once conceived the idea of turning the great water-way of the Volga and the Caspian to the purpose of diverting some of the trade to Russia. He hoped to do this the more easily, as Russian merchants were established in Shemakha and other Persian towns on the coast of the Caspian. At first Peter resorted to diplomacy, and he sent an agent named Volynsky to Ispahan, then the capital of Persia, "to persuade the Shah, even by bribing his advisers, to turn the Armenian trade in raw silk through Russia." Volynsky was also to study the country, especially in its commercial aspects, and to investigate the course of the rivers flowing into the Caspian, and to ascertain

whether there was not one coming from the direction of India. As these instructions were drawn up in Peter's own handwriting, there was never any room to doubt that he felt very strongly on the subject that the main prize to be secured was the trade of India. Everything else was only as a means to this end. Volynsky arrived at Ispahan when the internal affairs of Persia were in the greatest confusion. A long war with the Afghans of Candahar had resulted in the repeated defeat of the Persian forces, and the son of Mir Vais, the founder of modern Afghan independence, already meditated his counter invasion, when Volynsky presented himself before the Shah. His mission was so far successful, however, that he obtained a treaty allowing Russian merchants to trade freely, and to buy raw silk whenever they wished. Volynsky also reported unfavourably of the condition of Persia, stating that under the reigning prince it would be speedily ruined. At the same time, he wrote, force would do more than intrigue, and at the first favourable opportunity, he recommended direct interference in Persia. Such an opportunity was not long presenting itself, for a Lesghian tribe attacked and plundered Shemakha, and the Russian residents suffered in both their persons and their substance. On this matter Peter wrote as follows—

"I have received your letter in which you wrote about the affair of Daud Bek, and that now is the very occasion for what you were ordered to prepare. To this opinion of yours, I answer that it is very evident we should not let this occasion slip. We have ordered a considerable part of our forces on the Volga to march to winter quarters, whence they will go to Astrakhan in the spring. As to what you wrote about the Prince of Georgia and other Christians, if any of these should be desirable in this matter, give them hopes, but on account of the habitual fickleness of these people, begin nothing until the arrival of our troops, when we will act according to best counsel."

At this conjuncture the Afghan invasion of Persia became an accomplished fact, and the Russian plans were simplified by the apparent inability of the Shah to defend himself. The motive given out for military operations in Persia was changed, and instead of going to assail the Shah, the Russian troops were announced to be approaching to assist him against rebels and enemies. In the summer of 1722 Peter had collected at Astra-

khan a very large army for the Persian campaign. It was said to number in all more than 100,000 men. The Tartar and Calmuck contingents alone formed half of the expedition, and there were 20,000 Cossacks. Whatever idea may now be associated with their names these auxiliaries were always considered inferior troops, except for the purposes of irregular warfare. The first object to be attained was the capture of the town and harbour of Derbend on the western shore of the Caspian. The cavalry and irregulars proceeded by land. The infantry with Peter in personal command were conveyed by water. There were no troops at Derbend, and the governor at once opened the gates and threw himself on the Czar's mercy. The only opposition was made by some of the Circassian chiefs who fought with desperation in their native hills, and although defeated, inflicted severe losses on their assailants. At Derbend, the possession of which, truly speaking, did not benefit Russia so very much, Peter gave expression to several reflections which showed how strongly his heart was set on securing the trade of India for his own people. One of his officers had observed that Russia had a much nearer way to India than the long sea route by the Cape, and explained a very fanciful scheme how, by utilizing the water system of Siberia, goods could be easily, and with little land carriage, sent from Russia to the Pacific, and then by ships to India. Peter's reply was pregnant and practical, and it also showed that he possessed unusually accurate geographical information for the time.

"'It is a long distance and of no use yet awhile.' Then pointing to the mountains along the shore of the Caspian, he said, 'Have you ever been in the Gulf of Astrabad? You must know, then, that those mountains extend to Astrabad, and that from there to Balkh and Badakshan with pack camels is only a twelve days' journey, and *on that road to India no one can interfere with us.*'"

The ultimate result of this Persian campaign could not be held to be encouraging, for after finding that the local difficulties were very serious, Peter withdrew the greater portion of his expedition. The main objects of his policy on the Caspian remained unrealized. He had hoped to found a great place of trade at the mouth of the Kura. He had intended visiting his ally Vakhtan Prince of Georgia at Tiflis, and ensuring the stability of Christianity

in his country. These plans had to be abandoned, but his lieutenant Matiushkin seized Baku which had at first replied to the Czar's summons with open defiance. That success was followed up by a most important negotiation, and the representative of the unfortunate Shah Tamasp, who at the time could not number more than 400 followers, was compelled to sign a treaty at St. Petersburg in 1723, ceding to Russia the three northern provinces of Persia—Ghilan, Mazanderan, and Astrabad. The Persian ruler, whose star was again rising in the ascendant through the genius of Nadir Kuli, indignantly refused to ratify terms that dismembered his empire. It is not probable that under any circumstances Peter could have enforced the fulfilment of the terms he had nominally obtained. But the intervention of Turkey, which, under the instigation of England, resolved to reassert her rights in Georgia, compelled the Czar on a threat of war to abandon the ambitious scheme he had gone so far as to promulgate in a formal manner. Although nothing more was said of appropriating Persian provinces, Peter clung tenaciously to the places which he had secured on the Caspian, to which sea, he wrote, "we cannot allow any other Power to come." An arrangement was at last concluded between Russia and Turkey by which the Persian provinces, into which the Afghan conquerors had not penetrated, were to be divided between the two states, while Peter, ever vigilant to attract the sympathy of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, offered the Armenians many facilities and advantages if they would come and settle under Russia on the shores of the Caspian. As this was calculated to excite some displeasure at Constantinople, the Russian Ambassador was instructed to make the following representation, which is the more interesting as it formed the last instructions given by Peter on Eastern policy—

"If the Turks say anything about this, reply that we have not invited the Armenians, but that they on account of the unity of belief had begged us to take them under our protection. For the sake of Christianity it is impossible for us to refuse this to the Armenians who are Christians. As the Vizier himself has often said, it is impossible to refuse protection to those of the same faith who ask it."

It may not be out of place to record the ultimate fate of these Russian conquests. The Persians defied both Russia and Turkey

after Peter's death, and resolved to defend the integrity of their dominions. At first the operations of war languished, but as the Afghans were driven out of the country, and the authority of Tamasp, or rather of Nadir Shah, became consolidated, they were carried on with more vigour against Russia. At last, in 1732, the Empress Anne signed a treaty at Resht, restoring to Persia all the conquered provinces, and even Derbend, north of the Caucasus, was given up. General Manstein described the character of the Russian occupation of ten years in the following pregnant sentences—

"The Court who would have long before been highly pleased with any good pretence for getting rid with honour of those provinces which Peter I. had conquered from Persia, and of which the keeping cost more than they were worth (a prodigious number of people having perished in them), an expedient was at length found. A negotiation was entered upon for this purpose with the Court of Ispahan, and the provinces were ceded to it in consideration of several advantages granted to commerce. Russia had been obliged to keep near thirty thousand men in garrison in those provinces, and not a year passed without its being necessary to recruit the deficiency of above one-half, as the Russians, not being able to endure the climate, died like flies there. It was reckoned that from the year 1722, in which Peter had entered that country, to the time that the Russians evacuated it, there had perished a hundred and thirty thousand men in it."

Peter's death, accelerated by the heroic manner in which he exposed himself to save the lives of a shipwrecked crew, took place on the 8th of February, 1725, the anniversary, strangely enough, of the death of his father and brother. While he gave Russia a political importance to which she could never before lay claim, and which she has never lost, it is strange to think how many of his plans came to nothing, how frequently he absolutely failed, and how little of his comprehensive scheme of Asiatic policy ever bore fruit. The defeat and effectual humbling of Sweden, followed by the acquisition of the Baltic provinces, constituted a great and brilliant success. It gave Russia not merely an outlet to the world, but the means of breathing. But still, so far as practical results went, that was Peter's one achievement. In China his envoys had been slighted and almost insulted. They

were told that commerce was in the eyes of the Chinese people a very small consideration, and quite beneath the notice of their sovereign. At the same time the Russian settlers had been compelled to retire from the advanced positions they had taken up on the Amour, and to continue their existence in that bleak region under the shadow of defeat. Nor had the expeditions in search of the mythical Erket brought back either gold or any substantial equivalent. Several thousand Russian soldiers perished in the vain endeavour to extend the Czar's authority up the Irtish; and all the designs to establish a firm alliance with the Jungarian monarchy did not avail to save that state and the dynasty of Tse Wang Rabdan from being overwhelmed by the Chinese. Not in Bokhara where the ruler detained and imprisoned the few Russian merchants and travellers who reached his capital, not in Khiva where the vain prayers of an enslaved army went up daily to heaven, could it be said that the policy of Peter had produced practical results, or been accompanied by events of which his people might be proud. He had also been constrained with much pain and after some hesitation to surrender Azof, the place identified with his first feat of arms. The last military triumph had not proved much more fortunate than the first. The places snatched from Persia at a time of embarrassment could not be retained against the genius of Nadir Shah, and seven years after Peter's death there remained nothing to show how much he had expected to benefit by the possession of the Astrabad province and by holding the commencement of that route of twelve days' journey for camels to Balkh and Badakshan.

But if these many points of Peter's policy failed in his hands, and if the practical reward was denied to the author, there is also no doubt that the policy eventually adopted in one and all of these matters was Peter's, and the resolution or ability of his successors has in most cases availed to bring them to a successful issue. The land-borne foreign trade of China is almost exclusively in the hands of Russia, and it will expand whenever the internal communications of Siberia are improved by the construction of either canals or a railway. The old line of the Cossack settlements round Albazin has been recovered, while the possession of Maritime Manchuria has given Russia a position of almost paramount importance in the north-east quarter of Asia. The gold of Erket has not yet been discovered, but still Russia has acquired

in the possession of Turkestan an equivalent of some value. Neither Khiva nor Bokhara is in a frame of mind or physical condition to offer opposition or show resentment. The trade, such as it is, of the countries of the Oxus and the Jaxartes is the possession of the Muscovite; but the possession has not carried with it as Peter thought the monopoly of trade with the dominions of the Great Mogul. Russia has not secured, indeed, the advantageous route which Peter described on the Caspian in somewhat glowing colours as leading from Astrabad to the northern side of the Hindoo Koosh; but she has obtained in the Turcoman country an alternative and parallel route from the Caspian to the Murgab and Heri Rud. She has succeeded in obtaining a greater and greater hold on the shores of the Black Sea, which would have been converted into a Russian lake but for the vigorous intervention of the other Great Powers. She has long identified herself with the cause of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, and to such good purpose, that she has shattered the military power of Turkey, and despoiled her of all her fortresses both in Asia and in Europe. It is not because Peter succeeded that he is to be regarded as the author of the state policy of Russia, but because he marked out with almost unerring judgment what that policy should be. He gave it its form, even when his own efforts seemed to point to the conclusion that Russia did not, and might never, possess the strength or resources to carry it out. Another fact also is clear. Russia has not yet obtained the chief prize for which she strove, *viz.*, the trade of India; but, whatever may be thought of her chances of success, it would be rash to say that, after so many labours patiently borne and triumphantly vanquished, Russian statesmen have resigned the hope of realizing Peter's dream.

The reader of Peter's life will not fail to be impressed by it if he only realizes how completely he altered the whole current of Russia's history. Not merely did he introduce civilization, and check the undue encroachments of a most bigoted and unlettered priesthood, but he supplied his people with the ambition to attain specific objects, without which a nation must languish and deteriorate. Every matter received his personal attention, and very seldom did it happen that he had not some practical suggestion to offer. His suggestions were very often those of an expert and not of a theorist, for it had been wittily if maliciously said of him that he was "the master of fifteen trades." He was a great domestic

reformer as well as a master of statecraft, but without any one to assist and supplement his efforts it was impossible for him to do as much as he wished. The few foreigners of ability whose services he could command were hampered in every way by their Russian colleagues and subordinates; while even the able and faithful Menshikof was not free from the taint of corruption then as now the prevailing bane of the Russian services. Once Peter had wished to pass a law punishing with death all who had appropriated as much public money even as would pay for a rope, when an official said to him, "What! does your Majesty wish to remain alone in the empire? We all steal, some more, some less, but more cleverly." The edict was never drafted. One of the noblest of his speeches that has been preserved is the following, in which he dwells upon the duty of a good subject. The remarks were addressed to perhaps the ablest of his diplomatists, Nepluief, on his appointment as Resident at Constantinople, and who before that charge had been only employed in building boats. "Do not bow down, brothers; I am placed over you by God, and my duty is to see that I do not give to an unworthy man or take away from a worthy one. Provided you do well you will do good, not to me, but rather to yourself and your country; and if you are bad, then I am a judge, for God demands from me with regard to all of you that I do not give places to the wicked or stupid. Serve then with fidelity and probity. First God, and after Him even I will not abandon you."

Although it could not be sustained that Peter is not appreciated at his proper worth outside his own country, still it is no doubt true that it is necessary to be his fellow-countryman in order to attain the full height of admiration. We shall therefore close this article with the quotation which Mr. Schuyler gives us from Kostomarof, only once more pointing out that, while the alleged will of Peter must be regarded as a fabrication, the subsequent policy of Russia has been based on the lines laid down by Peter; that many of his objects have been absolutely attained; and that the crowning success is to be the monopoly of the commerce, if not the actual conquest of India. There is no reason to suppose that the St. Petersburg Foreign Office has any intention of dropping the last item from its programme. Kostomarof wrote—

"He loved Russia, loved the Russian people; loved it not in

the sense of the mass of Russians contemporary with, and subject to, himself, but in the sense of that ideal to which he wished to bring the people. For that reason this love constitutes that great quality in him which causes us, even against our will, to love him personally, leaving out of view his bloody tribunals and all his demoralizing despotism, which has exercised a baneful influence even on posterity. On account of Peter's love of the ideal of the Russian people, a Russian will love Peter as long as he does not himself lose this national ideal, and for this love will pardon in him all that lies with such heavy weight on his memory."

III.

ENGLAND'S POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN.[1]

BEFORE tracing back the history of the relations that have subsisted between the British Government in India and the independent kingdom of Afghanistan in the past, it is advisable to state that it has not been laid down with sufficient clearness in this country, that Asiatic politics—and this Afghan problem in particular—must be carried on in accordance with the lessons that Asiatic history and experience have suggested, and not with regard to the precepts and customs which hold good in European affairs. The Afghan and Central Asian questions may of late have increased so much in public importance that they have become a prominent branch of our foreign policy; but the laws which apply to the consideration of the merits and demerits of whatever foreign policy may, for the time being, be adopted in Europe, are applicable in only a very partial degree to the external affairs of India. It is truer in one sense than is generally admitted, that this country is a great Asiatic Power, and in that capacity it is bound to take more deeply to heart the lessons which the past history of India distinctly proclaims. The Afghan question is not the growth of yesterday. It was a burning question before the fate of England was decided on the field of Senlac. Every successive dynasty, every succeeding dominant power in

[1] *The New Quarterly Magazine*, January, 1879.

India, has been called upon to deal with it since Mahmoud of Ghuzni first led the mountaineers down from their fastnesses to pillage the cities of Hindostan.

On two occasions in modern times the problem has been solved —at least for a generation or so. The first was when an Afghan dynasty established itself in India in the 15th century; and the second when Baber, after absorbing Afghanistan and Northern India, was succeeded—after a brief interval, during which his son Humayoun was an exile in Persia and Cabul—by his grandson Akbar. The latter solution was, however, more temporary than the former. The growing strength of Persia, which steadily pushed her encroachments beyond Seistan in the direction of the Helmund and Candahar, was a danger to the tenure of that important city by the Indian Government. As the effete successors of Akbar grew less and less capable of exercising imperial power against warlike neighbours and over turbulent races, Persia's advance became more persistent and more openly declared. At last Candahar itself fell into the Shah's possession. Many an army crossed the Suleiman to regain that all-important city, but despite superior numbers and resources the hosts of the Great Mogul were worsted by either cold, treachery, or superior skill. In those days Afghan patriotism did not exist. There was no country to fight for, no union, no public cause. The country of the Afghans was that of the Indian ruler. They were content to be his most valiant warriors, his most skilled ministers, and his most accomplished courtiers. But in 1709 the Ghilzai chief, Mir Vais, snatched Candahar from the Persians, and established in Southern Afghanistan a form of government which, whatever its irregular method of creation may have been, was founded on a perception of the necessities that a great and brave people felt for a sympathetic rule. In modern times it was the origin of Afghan liberty, and of the Afghan state. It was then that the Afghans began for the first time to perceive that they had a national destiny, and that they could exist in independence of alien sovereigns. The credit of that discovery was due to the genius of the chief Mir Vais, and to the valour of the Ghilzai tribe.

It is unnecessary here to sketch in any close detail the events which occurred after the death of Mir Vais; suffice it to say that his son, and then his nephew, invaded and conquered Persia. An Afghan ruler less than twenty years after the first declaration of

Afghan independence was supreme from the frontiers of Hindostan to the borders of Armenia, and Ghilzai warriors rode in triumph through Khorasan, Seistan, and Iran. Within the short space of a single generation the kingdom of Afghanistan had come into being, and had absorbed the far more powerful state of Persia. The triumph was brief. Shah Hoosein's son Tamasp found a deliverer in the person of one of his generals, Nadir Kuli, who in time became Nadir Shah, the most extraordinary conqueror and ruler that has appeared in Asia since the days of Timour, with the possible exception of the Emperor Baber. This man, having defeated Ashraff, the Afghan ruler, drove the Afghans out of the country, worsted the Turks, treated on terms of equality with the Czar of Russia, and then collected his armies for the purpose of crushing out all remembrance of Afghan prowess by a successful campaign against Candahar. As a preliminary step in this design, he overthrew the confederacy which the Afghan clan of Abdalis[1] had erected round Herat, and with the conquest of that place he proceeded to mature those schemes of vengeance which he had designed against Candahar and the Ghilzais.

With a large army he approached the walls of Candahar in 1737. Long and desperate was the siege, and many a time did Ghilzai valour effectually check the onset of the Persian; but there was no quarter from which Candahar could expect succour, and the besieger was as persistent twelve months after he had arrived before its gates as on the day when he first sat down before them. All sieges carried on under such conditions must have an end adverse to the besieged, and Candahar at last surrendered. It is beside our present object to follow Nadir Shah in his Indian campaigns further than to say that the Afghans themselves bore a prominent part in them. It is pertinent to observe here, as Lord Lawrence himself has admitted, that the Afghans have always joined, and will always in the future join, any army which with reasonable prospect of success advances on the Indus with the intention of invading India. A chief of the name of Ahmed Khan, the head of the Sudozai family of the Populzai branch of the great clan of the Abdalis, had been delivered from imprisonment in Candahar by Nadir Shah. In

[1] The Abdalis became at a later period the Duranis and the most powerful of all the Afghan tribes. Their chiefs whether Sudozai or Barukzai have ruled Afghanistan for 140 years.

gratitude to his deliverer, and anxious to participate in the glory of the campaigns that were on the point of being conducted against India, Ahmed joined the army of the Persian conqueror, took a prominent part in all of his wars, and on his murder in 1747 strove to avenge him. In that effort he failed; but retiring on Candahar, he set himself up as king of the Afghans. His authority was slowly extended over Herat, Cabul, and eventually over the Punjab, and Lahore became the second capital of the state. The only difference between his authority and that of Mir Vais and his two successors was that under the latter the Ghilzais were the dominant tribe, whereas under the former it was the Abdalis. To give a lustre to his person, as well as perhaps to assuage the bitter feeling previously existing between Ghilzai and Abdali, Ahmed assumed the title Duri-i-Duran (meaning the "Pearl of the Age"), and henceforth the Abdali clan became the Durani. The brilliant campaigns which Ahmed conducted with such remarkable skill against the Emperor of Delhi and the Mahratta confederacy gave a cohesion to the newly-founded state which was unexpected. Feared abroad and respected at home, the great Durani left to his son Timour an inheritance of which any ruler might have been proud. There were, however, within the state discordant elements that could only be kept reconciled by the firmness of a great ruler. The old aspirations of the Ghilzais, far from being allayed, burnt as fiercely as ever below the surface. It was they who had first showed the Afghans the path to freedom; it was they who had first given their country a native rule. To such public benefactors a secondary position was intolerable. The feud at last broke out in open hostilities. The war which raged between Ghilzais and Duranis during the closing years of the last century and the earlier ones of the present concluded with the triumph of the latter. The Ghilzais resisted stubbornly, but the resources of the state were on the side of the Duranis, and they won. With the defeat of the Ghilzais it might be supposed that the rule of Timour Shah's successors was more firmly assured than before, but it was not so. Ghilzai ambition certainly represented a national danger, as the state might have been split into two hostile confederacies; but the danger of which we have now to speak, although only a dynastic one, has so much influenced the course of more recent events that there will be little hesitation in saying that it was of equal importance with the

question of inter-tribal differences and jealousies. Among the nobles of the court of Ahmed Khan none occupied a more prominent place both in regard to influence and power and also for personal ability than Sarfraz, better known as Poyndah Khan, head of the Barukzai family of the Duranis. The friend and companion of Ahmed, he remained the prop of Timour; and when Timour was succeeded by his son Zemaun, the influence of Poyndah had descended to his son, Futteh Ali Khan, who wielded the great power of the Barukzais. Three Sudozai rulers were alternately supreme in the state during the first fifteen years of the present century, viz., Zemaun, Mahmoud, and Shuja-ul-Mulk; but the country was in a very disorganized state, and the Barukzais, who appear at first to have been actuated by honourable motives, soon began to intrigue and to fight for their own hand. There can be no doubt that the murder of Futteh Ali Khan during the course of these disturbances, with every circumstance of brutal cruelty, by Mahmoud and his son Kamran, inflamed the resentment of the Barukzais, and gave a point to their ambition and covert hostility. The murder of Futteh Khan was amply avenged. His numerous brothers, towering among whom stands the figure of the able Dost, ousted the Sudozais from the state, and although for many years Mahmoud and Kamran retained the semblance of sovereignty in Herat, the Barukzai house had completely displaced the older and more privileged family. Dost Mahomed soon made the triumph of his clan his own particular triumph, and before the first Afghan war commenced he was *de facto* Ameer in Eastern Afghanistan.

It is only necessary to describe very briefly the diplomatic relations that subsisted between England and Cabul up to the point when it was resolved to uphold the cause of Shuja-ul-Mulk, the exile of Loodiana. The mission of Mountstuart Elphinstone in 1808 refers to such an old-world state of things—when France's pretensions were considered to endanger our hold on India, either through the overweening ambition or the extraordinary genius of Napoleon—that it is unnecessary here to consider it at all. The Burnes Mission in 1837, after the lapse of a complete generation, made a fresh start in our Afghan policy, but unfortunately that new departure was founded on the mistake of making Dost Mahomed our foe instead of our ally. After the Simla proclamation it became simply a question of settling the internal affairs of Cabul as

speedily as possible at the same time that we secured those engagements which were then so easily to be obtained from Shuja-ul-Mulk. It is scarcely required to point out how our occupation was either too brief or too long for practical purposes, and that the triumphs of Pollock and Nott did not entirely dissipate the remembrance of the disaster which had brought avenging British armies back to Cabul. The Afghan wars of 1839 and 1842 left the relations of England and Cabul in an uncertain state. Shuja-ul-Mulk and his son were dead. The life of the Sudozai cause was extinct. The only man that could restore order to the country was the Barukzai chief, who was a prisoner at Calcutta. It was resolved to release Dost Mahomed, and it became necessary to shape a definite line of policy towards him. The whole subject of the Anglo-Afghan question is to be mastered in the consideration of what that policy was and how it arose.

When Dost Mahomed was about to leave Calcutta he addressed an English officer who was present in words which, though seldom quoted, have exercised a great influence on the policy of our Governments. The Ameer said that during his residence among us he had marvelled greatly at our strength and our resources, at our fleet and our lines of communication both by road and water; that he admired our system of government and the manner in which it was administered; but that there was one thing he could not understand, and that was, what interest we could have in the affairs of "Cabul, which was a land of rocks and stones." While we remained uncertain as to our policy, Dost Mahomed was clear in his own mind that his true policy consisted in widely spreading the belief among Englishmen that a great and rich power such as England could never, by any chance, have any interest or concern in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. His efforts were attended with great success. He was undoubtedly aided very much by the impression that the Afghan wars had left behind on the mind of almost every Anglo-Indian, with the exception of Sir Henry Rawlinson. On all occasions he made a point of treating with astonishment any suggestion that England should establish herself within his frontier. He was our good friend, and he intended remaining so; but, as a proof of that friendship to us, he advised us, and his advice was listened to, never to interfere either in the internal affairs or in the intestine disturbances of his state. For thirteen years he carried on this astute policy, and its effect was

not weakened by the dubious part the Afghans played in the Sikh War. But after we became his close neighbour in 1849, upon the occupation of the Punjab, it was found necessary to have some more regular arrangement with his Government—now supreme north of the Hindoo Koosh, as well as south of it—than the tacit understanding at which we had arrived. With that object a treaty was signed at Peshawur on March 30, 1855, and by its terms there was to be amity for ever between the two Governments. The Ameer still protested that he could not admit British officers, and he also convinced our authorities that it would be a positive disadvantage to us to secure the concession. In 1857, danger to Herat and a Persian war compelled us to take a more decided step. The Ameer was subsidised, and permission granted to the British Government to send officers to supervise, in "Balkh, Candahar, Cabul, or elsewhere," the expenditure and offensive measures that were being carried out. Still Dost Mahomed adhered to his principle, and the deviation from it was only to be temporary, and under the present emergency. On his death-bed, in 1863, he advised his son to follow the advice of England, and to trust to her for support; but he could not forego the repetition of his old formula once more, which impressed upon us the necessity of leaving Cabul untouched and in a state of isolation.

From an Afghan point of view nothing could be wiser than the policy of Dost Mahomed. It preserved Afghan independence at the same time that it maintained a fiction of friendship and alliance between England and Cabul, which we now know to be delusive. It gave him all the advantages of an English alliance free of cost or responsibility; and for what he received he had to render no equivalent. There is no reason why this state of things should not have indefinitely continued, had there been no such power as Russia in Central Asia. But with that potent fact on the south-east shores of the Caspian, rampant in Bokhara and on the Oxus, and slowly pressing down on Wakhan and Baroghil, it was clear that the policy of Dost Mahomed could not long remain the policy of England. If we are to judge of statecraft as something more than the adjustment of a question which is of the hour only—if we may assume that there is such a thing as a great national policy in Cabul and Central Asia, which aims at shaping events in such a manner that each succeeding generation of Englishmen may find present difficulties to have given place to

future advantages, and the successful solution of the danger of the hour to have become the sure guarantee of tranquillity in the future—then, admitting that there is something higher than a time-serving wish to shirk responsibility and danger, it must appear that the policy of Dost Mahomed was not a policy worthy of our country. Yet it was adopted.

Lord Lawrence had, as chief commissioner of the Punjab, concluded those treaties with Dost Mahomed in 1855 and 1857, of which mention has already been made. No man ever had a higher opinion of the Afghan Ameer than he had; and he showed thereby that he could appreciate the genius of one of the most remarkable of modern Asiatics. But it is permissible to believe that, however much one may admire a foreigner, it is not usual to adapt the policy of one's country towards his, in accordance with the view he may have formed upon the subject. Dost Mahomed was the fountain-head from which Lord Lawrence derived his inspiration as to the virtue of "masterly inactivity" on the North-west Frontier. He was also impregnated with a belief that Heaven had declared against us in our previous wars in Afghanistan, which the historians of his school have not hesitated to characterize as iniquitous. He believed in the possibility of the recurrence of that unparalleled series of mistakes which produced the catastrophe to Elphinstone's Brigade, and, as Kaye has expressed it, the conviction was dominant in our council chamber during these years that "the judgment of God is against you, and He will requite," would be the certain result of any fresh advance into Cabul. All the Punjab authorities of the last twenty-five years are not free from this taint. Over their heads there has sat the Nemesis of the past, and the one point on which they were unanimous was, "never to interfere in Afghanistan under any pretence whatever." And this policy came to be known as one of "masterly inactivity." It is impossible to challenge its claims to the epithet of inactivity; but whether it was masterly or mischievous, history must decide.

When, therefore, the assured rule of Dost Mahomed came to an end with the death of that venerable prince, and a period of internal disturbance began in Cabul which continued more or less during six years, it was by a policy of inaction, caused by a too implicit belief in the soundness of the Dost's doctrines, and also by an unreasoning and unreasonable dread of a repetition of the

misfortune of 1841, that our Government strove to cope with a difficulty which formed the crisis in the relations between the two states. From the blame which must attach to the Indian Government of the day for delaying to recognize Shere Ali as Ameer upon the death of his father, Lord Lawrence must be exonerated, as he did not arrive in India to take up the Governor-Generalship until the year 1864. The death of Lord Elgin undoubtedly produced some confusion in the arrangement of foreign matters, and in order to explain the delay it is not necessary to suppose that Sir William Denison's letter of December, 1863, had been purposely held back in order to see how matters progressed within the Cabul state. Dost Mahomed had never advised that we should not recognize his heir, and upon that heir he had impressed the necessity of relying upon the moral support of England. The very first act of the Indian Government was to offer a slight to the new ruler, which was imprudent and in contravention of the spirit of our understanding with Dost Mahomed. The delay of six months in officially replying to Shere Ali's letter written from Herat was so far productive of ill to the cause of that prince that we find on reference to the "Afghan Blue Book" (pp. 5 and 7), that during those months Azim Khan, his elder brother, wrote letters to us which were overtures for an alliance. While our Government delayed its reply, all Afghanistan construed the delay as arising from a dislike to Dost Mahomed's choice, and as a natural consequence Shere Ali's brothers, who had sworn on the Koran to obey him, began to intrigue, and to take steps foı challenging his authority.

There was much to be apprehended by Shere Ali from the intrigues of Afzul[1] and Azim, who were both personal friends of Lord Lawrence, but there was also a more immediate danger from his own full brother, the turbulent Ameen, strong in the affections of the people of Candahar.

When in December of the year in which the Dost died, the formal recognition of Shere Ali came, it arrived too late in one respect, for the confederacy among the brothers had already been formed against Shere Ali; and Ameen, the first to take the field, was already assembling his forces for the fray. We need only consider the fortunes of this war in so far as they affect our policy,

[1] The father of the present Ameer, Abdurrahman.

which became with its outbreak one of intensified "masterly inactivity." In 1864 Lord Lawrence assumed the supreme control of Indian affairs, and one of the first points which he had to consider was the overtures made by Shere Ali to him for a fresh treaty. On this point the "Afghan Blue Book" is strangely reticent, but Mr. Aitchison, Indian Foreign Secretary at the time, has supplied the deficiency to a certain extent. By this time there had been several collisions between the troops of the Ameer and those of his brothers. But the result was favourable to Shere Ali. His brother Afzul became a state prisoner, in direct contravention of promises which the Ameer had given him at an interview near Balkh; and for the moment both Azim and Ameen were passive. It was but the lull before the storm, and Shere Ali knew it. He resolved to throw himself into the arms of England, and with that intention he despatched as his envoy his ablest and most trusted general, Mahomed Rafik Khan, to India to ask for a fresh treaty which should give him that moral and material support of which he stood in need. Shere Ali undoubtedly wanted arms and money. It is probable that he did not specify what he would give in return. It is also probable that we did not quite know what to ask. In those days Russia was far off. Tidings of Tchernaieff's advance against Tchimkent had then barely reached British India or Europe. It required a little foresight to perceive that within a decade Russia would be on the Oxus with Khokand, Bokhara, and Khiva at her feet. But it certainly should have been clear to our authorities that Shere Ali's overtures to us afforded a favourable opportunity for strengthening our position towards Cabul that should not be lost. Mahomed Rafik failed in his mission. He could get nothing out of Lord Lawrence. He was told that there was a treaty in force between the two states which answered every requirement. For a second time Shere Ali met with a rebuff at the hands of our Government.

After this event the war broke out with renewed vigour. Shere Ali won battles at Seyyidabad and Kujhbaz, at the latter of which his son Mahomed Ali and his rival brother Ameen were killed. But, on the other hand, his second son Ibrahim was driven out of Cabul, and when Shere Ali endeavoured to restore the fortunes of the war he was worsted at Shaikhabad, and routed at Khelat-i-Ghilzai. His cause was abandoned even by his once-trusted general Mahomed Rafik, and when he quitted Candahar the

clouds over the Ameer were black without a rift. In this dark hour of his destiny he bore himself like a true man. "He was still the rightful ruler of Afghanistan," he said, "and so long as he had life he would never cease to assert his rights; and for himself he knew that the result rested with Allah." This was his proclamation to his adherents as he fled through Candahar towards Herat and the yet-faithful West. It has been said on good authority that whatever personal sympathies Lord Lawrence had with any of the claimants were principally attracted to the persons of Afzul and Azim, both of whom were men remarkable for their courage and ability. Whether there is any foundation for the assertion or not, Lord Lawrence at once proceeded to recognize Afzul, who had been released at the battle of Khelat-i-Ghilzai, as Ameer of Cabul and Candahar. This was done in a very gracious letter dated February 25, 1867 ("Afghan Blue Book," p. 14). Here was a departure of the highest importance from the policy of inactivity which had been hitherto in vogue. If "masterly inactivity" had anything to recommend it, it certainly required to be consistent and applicable to all cases. It was consistent neither with our promises to Dost Mahomed nor with our repeated declarations on the subject, to seize so eagerly the opportunity afforded by the result of the 1866 campaign for recognizing a new Ameer. That grave step was taken with apparently as much levity as if our Indian statesmen were mere schoolboys, instead of being men grown grey in the service of the state, and intimately conversant with Afghan history and affairs. The well-known uncertainty of military fortune was also utterly ignored; and the only precautionary measure which was taken was to "officiously" recognize Shere Ali as Ameer of Herat! This was but adding fuel to the flame. Shere Ali might have forgotten our desertion of his cause, but he could never condone the insult we offered him in recognizing him as Ameer in a portion of the territory which was his by inheritance and by virtue also of our declaration in 1863. Upon the death of Afzul in October, 1867, Azim was recognized as Ameer (see "Afghan Blue Book," p. 24), and while Shere Ali was gathering strength in Herat, and recovering from an abortive expedition north of the Hindoo Koosh, the relations between England and Cabul were for the nonce satisfactory.

In 1868 the fortune of war once more veered round to the side of Shere Ali, and through the abilities of his son Yakoob Khan,

governor of Herat, Shere Ali recovered Candahar and Cabul. Azim and his nephew Abdurrahman—Afzul's son—were driven into exile, the former to die in the wilds of Seistan, the latter to find a place of refuge within Russian territory. Once again the weary game was gone through. There was a reversal of our foreign policy. Shere Ali was recognized, and became the hero of the hour. A new Viceroy assumed the reins of power. Lord Mayo succeeded Lord Lawrence; but although there was no longer any question of recognizing any other ruler than Shere Ali, "masterly inactivity" was still accepted as wisdom without a flaw. There appears to have been no apprehension that the ill-treatment Shere Ali had received at our hands would ever exercise any influence on the progress of events. The reasons for our recognizing his brothers were assumed to be perfectly clear to Shere Ali, and thoroughly appreciated by him. No doubt they were. A present of money and arms in 1869 was to obliterate, it was supposed, all remembrance of our acts in 1863, 1864, and 1867. At this point, when the first stage of our Afghan policy terminates, it is advisable to sum up what had been done in the way of propitiating the Afghans, and of knitting their rulers to our cause. It is evident that we had done nothing towards effecting either of these necessary objects. Our hesitation in 1863 encouraged the rivals of Shere Ali to challenge his authority; our refusal in 1864 to assist him, when both in arms and money he was nearly destitute, gave a fresh impulse to the sedition in his state; and lastly, our acknowledgment in 1867 of Afzul and also of Azim afforded natural cause of offence to a man who up to that point had been true to the English alliance. The Afghans saw in our vacillating action the cause of many of their misfortunes; their ruler attributed to it the disasters which almost crushed him in 1866. With his final triumph it became necessary to repair the blunders of the past by convincing Shere Ali that for the future we were enlisted in support of his cause.

When Lord Mayo became Viceroy in January, 1869, he found that a meeting between the Ameer and his predecessor had already been suggested. The final effort made by Azim and Abdurrahman in October, 1868, caused the postponement of that interview, but when Lord Lawrence left India it was generally recognized as about to take place. Great stress has been laid on the friendly tone of Shere Ali's letters at this period as

showing that he had forgotten, or perhaps never felt hurt at, the desertion of his cause by us; but this deduction from his letter of the 12th of Shaban, 1285, is not justified by the facts. The cause of the friendly tone of these documents was not that Shere Ali had forgotten or condoned anything in our past conduct, but that he simply desired to return suitable thanks for the six lakhs of rupees which were sent him in December, 1868. That gift had been most opportune. The revenue of Cabul had already been realized by Azim "not only for the present year, but in some parts of the country for the coming year also;" and from the impoverished people of a country distracted by six years of internecine war it was impossible to wring a sum adequate to the Ameer's expenses. In such a strait our money was not to be despised. Shere Ali could not then boast, as he did the other day, that in his treasure-house there were seven crores of rupees; and for the moment he consented to forget the wrongs which he was persuaded he had received at our hands. Yet even in these letters he permitted himself to be slightly satirical. Lord Lawrence, in his letter of October 2, 1868, had assured Shere Ali of his desire to maintain the bonds of mutual amity and goodwill, and had congratulated the Ameer on his success, "which is alone due to your own courage, ability, and firmness." Shere Ali in his reply says he had learnt of our "sincere desire" to see his authority strengthened, but he very pertinently remarked that this "sincere desire" was "in a greater degree than before." Despite our presents, and notwithstanding the more friendly attitude we observed towards him, Shere Ali was still sceptical as to the durability of our intentions. His position, however, did not become secure in Cabul for many months. While Azim lived there was constant danger, and the hold Abdurrahman had secured on the people of Afghan Turkestan, both by marriage with a Badakshi princess and also by his residence among them as governor, was not to be shaken in a day. The British alliance was necessary to Shere Ali; however piqued he might secretly be, he must conceal it. The tact and hearty manner of Lord Mayo undoubtedly produced a good effect upon the somewhat morbid temperament of the Afghan ruler, and the Umballa Durbar went far towards removing from the mind of Shere Ali the unfavourable impression which the policy of Lord Lawrence had produced upon it. So long as Lord Mayo lived, that friendly sentiment remained

a vital force in the bosom of Shere Ali. It induced him to forego the indulgence of any spleen at the acts of his predecessor. But during these years Shere Ali's own power was undergoing a change. His rivals had disappeared, his revenue was becoming assured, Afghan Turkestan was again in his possession. He was busy creating an army, which was expected to make him omnipotent at home and respected abroad. And finally, Herat—which had fallen into the possession of his son Yakoob Khan, who, having quarrelled with his father, ruled there in semi-independence, and in much too close relationship with Persia to be agreeable to the Afghan sovereign—had passed, with the imprisonment of Yakoob and the flight of his younger brother Ayoob, into his hands. In the year 1874 Shere Ali ruled over all the dependencies which the genius of Dost Mahomed had knit into one grand confederacy. The Seistan Boundary Commission had not, indeed, given him what he wanted in that quarter, but it had pushed Persian pretensions further back, and had brought security to Ferrah, and the country watered by the lower course of the Helmund. But the Seistan question sinks into insignificance beside the far greater and more momentous matter which was now reaching an acute stage. The labours of the English arbitrators between the Shah and the Ameer had not long ceased, when General Kaufmann undertook the third Russian invasion of Khiva. In that expedition Asiatics felt the deepest concern. At all times Khiva has held a position scarcely less important in Turkestan than Bokhara. Its prestige was great, and although its actual power was insignificant, its natural defences, surrounded on all sides by deserts, were so formidable that it appeared to its neighbours to be safe from the assault even of Russia. The approaches from the Caspian lay through a barren and inhospitable tract of country which had already been whitened by the bones of Russian soldiers, and from the Jaxartes across Kizil Kum the dangers and obstacles were scarcely less grave or formidable. The expedition against Khiva was a test of Russia's strength in the eyes of Asiatics. It succeeded, and the reputation of Russia for the first time became in Cabul that of a power equal in resources and strength to England. For the sake of argument it is unnecessary to dwell on the breach of faith Russia committed towards this country in annexing the right bank of the Oxus. Strong language might be applied to the falseness her Govern-

ment then showed towards this country, but for the purpose we have at present in view it is unnecessary to indulge in any recriminations.

Lord Northbrook's telegram of July 24, 1873, is the first token that was afforded of the effect Russian triumphs in Central Asia were producing in the Cabul Durbar. Khiva had surrendered to Kaufmann on June 10th, and five weeks after that event Shere Ali was so alarmed at Russian progress, and dissatisfied with the very vague assurances he had received from us, that he was anxious to know definitely how far he might rely on our help if invaded. Shere Ali's fear was caused by apprehension both of national and of personal danger. General Golovatcheff's expedition against the Turcomans might be but the prelude to an occupation of Merv; and with Russians at that place, there could be no durability for the Ameer's authority north of the Hindoo Koosh. The possibility of Abdurrahman reappearing in the field, backed up by Russian assistance in money and men, also assumed a more probable aspect, and with Russia hostile, and England only vigilantly passive, there loomed before the Ameer a time of trouble and uncertainty. He resolved to take precautions in time, and his first object was to secure from us a guarantee that his territory should not be invaded, and that his own individual right should not be assailed either by foreign power, or by a domestic enemy supported by foreign aid. In 1873 Shere Ali wanted a guarantee against Russia, and also against Abdurrahman. He laid his demand before our Government, and Lord Northbrook at one moment appeared to be disposed to concede the substance of his request. Other counsels ultimately prevailed, and the reply to Nur Mahomed Shah, the Ameer's envoy, was substantially that the discussion of the question had better be postponed to a more convenient season, and that we saw no reason for alarm at Russia's progress. Russia was, moreover, on terms of friendship with us, and under a distinct obligation never to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan. The negotiations that were carried on between Lord Northbrook and Nur Mahomed Shah are known as the Simla Conference, and they extended from July 12 to July 30, 1873. The pith of the negotiation is to be found in the Viceroy's letter to Shere Ali, dated September 6, 1873 ("Afghan Blue Book," p. 116). The policy of "masterly inactivity" had never been carried by Lord Lawrence to the pass that it was by Lord

Northbrook and the Duke of Argyll in 1873. For five years Shere Ali had been in undisturbed possession of his kingdom. His authority had during these years remained unchallenged. The choice of Dost Mahomed had been ratified by time, and confirmed by success. It was no longer a question of interference in the domestic quarrels of the Barukzai house. The original regulations of the policy of Lord Lawrence were no longer applicable, yet despite warning voices, and in defiance of the better sense which found expression in some of Lord Northbrook's utterances, our policy, which had been modified in 1868–69, relapsed into the old apathy and cruel indifference which had marked it in 1864 and 1867. The virtual effect of the abortive Simla Conference was to bring Russia and Shere Ali into relationship with each other.[1] General Kaufmann's solicitude became extreme and frequently expressed in the welfare of his neighbour; and Shere Ali's alarm grew less and less as Russia's soothing words became more and more sweet.

The effect of this policy was to raise doubts in the bosom of the Ameer as to our intentions towards his state that had long lain dormant. He was unable to persuade himself that our interest in his country had ceased; and he reconciled our attitude towards him with what he knew to be one of the necessities of our rule in India, by assuming that we either did not sympathize with him personally, or that we had ulterior designs against his throne. Yet, in those days, he had no other course but to temporize, and his letter of November 13, 1873 ("Afghan Blue Book," p. 119), is one of the most skilful instances of a man disguising his real mind, at the same time that he leaves clear indication of what that mind is.

[1] These lines were written in the last weeks of 1878. How accurate they were may be judged from what Yakoob Khan told General Roberts at Cabul ten months later. "In 1869 my father was fully prepared to throw in his lot with you. . . . He did not receive from Lord Mayo as large a supply of arms and ammunition as he had hoped, but nevertheless he returned to Cabul fairly satisfied, and so he remained until the visit of Nur Mahomed Shah to India in 1873. This visit brought matters to a head. The diaries received from Nur Mahomed Shah during his stay in India, and the report which he brought back on his return, convinced my father that he could no longer hope to obtain from the British Government all the aid that he wanted, and from that time he began to turn his attention to the thoughts of a Russian alliance. You know how this ended."

The arrest of Yakoob Khan in November, 1874, when he came to Cabul under a safe-conduct from the Ameer, called forth a protest from Lord Northbrook which deserves the highest commendation, as an act of generous appreciation of the qualities of a man upon whom now depends more than upon any one else, perhaps, the future history of Afghanistan. There can be no doubt, however, that this act inflamed the resentment of Shere Ali against us. While Russia had been flattering his vanity with repeated inquiries after the health of the declared heir, Abdullah Jan, England pronounced her sympathy for the cause of the distressed prince, who had at one time been a proclaimed rebel. The act was generous, but impolitic; but for generous acts, however impolitic, it would be wrong to pass censure on any British statesman. Had there been more generosity, more sympathy, in the cold and calculating policy of "masterly inactivity," it might have been less worthless. It would, at all events, have possessed the one redeeming feature of generosity; and a sympathetic mood towards the difficulties of an Afghan ruler, during the years of warfare, would have facilitated the arrival of that day when British influence must be supreme south of the Hindoo Koosh, and that would have been the case whether we pinned our faith to the person of Shere Ali or one of his brothers. All that was necessary was, that we should be consistent to our word and our declarations. But we were true neither to Shere Ali nor to Afzul, nor yet to Azim. We fluttered helplessly from one side to the other, and our responsible statesman showed neither common sense nor foresight.

In January, 1875, Lord Salisbury penned a despatch to Lord Northbrook, in which the sentence occurs that "though no immediate danger appears to threaten the interests of Her Majesty in Central Asia and on the frontiers of Persia and Afghanistan, the aspect of affairs is sufficiently grave to inspire solicitude, and to suggest the necessity of timely precaution." The object of the policy which this dispatch foreshadowed was to take precautions against Russia. It was the starting-point of a new policy. Up to that moment our policy had never so much as glanced beyond the Cabul council-chamber. We were on good terms with Russia, we trusted to her engagements, and we were generally contented with the existing situation. From that date to the present time a larger view has been taken of the Afghan problem. It was no

longer only a matter of how we were to stand with the Ameer, but of how we were to make our relations with that prince a means of restraining Russia, and, when the occasion arose, of checking her advance upon the gates of India. The exhaustive reply of Lord Northbrook of June 7th of the same year, containing thirteen enclosures, with the opinions of many of the Punjab authorities, was, as a matter of fact, beside the main point in the question. It was no longer an Afghan question pure and simple, but a Russian and Central Asian problem. Dost Mahomed's panacea was wholly out of date, and it was necessary to treat the altered circumstances of the case in a different manner. Lord Salisbury renewed his suggestions for an improved method of communicating with the Ameer on November 19th, but Lord Northbrook again failed to perceive either the necessity or the advisability of the change. Shortly afterwards Lord Northbrook left India, and under the new Viceroy, Lord Lytton, the suggestions contained in Lord Salisbury's despatches, and in his instructions to the Governor-General of February 28, 1876, began to bear fruit in acts. It is not necessary, nor is it possible, to say that all these acts were wise, and certainly some of them were carried out in an imprudent manner. But from this date it was clearly recognized that we should make a friend of the Ameer if possible, and that we should at any rate take up, by treaty right or otherwise, a position in advance of our present frontier that would enable us to check any undue aggression on the part of the Tashkent authorities. The absolute right of this country to supremacy in Cabul, as absolute and as clear as Russia's claim to supremacy in Bokhara, for the first time became an accepted axiom in our policy. All our subsequent efforts have been made with the double object of repairing the mistakes of the past, and of taking up a fresh position towards the Afghans and Persia. With this object in view, overtures were made throughout the year 1876 to Shere Ali, and the old scheme of the occupation of Quettah, sanctioned by our Treaty with the Khan of Khelat, and advocated long ago by General John Jacob, was revived and carried out. The occupation of Quettah was really a defensive step. There were symptoms even then that Shere Ali was meditating on that policy into which he took such a fatal plunge last autumn. Russian emissaries had come to Cabul, and had been received in a semi-official manner. The same presents that were made to

our native agent were given to the Russian, and the representative of Tashkent was placed on an equality with the British.

This state of things could not be tolerated. It would perhaps have been carrying the point too far to make the reception of Kaufmann's native envoys a *casus belli*, but the lesson of precaution which it impressed upon us was not to be disregarded. These acts on the part of the Ameer also rendered some warning measure on our side necessary, and none was readier to hand than the occupation of Quettah. That advance should have proved to Shere Ali that we were in earnest as to the fresh demands we made upon him during the Peshawur Conference, which was held in the early part of 1877. The treaty, a sketch of which was placed before the Ameer ("Afghan Blue Book," pp. 184 and 189, &c.), that we were willing to grant him, would have conceded him everything he had asked in 1873, and even more. But the negotiations between Nur Mahomed Shah and Sir Lewis Pelly proved abortive. Shere Ali still distrusted us. The promises from Tashkent were more specious, and apparently more attractive. Shere Ali thought they were also more to be depended upon. He had tried English friendship, and he had often found it wanting in substantial favours; he would now try Russian by way of a change. It does not follow, as a matter of course, that he wished to quarrel with us. He wanted to preserve his complete independence and the traditions of the Durani monarchy. He saw that we were becoming daily more persistent in making inconvenient demands upon him, and he fell back upon the Russian alliance as his only resource. The great recommendation in the Russian promises was that they required him to do nothing that would abate one jot of his sovereignty. They rather drew pictures of greater power and wider empire yet to be secured. From the close of the Peshawur Conference to the reception of the Stolietoff Mission, that is to say, for a period of eighteen months, the attitude of the British Government was one of sustained vigilance. It required no great wisdom to foresee what would be the upshot of the dislike and suspicion that lurked in Shere Ali's bosom, when they were brought face to face with the settled purpose of our authorities to solve the Afghan problem. In an extremity, Shere Ali or any other Afghan ruler must yield to the necessities of our empire in India. It is unnecessary to linger over the details of the Stolietoff Mission, or to describe the events which immediately preceded and followed

the departure of Sir Neville Chamberlain from Peshawur. Nor need we extend our concluding remarks to embrace what is already matter of daily gossip, by narrating the course of a campaign which had ended as soon as it had begun. Shere Ali's military strength was found to be a fiction; and he, like his father, has no other support than the rugged mountains which envelop the country on all sides. On no occasion have the Afghans fought with anything like desperation. At Peiwar, where they were in an almost impregnable position, they fled the instant they thought their line of retreat was threatened, and the advance of Sir Samuel Browne to Jellalabad has been completely unopposed, since the capture of Ali Musjid. Yet experts tell us that the Afghan powers of resistance, if they only had an able ruler whom they would faithfully obey, are far from being crushed; and it is easy to see from the acts of the Afreedees, and of the Turis and Jajis, what form that resistance would take.

The flight of Shere Ali into Afghan Turkestan, and the release of his son Yakoob Khan from confinement, are events too recent, and also too vaguely reported, to admit of any unhesitating opinion being passed upon their political significance. The flight of Shere Ali from Cabul was either compulsory, or was made in fulfilment of some plan of coming to terms with England, in which the reconciliation of Yakoob Khan and his father occupied a foremost place. It is much more probable that the Ameer felt obliged by the failure of his new policy and by the desire to provide for his own safety to accompany the Russian Mission in its flight through Bamian, for the turbulent Cabulis were manifesting their antipathy towards Russia, as the cause of their country's misfortune, by demonstrations against the mission that could not be mistaken. The Ameer, never very popular with his subjects, saw danger to himself in the demeanour of the townspeople, and when the Russian Mission abandoned the scene of its sinister and happily abortive labours, the Ameer accompanied it in its journey across the Hindoo Koosh. There have been rumours that he has entered Russian territory, that he has proceeded to Herat *viâ* Maimena, and that he is staying at either Balkh or Khojah Saleh on the Oxus. It is impossible to test the accuracy of any of these rumours; but it would be at the least very strange if Shere Ali should have so completely given up the battle as lost, and have sunk into a second Abdurrahman without an effort to

retrieve the fortune of war. Time alone will instruct us on this point.

Of the exact position of Yakoob Khan, who was erroneously asserted to have arrived at Jellalabad the other day, we are also ignorant. That he is free, there can be no question; that he is in possession of his senses, is also certain; but that he is in power and supreme, there is as yet no certain evidence to show. The Ghilzais are to a great extent on his side, and so also are the Momunds. His mother was the daughter of a chief of the latter, and his wife of a chief of the former. Nowroz Khan, who was reported to have brought the Momunds over to our side, is his uncle; and he stands well with the army, and also with the Heratees. He is a good soldier; he out-manœuvred both Azim and Abdurrahman in the 1868 campaign. He is a skilful administrator: witness his management of Herat on two different occasions; and as a diplomatist he has already shown, in his dealings with Persia, that he possesses ability and tact. Yakoob Khan is decidedly a man who must play a foremost part in the present crisis. Of the attitude he will adopt towards us it would be rash to hazard an opinion. Patriotism and personal pride will probably play a larger part in his resolve than is generally supposed; but, on the other hand, he will recognize that Shere Ali's policy must be reversed. He may endeavour to revert to the basis of the negotiations in 1876–77; and would certainly offer us the concessions which would at that time have sufficed. Over the right to station British officers at Balkh, Maimena, Herat, and Candahar, Yakoob would raise no objection; but to cede territory which belongs, in his eyes, by right indefeasible to the Duranis, is what he will certainly not consent to do. It is trusting to a broken reed to suppose that Yakoob Khan will assist us in rectifying our frontier at the expense of the outlying districts of Afghanistan. He will do nothing of the kind, and it is not natural to suppose that he should. The rectification of the frontier will have to be carried out in spite of the Ameer's inclinations. It is a duty and a necessity which has devolved upon us as custodians of India. We must not make the performance of that duty depend on the sympathy or the assistance of any Afghan prince. It must be carried through without looking either to the right hand or to the left.

English statesmen never had a graver duty to perform than that

which now lies before those who are in power. They have to solve a problem which requires to be dealt with in accordance with the exigencies of the day, and also in a higher and wider sense as part of a future and greater emergency. They have to remember that the act of to-day heralds the events that will happen in the years that are fast approaching. Certain truths are, however, evident to all, and these are some of them. British supremacy must be established as a practical fact in Cabul. The actual frontier of India must be rendered as strong as possible. The border districts must be pacified, and the mountaineers compelled to be amenable to the voice of order. These are the exigencies of the moment, and these must be satisfactorily met, and at all cost. But future emergencies cannot be disregarded. Russia will not forego those schemes of ambition which she has so long indulged towards India, because the Stolietoff Mission, false to its promises and regardless of all the scruples of honourable men, has left its duped ally to bear the punishment which was Russia's due, and which she yet shall surely repay. Turkestan must be brought into direct communication with the Caspian without delay, and that can only be done through Merv. With a Russian occupation of Merv, England must advance to Herat. Towards that consummation events are slowly, but surely, shaping themselves. Our statesmen have to remember that all their policy will have been in vain—that the sacrifices of men and money, of Indian treasure, too precious to be wasted, will have been utterly useless—if the terms of peace which we shall exact do not, in addition to rectifying a frontier, prepare the way for an easy occupation of Herat, whenever Russia's aggressiveness may render that step necessary. It is for this reason that the occupation of Candahar and Girishk on the Helmund is of infinitely greater importance than the annexation of any territory beyond the Punjab. To abstain from taking Candahar is to leave us in a position scarcely more favourable than it was before, as compared with that of Russia in Central Asia.

The remarks of Sir Henry Rawlinson should be taken to heart on this subject, both by the Government and by the nation. For more than thirty-five years this distinguished soldier and statesman—the Nestor among all students of the Central Asian question—has protested against the absurdity of the apprehensions that prevailed with regard to the wisdom and morality of

advancing into Afghanistan. He "the only man who," as Ferrier says, "came out of our Afghan blunders with credit," has always proclaimed the gravity of the danger, and the necessity there was to prepare for its reception by taking up a strong and unshakable position in Cabul. In securing this position Candahar is the first measure. That town is the key-stone of the arch. It would be better to follow General Hamley's advice, given on purely military data, and content ourselves with Candahar alone, than to obtain everything else we have demanded without Candahar. As a military town, as a political centre, as the key to Cabul as well as to Herat, and as the Durani capital, Candahar is for us the point of all importance. If we fail to take permanent possession of it, we shall have done literally nothing. Our third Afghan war will have been in vain.

IV.

OUGHT WE TO HOLD CANDAHAR?[1]

THE arrival of Yakoob Khan at the British camp at Gundamuck, the village on the Cabul road held by the advanced detachment of Sir Samuel Browne's division, brings us face to face with the necessity of specifying the terms of peace to which we shall require the Ameer to consent. For six months we have waged a war in Afghanistan with unvarying success. In the north we have reached a point within sixty miles of the capital. A forced march would take our soldiers to within sight of the Bala Hissar and the walls of Cabul. In the south our success has been not less complete. Candahar, the chief town in the southern portion of the country, the former capital of the whole state, the one spot which more than any other is associated with the past glory of the Afghans, whether under Ghilzais or Duranis, has for four months been occupied by a British army. The outlying places, Girishk and Khelat-i-Ghilzai—watch-towers to the north-west and the north-east respectively—have also beheld the irresistible progress of our arms. But although our military triumph was perfect, there seemed to be little permanent outcome from it. The death of Shere Ali did not bring his successor to our feet, and for a time it was doubtful whether there was any Afghan prince with whom it would be possible to arrange terms. Yakoob Khan has

[1] Pamphlet published May 16, 1879.

now been formally recognized as Wali of Cabul by Lord Lytton, and, consequently, that uncertainty is removed. It is only possible for us, after that recognition, to conclude a peace with Yakoob. Up to the present time what the conditions of that peace are to be is quite unknown. There have been rumours. There have been assertions bearing a stamp of probability; but if General Roberts's proclamation with regard to the Khurum valley be excepted, there has been no definite and official statement of what our terms, or any of them, are to be.

On one point, however, all rumours and assertions agree with singular unanimity. Look where we may, to all sections of the London press, to the utterances of public men, to that mysterious side talk among those "who know," it is remarkable that there is a belief in the fact that whatever else may be demanded in the way of concession from the Ameer he will not be required to cede Candahar to us. At the most, probably, these views and expressions do but anticipate the future. At the present time there is not the slightest reason for believing that the question of the fate of Candahar has been irrevocably decided by either the Home or the Indian authorities. It is still a moot point. Of all the topics that are being discussed at Gundamuck it is the most delicate. It is so delicate that it may not even be decided there. The Ameer is in a hurry to return to his capital. The question of Candahar can easily be left in abeyance, when the main point has been agreed upon, viz., that between the British and Afghan Governments there shall be peace and alliance in the time to come. It is extremely probable that at Gundamuck the principal point of all with regard to the rectification of the frontier has not been definitely settled. The Candahar question should be the one vital point with all Anglo-Indian statesmen. In this country we cannot too clearly ask ourselves, we cannot too anxiously inquire, Ought we to hold Candahar?

Before discussing that question, the terms of peace, which are generally believed to have been specified, may be stated. It is not to be supposed that they are literally correct. They approximate to what is accepted in well-informed quarters, and while having a London origin, they are substantiated by telegrams from India. They have also the merit of representing the *minimum* that will be accepted. It is said that "the Indian Government will be content to retain garrisons in forts to be erected at Lundi-

Kotal, Khurum, and Pisheen; the roads leading to these places from India being also left absolutely under our control. The Ameer to draw revenue from, and to administer in every respect, all the country not thus occupied. A British Resident to be permanently quartered at Cabul, and an Afghan Envoy always to accompany the Viceregal Court. The Indian Government to have the right to depute agents at any time to certain named towns in the North of Afghanistan, including Balkh, Maimena, Candahar, and Herat, for the purpose of obtaining political and commercial information. The two Powers to pledge themselves against listening to external intrigue levelled at the interest of one or the other, and to enter into a conditional defensive alliance. Finally, the Indian Government to pay the Ameer an annual subsidy of settled amount, nominally 'for keeping the passes open,' but in reality to strengthen his hands in dealing with malcontent tribes."

The verbal accuracy of these terms need not be insisted upon. It requires but a very slight acquaintance with the subject to perceive that in several points these conditions are, to say the least, of dubious authority. But, however inexact, they approximate to the truth. Pisheen marks the limit of our new frontier in the south, and there is no mention of Candahar. "Oh yes," it will be said, "there is. We are to have the right to depute an agent there whenever we may deem such a course to be necessary. We shall also have a garrison within eighty miles of Candahar. The Khojak pass through the Amran range will be in our possession. So also will be the alternative Gwaja pass, farther to the west. What more could be wanted or demanded?" The writer of this pamphlet, relying on the evidence of history, and of every competent Anglo-Indian authority, replies, without hesitation, Candahar itself.

Less than any man, perhaps, am I disposed to attach little importance to the fact of a friendly Ameer being seated on the Cabul cushion. So long as there shall be an independent Afghanistan, so long should its prince be an ally of the British, the friend of their friend, the enemy of their enemy. For Yakoob Khan, personally, I have a great admiration—a true sympathy. Having followed his career with great closeness, having written of that career much more, probably, than any one else, I feel no hesitation in predicting for him a brilliant, perhaps a successful future. But

because I sympathize with his difficulties as an Afghan ruler, because I admire him as a man, that is no reason why my judgment should be warped as to the necessity there is for him to make a very substantial territorial concession to this country. Yet it appears as if sympathy and admiration, in conjunction with a sense of boredom, had put judgment and common sense out of court altogether. Contrast what is written now in the papers on the Afghan question with what was said by the same authorities any time last year, from the news of the despatch of the Stolietoff Mission to the eventful 20th of November, when war was declared against the obstinate Shere Ali. What a difference! An Afghan policy, bold and comprehensive, was then sketched out. The necessity for such was admitted on all sides. We were to have, at the least, a "scientific frontier," and Russian pretensions were to be rolled backward from the confines of Afghanistan, and what our imagination had sketched out, the valour of our soldiers, Indian as well as English, the skill of our generals promptly rendered possible. Triumph succeeded triumph, and in a few short weeks we had secured what was a "scientific frontier." It needed but a punitive expedition against the Waziris, and the fortification of a post at the entrance to the Gomul pass, to have given us a line along the north-west frontier that would have been most easy of defence, and that would have brought us that sense of security which is now, and has for so long, been lacking. There was an unanimity of opinion on this question up to Christmas that was very striking. It was still more significant because no one dared seriously to challenge the importance of Candahar. General Hamley's remarkable paper on the strategical conditions of our Indian north-west frontier carried conviction with it. No one ventured to cross swords with that distinguished officer. It is only now, five months after the delivery of that lecture, when we were about to realize the benefit of our labours, that opposition to those views is beginning to manifest itself, not in words but in acts. The bold man has not yet been found who will set himself to show that the importance of Candahar, military or political, has been exaggerated. It is impossible to resist the logic of facts. When they are irresistible it is only possible to evade them. The just and true must be sacrificed to the convenient. On such principles as this can it alone be decided that we should withdraw from Candahar. It is not too late to arrest our action in this

matter. There is ample time for insisting that, if the principle of a restoration of Candahar to the Ameer has to be admitted, there should, for most weighty reasons, be no *premature* withdrawal of our troops from that place.

It would be difficult to add anything to the reasons that have been advanced for the retention of Candahar; but even the reiteration of what has already been written may serve to warn us that what was wisdom six months ago is not folly now. If we stultify ourselves in Afghanistan, it will be said that we showed a reluctance to carry out our original programme, simply because our hands were so much occupied elsewhere. The war in Zululand took off the edge of our vigour in Afghanistan. There can be no doubt that the interest of the British public in the Afghan question waned very much, once it was perceived that Russia did not intend to follow up her first move by a proclaimed interference in Afghanistan. It grew still less when Cetewayo and his braves became the topic of the hour. But, as a matter of fact, the Afghan question is immeasurably the more important of the two; and when Cetewayo and his formidable military system have become matters of history, the question of the relations between Cabul and Calcutta will still be a question of vital political interest. We should also remember that if, here in London and throughout England, our attention has been distracted from Candahar and Jellalabad to Natal and the Transvaal, such has not been the case in India. The Afghan question is still the question of the hour in the eyes of the Government and peoples of Hindostan. For that reason alone the fate of Candahar should not be lightly discussed. Still less should it be lightly decided. It is eminently a question upon which an opinion should be formed with deliberation. There is nothing urgent in the matter at all. Our prolonged stay at Candahar will cost us little. It will not weaken the cause of Yakoob Khan. It may very possibly serve to strengthen his position.

Intimately connected with the political subject are the questions: What is Candahar? What are the reasons which give it such special importance? Why should we establish ourselves there? What would be the result of such an advance on our part? And finally, Is such an advance necessary? The replies to these questions should be the reasons of our political action. There is yet the other question to be asked, should it be impos-

sible, for convenience' sake, to arrive at the conclusion that it is necessary to hold Candahar, Is this the time most suitable for withdrawing our troops from that town? That question can remain dormant until we have discussed the broader one.

The city of Candahar, which is supposed to owe its origin to Alexander of Macedon, lies between the Urgundab and Turnak rivers, in the midst of a plain of very considerable fertility. It has at all times been one of the principal cities in Afghanistan, and for almost a century it was the capital of the country. Its history need be only incidentally referred to. The modern city is rectangular in shape, but the ruins of former cities which surround it give it an appearance of greater size than is warranted by the fact. To the north cemeteries stretch for a considerable distance, for Candahar is the necropolis of the Duranis. Ameers and Sirdars of all the branches of the main tribe have always made it a point of honour that their remains should repose in the ancestral city of their race. Gardens lie to the west and east of the town, and the southern suburbs are the most thickly populated of all.

The town is surrounded by lofty mud walls, with large circular towers at the flanks, a deep and wide ditch adding to its strength. Though nearly four miles in circumference, it is stated by Dr. Bellew, who lived there nearly six months, and has twice visited it, to contain not more than 20,000 houses. These are generally built of sun-dried bricks, and have flat roofs; though some of the dwellings of the richer classes are covered with chunam—a glistening white plaster, which, in the distance, gives them the appearance of marble. The tomb of Ahmed Shah, an octagonal structure, overlaid with coloured porcelain bricks, and surmounted by a golden dome, surrounded by small minarets, is the most striking building in the city, and attracts the eye of the traveller from afar. The trade between Candahar and Herat is carried on by Persians, who bring down silk, copper, weapons of all sorts, horses, and carpets, taking back felts, skins, and camels' hair cloaks. The Povindahs carry on the trade with Hindostan by the Gomul and Bholan passes.

There can be no doubt, however, that if it were attempted to make Candahar appear as a flourishing town the effort would be useless. Candahar is not a mart of affluence. For an Afghan town it is fairly prosperous. It has a trade with Herat and Cabul,

and also with India. There is a large Persian and Hindoo element in the city, to whose industry it undoubtedly owes much of its prosperity. A detailed description of the city will be found in the writings of Dr. Bellew and Captain Marsh. I cannot refrain, however, from quoting here Lieutenant Rattray's less-known description of the town and its environs—

"Viewing Candahar from without, or at a distance, there is no peculiarity in its structure to strike the eye, as nothing appears above the long high walls but the top of Ahmed Shah's tomb, the summits of a few minarets, and the upper parapets of the citadel. But the interior, as seen from the battlements, cannot fail to delight. Its irregular mud-houses, partly in ruins, varied with trees and minarets; the square red-brick buildings, with doors and windows of Turkish arches; the lofty habitations of the Hindoo; the tents pitched here and there on the flat house-tops; the long terraces crowded with people busied in their various callings in the open air; the dung and mud-plastered hut of the Khakar, with his heavy, wild-looking buffaloes tethered round it; the high enclosures of the different tribes; the warlike castles of the chieftains; the gaily-decorated palace of some great Durani lord, with its fountains, squares, and courtyards; and the domed houses of the other inhabitants, the bazaars, mosques, turrets, and cupolas rising up in the midst of stupendous and inaccessible mountains—from the whole rise a panorama pleasing to look upon."

Since those lines were written, many an Englishman has visited Candahar, but the description for accuracy and picturesqueness yet remains to be surpassed.

When the district of Candahar is said to be of considerable fertility, that statement must be taken as comparative. It is probably more productive than any other portion of Afghanistan. The rivers Urgundab, Dora, Turnak, Argassan, Kadani, and others, are none of them very considerable, but at the least they present the means of fertilizing the eighty miles of country that lie between the Khojak and Candahar. "The inhabitants have also," the late Sir Henry Durand tells us in his book recently published, "an ingenious method of bringing water to the surface for purposes of irrigation; the system is a result of the configuration of the surrounding plains, and consists in the excavation of under-

ground galleries, which, by being carried nearly horizontally from the point at which a good spring of water is struck high up on the glacis-slope, gradually bring it to the surface at a lower level. Having no means of ventilating galleries in the course of excavation, the Candaharees necessarily effect this object by sinking frequent shafts or wells at short distances apart, by means of which the execution of the subterranean galleries is much facilitated, the proper direction secured, and the water level carried on correctly; the wells gradually diminishing in depth as they approach the point where the gallery or *Rariz* discontinues, and delivers the water upon the surface to be irrigated." This rather primitive mode of irrigation shows the necessity there is for man to supplement the bounty of nature in the case of Candahar. No wise advocate for the occupation of Candahar attempts to deny the plain facts.

The province of Candahar, as at present administered, is only fairly productive. But it is sought to add to the recommendations of the Pisheen valley what is taken off from those belonging legitimately to Candahar. Pisheen is certainly not as rich naturally as the plain of Candahar, and if we are to confine our advance in this quarter to its occupation, we may confidently anticipate having to make a great effort for its development. To render Pisheen fairly prosperous, we shall have to do precisely the same as if we were to attempt to render Candahar very productive. By no possibility can the result in the former case at all approximate to what it would infallibly be in the latter, for Candahar is a city, and Pisheen is only a valley, as malicious people would say, of rocks and stones. One authority told us, long before the occupation of Pisheen was advocated, that the tamarisk is found at the river which drains it. Are we to assume, with that writer, that its fertility is to be accepted because of that circumstance? General Biddulph's recent journey through it on his road to Dera Ghazi Khan, *viâ* Thull and Chotiali, proves that it possesses the undoubted advantage of being at the extremity of a new and shorter road from the Indian frontier to Southern Afghanistan. That fact is of real importance, but it does not justify us in shutting our eyes to the still greater and more apparent recommendations of Candahar.

But it will be said that we do not want a productive province. We only want a strong military frontier. Men on the spot, who

must, it is said, know better than any theoretical observer, assert that Pisheen will meet all our requirements. Its occupation will give us a "scientific frontier." It is an easy and, I think, a complete reply to them to retort that there are probably others on the spot who arrive at a completely opposite opinion. Certainly, if there are not, it is most singular, because among old Candahar officers, particularly those of the Scinde frontier force, there is, I have reason to say, a very strong opinion that the city of Candahar should not be restored to the Ameer—at least, for the present. Everybody was aware that the present town cannot be considered a powerful fortress. The weakness of the parapets, and the small dimensions of the ditch, would cause a besieger, provided with a siege train, but little trouble. That is telling us nothing new. It was asserted a few weeks ago that General Stewart had reported unfavourably of the military value of Candahar. The assertion may have been false, but in any case it is unnecessary to insist on the fact, which is admitted, that the present town of Candahar is almost indefensible against a modern foe. It should be remembered that the existing town of Candahar has never withstood a siege, for the attack in 1842 during General Nott's absence which Sir Henry Rawlinson so valiantly repulsed cannot be termed one. On its old site it was a formidable fortress, and the same position is still available for the purpose of establishing there either a fortress or an entrenched camp. But such a consideration as that cannot deter us from advancing to Candahar, if, for other reasons, that step should be deemed advisable. No amount of arguing, no bold assertion to the contrary, can blind us to the fact that its strategic value is great; for it is the first and only place of any strength, or where supplies in any quantity can be obtained, between Herat and the Indus.

Another great recommendation in the eyes of military men is its climate. As Sir Vincent Eyre says, "Snow seldom falls at Candahar, and an army can with ease keep the field there throughout the year." Even now, in the month of May, the weather is still cool, and, with ordinary precautions, European soldiers can live there throughout the whole of the year without suffering any very great discomfort, either from the heat or the cold. We find, then, that Candahar possesses two incontestable advantages—position and climate. As a fortress it is, at present, not formidable. The town could be made strong against any adversary, not

possessing a field train. There is a site near it which could be made impregnable against the best equipped army.

Nothing can sum up the advantages to be derived, in a military sense, from the garrisoning of Candahar, or some post near it, more admirably than the following passages from General Hamley's lecture, already referred to—a lecture of which it may be said that, unanswerable as it was admitted to be at the time, it has by some strange and inexcusable forgetfulness passed out of the memory of the public—

"I will go on, then, to suppose that the result of our present operations is to give us the power, if we choose to use it, of occupying Candahar, with a small space beyond it, necessary to complete its strategical value. The obstacle of the Khojak would thus disappear. At Candahar, the richest district of Afghanistan lies before us. A river flows in front of the place, another in rear, and we ought to hold the passages of both. Several practicable roads lead from thence on Ghuzni and Cabul on the one side, on Herat on the other—and others lead from it down the Helmund to the Persian frontier, and thence on Meshed, in the rear of Herat. The space beyond should therefore include a portion of the Helmund river, with the command of the passage at Girishk. Of the communications with Quettah I have already spoken.

"It is to be noted that between Herat and Cabul, two of the great cities which I have supposed the enemy to occupy, lies the range of the Hazara mountains, the road through which, between those cities, is so bad that the circuit by Candahar, or by a route north of the mountains, is generally preferred. Hence another important consequence would follow from our occupation of Candahar, namely, the rupture of the enemy's front; for if he occupied Cabul we could isolate the forces there from those at Herat—if he did not, we should be free to bring our whole strength to bear on the side of Herat. At Candahar, too, we should hold such a position towards Persia as would seriously affect her relations with Russia; and, finally, our presence there would be almost decisive against any design of the enemy to invade India through the passes. Observe, I do not say *annex but occupy Candahar, by friendly treaty, as we now occupy Quettah.*

"I think it is impossible to deny that our army posted here, in a delightful climate, and with such strategical possibilities open

to it, could desire no better field in which to contest with Russia and her allies the Empire of India. And perhaps many of you will think with me that the leader of that army will be, in his opportunities, the most fortunate British soldier whom we have seen since Wellington."

The italics are mine. After this very remarkable and clear exposition of the military recommendations of an occupation of Candahar, it would be supererogatory on my part to say anything more on that point. On a question of strategy the *dictum* of General Hamley may be taken without a single doubt. But it is necessary to remember that this advance of the Indian frontier is only the natural result of a previous advance. We occupied Quettah for various political reasons, but there was also one paramount military one. It secured the Bholan pass. So long as the Ameer was apparently only discontented and not hostile, so long as Russia abstained from any interference in the state, so long was it sufficient for our purpose to have secured the southern road leading from the British frontier into Afghanistan and the West. There can be no doubt that the advance to Quettah paralyzed the vigour of the Afghan ruler. It nipped the danger in the bud. But do not let us suppose that because we have escaped that danger we are never to be exposed to it again. It would be sheer folly to imagine that because Yakoob Khan's necessities have thrown him into our arms, he is always to be our firm and stanch ally. Our Afghan policy has always had a tendency towards degeneration. The problem admits either of a prompt and sweeping remedy, or of being worked out with care and close vigilance. We are not prepared to adopt the former, and we may be wise. But is it quite certain that we shall have the patience to devote the necessary judgment and consideration to the latter? It is much to be feared that, if things remain tranquil, in a few years we shall be only anxious to believe what is most agreeable. The Ameer will have been accepted as the "friend of our friend, and the enemy of our enemy." A policy of inaction will once more come into vogue, and we shall be content to take the security of our interests in Afghanistan, and also in Central Asia, on trust. That is not a prospect to which a prudent man can look forward with any feeling of satisfaction.

There are two standpoints, and only two, from which it is

possible to regard the negotiations being carried on between Yakoob Khan and our representatives. They can be regarded from our own standpoint, and also from that of the Ameer. It is to be feared that the predominant sentiment on our side is one of *ennui*. This is echoed in the hearts of the generals and soldiers on the spot, whose remaining interest in the war consisted in the prospect of an advance on Cabul. On the side of Yakoob we have the necessities of his position, scarcely secure even in Cabul, where the remnants of his father's army remain true in their allegiance to their old general. We have no guarantee that he is heartily resolved to be our friend. Still less have we any reason for supposing that his claims to supremacy would be generally acknowledged, were we, after officially recognizing him, to leave him to his own resources, assisted by a subsidy and a supply of arms. There is much reason for saying that, if we were now to withdraw from Candahar, the flames of a civil war would break out in Afghanistan in all directions. It is probable that Yakoob Khan would succeed, after some time, in establishing his authority, just as his grandfather did during the last fifteen years of his life. But at what cost it would be rash to say. It would be still more hazardous to predict that that success would be complete. We may have a perfect admiration for Yakoob Khan, but that consideration alone should not impel us to trust the future recklessly into his hands. The power of the Afghan ruler is but the shadow of a name. The authority of the Barukzai house is shaken to its base. Among Ghilzais in the east, and Duranis in the west, loyalty to the House of Poyndah appears to have become an unknown sentiment. The central administration finds no favour in the eyes of khans and sirdars. The greater feudatories are eager to cast off the yoke that has sat so heavily upon them. Is it, when Afghanistan appears to be on the verge of disunion, that we shall willingly surrender the one place which gives us a casting vote in the decision of the country's fate? It cannot be supposed that such a fatal blunder could even be contemplated.

Were the Afghans the arbiters of their own destiny it would be imprudent to withdraw precipitately from Candahar. But as they are not, it would be doubly imprudent. There is the highest authority for asserting that one of the principal reasons of Yakoob Khan's arrival at Gundamuck was the appearance of a great danger north of the Hindoo Koosh. A rumour of disturbances

in Badakshan reached Jellalabad a few weeks ago. Since then the accuracy of the statement has been confirmed from other sources. This is not the talk of the bazaars, for as yet the news has not become matter of public conversation. But that a rising against the Ameer's authority has taken place in Afghan Turkestan may be accepted as a fact equally recognized by Yakoob Khan and by our Indian authorities. Its significance cannot be overestimated. Let us consider what the state of affairs in this part of Asia most probably is.

For ten years there has resided within Russian territory an Afghan prince of noted ability and considerable reputation. His name is Abdurrahman. He is the eldest son of that Afzul, the eldest of all the children of Dost Mahomed, who was Ameer of Cabul for a brief space during the year 1867. At various periods Abdurrahman officiated as Governor of Afghan Turkestan, residing generally at Balkh. He married a sister of the Mir of Badakshan. He ingratiated himself with the Usbeg population, as no Durani had done before. On two occasions he raised considerable armies in that region, by means of which he once decided the fate of Cabul. But when he was finally defeated in the winter of 1868–9 at Tinah Khan by his cousin Yakoob, he fled the country, and at last, after some wandering, betook himself to Russian territory. Upon Shere Ali restoring his authority in Balkh, the Mir of Badakshan, Jehandir by name, fled to Samarcand, where he joined Abdurrahman. General Kaufmann gave these distressed princes an honourable reception. He assigned Abdurrahman an annual allowance of 30,000 roubles. That prince has very prudently contented himself with spending only one-third of his allowance —so, at least, he told Mr. Schuyler. He has, therefore, been able to save about 200,000 roubles during his exile. In those days he used to declare that for half that sum he would place Afghan Turkestan at the feet of General Kaufmann. Of the personal ability of Abdurrahman there can be no question. He is a good general, and a first-rate administrator. His experience of Afghan affairs is unrivalled, and no one possesses the same personal influence in Balkh and the adjoining Khanates. The presence of this prince in the Russian camp was a constant menace to Shere Ali's peace of mind. Now that Yakoob Khan stands in the place of Shere Ali the menace is more direct, the danger more imminent.

The first blow has already been struck. It has been levelled against the ruler of Badakshan, and it appears to have been successful. Little as we hear regarding the condition of things in Badakshan, we know that the ruler whom Shere Ali put upon the throne in October, 1869, is a man of considerable force of character. His name is Mahmoud. But he appears to have aspired to be a reformer, and although a seyyid he is very unpopular. His rival Jehandir, while dissolute and wanting in ability, was far more popular. Now it is an established fact that this prince has re-entered his country. There is an ominous silence as to the result. Nothing is more reasonable than to suppose that his arrival has been the signal for a rising against the Mir, and when we bear in mind all the attendant circumstances, including the very important one that Jehandir would bring with him arms far superior to those of the Badakshi troops, there would be nothing strange in hearing that the authority of Mahmoud had been upset. The significance of such an event is rendered apparent by the fact that it must be held to be the forerunner of Abdurrahman's more formidable expedition. If success crowned the enterprise in Badakshan assuredly Abdurrahman did not dally in his resolve to re-establish his authority in Balkh. His chance would consist in closing the Bamian before Yakoob had time to collect his forces south of the mountains. By means of our position at Jellalabad we have learnt something of the progress of events in Badakshan. We know less of Abdurrahman's movements. There is no obligation on Russia preventing her from permitting that prince undertaking such an expedition, if he may be disposed to do so. He is of course free to go whither he likes. If Abdurrahman has entered Balkh, and succeeds in establishing his authority throughout Afghan Turkestan, we should have no legal grievance against Russia. Although it were accomplished with Russian money, and by means of Russian weapons, Russia would not have broken the letter of any of her engagements. At this time of day no one can expect from Russia an adherence to the spirit of her treaties.

But for all that Abdurrahman would be a mere mouthpiece of Russia. He owes everything to her. He is consequently at her complete disposal. The very nature of his position would compel him to lean on Tashkent. General Kaufmann will then have carried out one of those objects which it lies in his power to attain

on his own resources. He will have given "a king to Afghan Turkestan." It is very doubtful whether Yakoob Khan would venture to enter upon a war with Abdurrahman for supremacy north of the Hindoo Koosh, unless he were to receive from us very substantial assistance. It is almost certain that that aid would not be vouchsafed to him. He would be compelled, therefore, to acquiesce in the severance of the Usbeg, and probably also the Turcoman Khanates from the state. What then, it may be asked, becomes of that clause in the projected treaty which would give us the right to send agents to Balkh, Faizabad, and Maimena? If Afzul's son rules in Balkh, what value does our parchment represent with the son of Shere Ali? Is it at such a time, when half the Ameer's concessions are possibly beyond his power to carry out, that we should abandon Candahar?

Nor if we turn our gaze westward is the prospect more satisfactory. It would require the gift of prophecy to discern the future of Herat. Its present condition is shrouded in a mist of uncertainty. The principal official left there by Shere Ali, Omar Khan, has been dismissed, and it is believed that Yakoob's younger brother, Ayoob, wields authority in his stead. Of this prince we know little. For five years he has resided within Persian territory. He has lived on the bounty of the Shah. He has always had a tendency to gravitate towards Persia. It is said that he is affectionately disposed towards his brother, but if Afghan history teaches one trait in national character more clearly than any other, it is that the ties of relationship are but slight fetters on personal ambition. On the other hand, we know that the Durani tribes of Zemindewar have, since the death of Shere Ali, openly proclaimed that they do not feel bound to fight against us at the order of Yakoob. That was the first symptom of a loosening of authority. More recently the insubordination has shown itself in clearer acts. The Durani Khans are nothing loth to refuse their fealty to a ruler who is identified with a lost cause. From them Yakoob Khan can expect but little active assistance. At the most, they will remain passive. The fate of Herat depends on two things—the power and the honour of Ayoob. There is some reason for supposing that just as Abdurrahman comes to Balkh as a Russian protégé, so did Ayoob come to Herat as a Persian. It was Persian assistance that equipped him for the enterprise. He derives his chief support from that Persian party which has always existed in Herat. If he

had not that support, it is doubtful if he would be where he is. He embarked upon his adventure under Persian auspices, and it is often difficult to break loose from trammels which have been voluntarily accepted. If Persia is willing to make use of him, Ayoob will scarcely raise up obstacles.

Now if there is one thing more assured than any other in Afghan and Central Asian matters, it is that the Shah of Persia—whoever he may be, and the present ruler in particular—casts a covetous eye on Herat. Little as that prince strives to place himself in harmony with his people on most subjects, he is in harmony with them on this. He represents a national aspiration in longing to possess Herat. The war between England and Afghanistan, whose alliance in the past had been the chief stumbling-block to Persian aggressiveness, afforded a prospect of confusion in Herat —the fit opportunity for the realization of those schemes, hatched in the council-chamber of Teheran and fostered from elsewhere. With that object Ayoob was permitted to depart for Herat before his brother was released from his confinement at Cabul. When Shere Ali fled his capital Ayoob was already on the point of being installed in Herat; on the morrow of that flight he was supreme there.

How was that possible if Persia abstained from interference? Not long ago rumours, which were of course contradicted, were circulated to the effect that a Persian army was being concentrated on the Afghan frontier. Now, as I happen to know the source from which that emanated, I have no hesitation in saying that there was some foundation for it. I have reason for believing that, so long ago as last Christmas, a small Persian force had been pushed forward from Meshed towards the Heri Rud. It is possible that that movement may have been the origin of the information which appeared early in April in a Russian official paper. But in any case it should be clear that Persia followed up her support of Ayoob by a military demonstration on the Afghan frontier. It is probable that this force does not exceed 5,000 men, but that only makes it the more formidable. If Ayoob plays for the Shah—and how he can help himself it is difficult to see—that number of troops is amply sufficient. In the past, the great weakness of the Persian armies that have assailed Herat has been their unwieldiness. They were armed caravans rather than armies. If Persia has 5,000 men on the Afghan frontier near Herat, she

has the force most suitable for establishing her authority in that city. The only reason inspiring caution in her eyes is the presence of British troops at Candahar. If we withdraw those troops hastily we shall remove the sole cause for hesitation in the mind of the Shah. Is it at such a time, when the fate of Herat hangs by a thread, that we should abandon Candahar?

Nor should we forget that while Abdurrahman and the Shah are the ostensible objects of danger, they are but the puppets of a show. The causes of their conduct are to be found behind. We have but to lift the veil to discern that the strings guiding their actions are pulled at Tashkent and Tiflis. Nor has Russia to overstep the limits of international obligations. She has but to work on the ambition of the one man, and the vanity of the other. And so long as she confines her acts to such delicate manipulations it will be difficult for us to do otherwise than mete out punishment to her dupes. But if, side by side with an advance on the part of Abdurrahman, and a demonstration against Herat by Persia, we should have a Russian march into the neighbourhood of Merv, to what other conclusion could we come but that there was a connecting link between the three events?

There is no question but that a large body of Russian troops has been assembled at the harbours of the Caspian for the purposes of a spring campaign against the Akhal Teke Turcomans. This campaign has now commenced. From a trustworthy source we are told that while some Russian politicians would fain make us believe that General Lomakine's expedition on the Atrek only aims at the coercion of the Teke tribes, others have no hesitation in telling us that the Persian campaign against Herat is intended to facilitate the occupation of Merv. The occupation of Merv, as was proved by last year's failure, is more easily projected than carried out. If really contemplated, it will be probably attempted by a combined movement from the Atrek and the Amou Darya.

The preliminary part of this campaign is to crush the Akhals in their fortified position in the Kuren Dagh. That accomplished, nothing lies between the Russian troops and the immediate outskirts of Merv. It cannot be long before we shall know the result of the fighting at Khoja Kala; and then not only shall we be on the threshold of a partial disruption of Afghanistan, but a Russian occupation of Merv will also be imminent. The one thing which gives us a voice in these matters, which enables us to adopt an

active policy in them should we be so disposed, is our garrison at Candahar. Are we, when all the elements appear about to conspire against us, to sacrifice the only advantage which we have gained? Not the least of its recommendations is that it alone will justify us in waiting upon the progress of events. It alone encourages us to suppose that some of them will not happen so long as we remain there. At the least it is doubtful if Persia would proceed against Herat. It is also uncertain whether Russia would press home her attack upon Merv. The Abdurrahman enterprise must continue, for unless everything is the opposite of what it is said to be, that measure has already been decided upon. It has passed into the region of facts. Once more the question appeals to us, Is it at such a time that we should withdraw from Candahar?

It is a very pertinent question to ask, What has been the result of our four months' stay at Candahar? There is a prevailing opinion in the country that the whole of Afghanistan is a series of mountains and valleys held by turbulent and ferocious clans. The description applies with some truth to much of the state, but it is wholly inapplicable to Candahar and its vicinity. There the people are by nature of a peaceful and industrious disposition. They love quiet, not turmoil. They are possessed by no demon of unrest. Their one want has been that sense of security without which there can be no trade, no prosperity. Well, for four months they have had that in need of which they have stood so long. They have enjoyed the *Pax Britannica*, that used to exist wherever the English flag flew, and what has been the result? The *Times* correspondent, telegraphing from Candahar on the 10th instant, tells us. The following is his telegram—

"Perfect tranquillity now reigns here. Even attacks on camp followers have ceased for upwards of a month. To give an idea of the condition of the country I may mention that the wire from Pisheen has been cut only once during six weeks. There are no guards on the line, and the culprit was brought into the camp by the villagers, who tried to levy black mail in the shape of pay to imaginary guards. They were told that the wire if unmeddled with takes care of itself, and that severe punishment would be inflicted if the wire was again cut. There is scarcely a petty chief or headman who has not come to Candahar to pay his respects to

the General. This has occurred without bribery or compulsion or even persuasion. The exhibition of strength without fuss or bravado has had an admirable effect. Seeing us indifferent whether they came or sulkily kept aloof, the chiefs came voluntarily, getting trifling presents and good advice. They admired the forty-pounders and returned to their villages, any lingering feeling of loyalty towards the Barukzai rule being gone. The whole of the Candahar district is now safe, and caravans are beginning to venture as far as Herat.

"The news of Yakoob's arrival at Gundamuck is regarded with satisfaction as heralding peace, but the prospect of a re-transfer to Barukzai rule appears to create something like consternation even among the Barukzais. Private letters from Herat report general joy being felt at the prospect of peace. All the troops are in cantonments and mostly housed. Their health is good. The weather is still cool. The prospects of harvest are excellent."

Those are the results of a British occupation of Candahar. The loss of a freedom, which was no freedom, is not regretted. The advent of an unknown prosperity is hailed with expressions of delight. If those advantages do but continue, they will, in the eyes of the Candaharees, have been cheaply purchased at the price of an acknowledgment of British authority.

The present condition of Candahar makes two other points clear. It shows us, in the first place, that the people would speedily become contented with our rule. In fact they are already contented, and there is something akin to consternation among the Afghan clans at the prospect of our withdrawal. In the second place, it makes it clear that the province of Candahar, with a city which should become the great trade emporium for the whole of the country beyond the Indus, could without much difficulty be converted into a revenue-producing territory. In a little time it would pay all the cost of garrisoning it with a corps of 8,000 men—5,000 of whom should be Anglo-Indian troops, and 3,000 Afghan militia. Between Candahar and the Indian frontier proper there would be no necessity to maintain a single regiment. Were the Khan of Khelat firmly united to us by an act showing our appreciation of his stanch fidelity, we could with safety entrust to him the task of keeping our communication open with Scinde and the sea. He would, besides, have no object in proving

treacherous, were he to receive that authority over Pisheen to which he aspires. It would be his undoubted interest to support us. He could not possibly play the traitor with any advantage to himself. Not only then would an occupation of Candahar be attended with safety, but it would be followed by economy. We should attain great military advantages. We should lessen the burden on the finances of India. Are these light considerations for retaining possession of Candahar? Is it because its recommendations are so apparent that we should hesitate to adopt a suggestion that has received the countenance of some of our greatest authorities?

But what about the alternative scheme? What of the Pisheen valley? To me, I confess, it appears to be a sufficient reply to that point, to say that the Pisheen valley represents the legitimate spoil of the Khan of Khelat. We have benefited by his alliance. It was to his friendship that our being able to establish ourselves without a war at Quettah was due. The well-timed aid which he afforded us during the recent advance has been only imperfectly appreciated in this country. Both General Stewart and General Biddulph have, however, handsomely recognized it. It behoves us to render some very tangible reward for it. Khododad Khan was not always so warm to the English alliance that, now that he has proved himself stanch, we can afford to disappoint him; and if he does not receive some very tangible reward, he will undoubtedly be disappointed. What reward can we confer upon him save the valley of Pisheen? For that reason alone it would appear to any one, who took the sentiment of Eastern potentates into consideration, impossible for us to annex Pisheen. We should certainly have to content ourselves with garrisoning some position in that valley. It may be accepted as certain that that garrison would have to be of considerable size. At the least it would have to be much greater than the force we have been maintaining at Quettah. It would consequently be an addition to our expenses. That is no slight objection to the claims of Pisheen.

Ill-natured people have been heard to call Pisheen a *cul-de-sac*. It certainly could, in itself, be converted into a position of considerable strength. It would be very difficult for an enemy to force the Khojak. It might be easier to outflank the position by means of the Gwaja, or of that route farther to the east, which General Wiltshire followed in 1840 on his march from Ghuzni to

Khelat. That is only a suggestion. It may be admitted that, if the battle for the preservation of India is to be fought in a place of our selection, no position would answer the purpose better, so far as we were concerned, than the Pisheen valley. The Amran range might without much difficulty be converted into lines similar to the historic position of Torres Vedras.

But it is quite certain that, whenever and wherever that decisive contest may occur, it will not be in a place of our choosing. If we make our chief effort of defence in one place, the principal attack will come from another quarter. Still more important is it that we should remember that, when the danger comes upon us, in order to defend ourselves we shall have to assume the offensive. It will be quite out of the question for us to think of taking up a position in an entrenched camp, and there abiding the assault. General Hamley recognized that fact in his lecture, and it is that consideration which above every other gives a special importance to the future of Candahar. Whatever may be said of Pisheen as an improvement on Quettah—a statement which it is impossible to accept without reservation—Candahar is the only place which gives us a *striking* power. Candahar is the only possible base for an army acting beyond the Indus on the Indian side of Herat. That is another fact not to be permitted to pass out of our memory.

And apropos of offensive measures, it is necessary here to state very clearly what is the main necessity in the whole of this Afghan business. It is mere sophistry talking of "curbing the insolence of the Ameer," and "compelling him to abandon his attitude of hostility." We know well enough that it was not the poor man's inclination to indulge needlessly in those expensive luxuries. It is simply absurd to talk of any danger to our rule from the Ameer's unaided ambition. There never has been a moment when that assertion was true, since Timour Shah collected his troops for a march on Delhi. Our Afghan policy has never had any other object than to make preparation for a Russian advance. The presence of Russia in Central Asia is the only *raison d'être* for an advance on our part into Afghanistan. It is well to recognize these facts very clearly. An act of perfidy on the part of Russia embroiled us with Shere Ali, and has in the result cost us two millions of pounds sterling and some bloodshed. We have now reached the close of the war, and we have to secure some return for the outlay we have been put to. We have above all to

obtain some fresh security against Russia. Having carried the business through with such remarkable vigour and success, it would be the height of weakness to go without our full reward.

The Prime Minister recently declared that we had obtained the "scientific frontier" of which we had been in search. The declaration raised a flutter of hope in the breasts of all those who knew how imperative it was that Candahar should be retained. Lord Napier of Magdala added his powerful testimony to those who have gone before him upon this question, and, in addition, expressed his decided opinion that Jellalabad also should be held. Those were in the days when Yakoob Khan was recalcitrant. He has evinced his willingness to become our ally now; can we not mitigate our demands? The reply is one that has to be made with some regret. It is impossible, with a just appreciation of our difficulties, to answer in the affirmative. The reasons which were all-sufficing until the other day retain their force. The act of the Afghan prince, driven into our camp by his own necessities, cannot alter the weighty judgment that has been formed upon the question. If we are to decide on the merits of the case alone, whether we are to hold Candahar or not, there can be no doubt as to the reply. But even if we permit sympathy to get the better of reason, we must, at all events, defer the generous act until the suitable occasion. Personally, I have not the slightest doubt that we ought to hold Candahar, and I feel sure that, even if we abandon it, our absence will not be for long. For many reasons it would be better that the question should be conclusively settled, now that it has been taken so satisfactorily in hand.

But if the principle of the restitution of Candahar has been recognized at the conference of Gundamuck, it is absolutely necessary to remember that no time could be more unsuited than the present for carrying that principle into execution. It is impossible for us to relax our hold on the country so long as we are not aware of the conditions of things both in Herat and in Afghan Turkestan. It would be particularly weak to do so until we saw how far consolidated the authority of Yakoob was likely to become. We have also to remember that our presence at Candahar is a benefit to the cause of the Ameer. He can devote his attention exclusively to the north and the west so long as we remain there, and if he fail to establish his authority, if he die on the field against his foes, or by the hand of the assassin hired by

his rivals, then we are on the spot to prevent the realm from going to rack and ruin. We are at hand to enforce the stipulations of the treaty of Gundamuck. Far from hindering the course of Yakoob Khan to the attainment of complete power, we should have done much towards assisting him. He would not nurse up a resentment against us on that account.

In replying to the question at the head of this paper, we have to remember that the *permanent* retention of Candahar is a question that admits of further consideration. On that point it may here be said, that to occupy some position near Candadar—to have a cantonment, say on the banks of the Urgundab—would probably secure for us everything that is necessary. We might carry out with regard to Candahar the same principle that was applied so successfully in the case of Quettah. That is a point worth suggesting to those who brand our advance into Afghanistan as an evidence of sheer lust of conquest. But there is no need for arriving at an immediate decision upon this point. The fate of Candahar may be permitted to remain in suspense until we know for certain the future of Afghanistan. But if our necessities are to be temporarily waived, it can only be on the understanding that we intend to retain our hold on Candahar until the dangers to which Yakoob Khan is exposed have been overcome, or have passed away. We cannot possibly retreat from Candahar so long as we are convinced that that act would be the greatest encouragement to Russia, Persia, and such adventurers as Abdurrahman. If a withdrawal from Candahar is, as there can be no question, the certain prelude to changes in the political standing of the whilom kingdom of Afghanistan of the most momentous character, and in their effect sure to be most disastrous to some of our most cherished interests, such a withdrawal would find no favour in the eyes of any Englishman.

I have already endeavoured to show—and although the evidence is not of the clearest, it is still significant in its very bareness—that we are probably on the eve of the severance of the northern Khanates from Cabul. As has been well said by an Indian correspondent, that is a "question for home consideration." The danger to Herat is more indirect, perhaps less pressing. Still it exists. Russia's menace to Merv was never more prominent than now, when her troops stand on the threshold of the Teke country. We flatter ourselves when we say that, with these elements of uncertainty and danger around us, we have put our

house in order with the Cabul Ameer. The result of a campaign attended with undeviating success should, indeed, give permanent results. But precipitancy in imagining those results obtained can only lead to disappointment. Can we imagine that a trivial rectification of the Indian frontier will suffice to smooth over all these difficulties? Will a treaty of alliance with Yakoob Khan give us any standing with Abdurrahman? Will the right to station agents in the northern cities possess any practical value when those cities have ceased to be under the sway of the Ameer of Cabul? Regard these facts and contingencies from whatever point of view we may, we cannot but consider them as productive of very intelligible apprehension. There is an Utopian sentiment current with regard to the approaching settlement of our difficulty with Yakoob Khan that is to be deplored. It cannot but lull us into a false sense of security.

For these reasons have the preceding pages been written. It is not necessary to suppose that there is any pressing danger from Russia to insist upon the necessity of holding Candahar for a certain time as a "material guarantee" for the future. We have only to consider the nature of the tenure of Yakoob's power, we have only to bear in mind the condition of Afghanistan itself, to arrive at that conclusion. The time has not yet come when we can say with any degree of assurance how far or how short we must push our frontier up from the south. Before we committed ourselves to too much or too little, we should consider the subject from every possible point of view. It is pre-eminently a question over which there should be deliberation. The *status quo* might, therefore, be maintained for the remainder of the year at all events. Certainly we should not dream of evacuating Candahar until we knew, on the testimony of Englishmen, the condition of things in Herat and in Balkh. Until then we certainly should hold Candahar. Its ultimate future could afterwards be very calmly discussed and decided. For the present, every principle of policy compels us to remain there. When Afghanistan has regained its normal quiet, and foreign intrigue has been beaten back from its confines, we may be able to discuss the Candahar question in a mood favourable to the pretensions of Yakoob Khan. But, until that time, we ought to hold Candahar.[1]

[1] Candahar was held for more than three months after the Treaty of Gundamuck, and when the last English troops were being withdrawn, the news arrived of the Cabul massacre, and Sir Donald Stewart re-occupied the city.

V.

HERAT AND THE TURCOMANS.[1]

IT is an accepted maxim that "coming events cast their shadows before," and it is already apparent that we are on the eve of important occurrences, and perhaps startling changes, both at Herat and in the country of the Turcomans. No matter how resolutely we may steel ourselves to bear with the outward show of indifference a Russian advance in the direction of Merv, or a state of chaos in the city of Herat, Englishmen will never consent that their Government should ignore the development of a question which touches them in numerous ways. At the present it is only given us to recognize plain facts and to watch with unceasing vigilance the next stages of the Central Asian Question. There is no likelihood, if even the necessity for it existed, of our resorting to any fresh action in Asia just at present. We have made our move on the political chess-board, and it is now Russia's turn to make hers. We can only wait, and discover, if we may, the game she aspires to play.

The success which may attend the operations of General Scobeleff in the country of the Akhal-Teke Turcomans, and the fortune Ayoob Khan may experience in his attempt to re-establish his authority at Herat, both claim our attention at the same time. Each depends upon circumstances distinct from the other, but

[1] *Army and Navy Magazine*, December, 1880.

as they will be decided concurrently, it is both convenient and necessary to consider them together. It would be difficult to give priority in point of interest to either subject, and therefore it is additionally just to include in one survey of affairs the dangers which menace the independence of the Turcomans and those which threaten the tranquillity of the fairest city of Khorasan.

When Ayoob Khan fled across the Urgundab after his defeat near Candahar, we may feel sure that his thoughts echoed the prudent advice of the ancient soldier who retreated because he meant to fight another day. Having reached a place of safety beyond the Helmund, he discovered that his defeat was not of that crushing character he may have supposed when he saw his line of battle pierced and broken up by the headlong impetuosity of Roberts's soldiers. He had lost his artillery and most of his baggage it is true, but Afghans do not attach much importance to the loss of weapons which are little more than *impedimenta* to their armies. The tribesmen withdrew to their homes, whence they will be in readiness to issue when the occasion offers, and while the Cabuli regiments retired northwards to Ghuzni and the capital, the Herat sepoys followed in the steps of their general. A considerable number of these rallied on Ferrah, and when Ayoob reached that place he found that he had at his disposal the nucleus of a force which might again become formidable. With the great Khans of Zemindewar he had succeeded in establishing friendly relations, and the old Belooch chief, Ibrahim of Chaknasur, was inclined to give stanch support to the cause of one engaged in a struggle with the Infidel. For reasons of which we cannot be aware, both these sympathisers have proved firmer friends to Ayoob after his defeat at Mazra than they were while the reputation of the victory at Maiwand was fresh upon him. The league in Western Afghanistan has, strange to say, become more solid in face of a reverse which we might well have hoped would prove crushing; and could Ayoob only feel sure of his position at Herat itself, he might concentrate all his attention and strength for a second expedition against Candahar.

It is unsatisfactory in a national sense to have to admit that the victory at Mazra was a very imperfect equivalent for our defeat at Maiwand, yet such undoubtedly it was. The peculiar disgrace attaching to our arms for the disaster to General Burrows's brigade was that our troops were defeated not merely in fair stand-up

fight, but in an open country where there *should* have been no greater advantages of position for one side than for the other. It would not be saying too much to assert that when the Ghazis saw the backs of our men on that day of confusion, the charm of our military superiority was broken. Something more decisive than a victory which is not followed up, and which is made the excuse for a precipitate withdrawal of the bulk of our army will be required to convince the Afghans and Ayoob Khan that there is an impossibility of success in fulfilling their duty by waging a bitter war against us. The instant Ayoob's hands are free in his own stronghold we may count on his resuming the attempt on Candahar, whether it be in our possession or in that of a nominee. There will, from his point of view, be no reason because his first attempt failed that his second should not meet with success.

Already mutterings of a coming storm have reached this country from Candahar. The gossip in the bazaar is of nothing save of the warlike intentions of Ayoob, the Lord of Herat, and of the mustering of armed men in the valleys of Zemindewar. The solution of the question whether our winter residence in Candahar is to be marked by a resumption of hostilities or not, depends, however, not upon the unfriendly wishes and malign intentions of the Afghan clansmen of the Helmund valley, but upon the degree of success Ayoob may meet with in his dealings with the disappointed Heratis, and in his negotiations with the Persian Government. In short, it is at Herat itself that we can only estimate aright the prospect before us during the winter that is now at hand.

The Persian Government has from the very commencement of the disturbed state in Afghan affairs regarded the progress of events at Herat with a vigilant attention, which it would be well for us to imitate. It was with its sanction, if not direct approval and assistance, that Ayoob, on the flight of his father Shere Ali from Cabul in the winter of 1878–79, quitted his exile in Khorasan, and proceeded to assert his authority in Herat. During the two years which have since elapsed, we know that the relations which have subsisted between the Afghan prince and the Shah's Viceroy at Meshed have been so far from unfriendly that Iskander Khan, a son of the Sultan Jan of seventeen years ago, has been prevented from interfering with his cousin. The Persians looked upon their pensioner with a favourable eye as a weak prince not likely to hold

his own without their support. Now that he is weaker than ever he will become still more an object of their solicitude, for they well know that the greater his need the more pliable will he be for their purposes. At this moment a loan of money, a supply of arms, would satisfy the uppermost wish in Ayoob's heart, at the same time that it would tend in the right direction for the attainment of the object of Persia's policy. Ayoob has already wrung as many tillahs as he can out of the unfortunate traders of his own city—whose chief avenue of wealth, the trade with Candahar, has been closed to them—and whatever assistance Persian officials may in their public or private capacity afford, will be thrown into the common fund for the fitting out of a fresh expedition against either Candahar or the new Ameer.[1] The Shah's representatives are astute enough to see that Ayoob will devote all his resources not to the consolidation of his hold on Herat as against them, but to the adventure to which he stands pledged in the eyes of the Afghan people against both ourselves and Abdurrahman. Whether he wholly fail or partially succeed, it is perfectly clear that his hold on Herat must become feebler, and that under certain contingencies he might be constrained to loose it altogether.

It may be that there is little distasteful to many of us in the prospect of Persia obtaining possession of Herat on certain conditions, but clearly those conditions should be of our own making. At present the informal negotiations between Ayoob and his Persian neighbours are directed to the out-manœuvring of our policy, whatever it may be, and to the obtaining by Persia of the object she most covets under the pretence of the moral obligations she owes to a kindred and suffering population. At Meshed there is no doubt allowed as to the direction in which the future of Herat is drifting, and our agent there has assuredly kept our Government informed of the progress of the delicate negotiations between Ayoob Khan and the Prince Governor of Khorasan. It would seem unnecessary to refer to this subject, but that aspersions, possibly groundless, have been cast on the integrity and trustworthiness of our native agent at Meshed. The outside world is also not generally aware that although Meshed news is only of interest as affecting Indian questions, it is sent through the Minister at Teheran to the Foreign Office. After a further delay

[1] Abdurrahman Khan acknowleged as Ameer by us in August, 1880.

the Foreign Secretary communicates the items of intelligence to the Indian Secretary, who in turn uses his discretion about remitting them to the Viceroy. The telegraph is not always although generally employed, and hence the information current in Meshed is sometimes not at the disposal of the administrators of India until after so long a period that it has been deprived of almost all its value.

With Ayoob Khan, as the person responsible for the murder of poor Lieut. Maclaine, whatever turn events may take in Afghanistan, we never can have friendly relations; and so long as he holds possession of Herat, or exercises independent authority in any part of the country, there can be neither security for Abdurrahman nor freedom from anxiety for ourselves. Such being the case we cannot hope to long put off a definite decision in the matter. Neither is it to our interests that we should defer it until the force of circumstances compels us to adopt some hasty and precipitate course for which we shall too soon have to repent. It is well to be deliberate and to wait until we have made up our mind, but irresolution and pusillanimity will only entail an addition to our troubles. There is one plain fact on which it is not possible to entertain a difference of opinion. Herat, which in a military sense commands Candahar, and the possessor of which has it in his power to cause annoyance if not positive danger to the occupant of the latter place, is in the hands of an enemy who has shown that he is not to be despised; and it therefore behoves us to spare no effort and to neglect no opportunity of expelling him. We are not inclined to take the task into our own hands—indeed the garrison at Candahar has been reduced to such low dimensions that it would be folly to think of attempting it—and therefore we should intrust it to others. The least satisfactory solution of the Herat question is the uncertain condition of things that at present exists there. It is in itself provocative of danger; and should General Scobeleff succeed in establishing himself at Ashkabad during the coming winter the Shah's government will not scruple to receive under Russian auspices, instead of British, possession of that city which it has coveted so long and with such remarkable pertinacity.

Meanwhile the Russians and the Turcomans are preparing for the struggle which will decide whether the latter are to become the subjects of the Czar, or whether they will win by their valour a fresh lease of independence. General Scobeleff, to whom the

task of retrieving the defeat of General Lomakine last year has been intrusted, is proceeding on a plan which, if he only has a sufficient number of troops and an adequate supply of provisions and military stores, must infallibly succeed. More than six months have been taken up with the preliminary measures, and at this present time they are represented as being still incomplete. We know from a variety of sources that this enterprising General has strengthened his line of communication with the Caspian by fortified posts in the valleys of the Atrek and the Sumbur. He has also improved the road between Chikishlar and the Kuren Dagh, and the Bendesen pass through that range has been levelled and is defended at several points by earthworks, ready to be converted into batteries. In the plain below this pass at the abandoned Akhal forts, Bami and Beurma, he has collected the main body of the force which is at his disposal. At present it is of modest dimensions, but such is a portion of the plan which was drawn up at Livadia in the spring. Scobeleff's main object is to collect a vast quantity of stores at various points, and not until that has been done is it intended to bring the bulk of the expedition—at present assembled at Baku in the Caucasus—into the field.

While these steps have been taken to facilitate movements in the Atrek valley, similar preparations have been in progress between Bami and Krasnovodsk, the principal of the Trans-Caspian landing-places. A railway has already been laid down from near that town to as far as the wells at Molla Kara in the direction of Kizil Arvat, and it is proposed to carry it on across the desert. It is said that General Scobeleff attaches little value to this railway, an assertion that it would be wise to accept with some degree of scepticism; but whether he does at present or not he certainly will appreciate the value of a double line of communication when he has advanced to a greater distance from his base than he has as yet.

Soon after General Scobeleff established himself at Beurma he led a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Geok Tepeh, the scene of Lomakine's defeat, and we know from the Special Correspondent of the *Daily News*,[1] who wrote from Koochan when on the point of starting to join the Turcomans, that on this occasion Scobeleff was fain to retreat with slight loss. It is true that no

[1] The late Mr. O'Donovan who perished with Hicks Pasha in the Soudan.

special significance attaches to this repulse, but it shows that the Turcomans are still confident and in force at the spot where they successfully encountered their assailants last year. On the other hand, Scobeleff no doubt obtained information that may have been more than an equivalent for the small loss he suffered.

The Turcomans have themselves experienced a loss that they cannot easily replace in the deaths of their great chief Noor Verdi, and of his son Berdy Mourad, who was mortally wounded at Geok Tepeh. The supreme command of the Akhal forces is now in the hands of another of the sons of the late Noor Verdi, Makhdum Kuli Khan, who is the bearer of a name honoured among all the Turcoman clans as that of their national poet. The duty has devolved on him of carrying on the scheme of defence devised by his father, and of performing deeds that some other bard of his race may hand down to his posterity. Strong as Geok Tepeh was when Lomakine appeared before it, it presents a much more formidable appearance now than it did then, when the Akhals would willingly have abandoned it if the Russian commander had only allowed them to execute their intentions. For more than a year the whole population, men, women, and children, have been engaged in the patriotic task of repairing its defences and making good its defects. Whatever the ingenuity and recent experience of a capable race can suggest as requisite we may be sure has been done to render it impregnable; and when nothing more could be effected, the women, children, and old men were sent off to a place of greater safety in the direction of the Tejend. A reinforcement of four thousand warriors had arrived from Merv, and in all nearly thirty thousand men stand in the path of the Russian General. They possess a position of considerable strength, are fairly armed, are mounted on horses unequalled by those of any cavalry in the world, and will fight moreover with the desperation of men for whom defeat alone possesses any terror. Against such a foe it will require not a little good fortune for even so enterprising a General as the man who led the assaults on the earthworks of Plevna to obtain a signal success. The fate of the Turcomans may in the end be the same, but nothing should excite less surprise than that the Russians will be a second time compelled to beat a retreat from before the position at Geok Tepeh.

The Russian commander himself is not over-confident of success with the means at his disposal, and although he has expressed his

intention of commencing active operations in February, when four months for active campaigning will remain before him, it is not impossible that the date fixed may come and go without any step forward having been made. The statement has been revived with some persistency that simultaneously with Scobeleff's march an expedition will advance on Merv from the side of the Oxus. Nothing is more certain than that this course will be adopted when the Russian Government resolves to finally settle the Turcoman question; but on this occasion, when it stands pledged to the understanding that Merv itself is not included within the sphere of its action, it is improbable that any troops will be despatched from the banks of the Oxus. At the same time it is only right to remember that a military demonstration at Charjui would go far towards effecting the main object by obliging the Merv Khan to recall the warriors who have been sent to reinforce the Akhals at Geok Tepeh. We may also feel sure that General Kaufmann will not willingly remain an inactive spectator of events in Kara Kum, and he may reasonably demand permission to hold out a helping hand to the column forcing its way through the region north of the Kuren and Kopet Daghs. The conquest of Merv and the obtaining of that direct route from Turkestan to the Caspian, which is the main object of Russia's policy in Central Asia, would consummate with a crowning success the career of the Russian Governor-General.

While these facts should ever be borne in mind, and rumours of the movements of troops on the Oxus constantly arrive to keep them prominently before us, the probability undoubtedly is that General Scobeleff will be instructed to make his direct attack on Geok Tepeh this winter on his own resources alone, and that General Kaufmann will have to remain quiet for another season. Russia will, in this instance, be true to her declaration, because there is no great advantage to be obtained by being false to it, that she seeks only to chastise the Akhals and not to annex Merv.

The course of immediate events depends therefore on the result of the fighting at and around Geok Tepeh. The elaborate preparations made by the Turcomans at this place seem to show that they are resolved to make their stand there, but they will up to the last have the option of a retreat to Ashkabad or Goores. General Scobeleff may after all find that when he takes possession of Geok Tepeh the difficulties of his enterprise are only com-

mencing. He will have a longer and more exposed line of communications to protect, and he will not yet have established his connection with the northern cities of Persia. In order to render his position at all safe, he will be compelled to continue his march to Ashkabad in face of an active and unbeaten enemy. If the Turcoman leaders only make the full use of their magnificent light cavalry, and refrain from encountering the Russians in close fight, they can undoubtedly make Scobeleff's progress more tortoise-like than that impetuous General will appreciate. The further from the Caspian that the decisive encounter takes place the more fatal for the Russian expedition must the consequences be of any act of rashness or over-confidence. To assert that the Turcomans must in the end give way to the Russians, if the opponents are left to their own resources, is simply to enunciate a permanent truth, but it may very well happen that General Scobeleff's success on this occasion will not be greater than that of his predecessors.

Should, however, any untoward occurrence mark the approaching campaign, or should indeed the spring of next year still find the Turcomans undefeated and defiant, the arguments of General Kaufmann and his school would become irresistibly cogent. The Czar could no longer refuse his assent to the despatch of an expedition against Merv from the side of Khiva and Bokhara, similar to that undertaken in 1873 against the former Khanate; and however great the expense it might entail, or arduous the undertaking in itself, there can be no question that it would stand a much greater chance of attaining a *speedy* result than any expedition sent along the Attock road from the Caspian. The capture of Merv would very seriously cripple and might possibly crush the powers of resistance of the Turcomans, whereas a defeat at Geok Tepeh or even at Ashkabad will leave the fate of the mass of the race as problematical as ever.

On the other hand, were General Scobeleff to succeed in establishing himself at Ashkabad, an event of the very greatest importance would have occurred to alter our existing ideas on the subject of the politics of Western Afghanistan and Eastern Persia. In itself it would matter little to the Turcomans of Merv, but it would matter a great deal to the Shah and to the actual ruler of Herat, for at Ashkabad the Russian commander will come into direct contact with the peoples of Northern Persia, and he will

have the command of a road, through a country well cultivated and inhabited by a prosperous peasantry, to Meshed and Herat. Not only will he then be in a position to draw most of his supplies from Khorasan, but he will be able to influence the policy of Persia in the matter of Herat. It is at this point that the two questions of the future of the Turcomans and of the city of Herat will come into sympathy with each other. Persia's interest being measured at the "fixed quantity" of a desire to possess Herat, her Government will be averse to dissociate the two. It matters little to her whether the contributory factor to the attainment of her object is the ambition of Russia or the apprehension of England.

It will be said, and many persons think, that we are concerned with neither Herat nor the Turcomans. Whatever may betide in Khorasan or on its frontier, these persons say, matters not to England or to India. The Persian may be turned from a friend into a foe, the Turcoman and the Herati may become the most valuable auxiliaries of the Russians, the Russians themselves may steal up under our ramparts—wherever or whatever these invisible bulwarks may be—and we are to do nothing and to take no precautions. We are even to give up Candahar as a useless possession! The argument is consistent throughout, and may be made unanswerable by being carried to its logical conclusion, which is the abandonment of India as another "useless possession."

But it is only by shutting our eyes to our responsibilities, and by neglecting our duty as the paramount power in India, that we can persuade ourselves into the belief that Russia may safely be allowed to follow, without let or hindrance on our part, her policy of bringing the Turcoman zone within the limits of her dominions, and of making the action of Persia subservient to her own. The sentiment of Ayoob towards ourselves will make him another willing tool in the hands of those who do not conceal that they have designs on Herat and Merv, and who may very well be encouraged by success in those matters to indulge similar sinister intentions in the direction of India itself. These views will no doubt be denounced as "alarmist," but it depends on ourselves whether there is any need for alarm. We have not played the game as well as, with our exceptional experience, we might have been expected to have played it; but still, as at present arranged, it stands in our favour. The advantage so far is of an

indecisive character, because it is uncertain whether of our own act we do not mean to surrender it. Were the doubt removed on this point, could we but accept as an unquestionable fact that Candahar is to remain a British city, there would at the least be something to be said in favour of the argument that Russia must be allowed a certain freedom of action with regard to Merv and the Turcomans. But even this small point is not finally settled one way or the other. The scales still hang doubtful in the balance, and nothing would be less surprising than that, should Abdurrahman next April be reigning Ameer at Cabul and Ghuzni, Candahar will be added to the possessions under the ill-balanced authority of that much-hoped-from prince. It appears very doubtful whether we shall remain undisturbed at Candahar during the coming winter, and a fresh attack will at least be as strong an argument for those who object to, as for those who support the retention of Candahar. In any case our abandonment of that city will mean that our future relations with the Afghans will be those of hopeless enmity. They hate us at present, but when we relax our last hold on their country they will despise us as mere boasters who do not possess the strength to execute our threats. They will regard the British power in India with the same eyes as their ancestors did the decaying Moguls, and their opinion will soon infect the bazaars of the Punjab and of Central India.

No one who will take the trouble to peruse the official declarations of past Liberal Foreign Secretaries can maintain that the questions connected with either Merv or Herat have been treated by them with indifference, or in any other manner than beseemed the dignity of the country. It would appear now as if the statesmanlike course previously adopted was to be discontinued because verbal protestations have to give place to acts. There is as much hesitation shown in coming to a distinct understanding with Persia as there is in placing a definite limit to the sphere of Russia's activity. When victory and final success are within the grasp of Russia, it will be too late to demur to arrangements which we cannot regard save with disapproval, but which we shall be unable to disturb.

In conclusion, while uncertainty shrouds the future both of Herat and of the Turcomans, it is our own fault if any ambiguity attaches to the fate of Candahar. By refusing to proclaim our intentions with regard to it we are discouraging those who are

friendly to us; and by neglecting to strengthen its defences, to fortify a position on the Helmund, and to complete the railway from Scinde, we are leaving our troops exposed to unnecessary dangers. It would almost seem as if, for want of a better argument to withdraw from it, we were endeavouring to create one by the folly of our own acts. The Afghans see in our hesitation a proof of the consciousness of our weakness, and they attribute to the impression made by the disaster at Maiwand the want of initiative now so painfully apparent at Candahar. A decision in favour of the retention of Candahar will be the first step towards the settlement of the future of Herat on a basis which we can approve of, but the longer it is put off the less satisfactory must be its results.

VI.

WHY CANDAHAR SHOULD BE RETAINED.[1]

THE announcement in the Queen's Speech that it is not the intention of the Government to retain permanent possession of Candahar removes all ground for doubt as to "the settlement" of the Afghan question which has been resolved upon by the present Administration. The "settlement" is to consist of a complete withdrawal from every part of Afghanistan, and of the surrender, or, at all events, the non-enforcement of the right, conceded more than twenty years ago to the late Lord Lawrence by the great Ameer Dost Mahomed, to station a native agent at Cabul. Not only is it to be, therefore, a return to the lines of "masterly inactivity," but to a "masterly inactivity" shorn of one of its few redeeming features. And much of this speculative policy, this abnegation of statesmanship, this reversal of solemn treaty and engagement, has already passed into the region of accomplished fact. The Khyber has been given back to the marauding Afreedees, who have for centuries made it the dread of the traveller and the merchant, and the Khurum has been placed in the charge of the Turi clan, an arrangement which only promises to be satisfactory because the value of the Khurum is now generally recognized to have been exaggerated. All official communications between Cabul and India have ceased, and the doings of the Ameer Abdurrahman are mysteries upon which

[1] *Army and Navy Magazine*, February, 1881.

even the rumours of the bazaar afford little light. Should he be hurled from his pride of place the rumour will be received at first with incredulity, and when shown to be true we shall be informed that the internal quarrels of the Afghans do not affect us in any degree, and that it is a matter of unimportance whether Abdurrahman or some other Afghan adventurer rules at Cabul. That point need not now or here be discussed; but a moment's reflection may suggest the advisability of more caution than has been evinced in the north in dealing with the question of Candahar, where the force of circumstances has, for the moment, proved too strong for even the plans of the present Government. Our garrison has not yet been withdrawn, nor can it with convenience be ordered to retire until the month of April; and, in the interval, should Abdurrahman fall a victim to the enmity of the hostile faction, or be driven back beyond the Hindoo Koosh to his old place of exile, the country would speedily awake to a perception of the hollowness of precipitate and ill-considered conventions with Afghan chiefs and refuse its approval to a repetition of the Cabul blunder in the matter of Candahar.

Government has announced its determination, and so far as it can arrange matters, it will not hesitate to carry it into action; but the most gifted of ministries cannot always command the course of events, and Candahar, which has now seen British authority established there, almost uninterruptedly, for two years, may yet witness it indefinitely prolonged. It is, therefore, without something of the misgiving of arguing upon a foregone conclusion that must be present in the case of every other section of the Afghan question, that I make one more protest against the abandonment of Candahar, and bring forward the well-worn but not yet sufficiently appreciated arguments in support of the permanent retention of that city.

And in the very foreground of those arguments I would put the moral obligations we have incurred towards the inhabitants of Candahar. It is said that the annexation of this place would be an act of spoliation, and carried out in opposition to the wishes of the people. We should be forcing, it is loudly declared, our authority upon them, and that would be a most unjust and unwarrantable proceeding. In short, it would be the exercise of the right of the conqueror. All this may be admitted, and, indeed, is perfectly true; but it is difficult to see in this, particu-

larly if viewed by the light of English history, the monstrous iniquity which it has presented to some morbid minds. The intelligent foreigner could only recognize, it is to be feared, in these moral misgivings, another proof of the strange inconsistencies of the Anglo-Saxon character. But apart from the dislike common to all peoples to pass under a new authority, who are they at Candahar, I ask, who would specially resent the permanent appearance of British authority in their midst? They are the Afghan swashbuckler, the fanatical mollah, and the predatory tribesman of the hills. Those who make their livelihood by tilling the land, and the peaceful pursuits of the city, have at all times been in constant fear of these enemies, their tyrants. Is it reasonable to suppose that they would regard our permanent and irrevocable assumption of the government of Candahar with disfavour when it must needs entail security for their lives, their honour, and their property? Is it not notorious that the withdrawal of our troops will be the signal for the departure of a large class of the population for India, and that those who can will thus seek safety from their persecutors by a timely flight? Many must, however, be unable to avail themselves of this avenue of escape, and will remain to be the objects of the wrath of the Afghans, infuriated because disappointed of much of their prey. The protection of these helpless citizens, both Hindoo, Persian, and Afghan, appeals loudly to our conscience for sympathy, and it is a doubtful morality to teach that we should abandon these hapless unfortunates to the tender mercies of the Afghan clansmen. Yet the designs of the Government, stripped of their specious covering, amount to this morality. We are to allow the weak and the peaceful to be oppressed and maltreated in order, forsooth, that the turbulent and the strong, the bitter foes of England and of all who love a stable government, may not be compelled to submit to an alien authority. If this course were carried to its conclusion, never would an English Government have prepared for itself a more crushing indictment than would be furnished by the consequences of a policy which was studiously careful of the interests of the wrongdoer, while ignoring those of a peaceable and friendly population.

Our "friend" Abdurrahman has been at some pains to show what sort of treatment those who have done any kind or friendly acts for us during our occupation of the country may expect from

an Afghan ruler. The single definite item of intelligence from Cabul has been that the Ameer has confiscated the property—valued at one million sterling, no doubt an exaggerated amount—of all the sirdars and chiefs who afforded the English any assistance while in the country, and we may safely assume that those who helped us were the most enlightened and civilized section of the nation. Their sympathy and friendly acts towards ourselves have brought down on their heads ruin and the loss of everything they possessed. The name of England will become as much an object of execration among its friends in Afghanistan as it has always been among its foes. And now it is suggested that a similar step to that taken at Cabul should be sanctioned at Candahar, and that we should hand that city over to some "native government" as soon as one can be improvised. In face of what has occurred at Cabul, ignorance cannot be pleaded as to what will happen at Candahar when we are gone; nor can we expect the reputation of our country as a just and generous state to long endure, in face of an injured morality whose commands we violate, at the same time that we quote its precepts with an appearance of respect that, viewed by our actions, assumes the repulsive garb of hypocrisy.

Objections to our leaving Candahar are not, after all, reasons for remaining there; but as all the principal supporters of the action proposed to be followed base their argument on "the justice of their case," it is essential to take our stand firmly on this question of morality, and to express without equivocation that, while we esteem their policy to be foolish and short-sighted, we are not less fully convinced that their code of morality is in this instance delusive. They will find it as difficult to justify their policy on the one ground as on the other, when it takes its place in the history of the empire.

The reasons why Candahar should be retained have yet to be stated, and their consideration may be appropriately introduced by a short summary of the course of events at Candahar during the last two years, and by a brief glance at the position we at present occupy there. In December, 1878, the advance into Afghanistan was made from three points, represented by the Khyber, the Khurum, and the Bholan. The last named was entrusted to the force under the command of Sir Donald Stewart, and early in January, 1879, it occupied the city of Candahar. At

the time of the Treaty of Gundamuck, its evacuation was prevented by the season, and when the garrison was in the very act of withdrawing in the autumn, the news of the barbarous massacre of the Cavagnari embassy arrived, and the troops promptly returned. During the winter 1879-80 the occupation was maintained, and when Sir Donald Stewart marched in the spring northwards on Cabul, a smaller garrison was entrusted with its defence under General Primrose. In the spring of last year an arrangement was concluded between the Viceroy Lord Lytton, and Shere Ali Khan, a member of the Barukzai family, by which the latter was proclaimed Wali of Candahar. It is well known how Shere Ali's power crumbled away on the approach of Ayoob Khan, and how quite recently the Wali of his own act abrogated the convention by a voluntary retirement into India. Since the campaign in which the battle of Maiwand was lost, and that of Mazra or Candahar was won, the military occupation of the city has been maintained, although a great effort has been made to restrict it as much as possible to the city itself, mainly through Lord Hartington's representations on the subject (see Further Correspondence on Afghanistan, 1881). This was accompanied by great inconvenience, as Candahar is fed by the valleys of the Urgundab, Turnak, and Helmund, all to the north-west or beyond the city; and General Hume has at last been compelled, as was inevitable, to despatch a force to overawe the disaffected in this region, which is the granary of Candahar. At the present moment, therefore, there is at Candahar no other authority save our military representative. Abdurrahman has no power south of Ghuzni, if he even has authority in that fortress; and beyond the Helmund, Ayoob is restoring his shattered forces and endeavouring to inspire his followers with fresh confidence. The British garrison at Candahar occupies a post half-way between these two rival and hostile potentates, and with its withdrawal there would be no further impediment to their engaging in a struggle for undivided supremacy. It would require a sanguine disposition to see in the outbreak of such a struggle a means of promoting either British interests or the welfare of the Afghans themselves. That such a condition of affairs would be more favourable to the furthering of Russian designs than to the preservation of our admitted interests in Afghanistan is so obvious, that it may be taken as indisputable. Our present position at Candahar, anomalous and inconvenient as

it is, is therefore preferable to its precipitate abandonment. It is the sole guarantee that exists against the outbreak of a bitter and perhaps protracted civil war.

There can, at the same time, be no question that the position we at present occupy in Southern Afghanistan is one that has many inconveniences, and while having all the disadvantages of a permanent occupation, it has none of its advantages and compensations. It is manifestly unfair to raise objections to the retention of Candahar from the fact that our present occupation is costly, insecure, and, in many ways, unsatisfactory. Yet this argument, which is manifestly unfair, and wholly inapplicable, is the one most frequently used by our opponents. Lord Hartington supplies the information that the present occupation costs at the rate of about one million and a half sterling, and at once there is a chorus of protest against such wilful and criminal extravagance on the part of a heavily burdened government like that of India. It may be at once admitted that the Indian finances cannot long sustain this drain, and our contention is that they have been already subjected to it for an unnecessarily protracted period. But the permanent occupation of the city rests on an entirely distinct footing, and for these reasons.

The garrison now maintained at Candahar is of the proportions suited to the occupation of a post in a hostile country. There are, at the present time, beyond Quettah at least 20,000 men, a number greatly exceeding the natural requirements of the protection of Candahar and the neighbouring districts. And why is this? Simply because we have persistently refrained from announcing a definite resolve to maintain our position. The proclamation of the Queen-Empress's intention to take over the government of Southern Afghanistan would bring to our side the whole population of the city with the exception of the small class of turbulent Afghan swordsmen; and once it became evident that we were there to protect the weak and curb the strong, the inhabitants of the surrounding districts would promptly imitate the action of the townspeople. The very first cause of the present expense in the occupation of Candahar is beyond doubt the prevailing uncertainty as to our intentions with regard to its future. That uncertainty has been rather enhanced than mitigated by the passage in the Queen's Speech; for even at Candahar there is a belief, or perhaps a hope, that events may yet prove too strong

for the decision of the British Government to leave its people and our allies to their fate.

And what are the practical effects of this uncertainty in the minds of the Afghans of the south? In what way, it may be demanded, does it adversely affect our present occupation of the city, for it cannot be maintained that the thoughts in the minds of the Afghan population would alone suffice to render our position either more costly or less secure. It is only because mental apprehension acts upon and influences their deeds, that it is essential to trace their origin and to go to the root of the matter. And what have those deeds been? The Hindoo merchants have throughout been compelled to buy the merchandise and stores with which they supply our troops in small quantities, and they consequently retail them to us at a higher rate of profit than would be expected in ordinary times. This may seem a trivial matter, but it has now reached its natural consummation in the stoppage of further supplies by these traders. The full significance of the closing of this source of obtaining many of the necessaries and all the comforts of garrison life at Candahar will be very speedily made plain; but when we hear from officers that Candahar was not, latterly, a comfortable place of residence, let us sift their experience more closely, and we shall find that it has much to do with this question of the Hindoo traders. But the disadvantages on this score are small in comparison with those caused by the fears of the villagers in the fertile and rich valleys watered by the three rivers already named. They would like to take their grain and their produce to the best market, which is that of Candahar; but they have been afraid to do so—doubly afraid since the disaster at Maiwand—because they apprehend that it will make them the object of the resentment of their more warlike kinsmen, who stand pledged to an undying sentiment of hostility towards our Government. Against the feeling that they were indirectly assisting the cause of patriotism—and patriotism can burn with as warm a glow in the breast of an Afghan as of any of our own race—we, by our studious, and, to them, incomprehensible indifference, have never furnished them with a counter argument. We have not even supplied them with the personal protection which might raise and support their moral courage.

When Sir Frederick Roberts, in that brilliant manner which excited, and will long continue to excite, the admiration of his

countrymen, drove Ayoob's army in confusion across the Urgundab, the opportunity was afforded of pacifying the whole of Southern Afghanistan: but although the season was the most suitable for campaigning, although there were 25,000 Anglo-Indian troops concentrated at one spot, a fact unparalleled in our Indian history, nothing was done to confirm the lesson of our single victory in the field. Not only were the Afghans permitted to feel that they were in security as soon as they had placed the Helmund between themselves and our troops, but the inhabitants of the villages in the valleys of the Urgundab and its sister streams were allowed to remain unmolested by even the presence of our victorious troops. The *results* of our great victory were, therefore, *partial*, and the remembrance of the rout of the British force at Maiwand, a few weeks before, only *imperfectly wiped out*. The effect of this unfulfilled result of victory was enhanced when, during the last three months of 1880, the Afghans found that we left them entirely to their own devices. The natural consequences ensued, for not only were they sceptical of the reality of our power and the extent of our success, but they also fell under the hostile influence of the eastern sections of the great Durani clan, who were emphatic on the point that no intercourse should be held with the British in Candahar, and that, so far as possible, we should be starved into evacuating that Afghan city. The consequences were further aggravated by the fact that our garrison was kept restricted to Candahar. It had been suggested that detachments should be placed at Baba Wali and other villages in the neighbourhood, but the suggestion was not carried into practice. The inevitable consequence ensued, that the price of provisions was unduly raised by their scarcity, and that we have for some months been paying at Candahar, in a district capable of maintaining a force of 100,000 men, quite 50 per cent. more than normal prices. And at last the final pinch has come. The supply of provisions, although sold at an unduly large profit, threatened a few weeks ago to stop altogether; and General Hume, obeying the imperative law of self-preservation, has found himself obliged to violate the official instructions not to quit Candahar, and to send a force into the districts between the city and the river Helmund. The result of this foraging expedition will, no doubt, appear strange to many, when it is reported that the villages were found to be full of supplies, although famine prices have been in vogue at Candahar.

Not only have we, therefore, been maintaining our position at Candahar in spite of these unnecessary difficulties with the people of the adjoining valleys, semi-hostile, and indifferent to, because unaffected by, our authority, and with the pale ghost Fear unnerving the hearts and tying the hands of those who would wish to be our friends; but we have maintained it with the most inadequate means of communication with the Indus, and the very worst transport service that the civilized world has probably ever seen. The energy of Sir Richard Temple gave us in a few months railway communication to the eastern side of the Bholan, but since his departure further operations have been suspended. The work was done with great rapidity, and stood admittedly in need of completion. It remains, and probably will continue to remain, an imperfect achievement; and no matter how useful and important as a section, and in the sense of being a sign-post pointing out to future governments the right direction for one of their chief currents of thought, it must continue to be shorn of most of its importance until it has been completed to Candahar, the trade centre and commercial capital of the whole region from Kurrachee to Herat. Yet it is without a railway that troops have been sent to and maintained at Candahar during the last two years, and the additional expense thus caused would have gone far towards defraying the cost of completing the line from Sibi to that city.

Lord Hartington has computed the cost of the occupation of Candahar under the present conditions at the rate of one million and a half sterling per annum; but when allowance is made for the facts stated it will be seen that this outlay is quite of our own seeking, because we are maintaining a garrison there under abnormal conditions, and under conditions wholly unnecessary and inexcusable. I do not think I am demanding anything from general credulity in saying that with the proclamation of British authority, the completion of a railway, and the organization of the adjoining districts to as far as the Helmund, Candahar would produce a revenue easily capable of defraying all the expenses incidental both to its military occupation and civil government. Far from being a drain on the Indian revenue it should afford a relief for our embarrassed finances, and I base this assertion on the ground not so much that commerce would in this quarter make any startling progress, although it certainly would, as on the

fact that Candahar should be one of the cheapest, most healthy, and most pleasant military quarters in British India.

The present garrison is also unnecessarily large, not for the vague duties it has to perform, but for the essential portion of its task. Sir Henry Rawlinson has shown, in a Report upon the subject, that a garrison of 10,000 men, of whom a large proportion should be Europeans, would be sufficient; and Anglo-Indian officers must have greatly degenerated if in a very short time they could not convert some of the tribes of Southern Afghanistan, such as the Marris, Kakars, &c., into as efficient sepoys as the Pathans of the Punjab. Moreover, there is among the warlike Brahooes and Belooches a recruiting ground as yet practically untouched. If the Indian Government were only to throw its heart into the question of maintaining, at as low a cost and with as great efficiency as possible, the occupation of Candahar, the garrisoning force (to be composed of five European, one Goorkha, and one Sikh regiments of infantry, three regiments of cavalry or light horse, and three batteries of artillery, besides an auxiliary contingent of local regiments—some Afghan and others Belooch) would very soon become known as the *élite* of the Anglo-Indian army.

The position of Candahar in a military sense is of commanding importance. Situated at the junction of the roads both to Herat and to Cabul, it dominates the whole of Southern Afghanistan, while it possesses a safe and convenient means of communication with the sea and the Indus. No army could so much as attempt the invasion of India without besieging or masking this fortress, the Metz of the Indian frontier, as I have called it elsewhere. For while it blocks the road from Herat, it occupies so menacing a position on the flank that no general would risk an advance from Cabul on the Khyber without detaching a corps of considerable strength to Ghuzni, when his very safety would depend upon its successful defence of the northern road. There is a general agreement of opinion among military authorities that no general would attempt, with the small army that could be sent across the Hindoo Koosh, so dangerous an experiment as an operation against the Indian frontier from the Cabul side would be when a fortified Candahar was held by a British garrison. And therefore Candahar would, practically, protect the Indian frontier as much from attack by way of the Bamian, as it would from the

Heri Rud. If ever the time should come when the invasion of India were attempted on a large scale, and two armies were directed on the Indus, the one from the Oxus and the other from Persia, the advantages of a central position at Candahar would be incontestable. On the principle that prevention is better than cure, we maintain that the fact of our occupying that position must exercise a deterrent effect upon any who cherish hostile designs against our Eastern Empire. If for that reason alone, the permanent occupation of Candahar must prove conducive to economy in the future. By rearranging the positions of our frontier garrisons—and the troops at Candahar would be performing, under more favourable circumstances, some of the principal duties of the present large force in the Punjab—the retention of Candahar should not interfere with even the reduction of the native army, if that step is resolved upon by the authorities for other reasons, especially if it be accompanied, *pari passu*, by a corresponding reduction on the part of the native states. In fact, it may be declared that whatever was prudent and practicable, in respect to the garrisoning of our Indian possessions, on the assumption that Candahar is to be abandoned, becomes more feasible if that city is to be retained.

It has been argued—and it is with regret that all those who have pinned their faith to, and are convinced of, the necessity of Candahar to India as a strategical position must see a yielding tendency upon this point—that we should obtain everything we can secure at Candahar in the Pisheen valley. There are those who support this view on the ground that Pisheen is about 100 miles nearer to the Indus; there are others that do so because it is a compromise, and also a step in the right direction. But let us be clear on this point. Pisheen has none of the advantages ot Candahar. It will not pay the cost of its occupation, neither will it restrain the hostility of our enemies, and the most recent investigations tend to show the accuracy of the observations of Conolly and Durand fifty and forty years ago respectively. As a matter of opinion it seems to me that what we hope to obtain in Pisheen we already have at Quettah. Moreover, it is no official secret that the resolution of the Indian Government is not to retain this district, as high military authority has reported it to be of little value. Those, therefore, who are willing to accept the Pisheen valley as a compromise, or as in some sort an equivalent for

Candahar, not only wrong their judgment, but are bargaining over a matter that admits of only one solution; and when the time comes for receiving their wage, they will find that it has only been used as a lure. It would be a reflection upon the thoroughness of our views to so much as entertain for a moment any suggestion short of the permanent occupation of Candahar, and its incorporation with the Indian Empire.

But if the occupation of Candahar is necessary for permanent reasons, it is rendered doubly necessary by the special circumstances of the hour. The present Government—with a haste that is almost indecent when regarded from the standpoint of the courteous relations that should subsist between Parties, and which must be followed by untoward consequences when viewed, as it will be in India, as one Viceroy and representative of Her Majesty the Queen-Empress seeking to undo and reverse the acts of his predecessor—has already surrendered every portion of the frontier attained under the terms of the Treaty of Gundamuck, with the single exception of the moot point with regard to Pisheen. Nothing will then remain as the result of two campaigns which have cost us 5,000 precious lives and fifteen millions of money. The frontier will be the old "haphazard" one, the foreign policy of Afghanistan, or rather of its various rulers, will be beyond the control of our Government, and the country will be again the "neutral" state which the Russians have consistently claimed that it should be. There will be hatred among the Afghans at the wrongs inflicted by a useless war, and contempt at our pusillanimity in being afraid to retain what we have taken. Among our own people the sentiment will be neither more complimentary to us nor more promising of assured tranquillity to our authority. The old restless feeling, never finally subdued, will reassert itself in the breasts of the natives, who, ever anxious for change, will see in the precipitateness and completeness of our retreat an incontestable proof of the decadence of our power. In Asia, the strong never retreat. A Liberal Government committed, in 1839, the mad act of rushing into the first Afghan war when every dictate of ordinary prudence forbade it; and it has been reserved for another Liberal Government to undo, so far as it can, the results of two years' successful campaigning beyond the passes. If the shock to the idea of the invincibility of our arms caused by the slaughter of Elphinstone's Brigade during the retreat from

Cabul contributed to produce the mutiny, a view which Sir John Kaye, to say the least, encourages, is it altogether prudent to give confirmation by our acts to the rumours at present prevalent to our disadvantage? Admitting as each of them may of a simple explanation in local causes, is it quite compatible with our vaunted common sense to regard with an indifferent eye such manifestations of popular feeling as are afforded by the disaffection among the Sonthals, the still smouldering rebellion in Rampa, and the recent conspiracy at Kolapore? These are instances well known to the public through the press, but the Indian authorities are aware that there are still graver causes of anxiety than these ebullitions of national discontent or ill-feeling. Compared to other points where there is silence, or perhaps a hollow friendship, they may even be called safety-valves.

The more closely and earnestly we scan the horizon of Indian affairs, the more must we be struck by the importance of an unbiassed and carefully considered judgment as to the future of Candahar. The mind of the native is keenly alive to the necessity of its retention, and perceives with amazement, only equalled by the mental perplexity it at the same time engenders, that the last campaign in Afghanistan, which was waged for the revenge of the murder of Cavagnari and his companions, and which would have had to be undertaken independently of the politics of the administration in power, is about to close with the surrender of all the privileges and possessions obtained by the first. The gentle Hindoo and the sedate Mussulman are not gifted with the subtle powers of reasoning which will enable them to see in these retrograde measures the proof of our magnanimity and strength. It is as if Germany were again to appear as the victor outside the walls of Paris, and then, as the terms of peace, to restore Alsace and Metz to the French. In Europe among enlightened peoples, such magnanimity might be understood and appreciated; but in Asia such a course on the part of a dominant race would only be construed in one way, as a token of weakness. Yet this is precisely what we are about to do.

Nor can the present action of the Russian Government be excluded from our consideration of the situation. At this moment Russia is engaged in a fierce struggle with the brave Turcomans of Akhal and Merv, and whether General Scobeleff meets with discomfiture or decisive success outside the earthworks of Geok

Tepeh, there can be no doubt that the war will continue until the Turcomans have been vanquished and their territory annexed. The magnanimity and moral misgivings of the Russians will certainly not prevent their prosecuting this struggle to the bitter end and retaining the fruits of victory. At the very moment, therefore, when we propose to evacuate Candahar the Russians are energetically advancing in the direction of Herat and the Afghan frontier; and while we have suspended operations on the Sibi railway, they are not only experimentalizing with the old bed of the Oxus, but are absolutely laying down a line from Krasnovodsk to Kizil Arvat. We have only, therefore, to glance at Russia's proceedings to see the gravest reflection on the impolitic measures which our Government is so hastily sanctioning and carrying into execution. The Oriental mind will from them become more and more possessed with the idea that Russia is the advancing Power, and that our vigour is on the wane. In a weak endeavour to avoid the momentary difficulty produced by extension of empire we shall be simply courting fresh difficulty and danger, and laying up further stores of trouble in the future. We are about to violate the first principles upon which the maintenance of the authority of a minority over a majority rests, and how can we expect the result to be satisfactory? This grave departure from the accepted policy of the Indian Government must inevitably have, directly or indirectly, an inauspicious ending. After we have finally withdrawn to Quettah, the importance of Candahar will be too late discovered when the hour of danger comes upon us. Then it will be admitted that those statesmen were right, who took as their motto in matters of Indian policy the sentence, *Vestigia nulla retrorsum.*

Most of the ground relating to the Candahar Question has now been covered. To the best of our ability it has been discussed in all its bearings, as a question of justice and also of necessity, as a military position and as a commercial centre, as the only compensation for two wars and as the sole equivalent left for much that has been surrendered elsewhere. We have seen that the assertion of the cost of retaining it will not bear examination, and that it can be garrisoned without placing an undue strain on the Anglo-Indian army. In short, as a question of argument, the advantages vastly preponderate over the disadvantages, which exist rather in the imagination of the timid than

in the world of fact. Yet none the less, so far as governments can shape the course of events, it has been decided that this city, the only prize now left of war, shall be given over to the first native ruler that is thought to be eligible for the post.

There will be a return to the blissful indifference of "masterly inactivity," Afghanistan will become the prey of rival chiefs and hostile families, and the Indian Government will recognize first one prince and then another as *de facto* Ameer of the ground on which he stands. It matters nothing that a similar course of action disgusted and alienated Shere Ali from our side, and induced him to welcome the overtures of General Kaufmann. The whole subject of our relations with the country and the people is treated as a matter of such little importance that we can leave it to the chapter of accidents; although the euphemism is still preserved that "the foreign policy of Afghanistan should be subordinate to our own." How this is to be effected remains an insoluble mystery, but that is of course of little importance. There will be a fresh exemplification of the truth of the saying that "history repeats itself," and, as Lord Lytton said pregnantly in the House of Lords a few weeks ago, we shall have to do the work *all over again*. Abandoning Candahar now is only putting off the inevitable for at most a few years, although the attendant circumstances will be altered.

Russia will be nearer the Indian frontier on all sides, the Turcomans may be subdued, there will be better communication with the Caspian base, and much else will have changed in favour of Russia; whereas we shall be the weaker and the more unnerved by our timidity on the present occasion. Our secret enemies will then be the more confident, and they will be not less formidable to us than our declared foes.

There is yet time to pause on the threshold of this unwise decision, and to refrain from carrying it into action. If we cannot profess much confidence in the wisdom or powers of self-restraint of the present Government, we have better reason for hoping that Candahar may never be abandoned because of the state of affairs in Afghanistan itself. The present aspect of tranquillity in the country rests upon a hollow and unsubstantial foundation, and at any moment the trouble seething below the surface may reveal itself. In the disorder which must ensue, the question of the future of Candahar may then present itself in a different light to

the mind of the present authorities. So long as there are British soldiers at Candahar there is still hope for our cause, and we need not despair that our convictions will eventually prevail; but even if Candahar should be abandoned, we may express our closing conviction that the departure of our troops will be only the precursor of their speedy return.[1]

[1] It is only necessary to say that in the event of the Ameer Abdurrahman proving unable or unwilling to maintain his position *against* Russia, the one practical step always within our power is to occupy Candahar, and to connect it by a railway with Kurrachee and the Indus.

VII.

LORD LAWRENCE AND MASTERLY INACTIVITY.[1]

WHILE the name of Lord Lawrence of the Punjab will be always remembered among the saviours of the British Empire in India during the crisis of the Mutiny, it will not be the fault of some of his admirers if it fails to become equally famous as that of the author of a scheme of foreign policy which was characterized by a friend as one of "masterly inactivity." Lord Lawrence's services to the country were so conspicuous, and his position was altogether so exceptional among Anglo-Indian administrators, that there is little wonder in his decisions on matters connected with Afghan policy having been accepted by many people as conclusive, equally above criticism and dissent. His administration of the Punjab, his magnificent energy and fortitude at Lahore, his devotion to work during his Viceroyalty, were each and all appealed to as reasons for the infallibility of his views on Afghanistan and Russia's progress in Central Asia; and such appeals sufficed, in the ignorance of the time, not merely to prevent most from disagreeing with his opinions, but even to induce many to adopt them as their own. The march of events, the apprehension of allies, the advance of a hostile and oft-proved perfidious Power mattered nothing at all when placed in the scales against

[1] *National Review*, April, 1883.

the *ipse dixit* of John Lawrence. To hold an opinion on the subject contrary to his was to be set down as a "visionary" like Rawlinson, or as one of the grasping Scinde school of Jacob and Frere, who were loudly denounced as "politicals" in contemptuous contrast with the gifted "administrators" of the Punjab. The recently published "Life of Lord Lawrence" takes us a little behind the scenes, and enables us to see how far the views of the great ruler were founded on reason, and how far on prejudice. Without subjecting Mr. Bosworth Smith's volumes to any unfair dissection it is possible to discover many inconsistencies in Lord Lawrence's recommendations, and to perceive, from an analysis of their contents, that his policy was rather the reiteration of preconceived notions than a statesmanlike manner of proceeding in accordance with the varying phases of a delicate and difficult problem in human affairs. Were "masterly inactivity" an exploded fiction, or a policy no longer to be applied in practice,[1] there would be no necessity to revive past discussions or to endeavour to penetrate the recesses of Lord Lawrence's mind. But Liberals assure us on all sides that the wisdom of his policy was never more clearly demonstrated than by our present relations with Afghanistan, and that we have only to continue its application to make the empire as secure as it need be, and to be able to disregard the approach of Russia to the Suleiman. It becomes, under these circumstances, an imperative duty to consider very carefully what Lord Lawrence both said and did, and when we have done so we think that the impartial reader may be left to decide for himself if the suggestions and remedies he advocated when Russia was many hundred miles distant from the Afghan frontier would suffice for the exigencies of the present time when her influence has reached if not crossed it, and whether they provide the least safeguard against those further changes and their accompanying dangers which loom before us in the near future.

Lord Lawrence was essentially a man of action. In critical moments he always rose to the occasion, and whether by happiness of instinct, or by promptitude of resolve, he generally perceived the point which it was vitally necessary to achieve. His boundless

[1] Fortunately since these lines were written it does seem as if facts had been too strong for those who were pledged to remain inactive on the wrong side of the Suleiman passes.

energy supplied the means which enabled him to accomplish the ends for which he strove. But in the cabinet, in the sphere of politics, his clearness of vision became, through some extraordinary defect, obscured. Notwithstanding his long experience, and his intimate acquaintance with details, he very often failed to see whither events were tending, and for a man of his undoubted mental calibre his errors of judgment appear strange and almost unaccountable. That this is no random assertion the following instances of short-sightedness will show. He did not think the Sikhs would declare war against us in 1845; they crossed the Sutlej and invaded our territory the very day that he expressed the opinion. He felt sure, in 1855, that the Persians would not attack Herat; they not only attacked but they captured it the following year. He had previously anticipated, with confidence, that "Dost Mahomed could not live long, and that his sons would assuredly not be able to maintain themselves;" the Dost lived nearly ten years longer, and his sons or grandsons have maintained themselves in Afghanistan ever since. And lastly he did not believe that there would be "any real resistance at Delhi;" it held out during four months, and was only taken after a stubborn defence by means of his own levies, and of the gallantry of Nicholson and Chamberlain. This list of predictions falsified by the event might be increased, but perhaps sufficient has been quoted to support the contention that Lord Lawrence was a greater man in carrying out a policy than in formulating one. When he left the sphere of action he was prone to err in his judgment, and to regard the position in Afghanistan and Central Asia by the light of the events of the first Afghan war and of the failures of Peroffsky and Simonitch.

Lord Lawrence's attention was first attracted to the Afghan question by the tidings, which reached him while in Europe, of the destruction of Elphinstone's brigade in the passes. The question came home to him in a very personal manner, as one of his brothers was captive to Akbar Khan, and his first recorded opinion, due to fraternal affection as well as to patriotic fervour, on the subject was, "I do not think we can leave the country now without wiping off our disgrace." The problem did not, however, present itself in any practical way to him until he became a member of the Punjab Board, seven years later; and then it was first brought under his notice in its simplest but not least unpleasant

form, viz., the turbulence and aggressiveness of the numerous warlike and independent tribes of the hills bordering the Punjab. Whatever may have been his defects in shaping a foreign policy for the empire, Lord Lawrence knew as well as any one the secret of good government, and repressed the slightest symptom of revolt with severity and promptitude. Acting on his own motto, that "a defensive fight is usually a losing one," he was always in favour of vigorous measures and of striking hard and quick against those who disturbed our borders. His views on this subject found repeated expression, and may surprise those who believed that Lord Lawrence was an advocate of "peace at any price" principles. "Another expedition is the only way to bring the Afridis to their senses." Again, "I feel convinced that until we do inflict a real chastisement on either the Momunds or Swatis, the Peshawur valley will never be tranquil, and that the longer the punishment is delayed the more manifest this will be." Again, what could be plainer or more vigorous than this? "You must thrash them soundly first before they will respect you." Nor did his views undergo any change after his elevation to the post of Chief Commissioner left him independent of control. His orders were as unequivocal and as much in the same direction as his recommendations had been when one of a triumvirate. "We must thoroughly subdue every hill-tribe that gives us just cause of complaint." These counsels of vigour, and these recommendations of the wisdom of assuming the offensive, may be left to the reflection of those not less thoughtless than timid persons who believe in the virtue of meekness, and who see in the provocation of barbarous neighbours only an opportunity of exercising forbearance.

Although Lord Lawrence had not taken any personal part in the misfortunes which culminated in the Khurd Cabul Pass, in the winter of 1841–42, on no one had the valour and treachery of the Afghans, and the natural difficulties of their country, produced a greater impression than on him. So powerful was the spell thus cast over him, by events due solely to the folly and incapacity of a military commander, that it became a cardinal point in his policy to have nothing whatever to do with any fresh advance into Afghanistan, under any pretext whatsoever. His admirers make this his chief claim to credit; but posterity will scarcely recognize a right to statesmanship in a method of proceeding which ignored

facts, and which based its wisdom on an obstinate adherence to views formed under a totally different condition of affairs. The outbreak of the Crimean War awoke, so far as it was possible to awake, Lord Lawrence to the advisability of coming to some amicable arrangement with the Afghan ruler.[1] "I am looking out sharp towards Cabul. If the war continues, Russia will no doubt intrigue there," was the admission he felt constrained to make. At that time we had no understanding whatever with the Afghans or their principal ruler. The last we had seen of them was when Sir Walter Gilbert chased them through the Khyber, after the "crowning victory" of Gujerat; and, so far as Lord Lawrence's original recommendations went, he would never have wished to see anything more of them. Although we might have thought him blind to the real significance of events, we could not have charged him with inconsistency had he remained steadfast to this view. The inconsistencies between this first persuasion and many of his subsequent utterances and deeds might be made the burden of an indictment, but they will serve a much more useful purpose if they can be made to show that his original policy—which was nothing more than the indulgence of the inclination, natural to everybody, to leave the Afghans undisturbed to their "rocks and stones and sanguinary feuds"—was neither statesmanlike nor possible in the long run. Fortunately, there were men among his own lieutenants who read the future with clearer eyes than he did, and Sir Herbert Edwardes resolutely advocated very opposite views from his post at Peshawur. Yet the Crimean War might have come and gone without causing any renewal of official intercourse with Cabul but for the decision of Lord Dalhousie, who, influenced though he was by Lawrence, decided that "it is wise for us to have regard to public opinion beyond the Five Rivers, and that it is wise for us to make some exertion, and even some sacrifice, to obtain a *general* treaty with

[1] It is very important to keep in mind the political division of Afghanistan at this period. Dost Mahomed was nominally ruler; but he only ruled over Cabul, Ghuzni, and Jellalabad. In 1850 he succeeded in capturing Balkh, and in 1855 Candahar passed into his hands on the death of one of his brothers. Herat, until the end of 1855, was governed by a son of Yar Mahomed, and then, for a few months, by Sudozai princes. It was held for a short time by Persia, and afterwards, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris, was placed under Sultan Jan. It did not become an integral part of the Ameer's dominions until 1863.

the Ameer." The result of this was the commencement of negotiations with Dost Mahomed; and soon afterwards Gholam Hyder, the Afghan heir apparent, came to Peshawur, where he signed a treaty with the Chief Commissioner pledging himself, his family, and his state to be "the friends of our friends and the enemies of our enemies."

These negotiations were of a general character; they were renewed less than two years later with a specific object. Herat had been attacked and captured by the Shah of Persia, acting under the undoubted instigation, as Lawrence himself believed, of Russia. Another treaty was thereupon concluded, as is well known, with Dost Mahomed in person; but, although Lord Lawrence's dislike to go beyond the passes has been accepted by every Liberal writer and speaker on the subject as a fact beyond dispute, no notice has been taken of his very important admission that "the Afghans would never be able to resist a formidable invader moving on India who had arrived at Herat." The inevitable inference from this opinion, coinciding with that of the "Forward" school, and based on a true appreciation of the teaching of History, is that the Afghans should make their most strenuous resistance at that town against any assailant coming from the west. The question remains for practical settlement in the future, how far will it be prudent for us, as their natural allies and supporters, to assist in making that resistance successful at the farthest possible point from the Indian frontier?

Nor did this admission stand alone. When the point was submitted to him as one of immediate importance, the man of action at once overcame his doubts and hesitation, and his proceedings were as vigorous and uncompromising as any one could desire. Lord Lawrence, the prophet and leader of the do-nothing party, has been lauded to the skies for opposing the despatch of English officers into Afghanistan; but the very same man, as Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, realized the necessity of doing so, under certain circumstances. He not only realized it, he absolutely gave it effect. During one of the interviews with the Ameer, a Sirdar asked "the pertinent question," "Do you intend to send any British officers into Afghanistan?" And what was John Lawrence's reply? "If we give you money and material to aid in your expedition to Herat, we must send officers to see that it is properly applied." Nor must this admission be supposed to have been

only founded on a supposition that never came into force. Lord Lawrence himself gave it effect, by sending the Lumsden Mission into Afghanistan in the following year, and may therefore be claimed as one of the authorities for the necessity of deputing English officers to the cities of Afghanistan. The principle once conceded, it will need much casuistry to show that Lord Salisbury was wrong in advocating in 1876 a step which Lord Lawrence had both sanctioned and taken twenty years before.

The outbreak and progress of the Mutiny brought fame to Lord Lawrence; it could not pass away without also revealing the peculiarity of his views on Afghan policy. The point on which they were expressed is one calling for the calmest consideration, and is commented on here not for the purpose of dwelling on what might be considered an act of weakness, if not worse, but simply because it tends to throw an instructive light on Lord Lawrence's Afghan policy of "masterly inactivity." I need scarcely say that I refer to the proposed abandonment of Peshawur. Lord Lawrence has left on record the motives which prompted him to come to the decision to abandon Peshawur in a certain eventuality, and they are summed up in the following sentences. When he found that the expectation of the early fall of Delhi was to be disappointed, and that he would have to further denude the Punjab of troops in order to effect what was, in his eyes, and rightly so, the main object of all—the capture of the Imperial city—he considered various plans for the concentration of his small force. First among these was the abandonment of Peshawur, with the withdrawal of the large garrison there behind the Indus. The proposal was, in itself, open to grave objection, and for several reasons; but the situation, in the event of a check at Delhi, would have been extremely critical, and this step might after all have become necessary to avert a greater disaster. So much may be conceded in justice to Lord Lawrence, on the question of his proposed abandonment of Peshawur, but the fountains of sympathy with him, in a dark and trying hour, are dried up when we find that his proposal was not a manœuvre of military prudence in withdrawing the garrison from Peshawur, but an absolute cut-and-dried plan to hand it over to the Afghans. The remonstrances of his friends were in vain, and only the strict injunction of Lord Canning, "Hold on to Peshawur to the last," prevented his carrying out a project that would have added immeasurably to the

difficulties of the hour, and that would have left a durable stain on our national honour.

A closer consideration of the subject does not serve to remove or weaken our natural objections to this proposal. Lord Lawrence's argument in support of his intention was of three branches. Withdraw from Peshawur, he said, because we want its garrison; abandon it permanently because it is of no value, and because the line of the Indus is preferable to it; and hand it over to the Afghans because they covet it more than anything else. I have made an admission in favour of the first contention, but it is only possible to meet the two latter arguments with a distinct negative; and here again Lord Lawrence was considerate enough to furnish us with some good arguments to show the erroneous counsel he gave in a moment when we may charitably assume that "the despair of empire" was strong upon him. Peshawur has no value, he asserts in 1857. What had he previously said? "Peshawur is useful to us in the event of invasion;" and again, "I myself see no value in Peshawur and Kohat, except as providing a good base of operations in the event of a general invasion from the west." Again, the line of the Indus is the best, he writes to Lord Canning, forgetful that he had himself declared that "we require both sides of the river (Indus) to keep the Punjab quiet, and hold our own against external aggression." Well may we ask, on reading these conflicting views and this clashing counsel, What was Lord Lawrence's opinion? Had he a policy at all, beyond that of waiting on the course of events, and of trusting to the chapter of accidents?

But of all the arguments the most fatal to the adoption of the proposition was the last. We were not merely to withdraw behind the Indus, and to leave the inhabitants, and those who had flocked to Peshawur on the guarantee of our protection, to fare as well as they could on their own devices, but we were to make over the whole of this territory as a free gift to Dost Mahomed and the Afghans. By this means we were to propitiate and conciliate the Afghans, the most treacherous people, as Lord Lawrence painted them, and as we know them to our cost to be, with whom we have to hold relations, a race to whom the more you give the more they will expect! Lord Lawrence's wisdom of a lifetime vanished in a moment when it became a question of executing a pet project. That Dost Mahomed coveted Peshawur, there is no question; more, perhaps, as the only means of approach to Cashmere—the

province without the revenue of which he himself declared "the government of Cabul to be an impossibility"—than for any inherent value of its own; but if we are to assume that he would have rested content with this gift from our weakness, we must first close our eyes to universal experience, and ignore the most natural passions of human nature. Unless Lord Lawrence was prepared to buy off the Afghans effectually, by making further concessions, there is no avoiding the conclusion that his act of propitiation would have failed of its purpose. They would have taken Peshawur because they could boastfully declare that the English could not keep it; and once the Afghans had broken loose from the mountains, which coop them in and fetter their energies, there would have been an end to the tranquillity, not of districts on a remote frontier, but of the fertile and populated valleys of "the five rivers."

There were other considerations still. Peshawur and the surrounding country had enjoyed tranquillity, and had prospered through British protection for more than ten years. However much our necessities may have rendered a temporary withdrawal advisable, were we in cold blood to make an agreement for its permanent evacuation? Was Afghan rule such a good thing in itself that we were to be the agents of providing it with a fresh opportunity of distinction? And what was the intrinsic value of the Afghan claim to ownership in that Trans-Indus region, which, long the scene of turmoil and internecine strife, was beginning, in the hands of Edwardes and Cotton, Nicholson and Abbott, to blossom like a garden? It was only the claim of a ruthless and barbarous conqueror. If its validity was to be admitted in the case of Peshawur, there was no reason to deny that it might with equal right be applied in Cashmere or at Lahore. There are some who still recur to "the line of the Indus" policy as the acme of wisdom and good sense, but perhaps we shall hear less of it now that Lord Ripon has so far disregarded his principles as to open a bridge across the Indus and the last link of railway to Peshawur, and also to sanction the fortification of that place. As an academical question on the pursuit of Utopias there may be something to be said for it, but it ceased to have any practical meaning when we deliberately crossed the Indus in 1849, and established the landmarks of our empire at the foot of the Pathan hills. Since then we have never had any choice in the matter,

save, in Lord Canning's phrase, to "hold on to Peshawur to the last."[1]

After a short absence, Lord Lawrence reappeared, in 1864, in India as Viceroy. By that time affairs in Afghanistan had undergone an important change through the death of Dost Mahomed, and the country stood on the brink of a civil war through the rivalry of Shere Ali and his brothers. Mr. Bosworth Smith is very reticent on the subject of the development of the Afghan question. He mentions, it is true, "the burly envoy from Cabul" at a Durbar in 1864, but he does not tell his readers that this personage was the Ameer's best general, Mahomed Rafik, come to solicit timely aid for the consolidation of Shere Ali's authority, and to save Afghanistan from a civil war. Neither does he tell them that the envoy was sent back with cold words of comfort and without the material assistance he implored. Well might Shere Ali exclaim, as he did four years later: "From the British Government I have received no friendship or kindness with reference to my success in this miserable civil war, until God Almighty, of His own favour, has again bestowed upon me the country of my inheritance." The unsympathetic attitude always held by Lord Lawrence towards Shere Ali during his years of misfortune was unfortunately not observed with regard to his brothers, when the uncertain verdict of war declared in their favour. When Azim Khan was defeated in Khurum, and fled to India, he was assigned a place of residence at Rawul Pindi. But when a fresh rebellion broke out in Afghanistan, he was permitted to return to his country for the purpose of attacking his brother, both the *de facto* and the lawful ruler of the state. Was that an act of justice, leaving friendship out of the question? What

[1] Perhaps the following incident is the strongest contemporary testimony to the inadvisability of withdrawing from Peshawur. It is quoted by Kaye (*History of Sepoy War*, vol. ii. p. 449) from Mr. Cave-Browne. "The latest news from before Delhi was exultingly mentioned, when one of the most influential of the Sikh sirdars, seeming to pay little heed to what was generally received with so much joy, asked, 'What news from Peshawur?' 'Excellent, all quiet there,' he was told. 'That,' said he, 'is the best news you can give me!' 'Why do you always ask so anxiously about Peshawur?' the civilian said. The sirdar did not at once reply, but, with much significance of manner, took up the end of his scarf and began rolling it up from the corner between his finger and thumb. 'If Peshawur goes, the whole Punjab will be rolled up in rebellion like this.'"

would "our ally," the quondam Russian pensioner, Abdurrahman, say of our goodwill, were we now to release Yakoob Khan, as we ought in simple justice to do, and to allow him to go where he liked? Yet it is in such vacillating and contradictory action in the past that we are commanded in peremptory tones to see the manifestation of a sound policy!

When, therefore, the Afghan question reached a more acute stage than any that had presented itself within the memory of the present generation, in consequence of the reception of a Russian Embassy at Cabul, that city which was forbidden to be polluted by the step of an Englishman, there is little wonder that the advocates of the two schools of Afghan policy should have come into conflict. The divergence of opinion arose from a point that might be compressed into a nutshell. "Is it better to meet or to wait for a danger?" Lord Lawrence was altogether in favour of the latter mode, and he may have been right, although many of his own arguments tell against his own conclusion. But, whether right or wrong, it is necessary that attention should be called to the principal and fundamental errors and misconceptions which are not difficult to be detected in the letters he sent to the *Times* during the winter of 1878–79. What seemed to be the salient point in his views was that the sure way to make the Afghans your enemy was to attempt to gain a diplomatic foothold in their country. If we could only make up our minds to stand aside and do nothing, we should be in a position to profit by the mistake of Russia in endeavouring to station her representative at Cabul. The appearance of Russians would infallibly be followed, we were told, by the Afghans becoming their sworn enemies. Well, the Stolietoff Mission came, and resided in safety and honour among the bloodthirsty Cabulis without the "inevitable" result ensuing; and, unless rumour has lied more even than its wont, they were not the last Russians to pass safely through that terrible ordeal. Lord Lawrence's friends, if not Lord Lawrence himself, regarded with complacency the possibility of the Russian officers meeting with the fate which befel Sir Louis Cavagnari; but it seems to me that the most serious peril of all, during the autumn days of 1878, was the risk that Russia might have been provided with a just *casus belli* against Afghanistan through the murder of her envoys. We hear a great deal of morality now-a-days, and I should like to ask whether Lord Beaconsfield or any other Minister would have

ventured to support Afghan murderers against the just vengeance of Russia, although, as Lord Lawrence would have said, the death of the victims was the natural consequence of their visit to Cabul?

Lord Lawrence indignantly repudiated any supineness in the matter of Russian ambition and aggression in Asia, but his action was restricted to observation. "I have watched very carefully all that has gone on in those distant countries," but the only specific remedy he ever suggested was a general war with Russia all over the world; and this violent expedient has become the one panacea of his party, although if it has any meaning at all, it is that Russia is to have *carte blanche* in her operations up to the very frontier of India.[1] The reluctance of this country to embark upon a great war is deep-rooted and not unnatural, and those who have to provide for the safety of India must be prepared to reckon with it. It is mere folly to expect that English opinion will see in a Russian advance across the Oxus, or to Sarakhs, a sufficient justification for taking so momentous a step as a general declaration of war, although either might be accompanied by that violation of Afghan territory which Lord Lawrence considered would have compelled us to oppose Russia's further progress. It sounds well and courageous to say that Russia, as the guilty party, should alone be held responsible, but, as a question of practical politics, it may be fairly doubted whether there could be any chance of inflicting the required chastisement until all the outworks of India were in her possession—when, perhaps, it would be too late. So far as the permanent interests are concerned of England in India, and of India herself—which we at least cannot doubt for a moment to be identical and co-existent—it seems a misfortune that the Indian executive has not been allowed in its own way, and on its own resources, to take such steps as might seem to it desirable for the counteraction of Russian conquest in Central Asia, and for the thwarting of Russian intrigue in Afghanistan, instead of having to devote some of its limited treasure towards the cost of an Egyptian campaign, in which it has no proper concern. Lord Lawrence's single remedy, although no doubt intended to be effective, was

[1] The natural timidity in appealing to this last resort would have induced the English Government to make many concessions to Russia on the subject of M. Lessar's ethnographical frontier, had not the Russian Government shown so manifest an intention to appropriate the border districts of Afghanistan by force of arms.

only calculated to supply us with a decent pretext for regarding with our hands beside us the gradual approach of Russia towards the Indus. Interpreted into plain language, it meant that the two empires were to become conterminous without viceroys holding the views of Lord Lawrence and Lord Northbrook having the trouble to formulate any more complicated policy than a fixed resolve to remain on the wrong side of the Suleiman, and to make "Russia understand that England is prepared to defend her hold on India at any cost."

There is only one more point in connection with Lord Lawrence's opinions to which it is necessary to call attention, and this is more important as showing his character as a fair disputant than for any light it throws upon his policy. In his published letters he was disposed to make as little as possible of the provocation offered by the Ameer Shere Ali in refusing to receive the Chamberlain Mission, and entreated that "we should not bear too hard upon him." His friends say for him, if he never publicly said it himself, that he never believed in "the insult to our envoy," or in numerous other matters about which even to have entertained a doubt reveals a somewhat uncharitable mind. But if Lord Lawrence never believed in "the insult to our envoy," what did that envoy think himself? It would, perhaps, be expecting too much to ask that Liberals should carefully read all [1] that Sir Neville Chamberlain reported to the Viceroy from Peshawur, but it is at least important to record that he, at all events, believed in the affront to our honour, and in the rooted dislike of the Ameer. Sir Neville Chamberlain's opinion on the spot may be fairly quoted as a set-off against the incredulity of Lord Lawrence. "If the Ameer's officer says 'No' to our further progress I should consider that answer the same as if we had been fired on. . . . After long warning and considerable preparation, we cannot now move forward out of our territory and be openly turned back *without being disgraced in the eye of India.*" And again, "I think we are bound to take immediate steps openly to resent the affront." Whose evidence is the more worthy of credence, the man writing with full knowledge from the scene, or the one framing an indictment in his study of a policy which was a reflection on his own pet creation? So much are party politics independent of truth

[1] See "Afghan Blue Book," 1878, pp. 236–7, p. 244, and pp. 256–8.

and oblivious to facts that it would be rash to hope that even now we have heard the last of ill-natured scepticism as to the insult to our envoy in September, 1878. Yet we feel sure that no candid-minded person will read the telegrams and letters of Sir Neville Chamberlain without coming to the conclusion that the insult was flagrant, and that no Viceroy with any respect for his country or himself could have overlooked it.

The main objection which was raised against Lord Lawrence's course when he was at the helm in India—Had he a policy at all? —could be advanced with equal justice against him when he came to criticise, in no friendly spirit, the application of the policy of the "Forward" or Scinde school, which he had so passionately denounced a quarter of a century before. In this, as in other matters, he showed himself "a good hater." In 1878 he used precisely the same arguments as he had employed in 1857 when expatiating on the advantages that would accrue from the surrender of Peshawur. Russia would have to operate from a remote base, her artillery would be greatly enfeebled, she would have made the Afghans her enemies, and only let her troops come through the passes, and they would be, not merely defeated, but annihilated. No doubt all this represented a very comfortable philosophy; but, in the event of their not being defeated, what then? Just as Lord Lawrence's policy had not expanded with the necessities of the time, so had his acquaintance with the progress of events not kept pace with them. Russia's "remote base" had even then become a near base; it is every year becoming a still nearer one. When Lord Lawrence died the Russians had made little or no permanent conquest east of the Caspian; they have now not only conquered much, but they have absolutely laid down a railroad for a considerable portion of the way to Herat, that town which, once taken, must, on Lord Lawrence's own admission, be soon followed by the overthrow of the Afghans themselves. Is there not every reason to suppose that, with the disappearance of the condition of things of twenty years ago, the policy of "masterly inactivity" has lost such wisdom as it ever possessed? We have at present to deal, not with a Russia creeping along the lower waters of the Jaxartes, and without a harbour on the eastern coast of the Caspian, but with a Russia firmly established on the Oxus and the Kopet Dagh, and possessing steamers on the Central Asian rivers and a line of railway for more than two hundred

miles into the territory of the Turcomans. Can we safely ignore such pregnant facts as these, or shall we long be able to deem ourselves secure against danger, because we adopt the practice of the ostrich and hide our head when the peril is in front of us and steadily approaching?

Lord Lawrence admitted five years ago that he felt anxiety as to the progress of events in Afghanistan and Central Asia; and, although his way was not our way, we would fain believe that the only difference between him and us was a temporary disagreement as to the proper course to pursue for nullifying a national danger. His own admissions justify the belief that the time would have come when he would have been all in favour of the strongest measures, even in Afghanistan.[1] But although Lord Lawrence himself was strongly imbued with the necessity of maintaining our empire in India, those who have no similar resolve or desire have fastened on to such of the opinions he expressed as suit their purpose, and have striven to hand them down as axioms of permanent truth and universal application to coming ages. We have seen that no one wished more than he to exclude Russian influence from Afghanistan, and if he meant his advice to be carried into practice he would have approved of our declaring war upon Russia for any infraction of its territory or of the Ameer's sovereign rights. How far that course is feasible may be doubtful; but it is something to feel that the object which Lord Lawrence and those who disagreed with his suggestions on Afghan affairs had before them was identical—the defence of India. It is impossible, unfortunately, to say the same of many who shelter themselves under his great name, and who loudly advocate a portion of his principles. We may conclude, as we began, by expressing the conviction that Lord Lawrence was a man of action, not of thought; and although we can only see in his Afghan policy of "masterly inactivity" an obstinate clinging to preconceived views, and a resolution to ignore unpleasant facts, we shall yet esteem ourselves fortunate if, when the time comes, as it will surely come, either through Afghan treachery or Russian ambition, or from both, for the application of a more comprehensive and statesmanlike policy, we can obtain the services of such a man as Lord Lawrence was to carry it into execution.

[1] His biographer, Mr. Bosworth Smith, whose "Life" is the best Anglo-Indian biography we possess, wrote to this effect in the *Times* of March 25, 1885.

VIII.

SUBSIDISING THE AMEER.[1]

IN granting the Ameer Abdurrahman an annual subsidy, the Government of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Ripon has made a remarkable concession to those who have consistently held that there is need of an active policy in Afghanistan; and it will now be impossible for Liberals to declare in the future, as some of their ablest spokesmen on the subject have protested in the past, that all we have to do for the defence of our Eastern Empire is to remain on the wrong side of the Suleiman, and to guard the line of the Indus. It might be amusing, but it could serve no useful purpose, to dwell on the many inconsistencies which the present decision to grant the Ameer a fixed and regular subsidy reveals with past declarations of policy both under the responsibilities of office, and when expressed in the warm and unfettered language of opposition. We shall prefer to keep in view the practical object of showing to what Liberal statesmen and ministers have now bound themselves without the least outside pressure, and how far they have, of their own free will, accepted the obligation of assisting towards the maintenance of peace in Afghanistan, and of retaining for the Government of India a predominance of influence in the Cabul Durbar.

Mr. Gladstone, in his reply to Sir Stafford Northcote during the

[1] *National Review*, November, 1883.

debate on the Affirmation Bill, said, with a certain degree of asperity, that the leader of the opposition "appeared to glance with censure at the payment of a subvention to the Ameer." What Sir Stafford Northcote had really said was, that it was unprecedented to grant so large a sum, or any regular subsidy at all, without a treaty or arrangement imposing some equivalent conditions on the Ameer, and that, consequently, it was a matter for explanation; and Sir Stafford was, of course, perfectly correct. The Premier then went on to say that "this proceeding was not without parallel and example," and that "the names of two Governor-Generals who are remembered in India with honour and gratitude, Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, are likewise associated with the rendering of *pecuniary assistance* to the Ameers of Afghanistan." Pecuniary assistance, yes; *a fixed annual subsidy*, never. And this distinction is of the very first importance, because Mr. Gladstone's own Government, on more than one occasion, forbade in the most peremptory manner the granting of a regular subsidy when the Viceroy of the time seemed half disposed to sanction some measure of the kind. The Duke of Argyll remonstrated with Lord Mayo in 1869 for what he thought were excessive concessions to Shere Ali, but, on that Viceroy explaining his policy, the Duke expressed his approval in the strongest terms. It was then laid down that the Ameer was to have none of the following things. "No treaty, no *fixed subsidy*, no European troops, officers, or residents, no dynastic pledges." Lord Lawrence himself opposed, at all times, and to the last, the idea of a fixed subsidy. Money gifts, varying in their amount, and fluctuating as to their times of payment, were, he maintained, to be preferred in every respect; and Liberal statesmen adopted his opinion in this as in every other matter connected with the foreign policy of India. But when Lord Lytton became Viceroy, there was a change in this as in other things. If there was less disposition to remain wedded to old convictions, there was an increased desire to look the facts of the situation in the face, and to provide for its dangers; and so it not unnaturally happened that Lord Lytton desired to attach the Ameer to our side by means of a generous subvention. Lord Lawrence's policy was to make gifts of money; Lord Lytton's, to grant a fixed annual subsidy. In accordance with this change of view, the late Shere Ali was offered, during the negotiations at Peshawur in 1876–7, an annual

subsidy of twelve lakhs of rupees. We know that those negotiations proved abortive, and that the attempt to establish a friendly understanding broke down. But the subject was renewed with better success in 1879, and the Ameer Yakoob Khan accepted as one of the terms of the Treaty of Gundamuck a fixed annual subsidy from the Indian Government, but of only half the amount that had been offered to his father. The policy of subsidising the Ameer with a fixed annual sum is therefore, beyond all doubt, the conception of Lord Lytton. That it forms one of the inseparable conditions of our exercising any influence in the affairs of an independent Afghanistan can hardly be disputed. A Liberal Government has, however, been compelled, reluctantly no doubt, and after three years' delay, to depart so far from the doctrines of Lord Lawrence as to adopt a measure which he repeatedly opposed, and one, moreover, which will be permanently associated in history with the name of Lord Lytton. Nor can it be long before it will find itself obliged to accept the remainder of a policy of which it has now borrowed one of the principal features.

A fixed annual subsidy formed no part of "masterly inactivity." It was quite incompatible with it; and for a very simple reason. Lord Lawrence was not the man to object to a trifle, but he saw very clearly that the conclusion of a close and definite arrangement with the Afghan Government, such as the payment of a regular subsidy must entail, would result in the despatch of English officers into Afghanistan to supervise the expenditure of Indian treasure. A fixed subsidy meant, in his time, and the present Viceroy, or his successor, will find that it still means, our having resident officers in the principal Afghan cities. Lord Lawrence's own declaration to the Afghans still stands to express in the most emphatic manner its signification: "If we give you money and material, we must send officers to see that they are properly applied." And if this supervision was the natural corollary of a subsidy many years ago, it will be found to be a great deal more necessary now that every charge on the revenue of India is scanned with the keenest and most exacting criticism both in that country and at home. Twelve lakhs of rupees are, even for India, not a very large amount; but that sum, paid regularly each year, can be shown to mount up, in the course of a little time, to no inconsiderable total. There will be a demand to know how it is being spent,

and no confident declarations as to the continued tranquillity of Afghanistan will be sufficient to satisfy the desire to ascertain whether Abdurrahman is devoting his hundred thousand pounds per annum to something more useful to us, and more profitable to himself, than sweetmeats and wives. Mr. Gladstone repudiates the charge of his course in subsidising the Ameer being either novel or a departure from precedent; and to a certain extent he is right. He has the justification that he is following the policy of Lord Lytton; but, having abandoned the practice of Lord Lawrence, he will soon find himself compelled to accept the second half of the same policy, and to send English officers to Herat, and the other cities of Afghanistan, if not to Cabul itself. He will, no doubt, be able to fortify himself to this further departure from "masterly inactivity" by recalling Lord Northbrook's admission in September, 1873 ("Afghan Blue Book," 1878, p. 110), that such a course "would for many reasons be desirable."

No one will be disposed to deny that the Indian Government has, on the whole, taken a wise course in bestowing upon the Ameer this large subvention. It may prove the means of averting many dangers and troubles which seemed to threaten the tranquillity of his country; and the tranquillity of Afghanistan, if it does not of itself secure the objects of our policy, at least enables us to see how they are to be attained. The Ameer Abdurrahman has, moreover, earned some personal claim on our consideration, for he has unquestionably succeeded under difficulties in restoring the unity of the Afghan kingdom—the best form in which that state can be maintained and governed for our interests, unless our authority were to be much more vigorously exercised beyond the passes than there is any present likelihood of its being. Abdurrahman, the ally of the sentimental school of politicians, has not attempted the vain task of governing the Afghans on what have been called "rose-water principles." He has ruled as the essentially strong man, ever swift to strike and slow to spare. But in Afghanistan the strong man is inevitably cruel, and Abdurrahman realizes the character to the letter. His public enemies and his private adversaries have both felt the weight of his power and the implacability of his animosity. The soldier Mahomed Jan either stood too high in the estimation of his countrymen or held views too much opposed to the Ameer to

breathe this upper air; and the dungeons of Cabul could relate a story of refined cruelty, unsurpassed in the records of crime. Ghilzai insurgents, the rebels of the frontier, the members of even his own branch of the Barukzai family, have experienced the severity of his resentment and the depths of his suspicion. He has placed his own person with some degree of security on the throne of the Afghans, and, with the exception of his cousin Ishak, he has cleared the realm of all with either the capacity or the inclination to oppose his plans. With Ishak, once his staunchest lieutenant, but now his defiant Governor in Turkestan, he has still to square accounts, and the son and heir of the Ameer Azim may prove no insignificant opponent. But the welcome receipt of a supply of money from India will enable him to bring this question to a speedy issue; and we have no reason to suppose that Ishak has any means of resisting the trained and well-armed soldiers of his cousin. Enemies and rivals thus rise up without much warning, but as yet they have only served to show how well suited Abdurrahman is to his post, and that the Afghans have again obtained a ruler who understands their peculiarities, and who will not hesitate to employ the means that can alone secure their obedience and respect. We may marvel at the admiration of his humanitarian friends at home, yet we cannot deny that in Abdurrahman the unruly Afghans have a tyrant after their own heart.

The necessities of the Ameer are the best argument that can be used in favour of his being subsidised; but, while acquiescing in the policy, we are bound to recognize its cause. There is no question that Lord Ripon was only induced to assist the Ameer because he was well assured that he stood in immediate peril. There was no middle choice for him between witnessing the possible collapse of the settlement of 1880–1 and coming to the aid of the Afghan ruler with a supply of money sufficient to enable him to pay his army. What Abdurrahman feared was not the appearance of some fresh competitor to the throne, but the paralysis of his own administration from want of funds; and the sources of information with which the timidity of the Government alone provides us leave us no room to adopt any other view of the situation save his own. It is consequently clear that notwithstanding the large presents of money and arms granted to the Ameer during the first year of his residence at Cabul, and despite

the fact that after an unchecked tide of success during three years he has restored the unity of the Afghan kingdom, he is still surrounded by difficulties and dangers of which we ourselves must remain ignorant. That he himself realizes them is, of course, much in his favour, and improves his chances of success; but it does not alter the fact that his authority rests not on the esteem or devotion of his subjects, but on the skill with which he nicely balances their differences and plays off one section against the other. So long as he is able to pay and to keep in good humour the men he has attracted into his regiments, he will be secure against the open attempt of any rival who has yet revealed himself; but the employment of a mercenary force in the provinces is calculated to arouse opposition as well as to repress it. Something of this was seen the other day with the Shinwarris; and, warned by this experience, Abdurrahman will, in all probability, base his policy towards the powerful Durani and other tribes of the west on the safe precept of "letting sleeping dogs lie."

While, therefore, we admit the prudence with which Abdurrahman has hitherto conducted his affairs, and also the serious inconvenience that would attend his overthrow, it would be unwise to assume that his power is better secured than it is. The fact that he has needed more pecuniary assistance from us in three years than all his predecessors received during the whole period of our political connection with them, is of itself hardly a proof that he is either the strong or the popular ruler that has been too readily imagined. Yet it may fairly be said in his favour that he has succeeded in what seemed to be almost a hopeless task, restoring the unity of Afghanistan, while his military reputation was established by the discomfiture and flight into Persia of the would-be national champion, Ayoob Khan. This is far indeed from constituting a complete triumph of his cause, but it is probable that his chief anxiety is not so much for himself as for the prospects of his dynasty. His success is imperfect so long as he can feel no certainty as to transmitting his authority to his son; and the arrangements of the Indian Government depend not only on the continuance of his success, but of his life. It is only by making due regard for these facts and circumstances that it will be possible to form a just opinion as to the policy of subsidising the Ameer; and the more carefully they are weighed, the more

strongly will the conviction come home to us that a subsidy, without the conditions which experience has shown should accompany it, is a doubtful experiment.

No doubt there is something to be said in its favour if it is only to be regarded as a temporary measure, and as paving the way for a closer connection; but there is nothing in the record of the present Government to justify the belief that this policy was adopted from any far-seeing motives of statesmanship. If it had been done with this intention there would have been a treaty, impressing upon the Ameer the favourable disposition of the English Government, and exacting from him in turn not concessions, but pledges as to his conduct. There has been nothing of the kind. Abdurrahman is free, practically speaking, to receive what diplomatic agents he may choose, and to entertain as many Russian visitors as he likes. That he does not do so is only because, as he reads the present situation, it seems to him to be unwise. The Government have conferred this annual subsidy upon him as much out of regard for their own reputation as from consideration of his embarrassments. They felt that to refuse him what he asked for in the early part of the present year, would be to imperil the arrangement which had kept things quiet in Afghanistan and given a seeming security to the Indian frontier. They could not deny the accuracy of the Ameer's facts, because they had no sure means of knowing the truth; they were equally unable to tell him that he had done nothing to justify such lavish largesse on their part, for fear of offending him; and in their dilemma they could see no alternative save to concede him what he asked, flattering themselves that, even if the matter did not turn out well, the principle of monthly payments would save them from any serious loss. Compelled by the urgent representations of the Ameer to come to a sudden resolution, they forgot that they were introducing a new principle into their policy, and that they were proclaiming, as clearly as they could, that the time had gone by when it was possible to witness with equanimity Afghanistan a prey to internal disorder. The Afghan ruler was to be helped in the way that he asked, not to place his frontier in order against a foreign enemy, but to assert his authority over his own people.

It is as little difficult to understand why the Indian Government complied with his request, as it is to realize for what reason it was

made. But the wisdom of granting it without any conditions must remain a point on which opinions will differ, and which a favourable result can alone demonstrate; for it cannot be contended that the mere possibility of ensuring the stability of Abdurrahman's power is of itself a sufficient return for the granting of so large a sum out of the Indian revenue, and for the suspension of all measures of vigilance on the further borders of Afghanistan. No one ever supposed in the past that the Afghan ruler could be taken definitely into our pay without requiring from him in return distinct pledges and guarantees. If it was desirable that his authority should be strong and effective, it was absolutely necessary that his sympathies should be firmly enlisted in the British alliance. The old formula ran, that the Ameer should only be strong in proportion as he was friendly. Until the extent to which Russian intrigue in the country had gone in the time of Shere Ali was revealed, it was possible to say that the Ameer's sense of his own interests would always incline him to the side of the wealthier and less grasping Government; but the experience of the last six years should have made it plain that what was true under a former condition of things has no longer any application to the existing circumstances. If the supervision of English officers and residents was necessary in the days of Dost Mahomed and his son, it is infinitely more needed now that Russia is so much nearer, and that no one affects to deny that the northern frontier of Afghanistan is open to her agents and traders. The Viceroy did not probably realize all the consequences of the important step he was taking when he gave the proposal his sanction during the summer; but although he intended his action to stop with the granting of this pecuniary assistance, he must discover, before very long, that it will have either to be suspended, or to be enlarged into a general scheme of policy.

Already it is becoming clear that the Ameer's difficulties are far from being over; they may indeed be only entering upon a fresh and fatal phase. Already there is less room than ever to believe that Russia is disposed to play a passive part in the affairs of Central Asia, and of Afghanistan in particular. We shall have to provide, therefore, for the necessities of a near present, as well as for the greater danger of a more remote future; and we may perceive in the military precautions adopted in British Beloochis-

tan, and along the road to Candahar, the sign that a great advance in the opinions of responsible persons on Central Asian matters has taken place within the last two years. Scobeleff's victory at Geok Tepeh did more than vanquish the Turcomans; it overthrew the last bulwarks of "masterly inactivity." Yet we cannot doubt that it is only with reluctance that the present Viceroy has adopted some of the vigour which is necessary to the maintenance of empire, and has provided both by diplomacy and by military preparations for the defence of those dependencies of India beyond the Indus which must continue to expand. These half measures are the clearest testimony to the reality of the future peril, if they fail to provide the remedy that would inspire confidence and repel hostility. They cannot stand by themselves. The Liberals have abandoned their old stronghold, to which the consistency of forty years and the great name of Lawrence lent a fictitious strength, and gave a character of impregnability. They have not merely retained Quettah—the *Trojani causa exscidii*, as we used to be told in the days of Shere Ali's sulky defiance—but they have appropriated the valley of Pisheen and the country of the Kakars. They have almost completed the conversion of Beloochistan into a British province, and they are nothing loth to ascertain fresh information as to the feasibility of the many passes[1] lying between the Khurum and Sukhur. The granting of a fixed annual subsidy to the Ameer takes Lord Ripon and the Home Government one step further from the happy time when to be a statesman consisted in doing nothing, and when the Russian bogey was said to be the possession of a few Anglo-Indians of rather more foresight than their neighbours. If the present course is much further continued, there will be little to choose between the policies of the opposite schools, and that it must be so continued does not appear to admit of the shadow of a doubt. Lord Ripon has still to discover that a subsidised Ameer may be surrounded with so many difficulties as to leave him disposed to turn to more than one quarter for the assistance he may need: while, even in his own interests, he may require that advice and that power of self-control which the presence of Englishmen can alone supply. Nor need there be any hesitation in saying that

[1] Witness the scientific expedition to the Takht-i-Suleiman—the loftiest peak (12,000 feet) in the region of the Waziris, and a spot hitherto preserved from the desecrating foot of man by the superstition of the hill-men.

subsidising the Ameer is only a phrase for squandering Indian treasure, unless measures are taken to ensure that the money is properly and prudently applied. Lord Ripon has adopted one half of Lord Lytton's policy. He will find it impossible to permanently omit the other.

IX.

MERV! WHAT NEXT?[1]

THE Russians have succeeded in appropriating Merv without its being followed by the supposed inevitable advance of English troops to Herat, and while we behold the triumph of our great rival we have also to listen to his compliments at our good sense in accepting the inevitable. These are to our taste the more nauseous, inasmuch as our "good sense" is only a pleasing phrase for want of power, an over-occupied attention, and the painful recollection, perhaps, of lost opportunities and miscalculated chances. The Russian Government has scored again in that diplomatic encounter which has continued for twenty years, and the sharpness of its wit, to use no harsher word, has availed once more, as it always has, and probably as it always will avail, against the dulness of the English Foreign Office and the trusting nature of the people of this country. The many despatches written on the subject of Merv by Lords Clarendon, Granville, and Derby, and the courteous replies which they never failed to elicit from Prince Gortchakoff, or his Imperial Master, furnish melancholy reading now, for, while nothing could be firmer than the language held by those Foreign Secretaries as to the impossibility of allowing Russia "to approach even the neighbourhood of Merv," they never received in response more than the repudiation of any

[1] *National Review*, April, 1884.

present intention to occupy Merv, and they have been followed by action so weak as to be absolutely pusillanimous, and which cannot fail to make all future declarations of policy by the English Government on Central Asian matters at least appear both unmeaning and insincere. A policy of vain protest is everywhere useless, and injurious to self-respect. It reveals the secret fear which will in face of danger become panic, and it shows a deficiency of power, and the sentiment of mental doubt which no one, perhaps, imagined to exist, and which are the sure precursors of ruin. On the question of Merv we have had from the beginning nothing but protest, and that it has been utterly vain the fact plainly shows. The peoples of India and Southern Asia are the witnesses of a discomfiture as complete as any recorded in the pages of diplomatic history. Lord Granville still clings to his old panacea. He has again protested in the mildest form at St. Petersburg, but it is understood that the feeling in Downing Street is that with this gentle remonstrance enough has for the moment been done. There is good reason to say that it would be premature to assume that we have even now heard the last of those miserable representations to Russia for the purpose of evoking promises, to which that Power only gives a momentary value, and the breach of which, as we have had no idea of enforcing them at the sword's point, has brought our diplomacy into contempt, and will, if repeated, subject the honour of this country to still lower degradation. It is against all direct negotiation with Russia that we have, in the first place, to make our most emphatic remonstrance, and to array all the forces of resistance which as an opposition we can muster.

We will not waste valuable time and space over the loss of Merv. Although our Government might by diplomatic means have kept Russia quiet for some years longer, although even at the eleventh hour it could by a little decision, and if it had wished, have caused the postponement of the scheme of annexation, still Merv is gone now; and the practical question is not how it might have been kept out of Russia's grasp, but how we are to confine Russia even to Merv, and to exclude her from Afghanistan. Merv is gone, and the question is, What next? not merely with regard to Russia's progress, but also with reference to English action, for it is admitted with remarkable unanimity that something must be done, although no precise action has been proposed except a

delimitation of the very extended and irregular northern frontier of Afghanistan. Now that delimitation, however necessary, must be a work of time, and if attempted by direct negotiation with Russia it will certainly lead to disagreement and come to nothing, as all previous attempts of a similar kind have done before. There should be an immediate and effective reply to the Russian occupation of Merv. Lord Granville thinks it is met by "communications with the Russian Ambassador," and by "despatches to St. Petersburg." The Asiatics, who are observing our attitude, look for deeds rather than words. The only act which will make an impression on their minds is that the Ameer of Afghanistan should be *at once* invited to India, and that he should be received in full Durbar by Lord Ripon at the most convenient spot in the Punjab.

Our position with regard to Merv has been so far consistent that we have always declared that a Russian occupation would lead to disturbance within Afghan territory, and that we should be bound to assist the Ameer in maintaining the integrity of his dominions. The first result of the annexation of Merv is to give practical meaning to this obligation. We are bound by our past declarations, as well as by our specific obligations to Abdurrahman, voluntarily accepted, and by the plainest motives of self-interest, to support with our arms the integrity of Afghanistan. Our intention to do so has been declared over and over again in the strongest language sanctioned by international courtesy. It is almost impossible to suppose that any responsible minister would counsel the repudiation of the obligation, or recommend that the violation of the Ameer's dominions should be received with the apathetic "good sense" that has been so conspicuous in the case of Merv. We have therefore, above everything else, to recognize this obligation, to define it, and to devise the arrangement which will best enable us to meet it and to secure our objects. But the chief point is for us to recognize the duty, for if it be clearly recognized on our part we shall find that it will be respected by others. Now, do Lord Kimberley and his colleagues realize to its full extent what the duty of defending Afghanistan practically means? Do they admit that it is to be as much a cardinal point in the policy of India as the protection of Belgium is in that of England? Unless they do, unless those acquainted with Indian politics speak out very clearly on the subject, there is grave danger that the phrase of "defending the integrity of Afghanistan" will become as void

of real meaning as "the prohibition to approach even the vicinity of Merv" is now shown to be.

Assuming our Government to be ready to meet the responsibility to which it stands self-committed of defending Afghanistan, the first question that calls for an answer is, What are its relations with the Afghan ruler, what has it done to gain his confidence, and what to ensure his fidelity? For it is perfectly obvious that the English people will never incur the risk and danger of defending a dominion the ruler of which is anything short of a sincere friend and staunch ally. If Abdurrahman is not seen to be clearly on our side there is an end to the feasibility of a policy based on the defence of the further limits of Afghanistan. The Liberal policy to oppose the onward march of Russia will again consist of a well-sounding phrase which, when the hour comes for action, they will not have the courage to follow up by deeds. While Lords Granville and Kimberley are making declarations in public speeches and private despatches to the effect that they do not admit "Russia's right to interfere in Afghanistan," and that they possess "the control of the Ameer's foreign relations," they would be wiser and would do more practical good by proceeding to ascertain without delay what are the personal views of the Ameer, what measures he will undertake with our support, and how far he identifies himself with the cause and interests of England. Now, nothing whatever has been done in this direction (March 17th) beyond telegraphing to Lord Ripon to know his opinion as to what is the opinion of the Ameer. Lord Ripon's opinion about Afghanistan is simple and comprehensive. As some politicians do with regard to Ireland, he wishes it under the sea, but this is rather the expression of excusable irritation than a political remedy capable of practical application. On the subject of the Ameer's opinion Lord Ripon has no special source of knowledge, seeing that he was careful to send to Cabul as our native envoy an official between whom and the Ameer there is a blood feud. If ever the Ameer feels the weakness of wishing to be confidential he is at once repelled, for it is not into the ear of the grandson of the man who murdered his ancestor Poyndah in the days of the Sudozais that he would pour his secrets.[1] Lord Ripon, therefore,

[1] At the beginning of the present century Wafadar Khan, Wazir to Shah Zemaun, and grandfather of Afzul Khan murdered Poyndah, father of Dost Mahomed and the present Ameer's great-grandfather. He was himself tortured and put to death by Futteh Ali, Poyndah's son.

can give no information on the subject of any importance, for the simple reason that the truth can only be ascertained by dealing direct with Abdurrahman, and of that since Sir Lepel Griffin officially recognized him as Ameer in 1880 there has been none.

Our existing relations with the Ameer are of the most singular and exceptional character. We are paying him a large subsidy. We have accepted towards him a variety of obligations and the responsibility of guaranteeing his dominions. In return he has not incurred a single responsibility beyond the very vague one of being our friend. It is the pleasure of our Government to say that he is our ally, that his foreign relations are under our control, and that a sense of his own interest is sufficient to make him adhere to the side of England in preference to Russia. We have heard all this before in the case of Shere Ali, who could not resist the overtures of those describing themselves as being "as wise as a serpent and as gentle as a dove;" and it is as baseless of real fact in the case of Abdurrahman as it was when General Kaufmann wrote his letters of sympathy and suggestion from Tashkent in the interval between Khiva and the Stolietoff Mission. We have given this Ameer much, and we have promised more. In return he has given little and done nothing. Even when the subsidy of twelve lakhs was conferred upon him last summer it was not thought necessary to have any written agreement. The Ameer took our money without incurring any obligation, and now that he will be expected to do something on his part we may feel sure that, even should he express his willingness to do what we ask or suggest, he will expect some additional recompense for such rare devotion in an Afghan. But until we have sounded Abdurrahman as to his private views, sketched out for his guidance the policy we wish him to pursue, and assured him that the power of England will be exerted to exclude Russia from his country, nothing has been done towards establishing an identity of interests and harmony of action between England and Afghanistan. We may call Abdurrahman our ally and dependent, but nothing will have been accomplished towards preventing the Russians coming to the Hindoo Koosh, and absorbing the whole valley of the Murgab. Nothing short, indeed, of the clearest and closest alliance between Cabul and Calcutta, resting on the firm resolve of the English people to treat the violation of Afghan soil as a *casus belli*, will avail to prevent those events coming to pass. But in face of such palpable resolution as

that, Russia would long pause before infringing the peace. Verbal phrases alone cannot restrain the Cossacks, but the Russian Government would be slow to provoke the great contest for which it is not yet prepared.

But if it is necessary to consider what England's policy should be, it is equally incumbent upon us to inquire what Russia's action will be. Russia has taken Merv. Is there any one who supposes that she will remain satisfied with it? Have we not always had reason to see in the Russian advance a forcible illustration of the truth of the saying that "*L'appetit vient en mangeant*"? Even so far as the taking of Merv itself goes, it seems probable that the act of occupation will be made to cover a great deal more than placing a governor and a garrison within the walls of Kouchid Khan Kala. One Russian officer declares that they must have the whole of the Attock up to the line of the Persian hills; another that they must hold all the routes from the Tejend to Merv; while a third puts forward the comprehensive claim to sovereignty over all of Turcoman race. Each of these contentions may be made to cover a more or less extensive surface, as convenience and opportunity may direct; but they all signify that the possession of Merv is held to carry that of Sarakhs with it, and Sarakhs is a place which Sir Charles Macgregor, a very competent authority, declared six years ago that "Russia would use for offence if England did not for defence." Already it is plain, therefore, that the difficulty of the moment is not to recognize Russia's presence in Merv, but to devise some means of restricting her to the vast region subject to her direction from the Caspian and Persian frontier to Kashgar and the Chinese borders. If she takes Sarakhs, she defrauds Persia of a possession; if she advances the ethnological principle, she must encroach on Afghanistan,[1] and sever communications between Balkh and Herat. In either case she can render the exercise of all authority by either the Persian or the Afghan ruler practically impossible; and her mandate in the interests of civilization will justify her in appropriating districts which the native rulers fail to keep tranquil, and which might become the scene of serious disorder. The English people, pre-occupied with the tortuous and unmeaning policy of Mr. Gladstone's Government in Egypt, where vacillation in Downing

[1] This is precisely what she has now done.

Street deprives our vigorous efforts of their due result, and where accumulated difficulties will yet be pronounced insuperable unless some startling tragedy recall with an electric shock the better sense and firmer resolution of Englishmen, may be assumed to have given its assent to the Russian seizure of Merv in the belief that it could not prevent its being effected. But is it prepared to accept with the same tameness the very extended signification which the Russians will give to the privileges attaching to the ownership of Merv, especially when it is remembered that that signification will only be limited by the firmness of the attitude of the English Government, and by the nature of the measures which it will take in reply to an act that has produced a profound impression throughout Asia?

The Russians have acted throughout this Merv affair with great astuteness, as well as exceptional promptitude. When they were in the full swing of their campaign with the Akhals, they took steps to minimize the importance of Merv. Their explorers declared, with charming *naïveté*, that Merv was a place of no strategical value, that it was not "the key of Herat," and that all Sir Henry Rawlinson had written on the subject was erroneous, and formed on a mistaken view. There were some English writers deceived by the specious theories of Colonel Grodekoff; but now that Merv is in their hands, those disingenuous statements are thrown on one side as having served their purpose, and Merv resumes its natural position as the commanding situation in the desert of the Turcomans from the Caspian to the Oxus. As soon as the convenient moment may be thought to have arrived, it will become the Russian administrative capital for the Trans-Caspian province. The Russians are, therefore, not much affected by the statements of their own explorers declaring that the importance of Merv has been exaggerated, and they are perfectly right. To those who believe and represent Merv to be an oasis in the midst of an irreclaimable desert, it will seem no difficult task to restrict Russia to this limited spot; but Merv being what it is—and that is geographically not an oasis at all, but the extremity of a strip of green land thrust out from Afghanistan into the waste—the question assumes a different complexion. From Merv there is, by the valley of the Murgab, an unbroken route of water and grass to Penjdeh, Meroochak and Bala Murgab, the last-named being only 135 miles from Herat by the high road.

Penjdeh is in the possession of the Sarik Turcomans, and Bala Murgab is the extreme station of an Afghan garrison, although both Shere Ali and the present Ameer claimed Penjdeh and Ak Tepeh [1] as Afghan, and made various propositions to fortify them. The significance of these claims will perhaps be made most clear by stating that Penjdeh is 150 miles south of Merv. Apathy in dealing with the occupation of Merv will thus enable Russia to secure other points very much nearer the Indian frontier. The most timely as well as the most vigorous measures will be needed to stop Russia's progress up the Murgab; and the only way to give practical effect to any policy will be for the Ameer to establish a fortified post as low down that river as is thought prudent, and

[1] This was the first mention of these places after the Russian occupation of Merv. They are now the principal points in dispute.

The following valuable letter from General Sir Edward Hamley to the *Times* with regard to the importance of Penjdeh merits attention:—"While the general intention of the Russian advance—namely, to open the way to Herat—is well known, the particular effect of the movement is by no means fully realized. But at this juncture it is very desirable that the change thus made in the situation should be appreciated by the public here, as it certainly is by the instructed soldiers of the Continent. In seizing the junction of the rivers Kushk and Murgab at Penjdeh the Russians have not only deprived the defenders of Afghanistan of a position of great value, both tactically and strategically, but have also secured for themselves—1. The principal road to Herat, which lies along the Kushk valley to an easy pass leading into the valley of the Heri Rud at Kushan. 2. The power of turning the pass opposite the Zulfikar ford if occupied for the defence of Herat. 3. The command of the chief road (that described in No. 1 is part of it) between Herat and Balkh, and thence on Cabul, which passes through Penjdeh; leaving the communications by this road between those Afghan towns dependent on the permission of the Russians. 4. The means of thereby advancing from the Caspian upon Cabul. 5. Several hill roads on Kushk leading by other passes on Herat. By seizing the Zulfikar ford a way from the Persian town of Meshed (where two great highways through Khorasan meet) to the Afghan bank of the Heri Rud is secured. Any concession of the pass opposite the ford to the Afghans is illusory, for their position there would be turned, not only by the route from the Kushk mentioned in No. 2, but by other roads up the valley of the Heri Rud. If the Russians should retain possession of these points, they will be able to march on Herat by many roads, not one of which was open to them so long as the Afghans held Penjdeh, Akrobat, and the Zulfikar ford, and to maintain throughout perfect co-operation and communication between the columns moving by the two valleys of the Kushk and the Heri Rud. From Penjdeh they can also direct their forces on Cabul as well as on Herat. The distance of Penjdeh from Herat is about ten days' march, from the Zulfikar ford about seven."

to assume the government of those Salor, Sarik, and other Turcomans who still prefer their independence to subjection to the Czar. That post will have to be very much farther north than Penjdeh; for once the Russians reach the vicinity of that place, Afghan authority in Herat will become an impossibility. They can then turn the whole flank of the Anglo-Afghan defence by using the Kushk valley, which will take them to within fifty miles of Herat itself.

More than one reason will impel the Russians to continue their activity, and to refuse to rest satisfied with what they have accomplished. In the first place, they believe that the English Government having allowed them to seize Merv will permit them to take as much more as they can swallow in the same mouthful. They will not be slow also to represent that unless they acquire supremacy over all the clans, and the possession of certain points, they cannot hold themselves responsible for the tranquillity of the various borders which they have now made their own. Their astuteness will lead them to cast upon the personal apprehension of England the blame for a continuance of those raids and frontier disturbances which have given the name of Turcoman an evil reputation throughout the West; while those irregular proceedings will serve as a useful screen to the substantial advances of the Russian flag. We have but one remedy. Those Turcomans who are not subject to Russia must become subject to Afghanistan, and as the latter are settled in permanent villages and have given up raiding for many years, there is the less risk in accepting the responsibility of their control. But there is no other safe issue. We deprecate the meeting of the frontiers of England and Russia, but the hour has come for a meeting of responsibilities. Russia will take whatever England will not protect, and what diplomacy may secure to-day, force of arms shall fail to rescue a few years hence.

Russia is urged into activity by other motives still than the belief that the apathy and pre-occupation of England are her opportunity. The subjugation of the Turcomans ought to mean the acquisition of the most valuable recruiting ground that she has obtained during the present century. The Turcomans and their excellent horses have always been thought to present the ready means of forming the most formidable irregular cavalry force in Asia. Whether for Russia or against her, they have been fre-

quently considered as the advanced force of the army that will one day assail India, or as the spear-head of the body that may be created by some reaction and revival throughout Islam for the discomfiture of its bitter and triumphant foe, the Russian Czar. Russia is now in a position of predominance among these tribes, and she holds in her grasp the long-coveted prize. In a short time the Turcomans of Merv will be as much her peaceful subjects as are the Cossacks and the Circassians. But it is not so easy a matter for her to know how to make use of them, to preserve, or rather to restore, their energy, and to ensure that a peaceful and well-conducted Turcoman shall retain those martial qualities which distinguished him as the wild, unfettered freebooter of the desert. And in the first place let it be remembered that the Turcomans are no longer what they were. They lost their best manhood at Geok Tepeh. Their braver chiefs either perished there or have died since. The terrible proceedings of General Scobeleff took the heart out of a people whose gallantry failed to suggest the idea of humanity and forbearance to their savage conqueror. Russia has consequently acquired the sovereignty of a cowed and humiliated people. It is the better for the assurance of her authority, but it certainly tends to minimize the value of the prize as she obtains it.

Russia has never given her critics any right to say that she is not wise. Her first effort will, therefore, be directed to the revival of the courage and military ardour of her Turcoman dependents. She will place upon them the lightest discipline she can devise, but it may be considered a doubtful experiment whether she will succeed. She has deprived them of the active life which sustained their vitality, and unless some other can be substituted, all that we know about the Turcomans justifies the belief that they will lose their former characteristics, become effeminate, and gradually disappear. In that event the Russian seizure of Merv would be deprived of one of its most important consequences. But of course the Russian Government is aware of these possibilities, and although with the whole force of the army of the Caucasus at the back of the adventurous lieutenants operating on the Murgab the value of any Asiatic ally may seem very slight indeed, they will still not be indisposed to do as much as they can towards making some military use of the Czar's new lieges. A consideration of the character and temperament of the Turcomans will, therefore,

increase Russia's inclination to be up and doing; while if the practice of forays is to be abandoned, there will have to be substituted for it one of systematic advance under the two-headed eagle.

The opportunity of giving effect to such a policy will be afforded if the supersession of Afghan authority beyond the Hindoo Koosh is in even the most insidious form to be tolerated. The Turcomans provide the ready means of encroachment on the Murgab, at Maimena, Andkoi, or any other of those places in Turkestan which mark the route that eventually turns the Paropamisan range north of Herat. At the same time that Russia would thus protrude the claims of the Turcomans to territory defended in the past with difficulty against their encroachments, she would obtain the extension of her own influence and the restoration of Teke vigour. If she can provide the Turcomans with a fresh vent for their activity in the valleys that lead to Herat or along the route to Balkh and the northern approaches to Cabul, she secures a double object with the least degree of trouble to herself. It will, consequently, be no light task to keep Russia where she is. Every motive of policy, time, and the local conditions of the case urge her onwards. That she has got much is no reason in her eyes why she should not get more. The dulness of England is rather a spur to her impetuosity than a reason for showing self-restraint. The absence of any clear geographical division until the Paropamisus is reached, the vagueness and the feebleness of Afghan and Persian authority, furnish the most powerful of all inducements why Russia should hasten to send her Cossacks as far up the Murgab as she dare, in the conviction that, excepting Sarakhs, it will be very hard indeed to show a better claim than hers to any place in which she may have established a garrison. Her promptitude may further confound and increase the vacillation of a Government which cannot carry into effect its own threats, and which has only exacted promises in order to show that it does not require them to be fulfilled.[1]

From every point of view, therefore, England has no time to waste, and the occasion is one not for criticism of such measures

[1] For a full description of the representations made at different times to the Russian Government by Liberal Ministers, the reader may be referred to an article which appeared in the *Standard* of 1st August, 1881, entitled, "The Liberals and Merv."

as Mr. Gladstone's Government may be disposed to pursue, but for the drafting of a distinct and definite policy adequate to the crisis, and calculated to check the progress of Russia, and to promote the safety of our dominion in India. Whatever the actual policy that may be carried out, we have, in the first place, no choice save to act through the Ameer of Afghanistan. He is in our pay; he has accepted our rupees; the time has come for him to show what he will do in return. It is useless to argue as to his personal predilections. They will not blind him as to the chances of the policy on which he may be secretly bent; and an Afghan is as little likely to be swayed by gratitude to a former host as he is by the weakness of a Government which supplies him with money without asking for anything in return. The private opinion and sympathy of Abdurrahman is a very important element in this question; but it is only possible to give surmises, and they are valueless. But it is above all things imperative that there shall be no longer room for doubt on this subject. Abdurrahman must be either on our side or against us. We cannot permit him to fill his coffers with Indian rupees in order that when the hour of peril comes he may quietly attach himself to the side of Russia. Unless our Government wishes to perpetuate a sham, to declare that there is strength where there is weakness, and confidence where there is meditated falseness and will be consummated treachery, this point should be decided at once. Lord Ripon, in his character of Viceroy and Governor-General, should invite, in proper and friendly terms, the Ameer to visit him in the Punjab.[1] The season is advancing, but it could still be accomplished by using despatch in the arrangement of the preliminaries. If the Ameer prevaricates or makes excuses, if, in short, he will not come, he is our foe, and should be dealt with accordingly. If he comes, and accepts the duties of his position, he can be trusted with some portion of our confidence. His arrival will prove to the peoples of India that the ruler who dwells amid the snows of Cabul thinks that England is still a greater power than Russia, and for the preservation of peace that alone is no small gain and advantage.

Assuming the more agreeable and perhaps the more probable

[1] This was not done until twelve months later, an unfortunate delay in every point as all now admit, except that Lord Dufferin has become Viceroy instead of Lord Ripon.

event, that the Ameer does come to India, that he feels alarm at the near prospect of Russian aggression, and that he shares our desire to place some restriction on its further expansion, it follows that the first thing will be to decide upon a plan of mutual defence and to define the exact limits of Afghan sovereignty. We should then no doubt have to increase our subsidy by subventions for special purposes; but, if so, it would be coupled with the condition of direct supervision by English officers, which should always be enforced. So far as the question of the point on the Murgab where the Ameer's authority will be held to stop, it cannot be too strongly insisted that the only way to effect a satisfactory solution will be by an act of assertion on the part of the Ameer's lieutenant in Herat, and not by the abortive and lingering movements of an international Frontier Commission. The time is favourable to show Russia that she cannot claim the monopoly of being aggressive. If the Ameer occupies Ak Tepeh, or still better Sary Yazi, without delay, and with the sanction of England, a check is at once imposed upon the advance of Russia which would not fail to be permanently effectual, if followed up by the despatch of an English officer to Herat and possibly to Maimena as well. Neither these measures, nor any others executed by the instrumentality of the Ameer, will produce any practical good unless we have fully made up our minds that the integrity of a friendly Afghanistan is worth fighting for. Once committed to that policy there must be neither misgiving nor looking back. To do so would be to invite discomfiture and humiliation that would far surpass any to which the present Liberal administration has yet condemned the country. To such miserable repudiation of responsibility, and such an unlimited capacity of eating our own words, the policy of doing nothing behind the Indus would be preferable if only because, though not less fatal, it would be accompanied with the less dishonour. The defence of Afghanistan by means of its ruler and people affords the simple and straightforward issue from a difficult position. It would probably be as effectual as we have any right to suppose that any plan we can now form for checking Russia at a distance from the frontier of India would prove.

But while the probability is that the Ameer would come to India if properly invited, there is also the possibility that he would not, and the consequences of his declaration of independence

and unfriendliness should be faced. His refusal would of course be discouraging and would signify a rebuff; but it would reveal the plain truth, and that is a thing always worth knowing. But weak individuals and embarrassed administrations agree in the desire to keep up appearances, and it may so be that Lord Ripon's leisurely sounding of the Ameer through the hated Afzul Khan will result in the Viceroy representing that the Ameer had better be left alone. They will not have the courage to resent his indifference and to expose the guile which bids him wait upon events, by withdrawing his subsidy and taking the initiative into their own hands. They will rather seek to extend their brief claim to be called wise men by leaving the ruler who will do nothing for them undisturbed, and by seeking to lead their fellow-countrymen into the deceitful fancy that what is calm must needs be secure. And there will not be wanting many to tell them that they are acting very sensibly, that Russia is still a very long way off, and that it will be time enough to think of opposing her when she reaches the plains of India. But the recent declarations of Her Majesty's ministers prevent their using any such argument themselves. They have admitted that in their eyes the most recent proceedings of Russia and the seizure of Merv are menacing, that they render it incumbent on us to take precautions, that they have accepted the control of the foreign relations of Afghanistan, and that we are bound to extend our protection to the Ameer. There is no difference of opinion, therefore, as to the obligations. It is only a question of how they are to be met and fulfilled.

But unless the Ameer is at one with us, the statement that his foreign relations are subject to our control is totally unmeaning, and the obligation to defend his dominions in their widest extent becomes one of convenience rather than a matter of honour. It also follows that the necessary precautions cannot be taken through the instrumentality of the Ameer, and the policy of giving the widest possible signification to Afghan sovereignty will not, without his hearty co-operation, admit of practical application. Under those circumstances, how will the Government act? It is much to be feared that, with the view of saying that there has been peace somewhere in their time, they will allow the doubtful ally to pose at Cabul as the true friend, that they will continue the payment of the subsidy for which he gives nothing in return, and that their

THE VALLEYS OF THE MURGHÁB & HARI RUD.

Prepared for "Central Asian Questions" by Demetrius C. Boulger.

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solitary precautions will consist in exacting a further promise from Russia, and in completing the line of railway to Quettah. Such precautions will be totally inadequate, and hardly worthy of the name. They will not stop Russia for a day, and the peoples of India will see in them still more convincing proof that the onward march of the Czar's legions is irresistible, and that sooner or later they will burst through the passes into the plains of the Punjab. Of course, it is a happy philosophy to believe, and the convenient answer to give, that the danger is remote and chimerical, and that the Russians would be annihilated on their arrival. But if the only measure taken in reply to the Russian occupation of Merv be the construction of a short line between Sibi and Quettah, and the palpable fact that the Afghan ruler does not admit the identity of his interests by his refusal to visit the Viceroy, it necessarily follows that, while the greatest freedom will be left to Russia to carry her claims up to the immediate neighbourhood of Herat and to the Hindoo Koosh, the Asiatic world will see in the inaction of the English Government the proof of indecision and the confession of weakness.

On two matters Conservatives, and all who attach importance to the preservation of our Indian Empire, cannot insist too strongly as the cardinal points of any policy likely to be effectual. Let there be no more negotiating with Russia until we can state the spots on the Murgab, in the Turcoman desert between Maimena and the Oxus, and on the upper course of the Oxus and its affluents beyond which England will not allow her to encroach, and let there be no delay in ascertaining what these points may be. Secondly, let our relations with the Ameer be defined and made as clear as day. He is our friend or he is our foe. He cannot be allowed to change his character with the scene, and to play a double part. If he will not come to see the Viceroy, he declares himself *ipso facto* our opponent. He should be then denounced as the enemy of the English State. His subsidy should be stopped, and the city of Candahar forthwith occupied. It is probable that his power would crumble away under his feet, even at Cabul, but enough would, at all events, have been done to make it patent that the English cannot be deceived and are not to be defied with impunity. There would be an end to a sham which, if it is a sham, had better be exposed with as little loss of time as may be. We should then have to pursue a different policy for our

own part. Without a sovereign in hearty alliance with us at Cabul it is out of the question for us to accept the responsibility of defending the complete integrity of Afghanistan. We should have to adopt the alternative policy of forming the strongest frontier we can secure. The first point in the execution of that policy would be the re-occupation of Candahar, and its connection with the railway system of India. The second point would be the arrangement of the Herat question on the basis of giving Persia that much-coveted possession; and, as Lord Ripon has already borrowed the subsidy policy from Lord Lytton, he should have no objection to take another leaf out of his book and ratify the draft convention of 1880 with Persia on this very subject. The third measure of this policy, as it may be termed, of limited defence, would be to raise a corps of 10,000 Belooches—perhaps the best fighting men in Asia—as a set-off against the Czar's Turcomans. This is a policy which, by its vigour, would assure our friends, inspire our enemies with caution, and show Russia that we are resolved to carry out our own plans without regard for her verbal assurances, and without the co-operation of allies of whose fidelity we have not made ourselves tolerably certain.

But there is every reason as yet to suppose that, if the Government will only act promptly and properly, Abdurrahman will come to India, and as he has shown a disposition to extend his borders by the incorporation of Roshan and Shignan, he should be the more inclined to acquiesce in the only arrangement which will enable him to retain them. He should have no objection to the presence of English officers at Herat, Maimena, and on the Oxus, where they will ensure the stability of his authority, and possibly free him from the presence of some of the rivals he most hates and fears. The guarantee of British protection will secure for him the enjoyment of all he at present possesses, and it does not seem as if Russia had anything to propose that could be considered as at all an equivalent. If Abdurrahman be only convinced of the firmness of our decision, there is not much doubt that he will place himself in our hands; but our promises will have to be kept in the spirit and the letter, and our words will have to be followed by deeds. We shall have to take Abdurrahman's own view of the situation, and to make our action appear as satisfactory to him as it may seem justifiable to us. The advantages of the policy of joint action with the Ameer are obvious and intelligible. It is not

merely the open and legitimate policy of this country to support the integrity of Afghanistan; but it is that which, on the present occasion, would produce the most immediate result. It would also have the effect of checking Russia at the furthest possible point from the Indian frontier. Only in the event of the Ameer's refusal to co-operate with us need the alternative policy already described be considered. The greatest peril with which we shall ever have to deal is a false sense of security, whether in the strength of our position in India, or in the efficacy of our arrangements with the native princes who hold the border states and provinces on our North-west Frontier. The Government is so highly pleased at the Ameer's success in restoring the unity of Afghanistan, that it takes the most lenient view of his friendship. But it necessarily follows that unless he is willing, if not eager, to prove himself our staunch ally, the unity of Afghanistan is the most dangerous form in which that state can exist, if it has to be regarded as covertly hostile. The Government may have to make an unpleasant discovery on the subject of the Ameer's sentiments; but if they only ascertain beyond dispute what is the fact, they will, at all events, have eliminated some doubtful quantities from the problem, and enabled the country to come to a sound conclusion. On the Ameer's good faith depends the decision as to which of the two modes of action that have been sketched forms the best policy to adopt as our reply to the Russian occupation of Merv.

No wise or effectual measures will be adopted until the salient fact in the situation is recognized as clearly as it ought to be, which is the steady and seemingly irresistible march of Russia towards the frontier of India. It is only twenty-one years since she resumed the operations on the Syr Darya, which had been discontinued through the prostration of the Crimean War. At that time she was distant more than 800 miles in a straight line from the frontier of India. She is now only 250 miles distant; and on Russian official maps places 100 miles nearer are marked as belonging to the Czar. To turn to the new line of approach. It was only in 1869 that Krasnovodsk was founded on the eastern side of the Caspian. At the time of the Khivan campaign and afterwards, the Russian posts there had only a struggling existence, and were held with difficulty against the Turcomans. In 1879 General Lomakine's precipitancy nearly entailed the destruction

of a Russian army. There was a doubtful struggle of ten years, and then General Scobeleff's victory changed the whole course of the question. In 1881 he had firmly established the Russian outpost at Goores, 350 miles east of the Caspian; and now, after an interval of only three years, it is about to be planted on the Murgab. On this new line of approach the Russians have, therefore, accomplished the first and the worst half of the march from the Caspian to Candahar. The obstacles of nature that have been overcome are greater than any that remain to be vanquished, with perhaps one or two exceptions; while the distances are very much shorter than those traversed by the generals who conquered the Khanates. Russia has been retarded as little by the unprofitable character of her enterprise as by the barriers of geographical configuration. Indeed, it would almost seem that the greater the Imperial deficit in Central Asian expenditure, the more rapid have been her movements, and the less desire has she shown to hold back. Her promises have not fettered her proceedings. She has evidently no compunctions, and those who accept the words of the perjured have as little ground of complaint as cause for surprise at each fresh deception. Russia has intrigued in Afghanistan with success. She will intrigue there again. There are two native capitals in India at least which are hot-beds of intrigue, fanaticism, and hatred of the English. They have been already tampered with, as our Indian authorities know. There are others[1] where, to say the most, there would be in our extremity a nice calculation of rival chances, and the inaction that deprives treachery of peril if it cannot conceal it. The Russians count on these circumstances as well as on their army of the Caucasus. They know as well as our military authorities do what is the effective proportion of our native army, and how many regiments our generals would dare place in line of battle against them. Fortunately, they are still far from being ready themselves. There is time to place our own

[1] The action of the native states in the present crisis is gratifying to us as well as prudent for themselves. But unless we show ourselves able to turn this movement of enthusiasm and sympathy into safe and profitable channels, evil will ensue. The native armies think themselves equal to the task of opposing Russian troops. If so, their self-confidence would be sufficient to encourage a struggle with our own. Experience will tell them whether their efficiency is as great as their good opinion. At all events, we can no longer assume that these native armies are in their own estimation, which is the first point, contemptible.

house in order, and to decide upon what the policy in Afghanistan is to be. Even if our measures only result, in the first place, in the unmasking of false friends the atmosphere will be cleared, and Russia will perceive that we are not, after all, as credulous as we have given her so many good reasons for supposing.

X.

THE FUTURE OF CHINA.[1]

WHEN, three years ago, I described in the columns of a daily paper the progress of the Chinese campaign in Central Asia, and when at a later period I narrated, in my "Life of Yakoob Beg," the whole of the events that had happened in the countries between Khokand and China from the year 1862 down to the present time, there were many persons who disbelieved the stories told of the extraordinary marches made by Chinese soldiers, of the quality of the weapons in their hands, and of the tactical, aye the strategical, ability of their leaders. But the evidence has now accumulated, and there is no longer any doubt that the narratives referred to represented facts which belong to the reality, and not the romance of history. We are also to-day brought face to face with the prospect of a rupture between China and Russia, which was then only a remote possibility; and on all sides eagerness is shown to acquire information on a subject which is not only very imperfectly understood, but which promises to become of very urgent importance to this country. It is not so much my desire to discuss here the existing difficulty between these two great Powers—the collision between whom, although appearing imminent, may be yet for a short time put off—as it is to enter into the larger question of the probable future of the Chinese

[1] *The Nineteenth Century*, August, 1880.

Empire. He would be a rash man who would attempt to cast the horoscope of that most singular of institutions—and certainly I have no intention of incurring the charge. But many gentlemen who speak with considerable authority, and who are friendly disposed towards China, have recently discussed this question, and some of them have gone so far as to describe what that future might be *on certain conditions.* They have based their arguments on the self-flattering formula that, if the Chinese will only follow their advice and accept the ideas of Western nations, then their empire will become more prosperous, and the future before it will be of a brilliant hue. I will not affirm that their silence is expressive of what will happen if their advice is not accepted; but at all events they are silent as to what the future of China will be, if shaped by the Chinese themselves in accordance with their ancient opinions. With your permission, I wish to bring this latter side of the picture prominently forward, and to say a few words on the future of China from the Pekin, and not the London, point of view. They may possibly serve to show that Chinese statesmen have less thought of foreign assistance in their plans than our reformers of their empire conceive to be necessary.

The present condition of China is such as must inspire the observer with a feeling of respect. In extreme age its Government exhibits all the vigour of youth, and now, fifteen years after it was supposed to be passing through the throes of dissolution, it stands, having given the most striking proof of military power, unconcerned to all appearance on the brink of a contest the outcome of which no man can see. Nor if we consider the subject in its details is the effect weakened. The supremacy of the law is evident from Yunnan to Manchuria, and from the coast to the Pamir. Rebellious states and races of hostile creeds are again united under the sway of the Bogdo Khan; and the authority of the emperor is as much respected at the extremities of his dominions as it is in the streets of his capital. At the same time the Manchu dynasty—which is after all of little importance in comparison with the Chinese nation—appears to have received a further lease of power. It could be wished that it were possible to feel more certain on this point, as one element of doubt in the problem would then be removed. The trade of the country is flourishing, and the resources of several of the larger provinces are being steadily developed. The vast tracts of country depopu-

lated during the civil wars are being gradually allotted to colonists, who will speedily restore them to their former state of prosperity. The finances are satisfactory, although there can be no doubt that extensive peculation prevails in the services; and the Chinese find less difficulty than many European Powers in borrowing money for the purchase of ironclads and improved weapons. There is no apparent reason for supposing that China's credit would very soon become exhausted, although a great war must inevitably shake foreign confidence. At the present time China possesses the nucleus of an army, the raw material for which she has always enjoyed, and the first step has been taken in the establishment of the Kiangnan Arsenal towards rendering it independent of foreign manufacturers. The alphabetical gunboats and the few ironclads that have been purchased represent the beginnings of a fleet which may one day be very powerful in the Eastern seas. The greater knowledge the Pekin statesmen have acquired of European countries and politics enables them to exercise their judgment in deciding when and where to act with vigour; and in many ways this, although the most difficult to grasp, is the most important advantage the Chinese have derived from the progress effected during the last fifteen years. Such then is the present position of China as exposed to our gaze. Her statesmen might be well content if the future were to be only a repetition of it; but they naturally aspire to a continuance of the same progress which would lead to the attainment of a height of prosperity justifying comparison with anything realized by the greatest of their emperors.

The remarkable successes of Chinese armies, which have been the ostensible means of promoting peace and prosperity at home, have not failed to enhance the national credit abroad. All the Mongol and Kirghiz tribes, some of whom are subjects of Russia, and also connected by ancient ties with China, have been stirred to their hearts' core by the victories of Tso Tsung Tang. Nor has the effect been restricted to these semi-civilized tribes. In Western Turkestan the *Tashkent Gazette* itself admits that there has been and still is great agitation in consequence of the reconquest of Kashgaria; and the independent courts of Burmah and Siam have been much exercised in their minds because of the demands made upon them by the Chinese. Within our own Indian borders, too, something of the same influence is percep-

tible. Neither Nepaul nor Cashmere has been an unconcerned witness of those events which have made the Chinese power more vigorous in Tibet, and which have brought the Celestials back to Sirikul and Khoten. To understand, therefore, in all its details the position which China at present occupies, it is necessary to take into consideration the reputation she has acquired among her neighbours as well as her internal condition. Without entering into historical particulars, it will suffice to say that the reputation won by Tso's victories, and by the pacification of Yunnan, is increased by the remembrance of China's prowess in the past, not only in Eastern Turkestan, but also on the banks of the Amour, and in the passes and valleys of Nepaul.

At the present time China raises a revenue which, at the lowest computation, exceeds fifty, and possibly reaches sixty, millions sterling; and, although much of this is paid in kind, and consequently re-spent in the local capitals, the Government can depend on this sum under all circumstances. In addition, another four millions are received annually from the customs of the ports open to foreign commerce, thus placing the Chinese revenue almost on an equality with that of India, including the return from the railways. In this direction China has not by any means reached the limit of her capacity, and, *apart from foreign trade altogether*, there is an illimitable field available for the employment of capital and labour to the advantage of the people and of the exchequer at the same time. The Chinese are among the lightest taxed people in the world, and the burden of contributing to the maintenance of the state only presses upon them in the exceptional districts where a disposition has been manifested to repudiate the obligations of citizenship. Until the means of communication have been improved to a certain extent—not, I must emphatically state, by the construction of railways which, except in a very few places, would be attended with quite as much danger as advantage to China—the progress must necessarily be slow; but, when the navigation of the rivers has been turned to better account, an expansion of the internal commerce, large as it at present is on the Yang-tse, may be expected on an extensive scale. The coal-mines in Kiangsi and Shantung are now being worked skilfully and successfully, while other provinces are not backward in developing their latent resources. In a very few years the results of this extraordinary activity in a direction where so little had been done must become

apparent, and both directly and indirectly the state will benefit by the increased wealth of the people. While most persons are asserting that the dislike to build railways is a proof of China's backwardness in the scale of civilization, I contend that there are many sound arguments to justify the hesitation shown by the Pekin ministers in sanctioning such enterprises. It may be admitted that railways would give a great impulse to foreign trade, and that consequently the Chinese would derive as much advantage as any one else from their construction; but the Government is guided in its policy by other considerations as well as those of pecuniary advantage. Even without railways Chinese commerce has reached a flourishing point, and it will be long before the Pekin ministry will be induced to disturb the *status quo*, and incur possible dangers for the sake of benefiting the foreign trade. If things go on at their present rate the Chinese can count on certain and very satisfactory returns as a balance in their favour on the foreign trade of the country. They have little to gain, and, perhaps, much to lose, by attempting to disturb the arrangements on which this trade exists.

Intimately connected with the subjects of the revenue and the trade of the state is the administration of the public service; and here we find many things that should not be permitted to exist. I will not go so far as to say that the Civil Service of China is an Augean stable waiting the advent of a Hercules; but certainly to purge it of the prevalent abuses, to instil fresh life into the ranks of its members, and to make them, in fact, as they are in name, public servants, will task the tact, courage, and perseverance of the ablest of administrators and the most determined of reformers. In this direction much remains to be done, and very possibly the only effectual remedy may prove to be one of resorting to extremities. But unless the labour is attempted everything accomplished in military re-organization and in statecraft can have only partial effect. The future power of China does not depend on any single condition being fulfilled or not, but certainly were any real reforms to be effected in the Civil Service, which is composed of the mental aristocracy of the country, a greater guarantee would have been obtained of the future before China than by any other measure that can be called to mind. Nor are the ruling powers blind to this. Various edicts on the subject have been issued, and, what is more important, a disposition has been shown

to employ officials in places of great trust and responsibility apart from their literary merits. This has the look of reverting to the plan of the great emperors of the first dynasties, who sought their ministers in the ranks of the people—that is to say, they rewarded original merit. Whenever a reform can be wholly or even partially carried out in this direction the Chinese Government will experience no difficulty in raising a revenue of one hundred millions sterling.

The first conclusion which, therefore, forces itself upon the mind is that China is a rich country, with a considerable revenue, susceptible under careful management of being almost doubled. Possessed of what are termed the sinews of war, she is also, to a greater extent than is supposed, independent of the foreign trade. It is much less of a necessity to her than it has become to a large section of the community at home among us, and, even were it otherwise, the grievances of a class would receive but scant attention if brought into conflict with the views of the Government. Unlike England, China subsists on her own produce, and could regard with equanimity the severance of all connection with the outer world, and unlike India also, her great rivers and ancient highways, which pass through the remotest districts of the empire, and only require a certain amount of repairing to be restored to their original usefulness, supply the ready means for protection against famine. All these facts relating to the commercial and financial condition of China have to to be taken into consideration and duly appreciated if we are to discuss, with any chance of arriving at sound conclusions, the future prospects of this empire in a world of rivalry in politics and in war. The financial and commercial independence of China is beyond question, despite the supposed value of the customs in the eyes of her rulers. These dues are in reality small matter of congratulation among thinking Chinese; for at the best they are only "the gilding of the pill." The practical conclusion at which we must arrive is that the foreign trade supplies no inducement to the Pekin Government to keep the peace with any foreign Power were it for other reasons to hold it safe and politic to embark upon a war; while it is no secret that there is much in that trade to which the official classes will never become reconciled. Having said this much on the natural progress that China should make in material matters, the remainder

of our attention may be directed to the probable development of China's military power, and to the consequences it must have as operating on her own policy and also on that of the nations brought into contact with her, particularly of Russia and England, her neighbours on the continent of Asia.

The military force of China numbers nominally nearly 800,000 men, but these are at present of course only on paper. It is divided into four divisions by Timkowsky, the Russian traveller, and in general matters his description, written fifty years ago, still applies. This large force is made up of 68,000 Manchus, 80,000 Mongols, and 625,000 Chinese. The last are divided into two bodies, the first of which partakes more of the character of a regular army than the second, and musters about half a million of men called the Green Flag army. The remaining Chinese division is a raw militia, and land is allotted to them for cultivation, their pay being too small to exist upon. The other soldiers receive four silver taels (nearly 27*s.*) per month. Timkowsky only returns the Mongol force at 48,000 men; but since the war the levies in Manchuria and Mongolia have been largely increased, and it is a low estimate to say that there are 30,000 more troups between Moukden and Kobdo now than there were when he travelled from Kiachta to Kalgan. While, therefore, we may take the strength of the Tartar army as falling little, if at all, short of the estimated 150,000 men, a very large deduction must be made from the Green Flag, and the resident militia which is subordinate to it. Yet it is from this force that the future armies of China must be created. The Bannermen of the Mongols, the *élite* of the dominant Manchus, are already enlisted. To their numbers it would be difficult to add any permanent reinforcement, although for hostilities on the Amour or the Irtish swarms of hardy clansmen are available to swell the garrisons of the northern districts to the proportions of a large and formidable army. And this observation serves to remind us of one of the great secrets of China's power. In whatever direction she may have to engage in a war she can depend that there will be no lack of fighting material once the nomad peoples recognize that she is in earnest. There is not another country that can say the same. A single reverse to Russia on a large scale in Central Asia would destroy the peace she has laboriously created in Turkestan.

The Green Flag army only partially exists as a fighting force.

No one who has read M. Huc's graphic description of the review which he witnessed during his return from Tibet can be expected to have a very high opinion of the soldiers of the Green Flag, for in those days they were only called out on rare occasions, and then the inspection made by the general was a pure sham. Their arms were of the most nondescript pattern, and, in a word, they were only civilians playing at soldiers once a year. "Yet the material was excellent" has been the comment of every writer on the subject since the French missionary. As yet no attempt has been made to reform this portion of the army as a whole. It was quite recently an accurate description to say that most of the men were to be found only on paper, while the Commander-in-chief drew pay for the total number.

But the hard law of necessity has worked out a partial improvement in spite of apathy in high places. The three great civil wars waged concurrently in the centre, the south, and the west of the empire, and the numerous risings which have accompanied them rendered it necessary in many provinces that the civilian Chinese should join the ranks, and thus in a short campaign he learnt more of soldiering than he had done during a lifetime of annual drills. Allowance must be made for these facts in considering the present condition of the Green Flag army, but I confess that the estimate of 300,000 effectives, which has been given me by an authority on the spot entitled to respect, appears to me to be excessive. It is true that the reviews are now held more frequently in towns and forts of the eastern provinces than at any previous epoch; but, allowing for all these causes of improvement, it may be doubted whether there are more than half that number of the Green Flag effective, in the most modest sense of the word. The principal evil at the root of this deficiency in the numbers of the Green Flag army is the corruption of the military authorities. The Commander-in-chief set the example which his subordinates were not slow to follow, and the burden of maintaining a force which did not exist fell heavily on the people of China. No reform which ignored the radical cause of the shortcomings of the national army could produce more than a very partial improvement, and until a few months ago there was no evidence that there was any party at Pekin in favour of the sweeping measures that are absolutely necessary to make the Green Flag force an army, in fact, and not in name. The evidence is now afforded by the

appointment of Prince Chun,[1] the emperor's father, to the post of Commander-in-chief. This has been regarded with considerable alarm by foreigners in China, as Prince Chun is their recognized enemy; but, on the other hand, in the interests of China it is an immense stride forward, as he is a man of great ability, and, moreover, the friend and patron of Tso Tsung Tang. One of his first steps will be to reform the Green Flag army, and, although he is considered to be inimical to Europeans, it is most probable that he will avail himself *at first* of their services. As his object is to create a national army he will undoubtedly dispense with them whenever he thinks they have served his turn. This is the extreme concession to Western ideas that may be expected from the party which, if not representing the exact progress Englishmen have sketched out for China, has a programme of its own well calculated to satisfy the Chinese and to preserve their empire.

The Tartar army is in a much higher state of efficiency, and great efforts have been made to arm it with modern weapons. The troops sent to Turkestan have been supplied with Berdan rifles, and the Pekin garrison includes a large detachment placed on the same footing. More recently a large quantity of rifles has been purchased in the United States, and these are now being rapidly distributed to the troops in Kansuh, Mongolia, and Pechili. A still more decided step in advance has been taken by the establishment of the arsenal and shipyard at Kiangnan, near Shanghai, for the Chinese already obtain from it nearly if not all the ammunition required for their army. The small-arms factory is not yet in full working order, but artillery of considerable calibre has been turned out. During last year twenty Armstrong forty-pounders, manufactured by Chinese hands, and tested by English engineers, were completed by the Kiangnan officials and sent to join "the active army." Since then seven-inch 150-pounders have been constructed with like success, and these are to be placed in the forts on the Peiho. In a very short time the Kiangnan Arsenal will have rendered China independent of the foreigner in the necessaries for an army; and there is no reason why it should not be maintained in a fair state of efficiency by the Chinese themselves, without even the aid of foreign superintendents.

Kiangnan has yet to earn its laurels as a naval dockyard. A

[1] In the summer of 1884 Prince Chun was summoned to take the prominent place in the administration previously held by his brother, Prince Kung.

terrible storm during the typhoon last year did extensive damage, and threw the works out of gear, so that the Chinese navy consists only of foreign purchased vessels. But this is to be remedied as speedily as possible. Within a certain space of time, which may be either more than ten years or much less, Kiangnan will be an arsenal and shipyard vying in its way with anything we possess. The works already cover 220 acres; the future before it might prove to be what would now seem incredible. This instance alone opens up a boundless vista for speculation, and there are other circumstances scarcely less striking which furnish proof of the remarkable progress China can make on her own initiative and with scarcely any foreign aid.

There now only remains in conclusion to say a few words on the probable effect these reforms and organic changes will have upon the foreign policy of the Pekin Government. Let it be assumed that ten years hence China has a fairly disciplined and well armed army of half a million of men, that her arsenals suffice to supply all her wants in arms, ammunition, and torpedoes, and that her navy for coast and river purposes is respectable, what would be the probable attitude of the Pekin Government towards foreign Powers? The question loses little of its significance if the period has to be put off for another decade, and the war, which is morally certain to take place between Russia and China within the shorter period, must, be it remembered, hasten the arrival of that time, because the Chinese will have to learn in the hard school of necessity where they have already learnt so much. A war fought either in Central Asia or in Mongolia would be one in which China could, and would if necessary, throw away several armies. Under such conditions it would be hard if her soldiers did not become veterans, or her leaders capable. It is probable then that within ten years China will be in a position to hold her own, and to shape her policy not in deference to foreign Powers, but in accordance with her own instincts, which warn her to have as little to do with foreigners as possible until she can treat with them on a perfect level of equality.

The prospect thus raised up cannot be expected to appear a pleasant one in the eyes of those who have regarded China as a factor of no importance[1] in Asian politics; but no sensible man,

[1] "Une quantité negligeable," as M. Ferry expressed it last year.

anxious to discern the future, can close his eyes to what is almost the inevitable. So far as India is concerned the danger from China's military growth is not of a kind to inspire us with much apprehension, although China's interest in Burmah, Nepaul, and even Cashmere, is much more active than is allowed by Anglo-Indians. But as China's new policy will be framed on the old lines laid down by the experience of centuries, teaching her what is requisite on the land side, and as India has always been outside her influence, there will be no danger of a collision between ourselves and the Chinese, until at all events we have advanced to Bhamo, or to a point threatening the road from Bathang to Tibet. Also, no invader would be opposed with greater unanimity than the Chinese would be by the whole population of Hindostan. There will be great opportunity therefore for showing diplomatic ability in settling the Burmese difficulty, which cannot be much longer put off, but no settlement will be satisfactory if it gives umbrage to China.

With regard to Russia, there are no similar reasons for anticipating that a hostile collision can be averted. From Sagalien to the Kizil Yart, at Kuldja, Chuguchak, Ourga, and Haylar, the interests of the two empires meet, and they meet only to conflict. The caravan trade through Kiachta has been forced on the Chinese, partly by the strong hand, and partly by the astuteness of the Russians; but it has always been distasteful at Pekin. More serious cause for disagreement is to be found in the unsettled questions connected with the frontier in the upper Amour region, and in the fact that Baikal has been made a Russian lake. Nor is the forcible annexation twenty years ago of the maritime province of Manchuria either condoned or forgotten. The dispute with respect to Kuldja has brought all these latent differences to the surface, and the complications must sooner or later develop into a struggle between Russia and China for supremacy in Northern Asia. The best energies of the Chinese will be devoted to that contest, which, whether its result be victory or defeat, will further quicken the progress of the empire; but apart from it the day is very near at hand when the Pekin Government will be able to carry out, in its own way, and on conditions which it approves, its policy towards foreign states, especially in regard to matters of external trade.

XI.

THE MONGOLS.[1]

AT the time when the Danes were carrying fire and sword through the eastern shires of this island and the northern provinces of France, there first appeared in the north-east corner of Asia a race of warriors formidable to their neighbours by their military prowess, and destined to exercise a wider sway, and to carry the terror of their name farther, than even the legionaries of Imperial Rome. Issuing several centuries later from their unknown and almost impenetrable retreat in the wild but fertile country of the region of the Amour, they swept all opposition from their path, whether on the part of the other nomads, who speedily assimilated themselves with the rising clan, or of the civilizations of China and of Europe. Neither the numbers of the Celestials, nor the chivalry of the Latin and Teuton nations, availed against the heavier-armed and impetuous horsemen who swarmed round the banners of the Mongol leaders. It needed but that Batu Khan should have been a second Genghis to have placed Europe at the feet of the same race which gave dynasties to China and most of the states of Asia, including, at a later period, Hindostan. During two centuries the Mongols were indisputably the first soldiers in the world, for not only were their strength and valour of the highest quality, but their tactics were

[1] *The Edinburgh Review*, October, 1880.

based on scientific principles superior to those known to any of their opponents. The deeds of this conquering people have occupied a large place in the world's history, and must excite interest whenever recounted; but, until Mr. Howorth[1] took upon himself the laborious task of collecting all the information bearing upon the subject, the reader had considerable difficulty in arriving at even a general idea with regard to their history. The excuse for remaining in ignorance upon the subject is removed by the publication, within the last four years, of the three goodly volumes which it has been Mr. Howorth's privilege and pleasure to write. Of the labour he has expended in making his work so complete that it will not require to be repeated, it is impossible to speak too highly. With almost unexampled assiduity he has ransacked every available source of information, from the history of Abul Ghazi to the learned writings of Professor Gregorieff, and every circumstance in the annals of the Mongols, in all their ramifications, during ten centuries, is preserved and written down in his pages. This herculean task being thus completely and, as we shall proceed to show, satisfactorily performed, it is the more to be regretted that Mr. Howorth did not permit himself to devote closer attention to his style and method of arrangement. He has been content to sacrifice form to substance, and, while students of history will benefit by his great assiduity, it is probable that he himself will suffer by not receiving the full recognition his meritorious achievement deserves. Mr. Howorth has, however, undoubtedly succeeded in erecting a durable monument among thinking men to his own erudition and powers of research.

In the Chinese histories of the Tang dynasty (618–907 A.D.) mention is repeatedly made of a great nomadic race called Shi-wei on the northern frontier, and in the ninth century the Mongu clan is specially referred to. During several centuries these people lived on terms of friendship with the Chinese, sending their tribute to the capital, and carrying on general commercial relations with the empire. They were much less a source of trouble than the Hiongnou, the nomad tribes holding Gobi and the adjoining districts, and they might even have been considered in the light of allies of the Chinese, with some of whose ruling families they claimed

[1] "History of the Mongols, from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century." By Henry H. Howorth, F.S.A. Part I. The Mongols Proper and the Kalmuks. London: 1876. Part II. (In two divisions.) London: 1880.

blood connection. On the other hand, ethnographical distinctions apart, the Shi-wei and the Hiongnou occupied towards China precisely the same position. They were both nomadic peoples living by the spoil of the chase, and by what their right hands could win, brought into contact with the civilization and the wealth of China. The rich cities and fertile provinces of that country offered a temptation not to be resisted, and early in the eleventh century we find that the Mongus or Mongols were implicated in raids within the frontier. On this occasion they were completely baffled, and the Imperial troops inflicted several defeats with much loss upon them. During the next hundred years matters progressed after a very similar manner, and then the Mongol chief Kabul Khan went to the court of the Kin emperor, and took an oath of fealty to him. This pledge sat very lightly on his conscience, and shortly after his return (1137 A.D.) he began hostilities against the Chinese. In this war Kabul was victorious, and no fewer than three armies sent by the Kin ruler to defend the frontier were defeated and destroyed. He also successfully carried on a bitter contest with his nomadic neighbours, and, on his death, left to his heirs the beginnings of the great empire which it was to be their task to consolidate and extend. We may pass on to his grandson Yissugei, who was the first to openly refuse to recognize the claims of China to suzerain rights, and to declare himself the ruler of an independent people under the style of "Emperor of the Great Mongols." Under his guidance the power of the Mongols greatly increased, and his influence was exercised towards the close of his life in restoring to Wang Khan, ruler of the Keraits—who is identified with the celebrated Prester John—the kingdom which his uncle Gurkhan had appropriated. Yissugei did not live long after this event, dying, as the legend puts it, of poison given him by his hereditary enemies, the Tartars, while accepting their hospitality. He had done much towards the consummation of the ambitious dreams of his ancestors, and he left their full realization to the abler hands of his son Temujin, known to all the world as Genghis Khan.

The story is told, in all the picturesque language of Oriental fancy, of how Yissugei, hunting with his brothers in the country of the Tartars, had come across a single chieftain and his wife, Ogelen Eke. Yissugei exclaimed, "This woman will bear a valiant son," and forthwith they carried her off to his home. Yissugei

made her his wife, and she became the mother of a boy who was called Temujin, from the name of an opponent whom Yissugei had just defeated in battle. This notable event took place at Dilun Boldak on the Onon, which becomes the Shilka branch of the Amour, and the balance of evidence favours the supposition that it occurred in the year 1162 A.D., although the Chinese and some other accounts place it five years earlier. At first it appeared as if the death of Yissugei would be followed by the disintegration of the clan. Several of the leading chiefs refused to obey a boy, or to accept a woman as regent, and, withdrawing themselves from the confederation, sought to establish independent administrations. Temujin was too young as yet to battle for his own cause, but his mother, the Tartar captive of fifteen years before, raised the royal standard and presented a bold front to the rebels. Soon Temujin was able to take his own part, but he fared badly, being made captive by his enemies, who forced him to submit to the indignity of the *cangue*. From the state of servitude to which he was reduced he had the good fortune to escape, but he nearly fell into a greater danger. The caution of his mother and the devotion of a few personal friends, added to his own intrepidity, saved him from this fresh peril. Temujin was now seventeen years of age, and many who had deserted the young prince were attracted back to him by the evidences of valour and sagacity which he was already affording. At this period his following mustered 13,000 men, whom he divided into thirteen battalions or *gurans*. He appointed officers and instituted an effective form of discipline, thus acquiring the nucleus of a regular army. He promptly turned the advantage derived from this military efficiency to account against his neighbours, and on one occasion he defeated with heavy loss a Tartar force of three times his own number. From this time onwards Temujin's power steadily increased, and slowly but surely he was welding into a consolidated state the whole of the tribes of Mongolia, although these included races opposed to each other by hereditary feuds. Towards the close of the twelfth century Temujin assisted the Chinese in a war with the Tartars, and for this he received a title of honour from the Chinese general. This circumstance affords proof of the vigilance of the Celestial Government in this direction, and also that the Mongols had at this time not yet broken off all friendly intercourse with it.

While matters were apparently progressing thus favourably, a league was suddenly formed between all his enemies and rivals against the young Mongol chief, and not only was his career arrested, but he was compelled to seek safety by flight into the desert. He did not despair, and rallying round him the relics of his army, and profiting by the disunion of his opponents, he speedily regained all, and more than all, he had lost. The completeness of his success was fully attested by the conquest of the country of the Keraits and the death of their chief, Wang Khan. To this triumph he added a not less important one over the Naimans, and one of the principal results of this latter success was that he secured the services of Tatakun, an Oighur Turk, at that period the most lettered people in Asia. Tatakun became one of Temujin's most trusted advisers, and was appointed tutor to his sons. It was after this campaign that a general council was summoned at a place near the sources of the Onon, for the purpose of conferring a higher title on the leader who had raised his clan to the rank of a great people. At this assembly it was decided that, as the title of Gur Khan had been humbled by the overthrow of so many of that rank, Temujin should take the new and higher name of Genghis, Jingis, or Zingis Khan, or in whatever other way it may be spelt, meaning "Very mighty Khan." Within a very short time after the assumption of this style Genghis resolved to give lustre to it by undertaking a great expedition into the northern provinces of China, then divided into two kingdoms. In the north the Tartar dynasty of the Kins had established a kingdom with its capital near the modern Pekin, and including the provinces of Pechili, Shansi, Shantung, Honan, and parts of Shensi and Kiangnan, while in the south the native Sungs still bore sway. In 1209, on the occasion of a new Kin emperor ascending the throne, Genghis was requested to pay him tribute, a demand usually made of all the desert chiefs. To comply with this Genghis flatly refused, saying that he would never debase himself before an imbecile like the Kin emperor. This act was considered tantamount to a declaration of war, and both sides prepared for the struggle.

Genghis had carefully considered the question of the invasion of China, and had come to the conclusion that there was nothing impossible in an attempt to overthrow the Kins, who were much hampered in their movements by the Chinese kingdom of the

Sungs. In 1211 the Mongol army set out on its great expedition from the banks of the Kerulon, and, having traversed the intervening desert, appeared in front of the Great Wall, garrisoned in this portion by the Ongut tribe. The treachery of their chief saved the invaders the trouble of forcing the great barrier erected by Tsin-Hoangti; and the northern provinces of China lay open and exposed at their feet without a blow. Mr. Howorth describes the results of this the first of Genghis's campaigns on a large scale in the following words—

"At length in 1212 he laid siege to Taitong-fu. This successfully resisted his attack, and having been wounded by an arrow he retired once more into the desert. His invasion of China had been an almost continuous success. He had broken the prestige of the Kin soldiery, and had tested the skill of his officers."

This success was the greatest possible encouragement to the Mongols to renew the attack; and, in the following year, Genghis led a fresh and larger host into Pechili. All the other tribes, notably the Tanguts, were excited by these victories, and seized the opportunity to assail the much-harassed Kins, who, far from showing a united front to their enemies, were engaged in intrigues and quarrels that effectually sapped their strength. Genghis's second campaign closed with his conclusive triumph. An imperial princess was given to the conqueror as a wife, accompanied by a large dower in jewels and slaves. The Mongols then withdrew, laden with booty, but with the full resolve to speedily return. Each of the years immediately following witnessed a fresh inroad into China on the part of the Mongols, further concessions by the Kin emperor, and the gradual extension of the sway of Genghis across the Great Wall and the Hoang-ho in the direction of the interior of China. These events struck terror to the heart of the Kin ruler, who, unable to vanquish his antagonists, conceived that it would be prudent to remove his place of residence to a greater distance from the frontier. Genghis took umbrage at this change in the capital, on the plea that it showed distrust of his intentions! He accordingly ordered a fresh invasion of China at the same time that the province of Leaou-tung was annexed, and the kingdom of Corea brought within the range of his influence.

These constant wars raised the military qualifications of his soldiers to a high point, and afforded an opportunity for several

great generals to reveal themselves. Prominent among these was the veteran Muhule, who wrested Leaou-tung from the Kins, and thus extended his master's dominions to the Eastern Sea. In the year after this success he led a large army into China charged with the special mission, not, as formerly, of ravaging the fair cities and plains of that empire, but of permanently conquering and appropriating as much of it as proved feasible. Victory followed victory with singular rapidity. In two campaigns Muhule captured all the fortified cities on the northern frontier, and drove the Chinese army from the field. In 1218 the Kin emperor wished to come to terms with the invader, but Muhule's curt reply was that the only terms on which he could treat were that the emperor should hand over his dominions to Genghis, and accept at his hands the title of Prince of Honan. Helpless as that ruler had become, death itself was preferable to a loss of honour and power so great as was involved in this demand. Muhule thereupon resumed his operations, which had as their principal objects the forcing of the famous pass of Tung-kuan in Shensi, and the capture of the southern capital, or Nankin. In the former Muhule was successful, but, his death occurring soon afterwards, he failed to realize the second object, which was the dream of his life. "For forty years," he said, "have I made war and fought for my master in his great enterprises, and I was never defeated. My only regret is that I have not yet captured Nankin." The affection of his soldiers, and the desire of his officers and generals to further his designs and promote his power, were not the least striking points of resemblance between the most famous of Asian conquerors and the great Napoleon.

Meanwhile events of greater importance had been in progress in the countries lying far to the west of China. During five years Muhule had conducted the war in China. Where were Genghis and his warlike sons during that period? It is necessary that we should now turn to and describe those events which made the names of Mongol and Tartar, indifferently used, household words in this continent. A series of events which it is unnecessary to describe had attracted the attention of Genghis to the regions lying west of the great desert of Gobi, where rulers inimical to himself had ousted the once celebrated dynasty of the Gur Khans. The old feud between the Tartar and the Mongol threatened to break out again under conditions less favourable to the latter than

formerly, unless the danger were promptly nipped in the bud. In a single campaign Genghis's general, Chepe, conquered the whole of the vast region from the banks of the Amour to the slopes of the Pamir. The hostile leader was made prisoner in the remote valleys of Badakshan, and his head was sent as a token of triumph to Genghis. This brilliant success brought the Mongols into direct contact with the great western empire of Khwaresm, which, under its then ruler, Mahomed Shah, had reached a remarkable height of prosperity. From the Indus to the vicinity of Bagdad, and as far north as the Kirghiz Steppe, his authority was recognized as supreme. Genghis wished to avoid a hostile collision with this powerful neighbour, and at first it appeared as if neither potentate desired to provoke a contest which would certainly be a bitter and an arduous one. Genghis even went so far as to write a letter expressing his friendship for the Shah of Khwaresm. "I send these greetings," he wrote. "I know thy power, and the vast extent of thine empire. I regard thee as my most cherished son. On thy part thou must know that I have conquered China and all the Turkish nations north of it. Thou knowest that my country is a magazine of soldiers, a mine of silver, and that I have no need of other lands. I take it we have an equal interest in encouraging trade between our subjects." But although both potentates wished for peace and a good understanding between their subjects, circumstances proved too strong for them, and the irrepressible passions of two rival peoples lit up the flames of war, despite the friendly utterances of both Genghis and Mahomed Shah. Mongol merchants murdered in the light of day, and haughty replies from the Khwaresmian ruler to requests for reparation, necessitated the advance of the Mongol warriors, thus inviting the scourge which was to desolate the fairest kingdoms of two continents.

In the spring of 1218, while Muhule was proceeding with the conquest of China, Genghis left his capital Karakoram at the head of an army of several hundred thousand men. He divided it into two divisions, one operating south, and the other north, of the great Tian Shan range, but both instructed to pursue their career steadily towards the west. His son, Juji, who commanded the former army, was the first to encounter the main force of Mahomed Shah, and he defeated it in one of those sanguinary engagements which have been of such frequent occurrence in the

annals of Asia. Mahomed Shah, unnerved by this preliminary disaster, withdrew all his armies from the field, hoping to have better fortune in the defence of his cities. The contest then developed into a succession of sieges, and in this kind of warfare the Mongols showed themselves to be not less adepts than in manœuvres and strategy in the field. As has been proved at every stage of history, from the time of the siege of Troy downwards, those who stand purely on the defensive in war court inevitable defeat. Mahomed Shah practically abandoned the contest, while he remained defiant. He admitted his inferiority at the same time that he took no effectual measures to ensure an honourable issue out of the conflict. Even had it been possible to arrest the torrent of the Mongols, he remained too long apathetic in face of the peril. The principal cities of his once magnificent kingdom surrendered one after the other. Otrar, Khodjent, and the chief places in Eastern Ferghana, fell before Juji, while Genghis, in person, having captured Tashkent and Nurata, marched on Bokhara, garrisoned by 20,000 of the best troops of Khwaresm. The garrison, unable to defend their charge, attempted, but in vain, to cut their way through the Mongols; the city was given up to pillage, and the able-bodied men were put to the sword. Samarcand, the capital, at this period, not only of Trans-Oxiana, but of the whole of Central Asia, was the next place to incur the wrath of the great conqueror, who applied to himself the title of being "the scourge of God," for, he said, "if you were not great criminals, God would not have permitted me to have thus punished you." Before this city the whole of the Mongol forces concentrated, and a large body of mercenaries included in the garrison deserted to them, thus putting a sudden termination to all prospect of defending it. On its surrender Samarcand was given over to the Mongols to plunder, and a large number of its inhabitants were sent into slavery; while the faithless mercenaries were slaughtered, on the ground that they who could not be faithful to one master must prove equally untrue to a second. The unfortunate Mahomed fled before the invaders to the remotest quarter of Khorasan, where he died on the shores of the Caspian, only three years after he had reached the pinnacle of power in Western Asia.

The capture of Samarcand completed the conquest of the Turanian kingdoms, but, whether impelled by the mere lust of

conquest or by some deep political motive which, after this long interval, it is impossible for us to comprehend, Genghis, far from remaining satisfied with the brilliant successes he had achieved, resolved to cross the Oxus and to turn his arms against the peoples of Iran. At this time, it is true, Mahomed Shah still lived, and his return with fresh troops from Khorasan was an event in itself not improbable. Genghis sent several armies across the Oxus under his son Tuli, and the experienced general Chepe Noyan. Four cities of the first rank, Merv, Balkh, Herat, and Nishapore, were their immediate objects, and all these cities either surrendered or fell into their power after protracted sieges. The Mongols repeated these triumphs in the interior of Persia, as well as against Mahomed Shah's son Jellaluddin in the Kara Kum desert. They then marched on Khiva (Urgendj), which after a brave defence fell before the energy of Ogotai. Not content with plundering the city and sending the able-bodied members of the population into slavery, the Mongols, in a spirit of ruthless spite, opened the dykes of the Oxus and flooded the great metropolis of Khwaresm. It is instructive to discover that in all these sieges the Mongols acted upon systematic principles. They drew up their lines in front of the besieged city; they raised mounds, on which they erected their batteries, so as to overlook the walls and command the interior of the place; and from their batteries they hurled stones, stink-pots, and shells charged with naphtha—engines of war unknown to any of their opponents. They captured one city by such slow processes as the means enumerated, the next by a vigorous attack, and the third by some act of treachery so sublime in its wickedness that it remains to the present day without being surpassed. All means were justifiable in their eyes, so that the result was victory and the attainment of their object. The further exploits of Genghis were the capture of Bamian after a first repulse, of Ghuzni, whence he drove Jellaluddin over the Indus, and of Peshawur, where for a time he pitched his quarters. Two of his generals ventured into the Punjab, but were compelled by the weather and want of supplies to beat a hasty retreat from before Mooltan. His long absence from Karakoram had had the effect of creating dissensions among the numerous tribal leaders and military chiefs, amongst whom the supreme authority of Genghis alone sufficed to maintain harmony and union. He wintered in the vicinity of the Indus, and then

returned by forced marches to the Amour, thus saving India from sharing in the common overthrow.

Before drawing to a conclusion this sketch of the career of the great conqueror, something must be said of the first inroad of the Mongols into our continent, and of the remarkable expedition headed by Chepe against the rulers of Georgia, Astrakhan, and the Crimea. It has already been stated that the force entrusted to that able commander had captured the royal cities of Khorasan, and penetrated into the interior of Persia; and in this direction also they strove to carry out the uncompromising principle of there being no satisfactory limits to their conquests except those set by nature. The overthrow of Khwaresm had not been complete without the conquest of Persia, and the latter rendered the invasion of Georgia absolutely necessary. The Mongols recognized no reason for hesitating to advance the audacious claim to the sovereignty of the human race. Chepe's later campaign proved another succession of victories. The capture of Tabriz was soon followed by that of Tiflis, and, having rendered his rear secure against hostile attack by the occupation of Hamadan, he prepared to cross the Caucasus into Europe. The Mongols then advanced, carrying everything before them, to the north as far as the modern town of Astrakhan, and to the west as far as the site on which Odessa now stands. The power of the Kipchaks was shattered, and a prayer went forth to the Russians of Volhynia and Gallicia that they should band together all the Eastern peoples of Europe in a league against the hordes of Asia. Prominent among the Russian princes was Mitislaf of Gallicia, and it was to him in particular that the vanquished looked as the leader in this enterprise. He fully realized the danger, and, accepting the propositions made to him, declared at Kief a holy war against the terrible assailants who appeared to be satisfied with nothing short of the extermination of their enemies. Whether Chepe dreaded the coming storm, or only wished to obtain the information necessary to measure it with greater exactitude, it is certain that the Mongols sent an embassy to Kief deprecating the hostile action of the Russian prince. Mitislaf's sole reply was to order the murder of the envoys, and Chepe could only rejoin: "You have killed our envoy; as you wish for war, you shall have it. We have done you no harm. God is impartial, He will decide our quarrel;" and then the Mongol forces resumed their march

westward. Passing over minor encounters, the two hosts met on the banks of the Kalka river, when, after a stubbornly contested engagement, the Russians were completely defeated and driven from the field. The Mongols, as was their wont, disgraced their triumph by the barbarous and insensate massacre of their prisoners, and, having vanquished the chivalry of Eastern Europe, there was nothing left to arrest their progress in any movement against the Latin races which they might care to undertake. Happily for Europe, Genghis at this crisis recalled Chepe to Asia.

Upon Genghis's return to Karakoram he devoted all his attention during the remainder of his life to the completion of his conquests in China, and when he died the task, though still unfinished, had been rendered, by the skill of his general Muhule and by his own exertions, a comparatively easy one for those who came after him. It was while engaged in this design that he was seized with a fatal illness, of which Mr. Howorth enumerates several poetic versions, and he was buried in great state at a spot near the sources of that river Onon, round which his tribe had gradually expanded into a race of world-conquerors. The record of the deeds of few conquerors furnishes as notable a history as the life of this great ruler. Originally little more than an uncouth and savage barbarian, Genghis became by his own merit not only the best general, but also the most skilful administrator and the greatest prince of his age; and, as Mr. Howorth very truly observes, he "holds a foremost place among the men who have influenced the history of the world." The extent of his conquests and the splendour of his achievements make a great and lasting impression upon the mind, but in his case the little that we know accurately makes it seem probable that, if we were possessed of more copious details as to the difficulties which beset his path, and as to his manner of triumphing over them, we should raise him to a still higher pedestal than that allotted him by general consent as the most terrible of human conquerors.

Ogotai was named by Genghis as his heir in preference to either Tuli or Chaghtai, and the first resolve of the new ruler was to continue, until completed, the wars with the Kin emperors of China, which Muhule had fought with such remarkable ability and unvarying success. The death of their great chief, and the ceremonies—not undisturbed, we may be sure, by the jealousies and the rivalry of the brother claimants—attending both his

obsequies and the selection of his successor had so much distracted the attention of the Mongols, that their border officers became, for a brief space, careless in face of the enemy. A returning wave of energy and confidence to the generals of the Kin emperor enabled them to take advantage of this apathy and inflict several defeats upon the Mongols. Ogotai then resolved to lead his armies in person, and his brother Tuli received an important command. During two years the brothers carried on hostilities, with almost uniform success, in China, and after their return to Mongolia their general Subitai continued the war with a like result. In the later battles the Chinese dynasty of the Sungs, which ruled at this time over Southern China, assisted the Mongols against their former conquerors the Kins. In May, 1234, the last of the Kin emperors, after valiantly opposing the united armies of the Mongols and the Sungs, committed suicide sooner than fall into the hands of the enemy. The alliance between the conquerors did not prove of long duration. The Sungs had hoped to profit by the fall of the Kins, and doubtless thought that the Mongols wished rather for plunder than for permanent conquests. In this mistaken view they were to be speedily undeceived. By an arrangement made with the Mongol commanders it had been proposed to indemnify the Sung ruler for his share in the war with the province of Honan; but the Mongols refused to hand over that valuable possession when the time came to fulfil their promise. The Sungs, in a moment of confidence, declared war, and attempted to enforce their claims. At first their troops were successful, but the Mongols, recovering from their surprise, drove them back into their former territory. The Sungs, having discovered their weakness, would then have made peace; but it was too late. Their overthrow and the conquest of their possessions had been decreed at a Kuriltai or general council of the Mongol leaders; and nothing but their own valour could avert the same catastrophe which had befallen the Kins.

During the last years of the reign of Ogotai, the Mongol armies attacked the Sung kingdom from three sides; but, although victorious on several occasions, the result remained uncertain when that ruler died. The Mongol armies succeeded in reducing many of the cities north of the great river Yang-tse-kiang, but the Sungs were far indeed from being reduced to extremities. At this stage in the war, Ogotai, whose brother Tuli had died some years

before, fell ill, and shortly afterwards expired. He appears to have been an able ruler, and his policy was certainly much more humane than his father's had been. Mr. Howorth adduces several instances of the generosity and natural kindliness with which he tempered the rigorous maxims of the Mongols. Whether it is to be attributed to the discipline of his people, or to his own ability, history shows that, while his selection as Khakhan was not at first popular, no attempt was made during his reign of fourteen years to dispute his authority. The Mongol leaders, commanding armies capable of giving dynasties to the kingdoms they had won, never ventured to question his decisions, and yielded implicit obedience to the mandates of Karakoram. The empire of Genghis became vaster and more consolidated in the hands of his son Ogotai.

Ogotai's death proved the prelude to grave troubles for the Mongols; but these may be very briefly summarized. Ogotai had named his grandson Shiramun his heir, but by the activity of the Empress Turakina this arrangement was set aside in favour of her eldest son, Kuyuk, when, being appointed regent, she held the attributes of power in her own hands. A great Kuriltai was held as soon as time had been given to the Mongol chiefs at the extremities of the empire to reach the capital, where a large assemblage of the royal princes, generals, governors, and the ambassadors of the tributaries was brought together as representative of the Mongol power. Among those present on this occasion was the monk Carpino, who had been sent by the Pope and the Council of Lyons to convert the Mongols, and who has left us an interesting description of the ceremony. Although Ogotai died in December, 1241, the proclamation of Kuyuk did not take place until five years later (Aug., 1246), and during the interval Turakina had governed the empire. Kuyuk's reign was of the briefest, as he died less than two years after his appointment as Khakhan. The seal which he adopted bore on it the following inscription, which may be quoted as showing what were the views of the Mongols with regard to other nations. "God in heaven, and Kuyuk on earth, by the power of God the ruler of all men." Kuyuk was succeeded by his cousin Mangu, the eldest son of Tuli, and the new ruler began his reign with a succession of reforms promising well for the prosperity of the empire. Having adjusted the finances which had been thrown into confusion by

the extravagance of Kuyuk, he placed experienced officers at the head of affairs, and gave a command in the field to his brother Kublai. The latter took upon himself the control of the Chinese provinces, and made systematic preparations for the conquest of the Sung kingdom.

In 1252, Kublai's preparations were completed, and he began the campaign with an attack on the western portion of the province of Szchuen. Yunnan, however, was his principal object, and after crossing the difficult mountains of Szchuen, and transporting his army across the Kincha river on rafts, he reached one of the capitals, the present town of Talifoo. After a short absence to relate his exploits to Mangu, Kublai returned to Yunnan, the whole of which he speedily reduced. He then waged wars with the same success against the Lolos tribes and the kings of Ava, Anam, and Tonquin. The Sung kingdom still remained outside the dominion of the Mongols, but these later triumphs in the countries lying to the west and south of it had paved the way for its overthrow. At this period Mangu, jealous probably of the growing fame of his brother, resolved to assume in person the command of his armies in China, announcing at the same time that he would not sheath the sword until the dominions of the Sung had been incorporated with his empire. The war opened auspiciously with the capture of Chentu, the chief town of Szchuen; but before it had proceeded very far, Mangu either died of dysentery, or was killed by an arrow before the walls of Hochow, to which he was laying close siege. Discouraged by this untoward occurrence, the Mongol armies withdrew, and much of the fruits of previous victory was lost for the moment.

Notwithstanding his brother's death, Kublai continued his march through China. When he reached the great Yang-tse-kiang, the bulwark of the Sungs on the north, he was told that the Chinese were fully persuaded that it was an insurmountable barrier. A small band of his troops under a determined leader crossed in barges, and, beating back the Sung army, made good the passage for the main body. The news of intrigues at Karakoram, where Mangu's youngest brother Arikbuka was endeavouring to obtain the succession to the throne, induced him to conclude a hurried arrangement with the Sung general, who consented in his master's name to pay tribute to the Mongol. Kublai did not, however, deem it safe to proceed farther north than to Pekin,

where he was proclaimed by his followers Khakhan. This informal manner of election made Kublai's authority only partially recognized by the Mongols. Of the empire which stretched from the China seas to the Vistula and the Danube, and from the Indian Ocean to the Scythian solitudes, Kublai cannot be considered as the sole ruler. Mangu was the last of the great Khans in a strict sense, and Kublai gradually merged the sonorous title of Khakhan of the Mongols in the less extensive, but scarcely less brilliant, rank of Emperor of China.

Mr. Howorth describes, with an amplitude of detail which leaves nothing to be desired, the family history and the domestic feuds of the princes of the House of Genghis. Into these we cannot attempt to enter, but must continue to devote our attention to the career of Kublai, to the establishment of the Yuen dynasty on the throne of China, and to the fortunes and eventual overthrow of the Mongols by the Chinese Mings. Having done this, we will retrace our steps to consider the Mongol wars in Asia Minor, Russia, and Hungary, and to narrate those events which in their dramatic character struck terror into the hearts of the European nations at the name of the Mongol hordes. In conclusion, the events of importance in modern history will be considered, and the influence the Mongol traditions are likely to exert on political questions in the future. The vast extent of the ground embraced by the Mongols, and included in Mr. Howorth's pages, may be inferred from the numerous points—and some only have been mentioned—which suggest themselves for consideration.

Arikbuka caused himself to be proclaimed Khakhan at Karakoram almost at the same time that Kublai took the same step at Pekin; but he was unable to make good his claim with the sword. Kublai defeated him in several battles, and at last Arikbuka was fain to accept the generous terms offered him by his brother. Kublai then turned his exclusive attention to the war with the Sungs, which may be thus briefly summarised. One of Kublai's first acts was to give the style of Yuen, which means "original," to his dynasty, and to adopt a generally friendly policy towards the Chinese. In fact, before this the Mongols had adopted the character and many of the customs and ceremonies of the Celestials; and, while the previous Mongol rulers had been regarded solely in the light of foreign invaders, Kublai had become, by his gracious demeanour and carefully considered policy, far from per-

sonally distasteful to the mass of the Chinese. The great siege of Sian Yang, which continued during three years, absorbed all the energy of the combatants, and before it closed with the triumph of the Mongols whole armies had been swallowed up in its defence. The exigencies of war had by this time produced a change in the customs of the Mongols; for, whereas the deserter had formerly to expect at their hands no sympathy, he was now always welcomed, and generally re-established in the posts he had previously held. A general inclination was shown on both sides to conclude a useless and sanguinary war; and the following incident, while proving both the valour and the fidelity of the Sung officers, shows that the Mongols were able to temper their natural fierceness with a show of moderation and a generous recognition of the courage of the enemy—

"The surrender of the town of Chi-chow is memorable for an act which ought to be recorded by those who would raise the repute of women for heroic conduct. Its commander, Chao Mao Ta, was pressed to surrender by one of his subordinates; he refused. Some time after, suspecting that his subordinate was carrying on secret intrigues with the enemy, and feeling that resistance could not be prolonged, he assembled his relations and friends at a feast, and told them that he could not survive the disgrace of surrendering the city. He bade his wife, Yong Chi, seek a place of refuge. She replied that she felt enough of courage to show herself worthy of him. He laughed, but he laughed in vain; for, having distributed his goods among his relations, she retired with him, and they committed suicide together. Bayan, the Mongol general, was much touched by this act of heroism, and himself performed the funeral ceremonies for them on his knees amidst the praises of the Chinese."

The Chinese were, after the fall of this stronghold, defeated in several pitched encounters, as much through the incompetence of their generals as by the superior valour of the Mongols. The energy of the Mongol general, Bayan, gave them no breathing-time to recover from the shock of frequent disaster. Although desired by Kublai to halt his army until the arrival of autumn, Bayan continued to lead his troops through the provinces of Chekiang and Kiangnan while the summer was at its height, saying that "it is not prudent to allow your enemy breathing-time when you have

hold of his throat"—a precept of war proved true from the earliest times. Nor was the fighting confined to the land; several encounters took place on the Kiang river, and in one of these the Mongols scattered the Chinese fleet by having recourse to fire-ships. The Sung ruler then wished to conclude peace on the basis of his acknowledging himself a tributary of the Khakhan, but it was too late. Bayan continued his march on Lingan, the capital of the Sung kingdom. Negotiations proving unsuccessful, Lingan surrendered on the appearance of the Mongol army. The Sung ruler and his mother were sent as prisoners to Kublai, by whom they were fairly treated. The spoil of the palaces of Lingan was conveyed by sea to Tatu or Pekin; but when the treasure and most cherished possessions of the last of the Chinese royal houses were laid out before Kublai's wife "she wept, and said, with some pathos, she was thinking that the empire of the Mongols would one day also come to an end."

The war still languished in the southern provinces, where, although their capital had fallen, and their ruler had become a prisoner, the Chinese proved tenacious of their independence. Expelled from the land, they held out on the islands, and their war junks swarmed in the gulfs and infested the rivers of the south. A general was despatched with a large force to attack them on their favourite element, and a great naval fight occurred at the mouth of the Canton river. The Mongols were again completely victorious, and more than 800 Chinese vessels were taken—one of the younger Sung princes, who had been proclaimed emperor, being amongst the slain. "His minister, seeing no hope of escape, seized hold of him, saying that the Sung emperor ought to prefer death to capitulation, and jumped overboard with him, both being of course drowned." With this great victory the long wars between the Sungs and the Mongols practically reached their close, and the Yuen dynasty took its place in due sequence amongst the ruling houses of China.

The long and brilliant reign of the great monarch Kublai Khan belongs to the history of the latter country. It is of his court, where he long resided, that Marco Polo has left us his most interesting description. The Yuen dynasty maintained itself on the throne of China for about a century, although it was never popular, and notwithstanding that its later representatives fell far short of the genius hereditary in the family of Genghis. When the

soldier-monk, who founded the Ming dynasty, drove Chun-ti and his followers over the Great Wall back into the desert whence they had originally emerged, the Mongol influence over the destinies of China reached its termination. In the hands of Kublai the military successes of Genghis and Mangu were brought to a consummation, and under his brilliant sway his empire seemed to have become consolidated. The folly of his successors stunted its growth, and finally wrecked all prospect of a stable government. The prognostications of Kublai's wife were to be speedily realized, and in China, after a rapid rise, the Mongol conquests declined and disappeared, leaving only a transitory impression on the institutions of that ancient country.

We have now to retrace our steps, and to take up the thread of the Mongol wars and conquests in Western Asia and this continent —achievements which were accompanied by more brilliant events than those marking the campaigns in China, and which also exercised a more durable influence on the history of the human race. The first inroad of the Mongols into Russia has been already described, and the return of the army under Chepe Noyan afforded Europe a brief breathing space. Ogotai Khan sent several armies into the countries west of the Caspian, and at one time had the intention of assuming the command there in person. He, however, appointed his nephew Batu Khan, the son of his eldest brother Juji, to the command instead; and the narrative of the campaigns of this prince is among the most interesting portions of Mr. Howorth's history. When this appointment was made the Mongol arms were suffering from a reverse inflicted upon them apparently in the modern Bulgaria, and one of the armies which had overrun Southern Russia had been compelled by the princes of Smolensko and Kief to beat a hasty retreat behind the Yaik. It was to repair that reverse, quite as much as to carry out Ogotai's favourite project of absorbing the eastern states of Europe, that Batu made his preparations for war on a large scale during the years 1236–7. The army which assembled under the Mongol banner on the banks of the Yaik was composed only in small part of soldiers of the dominant race. It included the remains of the Turkish armies which Genghis and his sons had vanquished in successive wars; and all the warlike races of the Turanian steppes had been attracted to the Yaik by the prospect of sharing in the spoil of the cities of Hungary and Little Russia.

At this critical moment the rulers of Russia presented a united front to the foe. It had not always been so. Internal dissensions and jealousies had gone far towards neutralizing the result which valour in the field and sagacity in the cabinet had done their best to attain. The Mongols had triumphed over their adversaries as much by their union as by their military prowess and discipline. On this occasion, however, the Russians were free from the discordant elements previously existing. The governing power was concentrated in the hands of a single family. George Vsevolodovitch was Grand Prince of Vladimir; his brother, Yaroslaf, ruled at Kief; and the latter's son, the celebrated Alexander Newsky, at Novgorod. The whole of the Russian power was thus made available for a defensive war, and it no doubt gathered to itself the greater number of the peoples on the shores of the Euxine and the banks of the Danube. The opposition that Batu Khan might expect to his advance was the greater than that encountered by Chepe Noyan by as much as the danger to Europe from the Mongol hordes had in the meantime become more fully realized.

Batu advanced with the main body of his troops on the strong city of Riazan, to which he laid siege in regular form. A breastwork of palisades and earth was raised around it, and during five days a bombardment from the formidable balistas, or Mongol artillery, continued without ceasing. At last the city surrendered; its inhabitants were given over to slaughter, and the town itself to plunder. A relieving force was defeated with heavy loss, and Moscow, then a place of only second-rate importance, met with a fate similar to that of Riazan. The Mongols continued their triumphant march from Moscow to Vladimir, and Vladimir to Nijni Novgorod. Each siege was followed by, in the graphic language of a German writer, "a carnival of death;" and the consequences of the capture of these cities were rendered the greater by a decided victory over the army of the principal of the Russian princes on the banks of the Sitti. The Mongols never relaxed for an instant their vigorous pursuit of the shattered fragments of what had once been the brilliant and confident army of the Russian princes. Ten days after the victory on the Sitti, they had reached Lake Seliger, at the sources of the Volga. Before the torrent of Mongol invasion "the villages disappeared, and the heads of the Russians fell like grass before the sickle."

After this decisive campaign in the north, Batu retraced his steps, and wintered his troops in Central and Southern Russia.

During that winter the Russians did their best in preparation for the renewal of the war, but their task was really little less than hopeless. Yaroslaf of Kief asserted his claims over Vladimir, but he reigned only "over ruins and corpses." Several of his most prominent supporters had been slain in battle, and he was left almost the last of his family to defend, as best he could, the sinking fortunes of the national cause. Dissensions between the various magnates began also to reveal themselves, and the Mongols had again to deal with a disunited foe when they approached Kief, the Russian metropolis. The resistance made here was not of a very serious character. The prince, who held it under his rule, fled at the appearance of the foe to Hungary, and the wretched inhabitants were given over to the tender mercies of a licentious and ferocious soldiery. During two centuries after this siege Kief remained a ruined solitude, and, when it eventually rose from its ashes, it was only as a shadow of its former greatness. Having vanquished all the resistance he was likely to meet with in the provinces of Russia, Batu made his preparations, and drew up his plan of campaign for the invasion of Hungary, the next country he had selected for his prey.

There were other reasons besides that afforded by its geographical position which led the Mongols to collect all their strength for the invasion of Hungary. At the time when Chepe Noyan routed the Russians on the Khalka, many of the defeated had sought and found shelter behind the Carpathians. When the Mongols returned under Batu, there was open sympathy between the princes of Russia and the Hungarian king. This natural alliance had been cemented by the ties of marriage; a Russian prince had married a Hungarian princess, and the Mongols, without entering into nice distinctions, accepted the alliance as formally completed, and followed up their victory over the Russians by declaring war upon the Hungarians. Batu's plan of campaign appears to have been skilfully conceived, with the intention of penetrating at several points through the strong natural frontier which guards the kingdom of Hungary on the north and east. He divided his whole force into three armies, to each of which was entrusted the conduct of a war as difficult in its character as it was important in its consequences. The

northern army, starting from Kief as its base, advanced westwards through Volhynia to Gallicia. The central and principal army, under the command of Batu in person, crossed the Carpathians, and marched into the heart of Hungary; while the third, or southern army, traversed Wallachia, and thus turned the Hungarian positions from the side of the Danube.

The operations entrusted to the first of these armies were carried out with uniform success. Poland was at that time divided into nine princedoms, and these had incurred the wrath of the Mongols for reasons similar to the Hungarians. In order to acquire information concerning the countries they were about to invade, the Mongols sent a strong but lightly equipped force in advance of their main body. This ravaged the country as far as the Vistula, sacking and destroying several towns, and carrying off a vast quantity of plunder. On its return march, however, the Prince Palatine of Cracow attacked it, and, although suffering some loss himself, succeeded in rescuing many of the prisoners, and in recovering much of the spoil. The Mongols had, notwithstanding this check, accomplished their main purpose. They had found and explored the road to Cracow, and they at once proceeded to utilise their knowledge. A great battle was fought a short distance outside that city, in which the Mongols were completely victorious. The Polish princes who did not fall on the field of battle fled either to Hungary or Prussia, while the mass of the people had no securer shelter than their own dense forests. When the Mongols entered Cracow on Palm Sunday, 1241, they found it abandoned by its inhabitants; yet they did not hesitate to indulge their ruthless spirit by giving it over to destruction. Having overrun Poland, the Mongols then marched into Silesia, where the fragments of the Christian armies, strengthened by Teutonic knights and by the hard toiling workers of the Moravian mines, had collected, and formed, under the leadership of Duke Henry II., the semblance of an army. The battle of this particular campaign was fought near the town of Lignitz, where the army just described, which did not muster more than 20,000 men, was called upon to encounter five times its number of Mongols. Of a battle fought under such conditions there could only be one issue.

The Mongol generals never despised their enemy because they happened to be in greater strength. On this occasion they

resorted to all the stratagems they had been wont to use when coping with an adversary numerically their equal. Putting aside the picturesque legends that the monkish records have preserved for us, it appears most probable that the Christian army, instead of taking up a strong position and remaining on the defensive, rashly assumed the offensive, and was of course unable to make any impression on the heavy ranks of the Mongols, who, when their turn came to attack, easily carried everything before them. Duke Henry and a vast number of the best knights of Moravia and Silesia were among the slain; but, although disastrous in its consequences, this the first great fight, to be followed in later ages by many another, round the walls of Lignitz, is still remembered with pride. Mr. Howorth tells us that seven of the noblest families in Silesia and Moravia still bear the Mongol cap in their arms in token that they are descended from some of those who led the Christian army against the hordes of Asia. The conquest of Silesia was followed by a pillaging expedition into Moravia, and then this northern army turned south into Hungary, where it joined Batu Khan and the main body.

In the meanwhile that main body had been carrying everything before it in the heart of Hungary. Advancing by way of Kresmenetz and the great pass between the districts of Ungvar and Munkatz, known as the Ruthenian Gates, Batu had literally to cut a road across the Carpathians. Forty thousand labourers went before his army, and paved the way for the progress of his soldiers. The rapidity of the Mongol advance was astonishing, and apparently unaffected by the bad condition of the roads. Within three days of reaching the Carpathians, their cavalry was reconnoitring at a short distance from Pesth. Here, again, the Mongols resorted to their usual tactics. Feigning retreat, they drew the Christian men-at-arms into the open, where, after inflicting severe loss upon them with their archers, they soon overwhelmed them with their superior numbers. Such was the case in the siege of the great city of Wardein, which was taken and destroyed after the garrison had been defeated by being decoyed from the citadel. The completeness of the victories of this force was insured by the arrival of the southern army, which had been not less successful than the others, and which arrived in time to participate in the culminating encounters of this war. The main armies on either side were drawing closer to each other, but

there were disintegrating causes at work in the Hungarian army which daily detracted from its efficiency. Many of the nobles were in scarcely veiled rebellion against their liege lord, and apparently regarded with indifference the prospect of his defeat. The Hungarian army assembled on the wide heath of Mohi, near the vine-clad hills of Tokay; but it was marshalled with little skill. The principal commands were entrusted to warrior-bishops, who showed small military capacity; and Batu, on examining the enemy's position, is reported to have said, with something of the gleeful satisfaction of Napoleon on discovering the blunders of his opponents, that they were "like a herd of cattle pent up in a narrow stable whence there was no room to escape." The battle began with every advantage on the side of the Mongols. Their artillery of balistas swept the field, and their superior tactics enabled them to outflank the position of the Hungarian army. When to their superiority in these respects was added the fact that many in the Christian army fought with little resolution, it will be evident that the statement that the Mongol victory was easily obtained is no exaggeration. The slaughter was immense; many of the Hungarian leaders were counted among the slain; and King Bela only escaped by the excellence of his horse.

Here again Mongol craft came in aid of Mongol valour. The seal of the Hungarian Chancellor was found among the spoil, and Batu turned it to a sinister use. He issued a proclamation in the king's name, and sealed with the royal seal, ordering the people of Hungary to remain in their homes, as there was no reason to anticipate danger from the Mongols. "Do not fear," it said, "the rage and ferocity of these dogs; do not quit your homes; we have only been surprised; we shall soon, with God's help, recapture our camp. Continue to pray to God to assist us in destroying our enemies." The Hungarians, deceived by this fictitious announcement, remained hoping and praying for better times, while the Mongols overran the country. A few days after the fight at Mohi, Pesth was in the possession of the conqueror. The town of Gran, the capital and chief place of trade of the country at that time, was next attacked and surrendered; but its citadel successfully defied the Mongols. At Buda they were more fortunate. Several small fortresses, defended by desperate men, resisted the Mongol attempts to storm them; and the invaders, without breaking their strength against impregnable rocks, passed

on to more important conquests. One of Batu's generals pursued Bela and the fugitive Hungarians through Croatia into Dalmatia, where the majority of them had sought safety in the city of Spalatro on the shores of the Adriatic. The Mongol general, after carefully examining it, came to the conclusion that both this town and the neighbouring one of Tran, whither Bela had retired on the approach of his enemies, were too strong for him to attack with his diminished forces. After waiting some weeks in the neighbourhood in the hope, no doubt, of drawing the Christians into the open field, the Mongol marched towards the south through Herzegovina and Servia, and, having laid Cattaro, among other places, in ruins, reached a place near the modern town of Scutari. This army then returned to Batu through Servia and Bulgaria.

At this moment, when Batu was on the point of beginning a fresh war with the power of Austria on the south, and that of the Teutonic knights on the north, the intelligence arrived that Ogotai Khan was dead; and the Mongols at once made preparations for their retreat. By this time Christendom was fully aroused to the greatness of the danger which threatened it, and a new league, under the headship of the Emperor and the Duke of Austria, was being formed for the defence of Europe. The Pope specially interested himself in it, and sent his blessing to all those who took part in the "holy war." Such, however, was the prevailing terror of the Mongols, and so numerous were the causes operating at that time to promote the disunion of Christendom, that it may be esteemed fortunate for Europe that this encounter was averted. Gibbon has told us in his immortal pages how fear of the Mongols, who had never fought on the sea, prevented the fishermen of Sweden attending the herring fishery off our coasts, and how in consequence the price of herrings became largely increased.

As soon as all the detachments had arrived, and when the necessary arrangements for conveying the immense quantity of plunder had been made, Batu began his return march from his head-quarters near Gran. Rapid as the movements of the Mongols always were in pursuit of a foe, their retirement was marked by deliberation and by a seeming disinclination to abandon a country which had proved so easy and so rich a prey. During their retreat they made it a point to destroy the little that had been either spared or neglected during their advance; and Bulgaria,

Transylvania, and Russia had especial cause to remember and deplore the passage of their pitiless conquerors. The only event of any peculiar importance that marked their return was the brief campaign with the forces of the Eastern Emperor Baldwin II., in which the Mongols were again triumphant.

Mr. Howorth enumerates, both in his first and also in his second volume, some of the causes of the apparently irresistible military power of the Mongols. These may be briefly summed up as follows: In the first place, and principally, the union amongst themselves in contrast with the dissensions of Christendom; and in the next, that their cavalry, in rapidity of motion as well as general effectiveness, was immeasurably superior to that formed by the heavy-armed knights of the Middle Ages. Their discipline and knowledge of the science of war were also the best of their kind in the world. Nor were these their only advantages. Much as it might be supposed that the knights and *condottieri* of Europe would be superior in the quality of their weapons to Asiatic hordes, the contrary appears beyond dispute to have been the case. In the magnificent collection of arms in the Peterhof palace there is, Mr. Howorth tells us, no contemporary armour to be compared with that of the Mongols of this period. They were armed with crooked swords, bows and arrows, and slings. Their arrow was longer than the one used in the West, and it was made of iron, bone, or horn. Their engines for the attack of cities were in their age unequalled, and no people had studied more carefully the best modes of attacking fortified places. In short, they were, as soldiers, immeasurably superior in all essentials to every other force in the world. Over the unwieldy man-at-arms and the badly armed and wretched retainer of the feudal states of Europe it was no difficult task to ask such troops as these to triumph. A similar lesson is inculcated by the campaigns of Khulagu Khan in Persia and Armenia, where the Mongols experienced as little difficulty in routing their opponents and in upsetting dynasties as they had in Europe.

Batu Khan died ten years after these successes, and from his family the long line of princes of the Golden Horde traced their descent. His brother Bereke, who succeeded him after a short interval, was the first of the Mongols to adopt Mahomedanism, and to this circumstance, as much as to anything else, may be attributed the schism which eventually occurred between the

eastern and western divisions of the empire—the eastern becoming, for a brief space, the empire of China, and then sinking back into its old condition as a collection of petty clans; while the western formed the independent khanates of Russia and Western Asia, which preserved the semblance, at the least, of royal authority down to our own day.

It must not be supposed that even the great victories of Batu had reconciled the princes of Russia and Poland to the loss of their former greatness. After Batu's death they indulged the hope that they would be able to drive out the Tartars, and several minor successes raised their hopes to a higher point than before. But the Mongols assembled their fighting men, and, under the leadership of a general named Burundai, proved themselves to be as formidable in the field as ever. On this occasion the Tartars devastated the whole country as far as Cracow; and then they appear, from a letter written by the Pope to Bela, to have made overtures to the Hungarian king for an alliance against the rest of Europe. These were in strict accordance with their customary policy, as during their progress westward they had uniformly recruited their armies from the subjected or defeated nations. They offered Bela their alliance on particularly favourable conditions, and nothing but his Christianity, the only bond in Europe at this troubled epoch, forbade him to conclude what might have proved, in a worldly sense, a highly advantageous compact. The people of Russia had practically concluded a similar arrangement, and were to be found in the vanguard of the Mongol army. Bereke was on the point of leading a fresh expedition into Poland, when, in consequence of the feuds among the great Mongol leaders, his attention was called away to other affairs. For the first time actual war broke out between two of the generals of the Khakhan. In the fierce hostilities which were carried on by Bereke against Khulagu, the Governor of Khorasan, Europe found a surer means of safety than in the decrees of Popes or the disconnected efforts of the numerous potentates of Central Europe. In this war the greater success belonged to Bereke, who died before it had concluded. The schism in the Mongol camp had the effect of completing the separation of the two divisions of the Mongol Empire, and it had the other result of making Bereke a practically independent ruler in Russia and on the Tartar steppes.

Concurrently with the events described, the Mongol governors

in Khwaresm, which had fallen to the share of Chaghtai, were founding an autonomous administration, which became in later times the possession of the long line of Chaghtai Khans—of whom a descendant still exercises nominal authority in the Khanate of Khiva. In Khorasan and Persia similar disintegrating causes were at work, so that, before the fourteenth century was very old, the power of the Mongols for offence had resolved itself into at least half-a-dozen parts, without any connecting links between them. Symptoms of decay rapidly revealed themselves among these kingdoms, and the Golden Horde reached its highest point of prosperity and vigour during the rule of Usbeg Khan and his son Yanibeg. From the death of the latter it rapidly declined, until at length the Russian princes, who, by a politic deference to the behests of the Tartar Khans, had managed to preserve their positions, found themselves strong enough to rid their country of the incubus of Asiatic domination. The task of emancipating the country began with the great victory of Prince Dimitri at Kulikof, and it reached its consummation two centuries later, when Ivan the Terrible conquered the Khanates of Kazan and Astrakhan. The Mongols had destroyed the ancient feudalism of Russia, but the new monarchy of Russia was formed out of the ruins of their despotism. A few years after the victory at Kulikof, Russia was menaced by the armies of Timour, who marched to within a short distance of Moscow, but then withdrew without coming into collision with the Russian princes. Timour had, however, shattered the military power of the Golden Horde, thus paving the way for the ultimate success of the Russian rulers.

Among the Mongol kingdoms of Central Asia, none reached a higher point of prosperity and grandeur than the Khanates of Bokhara and of Khwaresm or Khiva. After being merged in the conquests of Timour, the latter became the spoil of the ambitious spirits of the whole of the neighbouring countries. To establish an independent state in the fertile delta of the Oxus was the first object with them all. Sheibani, the Usbeg leader, conquered this region and established in it an administration of his own, and to this day the dominant caste is composed of Usbegs, the descendants of his followers. At a later period, Ilbars, one of the Usbeg leaders, was raised to the dignity of Khan of Khwaresm, and became the founder of the present ruling house. Among the most notable of the princes of this line was Hadji Mahomed

Khan, who flourished in the closing years of the sixteenth century. He was notable, however, as much for his misfortunes as his virtues. The ruler of Bokhara, although an Usbeg of the same stock as himself, was his bitterest foe, and affected to regard Khwaresm as a tributary province; and, not finding as ready an acceptance of his claims as he conceived to be his due, he invaded and for a time occupied that state. This event occurred in the year 1594 A.D., when Hadji Mahomed fled with his tale of woe to the court of the Persian king, Shah Abbas I. Out of these events arose a war between Persia and Bokhara, and an attempt on the part of Hadji Mahomed to re-establish his authority in Khwaresm. The latter partially succeeded through the opportune assistance of the Turcomans; but when these uncertain auxiliaries had retreated with their plunder, the Bokharan army returned in increased force, and promptly restored the authority of their master. The death of the Bokharan prince, however, simplified the task, and upon Hadji Mahomed renewing the attempt he experienced little difficulty in recovering his former position. It was during the lifetime of this prince that one of the first English travellers in Central Asia, Jenkinson, reached Khiva, of which he has given us a very graphic and interesting description.

The best known of all the rulers of Khwaresm is, however, the celebrated historian, Abul Ghazi Khan, whose history has greatly simplified the task of mastering the progress of the events which have here been touched upon. He ascended the throne at a moment of trouble, when the Turcomans were in actual possession of more than half the state, and when it seemed doubtful whether the Khivan Usbegs would be able to regain their shaken position. The Bokharans also returned, hoping to profit by the season of trouble which they saw at hand. Abul Ghazi, mainly by his own skilful dispositions, for the force engaged was extremely small, succeeded in defeating the Bokharans, driving out the Turcomans, and establishing his own authority on a sound basis. He then extended his operations into the desert, bringing many of the Turcomans into subjection, and restoring tranquillity generally throughout the whole of this region. Towards the close of his life he declared war upon Bokhara, and completely turned the tables upon that hereditary enemy of his family, defeating its army in several battles and occupying its chief city.

In the present century Allah Kuli Khan was ruler of Khiva at

the time when interest first began to be taken in the movements of Russia in Central Asia. Some years before the first of our wars in Afghanistan, this prince had marched across the desert on Merv, where he established a custom house. He founded another at Sarakhs, further west, a town now in the possession of Persia. His attention was called away from this direction by the preparations the Russians were making at Mangishlak on the Caspian, and also on the Orenburg steppe, for the protection of their commerce, and for the repression of the Khivan slave-trade. General Peroffsky, the Governor of Orenburg, was fully resolved to put a stop to these evils if he possibly could. Negotiations failing, he set out with an expedition computed to consist of 6,000 fighting men; but he was unable to accomplish his design. During his retreat a great portion of his force perished, and the Russian preparations for invading the khanates were thrown back at the least ten years. Allah Kuli Khan showed a very friendly disposition towards this country, and it was at the instigation of our officers, Captains Abbott and Shakespear, that the Russian prisoners, long confined in Khiva, were released. The present Khan is Allah Kuli's nephew, and is named Seyyid Mahomed Rahim Khan. His reign has proved unfortunate in that it has seen the disappearance of all his temporal authority before the power of Russia. The campaign of 1873, carried out by General Kaufmann with great success, closed with the attenuation of the Khan's dominions, and the imposition of a war indemnity, which made Khiva a vassal state of the Czar. It can now be held to be merely the shadow of one of the last relics of Mongol conquest.

In the same way Bokhara, where another line of the great Mongol conquerors still holds a nominal supremacy, and the comparatively young state of Khokand, founded by a military adventurer in the last century, have both become merged in the Russian Empire, which has thus erased almost all the landmarks of the Mongol conquests that remained north of the Oxus; while if we turn in another direction, south of the Oxus, the Mongol states of Afghan Turkestan have become subjected to the Afghan Duranis. In India, where one of the most remarkable of all the Mongol successes was attained, although more than a century after the decline of the military cohesion of the race, the great work achieved by Baber and consolidated in the hands of his grandson Akbar found its apogee in the triumph of British arms and policy

in the palace at Delhi. We have already seen that in China it fared as badly as elsewhere—the splendid deeds of Kublai alone saving the Yuen dynasty from being classed among the miserable families which have so often been placed by fortune at the head of the destinies of that country. The great fabric erected by Genghis, and maintained with renewed lustre by his immediate successors, is now level with the dust. The name of Mongol has been long deprived of its terrible significance among the peoples both of Europe and of Asia. The nomad who, in the days of his youthful strength, carried everything before him, and laughed to scorn the military science of the settled inhabitants, has for many generations been compelled to recognize that not only have the conditions of war changed to his disadvantage, but that his old energy and motive power have vanished. Without troubling himself about the prizes of war, the Mongol shepherd is now well content to be left in undisturbed possession of his own pasturage.

At the present time the whole of the Mongol conquests, with the exception of Persia and a narrow strip of territory proceeding from that state in a north-eastern direction to the Pamir, is divided between the three empires of England, Russia, and China; and probably before many years the remainder will have shared the same fate. Nothing will serve to show the extent of the Mongol conquest and influence more clearly than the fact that they embraced two of the largest of modern empires and our greatest dependency. So far as it is possible to judge, the Mongol tribes of to-day retain the same qualities which made their ancestors great soldiers and administrators. They have the same physical strength, and capacity for enduring great privations, and simplicity of life, that made the tribesmen of Kabul, Yissugei, and Genghis the most formidable soldiery in the world. But while their martial qualities, though dormant, remain as vigorous as ever, they have forgotten the science of war, which was one of their own creations, and are destitute of those weapons which were once the best of their kind in the world. So long as they labour under these disadvantages, the Mongol and neighbouring tribes, including the Kirghiz and Calmucks, must perforce, were they ever so bellicosely inclined, remain in peaceful pursuits at home in their own remote and little-known valleys. The world is, therefore, never likely to see a repetition of the Mongol raids on anything approaching the large scale of six centuries ago.

It must not be forgotten, and recent events have brought the subject very much home to us, that these Mongol tribes are, and have for two centuries been, subjects of the Chinese Empire. Some of them are enlisted in the regular army of that Power, and many more are engaged in service on the frontier. They have therefore become the soldiers and faithful subjects of the Pekin Government, which in its policy during the last two thousand years has never affected to conceal that the only limits it recognized to its empire were those imposed by its strength—a conviction similar to that upon which the policy of Genghis was based, and which may have been only an imitation carried out in a more trenchant manner. Now the Chinese Government is in a position, and will shortly be still better situated, to supply the deficiencies which render the Mongols of necessity a pastoral people. To a slight extent this has already been done, and all the tribes of the northern frontier from Lake Saissan and Kobdo to Manchuria are not only able, but willing, to serve the Chinese Government faithfully and well. The future attitude of these tribes depends entirely on the policy pursued at Pekin, for their aspirations, whatever they may be, have become merged in and subservient to the wishes and decrees of the Celestial Empire. The Mongol tribes are consequently of importance in the present and the future chiefly as being one of the instruments available for the carrying out of the policy of China. That their obedience will be more sincere in proportion as the task allotted to them is popular with them may be taken for granted.

Of the use to which the Chinese will seek to turn their authority over the excellent material for soldiers to be found among these tribes some evidence has already been furnished by their recent campaigns in Central Asia. The re-conquest of lost provinces is an alluring game, which, if attended with success, is sure to lead to the discovery of further claims only awaiting a favourable opportunity to be put forward and enforced. There is some reason for believing that such is the case on the present occasion, and that even the surrender of Kuldja would far from exhaust the dormant claims of which the present Government at Pekin might consider itself to be the heir. The lapse of time can alone show how far the Chinese Empire has consolidated its hold upon the possessions beyond the Great Wall. Should that position be as firm as it appears to be, one of the first steps taken will be the

levying of a much larger force than before from the Tartar tribes. When that has been done, and Tso Tsung Tang has moulded them into a state of some efficiency, a very formidable military power will have been created in the very quarter whence Genghis Khan came six centuries ago in his struggle with the other races of the world. It will lose little if any of its formidable character, because it will be guided by the settled convictions of Chinese policy instead of by the ambition and love of military fame of a "desert chief."

In glancing over the wide extent of country, and the vast quantity of detail in Mr. Howorth's volumes, which include events of great historical importance side by side with the adventures of petty marauding clans, and with the quarrels of their leaders, the one fact which throws a vivifying ray across the dense pages of this chronicle is that on that same north-western quarter of the Chinese Empire whence the Mongol tornado came to burst over a disunited Europe and an effete Asia, there now hangs a cloud which threatens, sooner or later, to develop portentous proportions. Guided by the persistent energy of the Manchus, it may yet absorb the whole of Northern Asia, and possibly Western Asia as well, in a common conflagration. The division of the heritage left by the mighty Mongol to his children is already complete, but two at least of the present inheritors have given no symptoms that they are satisfied with their share. Nor can it be assumed that the old Mongol idea is extinct, when the Chinese Government is doing everything in its power to show that nothing has been forgotten, while much has been learnt, at Pekin. The sentiments of the Mongols themselves do but echo the decrees of the Chinese; and with a motive power supplied, and the resources of a great administration at their back, these tribes would furnish a military force relatively as formidable as that whose great achievements Mr. Howorth has been the latest to record with an amplitude of detail which will find no imitators. The lessons of the old Mongol conquests remain for our edification, and they have a practical bearing on the present aspect of the political relations between Russia, China, and British India—the three heirs of the empire formed by Genghis Khan and by the conquerors who were his successors.

XII.

THE CHINESE IN CENTRAL ASIA.[1]

ABOUT three years ago rumours began to reach this country of the doings of a Chinese army in the heart of Central Asia. Few persons were aware of the western march of Chinese soldiers, until they had given signal proof of their prowess by the capture of walled cities and the overthrow of warlike enemies. The surrender of the towns of Urumtsi and Manas, and the destruction of the confederacy formed by the Tungani, fairly aroused the attention of the world to the further progress of the Chinese army that had achieved such victories. These preliminary successes on the eastern portion of the Tian Shan were to most persons a revelation. They seemed to justify the prediction of further Chinese triumphs over their remaining adversary, the late Yakoob Beg, the redoubtable Athalik Ghazi. How much more justified that prediction was by the past history of China, students of the career of that most singular of all empires were aware. It was these achievements, and those greater and more remarkable ones which have since been accomplished, that attracted general attention to the Chinese in Central Asia. The overthrow of the Tungani, the reconquest of Eastern Turkestan, the demand for the restoration of Kuldja—all stages in a settled policy on the part of the Pekin authorities for the recovery of the lost posses-

[1] *The Quarterly Review*, April, 1880.

sions of the empire—have not failed to rivet the eyes of Europe and Asia, the more closely with the development of each phase, on a remote and little-known portion of the latter continent. At the least, these things meant the introduction of a new element into the settlement of the Central Asian Question. But they meant still more. They demonstrated that, of the three great Asiatic Powers, China was at all hazards resolved to enforce her legitimate claim. The restoration of Kuldja will complete in this respect the task set before the Chinese generals. When that act has been accomplished, China will remain a contented spectator of the progress of events to the west of her present frontier. So long as she feels herself safe within her own borders, so long will she be content to continue passive. Any fresh move on her part will be a symptom that she is beset by some secret dread of danger, either from beyond or within her actual territory. It is proposed to describe here, as fully as our space will permit, the reasons why China undertook these recent campaigns at such a distance from her home frontier, and also the progress of those wars, their political significance, and the practical result of the reappearance of the Chinese in Central Asia as conquerors.

In our historical retrospect it is unnecessary to go further back than the reign of the second Manchu emperor, the great Kanghi. In theory, the emperor still preserved his claim to supremacy over the Tartar princes of Jungaria and Turkestan. The Manchus based this theory on a double right. They were emperors of China, and consequently the heirs of the pretensions of the great Song and Tang dynasties. They were also Manchus, to some extent the representatives of the Mongols, and also of the traditions of the great Mongol conquerors. It was not, however, until the Manchu dynasty began to become consolidated in the hands of the second emperor of that race that China was capable of undertaking any protracted military enterprise beyond her immediate confines. We may, therefore, pass on until about the year 1680, when Kanghi had been seated twenty years upon the throne. At that time a prince of Jungaria, known as Galdan, had succeeded in obtaining what may be termed an admitted supremacy among the petty princes of all the cities and districts that lie on either side of the Tian Shan range, from the country of the Khalkas to that of the Kirghiz. In 1678 he conquered the country of Kashgaria, and forthwith began to encroach in the direction of China.

He occupied Turfan and Haml, and arrogating to himself titles that were the peculiar property of the descendants of Genghis, intrigued among the Khalkas, and cast a coveting eye towards Koko-nor. Not content with secular objects, he meddled in spiritual. He had himself been a Lama in earlier days, and the personal friend of the Dalai Lama of Lhasa. He aspired to be the great secular chief in the country round Gobi, and he stood forth as the declared champion of Tibet. Rumours of these acts and pretensions reached Pekin, and Kanghi resolved to discover what was the power with which the ambitious Galdan could support a policy similar to that adopted in past times by other Central Asian rulers, and which had often been the precursor to inroads upon Chinese territory.

In 1682 Chinese envoys were consequently sent to the court of Galdan. They were received by that astute prince with every mark of honour, and he protested his sincere friendship for the great emperor. Six years later Galdan commenced, notwithstanding, a war with his enemies the Khalkas, in which he obtained several successes. Kanghi then resolved to settle the pretensions of Galdan once and for ever, for the overthrow of the Khalkas would have given the latter the key to one of the best roads into China. In 1689 a large Chinese army was massed on the frontier, and then pushed forward into the Khalka country, which Galdan was overrunning. After some undecided warfare, peace was concluded, Galdan promising "never to return into the territories of the emperor or those of any of his allies." [1] But the peace which had been wrung from his necessities was in the eyes of Galdan only a truce. The withdrawal of the Chinese army did but serve to encourage him to renew his ambitious schemes. "Ambition," the Chinese said, "became his only God." His conquest of the Khalka country, his overtures to the Mongol chieftains, his bidding for favour with the priesthood, all proclaimed that he was playing for a great stake. His boldness brought him face to face with the Emperor of China. In 1695 a second war broke out with the Eleuth ruler. After overcoming almost incredible difficulties, the Chinese army reached the Kerbulon river only to find that the Eleuths had retreated; but Galdan was cut off by another

[1] See "The History of the Mongols," by H. H. Howorth, for much interesting information about this campaign, and kindred matters.

corps, and, after a stubborn resistance, signally defeated. For many months he passed an uncertain life on the outskirts of the Chinese advanced positions, but at last, just as the Chinese were about to renew their advance, he either died of disease or, as is more probable, put an end to his own existence. There can be no question that Galdan was a singularly able ruler. His conquests were very considerable, and his influence wide-reaching. It is probable that he would have accomplished still more had he happened to have lived at a different period of Chinese history. Pitted against Kanghi, who was strong in the resources of a great military caste, he was unable to carry out those aggressive schemes over which he had brooded; but his successful rival himself bore testimony to his abilities. The emperor's words were, "Galdan was a formidable enemy."

With the death of Galdan the advance of the Chinese legions was stayed. In 1710 an Eleuth invasion of Tibet, when Lhasa was sacked, recalled Kanghi's attention to his troublesome western neighbours. The Lamas appealed to the Manchus for aid, and their request was granted. Tibet received a Manchu garrison, and several armies were sent across the desert into Central Asia. These did not attain any very striking success, although on two occasions they advanced as far westward as Saissan and Karashar. Until his death Kanghi continued to be engaged in a border war. These costly expeditions, undertaken for the practical purpose of preventing any ambitious chief from acquiring supreme control among the turbulent tribes that hold all the approaches to China, led Chinese statesmen to consider the wisdom of extending the frontier so as to include them within the empire. There is little doubt that, if the same view had prevailed when Galdan was overthrown, Kanghi would then have endeavoured to solve the question definitively. But when the danger first assumed serious proportions, Kanghi's reign was drawing to a close. The death of the great emperor put bold schemes out of court, for the new ruler was essentially a man of peace. Yung Ching withdrew the frontier garrisons, and the Chinese held aloof from those disturbances which broke out in Central Asia among the Eleuth princes, and which, after continuing for twenty-five years, paved the way for a Chinese triumph—the greater, perhaps, because it had been deferred.

In the year 1750, when Keen Lung had been emperor fifteen

years, the two foremost chiefs in Central Asia were Davatsi, or Tawats, in Jungaria, and Amursana, in Ili. The former soon grew jealous of the latter, because he maintained a greater court than Davatsi thought compatible with his own dignity; and, resolving to destroy Amursana before he should grow too strong, he invaded Ili. Amursana then fled to China. Davatsi was left to enjoy his triumph, but it was not to be for long. South of the Tian Shan his authority was repudiated in Kashgar; but the advance of the Chinese at this moment takes away all interest in minor matters, and absorbs the attention in the great contest that was at hand between Buddhist China and Mahomedan Turkestan.

When Amursana reached China, he found an honourable reception awaiting him. Keen Lung himself has told us what was the result of his conversations with this prince of the Eleuths. He gave him titles, and also estates. He feasted him at the royal table, and at last lent him the army of which he stood so greatly in need. The reasons which induced Keen Lung to take up the cause of Amursana were numerous. In the first place, there was Keen Lung's own warlike disposition, which urged him to emulate the deeds of Kanghi; and the conquest of Central Asia seemed at once the most hopeful and the easiest achievement. But there were other and not less potent reasons. The ten years of Yung Ching's reign had sufficed to put off the decided step which Kanghi's activity had foreshadowed, but the necessity for effecting a complete remedy of the troubles on the western frontier was admitted as much as ever, and the arrival of a distressed Eleuth prince of admitted ability and considerable influence at his court seemed to afford the opportunity.

At this moment Davatsi wrote a letter to the emperor, which the latter construed into an insult to his authority. Keen Lung had been waiting for an excuse. This letter afforded it. "Full of a stupid pride, he presumes to address me as an equal. It is clear he is a barbarian, and ignorant of the very elements of divine law, which prescribes a due subordination"—these are Keen Lung's words, and they constituted his ostensible *casus belli* against Davatsi. The true origin of the war was to be found, as we have seen, in far deeper motives. It was not through any affection for Amursana, or antipathy towards Davatsi, that Keen Lung undertook a war, the cost and dangers of which it was impossible to foresee. Besides his desire for military triumph, in emu-

lation of Kanghi's war in Central Asia, there was a settled purpose that all danger from Central Asia should be nipped in the bud. The Mahomedans within the empire must be taught, by the fate of those outside it, that it would be idle to dream of revolt against the authority of the Manchu ruler. Personal reasons combined with political to make the war in Central Asia popular with ruler and people alike. It was in very sooth a national enterprise.

The army which Keen Lung placed at the disposal of Amursana was a very formidable one, and he entrusted its command to one of his best generals, Panti, in whose hands Amursana was little more than a cypher. The march of this force was unopposed. Davatsi fled into Kashgaria, but the Governor of Ush Turfan handed him over to the Chinese, who sent him to Pekin. He was granted an honourable reception, but died soon after his arrival. The Chinese had set out in 1755, and early in the following year they were completely triumphant. "They broke cheerfully through all obstacles. Hardly had they bent a bow or drawn an arrow before there was submission everywhere." Tersely, but accurately, did Keen Lung thus summarize the result of his first campaign in Central Asia. The Chinese were again supreme among the Calmucks and on the northern slopes of the Tian Shan.

Amursana's ambition urged him to attempt the conquest of the country south of the Tian Shan range. But to do so by force of arms he had not the means, and these the Chinese were loth to supply. Under these circumstances, Amursana resolved to put forward a pretender to the throne, and Barhanuddin, son of Ahmed Khoja, was brought forth, and placed at the head of an army numbering about 6,000 Mussulmans and 500 Chinese, with which he took Kashgar and Yarkand, and was established in Kashgaria as the puppet of Amursana. But the latter soon aspired to be an independent sovereign in all that region which Chinese strength and prestige had won for him, and thus jeopardized the alliance which was the basis of his strength. Deciding to make his choice between the position of Chinese Viceroy with its certainty, and that of independent ruler with all its risk, he availed himself of the opportunity afforded by a summons to Pekin to assert his independence. He followed up the declaration by crushing the small detachment of Chinese troops scattered throughout the province, and by executing the generals and other officials. Some of Keen Lung's advisers were in favour of leaving Amursana to

his own devices. Not so Keen Lung himself. The blood of his slaughtered generals and soldiers called for vengeance; the good name of China demanded it. Amursana, "the wolf who, having satisfied his hunger, is given to prowling in search of fresh carnage," must be crushed. With that object in view a fresh army, with other generals, crossed Gobi to exact retribution, and, like its predecessor, it met with no resistance. Amursana's soldiers refused to fight and disbanded, and he himself fled northwards to the Kazaks, and ultimately to Russian territory. A series of petty wars and expeditions ensued, which resulted in the decimation of the population. But at last the spirit of resistance was stamped out, and the death of Amursana and the final overthrow of the Jungarian authority encouraged the Chinese to annex the country. The province was repeopled by settlers from Kansuh, and also by military colonies. Later on, too, 7,000 Mussulman families were brought from Kashgar into Ili, and the descendants of these became known as Tarantchis, or the "toilers." The internal administration was left in the hands of the people, the Chinese contenting themselves with garrisoning the principal places and drawing the revenue of the whole province.

In the meanwhile Kashgar had shared the fate of Ili. Barhanuddin, instead of being warned by the example of his master Amursana, imitated his acts to the letter. When the Chinese became supreme north of the Tian Shan, he asserted his claims the more openly to the south of that range, and refused to acknowledge his subordination to the Viceroy of Ili. Like all Central Asian despots, he longed for independence, but neglected to perform those duties which were essential to its preservation. A Chinese army was accordingly despatched against him, and after being defeated in several pitched battles he fled to Badakshan. But in that remote province he found no safety. The terror of the Chinese name had gone before them, and the Mir, anxious to avert danger from his own territory, executed Barhanuddin and his brother, and sent their heads to the Chinese. Of all the Khojas only a child, Sarimsak, the son of Barhanuddin, escaped from the hostility of the Chinese and the treachery of reputed friends. The Celestials treated Kashgaria as they had dealt with Jungaria. They garrisoned it, taxed it, and tranquillized it. In other respects they left the Mahomedans to govern themselves.

But the Chinese did not stay their progress with these permanent acquisitions. They resolved to strike a decisive blow against their western neighbours while they were in the full tide of their success. The towns of Khokand and Tashkent were occupied, and a tribute was imposed upon the ruler of the former khanate, who on two occasions sent embassies to Pekin, formally recognizing his dependence on China. The Kirghiz also acknowledged the emperor as their suzerain. Ablai, chief of the Middle Horde, was created a Chinese prince in 1766, and Nur Ali, chief of the Little Horde, paid tribute to Pekin. These acts of formal recognition on the part of the various Mahomedan potentates announced the conclusion of the campaigns in Central Asia. The Chinese had at last won a settled frontier, and by taking up a strong position in the heart of Turkestan had destroyed all danger to the Manchu dynasty from the ambition of petty rulers similar to those from whom it had itself sprung. These successes were also remarkable for the great effect they produced on all the peoples of Asia. There was quite a panic among the states of Western Turkestan at the seemingly irresistible approach of the Chinese armies. All the remembrance of the former prowess of the Chinese revived with tenfold force, at a time when they had only to assail disunited and enfeebled governments. In former days there had been a tradition among the Mahomedans that a Chinese conquest of Asia would herald the end of the world. In 1760 it seemed as if that event was about to take place. The Chinese, however, having struck terror into the hearts of their neighbours, withdrew within the strong frontier which they had secured. For sixty years there was profound peace in a region which had been the home of war. The policy identified with the name of Keen Lung was thus proved to be a wise one. It secured a permanent remedy of an evil that had long been dealt with by compromise. Had Keen Lung's successors acted with his vigour and sagacity, the Chinese Government would never have had to reconquer a country that was becoming more and more attached to its rule.

From 1760 to 1822 the Chinese were undisturbed either in Kashgaria or in Jungaria. Ten years before the latter date the Khan of Khokand had indeed stopped paying tribute, and the Chinese had acquiesced in his repudiation. That was the first symptom of a decadence in China's vigour. It showed a relaxing of authority, and to the exiled Khojas this afforded a gleam of

sunshine. The youngest of the sons of Sarimsak, Jehangir, was the first to stand forward, after sixty years of exile, as the champion of the cause of the Khoja kings. The Chinese had carried their tolerance of the customs of their subjects too far, when they permitted the Mahomedans to retain all the local administration, thus preserving amongst them a fellow-feeling that was of necessity a hidden danger to the dominant power. But this was neither all, nor the worst. A Khokandian element had been permitted to establish itself within the frontier, which really constituted an *imperium in imperio.* The terms of a treaty made with Khokand gave its Khan a certain percentage on all Mahomedan merchandise sold in Kashgaria as far as Aksu. He was permitted to depute Aksakals, or White Beards, to control the collection of the dues, and these men soon meddled in the internal affairs of the country for other and more sinister purposes. When Jehangir resolved to invade Kashgar, the Chinese power was secretly undermined. The unknown danger was infinitely more formidable than the known one.

Jehangir succeeded in surprising a Chinese detachment in 1826, and the Khan of Khokand then espoused his cause, sending him money and a general to lead his troops. Jehangir marched on Kashgar; and the Chinese governor, too confident in the terror of his name, went out with a much inferior force to meet him. The result was a Chinese defeat, which gave to the Aksakals the signal to throw aside the mask. They rose in Yangy Hissar, Yarkand, and Khoten; and the Chinese, surprised in all directions, were massacred without distinction of sex or person. For nine months Jehangir ruled in Kashgar, when, on a Chinese army advancing from Ili, a battle was fought at Yangabad, in which he was defeated; and, being captured shortly afterwards, he was sent to Pekin, where he was executed. The attempt of Jehangir was repeated in 1831 by his brother Yusuf; in 1846 by Yusuf's eldest son, Katti Torah; and in 1857 by one of Jehangir's sons, Wali Khan. All these risings were made under precisely the same conditions and attended by the same result. Each and all were temporarily successful; but on the arrival of Chinese reinforcements the insurgent leader was always defeated and compelled to flee. Each inroad was accompanied by a rising on the part of the Aksakals, and by the massacre of the Khitay, or Chinese. Each return of the Chinese was marked by the slaughter

of the townspeople, and the execution of the prime movers in the revolt. In these alternate scenes of slaughter all the good feelings generated by sixty years of peace expired.

Up to this point the Chinese had risen triumphant over every difficulty. For sixty years they had held the country in complete tranquillity, and for forty more they had maintained their position there, despite the hostility of Khokand, the reviving hostility of the Khojas, and the half-concealed hatred of a large portion of their subjects. Till the year 1862 the Chinese—Buddhist and Mahomedan alike—had combined in maintaining the authority of the emperor, and the armies which had so often been despatched from Ili were composed principally of the Tungani Mussulmans. A great change then took place, and the revolt of the Tungani against the Chinese marks the radical difference between the previous attacks on the authority of China and those that occurred afterwards. Up to this time, China, united within herself, had triumphed over every difficulty. After it, being disunited and rent almost to pieces by internal feuds, she staggered under assaults from every quarter; and the sword, which had been in older days wielded so well, dropped from her nerveless hand in the remote provinces of Central Asia.

The war of 1860 with England and France, in which Pekin was taken and the emperor's summer palace sacked, had scarcely closed, when the Chinese Government was brought face to face with dangers from its own subjects, that threatened to complete the disintegration of the empire which an unfortunate foreign war had begun. The Taeping rebellion was the most formidable of these half-popular movements. That rising chimed in with secret longings on the part of the millions of Chinese, which it did not seem possible for a Manchu dynasty to satisfy. It had, consequently, a more general support than either of the other great risings to which we have to refer. It was also nearest the capital. This domestic enemy was established in the very heart of the empire, and the second city in the country was in his possession. He divided the state into two portions, and held the lines of communication between them. The Taeping danger threatened the very existence of the empire. If the Manchu wished to preserve his position, it was absolutely necessary that the Taepings should be destroyed as quickly as circumstances would allow. By means of Colonel Gordon and his band of

European officers, the Taepings were crushed, if not exterminated. The Chinese Government was then able to turn its attention to other parts of the empire, where its authority had also been cast off. In Yunnan there had been disturbances which resulted subsequently in the establishment of a Mahomedan ruler, known to our Government as the Sultan of Talifoo. But we need not trace here the course of the Panthay rising, as it was called, further than to say that, after ten years' absence, the emperor's lieutenants re-established the imperial authority up to the frontiers of Burmah.

Captain Gill travelled through the greater part of this country, and his description of Talifoo and the surrounding districts throws a clear light upon a portion of China hitherto little known. He gives the following graphic sketch of a Chinese general who fought against the Panthays:

"General Yang, the Ti-T'ai, is perhaps one of the most remarkable men in China. He is almost a hunchback, but so active that the people call him 'the monkey.' In the war, unlike most Chinese generals, who sit in their chairs in the rear, he was always on horseback, under fire, at the head of his men. One day when he came to visit us he walked over from his yamen, a course of action that would shock the sensitive minds of most Chinese officials. He has made himself so powerful and rich, that he keeps 200 soldiers at his own expense, and is more dreaded than loved by the Chinese Government, to whom, nevertheless, he is an excellent servant."

The revolt of the Tungani concerns us more nearly than the Panthay rebellion. The Tungani, Dungani, or Dungans, as they have been indifferently called, were a Mahomedan people settled in the north-west province of Kansuh and in a portion of Shensi. Many of them had migrated westward at the time of the wars of Keen Lung, and had colonized various parts of the Chinese conquests. During a century this movement westward had continued, and in 1862 the Tungani represented the majority of the population, not only in parts of Kansuh, but also in the country to the west, as far as Ili and the city of Turfan. Although Mahomedans, they had acted as the soldiers of the Chinese. They had won their battles, laid down their roads, and held the Tartar population in check. From the Tungani the Chinese never for an instant expected danger. They were certainly

heretics; but then they were part and parcel of themselves in every other respect. They hated the Khokandians and the people of Kashgar with a hatred that was more bitter than that they bore to the Khitay or Buddhist Chinese. In all essentials the Tungani were treated exactly like the most favoured children of the empire. It is true that in the past they had given trouble. Both to Kanghi and to Keen Lung they had been a cause of anxiety. At one time the latter had decreed their annihilation, but now they were regarded as the backbone of the Chinese power in the west, the pillar on which the fabric of their strength in Central Asia rested. The only cause that it is possible to assign for their rebellion is that vague one of the religious revival which was then manifesting itself among the Mahomedans all over the world. But whatever the cause, the consequences were clear enough.

In 1862 a riot occurred at a village in Kansuh. Order was restored with some small loss of life; and the momentary alarm which had been caused by it passed away. The alarm was, however, only too well founded. A few weeks afterwards a more serious riot took place at the town of Houchow or Salara. This was the signal for the rising of the Tungani in all directions. The unanimity shown by the various Tungani settlements proved that there had been a preconcerted arrangement amongst them; but the Chinese had known nothing of it. The Tungani kept their secret well; but the Khitay must have been singularly obtuse and over-confident not to have perceived that there was something wrong. In all directions the Tungani cast off the yoke of the Chinese. The few Imperial troops remaining in the province of Kansuh were unable to withstand the desperate and unanimous assault of the Mahomedans. They were swept out of existence, and with them the larger portion of the Khitay population as well. The Mahomedan priests took the lead in this revolt, and the atrocities which they and their followers enacted were of the most horrible and bloodthirsty character. The butchery of tens of thousands of their Buddhist subjects in Kansuh appealed loudly to the Chinese Government for revenge; and it was not long before their troops restored Kansuh to its allegiance. Those of the Tungani who were captured were given over to the executioner. But a large number escaped, fleeing westward to those cities beyond the desert, where other Mussulmans had imitated, with like success, the deeds of their kinsmen in Kansuh.

The events that we have just described in the Chinese provinces of the north-west were naturally of great importance to the inhabitants of the districts of Central Asia. To the Mahomedans they meant the dawn of a new future; to the Buddhists, the arrival of a danger which it would require all their energy to avert. The Tungani were shrewd enough to perceive that their main chance lay in striking quickly. No sooner then did the tidings of the events in Kansuh reach Hamil and Barkul, Turfan and Manas, than risings at once took place against the Khitay. In all cases the movement was successful. The Manchus were deposed: the *mollahs* were set up in their stead. After a short interval the other cities of Karashar, Kucha, and Aksu, followed the example, with an identical result. The Tungan revolt proper had then reached its limit. The Buddhist Chinese had been destroyed by Mahomedan Chinese. For the first time there had been treachery within the ranks of the Imperial army. The communications between Pekin and Jungaria were cut, and a hostile territory of nearly 2,000 miles intervened. To restore those communications, to reduce that hostile country, would demand a war of several campaigns; and China was not in a condition to make the slightest effort. All that her statesmen could hope for was, that she would not go irretrievably to pieces. The Tungani flourished on the misfortunes of the empire. It was evident to any impartial observer that, the instant the Imperial Government had been relieved of some of the troubles and dangers which beset it, it would without much difficulty put down the Mahomedan rising in Kansuh.

During some months after the first successes of the Tungani, the people of Kuldja and Kashgaria remained quiet, for the prestige of China's power was still great. But when it became evident to all, that communication was hopelessly cut off between the Chinese garrisons and the base of their strength in China, both the Tungan element and the native population began to see that their masters were ill able to hold their own against a popular rising. This opinion gained ground daily, and at last the whole population rose against the Chinese and massacred them. It is true that the Chinese garrisons in the forts at Yarkand, Yangy Hissar, and Kashgar, long held out; but at last heart failed them, and in many cases they destroyed themselves. In Kuldja similar scenes were repeated; but no sooner had the Chinese been over-

thrown, than the victors, the Tungani and the Tarantchis, began to quarrel with each other. Up to the month of January, 1865, the rising had been carried out in a very irregular and indefinite manner. It was not a civil war for the establishment of any particular form of government, as all previous revolts had been. It emanated neither with Khoja adventurer nor Khokandian intriguer. It was essentially a blind and reckless rising, urged on by religious antipathy; and, successful as it was, it owed all its triumphs to the embarrassments of China.

The misfortunes of the Chinese attracted the attention of all those who felt an interest in the progress of events in Kashgaria. Prominent among these was a brother of Wali Khan, Buzurg Khan, who resolved to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the civil war for making a bold attempt to regain the place of his ancestors. Among his followers was Mahomed Yakoob, a Khokandian soldier of fortune, already known to fame in the desultory wars and feuds of which Central Asia had been the arena. His previous career had marked him out pre-eminently as a leader of men, and he now sought in Eastern Turkestan that sphere, of which Russian conquests had deprived him in its Western region. There is little to surprise us in the fact that, having won his battles, Yakoob deposed and imprisoned his master Buzurg. In several campaigns between 1867 and 1873 he beat back the Tungani from his confines, and established an independent government in the vast region from the Pamir to beyond Turfan, and from Khoten and the Karakoram to the Tian Shan. He treated on terms of dignity with the Czar, and also with the Government of India. He received English envoys and Russian ambassadors, and his palace was filled with presents from London and St. Petersburg. He formed a still closer connection with the Sultan, which might under different circumstances have borne fruit in acts, and was created an Emir, while from the ruler of Bokhara he received the much-cherished title of Athalik Ghazi. For twelve years he more than held his own in Central Asia. Alone among Mahomedan rulers, his territory was steadily expanding. The encroachments of Russia, which were going on all around, and which threatened on several occasions to crush him, passed by without doing him harm. He appeared to have a charmed existence, and the closer we survey his career the stronger does that popular fancy become. We entered into

relations with him by treaty, and so too did Russia. The bazaars of Kashgar and Yarkand were filled with English and Russian merchandise; but the difficulties of nature, added to the natural apathy of the people, prevented the development of any brisk trade.

Yakoob Beg laboured under two great disadvantages, against both of which he struggled ably, yet with little success. The first was the poverty of the nation, which stood in need of an enterprising government with considerable resources. Not only was Yakoob Beg not enterprising in the sense meant, but he was also absolutely destitute of resources. The other disadvantage under which Yakoob laboured was the proximity of Russia. He existed under the constant dread of a danger from the north from which nothing could free him short of a British guarantee that was not to be obtained. These reasons and others stunted the growth of the Athalik Ghazi's power. He could only expand in one direction, and that was towards China. Urged on by some vague ambition, he made war upon the Tungani, when every dictate of prudence pointed to an alliance with them. He destroyed his only possible allies, and in destroying them he weakened himself both directly and indirectly. In the autumn of 1876 Yakoob Beg had indeed pushed forward so far to the east, that he fancied he held Barkul and Hamil in his grasp; and the next spring would probably have witnessed a further advance upon these cities had not fate willed it otherwise. With the capture of the small village of Chightam, in 92° E. longitude, Yakoob's triumphs closed. Thus far his career had been successful; it may then be said to have reached its limit.

In the autumn of 1876, the arrival of a Chinese army on his eastern frontier changed the current of his thoughts. Up to this they had been of offence alone, but afterwards to defend himself was as much as he could do. The Chinese campaign commenced in August with the siege of Urumtsi, which surrendered in a few days. The Chinese then marched on Manas, where the Tungani had gathered all their strength, in preparation for a protracted resistance. After a steady bombardment for two months, and several sorties made by the besieged, the chiefs of the Tungani resolved to surrender. Terms were agreed upon, and the garrison marched out; but when the Chinese, always suspicious, found that the Tungani made no sign of abandoning their arms, they

assumed treachery to be at work, and attacked them on all sides. The *Pekin Gazette* in its graphic description of this siege affirms, and there is no reason for doubting its accuracy, that "the women, children, and old men" were spared in the slaughter that ensued. During the remaining weeks of the year 1876 the Chinese employed themselves in the task of extending their authority northwards towards Chuguchak, and in bringing up reinforcements from Kansuh for the greater enterprise that lay before them. With the fall of Manas the campaign against the Tungani closed. Before considering the later struggle it will, for clearness' sake, suit the reader best to discuss the reasons why the Chinese Government undertook these wars in Central Asia, as to the wisdom of which there may, perhaps, be a divided opinion.

We have seen that the causes of China's acquiescence in the casting-off of her authority by the Mahomedan peoples of Central Asia were, principally, the disunion and civil war which were at the time eating away at her vitals. Shortly but correctly speaking she could not help herself. For ten or twelve years those reasons preserved their force. There were dangers elsewhere, and of a more pressing nature, clamouring for attention. Of all these, the Central Asian question was the least important. It alone could afford to wait. The twelve years of China's absence had allowed of the formation of a Tungan Confederacy, and of the creation of a modern state of Kashgaria! But neither of these novelties menaced the existence of China. It was otherwise with the Taepings, otherwise even with the Panthays. The settlement of the Imperial question with these rebels could not be deferred. When, however, both the Taepings and the Panthays were crushed, when the fanatical spirit of the Mahomedans had been curbed, and the feverish longings of the native Chinese repressed, then the Imperial authorities were left free to deal with the question raised by the Mahomedan rising in the far west.

Before this the authority of the emperor had been restored in Kansuh. In 1874 and 1875 several places had been secured in the desert. Arrangements had been entered into with some of the nomadic chiefs. Long before the Chinese army started, the Calmucks of Chuguchak and Kobdo had been encouraged to remain steadfast in their fidelity by the promise of reinforcements. The advanced portion of the Chinese army left the Kansuh frontier in the autumn of 1874. Its progress was slow and tortoise-

like. During two winters it sowed the seed that was to nourish it during the succeeding winter. The task of collecting that army was arduous. It was still more difficult to push it forward. At last, after several years' preparation, everything was in readiness. There was an army of some 50,000 fighting men, provided with a commissariat of adequate proportions; and in 1876 it struck those blows which showed that it was an army in something more than name. The strength of the Chinese army and the thoroughness of its preparations have been insisted upon here, in order that it may be clear that the Chinese ministers proved their claim to the title of statesmen by undertaking a scheme for the attainment of which they possessed the necessary strength and resources. Whatever else they were, the Chinese were practical. It is not to be doubted that the statesmen owed much to their generals. Seldom has a campaign carried on by Chinese soldiers shown them to such advantage. But far more rare has been the occasion when in a single campaign not one but half-a-dozen generals have revealed themselves. The endurance of the soldier and his sustained courage were beyond all praise, while the tactical skill of the commanders was equally laudable. To Tso Tsung Tang, the Viceroy of Kansuh, who first pacified his own province, and then made all the necessary arrangements for the reconquest of the states in Central Asia, a still higher meed of praise is due. He proved himself in the conduct of the campaign to be not less skilful as a general in the field than he had already shown himself to be as an organizer and administrator. He is now the most popular man in China, more so even than Li Hung Chang.

There can therefore be no doubt that the Chinese were justified in undertaking these campaigns in Central Asia, on the plea that they were able to carry them out successfully. The question remains, Were they justified in undertaking them by the nature of the provocation they had received? There is also the other question, Was the reward of success of sufficient value to recompense them for the effort? The first question is in some respects the more important. We have already seen the motives which urged Kanghi to carry on war in the desert lands to the west. Those motives increased in intensity, until at last they had such an effect upon his successor, Keen Lung, that he undertook the conquest of the tribes whom his ancestors had been satisfied with

defeating. In 1876 those motives still possessed their validity. If we put Yakoob Beg for Galdan, we have an almost identical state of affairs. In the eyes of the Chinese the power of Yakoob Beg represented a growing power. It seemed to hold forth a reasonable prospect of forming a union among the tribes and nationalities of Central Asia. As such it had its dangers. But that did not constitute the principal reason why the Chinese nation and Government were of the one mind that the peril should be boldly encountered. There had been an overthrow of Chinese authority. The dignity of the emperor had been debased, and the *prestige* of his Government had vanished. But, above all, there had been the massacre of a Chinese army, and of a large body of Chinese officials. Tens of thousands of their fellow-countrymen had been murdered, and in the performance of their duty a great blank had been caused in the heart of the country by the loss of some of the most deserving of its subjects. The atrocities of 1862–65 called loudly for revenge. The demand for soldiers for the war in Central Asia met in the breasts of the Chinese nation with a singularly hearty response. If ever a war was popular with a country, that war was the one we are discussing. There can be no question, therefore, that the provocation justified the enterprise. It is difficult to see how the Chinese could have refused to undertake those wars of retribution which have terminated so successfully. If they had refused, they would have forfeited all claim to general respect. To have sat down content under the loss of the Central Asian provinces would have been as disgraceful on their part, as it would be on ours to consent to the loss either of India or of any Indian province. It would have been an irreparable shock to the claims of China to rank as a great empire. Such was the view that prevailed at Pekin, and such, there need be little hesitation in saying, will be the mature judgment of history.

Admitting these things—and they cannot be denied—it would seem supererogatory to discuss the point, whether the recompense was sufficient or not. It is impossible for any great Power to adjust the balance nicely on each occasion, when it is called upon to act with vigour, between the necessary outlay and the possible return. In many ways the Chinese possessions in Central Asia may be held to be more of a drag on the Imperial

resources than an element of strength. But this is not the Chinese view, nor will it be ours if we remember the past with all its lessons. The Chinese are satisfied, not only of the justice of their cause, but also as to the advisability of carrying this programme out to its logical conclusion. They, too, have felt the necessity for attaining a "scientific frontier;" and what man will say that this instinct has played them false, when he considers the exact condition of China's northern borders? It was these sentiments, not stronger now than they have been at any time during the past few years, which impelled the Chinese to carry out their design in its fullest extent. Actuated by such feelings, they did not reckon up in a niggard spirit whether the millions of taels they were expending would be all, or any of them, returned into the national coffers. When the Tungani were crushed, they showed no backwardness in encouraging their generals to advance still further. They were willing to pay the necessary price to secure complete success. These remarks on China's policy may appear to be a digression; but in reality they are not so, for China's policy did not become perfectly clear until after the overthrow of the Tungani. The war with Yakoob Beg, which we have now to describe, revealed it in its full extent.

Captain Gill, in his interesting and valuable volumes already referred to, draws a striking picture of the irresistible progress of Chinese power in another direction; and as it is typical of the recuperative faculties of that remarkable people, and of their extraordinary capacity for absorbing other races, it deserves to be quoted *in extenso.* The scene of his remarks is, we may state, the north-west border-land of the province of Szchuen, where the Chinese are brought into contact with barbarian tribes called Man-Tzŭ.

"In one place, close to the ruins of some Man-Tzŭ buildings, that I could plainly see had been burnt not very long ago, there was a new and flourishing Chinese village, where the Chinese, having ousted the aborigines, had established themselves. A little further on there was a cluster of inhabited houses, built in the Man-Tzŭ style, close down to the river, that had formerly been occupied by Man-Tzŭ, but had now been taken possession of by Chinese. The relentless advance of the Chinese was thus presented to the eye in a very striking manner; every

village had its tale of battle, murder, or sudden attack by the barbarians on the peaceable Chinese. In imagination it was easy to fill the picture with living figures. I could in fancy hear the clash of arms, or see the flight of the Man-Tzŭ from their ruthless enemy, who left nothing but the smoking ruins of some once quiet hamlet to bear witness to the cruel tragedy. The story as told me was always the same. How the Chinese came peaceably up the valleys, and were received by the inhabitants with every show of welcome; how unprovoked and unexpected attack was made on the new-comers, who, at first fighting only for existence, ultimately secured the victory, and established themselves in the place of their treacherous foes. . . . But the irrevocable law of nature must have its way; the better race must gradually supplant the inferior one; the Chinese will continue their advance, stopped only where the climate aids the soil in its refusal to produce even to those industrious agriculturists the fruits of the earth in due season."

From November, 1876, until March, 1877, the Chinese generals were engaged in massing their troops on the northern side of the Tian Shan range, in the country between Manas and Guchen. When the news reached Yakoob Beg of the advance of the Chinese, and of the successes they had obtained, he was stunned at the intelligence. The blow was sudden, and it came from an unexpected quarter. It was not easy to see how it could be parried. He had, however, four or five months before him for preparation. Acting on a false strategy, Yakoob determined to make his stand in a position 900 miles distant from the base of his power. His tactics were equally weak. By stationing himself at Turfan he exposed his flank to an enterprising enemy at Hamil and Barkul. Yakoob Beg's plan of defence showed neither military skill nor ordinary prudence. He sinned against the first principles of warfare, and also against the dictates of common sense. The Russian officer, Captain Kuropatkine, who was sent on a mission to Kashgar, told us that Yakoob Beg's army consisted of about 17,000 more or less trained troops, and a body of 10,000 Tungani, of doubtful value in a military sense. Yakoob's principal object was to defend the Devan pass against the Chinese; but, while they attacked it in front, another army under General Chang Yao was approaching from Hamil. Thus

outflanked, Yakoob's army retreated precipitately upon Turfan, where he was defeated, and again a second time at Toksoun, west of that town. The Chinese then halted. They had, practically speaking, destroyed Yakoob's powers of defence. That prince retreated to the town of Korla, where he was either assassinated or poisoned early in the month of May. His death was the signal for disturbances in Kashgaria, which further weakened the country, and left it completely at the mercy of the Chinese whenever they might choose to advance.

From April until August the Chinese army remained stationary in its positions north and south of the Tian Shan. On the 23rd of August it resumed its advance. Korla was occupied on the 9th of October without resistance; and towards the end of the same month, Kucha, once an important city, surrendered. The later stages of the war were marked by the capture of the towns of Aksu, Ush Turfan, and Kashgar. With the fall of the capital, on the 17th of December, 1877, the fighting ceased. The Chinese authority was promptly established in the country as far south as Yarkand, and after a brief interval in Khoten, by severe measures, and in Sirikul by the voluntary surrender of the governor. Hakim Khan, said to be a member of the Khoja family, and an aspirant to the throne, has ventured to make several inroads into Chinese territory during the last two years, but his last defeat was so disastrous that he is not likely to repeat the attempt. With those exceptions the Chinese possession of their ancient province has been undisputed. Not the slightest symptom of a desire on the part of the people to shake off the Chinese yoke is visible, and we are forcibly reminded of the wish that was often expressed during the lifetime of Yakoob for the return of the Chinese. We now know also that the reports of atrocities on the part of the Chinese have been grossly exaggerated. For Chinese they have exhibited remarkable moderation. From an enemy, Mahomed Yusuf Effendi, a Turkish officer in the service of Kashgar, they have received high praise.[1] He has styled their government "very fair and very just." If a soldier of fortune was

[1] The evidence of this officer about the capture of Kashgar and the subsequent conduct of the Chinese is most interesting and will repay perusal. It will be found on pages 21 to 23 of the recently published Central Asian Blue Book ("Further Correspondence respecting affairs in Central Asia," No. 1, 1880).

of that opinion, we may be sure that the traders of Kashgar and Yarkand are still more strongly of the same belief. The return of the Chinese means above all things a great revival in the trade of the country. The bazaars of the city will soon resume their old bustling, gay appearance. The highways will again be traversed by the enterprising and thrifty Chinese merchant. It is not within the range of possibility that the Kashgarians will feel discontented at these improvements.

Just as the Tungan question led to the Kashgarian, so does the Kashgarian lead to that connected with Kuldja. When the Tungani upset the Chinese rule in Kuldja, they had to divide authority with the Tarantchis, who formed a large element in the community. A ruler of the name of Abul Oghlan was elected, and for five or six years he governed the state. It was, however, during those years in a very disturbed condition, and the Tungan-Tarantchi government appeared to assume a truculent demeanour towards the Russians. There were assertions of Russian caravans having been attacked, but of these no certain instance can be found. At any rate the Russian Government availed itself of the excuse to establish its authority in the province in the year 1871. This was no sooner resolved upon than it was carried out. The resistance offered was insignificant in the extreme. Abul Oghlan became a Russian pensioner, Kuldja a Russian province. The general in command annexed it "in perpetuity," and issued a proclamation to that effect.

The Russian Foreign Office has always plumed itself upon the manner in which it carried on its business with the Pekin authorities. The Chinese problem is one of the strong subjects of Russian diplomacy. The chance was afforded by the occurrence mentioned for doing a sharp piece of business. The province had been formally taken over "in perpetuity," but, as China was never likely to be in a position to march an army into Central Asia, there could be no harm in giving the Chinese Government an assurance that, whenever they were able to do so, Kuldja would be handed back to them. At the least it would look well, and the Chinese would feel gratified. It was not for an instant anticipated that the Chinese would ever be in a position to demand the fulfilment of that rash experiment in diplomacy. The triumphs of the Chinese undeceived the Russians as to their power. The mission of the ambassador, Chung How, formerly Governor of Leaou-

Tung, to St. Petersburg, testified that China was resolved to press this claim with not less persistence than others. The Russian Cabinet, after six months' hesitation, found it advisable to make a great and a painful concession. A treaty was made, by which Kuldja, or the greater portion of it, was to be restored to China. The conditions under which the surrender of territory was to be made detracted greatly from its value in the eyes of the Chinese. The Pekin Government has since refused to ratify it, and Chung How has been disgraced, if not executed. Nor have the Chinese confined their action to awarding punishment to their representative for his deficiencies. They have collected troops in the vicinity of the Russian frontier—on the Amour as well as near Kuldja—and it is currently reported that the former have actually marched into Russian territory, thus beginning a war, the issue of which no one can foresee. The news arriving day by day oscillates between reports of new attempts at negotiation on the part of China and fresh rumours of war, of which the latest ascribes to Russia the bold scheme of attacking China, not only on the side of Kuldja, but from the Amour, and emulating the advance of the English and French upon Pekin; a very hazardous enterprise, especially in the present state of the Russian Empire. These rumours may be without foundation, or may but anticipate the progress of events; but the ascertained facts make it clear that the Kuldja question will have to be discussed over again. The difficulty between Russia and China is therefore on the point of entering a more acute stage than before. It must now be manifest that, until the Russian officials have retired from the province, and their place has been taken by the Chinese, it would be premature to say that the Kuldja question has been finally settled. It is known also that Tso Tsung Tang has spared no effort to increase the numbers and efficiency of his army; and that on several occasions he has not hesitated to show a quasi-hostility towards Russia. There is therefore an overwhelming balance of evidence pointing to the conclusion, that there can be no permanent solution of the question short of the complete satisfaction of China's demands, or a new blow to the empire from another war with European armies. Should the former result be attained, it would terminate the Chinese campaigns in Central Asia. The task of revindication will then have been completed.

A very important topic is suggested by the question, What is

the practical result of the reappearance of the Chinese in Central Asia as conquerors? It is one much too complex and difficult to discuss at the end of an article such as this. It is, moreover, a matter for individual opinion. Here it need only be insisted upon, that the event is one of marked importance in the affairs of Asia. It is one of which all the Powers in Central Asia will have to take grave account. It may not, perhaps, strengthen the individual interests of either England or Russia; but it brings into the arena a new and independent actor, whose action is guided by other motives than those that influence his two great neighbours, and one, moreover, apparently well able to take care of his own affairs without the assistance of any other state. If Kuldja is restored, then we may count on China being a contented party in the Central Asian question. She will not easily be tempted into any ambitious enterprise, which might risk everything she had gained. Neither against Russia, if the Kuldja question is settled amicably, nor against India, is it probable that she would, under any circumstances, undertake any aggressive war. The presence of China in Central Asia, which involves the certainty of war if Kuldja be not restored, will become a sure guarantee of peace, whenever that province is given back. For other reasons, then, than the ostensible one of fulfilling an engagement, it would be wise for Russia to restore Kuldja intact. It would be the removal of a permanent danger to her. On our side we should not be slow to recognize that the amicable settlement of the Kuldja question would be the death-knell of any expectation of an Anglo-Chinese alliance in the future. It would be prudent, then, for us to delay no longer in establishing relations with the Chinese both in Kashgaria and in Tibet, so that the friendly intercourse of a peaceful trade may endure to the advantage of both countries.

The critical state of affairs between China and Russia gives a special value to certain opinions expressed in the admirable work of Captain Gill, which placed him in the first rank of Asiatic explorers because, though his travels did not reach the scenes of the events we have been reviewing, his pages contain an abundance of materials calculated to throw light on the future destiny of the Chinese in Central Asia. Besides the many illustrations we might draw from the character of the people as depicted in his book, there is one passage (in his fourth chapter) to which we would especially refer, for his able sketch of the early progress

of the Chinese; the permanence of their individuality amidst all the successive invasions to which they have succumbed; the causes of the remarkable stoppage of that development by which they once gave promise of taking the lead in civilizing the world; and the question of their recovering a foremost rank, either in arts of peace or the prosecution of war.

On the immediate question before us, Captain Gill gives the following opinion:[1]

"A careful consideration of the circumstances would lead to the conclusion that such a conflict would be disastrous to the Chinese. This is not due to any want of courage in the Chinese soldier, but simply to want of officers and want of organization. With European officers, as under Colonel Gordon, we know how well the Chinese have fought, whilst, unlike most Orientals, they have not been utterly demoralized by a check; properly led they would make magnificent troops, for by nature the Chinese are singularly obedient to authority, and would not question the commands of those who had once established an influence over them. In this they are like other Easterns, but more than others their national characteristic renders them particularly incapable of military combinations. A Chinaman can learn anything, but he can conceive nothing; he may readily be taught any number of the most complicated military manœuvres, but place him in a position slightly different from that which he has learnt, and he will be found utterly incapable of conceiving any modification to suit the altered circumstances. This national characteristic is the growth of centuries of a narrow education; its roots are deeply seated, and lie in the insane reverence for antiquity, which is almost the beginning and end of a Chinaman's belief. Prompt action, readiness of resource, ability to seize on the smallest advantage, or to neutralize a misfortune, and the power to evolve fresh combinations—these are the qualities that make a soldier, and these are the very qualities that cannot co-exist with the Chinese want of originality. This is no unimportant matter, for it proves that, as they are, the Chinese cannot be feared as a military nation, but that with a large number of European officers, their almost unlimited numbers, their obedience to authority, and

[1] This opinion can only be accepted with limitations, but much in it is undoubtedly sound and has been confirmed by events in Tonquin.

personal bravery, when properly led, would make them almost irresistible."

Whatever may be the events now impending, whether a contest of cunning diplomacy, or a trial of open force between the two despotisms coming into collision from the extremities of the old world, and—if we may so express it—from extreme epochs of ancient and modern development, but both semi-barbarous, and whatever may be the final issue, there is a peculiar interest in the spectacle of this ancient empire—played out as we have been accustomed to consider its part—rousing its energies for self-defence in the only form in which defence is really effective, by assuming the offensive.

XIII.

RUSSIA AND CHINA.[1]

THE crisis which has been reached in the relations between these two great empires calls for general attention. The spectacle of a war between two neighbouring Powers at a point removed three thousand miles from the capital of either would of itself be sufficient to create an interest in the dispute on the Kuldja frontier, where the Celestial and the Muscovite must sooner or later meet in conflict. The questions involved are of scarcely less importance to England than to the two countries at issue, and their solution must in many ways affect our views not only on the Central Asian question generally, but also on the equally important one of the Chinese trade. It will, therefore, not be without present interest if, in describing the position of affairs, we glance farther back over the three centuries that have elapsed since Russia and China first began in modern times their intercourse with each other. By so doing it will be made plain that the Russo-Chinese difficulty is a larger one than any dispute over the territory of Kuldja alone would be; and that a complete and satisfactory settlement cannot be brought about if the question is approached on purely local grounds.

The Chinese Government came to the decision six years ago to reconquer the Central Asian possessions which, during the great

[1] *Fraser's Magazine*, August, 1880.

Mahomedan upheaval of fifteen years before, had cast off its authority. Between Kansuh, the extreme north-western province of China, and these districts lies the great desert of Gobi, or Shamo, which by reason of its vast expanse would seem at first sight to be the bulwark for an empire which a great people would most desire. The facts of history have shown such a belief in this case to be untenable, for from the earliest times the borders of Kansuh have been the scene of a fierce and never-ceasing struggle between the unsettled tribes of Central Asia and the civilized inhabitants of the Chinese provinces; so much indeed was this the case, and so troublesome, if not dangerous, had their periodical inroads become, that about the middle of the last century the great Emperor Keen Lung resolved to deal trenchantly with the difficulty by sending armies across the desert charged with the task of subduing these turbulent tribes to his rule. After several campaigns his wish was effected, and from 1760 until 1863 the Chinese Empire extended across Asia to the Pamir. On the west it was bounded by the Khanates, and on the north by Russian Siberia; but in the latter year, when Russia's successes were only on the eve of commencing in Turkestan, the Mahomedans in Kuldja and Kashgaria, imitating the example set them by the Tungani in the countries between them and China Proper, rose up and massacred all the Chinese on whom they could lay their hands. Several years were occupied in the task of exterminating the Celestials, varied by the luxury of party strife; but eventually the whole of the former Chinese possessions were divided into three parts—one of which was the state of Kashgaria, ruled by the late Yakoob Beg; another, the confederation of the cities held by the Tungani; and the third, the province of Kuldja, under the sway of a despot named Abul Oghlan.

This condition of things remained undisturbed until the year 1871, when the Russians entered and occupied Kuldja "for the purpose of restoring order." From that year onwards to the advent of the Chinese, the Tungan confederation was gradually becoming merged in Yakoob Beg's growing kingdom; so that in 1875 matters in this quarter of Asia seemed to have reached a permanent settlement, on the footing that the Russians were to be supreme north of the Tian Shan, and that Yakoob Beg was to have it his own way south of that range. Of the Chinese neither deemed it necessary to take any reckoning. In 1876 the sudden appearance

of the Chinese army, under the command of Tso Tsung Tang, the Viceroy of Kansuh, disturbed the harmony of this arrangement; and the speedy overthrow of the Tungani and of Yakoob Beg showed that the assent of the Chinese was essential to any permanent settlement of this region. Before the end of January, 1878, Tso Tsung Tang was able to notify to the emperor the complete reconquest of all the Central Asian provinces, with the exception of Kuldja, "held in trust for China by the Russian Government." From that date until the other day no further advance had been made by the Chinese. They occupied the same positions, and the lapse of time has served only to show that their success was durable and not fleeting.

But while no military event of greater importance than the suppression of a few insignificant revolts has marked the annals of the last two years and a half, the great diplomatic question of how Russia was to be persuaded to restore Kuldja has been discussed in all its bearings, and the conviction has at last come home to all concerned, that diplomacy afforded no means of solving pretensions so conflicting, and reconciling interests so incompatible with each other, as those brought forward or represented by the Russians and the Chinese in this matter. In 1871, when the occupation of Kuldja was sanctioned and carried out, the Russian Foreign Office assured the Pekin authorities that, whenever they should send an army into Central Asia strong enough to maintain order, Kuldja would be evacuated by the Russian garrison. In 1878 the necessary condition had been fulfilled by the Chinese; but the Russian garrison did not stir. Time works many changes, and in this short interval Kuldja had become one of the most prosperous of Russian provinces. It was felt to be too hard to have to surrender a valuable possession, because in a generous mood a rash promise had been made some years before. When Tso Tsung Tang preferred a formal request for the cession of the province, the matter was sent on to Tashkent, and thence to St. Petersburg. The subject was one that called for discussion; and so towards the close of the year, a special embassy under the charge of Chung How, a high official, was sent to St. Petersburg for the purpose of settling the Kuldja difficulty in an amicable manner by negotiating a treaty. Six months' negotiation—wearisome from unnecessary delay—ensued; and a treaty was at last concluded at Livadia, in the autumn of 1879, by the terms of

which Russia was to hand over to the Chinese a portion of the province on the payment of a large sum of money by way of compensation, and on the Pekin Government acknowledging her claim in perpetuity to the remainder, and on its granting fresh facilities for trade. Chung How, either cajoled into believing that he had obtained a full satisfaction of his country's claims, or more probably being imperfectly acquainted with the rights of the question, had the weakness to sign this treaty; and many supposed that the Kuldja difficulty was finally settled when the Chinese ambassador, having signed away his country's claims, took his congé of the Czar at Livadia. But the Chinese were not to be as easily deceived as their representative had been. The Pekin Government at once refused to ratify this unsatisfactory arrangement; Chung How was disgraced and arrested on his arrival, and the Imperial Council was divided into two parties—the one recommending the despatch of a fresh envoy to Russia, the other, that Tso Tsung Tang should be instructed to commence active operations against the Russians. The latter represented the dominant element among the councillors; and Tso Tsung Tang will certainly act upon his instructions if he has not already carried them out. In face of the collision now inevitable between these two vast and ancient empires, it becomes necessary to consider their relations in the past, and to touch upon those other points to which passing allusion has been made, and which, not less than the Kuldja question, await a permanent settlement in favour of the one Power or the other.

It is impossible to include in our retrospect the conquests of the Mongols; and though they certainly brought the Government of China into the closest contact with the princes of Russia, it may be doubted whether the remembrance of the prowess of the Mongol leaders has exercised any influence on the subsequent policy of China. The conquest of Western Siberia by the Cossack Irmak in the 16th century, and the completion of his task fifty years later by the subjection of the Eastern districts of that vast territory, which practically includes the whole of Northern Asia, brought Russia fairly into contact with China at the same time that it made her a great Asiatic Power. This event took place at a crisis in Chinese history. The native dynasty of the Mings had, after half a century of warfare, at last succumbed to the Tartar Manchus; and they for their part were, during many years after they had achieved their first success, engaged in con-

solidating the great triumph which they had won. The task of subduing the millions of China left the Manchu Tartars little time to devote close attention to the progress of events in the wilds and solitudes beyond their own northern frontier. The Russians had only to vanquish the Tungusian tribes, and to overthrow a few barbarian dynasties, to find themselves supreme on the Amour and the Irtish, and established at the very door of the greatest of Asian empires. Almost at the same moment that Chuntche, the first emperor of the Manchu dynasty, ascended the throne at Pekin, the Russians had established themselves on the shores of Baikal, and their line of forts, or block-houses, served to protect their new possessions from any sudden attempt at recovery on the part of the few Tartar troops kept in this region. In the year 1650 Russia's conquest of Northern Asia was completed. Such as her dominions were then they are still, with the sole addition of maritime Manchuria.

The Chinese were considerably alarmed at the construction of this line of forts on a portion of their frontier which was practically undefended; and when the first Russian embassy visited Pekin in 1656, it met with a cold reception. Soon afterwards the attention of both countries was more particularly directed to this region by the successes of Galdan, a Central Asian prince, who was gradually bringing under his influence all the nationalities between the Pamir and the Great Wall. To the Chinese the extension of his sway represented a grave peril, and the Russians were sufficiently aggressive in those days to hope that his ambition might prove a valuable auxiliary in the task of bringing their trade and political influence to bear more favourably on the Chinese. So about the time that the Emperor Kanghi resolved to advance into the desert for the purpose of coming to conclusions with Galdan, the Russian authorities in Eastern Siberia, believing that this contest would prove a protracted one, seized the opportunity to perfect their defences, by constructing two larger and stronger forts at Albazin and Astrog. These were built in the debatable country round the affluents of the Amour in its upper waters, and, as it happened, almost on the same site which Kanghi himself had selected for Chinese forts. Fresh cause was, therefore, furnished for dispute at the very moment that the armed forces of the two empires first came into proximity with each other. It was not to be expected that under these circumstances a collision could be avoided.

At first the campaigns with Galdan were marked by doubtful fortune; but when Kanghi's general Feyanku turned the scale of war against the Central Asian prince, a large Chinese army was left available for active operations in the Amour region. The victories won on the banks of the Kerulon in the Khalkha country were the greatest possible incentive to the Celestials to try conclusions with the small irregular and scattered Muscovite force in their neighbourhood. The Russian forts commanded the whole border, and were an insult to the Imperial authority; and the instant Galdan sued for peace, the Chinese troops were directed against the Russian possessions. A small detachment ventured to attack Fort Astrog, but was repulsed with loss. The Chinese, nowise daunted, returned in greater strength and laid siege to Albazin, which, after little more than a show of resistance, surrendered. The Russian garrison became prisoners of war, and were sent to Pekin, where they formed the nucleus of a Russian colony that still exists. Encouraged by their success against Albazin, the Chinese proceeded to demolish the other forts in the neighbourhood, thus, to all seeming, breaking up the hold which the Muscovites had acquired over this region.

The Chinese interest in these districts having always been of the slightest, their troops were withdrawn shortly after these events; but the Russian adventurers—for as yet the Government had little or nothing to do with affairs at this extremity of the empire—soon returned, and reconstructed the forts which Kanghi's officers had razed to the ground. Fort Albazin, in particular, rose from its ruins stronger and better prepared to resist a siege than before. In the meanwhile a second war had commenced with the troublesome Galdan, who aspired to little short of the empire of China itself; and the Russians were left undisturbed in their efforts to retrieve their shattered fortunes in Eastern Siberia. The local Chinese garrisons, however, collected an army of 7,000 men and several *tyfus* (pieces of leather artillery), with which they attacked the Russians at Albazin. After laying siege to the place for a fortnight, they were obliged to abandon the attempt. Recourse was then had to negotiation; and while Kanghi sent numerous reinforcements to this part of the frontier, he also despatched two foreign missionaries, Fathers Gerbillon and Pareira, to negotiate a treaty of peace. We are told that the Chinese concentrated an army at Nipchu on the Amour amount-

ing to not fewer than 25,000 men, of whom 10,000 were foot and the remainder horse: 3,000 camels were also attached to the commissariat. When, therefore, the negotiations began the Chinese were in far greater force than the Russians, and felt that they were virtually masters of the situation. The Russians protested against this display of superior force, but their protests had no effect. After some delay a treaty was drawn up and signed between the plenipotentiaries, and one of its clauses stipulated that it "shall be engraven in the Tartar, Chinese, Russian, and Latin languages upon a stone, which shall be placed at the bounds settled between the two empires, there to remain as a perpetual monument of the good understanding that ought to subsist between them." More definite, and consequently more important, agreements were expressed in the other clauses, marking out the frontier line, and stipulating for the destruction of several Russian forts; and throughout it is plain that the consciousness of superior strength gave the Chinese the best of the bargain. But the most important portion of the frontier—that district lying between the Khingan mountains and the river Udi—was to remain undecided until fuller information had been received. It is only necessary to say that this question is still an open one theoretically, although the Russians have done their best to give it a practical solution by encroaching down to the most *southern* limit, thus acquiring possession of the whole of Lake Baikal, and of the rich mineral district of Nerchinsk. It remains to be seen whether the Pekin Government has finally acquiesced in the loss of districts which were declared to be its possession by this treaty, drawn up on September 7, 1689, at the fort of Nipchu.

On both sides of the frontier the borderers strove to turn this new arrangement to their own advantage; and although the population was too sparse to allow of either desperate or protracted warfare, the state of affairs must be pronounced to have been one of continual disturbance. In 1692 Peter the Great, who was the first Russian sovereign to devote his serious attention to the Chinese question, sent an envoy to Pekin; but, although received in audience by Kanghi, nothing of importance ensued from this mission. The ostensible friendship between the courts exercised but little influence on those who were near the places of contact; and the Mongol tribes, assisted by a small body of regular troops,

attacked and destroyed Albazin for a second time before the close of the 17th century. The garrison was sent to Pekin, to swell the numbers of the Russian colony; while Peter, loth to lose all the advantages he had pictured to himself from trade with China, resolved upon despatching a fresh embassy. He selected as his ambassador M. Ismaloff, who was accompanied on his adventurous journey by M. de Lange, his secretary, and Mr. Bell, an English gentleman attached to the court of the Czar. This was the most successful and the best received of all Russian embassies to China, and although little of permanent benefit ensued from it, it must be held to have played a very considerable part in the development of the relations between the two countries. Ismaloff appears to have been the model of what a successful ambassador to an Asiatic court should be; and the impression he made on Kanghi was so favourable, that when he left on his return to Europe his secretary was permitted to remain behind as the Russian representative. But the court officials did not share these feelings of goodwill; to them foreign intercourse and the presence of a Russian envoy were as distasteful as ever; and when the whim of the emperor had been gratified, they did everything in their power to make things uncomfortable for M. de Lange, and to obtain his dismissal.

The great object before the Russians being the extension of their trade, his chief efforts were devoted to the task of obtaining concessions for the caravan from Siberia; and, as soon as he began to ask for practical favours, he found how unreal were the friendly speeches of the emperor. All his arguments and appeals met with the uniform reply that "trade was a matter of little consequence, and regarded by them with contempt." After seventeen months passed in a state of honourable confinement, De Lange left Pekin with the unfortunate first and only Russian caravan, bearing with him the final expression of the opinion of the Pekin Government on the subject of foreign trade—which was "that for the future no transactions should be carried on between the two nations, except upon the frontiers." Kanghi died soon after his departure, and before the period of state mourning had expired Peter the Great also was no more. The subject had to be approached by their successors under changed conditions and somewhat altered circumstances. The Chinese had, however, gained one and a principal point. They had

finally refused to entertain the Russian proposals for trade with Pekin itself. Whatever commercial intercourse might ensue was to be restricted to the frontiers.

In June, 1728, Count Vladislavitch negotiated the Treaty of Kiachta, which was intended to give fresh force to the expressions of friendship in the Treaty of Nipchu; and perhaps the most important concession contained in it was that relating to the establishment of a Russian Mission at Pekin. Permission was granted to the Russians to build a church, to follow the worship of their religion undisturbed, and to maintain a mission of ten persons—six being students of the Chinese language—at Pekin; and the Chinese Government undertook to defray the greater portion of the expenses of maintaining it. The only precaution taken by the Chinese was to stipulate for the members of this mission being changed every ten years; but practically this regulation has been always more or less of a dead letter. The Emperor Yung Ching, while less able as a ruler than either his predecessor or successor, appears to have been free from prejudice, and from the characteristic hatred of the Manchus to everything foreign. Five years after the signature of this treaty, in the year 1733, the first Chinese embassy that ever left Pekin set out for Russia; and this affords the most conclusive proof that the Chinese were anxious to obtain trustworthy and definite information of a country and a people with whom they were likely to be brought into close contact. The embassy reached St. Petersburg, where it met with an honourable reception, and doubtless brought back to China many strange stories of a country ruled by women, and where the brawls in the palace would remind the Chinese *literati* of the dark periods in their own history. In the year 1733–34 the state of society at St. Petersburg did not argue any great solidity for the young empire, which in little more than a century had flung its arms across the vast region from Poland to the Pacific; and it does not appear that the Chinese were much impressed by what they saw during their residence in Russia.

So long as Yung Ching lived the relations of the two countries remained fairly satisfactory; but on his death, in 1736, and the accession of his son, the great Keen Lung, the policy of the Pekin Government reverted to the lines upon which it had been based under the Emperor Kanghi. The caravan trade, which it had been one of the chief efforts of the Treaty of Kiachta to promote,

languished, until at last, in 1762, the Empress Catherine thought fit to abolish it altogether, and to decree that henceforth trade with China was free to all her subjects. A few years before this Keen Lung's armies had invaded and conquered Eastern Turkestan, when the Russians gave shelter to an Eleuth prince, Amursana, who had rebelled against the emperor's authority. This had led to a discussion, which assumed a recriminatory tone, and the Chinese themselves put it that they adopted towards Russia "the tone of an elder brother." The local Russian authorities succeeded in satisfying the Chinese commanders with regard to Amursana, who died of disease shortly after his flight from Kuldja, and this difficulty was amicably settled. Matters generally reached such a pass about this time, when the Chinese were carrying everything before them in Central Asia, up to the walls of Tashkent and the gates of Samarcand, that the Empress Catherine suggested that a Chinese representative should take up his residence permanently at her court. This proposition was treated with silent contempt, and when that haughty princess sent an envoy to Pekin he was summarily dismissed! The effect of this indifference was enhanced by the migration of the Tourgut tribe from the banks of the Volga to those of the Ili, a voluntary return to an allegiance that had lost all its significance unexampled in history.

During the long reign of the Emperor Keen Lung the attitude of the Chinese towards Russia continued to be one of defiance and proclaimed dislike. The trade proceeded on the frontiers; but the Russian traders, although coming as suppliants, reaped little benefit from the traffic. If there is matter for marvel, it is that they persisted in coming at all. In 1805 the Russians hoped to derive some advantage from the change in rulers that had taken place; and a magnificent embassy, under Count Goloiken, was sent to China. It had, however, to reduce its numbers before being permitted to cross the frontier, and was detained at the Great Wall under various pretexts. On Count Goloiken refusing to perform the "prostration ceremony" he was abruptly informed that he had better return, "as his journey had already been too long." With this event the long period of China's unqualified hostility towards Russia may be said to have reached a termination. The decay in the power and vigour of the state, which steadily declined after the death of Keen Lung, rendered the Government

less able to resist the pressure brought to bear upon them by foreign Powers, among whom Russia had little difficulty in securing her share of the privileges that were obtainable.

In 1820 another Russian embassy, under M. Timkowski, arrived in Pekin, but this is chiefly remarkable because it afforded that gentleman the opportunity of writing a very interesting book on China. The commercial relations of the two countries were steadily developing, not only by the great trade avenue through Kiachta, but also at other points along the frontier, notably at the towns of Chuguchak and Ili, in Jungaria. Thirty years after the return of M. Timkowski the Kiachta caravan trade had attained such proportions that there was little risk of either stagnation or retrogression, and so the main object with the St. Petersburg Government became the development of commerce with the western possessions of China. A treaty was concluded with this object at Ili in 1851, and special concessions were made by the Chinese to the Russian merchants of Vernoe and Semipalatinsk. There is no question that the Mahomedan insurrections in 1862–63 were a great blow to the commerce of the Russians, for a really steady and prosperous trade was springing up between Russian territory and the cities of Kuldja, Chuguchak, Hamil, Barkul, and Urumtsi. The rising of the Tungani put a stop to all communication between Russian territory and this region for many years; and it was only during the latter part of Yakoob Beg's rule that the trade showed any signs of reviving.

In 1860 a most important event occurred in the relations of the two countries by the Russian occupation of the large province bordering the sea, and lying east of Manchuria—maritime Manchuria, in short, for want of a better name. At the time of the Crimean War, it will be remembered that the English fleet carried on desultory operations against the Russians on the Amour; and the Russian naval authorities, encouraged by what they regarded as their favourable result, and for other reasons recommended, and ultimately carried out, the incorporation with the empire of the country between the Soungatche river and the sea. By this step the chief Pacific harbour was moved south from Nicolaievsk to Vladivostock. Availing themselves of the successes of the Anglo-French army, the Russians timed their movements so that the Pekin Government was powerless to prevent the annexation of this province, protected on the land side by extensive marshes and

dense forests, and at the mercy of the Power commanding the sea. General Ignatieff, at that time Russian Minister at Pekin, succeeded in mollifying the indignation of the Chinese, who were then much too anxiously occupied with affairs in their very midst to raise serious objections to the transfer of districts which had been in the undisturbed possession of a few robber clans. This wound has since rankled, and the growing size and strength of Vladivostock, as well as the activity of the Pacific squadron, have served to further inflame it. Here also a trade sprang up, and many Chinese came to settle at Vladivostock. The old grievance does but slumber, and the greater importance, in the settlement of questions in this quarter, of Corea—only divided from Russia by the small river Tumen—lends increased weight to it in the eyes of Chinese statesmen.

We have now glanced at all the points where the Russians and the Chinese come into contact; and from Kuldja to Vladivostock it is clear that there is more than one principle at stake, and more than one conflict imminent under present circumstances. In spite of the opposition of the Chinese Government and the indifference of the people on the one side, and the immense distance and other natural difficulties interfering with and retarding the progress of the Russians on the other, a very considerable amount of trade is carried on along the frontiers. It is not placing the value of the merchandize exported from China on the land side at too high a figure to say that it probably amounts to five millions sterling per annum; and whenever Russia has improved the means of transit within her frontier, either by the construction of railways or by connecting the Siberian lakes and rivers by canals, an enormous impulse must be given to commerce in this region. It is, therefore, evident that neither Peter the Great nor the long line of Russian rulers and statesmen of ability since his time, toiled in vain so far as trade with China is concerned. That trade, on the condition of peace being preserved, admitted of considerable expansion; but even a great war will probably fail either to destroy the results attained during the last two centuries, or to dissipate the interests slowly created during that long period.

The political questions are much more difficult to deal with, and the more carefully they are considered the more hopeless does a durable settlement, to the satisfaction of both empires, appear. For there can be no doubt that China's suspicions of the integrity

of Russia's policy are very keen, and now not easily to be allayed. Her statesmen see danger to the empire at every point where the nations come into contact from Vladivostock to Kuldja, and they utterly distrust—probably with good reason—Russia's intentions with regard to Corea, Japan, and Ourga. They scent danger in the air on all sides, and, rightly or wrongly, believe that to avert that peril their action must be prompt. To a people who, like the Chinese, judge the present almost exclusively by reference to the past, there is something intolerable in its oppressiveness in the existence of a great military Power along the whole of their northern frontier, and occupying the same relative position to them that the most famous conquerors of China—the Mongols and Manchus themselves—did at former epochs. There has also been added the sense of injury for the forcible occupation of maritime Manchuria. To all these grievances and wrongs the refusal to restore the province of Kuldja has given fresh substance and increased importance. The attempt to deprive the partial surrender of this province of any value, by securing more valuable equivalents—under the Treaty of Livadia—has further opened the eyes of the Chinese and brought matters to a head. When the Chinese Government angrily refused to ratify that treaty, and disgraced its negotiator Chung How, a rupture, sooner or later, between Russia and China became inevitable.

It is probable that, before the close of last year, the dominant party at Pekin, under the Imperial princes Chun and Li, had resolved upon war with Russia. The opinion appears to be prevalent among the official classes that Russia's strength has deteriorated on account of the war with Turkey and of popular discontent; but if these fanciful views are current among the provincial officials, it is not to be supposed that the responsible ministers are so easily deluded by them. The authorities are, on the contrary, showing remarkable energy and good sense. They have made large purchases of munitions of war in Germany and the States, at the same time that their own native arsenal at Kiang-nan has been constructing weapons more rapidly than ever before. The forts on the Peiho bristle with Krupp's most formidable artillery, and a fleet of gunboats carrying 25-ton guns has been collected to defend the passage of the river. An army of at least 100,000 well-armed and drilled men is at hand to guard the approaches to the capital; and, lastly, Colonel Gordon has reached

the scene of his former exploits. In Central Asia and on the Amour not less energy and foresight have been shown. Tso Tsung Tang has been largely reinforced in artillery and cavalry; and his army now probably numbers 100,000 combatants. In Manchuria, at Haylar in particular, active military preparations have been in progress for many months; and, should the Russians abandon the design with which they are credited of making their chief attack from the coast, it is probable that Colonel Gordon's services will be utilized in this direction. All these circumstances show that the Chinese Government is fully alive to the importance of the crisis, and that it is working out a methodical and determined policy.

The future must depend so largely on the fortune of war, that it would be weakness to speculate on what it may prove to be until better informed as to the exact course of recent events in Central Asia. But at the least it must prove fruitful in change. It may greatly alter our views of the military strength of Russia in Central Asia, and of the warlike characteristics of the Chinese. To which ever side the balance of success may go, there will needs be a modification in the relations both of England and of India to the victor and the vanquished. For the present it is enough to recognize plain facts. China has shown that rather than forego the least of her rights she is willing to appeal to the sword, and Russia is busy with preparations for an immediate commencement of hostilities. The harbours of the Baltic are being denuded of ironclads in order to reinforce the fleet in the Pacific, and troops are being assembled for frontier defence as rapidly as the vast distances admit of. In face of these patent facts it is hardly possible to hope that war can be averted. The suggestion of some of the journals of St. Petersburg to waive the Treaty of Livadia, and restore the whole of the province of Kuldja to China for a fair pecuniary compensation, involves a concession which the Russian Government is by no means likely to adopt. It would increase the arrogance of the Chinese, at the same time that it would be sure to create fresh dangers throughout Turkestan. When the war comes—and I am fully convinced that it cannot be much longer put off—Russia will be compelled to fight in defence, not merely of Kuldja, but of her very position in Asia. Although to Englishmen, remembering our easy march to Pekin, the contest may appear unequal, there are reasons, such as I have stated, for

believing that the combatants are fairly matched. At all events the Chinese—who are nothing if not human beings with a large development of practical common sense—are confident of the result,[1] and they too have not forgotten the unpleasant experience of twenty years ago. They have faith in the justice of their cause, in their numbers, and in their greater wealth; and there are those among them who declare that a successful war with Russia is the only way to place their empire on a firm foundation, and enable it to withstand the corrosive influence of daily contact with the "Barbarians of the West."

[1] The question was settled by the Treaty of St. Petersburg, which sanctioned the restoration of Kuldja to China.

XIV.

THE FRENCH IN ANAM AND TONQUIN.[1]

THE failure of Dupleix lies heavily on the conscience of the French people, and their intermittent attempts to establish colonial dependencies show the painful recollection of a great deed almost achieved. Success has still to come, however, for their efforts have hitherto been attended by the Nemesis of the weakness and irresolution that ignored and abandoned Lally and many another soldier and adventurer of the 18th century when on the eve apparently of realizing the Gallic vision of a colonial empire, which events in Tonquin prove is as much cherished as ever on the Quai d'Orsay. French opinion has shown a not altogether unintelligible reluctance to listen to English warnings on this subject, and our neighbours seem disposed to accept the objection of this country as a tribute to the wisdom of their own proceedings, and as the measure of their national importance. It is possible that this would have been the case under any circumstances; but there is no doubt that the French people have been very needlessly irritated by random and reckless statements that English interests must suffer from their *success*, and that the attainment of their objects in Tonquin will inevitably be followed by the introduction of their influence into Siam and Burmah, and by the establishment of a rival empire to ours on the borders of

[1] *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1883.

China. Such predictions are of the wildest kind, while they argue a strange want of faith in the capacity of this nation to hold its own in the markets and capitals of Asia. But this extravagant view, which is little more than the expression of individual opinion, is quite apart from, and leaves untouched, the great mass of adverse criticism which the French proceedings in Tonquin have aroused, aud to which, as representing the best information obtainable on the subject, French statesmen will be prudent to pay heed. England has no apprehension whatever from French success; the more complete it proved the more would English commerce, and foreign influence as opposed to Chinese exclusiveness, benefit by it. What she does apprehend, and what all those having a stake in the affairs of the far East dread to contemplate, is that France will fail not so much even to carry her point, as to sustain the reputation of European superiority, necessary to the maintenance of Asiatic peace. The effort will have to be so great and sustained that even a more determined people than the French might fail to prosecute the undertaking to a successful issue. Moreover the scene of the contest may become so extended, the passions of the Chinese not only against France but against all foreigners must be so inflamed by any hostile collision with a European Power, that the action of the French in Tonquin of which we have to trace the origin and course may entail endless calamities, and wreck the fair prospect before the peoples and governments of Eastern Asia. Let us state as plainly as words can in the very commencement of our remarks that it is the possibility of the half-success or the failure of French plans in Anam which inspires us with alarm, and not any idle fear at the chimerical scheme of their founding another Oriental empire on the confines of India and China.[1]

[1] In the last edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica" there is a valuable article on Cochin China from which we extract the following facts, which are of interest at this moment. The extent of the Empire of Anam is about equal to that of France. The population is estimated at ten or twelve millions. The delta of the Songcoi is intersected by numerous channels and canals, of which a curious Chinese map was executed by order of the Emperor Kia-Tsing (*i.e.*, Kanghi). It is copied in the "Lettres Edifiantes." Hanoi is situated on one of these channels. None of them are deep, and owing to the vast alluvial deposits of the rivers, the bar at the mouth of the principal entrance has only 5½ feet in winter and 12 feet in summer. The climate of Tonquin, though better than that of Cochin China, is fatal to Europeans. Dysentery and wood-fever

To the readers of this Review the question of French enterprise and exploration in Indo-China will not come as a new theme. More than ten years ago, when the labours of the Commission for the Exploration of the Mekong had terminated with the discovery that the mighty river of Cambodia was not navigable, and that the fairest dreams of the French in Indo-China could not, therefore, be realized, we[1] called attention to the fact that an expedition was about to start for the Songcoi and to break ground in another direction. It was indeed the beginning of the Tonquin question in the enterprise of M. Dupuis and the expedition of Lieutenant Garnier. But in order to realize the exact position of affairs, and to show the train of circumstances which have made the name of the Red River a household word in Paris, we must go back one step further, and include the journeys to Yunnan of M. Rocher from the one side and of M. Dupuis from the other.

While M. Rocher was an official in the Customs Service of China, M. Dupuis had preserved the independence which better suited his character and plans. He arrived in China at the time of the last foreign war, and after the conclusion of peace established himself in a commercial capacity at Hankow. He there acquired a fluent knowledge of the language, and made that important place of trade the centre for a succession of tours which are said to have extended throughout fifteen of the eighteen provinces of China. He did more than learn how to converse in the official tongue; he succeeded in gaining the confidence of the principal officials. As far back as 1866 he was engaged in the purchase of arms and munitions of war for the Imperial authorities. The outbreak of the Mahomedan or Panthay rebellion in Yunnan rendered the despatch of a supply of arms to the viceroy of that province highly desirable, and the offer of M. Dupuis to undertake the task was gladly accepted. M. Dupuis had been struck by the possibility that the river flowing

prevail. The month of August is the hottest and the most unhealthy in the year. The first treaty of the Anamese with France was concluded 1787, when she acquired the peninsula of Tourane and the island of Pulo-Condore. In 1862 the Court of Hué ceded three provinces to France, and in 1874 three more, the French finding that their position on the coast at Saigon was absolutely worthless, unless they had access to Cambodia, in the interior of the country.

[1] See article on Trade Routes to Western China in *Edinburgh Review*, No. cclxxx. for April, 1873.

into the Gulf of Tonquin, and which was known to rise within the frontier of Yunnan, might prove sufficiently navigable to afford a short and convenient route to South-west China; and when the results of the Mekong Commission were first made known he resolved to prosecute his inquiry with the least possible delay. He visited Yunnan in 1869, and again in the following year, when he resolved, although the rebellion was still far from being crushed, to return to Hankow through Tonquin. The difficulties of the journey gave a further zest to the enterprise in the eyes of this hardy adventurer, and notwithstanding the warnings of the Chinese authorities he proceeded across Southern Yunnan to the valley of the Songcoi. He succeeded in travelling down that stream to the vicinity of Hanoi, and then returned to Yunnan to report that the navigability of the Red River was a fact beyond dispute. The Chinese authorities still engaged in that province in their struggle with the Mahomedans were naturally much rejoiced at the prospect of receiving a supply of arms by an easy and rapid road from Europe, and gave M. Dupuis the fullest powers to act as their mandatory, as well as a letter calling upon the officials of Anam as the faithful vassal of China to assist him in every way whenever he should endeavour to convey his stores and arms up the Songcoi into Yunnan. M. Dupuis, it is true, had then only explored the upper course of that stream, but as no doubt was entertained about the lower portion being open to trading vessels he felt justified in declaring, on his return to Hankow in 1871, not only that the Songcoi was navigable, but that it was about to become an important avenue of trade.

M. Dupuis had thus not only established, to his own satisfaction at all events, the feasibility of the short route into South-west China from the Gulf of Tonquin, but, availing himself of the temporary difficulties of the Chinese authorities in Yunnan, had procured their assent to his bringing them a supply of arms by that route. M. Dupuis redoubled his efforts when he fancied that success was within his grasp, and hastened to France to buy the chassepôts and the field artillery which were to enable Marshal Ma to overthrow the truculent despot of Talifoo. It was the autumn of 1872 before this enterprising commercial agent had collected his stores and obtained the vessels to convey them to the Songcoi. At this point it became necessary to decide whether before starting on his journey M. Dupuis should apprise the Court

of Hué of his purpose; and after anxious deliberation it was resolved on the advice of M. Senez that it would be unwise and would really invite failure to take any such step. M. Dupuis was, therefore, to proceed in secret to the Songcoi; and in order that his character as a Chinese mandarin might not be lost sight of, or confounded with that of a French emissary, he was to purchase vessels of his own instead of using the French man-of-war promised him by the Minister of Marine. The expedition was fitted out, M. du Caillaud informs us, at Shanghai and Hong-kong; but as it was arranged in the interests and with the sanction of China it excited no opposition and attracted little attention. Yet the squadron mustered in all four vessels with an armed force of twenty-five Europeans and 150 Asiatics, principally Chinese; and it may be interesting to add that the supply of arms destined for Marshal Ma consisted of "thirty field-pieces, six or seven thousand rifles, and between twelve and fifteen tons of material of all descriptions." M. Dupuis cast his anchor off the mouth of the Songcoi on November 8, 1872, when he found that the real difficulties of navigation as well as diplomacy were still before him. Thanks, however, to his own energy and to the cordial support and co-operation of M. Senez, M. Dupuis succeeded in finding a navigable channel leading into the main stream, and in due course anchored his vessels outside Hanoi. The Anamese authorities were fairly taken by surprise, and without instructions from Hué they were unable to decide their proper course of action. M. Dupuis acted with prudence and determination. He allowed them an interval for the purpose of communicating with King Tuduc, and on the expiration of the specified time he procured some native boats through the assistance of his Chinese friends, who were influenced by his position as a mandarin, and by the direct order of a Chinese general named Chen; and having placed his stores in them, he continued his journey up the Songcoi, leaving his larger vessels at Hanoi. His vigour paralysed the Anamese, and before they had resolved what to do he had passed beyond the reach of their power.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the enthusiastic reception he met with in Yunnan, which of course loses nothing in the hands of its French narrators, or on the numerous commissions for a profitable trade with which he retraced his steps down the Red River. "The water route through Tonquin had been completely traversed

and its navigability effectually demonstrated"—such was the declaration made on his return by the French explorer. It remained to accomplish the most difficult task of all—to keep it permanently open by disarming the opposition of Anam and by respecting the susceptibilities of China. Marshal Ma is reported to have offered to send an army to subdue the valley of the Songcoi, but M. Dupuis rejected the proposition through a patriotic impulse to secure the monopoly of this region for France. Perhaps he also had an intuitive perception that the complaisance of Chinese officials was due to their temporary difficulties, and would prove short-lived when they had passed away. M. Dupuis preferred to rely upon himself and on the support of his own Government, and the successful despatch of a supply of salt after his return to Hanoi led to the expectation that things would gradually settle down and that the trade would continue. What M. Dupuis had been glad enough to obtain as a Chinese official, he was resolved to keep as a commercial agent for himself and the French Government; and it is most necessary to remember this fact, as it supplies the explanation of the change which has taken place in the sentiments of the Chinese since 1872.

While M. Dupuis had been thus busily engaged in demonstrating the navigability of the Songcoi, his friend the naval officer, M. Senez, had drawn up a scheme of policy to make the Court of Hué dependent on France and to give his Government the practical command of the Tonquin delta. The scheme could not be found fault with for want of boldness or comprehensiveness. The King of Anam was to be compelled to sign a treaty of the closest amity, and the six strategical points in the lower course of the Songcoi were to be occupied by the French and garrisoned with a force "of eighteen companies of marine infantry, six batteries, and twelve mitrailleurs." In addition to this garrison there was to be a strong naval squadron "of six despatch boats, eight or ten gunboats, and of from fifteen to eighteen steam launches armed with a four-pounder apiece." This garrison was more considerable than it might appear, and if M. Senez contemplated its retaining efficiency, it would have numbered at least 5,000 Frenchmen, a force which no French Government has ever contemplated as being permanently required for keeping open a small water-way in a remote region. Yet such, on M. Senez's own showing, was the force needed to hold Tonquin, and he had

the lowest opinion of Anamese opposition, and completely ignored that of China. We have given the opinion of M. Senez perhaps more prominence than it intrinsically deserves, because his official report forms the basis of the present action of M. Challemel Lacour and his colleagues; but as a matter of fact it is hardly worthy of this consideration, for among the proposals made are fanciful suggestions to stir up a rebellion among the Tonquinese and to put arms in their hands, as well as to deport all the officials of Hué to the convict station of Pulo-Condore if they raised objections to the carrying out of these plans. But let us resume the thread of events.

The success of M. Dupuis—for, notwithstanding the persistent efforts of Anamese diplomacy, he remained with his ships anchored off Hanoi, where he purchased from Chinese residents several houses, thus gaining a foothold on land—and the bold schemes of M. Senez induced the Saigon authorities to give the subject close attention; and they were easily persuaded by the deeds and words of these agents that success was to be attained, and that only a slight effort was required to add a vast and flourishing dependency to the French Republic. At this very conjuncture when the authorities in Cochin China were pondering over the attractive prospect, two circumstances combined to hasten them towards decisive action. The one was the rumoured intention of both Germany and England to interfere in Tonquin; the other, the intelligence that a rebellion was about to break out in that country against the authority of King Tuduc. These additional inducements proved irresistible, and the French hastened to assert themselves for the first time as a Government and in an official way in the affairs of Tonquin. They did not allow themselves to doubt for a moment that where an individual like M. Dupuis had not failed they would achieve the most complete and enduring success.

The interest in the subject now passes from M. Dupuis to the accredited representatives of France in Indo-China, who in the person of Admiral Dupré resolved to assert their rights on the Songcoi. Two war vessels were directed to proceed to the scene of the approaching struggle; and as the bad health of M. Senez, to whom the command was first offered, detained him in Europe, the expedition was entrusted to M. Francis Garnier, the most capable and intrepid of the French explorers in that region. With the appointment of Garnier the most brilliant and encouraging

period of French action in Indo-China began, but the reader will have little difficulty in perceiving that the success was due solely to the energy of the French commander, and that any expectations of its proving durable could only end in disappointment. Garnier was already known to fame as the author of the official account of the exploration of the Mekong, which had resulted in demonstrating the impossibility of making that great stream a means of communication with the interior. In that volume he had taken the opportunity to express some very strong opinions to the effect that French policy had been too long subservient to that of England, and that if the French Government acted with proper discretion it might easily become the most powerful moral force in the Far East and the real arbiter of the destinies of the nations bordering the China seas. Garnier's views were not of a kind to admit of close contact with the hard facts of the position in Cochin China; but it is essential to bear in mind that the policy entrusted to him for realization was one to secure the strong places of Tonquin so that French interests might be preserved during the critical period foreseen to be approaching in Anamese affairs. Garnier was all in favour of proceeding with due deliberation, and he deprecated the open employment of force as calculated to lead to the active intervention of China. His remarks are so instructive on this point that they deserve to be specially recorded.

"An expedition without an ostensible object will probably cost us unlooked-for interventions. What should we do if, for instance, the Court of Pekin were to order, at the request of the Anamese Government, the troops of Yunnan to march down into Tonquin in order to defend it against our invasion? Those troops are armed with the rifles and mitrailleurs sold them by M. Dupuis; they have also European instructors. Moreover, if conquest is such an easy matter, administration is a task of difficulty: and we absolutely lack the necessary staff for it. Would it not be preferable, therefore, for us to pose as the champions of the rights of the Hué Court, and to impose upon it, in return for our protectorate, the opening of Tonquin to commerce? We should thus place ourselves in an absolutely unassailable diplomatic position."

M. Garnier's advice was taken, and his proposed plan of proceedings was followed; but, as will be seen, the accompanying events were not of a kind to insure any satisfactory result for them.

Towards the end of October he reached the Songcoi with two gunboats and a small force of marine infantry and artillery under his command, and with *carte blanche* for his instructions. While M. Dupuis had carried his point as the mandatory of China, M. Garnier came in the character of the champion of King Tuduc against refractory subjects and the pirates of the Songcoi, and he had even the power to order M. Dupuis to depart from his position before Hanoi if he thought such a step advisable. In the prosecution of this new policy it was clearly seen how inconvenient and dangerous the claims of China might become, and all the efforts of the French officials were directed to the task of repelling her pretensions. From this point of view M. Dupuis was a hindrance to their plans, and he would have been repudiated and abandoned had the Chinese attempted to assert themselves in the province by his instrumentality.

But although M. Garnier came to Tonquin with these amicable intentions in the cause of Tuduc, he met with a very cold reception and found little sympathy on the part of the Anamese officials. Perhaps they knew or surmised that the secret sympathies of the French officers were with the Tonquinese, then on the eve of rebellion: and they were much more inclined to resent than to welcome the assistance of foreigners in performing their own duties. The French officer laboured under the disadvantage of having throughout a double policy. On the one hand he was to promote the authority of Tuduc, on the other he was to coquette with the aspirations of the people and to do his best to discover some eligible candidate of the old native dynasty to the throne. The French may see in this the proof of a very fine policy; but ordinary people will only be disposed to think that they did not know their own mind, or what they were exactly striving for.

The attendant circumstances of this expedition were not auspicious, and the superstitious will see in the loss of one of the gunboats the fitting emblem of the future of French colonial policy. However, Garnier was not the man to be deterred by such an incident, and although he had lost the greater portion of his stores he proceeded towards his destination. On the Songchi canal, which connects two channels of the river and affords the most convenient approach to the capital, he had his first interview with M. Dupuis, who was made to clearly understand that his individual interests must be subordinate to the policy of France

whatever form it might take. M. Garnier then wrote in his official letter, "M. Dupuis shows himself full of patriotism and good sense, and readily defers to all my instructions." The reception which awaited M. Garnier at Hanoi was far indeed from being cordial. The authorities hardly deigned to take any notice of his arrival, and it was only after a long delay that a mandarin of low rank appeared to point out the place of residence which had been selected for the French Mission. The house was a wretched inn situated in the centre of the town, unsuitable not less from its position than on account of its meagre accommodation. To the energetic remonstrances of M. Garnier, who forced his way into the citadel, and obtained an audience in person, the Anamese were constrained to yield, and for "this unsuitable and inconvenient inn" was substituted a large and commodious building outside the town, constructed for the use of the students at the public examinations. A period of uncertainty followed, marked by messages to and from the Songcoi and Hué; but without bringing the relations of France with the Anamese nearer to a satisfactory basis. The French candidly admitted that their main object was to open Tonquin to commerce, and they claimed their right to do so under one of the clauses of the treaty of 1862, which opened the port of Ba-lat to French vessels. But Tuduc's representative repudiated the power, and certainly did not possess the inclination, to meet the French officer half-way in this matter. It was a question, he said, to be decided at Hué, not at Hanoi. All the tact and energy of M. Garnier fell to the ground in face of the *non possumus* of Tuduc's lieutenants; and as the hostility of the mandarins was daily becoming more openly proclaimed, the French officer resolved to turn to the other side of his instructions and to assert the claims of France in the teeth instead of by the aid of the Anamese. To quote his own words—

"I have resolved on this striking action. On November 15th, I will attack the citadel. I will arrest the Marshal, and send him to Saigon in one of Dupuis' vessels which I will borrow for the occasion. I will then officially proclaim at Hongkong and along the whole coast of China this country open to commerce, and the customs will supply me with the means of carrying on the government."

In the course of a few short weeks, French policy had thus

veered round from one of friendship towards Anam, to unconcealed and unqualified opposition. The change suited M. Garnier, as it enabled him to see exactly what he had to do, and how to adjust his means towards accomplishing it. There then ensued a brief period of events most satisfactory to the French, and for a short space of time it seemed as if they might attain their object by the conquest of the Tonquin delta. On November 19th Garnier presented an ultimatum, to which no reply being accorded, he resolved to attack the citadel. The force of which he could dispose was limited, consisting of 188 Europeans, twenty-four Asiatics, and eleven pieces of artillery; but its superiority over the five or six thousand badly armed and inexperienced Anamese in the citadel was obvious and quite incontestable. Early in the morning of the day following the despatch of the ultimatum the assault was delivered, and the resistance encountered was so insignificant that in less than an hour the citadel was in the possession of the French. This satisfactory result was greatly assisted by the vigorous fire from the gunboats, and by the co-operation of some of M. Dupuis' Chinese soldiers. The French lost not a man, killed or wounded, while the Anamese left 2,000 prisoners in their hands, besides 80 killed and 300 wounded. From so signal a victory it was only natural that the French should expect to draw the greatest possible advantages, and M. Garnier freely gave the rein to his ideas on the subject of a mighty colonial empire for France in Indo-China. The capture of Hanoi was followed by that of Haidzuong and Ninbinh, while M. Garnier established his quarters in a sacred palace within the citadel, reserved for the exclusive use of the King of Anam, and from which he issued proclamations still declaring that France only wished to establish her protectorate in the interests of that ruler.

Although M. Garnier's first achievement had been so completely successful and easily obtained, it very soon became clear that the resistance of the Anamese was far from being crushed, and that they were preparing to oppose, after their own fashion, the further operations of the French. While M. Garnier was obliged to leave Hanoi in order to attack Namdinh, called by the people "the neck of Tonquin," the scattered Anamese soldiers had assembled in the country beyond the capital, and had enlisted many of the Black Flag Chinese into their service for the express purpose of driving out the French. Namdinh fell into his hands, but not

without resistance, and some loss to the assailants. The victory was scarcely assured, when alarming news from Hanoi recalled the French commander to the capital. The Anamese garrisons had collected and taken the field, while a still more formidable enemy had appeared in the Black Flags, who were Chinese rebels of the province of Kwangsi driven out by the Imperial commanders at the time of the suppression of the Taeping rebellion, and possessing a military capacity and personal courage far above the untried soldiers of King Tuduc. The success before Namdinh, instead of being decisive, would, it was seen, have to be confirmed by another signal victory at Hanoi; and when Garnier reached the capital, he found that the wreck of French schemes and hopes could only be averted by vigorous and sure action. M. Garnier reached Hanoi on December 18th, where he found the enemy rendered confident by several failures on the part of the French to dislodge them from their position, and his own men correspondingly discouraged and exhausted by much marching and continued fighting. It was imperative to strike an immediate blow; and even the commencement of negotiations for the signature of a treaty of peace with the Court of Hué could not prevent the prosecution of the necessary military plans.

The Anamese garrisons and their Black Flag allies had no inclination to refrain from pushing home their advantage against the foreigners; and their attitude became so menacing that it was only a question of awaiting their attack in the citadel or of going out to engage them. It was on December 21st, only one day more than a month after the capture of Hanoi, that the French were called on to defend that citadel against the attack of the large native force which had gathered from all sides for their destruction. Their efforts were successful, and the local levies were driven back with loss; but when the French assumed in turn the offensive, the Black Flags only retired into the shelter of the bamboo thickets, and made fresh front again. Garnier led in person the van of the pursuers, and, with eighteen men and one four-pounder, he placed himself on the traces of a worsted but savage foe of several thousands. Carried away by his own impetuosity, Garnier led the advance, regardless of obstacles and of the enemy. The gun had soon to be left behind, and several of his men to guard it, while others were detached to protect the flanks and to drive back any scattered bodies of the enemy.

When he arrived in front of the principal stockade, where the Black Flags had mustered in force, only three of his men were present to support him, and even these had been outstripped by their active commander. The appearance of the French officer seems to have either so surprised or so terrified the natives that for a moment they meditated flight, but they recovered from their panic, and when Garnier slipped in endeavouring to cross their palisade they stabbed him repeatedly with their spears, and carried off his head as a token of their victory. Too much indignation must not be vented on this barbarous proceeding, as it is the practice in that region, and the native soldiers of M. Dupuis had treated a chief of the Black Flags in precisely the same way only a few days before.

The death of Garnier signified nothing more or less than the failure of the French plans, which he alone understood, and which only his energy rendered at all possible. Garnier possessed in a remarkable degree those qualities of self-reliance and resolute determination which not less than a high order of courage are necessary to the pioneers of commerce and empire in Eastern lands. As he himself used to say, if he had been born an Englishman he would have done good service, and accomplished something that would have endured. Being what he was, he could only act according to his lights for the attainment of a very obscure object with extremely imperfect means, and that he managed to obtain what was a flattering if not a solid success is his chief claim to general admiration. Whether they better appreciated the difficulty of the undertaking, or, as Garnier's admirers insist, lacked the nerve to carry it out, his successors set themselves to the task of coming to as satisfactory an arrangement as they could with the Anamese Government, and thought that both the honour and the interests of France would be well served if the evacuation of the delta could be carried out under cover of a favourable treaty with the Court of Hué.

These new arrangements were entrusted to M. Philastre, who, although rewarded at the time, has ever since been made the object of the indignation of those persons interested in the exploitation of Tonquin. To him was entrusted the difficult and thankless task of winding up an operation that the French Government of that day had the good sense to see could not be successfully prosecuted with the forces and attention it could

spare from more important matters. Such arrangements are best completed with despatch, and in the early part of January, 1874, Ninbinh, Namdinh, and other places were evacuated by the French, and restored to the Anamese forces. Still more important negotiations were in progress at Saigon, where a treaty of peace was concluded on March 15th, by which Tuduc bound himself to conform his foreign policy to that of France, who in turn recognized that sovereign's complete independence. M. Rheinart was sent to Hanoi as the representative of the Republic, but his term of residence was very brief, and he finally withdrew from the Tonquinese capital in the following June. With his departure, the first active intervention of France in the valley of the Songcoi terminated, and it might have been thought that her experiences were such as to prevent her feeling inclined to renew the adventure. As M. du Caillaud expresses it, "our magnificent achievements were annihilated in a few hours, and Tonquin, of which we possessed the fairest provinces, passed again under the abhorred yoke of Hué."

There was one circumstance in connection with the retirement of the French which added to the significance of their discomfiture, and which attached a stigma to their name among the natives. The French had, as we have seen, veered from one policy to another, and had shown themselves undecided whether they should support a national rising or stand by Tuduc and the Government of Anam. Although they adopted the latter course, they went so far in encouraging the Tonquinese to revolt that Garnier's campaign was still in progress when the symptoms of a rebellion revealed themselves in the north-eastern districts of the country. The people proclaimed their intention to restore the family of Li, which had previously held the throne, and they felt so thoroughly convinced of French support that they embroidered their standards with the words *Famille des Lê.* There is no doubt that the French missionaries were the principal agents in stirring up this popular rising, for they saw in the expulsion of the Anamese, and in the restoration of a native dynasty, the last chance not only of advancing the political ends of France, but of insuring the triumph of Christianity.[1] The insurrectionary movement reached its height

[1] Our limits forbid us to enter, on the present occasion, on the very curious early history of the Christian missions to Cochin China and Tonquin; but a full account of them and of the history of Tonquin will be found in the sixteenth

during the negotiations of M. Philastre, and it so far promoted the policy of the French that it induced the Hué Government to cast aside its usual procrastination and to hasten the signature of the Treaty of Saigon. The French would not have obtained the favourable terms of that treaty but for the apprehension of the Anamese at the insurrection spreading throughout Tonquin, which compelled the latter to arrange their difficulty with France before the extent and formidable character of this rising were revealed. The French, therefore, distinctly benefited at the time from their coquetting with national aspirations, but the too confiding natives were left to pay to the vindictive lieutenants of King Tuduc the penalty of their trust in their European sympathisers. Nor was this all. The French officers on the Songcoi co-operated with the Anamese in attacking the rebels who had been led to revolt by their specious promises and flattering representations. The awakening of the people from the delusion they had nursed on the subject of French support was rude, but it was effectual; and henceforth they declared that they "would rather die than trust again to the Frenchmen's treacherous promises." M. du Caillaud again sums up the situation with a force and eloquence that justify the quotation of his sentences.

"Such was the end of that insurrection, which, if France had even only preserved her neutrality, might practically have placed in her hands the protectorate of Tonquin. We fought those very people who proclaimed themselves our allies, working thus after a fashion to be of the greatest possible use to our enemies. And then when the Court of Anam violates unceasingly the treaties and conventions which it has concluded with us, we carry out those very treaties and conventions in the way which will be most unfavourable to our influence. Behold the melancholy result of

volume of the "Lettres Edifiantes et Curieuses" of the Jesuit fathers, published in Paris in 1721. The mission to Tonquin was for many years one of the most flourishing attempts to propagate the Christian faith. It was founded in 1627 by Father Rhodes and Father Marquez, S.J., who were Portuguese priests. They were aided by the French; and at one time the mission boasted of 200,000 converts. But in 1721 a ferocious persecution broke out, and several of the fathers were cruelly martyred. It also appears from these narratives that the relations subsisting between China and Tonquin have been for the last 800 years of the most intimate character, and that the dynasty of Li enjoyed the special protection of the Court of Pekin.

the policy appropriately inaugurated by the evacuation of the citadels of the delta!"

The evacuation of Tonquin could not purchase the goodwill of the Anamese authorities; but although they chafed at the claims of France, they did not feel able to refuse the ratification of the Treaty of Saigon. The northern province was opened to foreign trade, and very soon European vessels, but very rarely those of France, began to visit the port of Haiphong, which has become the principal centre of the outside trade. But although the trade grew, France neither directly nor indirectly derived any benefit from it, and the following melancholy avowal is wrung from M. du Caillaud himself—

"Only the Chinese and those having close commercial relations with them have benefited by the opening of Tonquin. There is no French commerce there at all. During the nine months following September 15, 1875, the harbour of Haiphong received English ships, German ships, and Chinese ships, but not a single French vessel. Moreover, notwithstanding the privileges with which Saigon is invested by the Treaty of Commerce, the merchandise imported from that harbour into Tonquin does not exceed for that period the insignificant sum of 23,800 francs, whilst that imported from China, from Hongkong principally, was 141 times greater, and amounted to a sum of nearly three and a half millions of francs. And with regard to the export trade of Tonquin, Saigon has had a still smaller share; it did not receive at that period a single piastre of merchandise from that state, the exports of which, valued at two million francs, were all destined for Hongkong and China. These results were certainly not those we promised ourselves from the opening of Tonquin to commerce."

Meanwhile the fortunes of M. Dupuis, the discoverer of the Songcoi route and the real author of French interference in Tonquin, had been reduced to the lowest ebb by the change in the policy of his Government. In the days of his prosperity, when he had a fleet riding on the Songcoi, when he possessed more or less the goodwill of the Chinese, and when he felt confident that France was going to carry out a great mission in Indo-China, M. Dupuis had advanced a claim against the Anamese authorities for an indemnity of 10,000 taels, more than 3,000

pounds sterling, for each month that he was delayed in his commercial operations. His claim against the lieutenants of Tuduc rose by leaps and bounds; and, according to his own statement, it sprang in some incomprehensible manner from two to five hundred thousand taels, an enormous sum considering the small extent of the trade of Tonquin, and the very limited capabilities of M. Dupuis as a commercial agent. Of this sum he never received a sixpence, and when summarily ordered by Admiral Dupré to leave Tonquin in 1874 his ships and stores were seized to defray the charges and demands of the crews. M. Dupuis returned to Paris a ruined man, but he has ever since been engaged in impressing his wrongs on those in power; and in January, 1880, he had the satisfaction of receiving a favourable communication from a Commission of the Chamber which had reported on his case, that he had "an undoubted claim on the Governments both of France and of Anam." The claims of M. Dupuis for compensation supplied a convenient theme for asserting the moral rights of France, and enabled her to bring the greater pressure to bear on the Court of Hué; but it is only fair to state that M. Dupuis derived no personal benefit from the prominence again given to his harsh treatment and misfortunes in the official utterances of the Government. The unsatisfactory reports from the consuls at Haiphong and Hanoi, the stagnation of French trade, and the continued persecution of the Christians in Tonquin, all served to direct increased attention to the subject, and to make it clearer than ever that the French plans must either be abandoned or that some vigorous step should be taken to give them effect.

In 1881, therefore, Captain Rivière was sent as Commandant-General to carry out, by the show if not by the employment of force, the policy which M. de Kergaradec had been unable to realize. He, too, was to act, like Garnier, in the name of Tuduc, to which course indeed France was doubly bound by her own protestations as well as by the treaty of 1874; but he was also instructed to do everything in his power to strengthen and encourage "the natural sympathy of the people of Tonquin for France." Captain Rivière arrived at the scene of his labours with these ideas impressed upon him, that the Anamese Government was as weak as it was perfidious, and that the Tonquinese were filled with a desire to place themselves under the protection of France. He had also to carry out the stipulations of the Treaty

of Saigon, which was to give effect to the sovereignty of King Tuduc as against all opponents whatsoever. But on his arrival he was brought face to face with the realities of the question, and the first things he had to admit were that, while whatever popular sympathy may have existed had vanished, the Anamese officials were united in their determination to resist the patronage and to thwart the proceedings of the French. Their sentiments were tersely expressed by the Governor of Namdinh, who replied to Captain Rivière's summons with, "Why do you come here? If you want to fight, let us fight; otherwise stay away." Captain Rivière tried negotiation in order to obtain a foothold at Hanoi, but he was soon compelled to resort to force, and the incidents of his campaign almost exactly resemble those of Garnier's. Like his predecessor he had to storm the citadel of that town, like him also he had to seize by force the other places of the delta, and like him he died in a skirmish outside Hanoi when endeavouring to disperse the gathered forces of Anam and Tonquin.

Having now traced the course of events in Tonquin from the period of the first intervention of France there to the disaster last April, we have next to consider what objects the French have before them, and how they propose to reward themselves for so many labours undertaken without any definite purpose or careful calculation. There remains also the most important point of all, whether the French possess the means or the method to effect their objects, and to make their protectorate over Anam a virtual fact in face of the combined opposition of that state and of China. French writers find it so impossible to separate the facts from their fancies, that the same writer tells us precisely opposite tales on different pages. The name of the French is admitted to have become synonymous in the minds of the natives with falseness and the cowardly abandonment of their cause; yet in the very following paragraphs even the most intelligent of their writers record a series of hopes and expectations in flat contradiction with the facts they have already admitted. "While restoring the Li dynasty to Tonquin, France will leave it only the honours of royalty, and reserve for herself its power, thus imitating English policy towards the rajahs of India. All military authority especially ought to be reserved in her hands. With such precaution a greater number of French soldiers would not be required to guard both Lower Cochin China and Tonquin than the former alone.

Troops raised in Tonquin itself, and formed partly of the Muong mountaineers and partly of Anamese, could be sent to occupy the colony of Saigon; while the greater number of our own troops would be stationed in the more salubrious climate of Tonquin."

Such are the hopes which even the increasing bitterness of popular animosity, and the necessity to send 6,000 French troops from Europe, have not dispelled; and on which it is expected to rear in Indo-China that empire which Dupleix failed to establish in Hindostan. No doubt also is experienced as to the enormous natural wealth of both Yunnan and Tonquin. Latent and available resources are identical in the eyes of French exploiteurs; and in this new El Dorado, French merchants are only to ask and to have. Here again the facts and the theories are in flat contradiction. The small trade that has sprung up since the ratification of the commercial treaty in 1875 has passed through the hands not of Frenchmen, but of Englishmen, Germans, and Chinese. It is instructive to remember that very much the same thing was said of Saigon twenty-two years ago, when Lower Cochin China was annexed to the French dominions, as is said to-day of Tonquin. It was only after much deliberation that the territory at the mouth of the Mekong was selected as the site of the Imperial colony in preference to Tonquin; but Admiral de la Grandière thought "that he could attract to Saigon, a city laid out for half a million inhabitants, the important commerce which is carried on by caravans between Laos, Burmah, Tibet, and the western provinces of the Chinese Empire." Saigon was, therefore, to check the nascent prosperity of Rangoon, and to rival the commercial activity of Hongkong and Singapore; and there were just as good grounds for predicting this as there are now for prognosticating a great future for a French colony in Tonquin. But what are the facts in connection with the development and present condition of Saigon, which has enjoyed during twenty years every possible advantage that the direct encouragement and patronage of the Government could secure for it? The trade amounts in the aggregate to four millions sterling, and the principal export is rice, while the requirements of the garrison and European community represent a very large proportion of the imports. France herself only takes one-tenth of the exports, supplying in return one-seventh of the imports; the bulk of the trade being in the hands of the English and Chinese. These facts cannot be expected to be

palatable to our neighbours, but they are facts and cannot be altered. There is no reason why precisely the same course of things should not be repeated under precisely the same circumstances in Tonquin should the French even succeed in holding their ground there. The Paris authorities would do well to listen to the counsel of men of experience and calm judgment on this subject, instead of to the sanguine views of men who have staked their fortunes on the commercial future of the Songcoi route. Were they to do this they would turn to the reports of men like M. Dierx, President of the Chamber of Commerce at Saigon, who declared that "in that French colony French commerce was without a present and without a future"—a despairing statement which is borne out by that observant and amusing traveller Miss Bird in her latest book of travels.

"On my weary way I was overtaken by a young French artillery officer, who walked with me till we came upon an empty gharrie, and was eloquent upon the miseries of Saigon. It is a very important military station, and a sort of depôt for the convicts who are sent to the (comparatively) adjacent settlement of New Caledonia. A large force of infantry and artillery is always in barracks here, but it is a most sickly station. At times 40 per cent. of this force is in hospital from climatic diseases, and the number of men invalided home by every mail steamer, and the frequent changes necessary, make Saigon a very costly post. The French don't appear to be successful colonists. . . . I do not envy the French their colony. According to my informants Europeans cannot be acclimatised, and most of the children born of white parents die shortly after birth. The shores of the sea and of the rivers are scourged by severe intermittent fevers, and the whole of the colony by dysentery, which among Europeans is particularly fatal."

Such being the undoubted facts in connection with the condition of Saigon, it becomes the more instructive to consider how far the present hopes of the French with regard to Tonquin are similar to the equally confident anticipations of Admiral de la Grandière on the subject of Saigon. In the first place, it is anticipated that the delta of Songcoi will prove a more salubrious station for Europeans than the estuary of the Mekong, but even in this respect it is only a question of degrees of insalubrity between

the two places. Then it is said there is the enormous mineral and agricultural wealth of Tonquin, which is the chief granary of Anam, as well as the centre of vast coal-fields long coveted by the Chinese. More than all, there is the short and convenient water route by the Red River into Yunnan and South-west China. M. Dupuis is content to make assertions on these points, and therefore his statements neither carry conviction nor lend themselves to quotation. M. Rocher, however, gives a very full and interesting description of that part of the province of Yunnan which would be chiefly affected by the opening of the Songcoi route to commerce; and his statements command the more consideration as he shows throughout his volumes that he does not despise local difficulties or overlook the low condition to which Yunnan has been reduced by the bitter and protracted civil war which only terminated ten years ago. It is significant to compare the exactly opposite statements of this traveller and Mr. Colquhoun on the subject of the two routes by the Songcoi and the Sikiang.

"Manhao, situated on the left bank of the river at the foot of the mountain Wang-taipu, has no administrative importance whatever; but it is there that the further transit of the merchandise is arranged both for inland traffic and for the sea. At the time of our passing through it, there were not more than fifty families present, of whom two-thirds were natives and the rest came from Yunnan or other provinces. Established in the place for a long time, they represent business houses of Hongkong, Canton, or Macao. A great part of the village is occupied by large sheds, where the merchandise is stored prior to being sent to its destination. From the establishments and organization which even now exist, the great commercial activity and the large business transactions formerly carried on, when this trade route was perfectly free and open, may be inferred. Since the interruption in navigation, commerce, having no outlet in this direction, has betaken itself to some extent to the Canton river, so that many established houses here have been compelled to suspend their operations."

Mr. Colquhoun came to the exactly opposite conclusion, that trade had been diverted from its natural channel by the Sikiang to the Songcoi, but as he wrote ten years later it is probable that the experience of the English traveller confirms the accuracy

of what the French writer stated. Mr. Colquhoun in the main bears out what M. Rocher says about the extraordinary mineral wealth of Yunnan, although he is disposed to ignore what that gentleman has written about the agricultural fertility of its eastern districts, and to assume that the really productive portion of the province is that lying nearest to the Burmese frontier. It is highly probable that Mr. Colquhoun allows his hopes to bias him in this matter, but at all events M. Rocher is not less emphatic in extolling the natural wealth of the region round Yunnan-foo than the former is in endeavouring to show that it is only a myth. However, the main point is to ascertain the opinion of the latest traveller on the subject of the resources of Yunnan.

"The only accounts that we have had of the province, with the exception of that of the French expedition, have been from journeys through the northern region, which is a poor and sterile country, where the character of the country and people is greatly inferior to that of the south."

It is rather strange that Mr. Colquhoun should so completely ignore M. Rocher, whose volumes give us a very graphic account of that part of the province of Yunnan, probably the best extant in any language.

"In the north the province is wild, broken, and almost uninhabitable, on account of the heavy mists, fogs, and rains. In the tangle of mountains there are few valleys to arrest the eye. The population is wretchedly poor and sparse, living chiefly on maize —for the country is too mountainous for the production of rice. Maize is the ordinary food, rice an article of luxury. Other cereals are cultivated in small quantities. Tea and tobacco of the poorest quality are found here and there. There is no commerce or industry."

Mr. Colquhoun then draws a glowing picture of the south and south-west, which at one place he describes as "rich, and as a rule thickly populated;" but his own experiences of it, as he records them, were something widely different, and the valley which he calls the richest district in Yunnan was, when he passed through it, a plague-stricken and deserted plain. Our present purpose, however, is not to pick holes in Mr. Colquhoun's statements and theories, which would not be a very difficult task,

but just to quote his evidence as a contrast to the accounts of French travellers. The probable truth is, that the exportable wealth of Yunnan is solely mineral, which is at present barely developed, and which can never become a profitable industry to any large extent until the internal means of communication in this province have been vastly improved, or before the Chinese officials cordially consent to the mines being worked, as well as to an active trade across the frontier. Neither Yunnan nor Tonquin is a country where any large trade can be created without corresponding outlay and patience, over and above the unknown point of whether it is possible, on any terms, to obtain the assent of the Pekin Government. The French altogether overlook the fact that even M. Dupuis never had any direct relations with the Central Government. He received his instructions and authority from its embarrassed lieutenant against the Mahomedans, the so-called Marshal Ma, who was moreover a renegade Mussulman himself. If, therefore, the French contemplate prosecuting this enterprise because they believe that there is another India to be won in the border-lands of China and our Asiatic dominions, they are really pursuing a chimera. Tonquin itself might be a more paying, although a far less peaceable, colony than Saigon; but it would have to be that in a very large degree to defray the cost of an increased garrison and a heavier responsibility.

The radical fault of the French policy in Tonquin and in similar matters of colonial enterprise is, that they start on the assumption that trade will follow in the wake of territorial acquisition and state interference. Our neighbours expect that by constructing a colonial empire to order, they will succeed in procuring profitable markets for their home products; and although repeatedly disappointed, they seem to possess such an inexhaustible supply of hope that they go on anticipating in the old way. They seemingly never will learn the truth, that the only good work Governments can do is to follow in the track marked out for them by commerce; and whatever the French may succeed in accomplishing in Tonquin, it will not be their merchants and manufacturers who will benefit by it, but those of England, China, and Germany. The known facts speak for themselves; and were the French to resort to a policy of protection, they would only exclude other traders at the price of effecting

the ruin of their possessions, which are kept alive by the commercial enterprise of other nations. The more enlightened French writers are in their calmer moments not blind to this fact, and nothing can be nearer the truth than the following admissions of M. du Caillaud—

"Is there really any cause to feel astonished at there being, practically speaking, no French commerce in our possessions in Indo-China? At Saigon the greater number of French merchants are the official contractors; all the higher branches of commerce are in the hands of the Chinese. In Tonquin, as we have just seen, it is through Hongkong that the greater part of the imports come, and it is also to that port that the principal exports are directed. Hongkong has also from the first been connected with Tonquin by a regular line of steamers. Certainly one would have supposed that the treaty of March 15, 1874, was intended to protect the extension of French trade towards Tonquin and Central China. But the only Frenchman (Dupuis) who, from his position and experience, was in a way to profit by it, and to cause his country to immediately profit by it, has been crushed and ruined. If ever the route of Tonquin acquires the importance which it ought to have, it will be Hongkong that will benefit by it; it is on that English town, and not on our colony in Saigon, that the trade with the interior of China will pivot. A nous la dépense, aux autres le profit!"

But while it is important, in order to understand the present position of this question, and to have some idea of how much wider this complication will yet spread unless it be summarily checked, to know the course and the motives of French policy in Indo-China, those facts are of minor importance in comparison with the probable action of the Chinese Government in face of French aggression in one of the emperor's dependencies. The first point on which it is necessary to feel convinced is, that Anam is a dependant of China, and that its vassalage is a substantial fact and not a figment of the imagination. In support of this there are the tribute embassies every four years, duly recorded with all their proceedings and accompanying ceremonies in the pages of the *Pekin Gazette*, and the investiture of the sovereign on his accession to the throne by Imperial Commission. The latter event took place in 1847, on the occasion of Tuduc coming to

the throne, but that is so long ago that it appears to be forgotten. There is no similar excuse for overlooking the former fact, as there is resident at Tientsin at this very moment a special embassy from Hué, charged with the task of imploring the protection of the Pekin Government against the aggression of France. A number of competent authorities have expressed opinions on the subject; but perhaps the statement that will carry most weight is that of M. Dupuis himself.

"The suzerainty of China over Anam has been disputed in these later days. The right exists beyond doubt and question; the investiture was granted by the Court of Pekin at the accession of the last sovereign of Anam, Tuduc, just as it was at the accession of the preceding sovereigns. The details of the ceremony have been preserved by M. Pellegrin, who records how the Anamese sovereign made five salutations to the missive containing the emperor's good wishes and notice of investiture."

There is, therefore, not the shadow of a doubt that the dependence of Anam on China exists as a fact; it is claimed by Pekin and admitted at Hué. The important consequence follows from this, that the Chinese Government has a right to a voice in all questions affecting the political status of Tuduc's dominions, and France can therefore only sever the tie connecting these two states at the risk of incurring the mortal enmity of the Chinese. We have seen how, in the first place, French policy sought to avail itself of the moral influence of China in order to force the Anamese to open the Songcoi route to trade; but it very soon became clear to the French officials that the Chinese were not to be bought off, and that the endeavour to make a cat's-paw of them would only result in increasing their influence, and in giving fresh effect to their authority. When M. Dupuis recounted the difficulties he had experienced in conveying his supply of arms up the Songcoi, Marshal Ma at once proposed to send an army to occupy the course of the river down to the sea. The extension of the Chinese Empire could be advantageous to neither the commercial nor the political aims of France, and M. Dupuis enjoys the credit of obeying a patriotic impulse when he declined a proposition that might have benefited himself.

If the French began by using the moral advantages of an alliance and complete agreement with the Chinese, they very soon

conceived it to be part of their policy, first to overlook, and then to deny the suzerain rights of China. The treaty of 1874, which was either obtained from the ignorance of the Anamese commissioners of its significance, or from the embarrassments of Tuduc owing to the rebellion in Tonquin, sought to annihilate at a stroke the rights which China has acquired from antiquity, and which she has preserved with the most scrupulous care and exactitude. The second article of that treaty recognized "the sovereign rights of the King of Anam, and his complete independence of every foreign Power whatsoever." But while the French thought by this stroke of diplomacy to put an end to the connection with China, Tuduc either did not read it in that light or failed to act upon it. Certainly the tribute missions to Pekin continued to be sent with regularity and at the proper seasons; and there was nothing to show the Chinese Ministers of State that a European Government had stepped in in one of the vassal states of the empire, or that it had sought to arrogate to itself the privileges of the Dragon Throne. So long as the French did nothing to give effect to the special political rights secured under the Treaty of Saigon, there was no necessity to protest against an injury which, even if perceived, was of only a sentimental character. It is probable that the Chinese were not even aware of the exact terms of this treaty, and it was only in the early part of the present year that they received a copy of it from Hué. But when Captain Rivière attacked and stormed Hanoi, in April, 1882, there was no longer any possibility of concealing the fact that the French were determined *vi et armis* to establish their authority in the Tonquin delta at the expense of the sovereignty of Anam, and the historic claims of China. Whatever euphemisms might continue to be employed, the successful development of their policy would mean nothing short of the effacement of Tuduc's Government. It was at this stage of the question that the progress of the French expedition began to attract attention in China, and that inquiries were set on foot to ascertain for the information of the Pekin Government what France was doing in its dependency on the southern borders.

While the progress of French arms attracted the attention of Chinese statesmen, it also aroused Tuduc to the danger of his authority being annihilated, and in consequence he addressed a letter of supplication to Pekin for support in resisting the pre-

tensions of France. There is as little room for doubt on the point that Tuduc had the right to make this demand on the Chinese ruler, as there is that the latter can claim the vassalage of Anam; and in the document referred to, Tuduc lays stress on the long-standing and unvarying fidelity of his family to its engagements. There is no reason to suppose that the emperor's advisers, who have always insisted on the faithful observance of their engagements by the tributary kingdoms, will so far set precedent at defiance and escape responsibility by refusing to perform their part of the contract, and sanction the turning of a deaf ear to the prayers of a dependant in distress. Were they to do so, were they even to allow such prudential considerations as a doubt about their capacity to successfully resist a powerful aggressor, to interfere with the discharge of what is clearly their obvious duty, there would be an end not merely to the suzerainty of China, but to the whole system which preserves that empire from disintegration. The Chinese have been able to retain the privileges of past greatness, and to wield a fascinating influence over their neighbours, because they have never allowed any timid diffidence as to their power to make their action hesitating and to mar the consistency of their political pretensions. There have been times within the last generation when the most intelligent and well-disposed foreign observer abandoned hope as to either the existence or the integrity of the Middle Kingdom surviving a combination of storms and disasters without parallel in history. But even at the worst stage of that accumulation of internal commotion and popular sedition, there was no abatement in the proud claims of the Dragon Throne. If rebellion was successful throughout three-fourths of the empire, there was still in the capital, in the undeviating lines of the Imperial system which, apart from all question of the dynasty, would continue to exist and to be handed down like the undying spirit of the Lamas of Tibet, the same fixity of purpose, the same wide-reaching and comprehensive claims to supremacy among the states of Eastern Asia as there were at the happiest and most prosperous era of its history. The storms have now passed away, and the danger has been weathered without even a change of dynasty. The people are as contented as any Asiatic people can be, and China has no danger to apprehend within the wide-stretching dominions which are only limited by those of England and Russia. Is there the least reason to suppose that at a

moment of conscious strength and of visible achievement she will be inclined to waive any of those claims which she refused to abate in the worst hour of peril, or at the lowest extremity of embarrassment? Yet, unless she is prepared to abate them, there is the absolute certainty that the prosecution of French plans in Tonquin can only result in a hostile collision between France and China.

The Chinese have to regard this application from Hué not only as it affects Tonquin, but as a question directly concerning their relations with every vassal which has hitherto reposed in absolute trust on their power and fortitude. If they abandon Tuduc at the pinch, if, when it comes to their turn to justify the trust placed in their honour and sympathy for centuries, they turn a deaf ear to the entreaties of faithful allies in an emergency, and reply, after the cynical fashion of the age, that the cost would be too much, and that Anam must shift for itself, then there is not only an end to the lofty pretensions and unlimited rights of China, but the whole fabric of her majesty and power falls to the ground. The more clearly the consequences to China are realized of her policy in Tonquin proving either unworthy of her past or callous to her present duty, the more readily will it be perceived and admitted that there is not the least intention at Pekin to fail in preserving the national fame, or in rendering effectual aid to the sovereign of Anam. And this is really quite independent of what Li Hung Chang may do or the Marquis Tseng may say; for if it were only a matter of individual opinion and action, there might be the same vacillation in decision or half-heartedness in execution which mars the policy of other nations. In China we have to deal with a system based on unvarying principles, and carried out on lines that admit as little the modification of individual character as of the progress of time. It is at once the strength and the weakness of China; but it at all events enables us to say, if we only look the plain facts fairly in the face, that the action of the Chinese will be in consonance with the traditions of the state and people. They will not even so much as entertain the idea of refusing the application of Tuduc. The doubt as to whether they possess the power to check the progress of France will only be felt by their European friends. It is a question of the simplest and most obvious duty; and no great empire can possibly continue to exist if on every occasion that it has to take a decisive step it counts

up the cost of action with trembling, and looks round anxiously to see whether there may not be some safer and less troublesome alternative. The Chinese are the most ancient civilized people in the world, but they have not yet learnt the extreme civilization of the Lower Empire, which subsidised its foes and abandoned its friends. It is as certain as anything in human affairs can be, that however slow the Chinese may be to take action, they will show themselves implacably and persistently hostile to any scheme of French policy which would inflict an injury on Anam, and cast a slur on the dignity of the Middle Kingdom.

Our neighbours have only to bestow a little thought on the subject to realize the fact for themselves; and they will perceive that the greater the natural advantages of Tonquin, the more admirable the Songcoi may prove as a means of communication, the greater and more unshakable must the objection of China to the supersession of her authority in Anam be and remain. The Chinese have evinced the most remarkable determination in prosecuting their claims and in attaining their ends on occasions when no prospect of practical advantage could have lured them on to dangerous enterprises and remote undertakings. It would be difficult to say in what way China is the better from those campaigns which resulted in the reconquest of Kashgar and Kuldja, and which placed her in the path of Russian progress. If she had only taken into consideration the difficulty and expense of garrisoning distant possessions, she would have rested satisfied with the extermination of the Mahomedan rebels of Kansuh, and Tso Tsung Tang would have stayed the march of his legions at Suchow. But it is exactly because the state policy of the most practical people in the world is swayed by a higher sentiment and obeys a loftier instinct, that the Chinese prosecuted to the bitter end a policy that many will think unwise and unprofitable. They returned to Central Asia, not because they had drawn great advantages from its possession, but because they had been expelled from it with every circumstance of disaster and ignominy, and because it is part of the historic policy to push the landmarks of the empire to as great a distance as is possible from its heart. Precisely the same motives impelled her the other day to resort to the most vigorous measures in Corea to counteract the machinations of Japan, and so well was her action directed that she has completely checked the progress of her very restless and

self-asserting little neighbour in that state at the same time that she has consolidated her own position there, and given renewed force to a long-standing connection. Whether we consider what China has been recently doing in such matters, or the moral and political obligations she has accepted, it becomes equally clear that there is only one possible course for her in regard to the claim made by King Tuduc for support and protection.

While there is no room for uncertainty on the subject of China's policy, it is of course a different matter to say in what exact form it will work for the protection of Anam, or how it will endeavour to thwart French plans of aggrandisement. The Chinese do not desire war with France of all countries in particular, and Li Hung Chang is averse to any foreign war whatever; but, although the newspapers appear to think so, Li Hung Chang and Chinese policy are not convertible terms. His experience and influence will insure for negotiation a fair chance of success; they can do no more. The French pretend to act in the interests of King Tuduc; they will be expected to show that the bombardment of his fortresses and the slaughtering of his troops are calculated to promote them. If the treaty of 1874 is the authority under which the French Government claim to proceed, then they will necessarily be expected to abide by its stipulations, although they will be required to admit that China does not come under the category of "a foreign Power." Whatever action they may wish to take on the Songcoi will have to be with the assent and co-operation of the Anamese Court; and if that agreement is not to be attained, then it will naturally follow that the enterprise must be either dropped or prosecuted in the light of day as an act of conquest. The French are of course irritated at their want of success, which the death of Captain Rivière notified to the world, and it is only natural that they should wish to avenge that gallant officer and retrieve the credit of their arms. But they still protest their wish to keep within the limits of the Treaty of Saigon, with the important reservation that at present they are inclined to regard China in the category of other foreign Powers, and as having no right to intervene between them and the Hué Government. There is, no doubt, an important difference of principle in this; but, seeing the irrefragable evidence on which Chinese suzerainty rests, it is clearly a matter for negotiation, and one in which the good offices of a third Power might go far to procure a satisfactory arrangement.

With regard to what Power would best undertake this task, it has been stated, with some show of authority, that by a process of exhaustion, Russia has been deemed the most likely to bring about a satisfactory arrangement. Until the utility of negotiation has plainly passed away, the Chinese Government will certainly hope for a peaceful issue. They have no interest to serve by embarking upon a foreign war precipitately, and with France least of all countries. But the moment it becomes clear that the French intend to prosecute their plans regardless of consequences, and, it must be added, of right, then the question will leave the domain of negotiation for that of vigorous action.

The policy of France is very far from having the clearness of form and the definiteness of purpose that are so eminently characteristic of that of China. "If we only knew our own mind, everything would be possible," wrote poor Henri Rivière; but that is exactly what the French do not know. At one moment they are altogether in favour of acting through Tuduc, at another of stirring up his subjects, and supplying them with arms. One day they only ask for the opening of a river and its ports to enable more enterprising nations to dispose of their productions, and to tap a new region; the next day they must have a great Oriental empire from which every other European shall be rigorously excluded. The objects of their policy change like the views of a kaleidoscope; and their infirmity of purpose is matched by the inadequacy of their means. A large state with a population of more than ten millions is to be permanently subdued by a few hundred men; and a few thousand more are to render success a matter of certainty, and to completely dispose of all the forces of the Chinese Empire! The forgetfulness shown by the French authorities, not of what Englishmen have said, but of what their own countrymen, such as Garnier and Dupuis, have written on the subject of the military improvements effected by China within the last twenty years, produces a sense of bewilderment as to whether France really contemplates any serious measures in Indo-China or not. But assuming that the French mean to make some further effort towards carrying out their project before resigning it as unattainable, then they will have to be prepared to send out a great many more troops than even the 6,000 men that should by this have been collected in one part or another of the dominions of Anam, and to spend a great deal more treasure than

the Government has yet had the courage to ask for from the Chamber. If the French people will only consider the plain facts, and realize that continued interference in Tonquin means sooner or later war with China, then there is still every reason to believe that even at this eleventh hour they will hold back from a thankless task, and recognize that the death of Henri Rivière is not the justification for prosecuting a foolish policy, but, like that of Francis Garnier ten years ago, the token that a great nation should abandon an unwise undertaking and devote all its attention to those matters which are its immediate concern, and which promise to be profitable and advantageous to the people.

The French should have learnt by this time that the only sound principle on which a Government can proceed is to confine its action to following in the track of the commerce created by the independent efforts of its citizens. The French have sought to procure a great trade by reversing the process, and they have imagined that in order to secure flourishing colonies they have only to erect the tricolour and station a garrison in some conquered region. Over and over again this view has been shown to be mistaken, but the French system remains comparatively unaltered and the same. In Tonquin, as has been the case in Saigon, if they even succeed in carrying out their project it will only be to benefit the trade of Hongkong. They have no trade in Indo-China to foster, and any attempt to establish one by military expeditions will only fail as signally as it has failed before. So far as the local interests are concerned, any further extension of French authority and influence can only have the effect of enlarging the market for English goods, and of increasing the freights for English shippers; and if the French could carry out their plans without provoking war with China, there would be nothing for us to say against their proceedings, however short-sighted they might seem to us. We have certainly no reason to feel either alarm or jealousy at the measures of the French in themselves; and if it were only a question between them and Anam, we should not be bound to criticize in any detail the policy or its accompanying measures. But it is quite different when there is the moral certainty that the policy which France has set on foot in Tonquin can only be continued at the cost of a war with China.

Such being the outcome of the French adventure in Tonquin, we cannot at too early a stage bring home to the French Govern-

ment that a war between it and China would not only be a calamity, but that it would compel this country to adopt several measures of precaution, and to gravely consider how far it could allow its own interests to be injured and imperilled by the self-seeking policy of France. Were there any probability that the campaign would be short, sharp, and decisive, it would be conceivable that the general interest might not be gravely compromised. But whether the war were decisive or not, it is quite certain that it would not be short. A war in Tonquin must, from the very nature of the country, prove a protracted and arduous undertaking, and one which it would require years to bring to a decision. It is said in Paris by those who are disposed to admit the truth of this, that the easy way to put an end to Chinese opposition and to bring the Celestial Government to reason is to send an expedition to Pekin, and to establish a blockade on the coasts. That is to say, that the French believe they have the power in the event of war to put an end to all foreign intercourse with China for the time being, and moreover that they would not scruple to employ it in order to accomplish what they have hitherto egregiously failed to achieve on the Songcoi. A foreign expedition to Pekin means the interruption of all commercial intercourse between the people of China and Europeans, and it could not be carried out without reviving the antagonism which has happily slumbered for twenty years. The sufferers from this would not be the French, for their trade with China is extremely small, but the people of this country. While the French are airing a grandiloquent policy in a tributary state of China, it really appears that they are doing so at the risk of this country. It is we who have the solid interests at stake, and who must suffer from the effects of the disturbance which an unjustifiable act of aggression on the part of the Republic seems likely to create throughout Eastern Asia. The French people seem to imagine that our good nature would have to be stretched so far as to look on placidly while they were endeavouring to march on Pekin at the cost of shaking to its very foundations the existing trade between England and China. The most superficial acquaintance with the conditions of that trade ought to show that we should be bound in the interests of humanity, as well as of commerce, to insist on the war being localized and fought out in Tonquin itself.

We cannot better close this paper than by devoting our con-

cluding remarks to the probable form the action of China will take, and to her capacity to wage a war on a comparatively large scale. The object being the defence of Anam, it follows that the most efficient resistance can be made by the native levies if supplied with proper weapons. They have the inestimable advantages of being acclimatized, and of knowing thoroughly the scene of hostilities. It is evident that the Anamese troops are much better armed now than they were when first attacked by the French, while the Black and Yellow Flags have taken service under Tuduc's representatives. It only needs the expression of the sanction of the viceroys of the Two Kwang and of Yunnan to induce those very Muong mountaineers, on whose aid the French counted so freely, to take service against the invaders of Tonquin. The French have not yet shown such a capacity for vanquishing the local difficulties, as to leave it a matter of certainty that they will succeed in crushing the resistance which the forces of Tuduc and the inhabitants of Tonquin are capable of offering. Their arrangements have been so badly made, the arrival of their reinforcements has been so irregular, and their action so spasmodic, that they have inspired their opponents with fresh confidence, and led them to believe that the failure of the European attack is not impossible. Yet this is without China having moved a single man to the aid of King Tuduc, or without her having made any proclamation of policy or announcement as to the course she will pursue. The fortitude of the Anamese serves the double purpose, that it shows them worthy of support, and that it renders the task of supporting them more easy and agreeable. If without the least external assistance they have managed to make so good a fight of it in positions where the French had many advantages in their favour, what may they not succeed in doing when the French have to advance farther into the country, not only against them, but in face of a Chinese army also? That is a question which our neighbours cannot ask themselves too often or too soon.

It is quite clear that Tonquin can be best defended in the valley of the Songcoi, and China might be able to afford the enemies of France all the assistance they require without making any declaration of war, or committing any overt act of hostility. Certainly her armies will be directed to the scene of contest by land when the time comes for decisive measures, although the

journey for those sent from the north might be simplified and shortened by using the North China Company's steamers from Tientsin or Shanghai to Canton or Pakhoi. But as they have done before, the Chinese will pour their troops into Tonquin from the adjacent provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi, and they can easily occupy the whole of Northern Tonquin down to the Songcoi itself. In this region, which is very productive, and could sustain an army for an indefinite period, they would patiently wait until the French committed some blunder, or until they grew tired of keeping a large army inactive in the East, without obtaining either *la gloire* or empire. So far as a campaign in Tonquin is conceivable, the French have the very smallest prospect of success. They may blow up every citadel in the delta, but that will scarcely tend to the stability of their conquest, or to the promotion of commerce. When they leave Hanoi, difficulties will present themselves at every step, and foes will gather from all sides. Nor can they have any assurance that what they fail to obtain on the spot, they can secure by despatching an army and fleet to Pekin. The forts on the Peiho are now exceedingly strong; the garrison of the North includes 60,000 well-armed and fairly drilled men. How many thousands would a prudent commander require from Toulon before undertaking a march on the Chinese capital? There is the additional consideration as to whether England and the other states interested in the China trade would permit such an enterprise without any imperative reason for it; for the consequences of a Chinese victory would certainly be far more serious for foreigners generally than the realization by France of Dupleix's dream of a great Oriental empire. If the French people will only recognize the plain truth, they will at once abandon a policy of sentiment in this region and adopt one of matter of fact. To succeed, they must be prepared for a great expenditure of men and treasure; they must also face the probability that the reward will, after all, be hardly worth having, or beneficial only to others; and they must admit that their operations can only be continued at the cost of a war with China. If they will take this sensible view of the affair, there is little doubt that France will curtail her operations in Tonquin at the earliest possible moment, and that another scheme of colonial extension, by means of an armed expedition, will be consigned to the limbo of human vanities.

XV.

CHINA AND FOREIGN POWERS.[1]

THE passing of the Votes for the Tonquin Expedition by a large majority in the Chamber shows that the French Government is resolved to prosecute its adventurous policy in Anam, notwithstanding that it is beginning to be realized at Paris that both the Chinese and the Anamese are unequivocally opposed to its schemes. Success alone will secure for the sanction of a subservient parliament the final approval of the country; and the certain penalty of failure will be the popular denunciation of the policy and its authors. The speeches of M. Challemel Lacour breathe such a spirit of optimism with regard to local difficulties, and denote such contemptuous indifference for the power and indignation of China, that it is hard to say whether we should marvel more at the ignorance or at the sanguine hopes of the Foreign Minister. Obstacles are expected to vanish before the approach of the tricolour, and an expeditionary force of some 6,000 men is to occupy a vast and difficult country, and to satisfactorily dispose of the whole armed power of China. As the principal interest in the question undoubtedly centres in the probable action of China, it is proposed to sketch here in some detail the motives and objects of her attitude with regard to the suzerain rights she possesses in adjoining states, as well as of her general policy towards foreign Powers.

[1] *The Fortnightly Review*, May, 1883.

The foreign policy of China has been evolved from the commotion of centuries, and is dictated by the urgent wants and necessities of an administration entrusted with a task of exceptional difficulty. An intelligent observer might not find it impossible to draft a model policy for the use of the Celestials; but, although in his eyes full of common sense and logical force, it would surely be so coloured by his own convictions and by the prejudices of his nationality as to be quite inapplicable to their circumstances. The Chinese know better than any one else can what they want and what is suitable to their case. While it might be easy enough, therefore, to say what the foreign policy of China ought to be, it is much more difficult to discover what it is. The latter is the practical point, and will solely engage our attention here.

The foreign policy of China was originally simple in the extreme. Recognizing the existence of only one supreme potentate, the Emperor of the Middle Kingdom, who as the delegate of heaven claimed universal sway, it followed that all peoples who were brought into contact with his Government were treated as on a subordinate footing. The evidence is of the clearest kind back to the earliest ages that foreigners were only admitted as "tribute bearers," and that all foreign countries were regarded as being of undoubted inferiority to the Celestial Empire. The conquest of the empire by alien races, such as the Mongols and Manchus, did not break the continuity of this policy; for as soon as they became supreme they adopted all the ways and views of the people they had subjected, and in a very short time the Tartars of the desert and the mountain could claim to be more Chinese than the Chinese themselves, especially in the pretension to international pre-eminence. This idea had received no shock at the time of our two first embassies to China—those of Lord Macartney in 1793, and of Lord Amherst in 1816—and although the bombardment of Canton was thought to have brought home to the minds of the Celestials the perception that there were other Powers besides theirs, it really survived with almost unabated force the war of 1842. Not until the occupation of the capital eighteen years later, not until the emperor himself had fled beyond the Wall, leaving his palace to the mercy of the Western spoiler, did the Chinese Government and people realize that their ruler was not the only great potentate in the world, and that the

theory of the Hwangti being the one delegate of the Almighty was a fiction that could no longer be maintained. The Treaty of Pekin, ratifying that concluded at Tientsin two years previously, was the formal admission that China could no longer count on the exclusive enjoyment of a world of her own, and that she must be prepared to enter the family of nations and to hold her place by means of such resources as she possessed. The Treaty of Pekin was immediately followed by the formation of a new department in the official service for the special conduct of foreign affairs. The creation of the Tsungli Yamên, as this Council Board is called, marked the beginning of China's present policy towards foreign countries.

It began the exercise of its functions at an extremely unpromising moment. Several successful rebellions in different parts of the empire had reduced the authority of the emperor to a shadow, and the sole function of the Tsungli Yamên in the days of its infancy consisted in transacting such diplomatic business as could not be avoided with the representatives of European countries. Very possibly the Tsungli Yamên has never emerged from this condition of comparative unimportance, and, although put forward as the mouth-piece of the Chinese Government in its relations with Europe, the guiding and controlling power may still rest with the leaders of the Palace, the Grand Secretaries, and the Board of Censors. The formation of the Tsungli Yamên, however, was the token that the old idea of things had been displaced by stern necessity; but, although the Hwangti was no longer to claim an inherent predominance over his brother sovereigns, the conviction still held ground that he should rank with the first of them. The recovery of the Chinese after a succession of unparalleled disasters, and the triumphant consolidation of the empire, encouraged this not unreasonable ambition. Although some of the Chinese ministers would like, no doubt, to revive the prostration ceremony, and would not greatly grieve if intercourse with the foreigner were prohibited by a stroke of the vermilion pencil, the more general view is that neither step is necessary or politic. But the national sentiment is unanimous on the point that the dignity of the empire is to be maintained, and that sufficient concessions have already been made to foreigners. A perfect trust in the superiority of their own system of government, and a resolve to preserve intact their own political form and independence, lie

at the very root of Chinese opinion. With these preliminary remarks we can now turn to the consideration of the objects which suggest themselves most prominently to their minds, and in connection with which it is highly desirable that some general knowledge should prevail.

There appears, unfortunately, to be little doubt that, apart from all official direction, the people themselves are singularly antipathetic to foreigners. On this point the testimony of Mr. Colquhoun in the south seems to exactly tally with that of Count Szchenyi[1] in the central and north-western parts of China; and the evidence of these travellers is the more important as they traversed many parts of the country where no European had ever preceded them. So much may be said by way of illustration as to the natural inclination of the people; and, if the Government has, partly out of necessity and partly from superior knowledge, thrown a cloak over its mind, it is to be apprehended that its real views are not widely different from those that appear to spring most naturally from the hearts of the people. Had China the power to-morrow, and did she but see how to carry out a sweeping ukase against foreigners, we make no doubt that the decree would be passed without compunction, and that the thing would be done as effectually as it might. It is simply because China has not the power, and does not see her way out of so hazardous a business, that the attempt is not made, and that recourse is had to different expedients. One of the most striking features in the character of the Chinese is the way in which they adapt themselves to circumstances; and the history of our relations with them is full of significant proof to the same effect. For many years after we and other Europeans had succeeded in establishing commercial relations with them, the balance of trade was heavily against the Chinese. We sold them our linen and cutlery, our opium and tobacco, and in payment we took their silver. We bought in return from them only a very small quantity of their tea and their silk. As the consequence a considerable amount of specie left the country every year not to return, and the apprehensions of the Central Government, much of whose embarrassment at different

[1] The reader may refer with advantage to Lieutenant Kreitner's "Im Fernen Osten" (Hölder, Wien), as one of the most interesting works of modern travel. Lieutenant Kreitner was Count Szchenyi's companion, and is as yet the sole chronicler of his expedition.

periods has been caused by the want of ready money, were easily aroused by what seemed to be a hopeless drain of the national treasure. Under these conditions the relations with outside peoples assumed the appearance of a calamity, which the Pekin officials felt justified in endeavouring to cure by every means in their power. The question reached a climax in 1840, when the destruction of English property at Canton led to hostilities which terminated with the Treaty of Nankin; and from that time the trade was conducted on a new basis. Chiefly owing to the increased demand in Europe and America for Chinese tea, the conditions of the trade were reversed, and instead of China losing a considerable sum of silver annually, she became the actual gainer even in specie. It required a little time for this change to be recognized and appreciated; but, as soon as it was, the radical objection to foreign commercial intercourse lost its force, if it was not completely removed. What had appeared under the old arrangement to be absolutely intolerable, could under the new be regarded with equanimity and discussed with a certain amount of calmness.

The next stage in the development of the Government views on the subject of foreign intercourse was reached when the external commerce of the empire became, not merely a gain to the country, but a direct source of revenue to the administration. The establishment of the Maritime Customs, now under the able control of Sir Robert Hart and his subordinates, was speedily followed by the removal of many of the embarrassments which oppressed the central executive. The customs received under the stipulations of the Treaty of Pekin provided the sinews of war which enabled the late emperor and the regents of the present ruler to proceed to vigorous measures, not merely against the Taepings, but also against the rebels in more remote regions, such as the Panthays, and the Tungan and other insurgents in Central Asia. In no small degree, therefore, is China indebted for her recovery from the numerous difficulties that threatened her with, and that would under different circumstances have probably resulted in, the temporary disintegration of the empire and a change of dynasty, to that very foreign trade which it was the consistent policy of former rulers to discourage or violently prevent. Again we may repeat that the Chinese are a practical people, and are as well aware as we of this simple fact. The assurance may be entertained, there-

fore, with some confidence that there is no notion among responsible persons in China that any national interest can be served by destroying a source of wealth that has proved so beneficial to themselves; but, on the other hand, it is not less certain that there is a very widespread opinion among Chinese officials that their country does not receive its full share of the benefits and profit derived from the exchange of products going on between the Celestial Empire and the West. And this opinion must be greatly strengthened by any decline in the exports of China, although it may be due to the deterioration of native productions. We have not to apprehend in the future that even the most chauvinist of Manchú statesmen will seek to kill, as the man in the fable did, the goose by prohibiting foreign trade; but his object is now, and will be still more, to spare no effort to extract from it a greater number of golden eggs for the exclusive benefit of China.

From the consideration of the subject of trade in general we pass by an easy and natural transition to some of its principal details and particulars. And the two points that offer themselves most prominently for comment in connection with our subject are, the questions of opium and of the land-borne trade between China and her neighbours in Asia. The former has been made the subject of a bitter controversy, into the merits of which we have no intention to enter. The question is one which mainly concerns the responsible government of China. If the habit of opium-smoking be demoralizing the people, then it is its bounden duty to put down the practice by all the means at its disposal. It can do so in several ways. It can refuse to give licences to the opium-shops, it can prohibit the cultivation of the poppy, and it can notify to the English Government its desire to increase the import duty. As a matter of fact it has not done, and, so far as we can see, has not the least intention of doing, any one of these three things—at least with the view of putting down the practice. It is not impossible that the tariff may be raised by a fresh convention with the English Government; but although some persons may think that that step will be taken with the object of reducing the amount of opium consumed by the people, the balance of evidence is altogether in support of the view that it is as a measure of protection, and not of morality, that the Chinese officials contemplate it.

For there is not the least doubt that the interest expressed by the Chinese Government in the opium question is far from being simulated. It undoubtedly exists, and the reasons explaining it are not far to seek. The Chinese are well aware that the revenue of India is benefited by opium to the extent of eight millions annually. They have, indeed, heard that, without that income, the proud British Government in India would find it no easy matter to make both ends meet. On the other hand, they do not require to be told that the amount of their profit, as a Government, from the traffic does not exceed one million sterling. In this difference lies a very substantial grievance; and there is little reason to doubt that the authorities at Pekin are determined to remove it, and to adjust the trade on terms more advantageous to themselves. If our people will have opium—such is the view at Pekin—they must be prepared to pay heavily, not merely to the foreigner, but to us their rulers, for permission to indulge in a luxury. While the object of the Government may be attained either by the increase of the tariff or the levying of lekin transit dues, the acts of the most trusted and responsible officials in the empire seem to show that the much more effectual remedy is contemplated of altogether displacing foreign by native opium. There is no question that the revenue which China could derive in this way would largely exceed anything she could hope to realize under the terms of a new commercial treaty with England. If by the development of a new industry China could supply herself with opium, she would remove one of the greatest objections she sees to the foreign trade by turning the balance of exchange wholly in her own favour. China objects altogether from a sentimental standpoint not to selling her goods, but to buying those of others. It is declared by Anglo-Indians, and comfort is drawn from the supposed certainty of the fact, that the *chandoo* is not to be imitated, and is of as marked superiority as a Havannah cigar; but there need be no hesitation in saying that an increased production of Chinese opium, and an improvement in the manufacture of the smoking compound, must be followed by a marked decline in the importation of the article from India. By one way or another China will obtain the object she has clearly in view; and at the same time that she takes steps in one direction towards increasing her revenue, she will not be less energetic in another with the object of freeing herself from

that dependence on the foreigner which she hates above all things, and which is particularly irksome to her in the case of an article in such general use among her people as opium.

Of hardly less importance than the topic of opium is that of the land-borne trade between China and her neighbours, vast as the portion of Asia it embraces, and complicated as the numerous separate interests it involves. It is only possible to indicate here one or two points in connection with this subject; but there is one satisfaction in having to so briefly discuss it, and that is that the same principle applies to it in all its ramifications. The Chinese are consistent, whatever else they may be, in their political action. We have been able to see more or less clearly that three leading sentiments form the basis of their national opinions. These are that their country has an inherent claim to superiority, that they have at all periods been a self-sufficing world to themselves, and, lastly, that the vast extent of their territory makes it an axiom of prudence to abstain from cultivating close relations with neighbours independent of their authority. On the sea-coast the force of circumstances and the never-ceasing importunity of the races of Europe have compelled a modification of these views and a recognition of the laws of necessity. But the same considerations have not applied along that frontier where China has as her only neighbours the empires of England and Russia. There she has been able to do very much as she liked, and to retain complete command over those rights and privileges which the achievements of many centuries have obtained for her. In this direction she has not made a single concession to Western prejudice. She stands resolutely on the maintenance of the full letter of her rights. Although the Russians flatter themselves that they have recently secured an advantage in the reduction of the duty on inferior tea, which, combined with a prohibitive tariff on the Oxus, will give their merchants the monopoly of the tea trade in Central Asia, it is not unlikely that they will discover that the Chinese have only made this concession with the full intention that it shall prove inoperative and valueless.

The concern of the Chinese is much greater, however, at the possible loss of one of their own most profitable markets, than with any conjectural development of trade with a neighbour. The "brick tea" trade between the province of Szchuen and Tibet is one of the most profitable branches of the inland commerce of

China—doubly profitable for the reason that the Tibetans buy six million pounds annually of refuse tea, which could not be disposed of to any other purchaser. The preservation intact of this profitable monopoly is one of the salient features in China's foreign policy with regard to the principal of her Asiatic neighbours. The Chinese know very well, and dread the consequence in proportion with the clearness of their perception, that the day which beholds the commencement of intercourse between India and Tibet will sound the death-knell of this traffic. They have, therefore, resorted to the double-edged policy of stirring up the enmity of the lamas of Tibet against us, on the ground that we would undermine and shake their religious supremacy, until the priestly order of the Holy Land of Buddhism has become as inveterately inimical to the appearance of English traders as the Chinese Ambans and merchants are for their own reasons. Not content with having taken this effectual measure in one direction, the Chinese authorities in Szchuen have resorted to another, equally astute and efficacious, for the attainment of their object. The Viceroy of Szchuen gravely assures every European traveller that he has no influence at Lhasa, that Tibet has become a virtually independent country, and that he cannot answer for the safety of their lives beyond Bathang. Emphasis is given to his remarks by the rough behaviour of the Tibetans in the mountains round that town, and these do not even refrain from firing shots at such travellers, to complete the effect of Ting Pao-chên's observations. The Chinese have reason to congratulate themselves on the astuteness of these proceedings when a grave journal and one speaking with authority like the *Athenæum* asserts that there can now be no doubt that Tibet has no longer any dependence upon China. Meantime the brick-tea trade flourishes, and the valley of the Sanpou remains the convenient route of the tribute-bearers of Nepaul!

The desire to retain a profitable trade in its own hands is not the only, or indeed the principal, motive at the bottom of the policy of the Chinese Government in this and kindred matters. The extraordinary determination it has shown in the assertion of its sovereign rights over refractory subjects and defiant principalities, has attracted wide attention and some admiration. But people do not seem to understand that China can only retain the possession of her vast dominions by the preservation of the old conditions under which they were held, or by resorting to some

great extension of her military system which she does not seem to contemplate. At present Tibet is held to all the useful or desired purposes of its allegiance by a force of men that is purely nominal if not insignificant. A few hundred soldiers as the Amban's guard at Lhasa, a few hundred more at the outposts on the Himalayan range, these, so far as we can gather, represent the total of the Chinese garrison in Tibet. Nor is it very different in the reconquered region of Kashgaria or the recovered province of Ili. If there are 30,000 Chinese troops in the whole of this Central Asian region, it is the largest computation that can be made of them. Such a force is amply sufficient to preserve order even in that extensive region, and so long as it is maintained in an efficient state there will be no danger of the overthrow of the Pekin emperor's authority. But when English traders and travellers penetrate into Tibet in considerable numbers, and when the Russians crowd as they would like and expect to do in the bazaars of Kashgar, Yarkand, and Kuldja, is it to be supposed that these limited garrisons will suffice to maintain intact the power and influence of the Celestial ruler? It is said in the East that a great empire is most easily overthrown at the edges, and the facts seem to show that in no case would that natural crumbling process ensue with more certain effect than in that of China. The opening of Tibet to Indian commerce, the permission to Russia to carry on an active trade where and how she liked, instead of by fixed routes, in limited numbers, and under other onerous conditions, would infallibly be followed by the decline and, in many cases, by the disappearance of Chinese authority as exercised in its present form. It cannot be denied that this objection has force, and that the Chinese have some good and well-founded reasons for desiring to retain in unabated efficiency that barrier of a closed frontier on the land side which, despite the Ourga trade route and some other trifling concessions to Russia, they still preserve.

The objections they entertain to the abolition of the old condition of things are not weakened by any false expectations of their capacity for coping with the new. They know well enough that if it were to come to a struggle in earnest for the retention of their rights in Tibet, Burmah, or Central Asia, the advantage of position would be all against them, and in favour of those who possessed better means of communication and were nearer the

scene of action. Unless those rights were to be abandoned, China would have to station a large garrison permanently in Tibet, and to maintain a considerable army in a state of idleness in Central Asia. It is not at all certain that she could do either of these things without incurring many perils from which she is now free; for the sentiment of the Chinese is not only naturally pacific, but it is distinctly averse to any protracted military service from their homes, and to arm and discipline the tribes of Mongolia and Tangut might be to invite a national danger of a very serious kind. Moreover, these territories, which at present are barely self-supporting, would find it simply impossible to meet the cost of administration; and the Chinese, despite their presumed love of empire, would very soon give up the idea of defraying the expense of a barren and unproductive authority. The Chinese feel that the institution of trade relations with their neighbours will mean for them, sooner or later, in one form or another, the loss of those territories which at present admit the sway of the Bogdo Khan up to the Pamir and the Karakoram. The only chance of retaining them would indeed lie in the adoption of some risky policy of foreign adventure, and of taking a part on one side or the other in the coming struggle between England and Russia.

For such reasons as these the Chinese Government will seek to maintain by the aid of its good ally, Nature, the position which it has inherited from antiquity; and trusting that its passive resistance may postpone, if it cannot eventually prevent, the establishment of direct communication with India, it will shape its foreign policy so that no instance of favour or partiality may enable its neighbours to demand the application of a general rule. With this object in view it may be considered certain that China will strenuously oppose the establishment of French influence in Tonquin, and the opening of any trade route by the river Songcoi. The fear that it would form a precedent for this country in demanding an equivalent concession in either Burmah, Assam, or Tibet, will brace the mind of the Chinese rulers to face the most immediate risk sooner than sacrifice not merely their claims over the Empire of Anam, but the very *raison d'être* of their foreign policy. The Chinese are not so uninformed as to suppose that, if the great province of Yunnan were thrown open to external commerce, and if it became the venue of English traders on one side, and of French on the other, the maintenance of their

administration even there would be the simple and easy task that it is at present. China's strength consists to a great extent in her vastness. Each province is a kingdom, self-sufficing in its resources, and governed in deference to the local peculiarities. The authority of the Central Government is maintained by the isolation of each of these provinces, and by the shrewd arrangement that a mandarin is never employed in the province of his bringing up. There is also the feeling of a vague veneration for the emperor as the Son of Heaven and people accept in China, as elsewhere, the institutions which their ancestors have left them, and under which history shows that they have attained such security and prosperity as they may possess. But if the conditions are reversed, the fear is reasonable that the result will be sadly different. Remove the state of things under which China has become and remains a mighty, if anomalous, Power—and that is what foreigners are trying their best to do by the extension of trade, the improvement of the internal means of communication, and the spread of Christianity—and will China long remain united within herself, and obedient to the decrees of an emperor at Pekin? A thoughtful Chinese will tell you at once that such a happy issue is not likely to occur. No; when foreign ideas permeate the empire, when distance is traversed, and made as nothing, by the "iron horse," when the man of Yunnan realizes what a very different being he is from the native of Shantung or Fuhkien, and, lastly, when every petty and local dispute is magnified into an Imperial question, it will not be possible to preserve the fabric of an empire which, thanks to those events never having occurred, has braved the dangers and survived the storms of twice two thousand years. It is the first object of the foreign policy of China to prevent their ever taking place, and no present risk will be considered too great if only success can be ultimately attained, and the future rendered assured.

The explanation of the extraordinary persistency which the Chinese Government is showing in the assertion of its suzerain rights, in cases where most Europeans would think their claims shadowy and rather far-fetched, is to be found in very practical considerations, of the validity of which it is a much better judge than anybody else. In Corea, Tonquin, Burmah, Tibet, and on the Upper Amour there are questions of trade and position that render China the very vigilant guardian of her acquired rights in

those countries. Her interest is only limited by her available resources. In Corea she has repelled Japanese encroachment and asserted her own claim with singular promptness; and she is busily employed in the purchase and construction of the war vessels that will very soon recover for her what she has lost in Loo Choo. In Tonquin she will make the most of her natural advantages. Had the French retired, no blood would have been spilt and no useless threats uttered. Now that they persist in their adventure, the Chinese may still for a time hold aloof until they have felt the full force of the climate and native resistance. Even then the strict closing of the Yunnan and Kwangsi frontier might suffice to render the French position in Tonquin untenable. But if not, then in the last resort China will appeal to arms. To a French occupation of Tonquin she will certainly show herself as persistently and vigorously hostile as she would to a Japanese landing in Corea, to a Russian advance across the Amour, or to an English invasion of Tibet, and, possibly, of Burmah. The view may appear absurd and unreasonable that one people and government should claim an exclusive right to so vast a surface of the earth, but whether it be foolish or unjustifiable, this is not only the pretension on which China's national policy is based, but also that which, it seems to us, alone preserves vitality in her system.

It only remains in conclusion to see how far these pretensions are justified and supported by the natural strength and resources of the country. And in endeavouring to ascertain what these are, we are met on the threshold of our inquiry by the evidence of a vast and widespread corruption, which seems to eat like a canker on the strength of China. The mandarins are, with a few honourable exceptions, engaged in the daily occupation of accumulating wealth, not merely by an organized system of extortion from the people, but also by appropriating to their own use the sums which are ostensibly paid for the public service. Although there is a Board of Censors supposed to be constantly engaged in the revision and superintendence of the official world, and notwithstanding that petitions are freely admitted into the pages of the *Pekin Gazette*, the control is not sufficient to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the mandarins in the provinces. It is quite an ordinary thing to find that at certain stations where a force of 1,000 men should be kept up not a single soldier is to be seen, although the

pay is duly drawn for them all. As this discrepancy has reference exclusively to the Green Flag army, or Chinese militia, the evil is less serious in a military sense than in a financial. But until the Chinese authorities devote themselves to the purification of the administration, the national resources will be wasted, and the country will have to depend on only a portion of its natural revenue. Nor have the Chinese yet succeeded in making as much as they might have done of the military forces at their disposal. A large portion of the Tartar army is fairly disciplined and well, though differently, armed; but there is much yet to be accomplished towards giving it cohesion and a trained body of officers. As in every Eastern country the officers are the worst representatives of the army; and in China this is so notoriously the case that the men themselves often pay no heed to the orders of their officers, whom they treat on a level of equality, if not with a certain contempt. China has yet to learn that arms alone will not make an efficient army, and that if she wishes to preserve her present position it is not a day too soon to set herself resolutely to the task of reorganizing her forces. She will have to create a new class of military mandarins, and, adopting the old Manchu saying that "a man's sole duty is to ride a horse and to bend a bow" as her motto, make it obligatory that those who lead her soldiers must be soldiers themselves, and not, as is too often the case, civilians who have never heard a shot fired in anger. Certainly until the young emperor or his advisers have reformed the civil administration, and carried on the reorganization of the army to a much further point than it has yet reached, there will be an element of danger to the safety of China, and those may be excused who are sceptical as to the stability of her latest achievements.

In what, then, it may fairly be asked, consists the strength and formidableness as a power of the Chinese Empire? If corruption is prevalent in most of the departments of the state, if the efficiency of the army is problematical, where is this vaunted strength that is necessary to the maintenance of such a foreign policy as has been sketched? The answer is that it lies in the people and in their country. Whatever the governing classes may be, the people are there toiling on in their steady and persistent fashion, keeping their families from want and enriching the country by their labour. They have all the virtues necessary not merely to

success in life, but also to the preservation of society. Their sobriety, morality, and good temper with one another are not less remarkable than their patience, resolution, and fertility of resource in every pursuit of daily life. Whether as the tiller of the fields, or as the labourer in the crowded city, as a merchant, mechanic, or seafarer, they alike show the same extraordinary tenacity of purpose and powers of endurance. Under circumstances different from any they have previously experienced, they have come into competition with many races, with even the Anglo-Saxon, and they can affirm that they have generally borne away the palm. Wherever they go they preserve their individuality, not merely in their own persons, but also in those of their descendants. This is the case in California, Australia, and the Straits Settlements. It is still more strikingly demonstrated in Siam, where a Chinese colony has dwelt for more than two centuries. Although the original number was small, and notwithstanding that the men have from the first been restricted to the choice of native wives, they are still as Chinese in their appearance and ways as if they had never left Canton. They now number several millions, and form the most prosperous part of the community in Siam. Similar instances of the extraordinary vitality of the race are shown in the northern parts of Szchuen, where the Chinese are rapidly superseding the Mantzü tribes; in the district of Kokonor, where, according to Lieutenant Kreitner, the Fan people are disappearing before their energetic masters; and in Manchuria, where colonies of Chinese are making the valleys of the Songari and Usuri a thickly inhabited and prosperous region. These cases of national energy and development might be indefinitely multiplied, for there is not a province of the empire where the same task of reconstruction, and of recovery from depressing circumstances, is not being actively carried on. Whatever causes of complaint well-meaning friends may consider that the Chinese have against their rulers, the people themselves do not seem to be aware of them, and are content with being left undisturbed in pursuit of that laborious and monotonous existence which constitutes their lot. If they are discontented they have an admirable method of concealing their dissatisfaction, and it may be doubted whether any summary interference with their mode of life would promote their happiness. The people, therefore, and the natural wealth and diversified character of the country, where skilful husbandry makes the best

use of the soil, constitute the strength and formidableness as a power of China. In these possessions is the best foundation of a nation's strength, as well as the complete justification of a vigorous foreign policy.

It must not be supposed also that, because the Chinese are naturally inclined to the ways of peace, they are a timorous race and afraid of war. They are not like Bengalee weaklings, trembling at the clatter of the Mahratta horse. Physically vigorous, and indifferent to the fear of death, they have in them all the essentials of a first-class soldier. A Chinese army properly trained, and with a good and uniform weapon, would be a truly formidable force; and it will be the fault of the Pekin Government itself if such an army cannot in time be organized and made popular with the country. But even as the matter stands at present, a country with at least three hundred millions of the most remarkable people in Asia, if not in the world, has every right to decide for itself what it will do, and to arrange its affairs after its own fashion, even though its ways may appear antiquated, and some of its pretensions may raise a smile. But China will have to recollect that in a rough dealing world no Government will be able to long hold a foremost position, which of itself invites attack, unless it has the available means wherewith to maintain it. For the moment her reputation for strength has outstripped her actual resources as a fighting Power, and she will be wise to make no delay in completing the improvements in her army and navy which have been already begun.

The foreign policy of China has, therefore, as its main object the preservation of the *status quo*, and the prevention so far as possible of any further extension of the intercourse with Europeans. Were China to acquiesce in the commencement of a brisk trade with her land neighbours, it is felt that it would be followed by the decay of the empire, and by the subversion or disappearance of the emperor's authority in his outlying dependencies. So far as the Imperial privileges and perquisites among the vassal states are concerned, China would then be in the same condition as Samson deprived of his locks. If we apply, as the measure of what China will do to prevent such a contingency arising, the knowledge we have of how much she treasures the many feudal rights she retains, then we can only assume that the Chinese Government will resort to every means at its disposal, and will stake its very existence as

a Government, in order to prevent what it regards as a catastrophe. There is little ground for supposing that the people would not heartily support their rulers in an anti-foreign policy if the necessity for it should arise; and the danger of the future lies in the direction that any undue pressure on the part of Europeans in forcing trade concessions or in ignoring their rights in dependent states, as the French are bent on doing in Tonquin, may so far exasperate the Chinese leaders as to induce them to work for a total cessation of foreign intercourse. Such a contingency still happily appears remote, but its very possibility is enough to warrant great circumspection in dealing with the Chinese Government, and the moral obligation to do so rests equally on all Europeans. So far, foreign intercourse has not interfered in any way with the Imperial mission of China, or with the efficient discharge of her administrative functions. Indeed it can be shown to have contributed to the success of both of these objects, and to have advanced in several ways the dignity of China. The Chinese make, and have always made, a radical difference between trade by land and trade by sea. However much the latter may continue to be tolerated, it is felt that the former must carry with it a large increase of responsibility for which they are not prepared; and there is also the suspicion that it would lead to further conquests, whether by them or at their expense matters comparatively little. It is impossible for any one who will carefully weigh all the facts to say that in their opinions they are wrong; and, although the Chinese people have nothing to fear in commercial competition from any rivals, it is probable that, were its territory to be thrown open without restriction and at every point to the merchants of the contiguous states, the Chinese Government would not merely suffer in reputation by comparison with its neighbours—that is inevitable—but that the emperor would absolutely lose that controlling influence which he now dispenses with dignity and without effort up to the limits of the jurisdiction in Asia of the sovereigns of England and Russia.

XVI.

FRANCE AND CHINA.

LOOKERS-ON proverbially see most of the game; and there is not much ground for surprise if the French, intent on realizing the schemes over which they have meditated in the Indo-Chinese peninsula in one form or another during the last century, fail to perceive all the consequences of their present action in Tonquin, or to accurately measure the danger of a contest with the power of China. But if France is showing herself blind to facts, and inclined to embark upon a policy of adventure in the purest sense of the word, that is no reason why those who are concerned in watching the progress of events in the far East, and the development from their state of torpor of the mighty power and unlimited resources of the Chinese people, should be backward in assigning its true significance to a complication that promises to bring the name and authority of Europeans into disrepute. Although criticism on the subject of colonial extension may come with a bad grace from an Englishman, I shall yet devote myself to the task of showing here that in this particular instance France is attempting not only an enterprise of doubtful advantage, but one in which I have not the least doubt she will ultimately fail, and fail with ignominy.[2] The French Government has

[1] *The Nineteenth Century*, May, 1883.

[2] This prophecy has not yet been realized. But notwithstanding the greatly increased efforts of France she has had to accept the minimum of her demands. I entertain no doubt that French authority on the Songcoi will be ephemeral.

apparently been seized with a mania for colonial empire. In Madagascar, on the coast of Africa—nay, in the interior of the Dark Continent—among the archipelagoes of the Pacific, and lastly in an outlying dependency of China, it is bent on the same task—the creation of vast colonial possessions by presidential decree, and instantaneously as at the beck of some magician's wand. Each of these undertakings has its difficulties; but of them all there is not one requiring the same tact, determination, and display of force as the last, if it is to be successfully accomplished. Great care on the part of the French representatives in allaying its susceptibilities, and in promising to respect the rights it has acquired from antiquity, might perhaps have induced the Pekin Government to remain passive while the marauders of the Songcoi were being chastised, and until that river had been turned into a safe avenue for trade. But not merely have the French failed to display that tact; they have absolutely shown not the slightest desire to respect Chinese susceptibilities in the matter at all. The recent declaration—not less impolite than impolitic—of M. Challemel Lacour denying succinctly any rights on the part of China in Anam has swept away whatever cobwebs there may have been in the minds of the young emperor's advisers as to the intentions of France in Tonquin; and Chinese acquiescence in any form in the plans of our neighbours is henceforth an utter impossibility. The breach between China and France being thus clearly marked out, and not to be closed up save by the withdrawal of the French, it becomes necessary to consider what France hopes to gain in Tonquin, and how she proposes to obtain her objects. On the other hand, it will be essential also to ascertain the grounds and extent of China's pretensions, and the available force with which she can sustain them.

The ambitious plans of France in this quarter of Asia are not the birth of yesterday, and, if they admitted of being successfully carried out in the way in which her present rulers have approved, it would be difficult for us to challenge her right to extend her influence in that region where she has obtained some foothold. If there is adverse criticism of French action in the following pages, it is not because the conquest of Cochin China might lead to the introduction of French influence into the politics of Burmah and Siam, or to the further complication, by the appearance of a fourth Great Power in the arena, of the great Asiatic ques-

tion—which, plainly put, is how 600 millions of Asiatics are to be kept, if not absolutely in a state of subordination to the interests of England and other European countries, at least so as to recognize a community of interest with them. The French have in every way as much right as any other people to find and to use such vents for their energy in undeveloped and promising regions as they may require and can obtain. Their settlement in Lower Cambodia was certain with due encouragement to prove the means of the extension of their authority up the Mekong to the confines of Burmah and China. The growth of their dominion might have been slow, but it would have been certain, and it would not have attracted the hostility of the Chinese. But so tardy a development did not suit the views either of those in power at Paris, or of the adventurous explorers who have dilated upon the incalculable sources of wealth that await French traders on the road through Tonquin into Yunnan. The quicker method has, therefore, been resorted to of asserting French predominance in the councils of Anam, and of entrusting to the officers and soldiers of the Republic the duty of making Tuduc's [1] authority respected in the northern district of Tonquin. But the advantage of rapidity has only been obtained at the cost of the bitter opposition of China; and as the French have not even utilized it, but remain precisely where they were twelve months ago, they have not even derived from their change of plans the profit they anticipated. The opposition of China, as soon as it shall find expression in acts, will raise a much larger question than the mere addition of another tributary kingdom to the possessions of France, or even than the approach of the tricolour to the Chinese and Indian frontiers. No petty feeling of jealousy impels us to deprecate the measures of France in Anam, but a lively concern lest the interests of England and of Europeans generally should be permanently injured in China through the reckless and ill-considered acts of a country which has comparatively little at stake. Neither our knowledge of what France has done in the past in her method of colonization, nor her manner of proceeding on the present occasion, inspires confidence as to her successfully executing so dangerous an undertaking as that of wresting a vassal state from its dependence on China. The smallness of the votes asked for, the

[1] The King of Anam, who died at Hué, Sept., 1883.

meagre character of the reinforcements sent, and of the military preparations, prove either that the French Ministry does not comprehend the nature of the task it aims at accomplishing, or that the French people are to be blinded to its true character until they find themselves pledged to a struggle of power with China. On either supposition such an enterprise does not promise well at the very commencement; and in the event of French defeat or failure it will be the other Europeans, and particularly Englishmen, in China who will suffer from the consequences of Chinese triumph and European discomfiture. It is for this reason, and for no other, that we have a direct interest in the progress of the Tonquin difficulty; and France is morally bound to pay heed to the remonstrances of those who will have to suffer for her folly.

The missionaries of Rome were the pioneers of French influence and dominion in Eastern Asia. Had they been supported by the weight of a secular authority, there is no saying what splendid triumphs they might not have been the means of obtaining for the French nation. In Anam they succeeded in establishing the hierarchy of their Church, and the bishops and abbés of Cochin China contributed some of the most interesting epistles to the celebrated *Lettres Edifiantes*. It was their mission to spread the truths of Christianity; and it has been no part of Jesuit teaching to throw doubt on the capacity of that great Order's members to propagate its objects by taking a leading part in the management of secular affairs. Towards the end of the last century an opportunity presented itself for active intervention in the policy of the country. The ruler of Anam was deposed by a popular insurrection, and his authority was cast off by all his subjects outside the citadel of Hué. On the advice of the Roman Catholic Bishop Adran he sent his son with that ecclesiastic to Paris to entreat the aid of Louis the Sixteenth to re-establish his authority. His request was granted. A supply of arms, and the loan of a few officers and of some ships of war, sufficed to restore his sovereignty, when the grateful king accepted the terms of a treaty, concluded at Versailles in 1787, by which the peninsula of Tourane and the island of Pulo-Condore were ceded to France. The outbreak of the French Revolution prevented the execution of these clauses, and the places mentioned did not become French even in name. Although the French never quite lost sight of their pretensions in this quarter, where

they seemed to have a clear field of action, nothing was done towards realizing the designs of Bishop Adran until after the Anglo-French expedition to Pekin. The French fleet appeared at Hué, and reparation was exacted for a long list of outrages committed on Christians since the beginning of the century. The Emperor of Anam was called upon to fulfil the stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles, and after discussion the district of Saigon, on the Donnai and near the mouth of the great river Mekong, was ceded to France instead of the peninsula of Tourane, which would have placed the Anamese capital at the mercy of the French. No sooner were they established at Saigon than they set about extending their authority in the neighbouring states, and they did so with such effect that in the course of a very short time they were the masters of the whole of Lower Cambodia. Three years later, in 1864, the King of Upper Cambodia accepted the protection of France, and thus was the beginning of what was hoped would prove a flourishing dependency established in the valley of the Mekong. It need only be said on this point that Saigon has disappointed the expectations raised as to its future. Large sums were expended on its development under the empire, but it remains an unhealthy and stagnant settlement, from which commerce and prosperity have kept aloof.

Probably the disappointment thus occasioned spurred the French into activity in the direction of the capital of Anam and of the Gulf of Tonquin. The discovery in 1866–7 by the mission of M. Doudart de Lagrée, who gave his life to the cause of geographical research, that the Mekong was unnavigable, showed that that stream was not to be the means of tapping the fertile and undeveloped region of South-western China and its border lands; while the discovery at the same time of the navigability of a stream flowing into the Gulf of Tonquin supplied a further motive to turn their attention in that direction. This stream was, it need hardly be said, the Songcoi, or "Principal" river of Tonquin, the Red River of the Chinese. It was not, however, until the years 1870–3 that the journeys of the energetic traveller M. Dupuis attracted marked attention to this route into Yunnan, by which he conveyed a supply of arms to the Chinese authorities, then on the point of restoring order in that province. Although M. Dupuis did not receive from French officials all the support and countenance he desired and probably deserved, the effect of

his journeys was to hasten the progress of the measures which had been commenced for the complete subordination of the Anam ruler to French interests. Negotiations were begun with the Court of Hué for a fresh treaty; and although a personal outrage on a French officer, Captain Reinhardt, who had been appointed envoy for the occasion, arrested the conclusion of a treaty, it really contributed to the more prompt settlement of the question by obliging the French to present an ultimatum. The treaty was at once signed, and Tuduc recognized in 1874 the protectorate of France. The nominal effect of this treaty was to place Anam under the complete dependence of France, to assert there the predominance of her trade and her policy, and to lay down a series of regulations which would have the effect of opening Tonquin and the Songcoi to foreign commerce under the ægis of France. Nine years have nearly elapsed since those events happened, and the French find themselves very little advanced on the path to success, and in face of difficulties which were never contemplated, but which have not even yet fully revealed themselves.

This brief narrative of events will make the objects of French policy in Tonquin sufficiently plain. They desire, in the first place, to oust Chinese influence from Hué, and indeed they consider that they have done so by the terms of the treaty of 1874, which they only began to put in force last year. And, in the second, they hope to obtain in the Songcoi that easy and direct trade route into Southern China which they were disappointed of twenty years ago by the discovery that the Mekong was unnavigable. And I may be permitted to say that these objects appear to be perfectly natural, and as justifiable as any similar proceedings ever are by ambitious governments or energetic and expanding nations. But are they practicable? Will France be able to carry out her projects? That is the whole question; and it is to that point, and not to any minor issues, that we have to devote the best attention we can.

The French claim the right to act as they are doing in Tonquin under the provisions of the treaty with Anam. They assert that that instrument set aside the rights of China, and established those of France in her place. The Chinese were neither directly nor indirectly a consenting party to that treaty. They were ignorant of its stipulations until the French began in the early part of last

year to take measures to give them effect. In 1874 the condition of the Chinese Empire, although steadily improving, was very different from what it is now, and the French may be excused for supposing that they were not required to give much heed to the shadowy claims of Pekin. But at the same time, having no desire to irritate the Chinese, whose assent was necessary to the institution of trade with Yunnan, they studiously kept the Treaty of Hué secret, and did nothing to dissipate the idea that Anam was the tributary of the Dragon Throne. There was no interruption in the ordained relations. The Tribute Embassy entered China and visited Pekin in 1876; and M. Dupuis has placed it formally on record that "there can be no doubt as to the reality of China's suzerain rights over Anam." The assurances given by M. Bourée at Pekin and to the Marquis Tseng at Paris did not allow of a doubt being felt as to the intention of the French Government to do nothing to injure the self-esteem or the interests of China. This prudent attitude of conciliation towards the Celestial Empire has been abandoned by the present French Ministry. There is no more talk of respecting the rights of China, and the ruler of Anam is accused of breach of faith by M. Challemel Lacour for continuing to recognize the suzerainty of the sovereign from whom his predecessors sought inspiration at a more remote period than European history cares to contemplate. This declaration might pass for little in itself, but it acquires the greatest importance when taken in connection with the latest act on the part of those in authority at Hué. Far from being impressed with a sense of the overwhelming power of France, Tuduc has during the last few months manifested an intention to resist her pretensions, and his emissaries have been declaring to the Chinese their desire to maintain the long-established relations with Pekin, at the very moment that French officers thought their influence paramount at his capital. At the same time that M. Challemel Lacour was making his famous announcement in the Chamber as to the perfidy of Anam, the representative of France was taking a hurried departure from Hué.

There is consequently an end to the idea that France will find in the Anamese ruler a willing tool towards realizing her schemes of aggrandizement; and if those schemes are to be carried on, they will have to be accomplished against the will of the people and potentate in whose interests the world was asked to believe that

they were to be undertaken. The French are thus deprived of the simple method of proceeding which it was thought would disarm the suspicions of the Chinese, at the same time that it enabled them to declare that they were only giving effect to the lawful authority of Tuduc in his northern province. They will be obliged to revert to the proposal of conquest pure and simple of M. de Carné, if they are to do anything with effect; and it is impossible to see how, if they persist in the adventure, they can possibly avoid a collision with the power of China. We may feel reasonably certain that the Anamese have not ventured to show their antipathy to the French so plainly without some definite assurance of support from China; and we may see in the boldness of Tuduc and his people the conviction that that support will be neither half-hearted nor in vain. The fighting in Tonquin affords further evidence in the same direction. The French have had as opponents there, not the Black Flag marauders, but the troops and officials of the ruler of Anam. The latest news we received from the Songcoi was to the effect that the French commandant, Captain Rivière, had been obliged to attack Namdinh in order to keep open his communications with the sea; and at that place he had only to encounter the regular forces of Tuduc. Nothing whatever has yet been done towards the chastisement of the Black Flag marauders who hold the upper course of the Songcoi and the road into Yunnan, while the French find themselves engaged on the very threshold of their enterprise in a conflict of authority with Anam, and in open hostilities with a portion of its troops. If the French are to carry out their enterprise at all, they will have to devote themselves to the difficult and expensive task of conquering Anam, and of reducing it to the position of a subject province. It is not impossible that such an undertaking might prove both successful and remunerative; but if it is to be so, the French must understand that it is a very serious business, which would require an army of 20,000 men and a liberal expenditure. The insignificance of the reinforcements sent to Captain Rivière show an utter inability to comprehend the difficulty of the task, and argue a want of knowledge or a height of faith calculated to invite disaster. The inadequacy of the force employed by France is shown by the difficulty which Captain Rivière already experiences in maintaining his communications, while the open defiance of

the Anamese will scarcely allow even sanguine Parisians to believe that there is a very exalted opinion of the power of their country in this quarter of Asia. When the arrival of fresh troops is followed by a fresh ebullition of national antipathy, even the blindest can scarcely fail to see that the work of pacification or of conquest is not making any satisfactory progress. Such has been the case in Tonquin; and the French can hardly show themselves indifferent to its true significance. The obligation rests upon them either to at once abandon the expedition, or to prosecute it in such a manner and with such a display of force as will secure their objects and sustain the reputation of Europe. If they will only look the plain facts in the face, and take our criticism in the sense in which it is intended, they will recognize that it is not the prospect of their success which displeases or appals us, but a very real concern at the consequences of their failure, which for many reasons appears to be the far more probable result of their operations.

If the French have not been able either to overcome the local difficulties or to overawe the petty government of Anam, it will be readily understood how much more difficult it will be for them to vanquish opposition when to the resources of Tuduc are added those of the Chinese. It is typical of the increased and more accurate knowledge of China in this country that, although the Chinese have as yet taken no overt step towards the assertion of their rights, there is a remarkable unanimity of opinion as to their intention to do so; and there can be no doubt that this view is a correct one. The authority of a Chinese emperor over his tributary states is one of a peculiar character, and does not convey to the European mind much of the reality of power. But although it may be vaguely defined and loosely applied, it possesses in the eyes of Chinese statesmen an importance that is not to be lightly estimated. There has been no symptom at Pekin during recent years of any desire to curtail its responsibilities, or to draw in the advanced posts of the empire. The recovery of the Imperial authority has been followed by the vigorous assertion of dormant claims and historic rights that would have been allowed to lapse by any people less impressed than the Chinese are with their importance and by the bitter experience of the past. Having made their authority respected in most of the border provinces, and in remote dependencies which repudiated and cast off the connec-

tion, they are not likely to tolerate or to regard with indifference the violent severance of the link binding Tuduc to Pekin, when both that prince and his people desire its maintenance. To do so would, indeed, leave them open to the double charge of being indifferent to their own dignity, and of being false to a faithful dependant in distress. There can, therefore, be no reasonable doubt that the Anamese will find in China a staunch and vigorous supporter of their efforts to prevent the protectorate of France ever being carried into practical effect. It is only necessary to consider, in conclusion, the chances of whether that support would be effective or not.

The Chinese army on paper has a nominal strength of nearly one million men; but travellers are never tired of telling us that this force has no real existence. We shall not here claim for it any great efficiency, it being sufficient for the present purpose to point out what are the undoubted facts, that the Chinese have no difficulty in placing an army in the field at any threatened point, while their garrisons in Pechili, Mongolia, and Central Asia were never as numerous as they are at this moment. There are weak spots and some shortcomings in the military organization of China; yet there is no question that the emperor's representatives can, for the simple and sufficient reason that they have done it, place an army of 50,000 fairly efficient and well-armed soldiers in the field at any given spot without the least difficulty, and without weakening their garrisons. If this fact is fairly mastered, it will be seen to be a great deal. It may be doubted whether, so far as numbers go, any other empire in Asia could in a time of trouble do the same. Fifty thousand men at Pakhoi and on the Kwangsi frontier would imperil the safety of a much larger body of men than Captain Rivière has any immediate prospect of finding under his orders. But, formidable as such a force would be, the measure of Chinese opposition must not be assumed at any fixed number of 50,000 men, or of twice that number. For a point of vital importance there is practically no limit to the number of men China might feel disposed and be able to throw away. Her naval power has also steadily increased, and under foreign leading her ironclads and fast-sailing gunboats should be able to give a good account of themselves in the rivers and the shallows off the coast. A war with China will on the next occasion be no child's play for the best equipped and most determined

of nations; and if France were to endeavour to hold her own in Tonquin against such an assailant, she would have to send many armies and fleets to the East, and to station a permanent garrison of 30,000 men in Anam.[1]

There are some who think an expedition to Pekin is the sure and easy way to bring China to reason, and to extract from the Chinese Government whatever concessions and favours may be desired by grasping foreigners. It is more than twenty-two years since such a proceeding was successfully carried out by the allied forces of England and France; but while the grand result is remembered, the details are forgotten. A reference to the attack on the Taku forts and to the affairs on the Peiho may be suggested to those who imagine that a Chinese force is similar in character to the typical Asiatic rabble. Yet at that time not merely did the Chinese possess no modern weapons, but their fortifications were undefended in the rear and on the flank, and had only to be turned. Their principal rivers, and particularly the approaches to the capital, are now protected by forts built after the most approved models, and armed with Krupp's heaviest ordnance. The Chinese have carried out some of the most necessary military reforms in the disciplining and arming of their troops; and they have to a great extent procured the services of foreign officers, or adopted the teaching of foreign knowledge. Moreover, proof has been furnished by a succession of remarkable campaigns that these improvements have had practical effect, and exist in something more than in name. If France is blind to these facts, and disposed to echo the foolish scepticism prevalent in the treaty ports, German opinion has, with its sound common sense, rejected past delusions, and has not felt any hesitation in expressing the belief that China may on some future critical occasion prove itself a useful ally to the Fatherland.

The French people are following a very short-sighted policy in allowing themselves to be drawn into such unprofitable and interminable enterprises as the occupation of Tonquin is most likely to prove. They cannot succeed there without a lavish expenditure of men and treasure; and the reward of even the most complete success will probably be inadequate and disappointing to them.

[1] Thirty thousand French troops have been sent in all, and it is admitted that a further force of 40,000 men at least would be required for an expedition to Pekin, besides a greatly increased naval squadron.

But the essential condition of success in every affair of life is to employ means proportionate to the result, and this the French are certainly not doing in their operations in Indo-China. They have a most difficult and dangerous operation on hand; they are acting as if they had only to destroy some African village, instead of to subject more than five millions of people, and to check the pretensions of the proudest and most despotic Government in Asia. A war between China and any European Power, save for some principle in which all Europeans are equally concerned, can be nothing short of calamitous to the general interest. The country that would imperil the security of the present fortunate good understanding by prosecuting an ambitious scheme at the cost of China accepts a grave responsibility by incurring the disapproval of those with whom it is in this matter morally bound to act in concert. It is often said that China is not making sufficiently rapid progress; but while it may be doubted whether she would herself benefit by any acceleration in the adoption of Western improvements, it is quite certain that European nations would not derive any advantage from such a course, while it might entail for them the greatest peril. A successful foreign war is the one thing that would above all others restore the anti-foreign feeling to a dangerous height. It would certainly be followed by the making of many unpleasant demands on this country, and on others engaged in Chinese trade. It would lead to the general modification of China's foreign policy, and it could hardly fail to produce a most disturbing influence on her external relations generally, and with England in particular. These would be some of the disastrous effects of a war in which China were victorious; and if ever there was a near prospect of a campaign having such a result, it is in the case of Tonquin, where the possibility of war stares France in the face without her being able apparently to realize its dangers, or to exercise sufficient restraint to prevent herself being drawn into a collision with China. The more intelligent Frenchmen cannot suspect our good faith or doubt our goodwill; but if they are not to be consenting parties to a national calamity they must at once do their utmost to suspend the irregular warfare on the Songcoi, and to allay the gathering indignation of China.

XVII.

FOREIGNERS IN CHINA.[1]

THE latest news from China will make people reflect as to the nature of the position all foreigners hold in common in that country. It will also suggest to many minds the difficulty of retaining the numerous privileges and the happy position enjoyed at present by Europeans in China if, for the unanimous concord and harmonious action of their respective Governments, is to be substituted the personal ambition of single nations. Had there not been a very efficient union between all the foreign Powers interested in the affairs of China, it is morally certain that the Chinese would have successfully maintained their policy of exclusion. The Europeans triumphed by showing conclusively that they held themselves to be all members of the same family, and Chinese statesmen have always been keenly alive to the advantages that would accrue from any jealousies or differences of opinion that might arise among them. We propose to consider as briefly as possible the nature of the position which foreigners hold in China, and also to describe by what means they obtained it. Our object being to explain the conditions of foreign intercourse with the Celestial Empire at the present time, it is unnecessary to consider the early and very interesting attempts to establish commercial and generally amicable relations between Europe and the far East.

[1] *The Times*, September 15, 1883.

The earlier dynasties of the Chinese were not naturally averse to foreign intercourse. The foreign merchant not merely brought the rare and curious things of his own land; his very presence sufficed to prove the fame of the Chinese ruler in other countries. The borders of the Chinese Empire were well protected both on the land-side and on the sea-board, and there was nothing in the appearance or resources of the strangers to suggest the idea of superiority over the people of the Middle Kingdom. Yet even under these circumstances the habitual caution of the Chinese prevented their allowing foreigners to enter the empire except at one point, which was generally the great southern harbour of Canton. The Portuguese were the first to break through the suspicious opposition of the Chinese, and to obtain from them the right to remain in the country and to carry on a permanent trade. Before their time a foreigner was welcomed on the assumption that, as soon as he disposed of his cargo, he took his departure, and never dreamed of returning. A single journey to remote Cathay satisfied his greed or curiosity. But in 1560 the Portuguese managed to bribe the Canton mandarins into acquiescing in the establishment of a permanent factory at Macao, where the first foreign settlement was founded more than 300 years ago. One European people having thus secured a place of vantage, it was only natural that they should wish to preserve it exclusively for themselves; and although the Portuguese had been denounced as "spies who only came in the guise of merchants to fall upon the land hereafter with fire and sword," they never hesitated to describe every other race, and particularly the English, to the Canton mandarins as people regardless of faith and actuated solely by motives of self-interest. In the matter of the Chinese trade the English were quite a century behind other foreign competitors; and the first English expedition to Canton was nearly having an untoward result, principally through the treacherous conduct and misrepresentations of the Portuguese at Macao. This expedition was fitted out by Courteen's Association in the reign of Charles I., and it was intrusted to the command of Captain Wendell. The Portuguese effectually prevented its being received in a friendly manner by describing the English as a race of perfidious conquerors; but the English commander was not to be lightly disappointed of some market for the goods which he had conveyed so far. He accordingly

attacked on the first sign of hostility the forts and war-junks which opposed his passage, and inflicted very considerable loss on his assailants. But although he disposed of his cargo at the sword's point and obtained very favourable terms for the future conduct of trade, the result of his journey was far from encouraging, and no vigorous attempt was made to continue the enterprise. The Manchu invasion of China at this time added to the difficulties of conducting the trade, and when their conquest of the country had been accomplished it was found that the new rulers were not well disposed towards either the persons of the foreigners or the objects which brought them into China. As the local superintendents reported, "The Tartars are throwing every impediment in the way of trade; merchants from Canton are prevented from coming to Macao by the pirates, who take everything before them; and provisions are not to be had." Those who had been most sanguine as to the possible development of commerce with China began to doubt whether it would ever be worth the risk and trouble inseparable from it.

The Portuguese enjoyed an inestimable advantage from their possessing a foothold in the country and from their proximity to Canton. In 1681 they entered into an arrangement with the Chinese officials by which the monopoly of the foreign trade was sold to them for an annual sum of about 8,000 pounds sterling; and English trade was thus effectually excluded from the Canton river. Various attempts were made to break through the opposition of the Chinese officials, and English merchant captains did not hesitate to have recourse to the weapon which the Portuguese had so skilfully employed against them. But several unfortunate occurrences neutralized the effect of bribery, and the fines paid by the ship *Defence* in 1689 for the death of a Chinaman by one of her crew would alone have absorbed the profits of a successful voyage. During the greater part of the 18th century the trade not merely languished, but was conducted under the most irksome conditions; and the arrogance of the mandarins was only limited by a certain respect for the ships and artillery of "the outer barbarians." At the same time, they were extremely anxious that the bribes and perquisites to be derived from the foreign trade should be continued, and therefore, although they were never hearty in their approval and support of the external trade, yet they were never desirous for their own sakes of completely destroying it.

The Emperor Kanghi had declared in general terms that all his ports were open to foreigners, who were, however, always limited to Canton and Amoy; but his grandson Keen Lung in 1761 issued an edict confining them to Canton. English merchants during this period were subjected to various indignities, several of them being even committed to prison and kept in close confinement. The tameness with which foreigners submitted to the greatest extortion and the most cruel treatment, sooner than abandon what must have been an extremely profitable trade, would appear to be almost incredible if it did not rest on such certain foundation. In 1773 an Englishman, against whom there was no evidence whatever, was executed, and seven years later a Frenchman was publicly strangled by order of the Viceroy. In 1784 another Englishman was surrendered to what has been not inappropriately called "judicial murder;" and all these acts were perpetrated in consequence of the excessive timidity of the foreign residents, and of the emperor's order that in all cases of the death of a Chinese subject "a life was to be obtained for a life." It was thought that the true remedies for the evil were to obtain some mode of addressing the Imperial Government at Pekin direct, and the opening of several other ports besides Canton to foreign trade. The Pekin Government had shown itself to be actuated by fair if not friendly views towards foreigners, who were indebted for some concessions to the direct interposition of the emperor himself. The demand for an embassy to the capital was made twenty years before it was complied with in 1796 by the despatch of Lord Macartney to Pekin. Although received with a certain degree of distinction, this embassy cannot be said to have attained any of its objects, for no other port was opened, nor was the right to be represented at the capital conceded.

Notwithstanding the onerous conditions and the many disadvantages under which foreigners could alone reside in the country, the trade encouraged by the East India Company continued after the commencement of the present century to grow steadily, and to pass in ever-increasing proportions through the hands of Englishmen. In one other respect, too, there was an improvement, as we emphatically refused to surrender any more Englishmen to Chinese justice, and when several Chinese lost their lives in the frays that were of frequent occurrence between sailors and the natives our naval officers inflicted such punishment as the

cases seemed to demand in accordance with our own laws. Fifty thousand pounds were paid on one occasion for the re-opening of the trade after it had been stopped for two months, sooner than surrender an English sailor. The first step towards placing the relationship on a more satisfactory basis was taken when the principal foreign Government realized that it would have to resist the undue pretensions of the Chinese, and to make a stand in defence of the natural rights of those dependent upon it. We were fortunate at that time in possessing an able and firm representative in Sir George Staunton, who showed in his dealings with the Chinese persistence equal to theirs, and who replied to their threats to suspend the trade by ordering the withdrawal of all English merchants from Canton. What the Cantonese wanted least of all was the cessation of the trade, from which they derived a large portion of their official salaries or individual profit, and consequently Sir George Staunton's threats sufficed to procure an immediate resumption of intercourse. The mission of Lord Amherst in 1816 to Pekin did not effect any of the objects for which it was sent, while it failed to meet with the courteous and honourable reception which had awaited Lord Macartney, and to which as representing a friendly state it was entitled. The trade continued in much the same way as before, marked by constant attempts at extortion, and by more than one hostile collision. It was not until 1825 that the merchants obtained as a great privilege the right to take their wives and families with them to Canton, and this was only secured by the energy of the late Sir James Matheson, who forced his way into the Canton Yamên and demanded the removal of the prohibition. It is said that one of the mandarins passed his hand round his neck as an intimation that he deserved to lose his head, whereupon the Englishman, with great presence of mind, performed the same act twice round the neck of the Chinaman.

The question was further complicated by the expiration of the East India Company's monopoly, which was not renewed for the Chinese trade, and by the substitution of the representatives of a proud and powerful Government for the agents of a trading company that thought only of its dividend. At the very moment when this important change took place in the controlling power of the English trade, the Chinese were beginning to regard the matter in a more serious light, in consequence of the large

increase that had taken place in the import of opium and in the export of silver. Another consideration made it highly probable that a complication could not be averted, and this was that the Chinese never regarded Europeans in any other character than as traders. They came, it was contended, for purposes of gain, and with a view to secure some of the riches of the Flowery Land. The humility which the agents of the East India Company generally showed had confirmed and strengthened this opinion. But in 1834 all was suddenly changed, and the question of the relations between China and the foreign Governments entered upon its final and most critical stage. The representatives of the English Crown would not deal with the native merchants of the "hong" or guild, to which had been intrusted the control and direction of the foreigners; they expected to be brought face to face and to deal direct with the emperor's functionaries. These expectations appeared to the Chinese to be quite unwarrantable, and to reveal the arrogance of the foreigners generally, and of the English in particular. All Lord Napier's representations failed to make the least impression upon them, and the only replies he could get to his communications consisted of a string of opprobrious epithets applied to himself. The Chinese had no other object than to make the foreigners feel their immeasurable inferiority, and the simplest way of attaining this end was to prevent the foreigners gaining any secure and permanent position at Canton, and to ignore the claims to consideration of their respective Governments. Such a policy was only possible of continuance if supported by the superior power; and it was evident long before hostilities actually took place that a collision was inevitable. Canton and the Bogue had been the scene of much altercation and some fighting when the expedition under Sir Gordon Bremer arrived in June, 1840, at the mouth of the river and established a blockade of Canton. A small land force followed in a few weeks, and active operations began with the occupation of Chusan and the blockade of Ningpo. Lord Palmerston's orders were of the briefest. Reparation was to be exacted for past injuries, and security for the lives and property of English subjects was to be obtained for the future.

There is no doubt that until the English took this vigorous action the emperor and his immediate advisers were totally ignorant of the formidable character of the peoples from Europe,

and it is questionable if they even knew of the crisis which had been produced in their external relations, mainly by the extreme fanaticism of Commissioner Lin at Canton. But if the violent action of the English Government aroused them to some sense of the gravity of the position, their pride forbade them to yield to force the concessions they had previously denied. Nothing, moreover, could be gained until some channel of communication with the Central Government had been secured, and the despatch of the fleet to the mouth of the Peiho caused the Chinese so lively an alarm that a permanently satisfactory arrangement seemed likely to ensue. Their military authorities confessed, it was subsequently discovered, their inability to oppose an invasion, and their necessities compelled the Chinese statesmen to consider the wisdom of concluding a prompt arrangement with this country. The fleet was withdrawn too soon to gain all the requisite advantage from the apprehensions of the Imperial Government; but Commissioner Lin was removed in disgrace, and another high official, named Keshen, was appointed to carry on negotiations at Canton, whither the fleet had returned on the first symptom of an intention on the part of Taoukwang to make satisfactory proposals. These appearances, unfortunately, proved illusory, and it was soon made clear that the one object the Chinese had in view was to save the capital and gain time. No attempt was made to reopen at Canton the negotiations which might have been insisted upon in the Peiho; the prudence of the Celestial Government had again given way to its pride. In January, 1841, therefore, the English commander found himself compelled to turn to that side of his instructions which bade him carry his points by force, if necessary, and the ships of the English fleet were ordered to attack the Bogue forts which defend the river approaches to Canton. The Chinese troops fought well, and offered at some points a stubborn resistance even at close quarters; but the forts were carried one after another, and either destroyed or occupied. The following simple but necessary demands were then formulated as representing the terms on which the English Government were prepared to recognize a satisfactory settlement. The recognition of the King of England as an independent sovereign, an apology for the discourteous treatment of Lord Napier, and the right to trade with any port where an Imperial Custom-house was maintained, formed the chief points upon which we insisted as the condition

of further arrangements for the regulation of trade. But although Keshen consented to these terms, as well as to the surrender of Hongkong, it was only with the intention of gaining time, as his instructions from the Emperor Taoukwang did not allow him to make concessions to the foreign barbarians, but urged him to get rid of them by some clever and unscrupulous stroke of diplomacy. Several weeks' further delay ensued without availing to turn us from our course; and in February, 1841, the remaining forts of the Bogue were attacked and carried by storm. Keshen was disgraced and summoned to Pekin, while, in the following month, the foreign settlement of Canton was occupied by an English force and the town placed under the command of the guns of an English fleet. Even this discomfiture did not destroy the confidence of the Chinese, who forthwith formed a fresh plot to annihilate the English merchants and their defenders. The men-of-war were compelled to engage and to destroy the forts on Shameen, as well as eighty war-junks and fire-rafts in the river. The arrival of Sir Hugh Gough as Commander-in-Chief, and of Sir Henry Pottinger as Minister Plénipotentiary, was followed by the dispersion of all the Chinese troops in the neighbourhood of Canton, the putting of that city to ransom, and the resumption of negotiations for a definite treaty. Many months of further delay ensued, and in June, 1842, the scene of action was transferred from Canton to the Yang-tse-kiang, where the success of our arms was as rapid and conspicuous as might have been expected from the relative resources of the combatants. At last, on the 29th of August, 1842, a treaty of peace was concluded in Nankin, the old capital of the Mings.

The importance of this treaty, which was exceedingly moderate, on the admission of the Chinese themselves, consisted not so much in its trade stipulations as in the fact that it established the right of foreigners to reside in the Middle Kingdom, and that it admitted the power of the English Government to afford them protection. Hongkong was surrendered, and five ports—Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai—were opened to foreign trade and residents. Only one omission of prominent importance could be detected in this agreement, and that was our not insisting on the right to be represented at Pekin, and to hold direct communication with the Imperial Government. Yet, notwithstanding this omission, the Treaty of Nankin can claim a

permanent place in history as being the first time that the Chinese Government formally recognized another as being on a position of equality with itself. Other countries followed the example of England, and in 1843 embassies from France and the United States arrived in China to establish intercourse on a similar footing to ours. But although the Treaty of Nankin was a great triumph, and notwithstanding that the possession of Consuls and of a naval station in Hongkong rendered it impossible that the trade should ever lapse into the disgraceful condition of the previous century, the question was very far from being settled; and the arrogance of the Chinese authorities revived with the disappearance of the danger which had compelled them to realize the plain facts of the situation. The annals of the period between 1842 and 1856 are full of constant cases of friction between the opposite races, and afford no evidence that the Chinese Government regarded the foreigners with less dislike and distrust than before the Treaty of Nankin. The notorious "Arrow" case was only the last of a long list of grievances against the Chinese officials, who threw every impediment in their power in the way of foreigners, and who refused to facilitate the settlement of the simplest questions of procedure. The seizure of the lorcha *Arrow*[1] was undoubtedly an act without warrant or justification; but it would have been settled at once had the Chinese felt disposed towards peace. Commissioner Yeh was seized with an unfortunate zeal against the "foreign devils," and thought to carry matters with a high hand, in emulation of his predecessor Lin. Once the rupture came, fresh charges and countercharges were brought up on both sides, and the antipathy which had been acquiring intensity during fourteen years revealed itself in the plainest manner. Admiral Seymour occupied the river forts without

[1] The "Arrow" case is unfortunately one of those incidents about which it is impossible to write so as not merely to gain the approval, but even to avoid the censure of those who take another view of the matter. In my "History of China," vol. iii. pp. 396–405, I described the "Arrow" case with the facts recorded in the Blue Books lying before me, and under a sense of grave responsibility. To that narrative I can add nothing here except to repeat that the facts are as I gave them, and that I uphold the views I have expressed. Perhaps at some future time I may attempt the task of elaborately dealing with the "Arrow" case, and further vindicating the reputation of my late lamented friend, Sir Harry Parkes, if the fame of that most distinguished public servant can be held to require any vindication.

opposition, and called upon the Chinese authorities to make ample and speedy reparation for the insult to the English flag. The obstinacy of the Chinese official was fully aroused, and he declined compliance with our demands, although the penalty of his recalcitrance was the bombardment of his town. But at this point the hidden dangers of the undertaking were unexpectedly made clear.

The Chinese, far from being cowed, showed the most striking determination, and with each success, more nominal than real, their courage revived. Admiral Seymour found himself compelled to evacuate the positions he had seized, and sent off a request to the Indian Government for the services of 5,000 troops. The unscrupulous character of the Chinese as opponents was shown by an attempt to poison all the foreign residents at Hongkong; but, although this plot was discovered and disappointed, months went by without the arrival of the expected troops in consequence of the Indian Mutiny, and the Chinese remained, and felt themselves to be, masters of the situation. It was not until the end of the year 1857 that our ambassador, Lord Elgin, found himself supported by a sufficient force to justify his presenting an ultimatum to Yeh. This move was accompanied by an advance of our fleet in the direction of Canton, and by the occupation of the island of Honan. The French Government participated in these proceedings, and its representative, Baron Gros, acted in concert with Lord Elgin, while French marines fought side by side with English blue-jackets. The attack on Canton followed, and resulted in the capture of that city and also of Commissioner Yeh, who was sent at a later period to India. But, as had been proved before, the occupation of Canton produced very little effect on the Central Government, which felt itself secure so long as the foreigners were kept at a distance. Lord Elgin, therefore, announced his intention to proceed to Shanghai, where he would negotiate with any delegates the emperor might appoint; but in the event of no delegates making their appearance he would continue his journey to the neighbourhood of Pekin. This notification was made to the First Minister of the emperor, who however refused to make any direct reply and completely ignored the subjects mentioned in Lord Elgin's communication. The English representative was thus left with no choice save to proceed to the north, but the efficacy of his proceedings was weakened by a

further delay in the arrival of the English fleet. The self-confidence of the Chinese was thereby restored, and during the interval the forts at the mouth of the Peiho were much strengthened, and their garrisons strongly reinforced. These forts, known from the name of a village as the Taku forts, were eventually attacked and captured. In many respects their construction and armament excited surprise and admiration, while in others they were extremely defective. The capture of the Taku forts brought the Imperial Government to a more yielding frame of mind. Two commissioners were appointed on the arrival of the first English vessels at Tientsin, and after numerous delays negotiations were begun in as much earnest as Chinese tergiversation would allow. It is unnecessary to describe the course of these negotiations; suffice it to say that the Treaty of Tientsin was eventually drawn up and agreed upon. The principal concessions obtained by this instrument were the right to have a resident envoy at Pekin, and permission for English subjects to travel throughout the empire. Five other ports and the river Yang-tse-kiang were thrown open to foreign trade. These concessions were made to apply to all foreigners by subsequent treaties with the other Powers. Unfortunately, the Chinese Government had not even then learnt to make a virtue of necessity; and when in 1859 the envoys of England and France appeared at the mouth of the Peiho, and requested to be allowed to proceed to Pekin, they were met with objections and counter-suggestions that were tantamount to a refusal. The Taku forts had to be re-attacked, and after one failure they were taken. A European expedition then marched on Pekin. The incidents of that campaign are not forgotten, and the destruction of the Summer Palace is remembered as an act of just retribution for the treacherous imprisonment and ill-treatment of English and other officers and men. The Treaty of Tientsin was ratified in the capital, and its stipulations were immediately put into execution.

The principal effect of these wars and treaties was that they placed the relations of foreign Governments with the Chinese Government on a footing which made a friendly understanding possible. The Celestials so far abated their pretensions as to admit that there were other independent Governments in the world besides theirs, and that they were entitled to certain rights and consideration. The disturbed state of China herself lent

weight to these opinions, and while the Imperial authority was being reasserted to a great extent with foreign assistance, the Tsungli Yamên, under the guidance of Prince Kung, had an easy task in showing that an agreement with the European Powers was essential to the well-being of China. Yet the question always bristled with difficulties, and the settlement of one point seemed only to be the origin of fresh causes of disagreement. But so far as the action of the Tsungli Yamên and of the great Minister Li Hung Chang went there never was any cause to doubt the sincerity of their political persuasion as to the desirability of maintaining amicable relations with foreigners. But, at the best, these broad and enlightened views were the special property of a few gifted individuals. The official and literary classes were still possessed by a profoundly hostile sentiment towards all foreigners as the most dangerous of innovators. It only needs some incident which enables them to appeal to the patriotic or superstitious instincts of the masses to bring their latent hostility to the surface, and to reveal in all its repulsive features the deep-rooted antipathy of the Chinese towards strangers. The record of the relations with the Chinese Government even during the last twenty years is full of occurrences calculated to provoke strife and to revive the animosity that had been laid on one side. For several years after the Pekin Treaty the employment of force by English ships of war in exacting redress for acts of individual hardship was of common occurrence. The riot at Yangchow, when several missionaries were maltreated and expelled from the town, and a similar occurrence in Formosa marked the year 1868 alone. Redress was exacted for them in a summary manner by our men-of-war, and fortunately without disturbing the harmony of the official intercourse at Pekin. The following year also witnessed a still more daring attack on the pinnace of an English gunboat near Swatow, and this act had to be punished by the despatch of a squadron of five vessels to the scene of outrage. These petty incidents have been more or less frequent in subsequent years; but they have been completely overshadowed by the massacre of French subjects at Tientsin and the murder of Mr. Margary on the borders of Yunnan. The massacre of the French official and religious establishments at Tientsin was attended with many horrible circumstances. The mob was worked up to a pitch of excitement by false rumours, and the apathy of the Chinese

official, Chung How, allowed them to break loose from control. Twenty-one foreigners, including ten Sisters of Mercy, were killed, besides every native convert on whom the rioters could lay their hands. The report of the Tientsin massacre was nearly kindling the anti-foreign sentiment to a flame, and producing similar attacks on foreigners in every place of trade throughout the empire. The reparation exacted for this outrage was not adequate to the offence, and for the first time since the occupation of Pekin a strong party in the Imperial Cabinet recommended an appeal to arms rather than further concessions to the foreigners. The murder of Mr. Margary was a not less flagrant breach of the laws of amity; but the compensation exacted for it was in both a national and a personal sense more proportionate to the offence and worthier of our dignity than the terms accepted by our neighbours. Rightly considered, this untoward event proved one of the most important turning-points in the history of the relations between the Chinese and foreigners. The formal mention of foreigners in the official *Gazette* and the admission of their right to travel throughout the empire received increased force and significance from the despatch of a Chinese official as ambassador to London. The Chefoo Convention formed a worthy successor to the treaties of Tientsin and Pekin, and a few more of the barriers maintained by the most exclusive of Governments were either removed or overleapt. No one supposes that Sir Thomas Wade's agreement with Li Hung Chang has permanently solved every difficulty either in trade or in diplomacy between foreigners and Chinese, but it certainly provided a peaceful issue for what might have been a serious disagreement, and all our subsequent relations reveal an increasing knowledge of one another, which is the best guarantee of peace and good-will.

But although the treaties with the Chinese Government have given them many rights and privileges formerly denied, the position of foreigners in China must continue to be one of much delicacy and danger. The Chinese have abandoned their old policy of isolation, but there are many signs that they would not be loth to utilize their new knowledge and their vastly improved military resources with the view of returning to it. The readiness with which the Chinese authorities accepted a line of conduct in direct contravention of precedent, and in more or less subservience to foreign views, was due as much to a sense of their own internal

difficulties as to any inclination to admit European superiority. It cannot be too emphatically impressed on those having the conduct of relations with the Chinese, that the China of to-day is very differently situated in its capacity for war from the China of twenty years ago. We do not suppose that any design has been suggested for the putting in force of a scheme to expel foreigners generally by even the most chauvinist member of the Palace faction, usually designated the War Party; but certainly of late an increasing disposition has been shown to maintain the dignity of the empire and to assert its sovereign rights. So far questions of trade and the presence of foreigners in the treaty ports and other places in the country have not interfered in any way with the exercise of the emperor's power; but the attempt to force a trade in new regions by either open conquest or ignoring the views of the Chinese themselves, is certain to provoke retaliatory measures against the persons and property of those who are within reach of Chinese action. The rights which foreigners possess in China have been won by an unceasing contest with the antipathy and duplicity of the Celestials themselves. They represent the results and the prize of the best of alliances. Not a hundred years ago innocent foreigners were surrendered to certain death in order that the Chinese might not close the one port of trade. Less than half a century ago English merchants were willing to hand over their property to destruction in order to save their lives; and the record of intercourse down almost to the present day is full of passages of personal suffering and national injury. The conditions of our relations with a proud and despotic Government must always include many elements of peril and uncertainty, but if the plain facts in connection with the foreign intercourse continue to be realized by the Governments of Europe and America in the same way as in the past, there is every reason to hope that the happily existing condition of things may be preserved. But it must be remembered that the stronger China becomes, and the more independent she may feel of the assistance of others, the greater will be the danger of any unjustifiable act on the part of a foreign Government bringing the persons of all foreigners into jeopardy of their lives. The position of foreigners in China even now rests on no surer basis than the assumption that their Governments collectively, and that of England alone, perhaps singly, are more powerful than China, and that an anti-foreign policy would

be resented and resisted by them all. We cannot be expected to sympathize with or to approve of unjustifiable action on the part of France in Tonquin, any more than we should sanction Russia's aggression in Corea, yet none the less does division of opinion among the Powers weaken the position of foreigners. The long-looked-for opportunity of the extreme party, headed by the Manchu princes, would have come, if that diversity of opinion were to lead to opposite action on the part of England and France.

XVIII.

TIBET AND THE WAY THITHER.[1]

THE failure of the celebrated Russian traveller, Colonel Prjevalsky,[2] to reach Lhasa, should not induce either the Indian Government or those who happen to be interested in the question to treat with indifference the subject of our relations with the mysterious country lying beyond the northern frontier of India. Colonel Prjevalsky's attempt was one of a most interesting character, both in the cause of geographical research, and also as indirectly affecting several political questions of importance; and, although it failed to attain the degree of success which the gallantry of the explorer deserved, it was productive of sufficiently practical results to encourage others to resume the attempt on some favourable opportunity. While, therefore, the prospect of Russian influence penetrating into Tibet recedes for the time, it would be a mistaken view on our part to imagine that the idea of trade intercourse between Kiachta, or Semipalatinsk, and Lhasa has been permanently abandoned by the Russian authorities. The design has only been laid aside for a more fitting occasion, and this interval furnishes us with an advantage that we should not be slow to seize.

[1] *The Calcutta Review*, January, 1882.

[2] Colonel Prjevalsky is at this moment engaged in a fresh attempt—the sixth—to make his way to Lhasa, and, so far as can be judged, he has a better chance of success on this occasion than in any previous undertaking.

The following two facts can hardly be forgotten, that Tibet is our close neighbour in India, and that Sir Thomas Wade obtained for this country, in the Treaty of Chefoo, the right to despatch a mission to its capital. That concession, it is said, the Chinese consider annulled by the lapse of time, but it is difficult to perceive, from the wording of the treaty itself, how that view can be sustained. As it would be a very unfortunate proceeding to force ourselves or our representative upon either the Chinese or their subjects, the Tibetans, it will be admitted that before the enforcement of this clause a fresh expression of consent on the part of the Chinese Government should be obtained. Considering the anomalous condition of the relations subsisting between England and China along the land frontier of the two great empires, it is, to say the least, doubtful policy to forego points which appear calculated to promote a friendly feeling between the two countries. In face of the journeys of Mr. Baber and Captain Gill across China, and of the repeated tours of Mr. Morrison in the heart of the country, it can no longer be argued that the people are bitterly inimical to the presence of Europeans. The hostility appears to emanate rather from the minor officials than from the mass of the people, and the officials dare not act in opposition to the clearly expressed commands of the Government. The consent of the central authorities being obtained afresh, there need be no apprehension, that the entry of our representatives into Tibet would be opposed by the Chinese mandarins. The advantages of intercourse with Tibet are only remotely connected with politics, and may be rather classed under the head of commercial improvements. But greater importance will be attached by most persons to the fact that it would be taking a step towards improving our relations with the Chinese, whom we so imperfectly understand. It would be placing our neighbourly relations on a new footing with a Power whose history and present condition alike command our respect and attention.

Within the last few years the subject of Tibet has attracted considerable notice in this country, mainly due perhaps to the writings of Mr. Clements Markham. Certainly it is to the publication of "The Mission of George Bogle to Tibet" in the early part of the year 1876, that all the discussions that have since ensued about the land of the Lamas is to be attributed. Never was

a book published at a more opportune moment. The failure of the Mandalay route, and the uncertain future before us in our relations with China, gave a general interest to the chronicle of past ill-success in a similar direction, at the same time that the story served to remind us that another road to China from India existed than that through the dominions of the King of Burmah. It is permissible to believe that the work of Mr. Clements Markham made an impression on the mind of Sir Thomas Wade, and that the practical result of this publication, relating to the only English missions [1] to Tibet—the first two official, and the third unofficial in character—was nothing less than the insertion of the clause relating to a mission to Lhasa in the Treaty of Chefoo. In India there have always been advocates for a repetition of Bogle's mission, and, indeed, it is not in the character of the English to admit of the existence of a mystery,[2] such as Tibet was and still is, a very few miles beyond the frontier of their dominions. Although, therefore, no Englishman has, since Manning, penetrated into Tibet, many have ascended the peaks of the Himalayas, and the majority of the passes in Sikhim, at all events, have been explored. The preliminary stages have, during the last forty years, been mastered, and it only now remains for some fortunate official to reap the reward that the energy and indomitable courage of a whole generation have been enlisted to secure.

Tibet is the vast country which lies between the two mountain ranges, the Kuen Lun and the Himalaya. In its own language it is called Bhot, and by the Chinese it is known as Tsang. It has been divided into three natural divisions—Eastern, Western, and Central; but it is only with the last or Metropolitan State that we are at present concerned. The early history of the country is wrapped in a thick mist of fable, and, so far as our knowledge of its extensive literature yet goes, we are unable to do more than grope uncertainly in the darkness. It is not until the end of the 14th century that we are able to discern events that are tangible, and that for us the history of Tibet may be said to commence. Before that time there were Lamas, and the Buddhist religion was supreme; but neither the Dalai nor the

[1] Those of Mr. Bogle, Captain Turner, and Mr. Manning.

[2] A. K's remarkable tour of four years described in a special Report in 1885 has done much to clear this up.

Teshu titles had been created. The rulers of Lhasa had no claims to the special sanctity that is now their prerogative and birthright, if it is appropriate to apply the latter term to a spiritual being who is never supposed to lose vitality. The state was ruled by its native Lamas in some sort of ill-defined dependency upon the sovereigns of Pekin.

The Buddhist Church of Tibet had fallen into evil ways in the 14th century, and there was urgent necessity for the appearance of a reformer, when, in reply to the prayers of the people, one came in the person of Tsong Khapa. The origin of the Tibetan Luther, according to the popular legend, was no ordinary one. His father, Lombo Moka, lived in the fertile regions south of Kokonor, where the two mighty rivers Yang-tse and Hoang Ho find an almost common source. Here he, with his wife Chingtsia-Tsio, is depicted for us as passing a happy, contented existence, far from the commotions that disturbed the neighbouring states, and uncontaminated by the prevailing corruption. One grief alone oppressed them, to prove that these dwellers in Aindo were after all mortals like the rest, and that was the absence of children. Years passed on, and still Chingtsia-Tsio proved barren, till at last they both became resigned to their lot. One day, during the absence of her husband, Chingtsia met with an adventure which was destined to bear fruit of no ordinary import. On her way to the place where she drew the household water, she fell into a trance, and sank senseless on a large stone on which were graven characters in honour of Sakya Muni.[1] Nine months after this occurrence she gave birth to a son, who was called Tsong Khapa, from the name of the mountain at the foot of which this had taken place. At an early age he entered the church, and eventually became Abbot of Galdan, near Lhasa. It was he, who then by steady reform swept away most of the abuses which had crept into the order of the Lamas, and more than any other person did he contribute to exalt the priesthood of Tibet among their neighbours as the purest and most enlightened of the exponents of the doctrines of the Buddha. The work he had carried on from the neighbourhood of Lhasa was supplemented by that accomplished by Gedun-tubpa in the southern portion of the country. A contemporary of Tsong Khapa, the latter sur-

[1] The prophet of Buddhism.

vived him many years, and the work he left behind him was consequently of a more permanent nature. His rule was confined to the neighbourhood of Shigatze; but there it was supreme. His successor became distinguished as the Teshu Lama. At this time there was no Dalai Lama; consequently the inferior title dates further back than the superior. A very accurate idea may be obtained of the difference between these titles by the chief epithet that is applied to their respective holders. The Dalai is the gem of majesty; the Teshu the gem of learning. The sixth descendant of Gedun-tubpa, and consequently the fifth Teshu, by name Nawang Lobsang, brought the whole of Tibet under his sway, and was the common ancestor of the three great Lamas, the Dalai of Lhasa, the Teshu of Shigatze, and the Taranath of Urga beyond Gobi. In 1650 the Tibetan ruler entered into the closest alliance with Chuntche, the Emperor of China. The Manchu conquest had just been consummated, and the new emperor was pleased to secure the good services of the priestly order of Tibet. Their influence has always been much solicited by the present dynasty, and, so far as we are justified in speaking, they have been consistent in their support of the Pekin authorities. Nawang Lobsang was publicly created, by order of Chuntche, Dalai Lama, which signifies Ocean Lama, his ability being thus proclaimed to be as deep and as unfathomable as the sea. He was therefore the first Dalai and the fifth Teshu, but the former soon became recognized as the higher title, and that specially attaching to the ruler of Lhasa. From that day to the present, so far as our most recent intelligence goes, the two Lamas have continued to rule in Tibet, although the Chinese have encroached in many ways on their governing privileges.

The wars with Nepaul have afforded plausible excuses for this extension of the authority of the Chinese Ambans, but, if we may accept the Abbé Huc as a trustworthy witness, the number of the Chinese garrison has been grossly exaggerated. It used to be believed that it consisted of 60,000 Chinese troops, always maintained in a high degree of efficiency. From the missionary's interesting account 10,000 would appear to be too high an estimate, and these deficient in every requisite of an army. It should be stated, however, that, even if this evidence were correct at the time, the Chinese army is now greatly superior

to what it was in that year. Since then it has virtually been recreated. On the other hand, outside the circles of the priests, of whose real convictions we know absolutely nothing, there is much antipathy on the part of the Tibetans towards the Chinese. Some would have us believe that this aversion is deep rooted, and that some day it will find vent in a general rising against the mandarins. That they regard the Chinese as "a gross and impure race of men" is not to be wondered at, when we remember that the only Chinese in the country are the soldiers and some of the lower grades of the official classes. There is undoubtedly a kind of prophecy believed in by many of the people that a grand era is yet to dawn for their country, and that the true doctrines of Buddhism will sweep all error from amongst the surrounding nations, and result in the supremacy of Tibet, and its ruling priesthood. Such are the few popular aspirations with which we have any acquaintance. They are vague in the extreme, and perhaps are only the expression of the discontent of some intriguing or oppressed clique. They may also possess the highest importance, and if the power of the Lamas for good or evil be as great as is asserted by some, then these murmurs, taken in conjunction with the known restless feeling among the Chinese themselves, finding expression at the present moment in the demand for a change in the dynastic style, may yet bear fruit in practical results. The traditions of the country and the practical experience of its educated classes alike teach that the part Tibet has to play in political matters is confined to the northern side of the Himalaya, yet the religion of the people attracts them in as great a degree to the southern. The importance of this fact in the present case is, that there is a common desire both in India and Tibet to gravitate towards each other. The religion of the Lamas impels them to regard the holy cities of Bengal as the most to-be-venerated spots on earth, and thrice happy is that one who, having overcome the obstacles imposed by the loftiest mountain-chain in the world, and the dangers of the pestiferous jungle that then succeeds, has bathed in the sacred waters of the Ganges. Few, indeed, have been the pilgrims who in our time have come from the Holy Land of Buddhism, yet there have been some, and these in their own country are regarded with particular respect. The travels of Gosain Pranpouree were on a still more extended scale. He had

visited far-distant Moscow, and barely escaped slavery at the hands of the Turcomans. He made a complete circuit of the more interesting portion of Asia. From India he had penetrated to Persia, thence north to Russia, and by Siberia and Urga had entered the Chinese Empire, whence he returned to Lhasa by the Sining route. Captain Turner has given a very interesting description of this distinguished character, who was, very naturally, quite a celebrity among his countrymen. The natural inclination of the people of Tibet to visit India exists, and should be encouraged by every means in our power.

It is by this time well known that Warren Hastings was the first to direct the attention of his countrymen to the regions beyond the Himalaya, and that he aspired to open up, in these little known states, a fresh field for that energy and activity of which he himself possessed such a superabundance. It is not so well understood that his first and more important embassy to Tibet was in reality a return mission, dictated as much by the rules of good breeding as by any more ambitious sentiment; nor is it perhaps more fully realized that the mission of George Bogle was, strictly speaking, a success, and that it was only when it attempted to extend its functions that it met with a check which has made the whole affair appear an unqualified failure. The Cis-Himalayan State of Bhutan is inhabited by a tribe of some of the fiercest and most warlike of the clans of India, and even now, after the punishment inflicted on it by three English expeditions on a large scale, the good conduct of the Bhuteas is always doubtful. In 1772 their depredations into Cooch Behar necessitated the despatch of a small force against them, and, remembering the difficulties of warfare in such a country as Bhutan, the success obtained on this occasion was exceptionally great. In one brief campaign they received a severe defeat in the field, and their chief town Tassisudon was placed in jeopardy, when instructions arrived from Calcutta to grant a truce to the disheartened mountaineers. The Deb Rajah, or ruler of Bhutan, finding himself unable to stem the tide of British invasion, sued the Teshu Lama of Tibet to come to his aid. In answer to that application this priest-ruler sent a letter and a small embassy to Calcutta, and Warren Hastings, occupied in far more important affairs in Central India, was not loth to call away the troops he needed so much elsewhere from barren achievements in the mountains of

the north. Yet, with the promptitude that characterized all his movements, he seized the opportunity thus afforded him of learning something of Tibet and its people, and in accordance with instructions of the kind that, we are led to believe, Prince Bismarck dictates for the guidance of his representatives in foreign capitals, Mr. George Bogle set out on that journey which was intended to place the secrets of Lhasa at the disposal of our Governor-General. The Teshu Lama of Tibet, although nominally on an equality with the Dalai Lama, is in fact a kind of viceroy in the southern division of the country, and exercises, as it would appear, little or no influence upon the foreign policy of Tibet. This is the more to be remarked, as the Teshu of Bogle's time was a man of exceptional ability and piety. His opinion ought to have carried great weight; and that his fame was widespread is proved by the fact that the Emperor of China, the mighty Keen Lung, sent for the Teshu to come and see him at Pekin before he died. It would be instructive to know what these two men conversed upon, what topics were of mutual interest to the man who had gained everything by war, and to one whose reputation was founded on peace and goodwill to all. The lesson to be learnt from Mr. Bogle's mission is that Lhasa is supreme, and that the Teshu Lama is not the potentate to whom we should address ourselves when we seek to effect an entrance into his country. Matters may also have changed since the days of Bogle, and the present Dalai Lama, no longer a child, although it is now rumoured that he is one, and the puppet of a schemer such as Gesub Rimboché was, may combine the power of supreme ruler with the peculiar personal claims to consideration that attached to the Teshu who was Bogle's consistent friend. In the reception of our envoy so much depends on the inclinations of the Dalai, that it is doubly to be regretted that we know nothing whatever of the present holder of the title.[1] The point in Bogle's mission which is lost sight of is, that it was ostensibly sent to the Teshu in response to that which had come from him, and that the reception it received at Teshu Lumbo was cordial in the extreme. It would almost appear that Warren Hastings had forgotten the dual form of government in Tibet, and that he conceived, in dealing with the Teshu, he was treating with

[1] We now know conclusively from A. K. that he is a child.

the recognized sovereign of the country. If so, his representative was quickly undeceived, for all his efforts to obtain permission to go on to Lhasa were in vain. Bogle's mission to the Teshu was an unqualified success, but when he sought to extend it into an official visit to the Dalai, he was unable to accomplish his object. The Teshu Lama asked a favour of the Governor-General, who granted it. The Teshu extended his hospitality to the messenger of the ruler of India, and moreover contracted a personal friendship with him which was unimpaired long years afterwards. With all of this the Dalai had no concern. It is probable that nothing was known of these negotiations at Lhasa until Mr. Bogle's request came, to be allowed to visit it. The net result of this mission was that the introduction to the book of Tibetan history was temptingly exposed, and then it was closed, to all seeming, more firmly than before. On one occasion afterwards Mr. Bogle made a fresh effort to accomplish that wherein he had previously failed, and he was again assisted by the influence of the Teshu. Whether the opposition came from the Chinese governors, or from the palace of the Dalai, he was once more compelled to forego any hopes he may have indulged of visiting Lhasa. Yet neither Warren Hastings nor Mr. Bogle was daunted by adverse fortune, and at one moment it seemed as if their resolution was to be rewarded. When the Teshu, in 1779, set out for Pekin, he in the kindest manner possible wrote to Mr. Bogle asking him to go round to Canton, where he would use all his influence with the emperor to obtain his permission for the English representative to proceed to Pekin. He could then return with the Teshu to Tibet, and thus visit the abode of the Dalai Lama. The Teshu did approach the emperor on the subject, and paid a high tribute to the moderation of the English in their dealings with Bhutan. But in the midst of these negotiations the Teshu died suddenly, of small-pox it was said, at Pekin, and Mr. Bogle himself did not long survive his friend. With their deaths the most favourable opportunity of exploring Tibet passed away, and the motive power supplied by the Teshu's friendship for Bogle, and the latter's sympathy with the Lama being removed, it required a greater effort on the part of Warren Hastings to keep the question before the eyes of his countrymen. Yet this extraordinary man in no way relaxed in his determination to solve the Trans-Himalayan question, and he was not long in search of a

pretext for a renewal of those overtures to Tibet which, he was convinced, must in the end be crowned with success.

Although terms had been granted to the Deb Rajah of Bhutan, negotiations were still pending between him and the Government of India. Several districts, originally forming part of this state, were still held by British troops, and an English official was in treaty with the native court at Tassisudon. The intercourse with Bhutan necessitated some communication between Tibet and our representatives, and at last, in 1782, the news reached Calcutta that the person into whom the never-dying spirit of the Teshu had passed had been found. This time the potentate with whom we had to deal was no experienced man of the world, but an innocent child, in whose predilections no faith could be placed, and who was incapable of affecting the question of Anglo-Tibetan intercourse in one way or the other. Warren Hastings at once recognized the necessity of seizing the chance that was again offered him, and, as the road to Tibet was still open through Bhutan, he permitted no delay to retard its execution. In January, 1783, accordingly, Captain Samuel Turner, a connection of the Governor-General, left India for Bhutan with a message of congratulation to the new Teshu. After a delay of some months in Bhutan he, by the same route as that followed by Bogle, entered Tibet, and proceeded to Teshu Lumbo. It was not till the month of September of the same year that Turner entered Tibet, and, when he reached his destination, he found that the new Teshu was residing some distance from the town. He was, however, received cordially by the regent, who remembered Mr. Bogle, and one thing is clear from his narrative, and that is, that the English were in good repute with the Tibetans. The Teshu, beloved by his people, had impressed upon all his followers his admiration for the English, and the regent had been one of his most trusted counsellors. Captain Turner was therefore well received, and although there was some reluctance manifested to grant him an audience with the Teshu, he was permitted on his departure to make a detour to the monastery of Tarpaling where the Lama resided. While he was staying at Shigatze, a grand ceremony took place, but, although Captain Turner suggested his desire in the most courteous terms to participate in it, the regent felt compelled to refuse his permission on account of the "jealousy of the Chinese." Purungir Gosain, the intelligent companion of Bogle

and Turner, and the friend of the Teshu, was present at this great fête, which was to celebrate the removal of the Teshu from his natal place to the monastery of Tarpaling, which had been specially prepared for his reception. Captain Turner transcribed the Gosain's description, and it will be found in his account of his embassy to the Teshu Lama. Captain Turner spent four days at Tarpaling in December on his way back to India, and he was very cordially welcomed by the parents of the Teshu. If possible, he found a stronger sympathy for his countrymen in the monastery than he had in the city; and the Teshu's father in particular manifested extreme goodwill towards the English. This dignitary, a connection of the Dalai Lama, had felt "the stings of outraged fortune," and at one time had even thought of taking refuge from his foes in our dominions. The Teshu himself, a child not more than eighteen months old, produced a most favourable impression on our ambassador, by both his dignified behaviour and his fascinating appearance. Although speech was denied as yet to the Teshu, it was impressed upon Captain Turner that he understood all that was said to him. He was told that already the youthful Teshu attempted to pronounce the word "English," and that "Hastings" would be the next word that he should be taught. Without producing any permanent result, Warren Hastings's second mission served to preserve the remembrance of the first, and might undoubtedly have been most beneficial had the succeeding Governor-Generals perceived the importance of the question in the same degree as Warren Hastings had. Even with the return of Captain Turner all official intercourse between the courts did not cease, for Purungir Gosain was appointed a sort of diplomatic agent in Tibet for the British Government. In other ways, too, Warren Hastings strove to perpetuate the question of our relations with Tibet, and noteworthy among them may be mentioned the institution of the great fair at Rangpur, which contributed in a marked degree to the increase that then occurred in our trade by land with China and Tibet. But very shortly after the return of Captain Turner, Warren Hastings left India, and with his departure a complete revulsion took place in the policy of the Indian Government with regard to this question. Not only was trade with Tibet nipped in the bud by the abolition of the Rangpur fair, and Trans-Himalayan affairs tabooed in the council chamber, but more serious and irreparable mischief was done by the "drifting" policy which then came into vogue.

During the Nepaulese invasion of Tibet in 1792 we did nothing, although the Teshu Lama sent to inform us of the inroad and to request our assistance to repel it. The hostility of the Goorkhas to us was at that time scarcely concealed, and, twenty years later on, we had to undertake their castigation ourselves; yet we refused to restrain the aggressive proclivities of the ruler of Khatmandoo. The task that should have been performed by us, we permitted a Chinese army to accomplish, and we thus not only damaged our reputation in the eyes of the Tibetans, but also permitted Chinese power to be made evident within our own natural borders. Our subsequent intervention did undoubtedly save Nepaul from destruction, but not until it was too late to prevent the imposition of a Chinese tribute, which is still maintained. To that cause may be attributed, more than to anything else, the isolation the Nepaulese Government has since been so consistent in maintaining, while it undoubtedly alienated the sympathies of the Tibetans themselves. Most important of all, perhaps, it gave the Chinese Government the excuse it had been for some time seeking, for increasing the strength of its garrison in Tibet, and the forts at the northern entrances of the principal passes were accordingly occupied and re-fortified. From the intelligent policy of Hastings there was, therefore, a complete revulsion, and no succeeding Governor-General had either the inclination or the power to renew the attempts he had made. The Tibetan problem was shelved, and its solution has now to be commenced almost *ab initio*. It was while this revulsion in the sentiments of the Indian Government was at its height that the third attempt was made by an English subject to reach Lhasa. Thomas Manning, the friend and correspondent of Charles Lamb, had from his youth been fired with a desire to visit and explore China. Whether his attention had been drawn to this subject by the writings of the Jesuit fathers, or by some "tale from over sea," we are not informed; but he went to China with the firm resolve to penetrate into the country. At that time Canton was the only port to which Europeans were permitted entrance, and thither in the earlier years of the present century went Thomas Manning, full of his one grand idea. During a residence of several years' duration he acquired a complete colloquial acquaintance with the language, which he had previously studied both in France and England, and devoted his attention to the customs and prejudices of the people.

Gifted with rare tact and singular powers of observation, Manning ingratiated himself with the mandarins. If any one could have overcome the objections raised to the prosecution of his further travels, one would have supposed it would have been the man who had paved the way to deserved success by such energy and forethought. It was not to be, however; and, although the local authorities were friendly, their veto to his request for liberty to proceed into the interior was not to be overcome. Thwarted at Canton, Manning turned his steps in another direction. He had probably been told that the Chinese Empire extended to the Himalayas, or he may have remembered Lord Cornwallis's intervention on the occasion of the Chinese invasion of Nepaul already referred to. To Calcutta, therefore, he came early in the year 1810, when Lord Minto was Governor-General, and made overtures to the Government for an appointment in some official character during his intended journey to Tibet. His offer was met with a decided refusal, and it was in a private capacity, relying solely on his own qualifications and resources, that he set out on his arduous and well-nigh hopeless undertaking. In the fragments of his diary, which Mr. Clements Markham has preserved for us, he comments on what he not inaccurately terms the short-sightedness of the Government in the following sentence—"I cannot help exclaiming in my mind (as I often do) what fools the Company are to give me no commission, no authority, no instructions. What use are their embassies when their ambassador cannot speak to a soul, and can only make ordinary phrases pass through a stupid interpreter? No *finesse*, no *tournure*, no compliments. Fools, fools, fools, to neglect an opportunity they may never have again!" This bitter expression of disappointment is accentuated by Manning's ultimate success, and we may say here that there is much practical advice suggested in these few lines of his. Our ambassador, whoever may be selected, must, above all things, know the Chinese language, and be skilled in the etiquette of the court. To sum up briefly upon the result of Manning's journey, it is sufficient to say here, that he resided in Lhasa for nearly twelve months, that he saw the Dalai Lama, that he won over the reserve of the people by his kindness and wonderful skill in propitiating their feelings, and that he has left us the only personal record in English we possess of the most interesting portion of the country. But, so far as his desire to break through

the close ring maintained by Chinese reserve was concerned, he was again doomed to disappointment. With inferior means at his disposal, and with greater obstacles in his path, Manning had, however, accomplished more than the ambassadors of Warren Hastings.

With the return of Manning to India a long period of inaction in Himalayan exploration ensued, which has during the last forty years been slowly overcome by the devotion of a small band of enthusiasts. So long as there remained a fringe of independent territory between our frontier and that of Tibet, an excuse for continued apathy was easily obtainable, but with our gradual approach to the southern entrances of the Himalayan passes, this was removed. In the time both of Bogle and Manning, the Deb Rajah had to be propitiated as well as the Tibetans, for through his dominions lay the only known route to Lhasa. The Nepaulese were far too hostile at that time, and Sikhim was too little explored to admit of any alternative route being essayed. Shortly after the return of Manning our interest in Sikhim became greater, for our decided interference alone saved it from falling into the possession of the irrepressible Goorkhas. This further increased in 1836, when the southern portion of the little territory was ceded to this country. It was after this year that the extraordinary revival of interest in the relations of these states to India took place, and that many devoted their attention to a question that had been conceived by the brilliant intellect of Hastings, and which the dogged resolution of Manning had striven to bring to a satisfactory termination.

Mr. Brian Hodgson, during his long residence at the court of Nepaul, not content with studying the history of the Goorkhas and the Newar kings, lost no opportunity of inquiring into the state of affairs beyond the Himalayas; and his reputation, which became great in these regions, penetrated even to the Dalai Lama at Lhasa. A correspondence ensued, and the Dalai sent the minister, as a token of his friendship, the manuscript records of the Capuchin fathers who at one time had been established at Lhasa. These Mr. Hodgson presented to the Pope, and they are now deposited in the Vatican. Mr. Hodgson's investigations in Nepaul, which have been lost sight of chiefly through the exclusive policy adopted by the late Sir Jung Bahadur, and Dr. Campbell's in Sikhim, were most instrumental in putting fresh

life into the topic. Slowly, but surely, the work henceforth proceeded, and no want of encouragement was able to damp the ardour of those who devoted themselves to the cause they held so dear. In the meanwhile the French priests, Huc and Gabet, had visited Tibet, but their residence in Lhasa was brief. They came from the north of China, and returned in a due easterly direction to Canton; and M. Huc has left us a most interesting description of his impressions of what he saw. His travels in Tartary and Tibet still form delightful reading, and the activity of the French in this quarter, beyond doubt, gave an impetus to our own movements. It is *à propos* here to mention that Mr. Ney Elias considers the best route to Tibet to be that followed by Huc. That is to say, we must, according to him, abandon all intention of visiting Tibet as a neighbouring state, by going a roundabout journey to enter it as some strange and far distant country. All the arguments in favour of commencing political relations with Tibet fall to the ground, if we are constrained to admit, as Mr. Elias does, that the best road thither is from the Chinese sea.

The trigonometrical and topographical surveys of India brought all the influence of science to bear on the question of how far the Himalayan passes were practicable, and the despatch of Indian Pundits to explore, where Englishmen were unable to penetrate, was another step in the right direction. The result of their journeys is still but imperfectly realized, and, indeed, the more important of their reports remain India Foreign Office secrets. Pundit No. 9, Nain Sing, in his numerous visits to Tibetan territory, learnt much of the state of affairs in the country; but of these the details have not been fully published. In 1872, however, while at Shigatze, he heard of disturbances having broken out at Lhasa, but the cause of these he was not able to ascertain, nor has it since been made known. The rumour appears to have more foundation which asserts that the Chinese during the past generation have been endeavouring to monopolize all the civil functions in the state, but of the result of this we are also totally uninformed. There is some ground for believing rather that the Chinese have passed more under the influence of the Lamas, than that the latter have sunk into the tools of the former, and a recent Imperial edict from Pekin with reference to Tibet strengthens this supposition. We are, therefore, in total ignorance of the exact state of affairs in Tibet. We know neither the strength of the

Chinese there, nor the extent of the authority exercised by the native rulers. All this has to be ascertained before it will be possible to estimate the future before us with regard to Tibet. We may find that the Chinese are supreme, and that the great Lamas are now but the shadow of a name, and that in consequence of the hostility of the official classes we must once more abandon our design. This is looking at the dark side of things—the "way how not to do it;" and it is impossible to admit the existence of such obstacles until they have been encountered and proved insuperable. But in this case the far more probable side is of a brighter hue. The Chinese officials would not dare to oppose our entry into Tibet if their Government consented to it; and, once there, it would be our own fault if we could not secure the permanent opening of the passes through Sikhim and Bhutan. The Lamas, whose sentiment is dubious, may without great difficulty be propitiated, as they have been before, and the people who have more to gain by trade than we have, be it remembered, will be only too eager to welcome the return of those days of prosperity which passed away with the Rangpur fair. Let it be known that it is the intention of the Indian Government to revive that annual celebration, and that the roads and bridges shall be maintained in perfect order, a task that will in the first years be expensive, as they have fallen into a state of disrepair through neglect, but which a small toll will afterwards be sufficient to maintain, and there is every reason to believe that commerce will find the outlet it has been so long seeking in this direction, and that a new field for enterprise and international utility will be opened up to us.

In two articles alone intercourse with Tibet might completely revolutionize the trade of India. The wool of Tibet, the finest in the world, and almost inexhaustible in quantity, would create a new industry in Bengal, which would rival that carried on in Cashmere during its most prosperous years; and the tea of Darjeeling and Assam should alone supply the 6,000,000 of tea-drinking people who inhabit Tibet. Indian finance is in no flourishing state, and chances such as these, of adding to the wealth of the people, it is sheer folly to disregard. We must decline, however, to discuss the mineral wealth of a country which geologists tell us is of the most boundless promise. Gold is known, however, to be in common use among the poorest of the villagers. It was at a moment when so many circumstances combined to attract our

attention to the land of the Lamas that we received tidings of the departure of a Russian officer to explore a country which is almost a sealed book to ourselves. The possibility of being forestalled by the representative of another Power, which, in Tibet, must be considered as an interloper, was not flattering to our self-love. If Colonel Prjevalsky had succeeded, he would, to say the least, have overcome obstacles and difficulties of a far more formidable character than any that would beset a traveller proceeding from India. The credit of an English explorer could not equal that which the Russian would have deserved if he had been successful. That danger is happily averted, but none the less would it appear that our attitude in the matter should no longer be one of apathy. We should have bestowed our plaudits on the successful one, though he might have been a Russian; but now we should take steps that something of the glory may be earned by our own countrymen. Russia's personal concern in Tibet can, under no conceivable circumstances, ever equal our own. If we permit its trade to pass into the hands of the merchants of Urga and Ili, and thus defraud our own subjects of their legitimate rights, we deserve the worst that can be said of us. It is more reasonable to suppose that, if the Russian Government has any more definite object than the vague desire to increase the trade of its country, it was a wish to strengthen its hands in its relations with China that impelled it to sanction Colonel Prjevalsky's explorations of Tibet and Southern China. The intrigues that are said to have been carried on ever since the year 1800 at Urga with the Taranath Lama and the Khalka princes, may yet very possibly bear fruit during any Russian complications that may arise with China; an acquaintance, therefore, with the aspirations of the Tibetan Lama, who claims and exercises a certain supremacy over the Mongolians, is very necessary, and, although no disaffection may exist in Lhasa against the Chinese rule, the Russians are far too prudent to suppose the "dark side of things exists" until it has been proved by ocular demonstration.

In Asia, during the present century, we have publicly proclaimed our desire to confine our attention to strictly Indian affairs, and we have been often compelled to belie our most earnest protestations. Beyond our natural frontiers, the Indus and the Himalaya, we have, it may plausibly be said, never done anything, except through apprehension of Russia's designs. Once more the truth of that

assertion is being brought home to us. If we had convinced ourselves that there was any one state in Asia destined to be free from the intrusion of the Muscovite, we should all have agreed in saying that it was Tibet. Instead of seizing the favourable opportunity to establish relations with Tibet that was thus afforded us, we persistently neglected it. That belief has now been shown to be a fallacy, and the delusion is more or less dispelled. The incentive present in every other Asiatic question for us to put forth our best endeavour has also arisen in the case of Tibet, and now that we are compelled to recognize this fact, no sluggishness should be shown in obtaining fresh sanction for the Tibet clause in the Treaty of Chefoo. Colonel Prjevalsky has failed indeed to accomplish his object, and years may elapse before he has a successor. But that is not our standpoint. Our interest in Tibet is of a varied character. It is based on historical, geographical, and commercial considerations, as well as political. With China itself the same influences hold good, only with double force. Through Tibet we may reasonably hope to dispose the Chinese to adopt a more friendly policy towards us along the whole of our land frontier. Without accepting any risk, for that will have been obviated by the further expression of approval on the part of the Chinese Government, we shall have done more to promote mutual sympathy between the Governments of England and China than by any other act that can be called to mind. Colonel Prjevalsky [1] may claim admiration at our hands for his intrepidity, and from geographical students a high meed of praise; but if he has inspired our rulers with a spirit of emulation which shall lead them to apply to Pekin for the authority necessary to despatch an envoy to Lhasa, he will deserve still more our gratitude and thanks. The present moment for renewing our old negotiations with Tibet is in many ways peculiarly auspicious, but if permitted to pass by unused, it is doubtful whether in our time it can come again.

[1] In a letter written from Lob Nor in the middle of March in the present year, Colonel Prjevalsky speaks of his intention to return to Russia next winter, from which it would appear that he had abandoned all hope of reaching Lhasa.

XIX.

TSO TSUNG TANG.[1]

THE capture of Sontay will necessarily attract attention to the movements of Tso Tsung Tang, who was recently appointed Imperial Commissioner for the conduct of affairs on the southern frontier; and there will be as much curiosity to see how he will bear himself in face of French victories in Tonquin as there is about what the Marquis Tseng will do at Paris. It may, therefore, be interesting to give some account of the long and remarkable career of a man whose influence on Chinese policy is certainly not less than that of Li Hung Chang, while in some respects he represents better than the enlightened Viceroy of Chihli the passions of the people and the traditions of the Government and Court. In doing this we are enabled, mainly through Lieutenant Kreitner's admirable account of the Szchenyi expedition, to give our sketch of Tso Tsung Tang something of a personal character, and to show how the most successful of Chinese commanders and conquerors of this century rose to fame.

Tso was born in the year 1812 of poor parents, in that province of Honan, which from the earliest period of Chinese history has been renowned for giving brave men and capable Ministers to the public service. Without influential relations, and poor in the most extreme sense of the word, the young Tso would in any country

[1] *The Times*, December 25, 1883.

where literary skill and proficiency before the examiners were not the certain passports to success have remained an unknown artisan or mechanic in his native village. Short of stature, and without any striking feature to denote the working of the keen and active mind within, he failed to impress his earlier colleagues with a true sense of his personal capacity and ambition. His success at the local examinations and his obtaining in consequence the rank and title of provincial graduate rescued him from the dull routine of a Honan peasant's existence, to which his birth only entitled him to look forward. In the best spirit of his order it was declared of him that he owed everything to his own merit. A provincial graduate has greater difficulties to contend against in official life than one of the metropolis; but in the troublous times through which China has passed during the last thirty years the former often found opportunities of distinction that did not present themselves to those who dwelt in the security of the capital. Such must have been the case with Tso, although the precise occasion when he first made his mark has been forgotten, for at an early date after his admission into the Civil Service he succeeded in attracting the attention of the great Viceroy Tseng Kwofan, whose eldest son is the present Resident Minister and Ambassador at our Court. The Austrian writer to whose work we have referred says in a striking sentence that "courtesy on the tongue, envy in the heart, and greed in the brain, are the three essential qualities" which distinguish the Civil Service of China. It is clear from his own account that while this statement may accurately represent the rule, Tso himself has always been an exception to whom the description did not apply. Tso's worst enemy has never questioned his probity, and much of his extraordinary success has been due to the fact that he has never amassed private wealth at the expense of his country, and that now, as one of the foremost men in the empire, he is no richer than he was on the first day of his entry into the service—being satisfied, to use his own phrase, "to live simply and contentedly on what his kitchen garden produces."

While the struggle with the Taeping rebels was at its height Tso attracted by his energy and devotion to duty the notice of his superior, the Viceroy Tseng Kwofan, then anxiously on the lookout for able and trustworthy lieutenants to support the sinking cause of the Pekin Government. Tso was forty-nine, however, before he was gazetted, in the spring of 1861, to a post of honour

and responsibility under the Governor-General of the Two Kiang; but the recommendation of Tseng Kwofan, at that time unquestionably the most powerful man in the kingdom, was couched in such exceptionally favourable and eulogistic terms that it made Tso at once a person of note, and rendered his ultimate success a matter of little uncertainty. Nominated in May to be one of Tseng Kwofan's lieutenants, he was intrusted in the following November with the command of the Imperialist forces in the province of Chekiang. In that capacity he took a foremost part in the pacification of the country, after the valour and ability of "Chinese" Gordon had effectually turned the scale of war against the insurgents who followed the standard of Tien Wang. While his colleague, Li Hung Chang, was rewarded for his part by receiving a command near the capital, Tso was recompensed for his prominent services by being provided with the opportunity of gaining further distinction. In February, 1867, he was placed in supreme command of the forces which were to operate against the Mahomedans of the north-west; but although he was to enjoy the title of Governor-General of the provinces of Shensi and Kansuh, those provinces had been severed from the empire, and were in the actual possession of the Mussulman insurgents. When Tso began his operations, he found everything in confusion and disorder. There was no army or police, the public treasuries were empty, and the loyal population had been almost exterminated. A fertile region had been rendered desolate, and the track of the Tungani was marked by ruined cities, which have not yet recovered from the effects of their savage fury. The small force which could alone be spared from the eastern provinces was palpably inadequate to the task of subjugating the Tungani, and was, indeed, only expected to serve as the nucleus of an army which would have to be formed from those who were either well affected towards the emperor or discontented with Mahomedan intolerance and oppression. The work was also subject to frequent interruption, owing to the numerous complications in other parts of the empire; and Tso had done little towards its accomplishment when, in the year following his appointment, he was summoned back in all haste, and with all the troops at his disposal, to operate in conjunction with Li Hung Chang against the Nienfei rebels of Shantung, who seemed to threaten the capital with danger. That insurrectionary movement

was not suppressed without some delay and difficulty, but eventually arms of precision and the brute force of numbers turned the scale in favour of the Imperialists. When the two commanders, Li and Tso, had succeeded, by a happy combination of circumstances, in hemming in the main body of the Nienfei and in annihilating them, Tso Tsung Tang was instructed to return to his governorship in the north-west and to deal in a similar manner with the Mahomedan insurgents. The work temporarily interrupted by a danger nearer home was to be resumed and carried on to completion.

There were not many Englishmen at the time to prognosticate favourably of the result of this campaign in a remote region, and the reports of the fighting that ensued during the three following years were received with more scepticism than they deserved. It should, however, be remembered in extenuation of these opinions that China was at that time far from having escaped from all the internal dangers to which she had been exposed. The south-west province of Yunnan was in the actual possession of a rebel potentate, and in many of the other border provinces the emperor's authority was dispensed only on sufferance. Because the metropolis and eastern provinces had been saved from the attack of the Taepings and the Nienfei, it by no means followed that the authority of Pekin would be restored to the same height as it had been under the reign of a vigorous ruler such as the Emperor Keen Lung. Moreover, the incapacity of Chinese generals and soldiers had been shown to be so great that no credence was attached to the statements published in the *Pekin Gazette* as to great victories, and the stories of feats of valour performed by the Chinese army were listened to with more amusement than admiration. But in the course of a little time it became generally known that the raids of the Mahomedans had stopped, that mandarins were in possession of the yamêns of the towns, and that the postal couriers traversed the high roads; and then the natural inference that Tso was succeeding in his task became irresistible. Before the close of the year 1871, even those most disposed to make little of the executive power of the Pekin Government were constrained to admit that the success of its lieutenant was assured, and that the cause of the emperor had gained the undoubted ascendency in Kansuh. It was not, however, until the year 1873 that the operations of this war assumed a definite reality for observers in the

siege of the important city of Suchow—a place situated almost at the western extremity of that great wall which was constructed 2,000 years ago for the purpose of keeping out the barbarian hordes of the north. Suchow is the last place of importance on the road from Kansuh to the towns of Hami and Barkul, and the desert has encroached so much on the cultivated land that the strip of the province of Kansuh from Lanchefoo to Suchow looks on the map like a promontory thrust into the waste. Both on account of its position, and also because of its reputation as a walled city, Suchow had been made by the Tungani their principal stronghold, and as Tso advanced westwards the scattered bands of the rebels took shelter in this place, which they resolved to defend with their lives. The town, which had been in the possession of the Tungani for ten years, was closely beleaguered by Tso in the autumn of 1873. The rebels fought with desperation, but could neither defeat the Imperialists nor cut their way through their ranks; and at last hunger compelled them to surrender, when their means of subsistence had been reduced, to use the words of the *Pekin Gazette*, to some seventy horses. Nine of their chiefs and 4,000 of the common sort were summarily disposed of, and Suchow became Tso's base for the prosecution of those further schemes of conquest upon which he was resolved. For the capture of Suchow Tso was created a Tu Wei of the first class, a title corresponding to that of earl, and being hereditary.

The capture of Suchow inspired the Pekin Government with such confidence in its own strength that it cordially approved of Tso's proposition for further operations in the region of Central Asia. An army of nearly 20,000 men was brought together and supplied with all the necessaries of modern war, while special arrangements were made to enable the troops to undergo the privations of an arduous climate. The active command was intrusted to Tso's lieutenants, Kin Shun and Chang Yao, while the Viceroy himself supervised the conduct of the war from Suchow. To encourage him in his work, Tso was raised by Imperial edict to the post of Grand Secretary, of which one happened to be vacant. It is not part of our present purpose to describe the campaigns of Kin Shun and Chang Yao in the west, or to tell over again how the Tungani were finally expelled from their fortresses, Urumtsi and Manas, how the dominions of the Athalik Ghazi were reconquered, or how the province of Kuldja was regained from Russia.

It is enough to say that, although Tso never assumed the personal command after the capture of Suchow, everything was done under his direction, and on several occasions he journeyed across the desert in a sedan chair or palanquin to visit the troops at Hami and in the entrenched camp at Guchen. Our object being to bring the man within the knowledge of the English reader, we shall not dwell any further on the military exploits performed by his soldiers, although it may be pertinent to observe here that on the capture of the city of Kashgar, Tso was raised to the hereditary rank of Hou or marquis.

Short and corpulent of person, there is nothing in Tso's appearance to strike a casual observer. But a more careful survey shows that he is no ordinary individual. A pair of small, crafty eyes brightly light up a countenance remarkable for its rough-cut but wasted features, and a moustache still more black than gray only partially conceals the firm lines of the mouth. The hair is scanty, and the whiskers, which in idle moments he has a habit of twirling, consist of only a few thin hairs. As has been said, he owes everything to his own merit. The cause of his extraordinary success seems to have been his never suffering contradiction from any of his subordinates. For him to order a thing to be done was tantamount to its being executed. If his influence was due in the first place to fear, it was extended and recognized without demur by officials and people, because experience showed that his plans were always ratified by success. In the land *par excellence* of official corruption his reputation for rectitude and honour stands without blemish; and among colleagues who think only of amassing a private fortune, his threadbare and much-worn garments, his abstemiousness of life, and his empty purse attest the probity of his public career. He is also a woman-hater, whether from natural inclination, or from settled policy, or from grief at the loss of his son eight years ago, is not clear. But the fact is undoubted that he sent his wife back to her home many years ago, that her place has not been taken by any one else, and that even his own mother, in the land of filial devotion, mourns in her Honan village over the coldness of her son. Under the influence of such a man it is only natural to learn that severe laws were passed against prostitution, and that harsh penalties were enforced in his army against all offenders. He is also, and has always been, strongly opposed to opium, the

cultivation of which was unknown in Kansuh while he was there, on account of his measures, and those who indulged in its use could only do so in secret and in fear of punishment on detection. Tso Tsung Tang is, in his life and observances, the sternest of Puritans, and were he twenty years younger he might effect that reform of morals and manners which is so much needed among the administrative classes of his countrymen.

Although thrifty in his own habits and parsimonious in personal expenditure, Tso is lavish in the outlay of money when it either benefits the people or furthers the work intrusted to him by his Government. The sums he expended on the equipment of his army and on the construction of roads were very considerable, amounting in the aggregate to several million pounds sterling. He bought two or three batteries of Krupp guns through his agent, the banker Ho of Shanghai, and having established a foundry and small arms factory at Lanchefoo, he turned out a great many more weapons of different patterns in imitation of the arms of Europe. Count Szchenyi speaks of a needle gun shown him as a specimen of native work as "a very serviceable weapon indeed." Tso was very proud of this particular rifle, but seemed to be easily satisfied by saying that it would carry one hundred paces. Indeed, the incongruities apparent between the weapons and the men who handled them were in some cases extremely absurd, and although Tso is far ahead of his subordinates in this as in other matters, it is clear that the Chinese soldier will have to make great progress in military education before he can be considered formidable, even with the most improved weapons in his hands, in the open field against European troops. Tso showed his sound judgment and administrative capacity by the strenuous efforts he made to improve the means of communication throughout his jurisdiction. The high roads, which had been allowed by Mahomedan neglect to fall into a dreadful state of disrepair, were renovated and widened to ten paces, and the bridges were rendered safe for passage. Posthouses were established at regular stages, and for the security of travellers patrols of cavalry passed from garrison to garrison. At the instigation of his adviser and right-hand man, the late General Pitaschen, he also planted trees along the route, in opposition to the current superstition sanctioned by the greatest of China's sages, that "trees harbour bad spirits." The condition of the country will surely benefit from this wise measure, which

has been rendered still more excellent by the mulberry having been specially chosen in many places for the purpose of facilitating the rearing of the silkworm. General Pitaschen, it will be interesting to learn, was not a Chinese by birth, although he had adopted their customs and mode of life. Pitaschen was a native of France, and by profession a drummer in the army of Count Palikao. He may have been the M. Pivelle mentioned in the Blue Books during the operations in the Chekiang province. At the time of the occupation of Pekin, he went over to the Chinese and became their principal military adviser. When Tso marched into Kansuh Pitaschen went with him as his chief adviser, and no doubt much of Tso's success was due to his colleague's knowledge and experience.

Tso's ideas of war are simple in the extreme. He is the advocate of "dashing tactics;" with him the *coup de main* takes the place of deliberate manœuvre. Without having too closely studied the art of war, he has arrived at the conclusion that the best way to win victories is to impress on his army the impossibility of losing battles; and he is content to think that the soldiers' excellence is no bad equivalent for the general's want of scientific knowledge. The discipline of the soldiers being only secured by the severity of the commander, it follows that Tso is the most severe of generals. He tolerates no liberties on the part of his subordinates, and overlooks no shortcomings in their conduct; and the executioner is always ready to enforce his behests. The following is an instance of his not unjust severity. A nomad tribe of the Mongols had committed some depredations, but agreed to give reparation, and Tso sent several commissioners to collect from them a certain number of horses. The commissioners selected the best they could find, but, instead of taking them to Tso, sold them on their own account and returned to Suchow with a tale to the effect that the tribe had not been able to give them any. Their fraud could not long remain concealed, and when the truth reached Tso's ears, orders were at once given for the execution of the culprits, whose heads were sent to be hung up at the gates of their native towns as a warning to evil-doers. This is to be considered as by no means a single instance of Tso's implacable rigour, which, as much as anything else, has gained for him the unique reputation he possesses. The principal secret of Tso's success as a ruler, and of his ability in keeping up the large army

which he has maintained during the last twelve years, is unquestionably the regularity with which he has paid all those serving under him. His treasury at his castle outside Suchow was full of the silver bars received from Shanghai, and with these he punctually defrayed all the costs of his government.

During the interview which Count Szchenyi and his companions had with the Viceroy, so much was said throwing light on Tso's character that a brief summary of its main incidents cannot fail to prove instructive. Tso was dressed on this occasion in a blue under-garment, over which he wore a yellow silk coat coming almost to the knees. His usual colour on days of ceremony was yellow exclusively. With his mandarin hat surmounted by the red button and trimmed with fur, ornamented, moreover, with the two-eyed peacock feather, he presented a very dignified appearance. His attendant mandarins all stood apart in respectful silence, which is unusual even in the yamêns of the highest governors, while he smoked through his water-pipe the excellent tobacco of the country. Not averse to flattery, although well aware of its hollowness, he allowed the Taotai of Suchow to stand near his person during this interview and to applaud his remarks. While he accepted Count Szchenyi's compliments upon the condition of the roads, he did not allow himself to be entrapped into approval of his projected journey towards Tibet. He showed himself perfectly self-possessed throughout the conversation, not failing to reveal that he considered an inhabitant of the Middle Kingdom a very superior being to the nations of the less happy states of Europe. His ideas of geography were of so hazy a nature that he thought Austria might be somewhere near Lob Nor. He was more emphatic on a point in connection with Germany which came within the range of his experience; for he declared, as a matter of common acceptance, that the Germans sold the best articles, while the English and Americans sold distinctly bad ones. His table was ornamented with a telescope, of which he knew the use, but he took the opportunity to express his utter disbelief in European maps being drawn from an examination of the heavens. He was not equally sceptical as to the possibility of divination from the same means, or as to the value of astrology. During this very interview the arrival of the Belgian Bishop Humer, of Kansuh, afforded the opportunity for Tso to give vent to his opinion on the subject of foreign missionaries. At

first Tso refused to see him at all, and but for Count Szchenyi's intercession it might have fared badly with the courageous bishop, who, on the strength of a clause in the Chefoo Convention, had penetrated to the remotest borders of China Proper. The Viceroy loudly declared that "the Catholics make the people discontented, and that he would receive no missionaries." It was only as a personal favour to Count Szchenyi that he at last consented to receive Bishop Humer, but even then it was only on the condition that "he should stand during the audience, as he was no gentleman." This incident seems to have acted as a spur to Tso's opposition to the Hungarian traveller's proposed journey towards Lhasa, and in the heat of the moment he gave full vent to his views on the subject in a string of disconnected sentences. He had heard, he said, that certain English newspaper writers had stated that Huc and Prjevalsky had visited Tibet. It was not true; the thing was a story, an invention. As for maps, "he had better ones than we possessed," and "knew all about it." Moreover, there were no roads in Tibet; he would be unable, in the probable event of their murder, to give any explanation to the emperor, and he could spare no soldiers as an escort. He concluded with, "What I say I stick to," and striking his left arm with his right hand exclaimed, "I am master here." As some proof that Tso was not deaf to reason it may be mentioned that at the close of this speech he received Bishop Humer, and allowed himself to be so far overcome by his arguments that he gave the permission to establish missionary stations at Kanchow, Liangchow, and Lanchefoo. His shrewdness of observation was shown by his complaining to the bishop that the European travellers had appeared before him in their travelling suits. They should have dressed in proper costume, as he knew what foreigners wore on such occasions. There is little doubt that Tso was actuated by the best motives in opposing Count Szchenyi's request to travel in the wild region south of Lake Kokonor. He protested that as a Chinese he was much better disposed to foreigners than the Manchus were; but "if you go into the desert," he declared, "you are only three, and a thousand men will track you for your lives."

Tso is not the bitter enemy of Europeans that has been too commonly supposed. During his rule in Kansuh he made the fullest use of their services. We have mentioned the General

Pitaschen. He also employed a German engineer named Mikhaelios, to whom he paid, in addition to free living, a salary of £100 a month, for the purpose of developing the mineral wealth of his province. Tso was disappointed at the result in his search for gold, and wished to attach the blame to "the bad instruments" of his engineer. But this did not prevent his securing from Germany a number of skilled persons to found a woollen factory at Lanchefoo for the clothing of his army. Similar steps have more recently been taken with regard to the silk industry, while many settlers were brought from Chekiang to prosecute the cultivation of tea. A man so well aware of the advantages of European knowledge and one who has so greatly profited by it in his own affairs is not likely to be bitterly anti-foreign, although on the opium question, and apparently in other ways, he seems to be distinctly unfriendly towards England.

Although a late riser, Tso despatches his business with the regularity of an experienced official. At a great entertainment, consisting of forty-five dishes, he surprised his Hungarian visitor not more by producing numerous bottles of excellent wine, including Tokay, which had been given him by the Russian traveller Colonel Sossnoffsky, than by his evident sense of superiority, which revealed itself under a show of humour. He said in a bantering tone when he found his guests very unskilful in manipulating the chopsticks, "You Europeans are truly very helpless creatures, you cannot eat without two hands!" but the courteous promptings of a host led him to at once provide them with a knife and fork. When any special dish appeared on the table he could not restrain the exclamation, in a manner too that did not admit of contradiction, "Mejo! mejo! you haven't got that in your country."

While ruling in Kansuh his favourite residence was in the castle, which he had built a mile outside the walls of Suchow. In this he had placed both his armoury and treasury; and a chosen body of cavalry and infantry, with a battery of Krupp's guns, formed his personal guard. His regiment of household cavalry presented a picturesque appearance, and they are also represented to us as an efficient corps of men. Each trooper carried a carbine and sword, while the squadrons were denoted by a red, black, or yellow flag. The officers wore a button corresponding to the colour of the flag of their troop. The infantry were armed with rifles, and presented

a clean and soldierly appearance. The guns were drawn up in the courtyard of the castle, immediately underneath the audience chamber, while above them streamed from a lofty flagstaff the Viceroy's personal banner—a red standard with the name Tso traced on it in black characters. Many men with a reputation greater than that of Tso Tsung Tang cannot stand the test of a close scrutiny of their acts. It will not be denied that Tso Tsung Tang has passed through the ordeal creditably.[1] The solid service which he rendered in Central Asia has been followed up by a vigilant attention to his duties in the important post of Viceroy of the Two Kiang. He has attracted into his service many foreigners, principally Germans, and has already formed the nucleus of a fleet on the Yang-tse-kiang. His vigour remains undiminished by the lapse of years, and should the present question with France lead unfortunately to hostilities, there is no doubt that his services will be as prominently utilized as when he was appointed, with unlimited power, Warden on the Western Marches.

[1] Since this was published the travels of the Russian traveller Piassetsky have been published in an English form by Miss J. Gordon-Cumming (Chapman and Hall). In this work there are several references to Tso Tsung Tang which confirm the favourable impression of his character and amiability; but it is clear that he is too old to exercise that important influence on the progress of his country which might have been expected from his talents and achievements.

XX.

THE LATE YAKOOB BEG OF KASHGAR.[1]

OF all the rulers and petty potentates who have strutted on the stage of Central Asian politics during the last generation only one has succeeded in stamping the impress of his genius on the history of the period, only one has obtained a reputation beyond the confines of his own particular state, and has been generally recognized as an independent sovereign in the capitals of Europe. That solitary exception was Yakoob Beg, the late ruler of Kashgar, who died last summer at the town of Korla, in the very heart of Central Asia. We propose, at the present time, when so much interest is taken in the subject, to place on record a history in some detail of this man, who was chiefly remarkable for having given, during twelve years, a settled government to an extensive territory. We believe that in itself this will not prove uninteresting, and it will undoubtedly make clearer the events now happening in Eastern Turkestan, and of which the Chinese and Russians are the sole arbiters.

Mahomed Yakoob was born in or about the year 1820, in the flourishing town of Piskent, in the state of Khokand. His father, Pur Mahomed Mirza, had at various periods of his life held positions of some responsibility in the administration of the places in which he happened to reside. Originally a native of Dihbid,

[1] *The Westminster Review*, July, 1878.

near Samarcand, he had migrated to Khodjent, in the reign of Mahomed Ali Khan, with the intention of entering the priestly order. For some reason or other after he had enrolled himself as a student in a religious seminary he changed his mind, and, instead of entering the Church, turned his attention to secular affairs. He was soon elected Kazi of Kurama, a district and town of Khokand, and there he married his first wife, a lady of considerable influence in the place. By this marriage he had one son, Mahomed Arif, who has since filled several posts of trust in the Administration of Kashgar, notably that of Governor of Sirikul; But of late years this half-brother of Yakoob Beg appears to have been under a cloud, as in 1872 he was removed from the public service. About the year 1818, Pur Mahomed, or Mahomed Latif, as he was more generally called, changed his place of residence from Kurama to Piskent, and shortly afterwards married again. His second wife was the sister of Sheik Nizamuddin, the Kazi of Piskent, a lady of most noble lineage and claiming family connection with many of the leading officials of Khokand. Yakoob Beg was the issue of this marriage. The origin of the family of Mahomed Latif was neither so clear nor so influential as that of his second wife, but when his son had elevated himself in the eyes of his countrymen, a descent from Tamerlane was claimed for him, of which it is impossible for us to test the accuracy. The family of Yakoob Beg's father seems to have come from Karategin, on the borders of Badakshan, and, in the time of the Usbeg conquest of that district, the father of Mahomed Latif fled for refuge into Khokand. At that time the inhabitants of Karategin were mostly Tajiks, who are the descendants of Iranian peoples, and who, although now subjected to the Turk-governing classes of these states, still retain the fine presence which is characteristic of the Aryan family. It was of this race that Yakoob Beg was a striking representative, and although his whole life was occupied in ruling nations almost exclusively Tartar, he exhibited some of the distinctive traits of his origin in the manner in which he accomplished his task. Some of the more prominent among his supporters as well as the flower of his army, the warlike Badakshi, could boast that they too represented that master race, whose birthplace is supposed to be in the valleys of the Indian Caucasus. It will be seen, therefore, that the father of Yakoob Beg had filled several minor official posts, and that on his mother's side he had

relations still more advanced in the public service. But there can be no doubt that it was to the marriage of his sister with Nar Mahomed Khan, the Governor of Tashkent, that the youthful Yakoob owed his first introduction to public life.

The early years of the subject of our remarks were passed in his natal town of Piskent, and it is said that it had been resolved that he should follow the profession which his father had repudiated. But the youth was far too wayward to submit to any restraint upon his impulses, and the design of educating him as a "mollah," if it was ever seriously entertained, had to be abandoned long before he arrived at what are termed years of "discretion." The influence of his brother-in-law obtained for him a minor situation in the palace of the Khan. Once launched on the troubled waters of Khokandian politics the young aspirant to distinction showed that he had at last discovered his proper element. In 1845, when we may suppose that he was about twenty-five years of age, he was appointed Mahram, or chamberlain, to the new Khan, Khudayar, and soon afterwards, chiefly through the intercession of his brother-in-law, was raised to the rank of Pansad Bashi, or commander of 500. This was in 1847, in which year he married a Kipchak lady of Juelik, a village near Ak Musjid. He had three sons by this marriage, Kooda Kuli Beg, Beg Kuli Beg, and Hacc Kuli Beg.

After this promotion came rapidly. Khudayar Khan himself was favourably impressed with his chamberlain, and created him Koosh-Bege, or "lord of the family"—more intelligibly translated as deputy-vizier—with the charge of the important fort on the Syr Darya called Ak Musjid—White Mosque. This post he held with great credit to himself down to the year 1853, when the Russians commenced that forward movement of which, to judge by events, we are yet far from seeing the close. At that time Russia had acquired scarcely a single post of the greatest strategical importance, and the Syr Darya was as far removed from her influence as the upper course of the Oxus is now. Ak Musjid was the grand obstacle in the path of the Russians operating from Kazalinsk, and was at once the symbol of Khokandian sovereignty and the barrier to Russian aggression. It was resolved therefore that this fort, which encouraged all the marauding clans in its vicinity to continue their depredations against Russian subjects, should be wrested from the Khokandians. To raze it with the

ground or to convert it into a stronghold for the Czar appeared to the Russian generals no act of an unjustifiable character. Nor, if we regard this act simply as one of self-defence on their part, should we be disposed to cavil at the means which they adopted. It is only because the justification for this action is more ambiguous that we should venture to condemn as unnecessary the Russian action with regard to Ak Musjid. To General Peroffsky this undertaking was entrusted. The distance from Kazalinsk to Ak Musjid is not much over 200 miles along the banks of the Syr Darya. No very extended commissariat arrangements were necessary, nor did the march delay the Russian officer for long in commencing siege operations. The force with which he appeared before the walls may not have been large in numbers when compared with the armies of modern times, but in all that makes a disciplined body of men formidable it was exceptionally well supplied. The artillery was more numerous than is usually considered necessary for similar purposes, and the expedition was still more efficient in cavalry and engineers. The garrison of Ak Musjid, on the other hand, was ill-supplied both in provisions and in ammunition, and the fort itself presented neither in its position nor in its construction any feature that an engineer officer would have considered calculated to make it capable of sustaining the attack of artillery for twenty-four hours. The Russian lines were constructed in a most approved method, but twice were their approaches destroyed, and twice their mines countermined.

During twenty-six days the bombardment was fast and furious, and during all that time the Khokandian defence was not less stubborn and persistent. All the efforts of the garrison to break through the beleaguering lines were unavailing, and after so protracted a cannonade little more resistance could be expected from ramparts which were pierced in several places by wide and gaping breaches. The resolute commandant, who had done everything required by the most exacting code of military honour, confessed that there was nothing to be gained by a continued resistance, and, as it was known that the Russians were making preparations for an early assault, a messenger was despatched without delay to the Russian general expressing the willingness of the garrison to capitulate on honourable terms. The Russian officer, enraged at the long defence of the Asiatics, refused to entertain this proposition, and gave orders for an immediate assault. Ak Musjid fell,

and in its place arose the Russian fort, No. 3, now more generally known, from the name of its captor, as Fort Peroffsky. The historical student may be permitted to believe that this title should rather perpetuate the infamy than the fame of this general. In the winter following Yakoob Beg, with Sahib Khan, the brother of Khudayar, attempted to retake it by surprise, but the *coup* proved abortive, and the Russians have never receded from their new acquisition. Although Mahomed Yakoob became to a certain extent notorious for his gallant defence of Ak Musjid, it would appear from his being styled after that event simply "Mir," or chief, that he had sunk in official status. It is probable that the principal cause of this loss in rank was his failure to retake and not his ill-success in defending Ak Musjid. He was, however, too good a soldier to be left entirely in the shade, and the Kilaochi fort was placed under his control. This post he held until the murder of the Khokandian minister, Mussulman Kuli, in 1858.

In order to make the subsequent career of Mahomed Yakoob clear, it is necessary for us to say something of the state of affairs in Khokand itself. On the death of Mahomed Ali, who had governed the state well during his tenure of power, dissensions broke out in all parts of the Khanate, and it was only the influence and personal energy of Mussulman Kuli, a Kirghiz chief, which restored something like order to the distracted country. This astute statesman had selected Khudayar Khan as the most eligible of the candidates for the throne, but this had given umbrage to, among others, Mullah Khan, an elder brother of Khudayar's. Now on the death of Mussulman Kuli (from the chief responsibility of whose murder it is impossible to exonerate Khudayar), who alone had given vitality to the *régime* of Khudayar, Mullah Khan and his partisans began to hope that it would be possible to oust the ruling Khan. Among those who participated in this intrigue was the governor of Kilaochi, and when it had been crowned with success, and Khudayar, deposed, had fled for refuge to his neighbours, he reaped the advantage of his duplicity in receiving the post of Shahawal, a sort of chamberlain or court intendant in the palace of the new ruler. For the moment his progress was rapid. His old rank of Koosh-Bege was restored, and his unimportant charge of Kilaochi was exchanged for the more important post of Kurama, of which his father had once been Kazi. Nor did his fortunes under the rule

of Mullah Khan stop here, for in 1860 he was despatched to Tashkent to assist Kanáat Shah, the Naib of Khokand, in making preparations for the reception of the Russians, who had for some time assumed a threatening attitude towards Khokand. But at this point in his career Mullah Khan was murdered in a palace brawl, and the exiled Khudayar returned to enjoy his own again. Both Kanáat Shah and Mahomed Yakoob veered round to the cause of the old Khan; and the latter, in return for their support, agreed to forget their former delinquencies. Yakoob's reward for this piece of time-serving was his reinstatement in the governorship of Kurama. It was during these troubles that Alim Kuli appeared upon the scene. A Kirghiz chieftain, he also possessed much of the personal vigour and ability of his predecessor and kinsman, Mussulman Kuli. The triumph of Khudayar on this occasion was short-lived, for Alim Kuli at once set up a fresh rival in the field. Shah Murad, a grandson of Shere Ali Khan, a former ruler, was the puppet of whose name Alim Kuli thought fit to avail himself. Despite his governorship of Kurama, Mahomed Yakoob again deserted the cause of Khudayar, and threw in his fortunes with those of Alim Kuli. It should be remembered that Khudayar had always treated him with kindness, and that in their earlier days they had to some extent been boon companions. On this occasion his insincerity received its due reward, for the enterprise of Alim Kuli failed, and Mahomed Yakoob fled to Bokhara. During his absence Alim Kuli, at first defeated, had succeeded in placing his own nominee upon the throne, and Khudayar once more became a fugitive. In 1863 the Ameer of Bokhara, Mozaffur Eddin, raised a large army and entered Khokand for the purpose of reinstating his brother-in-law, Khudayar, in his possessions. With that force went Mahomed Yakoob, who now appears for the last time on the troubled scene of Khokandian politics. Mozaffur Eddin soon gave up his intention, and the Bokhariot army, which had advanced some distance into Khokand, was recalled. Khudayar Khan for a short period ruled again in peace, but his government was not left undisturbed for long. Alim Kuli plotted his overthrow anew, and was joined by Mahomed Yakoob and others of the leading men in the state. In the meanwhile Shah Murad, the first Khan set up by Alim Kuli after the death of Mullah Khan, had been got rid of by the same means as the

latter, and Alim Kuli then put forward Seyyid Sultan in his place. Although Seyyid Sultan was paramount in a great part of the state, Khudayar Khan still retained some hold on another portion of it, and three years were occupied in the progress of a bitter civil war. The part that Mahomed Yakoob played in it was far from unimportant. In a certain sense he may be said to have been the right-hand man of Alim Kuli throughout, yet their relations were not free from jealousy. At first he was sent to his old district of Kurama to gain that over to the side of the new Khan; but on the capture of the important position of Khodjent he was called away from Kurama to participate in the operations that were being carried on against Tashkent. That city surrendered at once, and the rising under Alim Kuli had thus far been crowned with success.

Khudayar Khan still held out in the western regions, but his authority seemed to have finally departed. At this moment the appearance of a third Power gave a different complexion to the internal affairs of Khokand; and, among other reasons, tended to induce Mahomed Yakoob to undertake that expedition into Kashgar which resulted in his own advancement to independent sovereignty. While Alim Kuli and his lieutenant were engaged in consolidating their hold upon Tashkent, news reached them that Tchimkent had been occupied by the Russians, who had for some time been menacing Khokand. This intelligence was soon confirmed by the arrival of the survivors of the garrison. This was in April, 1864, and until October in the same year, when the Russians appeared before the town, Mahomed Yakoob was actively engaged in strengthening its defences. But although these measures argued a resolution to stand on the defensive, when Tchernaieff's army approached, the Khokandian officer, with a rashness that cannot be too strongly condemned, went forth from behind his fortifications to encounter it in the open. The result of the combat that ensued was such as might have been anticipated. The Russians were victorious, and Mahomed Yakoob was obliged to find refuge for himself and his discouraged army within the walls of Tashkent. The Russians had, however, suffered severe loss; and either awed by the bold demeanour of their old antagonist, or, more probably, experiencing some difficulty in obtaining supplies, they withdrew to Tchimkent, there to wait reinforcements, and to collect the necessary munitions for com-

mencing the siege of the city. Some months afterwards the Russians returned, but it is only necessary here to say that after winning a great battle outside the walls of the city, in which Alim Kuli was killed, Tashkent surrendered to Tchernaieff. Nor is it necessary for us to follow the history of Khokand any farther, for Mahomed Yakoob's connection with it ceased at this time. Suffice it to say that, despite the intervention of Bokhara, whose army was severely defeated by Romanoffsky at Irjir, Khokand in the ten years that closed in 1876 slowly, but surely, passed under the sway of Russia.

The reputation of Mahomed Yakoob was lowered by his defeat before Tashkent, and the old jealousy between himself and Alim Kuli became more bitter. There had never been much sympathy between the Kirghiz chief and the Tajik soldier of fortune. The former recognized in his Koosh Bege a possible rival, and the latter's path to supreme authority was barred by the existence of the former. It was evident that any excuse, therefore, for getting rid of his lieutenant would be very welcome to Alim Kuli; and the occasion was not long in presenting itself after the first withdrawal of the invading Russian army. It was while these events were in progress at Tashkent that an envoy arrived there from Sadic Beg, a Kirghiz leader in the regions between Ili and Kashgar. He brought intelligence that his master had availed himself of the weakness of the Chinese and the discontent of the people to seize the capital, Kashgar: and he requested the Khan of Khokand to send him the heir of the Khoja kings of Kashgar, who was living in Tashkent, in order that he might place him on the throne. As the facts really stood, Sadic Beg had only laid siege to the capital, and finding that he was met with indifference by the people, and with strenuous resistance by the Chinese, had recourse to the plan of setting up a Khoja king to strengthen his failing efforts; but of the true state of affairs in Kashgar it is evident that everybody in Tashkent was profoundly ignorant. The Khokandian policy had always been, however, to maintain their interest in Eastern Turkestan, and to discredit as far as possible the Chinese. An envoy bringing tidings of fresh disturbances in Kashgar was, therefore, always sure of a friendly reception, even if he did not return with some more striking tokens of amity. But on this occasion the danger from Russia was so imminent, and all the strength of the state so absorbed in

preparations for home defence, that Alim Kuli, whatever he may have thought of the prospects, and however much he may have sympathised with the objects of his enterprise, was unable to give the Kirghiz emissary any assistance. When, however, Buzurg Khan, the eldest son of Jehangir Khan, who on a previous occasion had invaded Kashgar, either of his own inclination, or instigated, as some say, by Mahomed Yakoob, offered to reassert his claims to the throne of Kashgar, Alim Kuli expressed his approval of the design, and assisted him with a small sum of money and a supply of arms. But although he could spare no troops, he lent Buzurg Khan the services of the Koosh Bege Mahomed Yakoob as Baturbashi, or commander-in-chief. Thus did Alim Kuli get rid of his troublesome subordinate by sending him on an expedition which, to all appearance, would end in defeat and disgrace.

Before following his fortunes into Kashgar, it may be useful to summarize the chief events of his career in Khokand, and to call attention to the more marked characteristics of the man at this eventful period of his life. Up to this point Mahomed Yakoob had given little promise of the distinction to which he was yet to attain. He might even be termed a disappointed man, for, no longer young, he had left the most energetic years of an Asiatic behind him, and was commencing the decline of life. He had indeed earned the reputation of being a gallant soldier, if not a very prudent one; and in the intrigues that had marked the history of his state for twenty years he had borne his fair share. But no one would have ventured to prognosticate that he could win battles against superior forces, that out of a miscellaneous crowd of men he could make an efficient army, and that on the ruins of a fallen state he could erect an administration that obtained general recognition and praise. The most favourable prediction would have been, that he would fall at his post like a brave soldier and true Mussulman. But he had one grand recommendation, which supplied the want of many other advantages, such as wealth and family power. His orthodoxy as a follower of the Prophet was incontestable. Through the whole of his life he had made it his one great object to secure the approval of the Church. When he was reduced to the most desperate straits in Kashgar, when some of the most faithful of his followers fell off from him, and Buzurg Khan himself plotted against him, he never lost heart so long as the representatives of the Church

stood by him, and mainly through their aid he triumphed over every difficulty. In every way he championed the interests of his religion. He enforced the Shariat as it had never been enforced before; he re-erected the injured temples to the Khoja saints; and he absolved all the mollahs from taxation. It was the one declared object of his life to go to Mecca; but this he was always compelled to perform by deputy. His past life, therefore, had given him a reputation for courage and for religion; and although he was nearly forty-five years of age when he came to the crisis in his career, he showed that he had not lost the vigour and energy necessary to earn him his due reward. As a rule his recognized orthodoxy stood him in good stead, and with each fresh triumph he came more and more to be regarded as the most redoubtable supporter of Islam in Asia.

The Chinese had appeared in Kashgar in the middle of the 18th century, and by skilfully availing themselves of the quarrels of the native princes, made themselves masters of the whole region from Ili on the north to Khoten on the south. For rather more than a century before the inroad of Sadic Beg they had given a settled government to these states. During the reign of the great Emperor Keen Lung, which embraced about the first half-century of the Chinese domination, there was widespread peace in this portion of his dominions. The subjected races had lost the heart to revolt, and indeed the Chinese governed them so well that there was no inducement for them to attempt to shake off a yoke which was made as little galling as possible. But shortly after the commencement of the present century it became evident that the power of China was falling off, and that deterioration continued to be manifest until about the year 1863. The whole empire seemed to be rent, beyond all hope of recovery, into disjointed fragments. In the fifty years between 1813 and 1863 several invasions of Kashgar, on the part of Khoja adventurers under the auspices of Khokand, took place; but they, one and all, such as those under Jehangir Khan and Wali Khan, which were temporarily successful, failed to make any permanent impression on the Chinese power. But they resulted in this much at all events, that the massacres of Chinese garrisons by the inhabitants, and then the equally sweeping destruction of the people by the infuriated Khitay soldiery on their reappearance, hopelessly destroyed the good feelings which the lenient and

prosperous rule of the Chinese for the first fifty years had done much to call into existence. The intrigues of Khokand added fuel to the flame, and there was always a predisposition on the part of a large portion of the population to join any invader who came in the guise of a Khokandian general. If we had only to explain the despatch of the expedition of Buzurg Khan, the causes of its being joined by many of the people would not be far to seek; but we have to discover the reasons why it alone, of all the other Khoja invasions, attained a permanent success. That is obviously a far more difficult inquiry, for we must dismiss at once the untenable theory that this was exclusively due to the talents of Yakoob Beg.

Within the frontiers of China Proper was to be found the disease which rendered the strength of its Government weak at the extremities. The cause of some of the discontent that broke out in China shortly after its disastrous war with this country is mysterious. It would appear that there are some popular aspirations, which a Tartar dynasty finds it impossible to satisfy. What these may be, we are of course more ignorant than the ruling classes at Pekin; yet that the latter are now beginning to realize the existence of such, after these have to a certain degree been vanquished in the field, cannot be contested by those who have remarked the strange petitions presented of late at the capital. The Taeping revolt in the most populous provinces, and the Panthay insurrection in Yunnan, both affected the strength of the Chinese in Ili and Kashgar in an adverse manner. But the effect of these was as nothing in this respect to the great Mahomedan rising that broke out in 1862 in Kansuh and Shensi, and that quickly spread westward through the Mussulman cities lying beyond. A sketch of that movement is absolutely necessary to show how the task before Buzurg Khan and his lieutenant had been facilitated, and to make clear what is often forgotten, that their chief opponents were no longer the Chinese, but these very Mahomedan, or Tungan, rebels against the authority of Pekin. From a remote period there had been extensive Mussulman settlements in Kansuh and Shensi, and in the 17th century these had been the cause of some anxiety to the Emperor Kanghi, and to his successors passed the legacy of harmonizing Buddhist institutions with Mahomedan fanaticism. At one time the Emperor Keen Lung sought to settle the question for ever by ordering the

massacre of every Mahomedan over fifteen years of age. But whether because of the partial execution only of this threat, or for some other reason, this sweeping measure did not have the desired effect. Persecution may have been a means of giving vitality to a religion that milder opposition might have rendered meaningless; but it is certain that these settlements had become more numerous, more self-reliant, and more hostile to the other Chinese by the middle of the present century. They became more and more a people within a people, and the dislike of one creed towards the other embittered the ordinary relations of life. If we are to believe the testimony of those who knew these settlements when at their most prosperous period, we should describe these Tungani of Kansuh as a sober, honest, and agreeable sort of people. Their physical superiority over the other Chinese was probably due to their abnegation of opium, bang, and other deleterious stimulants. With so satisfactory an explanation ready to our hand and patent to all, we need not, as some do, seek a cause for their superiority in attributing to them an origin from some mighty race which had issued from the regions of the frozen north. These Tungani were of great use to the emperors of China, and several functions in the public service were exclusively filled up from their ranks. They made excellent soldiers, but as policemen and public carriers they excelled still more their other fellow-subjects. In this latter employment many found their way to Hami and Urumtsi, where they settled, and their numbers were swollen by discharged soldiers, who, sooner than return to China, remained with all the advantages accruing to military settlers. In the lapse of a generation or so they had so multiplied that they formed a majority of the population of the cities mentioned, and in the northern regions of Jungaria they spread rapidly. Ili became almost as much a Tungan city as Urumtsi; but, on the other hand, to the south of the Tian Shan the Tungani were outnumbered by the Andijani and native Kashgari. Westward of Kucha the Tungani never possessed any political influence. The Tungani were, therefore, Mahomedan subjects of China, and they left in the service of the state their own homes in Kansuh to find new ones in Eastern Turkestan. They carried their religion with them, and retained their prejudices and antipathies for the Buddhist Chinese, or Khitay. They derived one advantage, too, from migrating westward, for they left behind them in Kansuh the inferiority in position to the other Chinese,

and all the suspicion with which they had come to be regarded at Pekin. In Kansuh it was natural for a Tungan to be disaffected; but, removed to another sphere, he was treated with implicit confidence. They enjoyed equal privileges with the most favoured of the Khitay, with the sole exception of some of the Sobo tribes, and they formed a majority in the army, as well as in the civil service of the state. The Chinese authorities never anticipated danger from them, and it is not easy to discover the reason why this natural expectation was falsified. The Tungani were fervent Mahomedans, if not among those most orthodox in form, and, as we have seen, they believed in their own individual superiority. The antagonism of religion, and the contempt arising from physical qualities, were both fostered by the "mollahs," or priests, who became very active within the Chinese dominions when these had been extended by conquest into the heart of Asia. As if in retaliation for a Khitay conquest, the Mahomedan religion was slowly but surely undermining the outworks of its rival's power. It required many generations to pass away before the effect of these machinations became visible, and it was not until the power of China fell into a rapid decline—a decline which many thought, with some show of justice too, was to herald the fall, but which later events have seemed to make but the prelude to a more vigorous life than ever—that these Mahomedan propagandists among the Tungani knew that the time had come when they might hope to reap what they had sown with such persistency and patience. It is impossible not to connect this event to some degree with that unexplainable revival of fervour among Mahomedan races which has produced some astonishing results in the last thirty years.

In 1862 a riot occurred in a small village in Kansuh, which was suppressed with some loss of life. People were beginning to suppose that it possessed no special significance when disturbances broke out on a larger scale at Hochow, or Salara, in the same province. It then became apparent that the Tungani had risen, and the unarmed Khitay were massacred in all directions. The revolt soon assumed the proportions of a civil war, and the infection spread into a portion of Shensi. Then ensued scenes of the most frightful barbarity. The Khitay, who had all their lives dwelt as neighbours with the Tungani, were butchered without mercy, chiefly at the instigation of the "mollahs." All the govern-

ing authority centred in the hands of the priests, who incited their followers by word and deed to commit acts of unexampled ferocity. The insurrection, even when we make allowance for the difficulties besetting the Chinese Government in other directions, must be held to have been attended with unexampled success. This can only be accounted for by the supposition that the Khitay were taken completely by surprise, and realized neither the extent nor the nature of the danger to which they were exposed until it was too late. Before the close of 1862 a Tungan Government was established in Kansuh, and its jurisdiction was for a time acknowledged in part of Shensi also. The priests organized some sort of administration, but devoted most of their attention to extending their influence westward, and to making preparations for the inevitable return of the Chinese. Such was the progress of the Tungan movement in its native country; it naturally exercised a very potent influence on the Tungani in the country lying beyond Kansuh. The example set them by Lanchefoo and Hochow was speedily followed by Hami, Urumtsi, Turfan, and Manas. The same success attended the insurgents in this quarter that had favoured their kinsmen in Kansuh, and the Chinese power was completely subverted. The Khitay were butchered, if possible, with greater cruelty than they had been in Kansuh, and new Tungan states were founded in each of these cities. Each district retained a nominal independence, and placed at its head either a priest, or a body of priests, or a descendant of one of the old Eleuth princes. Then the movement spread with irresistible strides to Korla, Karashar, and Kucha, where it came to a sudden halt, and south of the Tian Shan the Tungan revolt never extended west of Aksu, to which, after a considerable delay at Kucha, it eventually attained. For some months after the declaration of independence on the part of these cities, Western Kashgar, or Altyshahr (six cities), and Kuldja, remained in the possession of the Chinese, but with the severance of all communication with China it was patent that their authority would be challenged at an early date. It is not necessary for us to follow the fortunes of the Khitay in Kuldja in any greater detail than to say that contemporaneously with the Khoja invasion of Kashgar an insurrection broke out therein which effaced all trace of the power of China, and which, after the installation of a native Government for a few years, resulted in the Russian occupation of that province,

which is still, and to all seeming always will be, maintained. Having now traced the two chief reasons of the decadence of Chinese power—viz., the difficulties by which the central authorities were beset by the Panthay and Taeping risings, and the serious disadvantage they laboured under from the Tungani having established themselves in the chief cities along the route from Kansuh, it is time for us to return to Yakoob Beg, and see how he fared in his undertaking.

By a treaty with Khokand the Chinese had sanctioned the appointment in each of the chief cities of a Khokandian consul, or rather tax-gatherer, seeing that his chief duties were to collect the imports allowed to the Khan of Khokand on all goods imported into Kashgar from his state, in return for his keeping the peace towards China. But these men, as a rule, were Andijani or Khokandian immigrants, and they brought with them all the religious prejudices which they were free to indulge in at home. They never regarded the Chinese with any other but the liveliest feelings of hatred, and there is little doubt that their secret instructions were to foment, as much as possible, ill-feeling against the dominant power. As a matter of fact, they soon became the centres of intrigue against the Chinese, and in the preceding Khoja invasions their active participation with the invaders had always been punished with extreme reprisals. But as China never felt strong enough to prosecute war actively against Khokand in these later years, the Khan was always permitted to depute fresh consuls as his representatives in Yarkand and the other cities. Long before Yakoob Beg had set out from Tashkent, the people had risen under the Andijani emissaries, and combining with the Tungan soldiery in the Chinese service, surprised and massacred their Khitay defenders. In the city of Yarkand more especially did the Andijani element proclaim itself, but the supremacy of the aliens was disputed by two Khojas from Kucha, who had left their city when the Tungan movement absorbed it. In alliance with the Andijani these and their followers stormed the Yangyshahr, or fort of Yarkand, but the indomitable Khitay governor defrauded them of their triumph by setting fire to the powder magazine, and thus blowing himself, his family, and the garrison, together with many of the besiegers, into the air. On the fall of the fort, the Khojas obtained the chief control, and a priest of the name of Abdurrahman was set up as king. The

other cities speedily followed the example set them by Yarkand, and the Chinese power was overthrown on all hands. The Khitay were massacred by the Mahomedans in every direction, and only the citadels—notably that of Kashgar—still held out for Pekin. To these fled all the survivors of the Chinese colonies, and had the Chinese Government not been hampered in every corner of the empire, they could easily have held out till aid came. Noteworthy among these forts, on account of its importance, its strength, and the number of its garrison, was the Yangyshahr of Kashgar. The inhabitants of that city were unable to make any impression upon it, although they had found so eager an ally in Sadic Beg, the Kirghiz freebooter.

It was during this check that Sadic Beg bethought him of setting up a Khoja candidate to the throne, and had for that purpose despatched the embassy, of which we have already spoken, to Alim Kuli, the regent of Khokand. When Buzurg Khan and his lieutenant left Tashkent in response to this summons their followers were only six in number, but these were tried soldiers and steadfast followers of Yakoob Beg. In their journey from Tashkent to the city of Khokand their ranks were swollen by a reinforcement of sixty-two volunteers. Here the final preparations were made, and during the first days of January, 1865, this little band of adventurers passed out of the limits of Khokand into Eastern Turkestan. The mountain forts which were intended to guard the Terek pass had been deserted, and, without encountering any opposition, the little force, which had been joined by some of the inhabitants, reached Mingyol, a village in the neighbourhood of Kashgar. In the interval between the despatch of his envoy and the arrival of the Khoja prince Sadic Beg had formed a more sanguine view of the state of affairs, and half regretted that he had invited Buzurg Khan in at all, more particularly when he found that the Khoja had a following of his own and a skilled commander in Yakoob Beg. He then strove to dissuade Buzurg Khan from proceeding further in a matter fraught with such great peril, and he laid emphasis on the certainty of the return of the Chinese, when summary vengeance would be exacted. His arguments were unavailing. Buzurg Khan, or more probably his lieutenant, was deaf to all his representations. The enterprise they had embarked upon must be followed out to the bitter end. Almost immediately after this

interview at Mingyol Buzurg Khan entered Kashgar, where he was placed on the throne of his ancestors, and for a short time administered justice in person. Had his rule continued as well as its commencement promised we should have heard less of the Athalik Ghazi.

The first thing that became clear in the new administration of the country was that the rival pretensions of Sadic Beg and the Baturbashi of the Khan could never be reconciled. On finding that he was destined to play a secondary part where he had expected to be supreme, Sadic Beg called off his followers and set himself up as an independent prince at Yangy Hissar. The first enemy therefore that the Khokandian adventurers had to encounter was the chieftain at whose invitation they had entered the state. The Chinese garrison was still in possession of the fort outside Kashgar, but the national hatred of the foreigner was not sufficiently great to overcome the differences that started up between the allies. In the battle that ensued between these rival competitors the forces of Buzurg Khan were successful, and this victory was followed up by a close pursuit of the fugitives into their mountain recesses. The next step after this conclusive failure of the Kirghiz chief to establish an independent power was for Buzurg Khan to establish a blockade of the Chinese garrison in the Yangyshahr of Kashgar, and having done this he was at liberty to extend the area of his authority in Kashgar itself. The city of Yangy Hissar opened its gates without resistance, but here again the Chinese held the fort. An attempt to storm the latter was repulsed with heavy loss, and a momentary lull ensued in the campaign. So far the cause of Buzurg Khan cannot be said to have achieved any astonishing success. It was at this period that Yakoob Beg came more prominently to the front and sought to heal the differences betwixt Khoja and Tungan by declaring that the Chinese were the sole adversaries with whom Buzurg Khan had come to deal. In order to assume a more complete control over the management of the war he induced Buzurg Khan to return to his capital, and to leave the reconquest of the state entirely in his hands.

Yarkand, as the wealthiest and most populous city, had always exercised a great influence upon its neighbours, and the indifference with which it still regarded the person of Buzurg Khan was in itself no slight cause of grievance. Alone in Yarkand had

the fort followed the fate of the city, and before the occupation of Yangy Hissar by Yakoob Beg's forces it had enjoyed a government of its own for a space of about two years. Yet the relations of the Tungan and Khoja parties were not free from their old antipathies, and to heal the strife an arrangement had been come to by which the Khojas exercised jurisdiction in the city and the Tungan troops held the citadel. While these affairs were in progress in Yarkand, Yakoob Beg resolved to settle the question of rivalry for ever by establishing the authority of Buzurg Khan there.

With as small a following as was compatible with safety, Yakoob Beg set out from Yangy Hissar, and by slow marches approached the city. Difficulties were thrown in his way, and it was only after much negotiation that the authorities would consent to admit him within the town. Incensed at this unfriendly treatment, the wily Khokandian took his measures secretly, but effectually, for humbling the pride of the Yarkand rulers. In a street riot, probably got up for the occasion, the chief Khojas were arrested, and their followers expelled the city. Yarkand for the moment passed into the hands of Yakoob Beg, but, on this occasion, not for very long. As ill-fortune would have it a fresh army from Kucha had just arrived in the vicinity, and when joined by those who had been expelled from Yarkand presented a very formidable appearance. They marched against the city with complete confidence in their superior numbers, and Yakoob Beg, always in favour of the boldest course, marched out to meet them. His van, under the command of Abdullah Pansad, one of his most trusted officers, suffered severely in a skirmish, and Yakoob Beg at once recognized the necessity of a prompt retreat. During the following night he made a forced march and arrived the next day after that at Yangy Hissar without any very serious loss in men, but with no baggage. The expedition to Yarkand then appeared in its true light as a rash venture.

This reverse at all events inculcated the necessity for caution upon the daring leader, and it was resolved to prosecute the siege of the Chinese citadels with greater vigour. The Yangyshahr of Yangy Hissar was the first selected for the prosecution of military movements. The garrison was closely confined to its fort for forty days, and, on the repulse of several sorties, agreed to surrender. Yakoob Beg was desirous of showing moderation him-

self, but in the confusion that ensued more than 2,000 Chinese were butchered. With the capture of this fort, the half-way house between Kashgar and Yarkand, the first great success of Buzurg Khan's expedition was obtained. At this moment a fresh danger was appearing from a different quarter. An army from warlike Badakshan was overrunning Sirikul in the south-west, and was threatening by its presence the neighbouring portion of Kashgar. Admitting his inability to cope with them, Yakoob Beg made overtures to the Badakshi chiefs, the result of which was that they took temporary service under him. The Kirghiz under Sadic Beg were also taken into alliance, and by these means Yakoob Beg found himself for the first time at the head of an army formidable in numbers. And there was urgent necessity for such a force, for a large army from the cities of Aksu, Kucha, and Turfan was advancing to dispute the palm of sovereignty with Kashgar, at the same time that the rulers of those cities extended their protection to Yarkand, now menaced by the military preponderance of its northern neighbour. This army occupied without resistance Maralbashi, whence it could advance westward as it pleased. But Yakoob Beg had profited too much by his past experience to risk anything by assuming the offensive with inferior numbers. He accordingly drew up his forces outside Yangy Hissar, and there awaited the onset of the enemy. The Tungani did not delay long in their advance when they learned that the Kashgarian army had been mustered at Yangy Hissar, and as both sides were eager for the fray, the combat followed quickly on the first meeting. The fight appears to have been fiercely contested, and only resulted in a victory for Yakoob Beg through his own good leading and desperate courage. The Kirghiz troops, half-hearted in their faith, and thinking more of the advantages of victory than of the duties of the fight, were the first to give way; and the Badakshi division, though still stubbornly holding each foot of ground, was slowly but plainly retreating. The immediate followers of Yakoob Beg alone made any progress, and kept up the fight throughout the afternoon. Their chief fought on foot at their head encouraging them to desperation with the exclamation that "victory is the gift of Allah." Before the determined resistance of this phalanx, the Tungani exhausted themselves, and were only too glad towards evening to desist from the attack. With admirable devotion the little army

of Yakoob Beg seconded him in his effort to turn this drawn battle into a decided advantage, and the Badakshi, returning at the critical moment, enabled him to assume the offensive with great effect. The Tungani were driven in complete rout from the field, leaving a large number of killed and wounded to attest the completeness of the victory, while the desertion of more than 1,000 Tungan soldiers in a body to his cause raised the army of Yakoob Beg to a higher nominal strength on its morrow than it had been on its eve. The Tungan army retired on Maralbashi, but its importance had disappeared. That town remained in its possession some time longer, but the influence it could exercise over the course of events in Kashgar had become powerless for good or for evil.

The results of this battle were in many senses important. Buzurg Khan, who was present on that day, had been among the first to seek safety in flight. When the news came that after all his side had been victorious, his mortification and chagrin were more evident than his satisfaction at the result. Unlike the Great Frederick on a similar occasion, he was unable to appreciate the good service his general had done him. His fear of the ambition of Yakoob Beg increased as the latter's claims to public recognition as the champion of the state became more evident. Many of his followers were only too eager to dim the lustre of the Baturbashi's achievements, and all the parasites of the palace, who feasted while the Khokandian warrior fought, added their cackle to swell the indictments of jealousy, greed, and fear. At this period the ruling parties in Yarkand, awed by the prowess of their neighbour, thought it would be prudent to come to terms with him before they should feel the weight of his hand. Accordingly an embassy was sent to Yangy Hissar to tender the submission of the Yarkand authorities to Buzurg Khan, and to recognize him as sovereign of Kashgar. The envoy was also instructed to ask for the appointment of a city governor, who would be agreeable to Buzurg Khan, and his "vizier" Yakoob Beg. The example set them by the people of the city was promptly followed by the garrison of the fort: and they too in their address worshipped the "rising sun." It was on this occasion that the growing importance of Yakoob Beg was first clearly revealed, and it added fuel to the flame of Buzurg Khan's morbid suspicions. But before we proceed to consider the

events that transpired in Yarkand, it is necessary for us to return to the citadel of Kashgar, where the Chinese garrison still maintained its forlorn guard over the last remnant of Chinese territory in Central Asia. During all these months the garrison had been more or less confined to the fort, but after the victory of Yangy Hissar the blockade became more strict. Treachery within too came to the aid of force without, and Kho Dalay, the superior officer in the fort, but not the commandant, made an arrangement with Yakoob Beg, by which favourable terms were secured to the garrison. Kho Dalay and 3,000 Khitay troops took service in the army, and these became known as Yangy or new Mussulmans. This act of moderation on the part of Yakoob was cemented by his marriage to the daughter of Kho Dalay, and down to the visit of Sir Douglas Forsyth, in 1873, these still resided in a settlement of their own. But the last representatives of Chinese rule were not to make their departure from the platform of history in so ordinary a manner as an acknowledgment of the force of circumstances. A small minority under the commandant Chang Tay refused to accept the honourable conditions that their foe granted to them, and when the day arrived for the surrender of the citadel they withdrew into his "orda." When his family and dependents had assembled around him, and it was announced that the Kashgarian army was entering the gates, the resolute Amban set light to the powder magazine that had been placed underneath the room, thus protesting to the last the invincibility of Chinese institutions. "The tree which God planted it is impossible for human means to destroy," so reads their own proverb. This event took place in September, 1865, nine months after the entrance of Buzurg Khan into Kashgar, and it at once set free a large body of men for the prosecution of military operations in other directions. At this moment too a large body of the followers of Alim Kuli, of Khokand, arrived in Kashgar, so that altogether the power of the Khoja ruler had become very considerable. The contest was now becoming one chiefly between Buzurg Khan and Yakoob Beg, and the former's prime instigator was Sadic Beg, the Kirghiz chief, while the latter's chief supporters were his lieutenant Abdulla, and his old secretary Mahomed Yunus, since known chiefly as the Dadkwah or Governor of Yarkand. Both these conflicting interests were represented in the camp that was established outside Yarkand,

and the Tungan soldiery and townspeople soon took sides in the struggle that, it was becoming more plain every day, could not much longer be put off. It would not be of sufficient interest to follow the ramifications of these intrigues in close detail. Suffice it to say that the Tungan soldiery, both in the citadel of Yarkand and in the service of Yakoob Beg, plotted his overthrow, and that Buzurg Khan hoped to reap advantage from their design. At first everything went well for the conspirators, and Yakoob Beg found himself deserted by all but a mere handful of his followers. His fortitude in these untoward circumstances was above all praise, and after some weeks' desultory fighting in the neighbourhood of Yarkand and in the town itself, Yakoob Beg drew off his small army to receive reinforcements from Kashgar. The rivalry of the two leaders was finally settled in favour of Yakoob Beg on the field of battle, in the vicinity of Yangy Hissar. Buzurg Khan was taken shortly afterwards, and was placed in honourable confinement; but so long as this incapable prince remained in Kashgar he was a source of endless trouble to Yakoob Beg. He remained a close prisoner for about eighteen months, but on being detected in fresh intrigues was banished to Tibet. After wandering for some years in various countries he found his way to Khokand, where he is said to be still residing with a large family. On the deposition of Buzurg Khan, Yakoob Beg reoccupied Yarkand, and established his authority there in the person of Mahomed Yunus, whom we have already mentioned. He now believed his rule to be so far consolidated that he permitted the Badakshi contingent to return home, presenting each man with a present over and above his pay. For many years afterwards he appears to have maintained some sort of influence in Badakshan, and this interference in a region which Afghanistan has always affected to regard as its own was never approved of by Shere Ali. To this very possibly may be attributed the scarcely concealed suspicion and dislike of these potentates towards each other. With the close of the year 1865 Yakoob Beg found himself installed as an independent prince in a considerable portion of Kashgar, and in a position for the prosecution of further conquests, about which, with the commencement of the new year, he energetically busied himself.

No sooner had Yakoob Beg become the recognized ruler of Kashgar than a marked change came over the friendly attitude

towards the new rule in that state adopted by Khokand. This may indeed have been solely attributable to the personal dislike of Khudayar Khan, who once more had become supreme in the independent portion of Khokand, and who never forgot or forgave the faithlessness of Yakoob Beg towards him in the past. While the ambiguous conduct of Khudayar was rather a source of petty annoyance than of serious danger to him, in the east his possessions lay exposed to the attack of the Tungani so long as Aksu remained in their hands. There are some indications that he made friendly overtures to them, but as the basis on which he treated was that his authority should be recognized by Aksu and Ush Turfan, these never had much prospect of a satisfactory conclusion. Mussulmans as the Tungani were, they had no sympathies in common with the Andijani or Kashgari; they remembered that they had formed a large proportion of the conquering armies of China, and they were no less convinced of their own superiority to the levies of Yakoob Beg than to the Khitay. To an impartial observer it was patent that the Tungani and Yakoob Beg should have entered into close alliance, and resisted with their united forces both the Russian occupation of Ili, and a Chinese advance out of Kansuh. But neither of these were impartial observers; they were the litigants themselves, and, oblivious of every other consideration, submitted their quarrel to the sharp but efficacious arbitrement of the sword. We cannot refuse Yakoob Beg the credit he deserves for partially seeing through the hollowness of this contest, although, so far as we can trace, the idea never seriously suggested itself to his mind that the Chinese would dream of reconquering what he had won. Far and wide not a vestige of the Khitay power remained to show where once it had been vigorous and supreme. Shaken to its very foundations, the ruling caste in Pekin would be glad to maintain a precarious hold over its own immediate provinces. Such was the opinion of Yakoob Beg, and we cannot blame him for failing to perceive that which no one could have been expected to anticipate. Freed from anxiety with regard to the return of the Chinese, Yakoob Beg, now becoming known as the Athalik Ghazi—Champion Father—a title conferred upon him by his old friend, the Ameer of Bokhara, at the instance of the Sheikul-islam in Kashgar—was the more willing to indulge his ambition for founding an independent state in the heart of Asia, which

might serve as a bulwark to the tide of Russian aggression. He was full of this grand idea when he resolved to place his relations with the Tungani on an unequivocal basis, either by conquest or by a defensive and offensive alliance. But before an open rupture with the Tungani had taken place, the Athalik Ghazi had, by an act of the most disgraceful treachery, seized Khoten and its dependency Sanju, although the local chief, the Mufti Habitulla, had, early in the campaign against Yarkand, proclaimed his adherence to the cause of Buzurg Khan, and steadfastly held to the promises he had then given. The murder of Habitulla and his chief followers cast a still deeper stigma on the unprincipled conduct of Yakoob Beg, and Khoten, after his death last year, proved its good memory by being the first to deny the authority of Beg Bacha. It was for a short time ruled by a chief elected from among its inhabitants, but has now hastened to make terms with the Chinese.

The Tungani in Aksu were the first to incur the wrath of Yakoob Beg. Their attitude had for some time been insolent in the extreme towards Kashgar, and they had even gone so far as to molest subjects of the new ruler. A large army was assembled at Kashgar, and, advancing by Artosh, fell on the Tungani before Aksu with impetuosity. A flank attack was at the same time made on the town by a division operating from Maralbashi. The army of Kashgar was victorious in both directions, and the defeated garrison was glad to find safety by a hasty retreat. Yakoob Beg then issued a proclamation condemning in general terms the hostile conduct of the Tungani, and promising pardon to all those who would recognize his authority. This edict is the more noteworthy as proclaiming the strict enforcement of the Shariat, and as impugning the orthodoxy of the Tungani, who, it was said, had lapsed into irregularities in form, that were not to be condoned by all true Sunnis. The claim was then advanced to the restoration of the sovereignty of the old Khojas up to Kucha, and to recover this region fresh levies were brought up to Aksu; that city itself was strongly fortified, and the Athalik Ghazi in person directed the movements of the army from the old capital of the Khoja kings against their ancient fortress in the East. The spring of 1867 had not far advanced when the Kashgarian army appeared in the neighbourhood of Kucha, where the full power of the Tungani had been collected to meet

the invasion. So formidable did the fortifications of the town appear, and so bold a front did the Tungan army assume, that he found himself unable to risk a battle until the arrival of fresh troops from Yarkand. He accordingly constructed a fortified camp outside Kucha, and there awaited the men and supplies which were to enable him to recommence active operations. The interval was seized by the friends of peace on either side to attempt a reconciliation, but all the negotiations proved unavailing. Each side spared no pains to bring up reinforcements to decide once and for all the question of superiority between Tungan and Kashgarian. In numbers the Tungani probably far exceeded their opponent, but theirs was a motley assemblage in comparison to his fairly disciplined and better armed array. The nucleus of his force, consisting of Afghan and Badakshi levies, officered by deserters from our native army, was probably more formidable than any other body of men in Central Asia, and inspired by their prowess the rest of the army with some confidence. The Tungani, mistaking Yakoob Beg's inaction for weakness, in a foolish moment left their fortifications to encounter him in the open, and were severely worsted in several skirmishes that ensued. Driven within the town itself, the Tungani found themselves completely environed by the Kashgarian army. Yet they did not lose heart; and Yakoob Beg was unable to make any impression upon the town itself. The walls of Kucha were too extensive to admit of an effective defence at every point, and it was not long before the Athalik Ghazi perceived weak places in the lines of the enemy. An attack made from three different quarters simultaneously was repulsed, but an assault on the rear of the town by Yakoob Beg's son, Kooda Kuli Beg, was more fortunate. Chiefly owing to the gallantry of this youth Kucha was captured, but the brave assailant lost his life in the fight that took place in the streets. With the fall of Kucha the Tungan power south of the Tian Shan was broken, and the survivors in all these districts hastened to atone for past offences by a thorough recognition of the new ruler. Although on this occasion he did not advance east of Kucha, he had the satisfaction of receiving embassies from the Tungani of Turfan and Urumtsi, suing for peace. This was granted for the time, but in 1871 a fresh war broke out, which resulted in the extension of Kashgar up to Turfan and Pidjam. The cruelties which marked this latter campaign are said to have

been the handiwork of Beg Bacha alone, but whoever was the responsible person, Karashar, Korla, and Turfan, once flourishing and populous cities, were converted into silent and ruined testimonies of a departed age. Such was the result of his wars with the Tungani. His nominal territory had been vastly extended, but it is questionable whether his effective power had not deteriorated. His eastern frontier, indeed, was rendered secure against every adversary save the Chinese, but with the decimation of the fighting population of the Tungani he had lost an ally who might, in his last campaign of all, have proved invaluable.

It is now time to turn to the consideration of Yakoob Beg's relations with a more formidable neighbour than the Tungani. During the earlier years of his career in Kashgar the Russians had been in no way concerned in the fortunes of either party; but in Ili their interest, political and commercial, had always been of higher importance. Consequently, when the Tungan rising made its appearance there, and the rivalry of Tungan and Tarantchi removed all the benefits of Chinese authority, the Russians were not well pleased. They discovered that the change meant to them the disappearance of their old trade intercourse, and that the fanatical and narrow-minded ruling classes were in no sense eager to renew the stipulations which had been ratified, after years of persistent negotiation, by the Chinese. The Tungani were accordingly not regarded with any friendly eye at Vernoe, and the necessity was being discussed in official quarters, either of assisting in the restoration of the Chinese or of a temporary occupation of the region by Russia. The achievements of Yakoob Beg south of the Tian Shan precipitated the course of events in the country north of it; and whilst Yakoob Beg was to some extent making hostile preparations at Aksu for an expedition into Ili, the Russians promptly forestalled him, and converted it into a Russian province. It was this occupation of Ili, or Kuldja, which brought Russia and the Athalik Ghazi into direct contact, and it was from this date (1869) that the attitude of these two Powers towards each other became important. The Russians followed up this occupation with a curt refusal to recognize Yakoob Beg as the ruler of Kashgar. That state was a Chinese province, and they could only formally recognize the Chinese as its owners. A coolness at once ensued between the two neighbours, which was to the last perceptible. Although it was impossible for formal

diplomatic relations to take place under these circumstances, the Russians were fully resolved to make as much use of their post of vantage as possible. Accordingly Russian merchants were encouraged to attempt the exploration of Kashgar, and in one case, that of Herr Kludof, this was done with some success. But this was an isolated occurrence. As a rule, the merchants were harassed in their business operations; their personal liberty was curtailed to the lowest possible point compatible with the laws of hospitality; Russian trade in Kashgar was reduced to a minimum, and Yakoob Beg, incensed at the refusal to acknowledge his title as ruler, retarded in a quiet but effectual manner the Russian commercial designs upon his little state. But the grand object of the Russians in dealing with these Asiatic countries has never been so much the welfare of their own individual merchants as the progress of the state interests or necessities, and all their diplomacy in treating with Yakoob Beg was directed to the object of obtaining his permission to the appointment of Russian consuls in the chief cities. Yakoob Beg knew of old what these functionaries meant, and into acquiescing in their creation he would be neither threatened nor cajoled. Until the year 1872 the Russians persistently refused to have any official dealing with the Athalik Ghazi. In a semi-official, or indirect, way they had taken advantage of the journeys of Herr Kludof and Captain Reinthol into his state to acquire information concerning it, and they had even gone so far as to make use of the Khan of Khokand as an intermediary in their negotiations with him. But all these tentative operations had been foiled by the firmness of Yakoob Beg, whose attitude throughout had been one of great consistency and dignity. So long as the Russian authorities refused to recognize him as the Ameer of Kashgar, so long did he meet defiance with defiance and threat with threat. For the first time in the annals of Central Asian conquest the Russians were foiled by a native despot, and for the first time they paused in their advance, partly through a belief that the new state of Kashgar was able to offer a strenuous resistance. The fact is the more noteworthy as being one of the rare instances on which Russia has shown a nervous susceptibility of the power of neighbouring states. In 1872, after four years spent in fruitless attempts to drive what would be considered a hard bargain, the Russian authorities, fairly worn out by Yakoob Beg's persistency, and

anxious to come to some definite understanding with him, despatched Baron Kaulbars, the explorer of the sources of the Syr Darya, as their envoy to Kashgar. This embassy was courteously welcomed at the capital, and indeed Yakoob Beg had every reason to feel satisfied with his diplomatic triumph.

It is not necessary for us to follow in any detail the course of the relations between these two scarcely concealed enemies. At no period did any cordiality subsist between them, and often and often were they brought to the very verge of a rupture, although Yakoob Beg sent his nephew, Yakoob Khan, or Hadji Torah, to St. Petersburg, where, for a brief season, he was the most welcome of guests. But between a Power carving out a fresh empire from the various Mahomedan states of Asia, and a state which represented under peculiar circumstances the cause of Islam in the most advantageous position for its defence, it was sufficiently clear that the recently cemented friendship could not bear much fruit. At last, in 1873, all the necessary preparations were made for a Russian invasion of Kashgar, and for a moment it seemed as if the question was to be summarily settled by the sword. But at this moment the despatch of an English embassy to his state gave him a new lease of life; and the Russian authorities, under strict instructions from St. Petersburg, gave up their hostile designs against Kashgar. Yakoob Beg made the most of his new English ally, and once more had recourse to that game of brag which had stood him in such good stead during the earlier years of his rule. But the Russians had by this time taken the measure of his strength more accurately, and were only moderate in their attitude lest they should give umbrage to this country. When it became evident that the mind of this country was more indifferent than had been at first supposed as to the fate of Kashgar—for while the Forsyth Embassy had interested us in the personality of the Athalik Ghazi, it had also consoled us with a sense of the security afforded by the difficulties interposed by nature between Eastern Turkestan and India—these preparations, which had for a time been stopped, were recommenced with greater vigour than before. Stores of ammunition and food were collected at Narym and the other mountain forts, while large bodies of troops were directed to Kuldja. The invading force was to be entrusted to the command of the two Skobeleffs, the younger of whom has gained on the fields of Bulgaria and Roumelia an imperishable reputation for

reckless daring. Twenty thousand Russian soldiers were to undertake the task of chastising the Athalik Ghazi for eight years of independence. For the first time in his career the bold spirit of Yakoob Beg misgave him, and, too late to be of use, he had recourse to concession. The Russians had gone too far now to draw back, and the battalions were in daily expectation of receiving instructions to cross the frontier. At this moment, when his ruin seemed inevitable, fortune intervened. A Kirghiz insurrection in Khokand had compelled Khudayar Khan to flee to Russian territory, and that insurrection, joined by the forces of the Khan himself, under his brother-in-law Abdurrahman Aftobatcha, soon established a fresh government in the eastern portion of Khokand. This at first appeared to be one of those internal commotions of such frequent occurrence in Central Asian states; and although the Russian advance into Kashgar was suspended until it was known what Nasruddin, the new Khan set up by the Aftobatcha, would do, the main body of the forces still remained echelonned round Kuldja and Narym. It soon became evident that the conspirators in Khokand had ulterior designs in their rising against the authority of Khudayar, and that they intended to attract general sympathy to their persons by challenging the authority of Russia throughout Western Turkestan. In this they looked for assistance from the Turcomans beyond Khiva, from the ruler of Bokhara, himself humbled on many an occasion by Russia, and, above all, from Yakoob Beg, of Kashgar, menaced at the moment by Russian threats. Suffice it to say, that after a defence of six months the Khokandians were crushed by the forces with which it had been intended to invade Kashgar, and that neither Bokhara nor the Turcomans nor Yakoob Beg moved hand or foot to assist these champions of their country and their religion. Yakoob Beg was thankful that they had diverted from his state the invasion which he knew himself impotent to resist, and therefore followed the strictly selfish and undoubtedly prudent policy of neutrality. If Yakoob Beg had never given other Asiatics reason to believe that he aspired to be their protector, if he had not arrogated to himself a supreme position by right of the good service he would render when the final effort should be made to shake off the Russian thraldom, we might then think that he had simply been weak in refusing to join the Khokandians in a war against Russia, and that he had let pass by unutilized the only

occasion he would probably ever have of combating on some terms of equality the great northern power. But when we remember that he, throughout his rule, had encouraged all Asiatics, and, above all, his own countrymen, the Khokandians, to place their trust in him, and to consider him as always eager to participate in a war against Russia, we must condemn more strongly the vacillating conduct of the Ameer throughout this crisis. His desertion of the great cause, in which he alone could have induced the various potentates to forget their mutual jealousies, at the most critical period of Russian rule within the last decade, remains the one blot on his foreign administration; but even that unfortunate vacillation of purpose cannot destroy the admiration inspired by his bold defiance and consistent opposition to all Russian pretensions to dictate terms to him as ruler in Eastern Turkestan.

With this country his relations had at all times been amicable, and the friendly receptions accorded to Mr. Shaw and Sir Douglas Forsyth secured him the sympathy and goodwill of many among us. These bonds were still further strengthened by the favourable impression produced, both in India and in this country, by his envoy, Hadji Torah. But our goodwill never went beyond words, for, in the first place, it was not clear what we could do for him, and, in the second, it was patent that any active intervention could only be adopted at great risk and greater expense. In his dealings with his two civilized neighbours, it is only with Russia that there is much to be said about them.

Yakoob Beg's chief claim to our consideration is that for more than twelve years he gave a settled government to a large portion of Central Asia, and that however faulty his external policy—now pushed to the verge of audacity, and then, when the moment came for daring, weak and hesitating—his internal management of affairs was founded on a practical and sufficiently just basis. As a warrior he had done much to rouse our admiration, and had proved on many a well-fought field and in many a desperate encounter his claim to be considered a fearless and resolute soldier; but in this he was equalled, if not excelled, both by his lieutenant Abdullah and by his son, Beg Bacha. But in capacity for administration, Yakoob Beg far surpassed all his contemporaries, and the merit of his success was enhanced not so much by the originality of the method adopted, as by the unique vigour and perseverance with which it was put into force. The interior working

of the statecraft of Yakoob Beg, who made his state, young in years, tower above its fellows, would naturally be a very interesting theme to dilate upon, but here we can only briefly trace some of its salient points. To commence with the court and its immediate surroundings, there were no great nobles or public functionaries whatever. Those chiefs who, whether they were Khokandian leaders, or Kirghiz or Afghan adventurers, had proved their fidelity to their ruler, and also their capacity for service, were actively employed either as governors of districts or as commandants of forts. Periodically they came to pay their respects in the capital, and at frequent intervals Yakoob Beg would visit them and superintend their operations in person; but in so active and sparsely peopled a community the intellectually gifted members of the society were far too valuable to be permitted to become mere palace ornaments. To make the rule of the late Athalik Ghazi a vigorous welding of a naturally indifferent people into a state of good order required a never-relaxing vigilance on his part, and a corresponding energy and devotion on that of his subordinates. The former of these was never wanting, and the latter was at his disposal until the last six months of his rule. We have already spoken of his strict orthodoxy as a Mussulman, and the chief strength of Yakoob Beg's rule lay in the support of the Church as a body, and of the more fanatical Andijani element. As for the native Kashgari, they have not much religious zeal at all, and it is a delusion to speak of them as fanatical Mahomedans in the same degree as it is true to apply that term both to the Bokhariots and Afghans. But while he founded his temporal authority on a religious basis, and proclaimed the universal application of the Shariat, he did not neglect other measures for strengthening his personal sovereignty. His military system was at once the marvel and the admiration of his neighbours, and although his best troops were few in number, they deserved in all probability much of the praise so freely bestowed upon them. But the greater proportion of his soldiers were raw recruits, uncertain in their fidelity, and more than dubious in their personal courage. The great difficulty under which he laboured was, however, in procuring arms for them. The presents sent him from this country, and the few cannon he was able to purchase, were made the most of. These were mostly useless after a short time for want of the proper ammunition; and although he asserted

that in his workshops he could build cannon and make cartridges, this had never been proved true, and is far from probable. The flower of his army was undoubtedly the Afghan-Badakshi element in it, and these officered by sepoys who had deserted either from Cashmere or from India made really good troops. They may have numbered 2,000, but it is more likely that they did not exceed 500. The Tungani from Aksu and Kucha were also hardy and experienced soldiers, but they were not to be relied upon in any emergency. The former were mostly employed as artillery, or as *jigits*, *djinghites*, horse-soldiers. The latter generally acted as *sarbazes*, foot-soldiers. Both these were regular troops, who resided in barracks and performed military duties. Between *jigits* and *sarbazes* it is not probable that Yakoob Beg could ever muster more than ten or twelve thousand men. In addition to these more or less regular troops, he had the Khitay contingent under Kho Dalay, which would fight against every enemy except the Chinese; and the Kirghiz tribes would generally furnish a large number of light cavalry and skirmishers when occasion required. Far be it from us to attempt to detract from the high credit which is due to the Athalik Ghazi for accomplishing the great things that he did with such bad materials. If this review of his military system is properly considered, it will be seen that higher praise is due to Yakoob Beg for what he did than if he had found himself at the head of a physically vigorous and warlike people. As the ruler of an effete population, who never were noteworthy for courage, he beat back every invader from his borders, and stamped himself as one of the great conquerors of his age.

His civil administration was not less practical; Kashgar was parcelled out into a certain number of districts, and at the head of each district was placed a Dadkwah, or governor. Nominally vested with supreme control in his government, he was technically subject to the approval of those he governed. Tyrannize in petty ways undoubtedly many of them did; but, as the life of the subject could only be taken away by the express order of the Ameer himself, the most powerful weapon in the hands of an unscrupulous viceroy was removed. At stated periods, also, he had to proceed to the capital to give a report of the chief occurrences in his province, and on these occasions petitions containing charges against the Dadkwah were formally considered in his presence.

Another check on the Dadkwahs was to be found in the Kazi, or judge, who alone decided all legal matters.

The prominence given to the legal authority was not without a good effect on the public mind, and even in the administering of the law precautions were taken to prevent its abuse. All ordinary offences, such as petty thefts, acts of irreligion, &c., were punished summarily with a certain number of strokes from the *dira*, or strap carried by the attendants of the Kazi; but any charge for which a more severe chastisement seemed necessary had to be investigated by a member of each official rank; so the Kazi passed a culprit on to the Mufti, the Mufti to the Alim, and the Alim to the Dadkwah. Should any of those authorities differ as to the necessary punishment, and an adjustment be found impossible of attainment, then the disputed point was reserved for the consideration of the Ameer himself. The Dadkwah alone could declare what the punishment should be, and he had to be present at the time when it was administered, the governor being responsible in his person to the sovereign for any miscarriage of justice within his jurisdiction. Under this system it is not to be wondered at if order was maintained throughout the country. Thieves, vagrants, and beggars were arrested and incarcerated, if found abroad during the night-time or under suspicious circumstances, and difficulties were thrown in the way of those who wished to travel from one part of the state to another. Without the *permit* of the Dadkwah no individual could leave his home, for the roads were constantly patrolled either by regular troops or mounted police, and these had strict instructions to convey back to their homes any persons journeying without Government permission. Yakoob Beg's police system was in no sense inferior to either his military or his judicial. The guardians of order were divided into two classes, the secret and the municipal. The municipal were chiefly the attendants on the Kazis in the towns, and the suburban patrols stationed at all cross roads, and generally throughout the country. In numbers these were limited, but to judge by the result they performed their duties in a very effective manner. But the secret were a far more effective body. They permeated all ranks of society, and were omnipresent. Their zeal was invincible, for it resulted in their own advancement, and every one was eager to enter their ranks and receive the pay and emoluments that were the reward of their good service. The eagerness shown by every one to speak ill of

his neighbour in a very short time produced a block in the progress of justice, and restrictive acts were brought into operation to remove the threatened confusion in public business. Laws against libel and false accusations were passed, and the punishment for such offences made extremely stringent.

Another effective method was to reduce the rewards given to informers. These measures produced a salutary improvement, and during the last years of Yakoob Beg's rule the secret police had become no longer a nuisance to the public and the ruler alike, but a most powerful assistant of the latter in his dealings with the former. But while Yakoob Beg gained strength in one direction by this effective police system he lost as much in another. Order was supreme, but discontent was widespread. The freedom of the subject had disappeared, and in its place had sprung up a sense of thraldom that had never been apparent under the Chinese rule. Neighbours feared to express their convictions even to those whom they had known for years, and a sort of stupor fell over the population which even perfect security could not dispel. In the bazaars the busy hum which prevailed during the Khitay domination had given place to a more monotonous undertone, and although the morality of the Mussulman law far excelled that of the tolerant and indifferent Chinese, the merits of the new Government were effaced by its harshness and rigour. Many said, too, that the good state of public morality was only on the surface, and that as much vice existed beneath this pleasing exterior as during the days of the opium-smoking, bang-drinking, and amusement-loving Khitay. A blight had fallen on the energies of an enervated population, and all the attempts of Yakoob Beg, who, as a warrior, was averse to trade, to increase the prosperity of his state seemed doomed to failure. Yarkand alone maintained some of its old activity, and Kashgar itself assumed something of the appearance of a capital. But everywhere else was stagnation and retrogression. The Chinese had been expelled and the Tungani crushed, but the effort those triumphs had cost produced exhaustion. A ruler, who devoted his attention to military matters so much as did the Athalik Ghazi, who sought to play so important a part in the affairs of neighbouring states, was not the one most fitted to raise Kashgar from its fallen condition. The money spent on warlike stores and in the maintenance of a large army, if devoted to more peaceful operations, would have raised Aksu and Kucha to cities of the first

rank once more, and would have really added to the effective strength of the nation more than high-sounding but useless enterprises against the Tungani and toward Wakhan. The truth does not seem to have been far exaggerated in the pathetic language of the son of the ruler of Artosh when he said, "During the Chinese rule there was everything, there is nothing now."

We have now nothing left but to briefly consider the terminating act of Yakoob Beg's reign, and it is not necessary to say much here on this final catastrophe. In the autumn of 1876 the rumour reached the Ameer that a Chinese army had commenced operations to the east of Turfan; but it was not until the fall of Manas in October of that year that he perceived that this fact was of importance to himself. Swiftly the rumour ran through Kashgar that the Khitay were returning for their revenge, and all the memory of their former prowess revived at their preliminary successes north of the Tian Shan. Yakoob Beg, undisturbed for twelve years in his occupation of Eastern Turkestan, had now to face the same danger which had crushed every Khoja prince from Jehangir to Wali Mahomed. With all his natural courage, the heart of Yakoob Beg must have misgiven him. The return of the Chinese after so long a respite seemed like the inexorable decree of fate. Early in the spring of last year the Chinese army, considerably more numerous than that collected by the Athalik Ghazi round Turfan, commenced operations from Manas by forcing the Devan pass through the Tian Shan, and also from Hami by pushing on a detachment against Chightam and Turfan. Both operations were crowned with success, and Yakoob Beg, driven out of Turfan, seems to have kept up a running fight to Toksoun, where he was again severely beaten. He then withdrew in haste to Korla, where, some weeks afterwards, he died, either through natural causes, or by the hand of the assassin, as is now the accepted version. His army thereupon abandoned all the country up to Kucha, and the Chinese slowly advanced into Kashgar. In the meanwhile Beg Bacha had, after some opposition, succeeded his father; but the skilful generalship of the Chinese has compelled him to seek refuge in Russian territory. Practically speaking, Eastern Turkestan has reverted to its old position as a Chinese province, and the story of Yakoob Beg and of his rule passes into the domain of history.

Yakoob undoubtedly possessed great abilities, and for a modern

Asiatic he achieved no mean task. As soldier and ruler he equally excelled, and in his own private life he appears to have been both moderate and generous. Steeped in all the customs, or intrigues, of the Court of Khokand, he emancipated himself from the enervating influences of that court, once he became an independent ruler, and has left a name which, whether he be handed down to history as Yakoob Beg or as the Athalik Ghazi, will not lightly pass out of the pages of Central Asian chronicle. Therein is the chief proof of his individual superiority. When Khudayar Khan, Mozaffur Eddin, and possibly Shere Ali, are forgotten, the mention of Kashgar will bring back the remembrance of a warrior who roused sympathy in the streets of Calcutta, and in the reception-rooms of London. Identified with the Mahomedan religion, and the bold defier of Russian power, the sympathies of all his co-religionists were attracted towards him; nor, though he failed in accomplishing the summit of his or their desires, will he be soon forgotten by those who had come to regard him as a heaven-sent champion. His premature end, brought about by an invasion which was generally considered to be an impossibility, dispelled every illusion about the power of his state. But in closing this account of the great ruler we may say that his final overthrow in no way detracts from the high esteem in which we must always hold this able and successful sovereign.

XXI.

THE HISTORY OF THE OPIUM TRAFFIC.[1]

THE subject of the opium traffic between India and China is attracting so much attention both in the East and at home, where it has been frequently represented in the light of a national scandal, that the enumeration of the simple facts connected with its origin and development may be useful for the removal or correction of popular error and misconception. The task has become the more necessary because statements have lately been put forward to the effect that the Chinese authorities meditate taking diplomatic action in the matter. Whether these rest on any solid foundation or not, the mere rumour has sufficed to rouse the energy of those who have long devoted a laudable, if, perhaps, a somewhat mistaken zeal to the cause of the abolition of the use of opium, and we have already witnessed several and are on the eve of witnessing more meetings brought together for the purpose of denouncing the opium traffic by those who are rightly looked upon in this country as the champions of this propagandum. The remarkable letter which appeared some weeks ago from the Chinese statesman Li Hung Chang furnished those who had enlisted in the cause of the Anti-Opium Society with a fresh inducement to persevere in an undertaking which, if statistics are to be accepted as the test, is not more agreeable to the

[1] *The Times*, January 4, 1882.

people who consume opium than to the Governments whose revenues profit by its consumption. For that letter showed, at least, that there was a feeling prevalent among Chinese statesmen generally in favour of measures to control and circumscribe the actual consumption of opium as the enemies of the drug have long sustained. The argument has been consistently advanced by them until it has become a cardinal article of their faith that we should not only hold out the hand of friendship and brotherhood to the Chinese in their praiseworthy endeavours to put down the use of opium, but that we should set them a great example of Christian virtue and aid their gropings in the dark by ourselves cutting the Gordian knot for them. For, as it has been somewhat naively stated, the prohibition of the export of opium from India would, of course, solve the difficulty at once and strike the evil at the root; but those who suggest so extreme and violent a remedy can have but little idea of the disturbing consequences that would ensue both to the prosperity of a large number of the people of India and also to the buoyancy of its revenue, without, perhaps, attaining the very object they had in view. In face of these circumstances, it may not be uninteresting to sketch the history and growth of opium and to explain the present conditions of its manufacture in India and of its exportation to China, where, it must be remembered, the native-grown opium is as much an article in common use as the finer Indian growth is one of luxury.

The subject promised once to engage and could alone have been done justice to by the pen of De Quincey; but, although he left posterity the "Confessions" as a source of delight, the fates were not auspicious for his plan of enriching our literature with a standard history of a drug whose medical properties have from the earliest ages proved most beneficial for mankind, but which he wished to exalt to a still higher pinnacle as an infallible consolation for melancholy humanity. In the absence of that classic we may, without presumption, proceed to trace the origin and development of the poppy-seed, whence is taken the opium of commerce. Originally the poppy, which was cultivated with the greatest success in Asiatic Turkey and Persia, was used exclusively as an article of medicine, and several allusions to its excellent qualities are to be found in the works of the great medical writers of the Eastern Empire. But it is probable that the practice of opium eating had been introduced into the palaces

of the great in Persia at a comparatively earlier period than elsewhere, although the custom was restricted to a numerically small and select class. The example set by the Persian magnates was imitated at a later period by the Hindoo princes of Rajputana, and also, there is some ground for believing, by a few of the later emperors of the Ming dynasty in China. But these exceptions were instances rather of individual weakness and self-indulgence than of general depravity or of a confirmed national taste. The total production of opium throughout the East was extremely small and consisted almost exclusively of that grown in Persia and parts of Asiatic Turkey. The former was conveyed into Eastern Asia, either as merchandize or, more frequently, as part of the gifts accompanying the embassies which during the 15th and 16th centuries often proceeded from Persia to China, while the latter supplied the markets of Europe with an invaluable medicine. Turkish opium was till quite recently admitted to be the finest in quality in the world, and was in general use for medical purposes among ourselves; while Persian opium, after suffering from the depression which has beset everything connected with that country for many years, has recently developed fresh energy and is now exported in considerable and increasing quantities to China.

With the exception of that brought into the country from Persia, the supply of opium in China was very small until within a comparatively recent period. A small quantity appears to have been always cultivated in the southern parts of Yunnan, but this barely sufficed for the medicinal requirements of the country. As it was of an inferior quality also, it probably did not present the temptations for smoking or consumption that were possessed by the finer growths of foreign countries. Be that as it may, the Yunnan opium was either used only locally or sent out of the province for the purpose of being employed medicinally. The Portuguese were the first to introduce Indian opium into China, which they did in small quantities through their possessions of Goa and Macao. The amount imported by their means probably varied, but, up to the year 1767, the average has been considered upon good authority not to have exceeded 200 chests annually. To what use this imported opium was turned is not known, nor can we say with any degree of certainty whether it was employed medicinally, or whether it formed an article of luxury for the

private indulgence of the mandarins of Canton. We know, however, that the Portuguese paid heavily for its admission, both by their rent at Macao and by custom dues at Canton. We shall not be drawing a false conclusion from these facts when we trace to this source the origin of that taste for opium which began to reveal itself in a marked manner among official classes in China towards the end of the last century. After the year 1767, the Portuguese trade in this article developed to a considerable extent, for whereas before that year the amount had long remained stationary at 200 chests, it suddenly increased after that year to 1,000 chests, which may be taken as a strong proof of the growth in the interim of a national taste for this article. After this remarkable development in the traffic, the Portuguese did not long enjoy the monopoly which they had hitherto possessed, for the subject had naturally attracted the attention of the representatives of our East India Company; and it was, of course, resolved, with the promptitude that characterized all the measures of that great association, to enter into competition with the Portuguese and to secure for their nation some of the advantages of this branch of the external trade of India. The motives which underlay the first venture made by Englishmen of exporting opium from India to China were therefore most natural and, indeed, honourable. The pernicious effects of over-indulgence in the use of the drug were not visible,[1] if they were even so much as conjectured, and

[1] In a letter written by a Mr. Faucett from Vizagapatam on November 17, 1711, preserved in the Records of the India Office, occurs perhaps the earliest reference to the medicinal virtues of Indian opium. The passage is as follows: "I hope the West Coast will prosper; it has been hitherto a fatal place to our countrymen by reason that few of them have observed the rule of moderation in eating and drinking. I have taken notice in these parts that those that content themselves with a poor living upon rice, grain, fish, &c., live easy and free from distempers; whereas those that indulge themselves with daily eating flesh meat and strong liquors bring upon themselves those distempers in their prime and younger years that are incident and seldom happen but in old age in Europe. Every excess is bad; that of eating so much flesh in these parts is the worst of all; but if this and so much strong liquors cannot be avoided, it *is better, I am sure safer, for such to indulge themselves with a moderate dose of opium daily*, which would free them from all distempers, strengthen and invigorate them to go through all fatigues of business, and cause longevity and old age, as I have observed by hundreds of people who have taken it for fifty or sixty years together which confirms me in the belief that the medicinal virtue of opium does not consist in working of and curing distempers, but in preventing of them, preserving the body in a true state of health."

the simple, practical fact, that there existed at Canton a demand for an article which India could supply, afforded a sufficient and only reason for the East India Company to take up a commercial venture which its Portuguese rivals appeared to find profitable. The Portuguese trade in opium with China was not a matter that could be kept long concealed from their English rivals, and in 1773 the East India Company, under the auspices of Vice-President Wheeler, sent their first venture of opium to China from Calcutta. The experiment was made on a small scale, but its success was so considerable that three years later it was repeated. Two vessels were left at anchor in Larks Bay, south of Macao, to serve as depôts for the traffic, which, it must not be forgotten, was contraband, and maintained in defiance of Imperial edicts. In connection with this the second shipment by Englishmen of opium to China, we are told that the drug, which costs at Calcutta 500 rupees a chest, was sold to the Chinese at the rate of 500 dollars, or at a profit of about 100 per cent. After this successful beginning the trade went on steadily increasing, and it appeared to consist equally of private ventures by British shippers, and of expeditions fitted out by the East India Company, into whose coffers the profits were paid. To note the progress of this traffic it may be useful to record that, in 1794, when the importation of Indian opium through English agents had risen to nearly 1,500 chests, a large vessel, which was stationed at Whampoa, near Canton, for the purpose of serving as an opium depôt, was allowed to remain there unmolested for a period of more than twelve months. News travels slowly in China, and time has to elapse before the fixed lines of Chinese policy can be moved from their torpor to meet the exigencies of some new political or social danger; and so it was in the case of the opium traffic. A single generation had sufficed to create among the official and wealthier classes of Southern China a taste for opium smoking, which presented a favourable opportunity to the mercantile community in India not likely to be overlooked or left unutilized. But it was not until the practice had made considerable progress and firmly established its ground that the Pekin Government awoke to what it considered the serious nature of the evil; then its action was marked, however, by considerable vigour.

In the year 1800, Kia King, who had not long succeeded his illustrious father, Keen Lung, issued a formal proclamation

not only forbidding the importation of opium, but absolutely prohibiting its cultivation in Yunnan—a step which had never before been taken, and which, if it had been literally carried out, would have been attended by considerable inconvenience and evil consequences. So far as the Imperial commands went they were emphatic, and the punishments ordained against those who broke the new law were of the severest kind. The Governor of Yunnan, in particular, was enjoined to employ some stronger argument than "the use of empty words," but the powerful mandarins at Canton, who controlled one of the most convenient sources of the Imperial revenue, were left to pursue their malpractices with impunity. Despite Kia King's good intentions and the frequent issue of edicts of marked severity against all those who either cultivated, imported, or consumed opium, the traffic in this article of contraband steadily increased. The trade, of which we have seen the small commencement, amounted in 1827 to nearly 10,000 chests, and ten years later it had risen to four times that quantity, or more than 40,000 chests per annum. The further progress of the trade may here be briefly indicated. In 1856–7 the import of opium into China reached the sum of 70,000 chests, and at the present time it may be computed at 90,000 chests. The trade made much of this progress under all the disadvantages arising from its being contraband. The task of landing opium on the Chinese coast was not unaccompanied by danger as well as by inconvenience; and, until the first of our wars with China, there were frequently collisions between our armed merchantmen and the revenue cruisers sent from Pekin and the north to control in some small degree the movements of the local mandarins. In 1842, however, the Treaty of Nankin placed our trade relations on a more satisfactory basis, and the later Treaty of Pekin gave opium a place among the legal imports into China and removed the last obstacle to the development of the trade, which forthwith attained its present large dimensions.

Although the proclamations of the Pekin Government were sufficiently clear in their terms, and notwithstanding that there is every reason to believe that, so far as the matter was a question of domestic policy, both the emperor and his advisers were acting from the most laudable motives and with the full intention of carrying out their determination to suppress the cultivation and the use of opium, very little was practically done towards the

attainment of their objects. In Yunnan the cultivation of the poppy seed continued, and it gradually extended into the neighbouring province of Szechuen, while the Canton estuary presented the ready means for the introduction of the foreign growth into the country. The provincial officials were too little under the control of the central authorities to fear the punishments nominally in force against those who meddled with the opium traffic; and so long as they felt able to send bribes to the capital and to contribute their quota of revenue to the exchequer, they well knew that they had little to apprehend from the moral indignation of those *literati* who presented their petitions as to the degenerate practices of the age, and who received thanks for their patriotism and regard for Confucian precepts. The clumsiness of the official machinery of China matched the impotence of the central authority, and neither the gravity of the evil nor the earnestness of the few reformers who deplored the pernicious consequences which they partly saw in fact, but which they more frequently conjured up in their imaginations, availed to arrest the development and progress of a traffic which was based on the universal law of demand and supply. Internal disturbances, which had revealed themselves before that date, broke out on a large scale in different parts of the empire after the close of our first Chinese war, and rendered the task of abolishing the use of opium still more difficult, if not absolutely impossible.

But, so far as the policy of the Imperial Cabinet is to be judged in this matter, it must be pronounced to have been consistent enough up to this point; and even the realization of China's weakness in comparison with Europe's strength did not for many years produce any corresponding change or modification in the established policy of the Chinese. The old edicts remained in force, and it was still death to have any dealings in opium, which was denounced in the official document as "the flowing poison." Two years after the Treaty of Nankin the emperor, among whose advisers the opinion was beginning to spread that the consumption of opium might be turned to good account for purposes of revenue, declared that he would be no party to any scheme for profiting out of a national weakness and vice. His reply may be fitly quoted here as expressive of the views prevailing among the more national or extreme party of Chinese statesmen: "It is true that I cannot prevent the introduction of the flowing poison—gain-

seeking and corrupt men will, for profit and sensuality, defeat my wishes; but nothing will induce me to derive a revenue from the vice and misery of my people." The praiseworthy and admirable sentiment contained in this sentence long guided the opium policy of the Government; but its numerous necessities, produced by a series of unparalleled misfortunes, gave practical significance to the arguments of those who strenuously maintained that the opium consumption supplied the state with a great source of revenue. The close of the second foreign war, which terminated with the Treaties of Tientsin and Pekin, found the views of this new and, it may be added, practical school gaining the ascendant; and when the new tariff was issued opium figured in it as a legal import, subject to certain provisions and to an import tax at the rate of thirty taels per picul—*i.e.*, of about £10 per chest. In addition to this direct tax, transit dues or "lekin" were leviable after the opium had been removed from the port; so that by our last treaty the Chinese Government were vested with the right to share in the revenue derivable from the large Chinese consumption of opium. There can be no question that they found this new source of wealth very useful, and we must attribute to the large sums drawn from this source during the last twenty years, quite as much as to any other cause, the remarkable progress made in that period towards the complete reunion and pacification of the country. Before pursuing this portion of the subject further we may appropriately say a few words about the manufacture of opium in India and concerning the revenue raised from that article.

We learn from Dr. Hunter's admirable "Imperial Gazetteer" that opium is grown and manufactured in two special tracts, "the valley of the Ganges round Patna and Benares, and a fertile tableland in Central India corresponding to the old kingdom of Malwa, for the most part still under the rule of native chiefs, among whom Scindia and Holkar rank first." The former is exclusively in territory directly under British rule, whereas the latter lies for the most part within the borders of the two principal Mahratta chieftains. In Malwa the cultivation of the poppy is free, but a large duty (£65 per chest) is raised on it as it passes through British territory. In Bengal, on the other hand, the cultivation is a Government monopoly. With the exception of Rajpootana and of a few places in the Punjab and the Central Provinces, the cultivation of the poppy is prohibited elsewhere in India. The manufacture of

the juice extracted from the white poppy (the unripe capsules of the *papaver somniferum*) into the opium of commerce is performed at Patna and Ghazipur for that grown in British territory, and at Indore and Gwalior for that cultivated in Malwa. In 1878–9 the total out-turn was 91,200 chests, of which the export value amounted to £12,993,985, and it was officially computed that the net profit to the state on this transaction amounted to nearly £8,000,000. Rather more than half of this total is derivable from the Bengal monopoly, and about £1,000,000 worth of this opium is destined for Burmah and the Malay settlements. The Chinese purchase the remainder for nearly £11,000,000. The operations of cultivating the poppy and then manufacturing it into good opium are marked with considerable difficulty, and require great patience and delicate treatment. As has been truly said, the success of an opium crop depends entirely on the care which is bestowed upon it, and some thirty years ago a medical gentleman demonstrated the accuracy of this statement by raising a very successful crop of opium under arduous climatic conditions near Edinburgh. This industry forms, since the decay of indigo-planting, one of the most remunerative branches of agriculture throughout a large part of India, and were the demand to be much reduced or summarily arrested, very great loss and suffering would inevitably ensue to a thrifty population unless some equally profitable substitute could be found for it.

The important share which the opium taxes contribute to the revenue of India is well known, and the task of adjusting the finances of that country without them would be more difficult than to carry on the administration of England without an excise. Yet practically that is the dilemma to which precipitate and rash action in this matter would bring us. The plausible argument is also brought forward that it is not only unworthy of a great Government to interfere in commercial matters by exercising the Bengal monopoly, but that it is to its discredit to make profit in this direct manner out of a traffic which is open to grave moral objections. The argument is ingenious, and might carry more weight if it were directed against the sole anomaly connected with our administration of India. But when the state took over the affairs of the East India Company, it had to accept many of the conditions of government which had alone enabled a few thousand Englishmen to establish their authority over the millions of India;

and among the anomalies which still exist is the opium monopoly of Bengal. The iconoclast or reckless reformer will not be deterred from demanding its removal because of the simple explanation of its origin; but prudent men will ponder before acting over the opinion expressed on this point by Sir Richard Temple, an Anglo-Indian statesman of proved ability and caution. Referring to the Bengal system, he says—

"These operations are, however, undertaken by the Government only as a means of securing the revenue. It would be possible to substitute for them the system which prevails on the western side, and which would be free from this particular form of objection. But, as the Bengal system has been long established and is thoroughly understood by the numerous persons concerned in it, the authorities have hesitated to make any change lest some loss should thereby accrue to the revenue."

In these lines may be seen the cautious views which guide the policy of the Indian Government in this matter. The withdrawal from the monopoly would derange all the machinery at present in work; but, although it might entail a loss to the revenue, it would hardly decrease in any appreciable degree the total export of opium from India. Monopoly or no monopoly, the object put forward by those who clamour against the opium traffic would still be as far from attainment as ever.

We have already seen that the Chinese Government derives a good round sum in the shape of customs from opium, and it is not unnatural to suppose that, as the present condition of China, both as regards political power, population, and material well-being, affords no reason to apprehend that opium-smoking has produced any worse effect on the national temper and character than spirit-drinking has among ourselves, this convenient revenue which has proved of such incalculable value to the public coffers has to a great extent reconciled their minds to the actual condition of this question. Of course there are those among the older Ministers at Pekin who would favour a return to the original policy of the empire, and who make the most capital they can out of the petitions presented to the throne by enthusiastic *literati* or by youthful aspirants to official rank. But facts are not to be overcome either by rhetoric or by reference to a period of Arcadian simplicity, and the necessities of the Chinese Government are just

as real as those of the Indian Administration, and admit as little of rash experiments being made. The action of the Pekin Cabinet, whenever it comes to the resolution to take action, will therefore probably be in the direction of obtaining an increase in the amount of the customs raised on opium, and the recent visit to Simla of a secretary of the Minister Li Hung Chang may be considered as a first step in this direction. Both the Chinese and ourselves will then have anxiously to consider whether the consumption of Indian opium, which is already a costly luxury beyond the reach of all save the wealthy, will admit of any further burden being placed upon it without entailing a diminution in the quantity purchased. Of course, so far as can be practically arranged, this result should not be deplored, as opium certainly comes under the category of those articles from which we should hope to derive "the *maximum* of revenue with the *minimum* of consumption;" but there is risk here as in other things of killing the goose that lays the golden egg.

The action of the Chinese Government is further hampered by the remarkable increase that has lately taken place in the cultivation of the opium poppy in the south-western province of Yunnan and in the adjoining province of Szchuen. Captain Gill, Mr. Baber, and several other travellers in this quarter bear testimony to the fact of the great increase that has taken place in the cultvation of the opium poppy; and of the prevalence of the fashion of opium-smoking in this part of China, where Indian opium is simply unknown, there can be no question. It is a common saying with the people there that "while you find an opium-pipe in every house in Kweichow, you find one in every room in Yunnan." There can also be no doubt that the practice is spreading among the people, and that the area under cultivation to meet the demand is annually growing larger and larger. Despite official protestations that the Government is desirous and resolved to put down by every means in its power the use of opium within its borders, the plain fact remains that within the last ten years the cultivation of native opium has gone on rapidly increasing; and the Pekin authorities have been either unable or unwilling to suppress this increased home production of a drug which they have denounced as a "flowing poison," and as coming under the ban of all honourable men. Their diplomatic action must necessarily be seriously hampered by these facts, and when we consider

that the Chinese taste for opium, confirmed by the lapse of time, can without difficulty be satisfied both from native growths and from Persia should the supply of the Indian opium be stopped or withdrawn, it will be admitted that even the somewhat exaggerated moral arguments or inducements brought forward against the maintenance of our trade in this article lose the little force they possessed and fall to the ground. The probability is that, if the Chinese Government take any steps at all in the matter, they will be in the direction of a revision of the tariff.[1] Beyond the trade ports opium is now under the complete control of the Chinese, and they can pass what internal regulations and laws as to its transit they like. It brings at present into their coffers a useful sum of nearly one million pounds sterling per annum.

[1] This is precisely what they have done, and the negotiations now concluded, and of which an account will shortly be published, have resulted in an increase of the import duty, and an amalgamation of customs and lekin. By this means the Chinese Government will have the immediate command of probably an additional two millions sterling.

XXII.

THREE CHINESE GENERALS.[1]

THE second of the Manchu emperors of China, the illustrious Kanghi, left to his successors a legacy of war beyond his Western Marches. In several campaigns he penetrated into the country lying to the north of the great desert of Gobi, and around the sources of the mighty river Amour. He reasserted the long-lost authority of the emperor over the petty princes of Jungaria, and waged in those regions thirty years of successful warfare, marked above all by the overthrow of the able and not less ambitious Galdan. It was not, indeed, until the genius of his general, Feyanku, turned the scale against the Jungarian prince in battle at Chao-modo, that Kanghi could congratulate himself upon assured success; and the death of Galdan in the following year rendered the triumph of his arms still more complete. But although the ablest and most formidable of the desert chiefs had been obliged to succumb to the emperor, all danger to Pekin from the West, whence in previous ages peril had so often come, had not been removed. The years following the death of Galdan were occupied in arranging various matters connected with the countries beyond Kansuh and Szchuen. They were years also of war, and of expeditions into Chinese territory sanctioned by Eleuth princes, and composed of the scum of Jungaria and

[1] *The Calcutta Review*, October, 1880.

Altyshahr.[1] One expedition against Sining failed; another against Tibet succeeded, and returned laden with the spoils of Lhasa. About the same time a severe defeat was also inflicted upon the Manchus near Turfan. Desultory warfare continued until Kanghi ceased to reign, and then his successor Yung Ching withdrew the Imperial forces. The refractory chiefs were left to their own devices, and the emperor remained content with the enjoyment of his home provinces. There was prudence in his resolution, if there was little of the heroic. But, at the same time that this withdrawal from the advanced position which Kanghi had taken up beyond Gobi was calculated to husband the resources of the state, it must not be forgotten that it possessed another and a less favourable aspect. It was a tacit admission that the bold and prescient policy of Kanghi, in anticipating danger from the ambition and military ardour of the peoples of Central Asia, was to be abandoned, and that the Manchu dynasty, under the guidance of Yung Ching, would trust to the chapter of accidents for the avoidance of a danger which in times past had frequently proved to be of the gravest description. Fortunately for the peace of the Chinese frontier—nay, perhaps, even for the preservation of the Manchu dynasty—the hesitating and weak-willed Yung Ching was succeeded by the resolute and sagacious Keen Lung, before the princes of Jungaria had recovered from the blows which Kanghi and his generals had inflicted upon them.

The same reasons which induced Kanghi in the 17th century to undertake war against Galdan, operated in the mind of Keen Lung in the 18th, and made him disposed to champion the cause of Amursana, a chief who had ruled on the banks of the Ili, and who had fled to China for safety from the pursuit of his rival, Davatsi. It was not long before Keen Lung came to the determination to support the cause of the fugitive, and in 1755 he placed at his disposal a Chinese army commanded by a general named Panti. This general had already distinguished himself, and had obtained from his master several titles of honour. It is scarcely necessary to remark that, as has always been the case when the claims of a pretender have to be supported by a foreign army, the real authority was vested in the hands of the Chinese general. It is instructive to know what the condition of China

[1] *I.e.*, Kashgaria, or the land of the six cities.

was at the time when military enterprises were being sanctioned in remote regions, and the Emperor Keen Lung himself tells us something upon the subject: "My empire is the largest, the richest, and the most populous in the world. My coffers are overflowing with money; my magazines are filled with all kinds of supplies. I have sufficient resources to furnish the expenses for the longest war, to support my people when oppressed by unforeseen calamities, to provide for multitudes of workmen by employing them on public or other useful works." Such was the picture drawn by this ruler of the internal condition of the vast empire which he governed. It was, we know from independent sources, neither exaggerated nor overdrawn. He gives an equally glowing account of the condition of the Chinese army, of the Manchu and Solon warriors. It was with a strong detachment of these latter that Panti advanced towards Ili. Terror went before them. Davatsi's followers deserted him. In five months the whole of the country lying immediately to the north of the Tian Shan was at the feet of the Chinese emperor. His troops, sure of victory, had broken "cheerfully through every obstacle. Hardly had they time to bend a bow, or to draw an arrow, before there was submission everywhere." For this brilliant success Panti received the title of Tsè, and was honoured with other marks of his sovereign's pleasure. With a force computed at 150,000 men he had conquered an enormous extent of country, and it was his proudest boast that he had done so without losing a single man of his in action. China's first campaign on the banks of the Ili was therefore bloodless. Her subsequent successes were to be neither so easily attained, nor so wholly satisfactory in their results.

Amursana became king of Jungaria. He was only a puppet in the hands of Panti, yet he aspired to increase of dominion. From his palace on the Ili he looked with a coveting glance towards the rich cities of Altyshahr. He longed to see himself installed as ruler in Kashgar and Yarkand. He intrigued, and he promised freely. His overtures were regarded with suspicion, yet he was the nominee of the Bogdo Khan, and, as such, spoke with authority. The leaders of one of the factions of Altyshahr placed themselves at his disposal, and Panti gave his approval to a scheme which had every appearance of resulting in the addition of a fresh province to the empire. The enterprise fared well, and another Chinese vassal established himself as ruler at the

important city of Aksu, chiefly by the assistance of a detachment of Chinese troops lent by Panti. This success further increased the growing confidence of Amursana, and, as it acquired fresh force, so the restraint of the Chinese general's presence appeared to be more and more irksome to him. When the campaign had closed with the capture of Davatsi, the Chinese army had returned home. Panti remained behind with a small garrison of 500 men. The emperor's representative continued to insist upon Amursana submitting to his guidance in all things, although the power to enforce his will had really departed from him when his army retraced its steps to Kansuh.

The friction between the rival authorities was continual, and soon mutual suspicion became pronounced hostility. Amursana beheld his authority daily more curtailed, and he chafed at the restraints imposed upon his inclinations. Panti saw the growing distrust and restlessness of the Eleuth, and by his advice Keen Lung summoned Amursana to Pekin. The latter refused to comply, and both parties prepared themselves for the conflict. Panti, although aware of the growing rebelliousness in the mind of Amursana, does not appear to have believed that he would have sufficient audacity to attack a Chinese viceroy. He trusted to the prestige of his country to carry him safely through all dangers. His over-confidence was not justified by the event. Amursana revolted, and his followers carried everything before them. Panti, surprised when almost alone, was slain, and his fate was shared by his colleague Aiougan and all of Manchu race. Thus fell, by the hand of the assassin, the general who but a short time before had laid the greater part of Central Asia at the feet of Keen Lung. His operations in the field had been characterized by rapidity, and they had been crowned with success. Lulled by his triumph into a feeling of security, he had not appreciated at its due importance the danger from the piqued ambition of Amursana, and he paid the penalty of his blindness with his life. As a general he was no unworthy successor of Feyanku, and he left to those who came after him a name and an example.

For a moment the shock of this reverse unnerved the statesmen at Pekin. The cry was raised that it would be well to abandon the possessions on the Ili, and wise to give up the idea of preventing a sad and useless war. These views found no favour in the eyes of Keen Lung. He sent vindicating armies, and he told his

generals, "in the most precise orders," that they must either capture the rebel or perish in the attempt. So far as regular resistance went, Keen Lung's generals were not more strenuously opposed on this occasion than Panti had been on the previous one. They were, however, deceived by Amursana, and an order for their recall was sent from Pekin. In the meanwhile they had fallen into an ambuscade, and been murdered. Their next successors were not much more fortunate. They also proved themselves to be too confiding, and fell into disgrace. Keen Lung never showed pity to incompetence or ill-success, and they were re-called the year after they had set out for the command of the army, to meet the fate of defeated generals at Pekin.

At this moment when matters wore their blackest aspect for the Chinese, the second of the great generals produced by the wars of Keen Lung appeared upon the scene. This general's name was Tchao-hoei, and, when everything appeared lost in Central Asia, he gathered round him the few Manchu troops that remained, and opposed the hitherto successful rebels at all points. By his noble example he restored the confidence of his soldiers, but, while striking at sedition wherever it raised its head, he made it appear that he was not less anxious for the attainment of a solid and lasting peace than he was for military renown. At first his forces were too few to strike at the root of the danger, and he was compelled to ask the emperor for reinforcements, at the same time that he submitted a plan of campaign to him. Struck with the ability shown in this despatch, Keen Lung sent the troops required, and appointed Tchao-hoei General-in-Chief. The result completely justified the emperor's discrimination. The whole region was re-conquered, and Amursana compelled to flee for safety to Russian territory. The close of the year 1757 found the Chinese again established in unquestioned supremacy in all the region north of the Tian Shan. Tchao-hoei became convinced that there would be no tranquillity for his master's dominions until the country to the south had also been converted into a Chinese province. The attempt was made of governing through native princes, but these either proved weaklings or rebelled. Barhanuddin Khoja and his brother openly raised the standard of revolt at Kashgar and Yarkand, although but a few months before they had experienced the clemency of the emperor. An envoy with an escort of 100 men was sent to the court of Bar-

hanuddin, by whose orders they were barbarously murdered. It became necessary, as Keen Lung says in his narrative, to again draw the sword from the scabbard in which it had just been sheathed. "March," he wrote to his general, "against the perfidious Mahomedans, who have so insolently abused my favours. Avenge your companions, who have been the unhappy victims of their barbarous fury." Of the details of this war in the country of Little Bokhara, or Kashgaria, Keen Lung says nothing. "My troops set out, and in a short time Hoeipou (Little Bokhara) was conquered." Fortunately the Père Amiot has supplied the omission, and left us contemporary evidence which enables us to fill up something of the outline of that war. This consists in the letters from Tchao-hoei to Keen Lung. It would be easy to compose an epitomized narrative from these; but as they have rarely been quoted by any author, it will be most instructive to give the principal passages from the Chinese general's account of his own campaign. The letter is written from the camp before Kashgar on a date which corresponded with the 13th of September, 1759. "The two Hotchom" (Barhanuddin and his brother) "having learnt that your Majesty's troops were marching against them, abandoned their amusements in repairing the fortifications of Kashgar and Yarkand. They at once perceived that it would be impossible for them to resist your arms. They fled from their cities, and they dragged themselves and their families from hiding-place to hiding-place. The inhabitants of Kashgar, like those of Yarkand"—who had surrendered to Tchao-hoei without offering any resistance before he advanced on Kashgar—"surrendered to us with every demonstration of joy, which was a sign that they asked for nothing better than to live under the laws of your Majesty, to experience in their turn the effects of the goodness of your great heart which embraces all the world. They came before us, bringing refreshments, which I accepted, and caused to be distributed among the soldiers, whilst giving in all cases to those who brought them small pieces of silver, or other money, not under the name of payment, but rather as a reward. They appeared to me to be very well satisfied with the arrangement. I entered the city by one gate, and left it by another. The inhabitants covered me with honour. Some accompanied me throughout my progress, crying out frequently, 'Long live the great Emperor of China!' Others lined the streets

through which I had to pass. They were kneeling, and remained in that posture the whole time that I was making my progress. I made them a short address, in which I pointed out the happiness that they were about to enjoy, if they remained faithful in their duty to your Majesty. At the same time I announced that those amongst them who had followed the side of the rebels could be sent to Ili, and that that would be the only punishment for a crime for which they deserved to have lost their lives. I was frequently interrupted by fresh cries of, 'Long live the great Emperor of China! May he and his descendants give us laws for ever!' I at once gave orders for the preservation of public tranquillity, and for the prompt re-establishment of all things on their ordinary basis." The remainder of the letter is taken up with a description of the emperor's new province, which is very interesting, but beside the present subject. By a judicious mixture of severity and moderation, by tact as a governor, quite as much as by valour as a soldier, Tchao-hoei had accomplished the task—which the courtiers of Pekin had styled impossible—of conquering Little Bokhara. The measures he took were such as to make conquest appear to be as little odious as possible in the eyes of the subjected people.

While Tchao-hoei was re-arranging matters in the great cities, his lieutenant, Fou-ta, was in active pursuit of Barhanuddin, whom he defeated near Altchour (Sirikul). He defeated him again on the little Pamir, and the Khoja with his brother fled into Badakshan. The ruler of that country surrendered them to the Chinese, and they were sent to Pekin, where they were executed. The Chinese wars in this region closed with complete success. Beyond the frontier line which they had taken up, the chiefs of the Kirghiz tribes and the rulers of Khokand became vassals of the Bogdo Khan. Tchao-hoei's task completed, he returned to Pekin to receive the rewards showered upon him by a grateful sovereign. His success had been equal to that of Panti. It was greater in that no ill-success marred its close. His brilliant achievements did not shield him from the envy of the great, but they received their due recompense at the hands of the sovereign. It was not too great a price to have paid, to have incurred the malice of one's rivals for having won the favour of the dispenser of all honour. Keen Lung, on his approach to Pekin, went out half-a-day's journey to meet his successful general. One of the

royal palaces was set apart for his use, and he was raised to the title of Count, and appointed a Minister of State, while his son was espoused to a princess of the blood royal. For several years Tchao-hoei enjoyed in peace the honours which his master bestowed upon him, and then he sank under the infirmities to which flesh is heir. An incident occurred in connection with his death which is worthy of preservation. Keen Lung paid him a visit, although it was known that he was dead. He wished it to be supposed that Tchao-hoei was still alive, and the general was dressed and placed in his chair to receive his Majesty, who addressed him as follows: "I command you to remain as you are. I come to see you for the purpose of exhorting you to leave nothing undone towards the re-establishment of your health. A man like you is still necessary to the empire." The task which it may be said that Panti commenced and Tchao-hoei completed, was one that stood the test of time. One hundred years after Tchao-hoei made his triumphant progress through the streets of Kashgar, and Fou-ta won his memorable victories on the crest of the Pamir, the Chinese authority was still supreme in Little Bokhara. Many a blow had been levelled against it. It had withstood the shock of rebellion and external aggression. Treason within and force from without had gone far to ruin the bright prospects that had appeared so easy of attainment, when Tchao-hoei harangued the town people of Kashgar and Yarkand, yet the writ still ran throughout the land in the name of the Bogdo Khan. The great rising of the Tungani in the country from Kansuh to the Kizil Yart in 1862–63 produced a series of events which led to the overthrow of the Chinese administration, and to the substitution for it of a variety of Mahomedan governments of which the most respectable was that of the late Yakoob Beg. That overthrow and the creation of these independent states revived the condition of things that obtained in the days of Kanghi and Keen Lung. For Galdan stood the Athalik Ghazi, with the exception that to the Khokandian soldier of fortune China in her weakness appeared to be a more likely prey than she could possibly have seemed when the Manchu dynasty was at its prime to the King of Jungaria. It is unnecessary to follow the course of events during this period. In due time the right and inevitable policy of repelling all possibility of invasion to a considerable distance from the Great Wall was adopted by the Pekin Govern-

ment, whose confidence had been restored by a series of successes elsewhere; and it was determined to recover the lost possessions round the Tian Shan and to chastise the murderers of Chinese soldiers and settlers. The accomplishment of this resolution was entrusted to a general who, whatever test we may apply to his actions, must be held to be one of the greatest generals of the day. There is no living commander of any country who has conducted so extensive, hazardous, and little appreciated a campaign as that against the Tungan rebels and the chief of Kashgar, and there are few who have shown as much skill and knowledge of the art of war as Tso Tsung Tang, the third great general which China's wars in Central Asia have produced in modern times.

Tso Tsung Tang, as viceroy of the north-west province of Kansuh, had at an early period in the disturbances been called upon to deal with the Tungan rebels, and very soon he was in a position to announce to the Pekin authorities that the insurrection has been stamped out of his province. He then set himself to the task of collecting an army, and the necessary supplies for an advance across Gobi upon the countries of the Tian Shan. Years were occupied in this work. He submitted a plan of operations, but unlike his predecessor Tchao-hoei he had no Keen Lung to deal with. In 1871 he succeeded, by intrigues among the Calmucks, and by despatching a small expedition, in re-establishing the Chinese authority at Chuguchak; but it was only on sufferance that he was able in that year to do even this much. His preparations were not finally completed before the year 1874, when he commenced operations by sending forward detachments from Lanchefoo, the capital town of Kansuh, and situated in the extreme north-west of that province. Two years at the least passed away before any considerable force had reached the vicinity of the Tungan cities, and during that period the Chinese soldiers had on several occasions to make halts of some duration for the purpose of forming depôts. The differences of climate between the various spots where these detachments halted also obliged them to pursue their way with deliberation across the barren wastes which lie between Lanchefoo and Barkul, the nearest of the Tungan cities. They are represented as having sown the corn which was to provide them with the means of continuing their march when it had ripened; and, primitive as the plan may seem to the military student to be, it is the only one which

makes warfare on a large scale possible in the barren regions between the Great Wall and the Caspian Sea, at least until the introduction of railways shall have annihilated space.

But in 1876 there was no longer room for doubt as to the movements of the army of Tso Tsung Tang. Rumour had long been rife as to its strength and the intentions of its general. Its very existence had been called in question, but in the early autumn of that year its appearance before the walls of Urumtsi, a once important city, commanding a pass through the Tian Shan, furnished a conclusive reply to the doubts and fears of the Mahomedan peoples, to whom the prospect of a return of the Chinese had long been the one oppressive dread of their existence. The Chinese general encountered little resistance at Urumtsi. The garrison surrendered in a few days, but the Chinese gave them no quarter. It is probable, however, that the townspeople were spared. Most of the chiefs and all the fighting men of the Mahomedans fled to Manas, a town to the north-west of Urumtsi. There they made their first and last stand against the Chinese. For two months—from the 2nd of September until the 6th of November—Tso Tsung Tang laid close siege to it, bombarding it from batteries constructed on the model of European artillerists, and levelling its walls by sap and mine. The defence was resolute, but the besiegers were persistent; and at length the end came, and the place surrendered. The Tungan army was to march out with the honours of war; but when the day arrived there were signs—at least such was the Chinese general's account—that it intended to cut its way through. Tso Tsung Tang took suspicion for certainty, and acted upon it without hesitation. The Tungan soldiers were all destroyed. The women, children, and old men were spared. With this decided victory Tso Tsung Tang's campaign north of the Tian Shan closed. It was but the prelude to a still more important one to the south of that range.

The Tungani being overthrown, the Chinese general turned all his attention to the more difficult task of prosecuting the war with Yakoob Beg, the late ruler of Kashgaria. The winter of 1876–77 was employed on both sides in making preparations for the conflict, and early in the latter year Tso Tsung Tang had a large army under his immediate command, probably 50,000 men, in readiness for the task of forcing the Tian Shan, while a smaller corps was advancing from Hami. Yakoob Beg had for his part not been

idle. He had concentrated most of his troops round Turfan, and a Russian officer who visited him at the time, computed their strength at 17,000 men with thirty guns. In addition to these trustworthy troops, he had 10,000 Tungani; but as most of these deserted before the fighting began, they were no element of strength. Early in April the Chinese army was in motion. Fighting took place in the defiles of the Tian Shan, with, however, no result; but the advance of the corps from Hami was rapid and unopposed. This movement turned the Kashgarian line of defence. Yakoob Beg was compelled to concentrate his troops behind Turfan in face of a more numerous and a successful enemy. He was defeated, and again in a second battle at Toksoun. Soon after he died at Korla, but the Chinese general kept his troops in camp at Turfan during the whole of the summer. In August, when he had completed all his arrangements, and had occupied Manas and Karakaru with a large army, for the double purpose of overawing the remaining Tungani, and of providing against any dubious act on the part of the Russian authorities, the orders for the resumption of the campaign were issued. Tso Tsung Tang drew up a plan of action which was followed to the letter by his lieutenants. On the 2nd of October the Chinese army for the reconquest of Kashgaria was assembled at a village called Kuhwei, some distance west of Turfan. It numbered 15,000 men with thirty field pieces. On the 7th of October, Karashar was occupied; on the 9th Korla; on the 19th Kucha, near which two battles were fought and won. Before the end of the month Aksu was in the hands of the Celestials, and on the 17th of December Kashgar itself surrendered. The numerous pretenders to the throne fled to Russian territory; and the other great cities, Yarkand, Yangy Hissar, and Khoten, opened their gates to the invaders. It is not within the scope of this paper to consider the political significance of these events, but, in discussing Asiatic matters, it cannot be forgotten that China has incontestably proved that her fighting strength is far from being insignificant. The man who can collect troops under extreme difficulties, move them across a distance of more than 2,000 miles, and convert raw material of an unpromising character into soldiers capable of winning three campaigns, must be of no ordinary stamp. His manœuvres in the field, his operations against fortified towns, his tactics, and strategy prove Tso Tsung

Tang to have been an organizer of victory and worthy of the title of general. Lastly, his triumph has not proved ephemeral. He holds what he has won more than two years after his final victory, and he has held it under circumstances of peculiar difficulty. There is no reason for supposing that he will show less ability in retaining his conquest in the future.

The careers of these three generals, Panti, Tchao-hoei, and Tso Tsung Tang, the Chinese conquerors of Central Asia in modern times, will serve to show what China has done in the way of military enterprise. Equally important evidence might be furnished from the study of her wars in Tibet, and the Himalayan regions, in Burmah, Yunnan, Szchuen, and Formosa; but the Central Asian campaigns will suffice, and are of more present interest. The question, which need not here be answered, though it must suggest itself, arises, if in the past China has been able to do so much, what in the future may be expected from her when her army has been drilled by German, or French, or other instructors, and when her arsenals are as well supplied with weapons as those of this country? That day is certain to arrive sooner or later, and already the great military journal of Germany has gone so far as to style China "the natural ally of Germany." These predictions do indeed anticipate the future by certainly one, if not more than one, generation; but it is impossible to shut one's eyes to their growing significance.

XXIII.

THE CHINESE ART OF WAR.[1]

THAT the Chinese should possess a standard treatise on the art of war may appear strange to those who have hitherto classed that people in the category of uncivilized nations, but is none the less true as a matter of fact. If it will not bear comparison with Jomini's "Art de la Guerre," or "The Operations of War," of our own Hamley, it at least gives us a curious and instructive insight into the manner in which a great and practical people have carried on military operations in all parts of Asia, and under conditions as arduous as any that the armies of the great empires of the West have been required to face. The subject acquires peculiar importance at the present time, when practical proof has been afforded of the military capacity of the Chinese.

The supposition on which the organization of the Chinese army is based has always been that it is a militia, or army raised for home defence. Foreign service was a matter for special arrangements, and did not enter into the ordinary provisions of the military authorities. It was enough if they could maintain order within the vast empire, which was represented by what we call China Proper, without imposing unnecessary hardships on the mass of a people addicted to domestic pursuits and home-life. This view was modified after the Manchu conquest, and the

[1] *The Army and Navy Magazine*, November, 1880.

founding of the present dynasty, by the necessity that arose for the protection of the new conquerors and the consolidation of their rule. Hence came the two Tartar armies, composed of the Manchus, and their allies the Mongols, which are, and have always been, essentially mercenary, and consequently active bodies of troops. This Tartar army, after being employed in the conquest of China, became the standing force in the realm, the nucleus of those troops who subdued Central Asia, garrisoned Tibet, struck awe to the hearts of the rulers of Ava and Bangkok, curbed the pride of the Goorkhas, and died in their thousands in the island of Formosa. What it was during the reigns of the earlier Manchus, it still remains.

It is necessary, therefore, to remember that the army which the Chinese Government has at its disposal is one better suited for home defence than for foreign war. Yet the exigencies of its position, the character of the neighbouring tribes, the supreme difficulties raised by nature in the shape of vast deserts, lofty mountains, and desolate plateaus, to operations on the part of the inhabitants of the plains of China against the fierce clans of the uplands of the Mongolian and Tibetan wastes, have compelled this Government to wage, however reluctantly, more wars beyond its borders than any other known to history. From the earliest times, for more than 2,000 years, China has been engaged in a struggle with her neighbours, a struggle the alternating fortune of which has been clearly marked by her advance across, or retreat behind, the great desert of Shamo or Gobi. Her small, active army has, therefore, had a constant strain thrown upon it, and in the successive wars which have been fought, it has always been the plan to despatch a *corps d'élite* from the capital, and to recruit on the frontier the troops necessary to swell this force to the required dimensions. On account of the superabundant population, no difficulty was ever experienced in this respect; and the levies from the Tungani, Mongols, and Calmuck tribes were always numerous and forthcoming without delay. The Chinese army in the field was, and is, therefore, composed of a small contingent of Tartar regulars, of such of the local garrisons of the Green Flag army as happen to be disposable, largely augmented by recruiting for the particular campaign, and of a considerable auxiliary force from the tribes of the borders. The inducements to the soldier to proceed on these expeditions are numerous. In

the first place, there is an increased rate of pay and the prospect of plunder; in the second, if the private is killed, his family is provided for; and in the third, lands are allotted to him, if he likes, in the conquered country, on no other condition than that he shall give military service in the event of rebellion or foreign invasion. It will therefore be evident that the inducements offered to the Chinese soldier to join his Tartar brother in the danger and glory of a foreign war are very tangible, and well calculated to secure his sympathy and approval.

It only remains to briefly record the present strength of the Chinese army before proceeding to describe a military work which, in its phraseology at all events, is unique in the literature of the world. Nominally the Chinese army numbers nearly 800,000 men, divided between the three divisions of Manchus, Mongols, and native Chinese. The first-named are divided into 678 companies of 100 men each, which gives a total of 67,800 men, and this force is composed of the three arms—infantry, cavalry, and artillery. A very large proportion of the Manchu soldiers have rifles and modern weapons. The Mongol division probably musters rather more than 80,000 men, of whom 30,000 are distributed as the garrison of Mongolia and Manchuria. These are quite as efficient as the Manchu army, and are employed indiscriminately with it. The native Chinese army numbers the large total of 625,000 men, and of these half a million are styled the Green Flag army, and the remainder are utilized as a resident militia, whose service is of a vague and perhaps undefined character. This force is scattered over the whole of China, and its present efficiency is not very great. The soldiers reside in their own homes with their families, receive a small pay, and are allotted lands to eke out their existence. On the whole, they have little to complain of, and manage to pass a comfortable existence enough. They are found to be docile, if not very formidable, soldiers, and when induced to take part in an active campaign they evince those sterling qualities of sobriety, endurance, cool courage, and devotion which make the Chinese peasant one of the best materials for a soldier in the world. The armament of the Tartar army may be taken as fairly good, while that of the Chinese force is as wretched as it well can be. It is probable that it will remain so until the producing capacity of the rifle factory at Kiangnan has become sufficiently expanded to enable it to supply the wants

of the whole of the Chinese army. Having thus briefly detailed the principal points relating to the strength and character of the army of the Dragon Throne, the remainder of our attention may be devoted to the Kiau Ping Siu Chi, or manual for Chinese soldiers.

This great work is divided into eighteen sections, which partake of the double character of a homily on the duties Chinese subjects owe their country, and of a code of instruction to both officers and men in the rudiments, and also in the higher branches of the military art. It is supplemented, moreover, by the official lists, tables, and orders contained in the great publication which may be aptly styled the Imperial Blue Book, and to which we shall refer later on. But the Kiau Ping Siu Chi is for the Chinese officer and soldier what the Queen's Regulations are for our own, in addition to being the chief treatise on tactics and the art of war generally.

The first section of this compendious work deals with the all-important question of the transport and commissariat of an army in the field. The commissaries, who act immediately under the eye of the general, are instructed to spare no trouble and to use every effort to secure the services of trusty camp-followers. These are to be trained to the duties they will be required to perform, and when they have been certified as competent, a license is granted to them, and they are placed on the official register. It must not be supposed that this effective commissariat exists as a permanent department, but it is always organized on the eve of a campaign. The method is slow, but for wars that are meditated over for months, and even years before they are undertaken, it proves cheap and effective. In the districts included within the sphere of active operations, all carts, horses, and other beasts of burden are to be held at the disposal of the military, but payment is given for the hire, and fair compensation allowed for loss. The order of marching—cavalry in front, then infantry, and lastly the baggage with its appointed guard—is laid down, while the section concludes with the advice to generals not to exhaust their men by unduly long marches, as "gentle treatment begets obedience and respect."

Section two relates to reconnoitring an enemy's position, the construction of bridges, and the general necessity of trusting nothing to chance, and of "keeping one's eyes wide awake" in

the neighbourhood of a foe. Maps and all trustworthy information concerning the country, towns, and fortified places in the territory to be invaded are to be collected for the use of the general. Where this is impossible, the cavalry and "light companies" are to be sent ahead for the purposes of surveying the country and collecting information, which is to be carefully sifted "in order to prevent the villagers misleading the army." The instructions for bridging rivers are equally simple, and calculated to raise a smile among those accustomed to pontooning. Considering the remarkable engineering achievements which the Chinese performed twenty centuries ago, in throwing bridges across chasms and over valleys in the mountainous districts of the western provinces, something more durable than "a raft of reeds, bundles of straw, and wooden planks" might have been expected from this Chinese Jomini, whose name has unfortunately not been preserved. But perhaps a further proof is afforded by the very simplicity of this arrangement of the intense practicality of the Chinese.

The third section ordains that each company of 100 men is to form its own encampment, which is to be fortified by a trench and rampart. Not only do the soldiers thus obtain a considerable amount of shelter, and a fair substitute for the tent, but they hold a position which is practically secure against surprise. A Chinese encampment presents, therefore, the appearance of a collection of small forts, varying in number in accordance with the size of the army. This practice is, no doubt, modified in the case of a very large army, but as a general rule it is strictly carried out. The soldiers are always to sleep in their clothes, and with their weapons ready to their hand. Everything is to be done in as orderly a manner as possible, and on the assumption that an attack may be made at any moment. It would be difficult to say that these precautions, simple as they may appear, are not, after all, the hardest lessons to take to heart in military science.

At a moment when there is considerable discussion as to whether standards should not be abolished in our own army, it is significant to observe that section four dwells upon the importance of the flag, and its peculiar claims upon each company. It is to be carried by four of the strongest men, and when the drum sounds, is to be followed by the whole company with all speed although "fire and water should be before them."

The fifth section refers to various minor points, such as the attention to be paid to the gunpowder, balls, "which should be tried before using, as they may not fit properly," flints, and bow-strings.

The sixth treats of the careful treatment required by horses, a rare animal in China even now, and much more so at the time when this treatise was compiled; while the seventh, reverting to the question of the commissariat, stipulates that "all camp-followers should be steady men"—no doubt a thing much to be desired, yet scarcely to be obtained.

The eighth, ninth, and tenth sections describe the principal movements in the field before the enemy is "touched." The best place for an encampment to be pitched is on the summit of the highest ground, and if there is more than one hill near the site selected, the other heights should also be occupied, the essential point being strictly adhered to, and in no case departed from, that the extreme distance from one camp to another is "never to exceed two miles." Besides selecting the position of the camp from considerations of its defensive capabilities, due allowance should be made for such necessaries as water, wood, and grass being close at hand, and easily obtainable. There are also regulations included in these clauses about the police of the camp, and about the employment of spies and scouts—more remarkable as showing the wide extent of the subject covered by the Kiau Ping Siu Chi than for their own merit.

Having gradually traced the various stages of a campaign from the formation of the army to its advance into the enemy's country, the Chinese manual proceeds to describe the tactics to be observed when face to face with the hostile force. These are probably the most interesting of the whole contents of the volume. The cavalry is to be divided into two brigades, one of which is to be stationed on each wing, and slightly in the rear of the main line of battle. The guns are either to be massed in the rear of the centre, or distributed along a line parallel to, but behind, the front of the force. The infantry form the first line, with slingers, bowmen, and musketeers indifferently mixed up with each other. Each soldier is required to keep his rank, and to stand at the distance of fourteen inches from his next comrades. This is done with the double object of giving free play to the man in handling his weapons, and of enabling the force to cover a wide front—a great object with

Chinese generals of the past, whose generalship was chiefly shown by overlapping the hostile line, and by then compressing their wings so as to outflank and surround the enemy. As soon as the troops of the opposing force come within range a vigorous fire is to be opened upon them from all arms, and this, after being kept up for some time, is to be followed by an advance of the infantry. Unless the enemy shows symptoms of being beaten, the cavalry are to remain stationary, while the guns may take up a fresh position, if advisable. Should the enemy stand firm, the infantry, after firing one volley at the nearer distance, is to retreat slowly by companies, firing a further volley at each halt. Having regained the original line of battle, the artillery fire is to be redoubled, and when its effect is perceptible on the enemy, the forward movement is to be repeated, but this time, as there is to be no thought of retreat, the whole army is to advance, spearmen, bowmen, musketeers, cavalry, and the guns also, but at a slower rate. It is then, at this supreme moment of the battle, that the outflanking movement already referred to is attempted, and the result of the battle is generally decided by its success or failure. The description of these manœuvres forms the eleventh section of the Kiau Ping Siu Chi.

The twelfth points out that for any peculiarly dangerous enterprise special men should be selected. These should be volunteers, but if too few come forward, the strongest and veteran soldiers are to be selected by the captains of the companies. If the foe is posted on a hill, "a forlorn hope" should be formed to scale the height, and drive the enemy away. If, on the other hand, he should be in a valley, the surrounding heights are to be seized, and the enemy overwhelmed from the superior position. In both cases the enemy is to be vanquished, and with as little delay or loss as circumstances admit of.

The thirteenth section is remarkable as insisting on a point that is not perhaps sufficiently appreciated in some other armies, which is, that it is derogatory to the dignity of the army to select special men for the bodyguard of an officer. In China, no doubt, as in most Eastern countries, there is always a risk of the commander thinking more of his own personal safety and convenience than of the conduct of the battle, especially when it is remembered that history affords an instance of Chinese generals who, when entrusted with a numerous army, instead of engaging the enemy,

passed the time in inaction beyond the frontier, and returned reporting that they had performed doughty deeds and won great victories. This injunction has, therefore, practical force in a service possessing such traditions.

The remaining five, which complete the eighteen sections of this military text-book, partake more of the character of a homily to the men on their conduct than of a military treatise. The soldiers are reminded of the duty they owe their country, and of the peculiar glory which is theirs in fighting in its defence. They are to be patient under every privation, and obedient to their officers. If they behave as good soldiers, they are rewarded; while in the event of their being slain, their families have irresistible claims to the sympathy and support of their countrymen. The disgrace attaching to defeat is represented as "eternal," although the blame and punishment for it are reserved for the commanders alone. Lastly, officers are required to impress all these lessons on their men, who are in turn expected to pay heed to, and obey their injunctions.

In the Imperial Blue Book, which has been previously mentioned, and which consists of forty-eight volumes, there is a complete list of the generals, officers, and soldiers in the army, as well as of all weapons, munitions of war, &c., stored in the magazines. Eight at least of the volumes relate to things military, and much of the Kiau Ping Siu Chi is taken from the volumes of this Imperial register. The rate of pay, which for the Tartar army is 27*s.* a month, and other conditions of enlistment, besides the rewards of good service, are enumerated, while much of interest is said on the subject of military colonies, a method of conquering and pacifying a country adopted as much by the Chinese as it was by the Romans.

The military staff employed in the administration of the army is, according to the most advanced ideas, amply sufficient for the requirements of the army. There are no fewer than sixteen generals with the nominal rank of commander-in-chief. These constitute the Board or Council of War. There has at all times been a tendency for the guiding power in this assembly to gravitate towards individuals, and latterly this tendency has increased to such an extent that the popular voice fixes upon the foremost member, and invests him with the title of commander-in-chief. It has been computed that there are more than 18,000 military mandarins which, as the native Chinese army is very scantily

officered, gives a very large percentage to the Tartar troops. Literary qualifications decide an officer's claims not only to admission into the army, but also to promotion, as it is thought, and was expressed centuries ago, that the man who can pass the best competitive examination must make the best general. The fallacy of this view has been long exposed, and is beginning to be recognized in China. Several of the officers who took a prominent part in the overthrow of the Panthays in Yunnan, and two at least of the lieutenants of Tso Tsung Tang in Central Asia, are not *literati*, and have risen to their position by evincing courage, presence of mind, and fertility of resource in the field. It is from such men as these, and not from the book-worms round the council-table at Pekin, that the Chinese army will receive the impetus which is to make it a formidable machine under the conditions of modern warfare. Practical experience, and the hard teaching of difficulty successfully overcome and of disaster leading to victory, can alone bring about a change and improvement in Chinese tactics.

We have briefly recited the injunctions and regulations of the Kiau Ping Siu Chi, and it will not be denied that underneath the simplicity of its language there is apparent a plain practical common sense, which is the foundation of more complicated and scientifically worded military manuals. Ostensibly this treatise is still the only and the standard work recognized by the Chinese. It was by studying its primitive lessons that the commanders of the present day have restored the empire to its original limits. The great and the important questions that we have to ask are—Can, or will, the Chinese graft on the lessons of the Kiau Ping Siu Chi those they have acquired from the exigencies of war with the nations of the West? Will they modify its instructions so far as to render them compatible with modern tactics? Will they ever recognize the great truth of all, that the changes of battle are too many and too local in their character to admit of being arranged for by some hard-and-fast rule?

The evidence yet in our hands does not admit of a confident reply being made to any of these inquiries. We know that the Kiau Ping Siu Chi is still ostensibly the text-book of the Chinese soldier, and that, however much the victorious generals of the present day may have departed from its strict injunctions in practice, they have always continued to express the highest respect for

it. There are not wanting numerous circumstances to show that, while the formation of the troops may have been preserved, they are manœuvred in the field in a more skilful fashion. The introduction of rifles and modern artillery has unavoidably necessitated a change in the mode of delivering an attack, at the same time that the old practice of turning the flanks has developed into a form of strategy, often attended with striking success. Indeed, it is probable that the strategy of some specially gifted Chinese commanders at this moment is greatly superior to their tactical knowledge, or to that of the mass of Chinese officers.

In conclusion it need only be observed that the fact of the Chinese possessing a book on the art of war, incontestably their own invention, and as yet uncontaminated by Western knowledge, is a proof, not of their incapacity for war, but rather of the reverse. Acting upon its recommendations, which are plainly the result and teaching of practical experience, they have obtained remarkable successes, and made great conquests. It only requires some revision and amplification to meet the necessities of the age, and to leave the Chinese in possession of a military manual as suited to their customs and as complete as any possessed by other nations.

XXIV.

REFLECTIONS ON CHINESE HISTORY, WITH REFERENCE TO THE PRESENT SITUATION OF AFFAIRS.[1]

THE complication in Tonquin has not developed in the rapid manner that would have been in accordance with the habits of this continent. The crisis between France and China continues, but, to all appearance, it is less acute at this moment than it has been for some months past, although the imminent attack on Hunghoa and Bacninh may have decisive results one way or the other. France remains in actual possession of much of the northern province of Anam. Her arms have been victorious on every occasion. The enemies she has encountered have experienced the gallantry and discipline of her armies. Even the obstacles of the climate have been vanquished by science. On the other hand, China has done nothing to secure respect for her pretensions, to retain the sympathy of those who believe that she had the moral right on her side, and to convince her opponent, and the world at large, that she has the power and the disposition to enforce respect for those rights which both Prince Kung and the Marquis Tseng have defined with much force and clearness, as will be found on reference to the pages of the Yellow Book.

[1] Read before the Foreign and Colonial Section of the Society of Arts, Feb. 26, 1884.

Yet, slow and disappointing as, in a certain sense, China's diplomacy has been to those who thought that she had acquired the decision in council and celerity in action of a European Power, I shall be bold enough to say that those who were convinced that the Chinese would act in their own way, and not in servile imitation of the practice of this continent, never believed in the Chinese Government taking some open step of hostility against the French in the prompt and gallant manner that would have received the transitory admiration of this and some other countries, and that would have entailed defeat and disaster. The Pekin Government has placed on record, in the clearest possible characters, the rights it possesses in Tonquin. Those rights have been infringed, and some may consider that they have been surrendered. But a brief study of Chinese history would suffice to convince the most sceptical that the Chinese have acted on the present occasion exactly in accordance with their own fashion, and as they might have been expected to do, as well as to prove that dilatoriness in enforcing rights must not, in the case of China, be held to indicate the determination to abandon them.

The fact above all others which the study of Chinese history impresses upon the mind, is the extraordinary and undeviating persistency of the people, and the resolution with which the Government ever recurs to the pretension of paramount authority throughout a vast surface of the Asiatic continent. It is true that that claim has frequently been reduced to an empty pretence, that there have been long periods of the cessation not merely of all authority but of all intercourse between the central authority and its tributaries, and that the task of conquest has had to be resumed on many occasions at great sacrifice and under extreme difficulties. It is mainly because it has been so, that the fact is of more than historical importance, that it illustrates the pertinacity of the Chinese, and that it serves as a key-note to their character. In dealing with other peoples and empires, the historian finds the progress of national character and dominion marked by regular and duly ordered stages, until the apogee of power is reached, and the decline, rapidly accelerating in its descent, follows as inevitably as the night does the day, until the people are extinct or enslaved, and their greatness has become a tradition. It has been the same in Asia as in Europe. The famous dynasties of India, Persia, and Central Asia have passed away as completely

as the empires of Greece and Rome. But China has been the exception, since the beginning of tangible as opposed to traditional history. With her, the necessary penalty of decay has not followed. She has sounded the lowest depths of misfortune; she has reached the last stage of decrepitude; and then, by some marvellous essence in her composition, exhaustion, instead of entailing destruction, has facilitated the recovery of vigour. The historian could point to more than twenty occasions, within the last 2,500 years of China's existence, when it would, to all seeming, have been justifiable to exclaim over the dismembered fragments of the Middle Kingdom, *Fuit*. Yet it has emerged from all these calamities with undiminished power and reputation, and seems to have acquired renewed strength from the closer knowledge of misfortune. Sometimes the re-invigorating influence has come from a foreign conqueror, such as the Mongol and the Manchu; but more frequently the restorer has emerged from the ranks of the people themselves, in the garb of a religious devotee, or of a social reformer. But whether it was Taitsong or Hongwou, Kanghi, or Kublai, the result has been the same for the Chinese people. They have been rescued from the evils of civil war, or relieved from the oppression of effete despotisms; and in return they have, by their diligence and assiduity in peaceful pursuits, restored the prosperity of the state, and sustained an administration capable of asserting the dignity and privileges of the Dragon Throne. The history of China is composed of successive periods of greatness, decay, and revival, which would be wearisome to the student were it not so peculiarly distinctive of this one state and people, and so opposed to the power, decline, and fall of less stable countries and less favoured nations. The Chinese have a traditional saying, that "after long abiding union disunion must come, when again union will revive," and, while it accurately illustrates the course of Chinese history, it appropriately expresses the self-confidence of a great people, whose first article of faith is that their kingdom has been established by heaven.

These periods of dissension and deliverance have been followed not merely by the restoration of domestic peace, but also by the vigorous reassertion of all claims to exercise paramount authority over the minor states adjoining the immediate territory of China Proper. The same idea which urged Tsin Chi Hwangti—in the 3rd century before our era—to send his generals into Central Asia,

Tonquin, Burmah, and, perhaps, even India, actuated Wang Kue, a famous Chinese general, a century later, when he collected a vast host for the express purpose of destroying the Tartars of the desert. Wang Kue failed, and committed suicide; but his successors, Wei Tsing and Hokiuping, waged a successful war against the barbarian enemy. During fifty years the struggle continued, and although the Emperor Vouti had frequently to complain of the inconstancy of fortune, he extended the influence of China far beyond the desert of Gobi. Another century passed before the supremacy of the Chinese was fully recognized, but at last it was stated, in B.C. 50, that all the peoples from Shensi to the Caspian acknowledged it, and the "troops of justice," as the Chinese were called, returned. After the lapse of yet another century, the greatest of all the Han generals, Panchow, led his army through Eastern Turkestan to Bokhara, planted his standards on the Oxus and Jaxartes, and for a moment contemplated the possibility of crossing the Caspian, and carrying the terror of Chinese prowess into this continent, then subject to the sway of Imperial Rome. Fifteen kingdoms were stated to have been subjected by Panchow, and to have accepted the authority of his emperor. I am obliged to direct your attention to this remote period, for the reason that it was then that most of the claims of Chinese suzerainty originated, not only in the Turanian regions, but also in Cochin China, Corea, Burmah, and Tibet. Moreover, these campaigns had the most important influence on European history; for before the legions of Panchow fled those Hiongnou, or Huns, whose descendants, four centuries later, lowered the pride of the Cæsars, and debased the majesty of Rome.

It is not my wish to obscure the practical point by detaining you over the events of that remote period. We have only to recollect the antiquity of China's pretensions in the first place, and in the second to consider how vigorously they have been repeatedly asserted, in the face of dangers that would deter the timid, who dread the responsibility of their own acts. When the present reigning dynasty conquered China, and assumed the personal direction of affairs, the empire had been long exposed, under the degenerate Mings, to the attacks of foreign enemies, and the insults of its vassals. But it had redeemed some of its diminished character, and had at least demonstrated its consistency, by successfully defending Corea against the invasion of the great

Japanese ruler, Fashiba. The Manchu conquest, followed by the formidable revolt of Wou Sankwei, covered a period of more than half a century. When peace had been restored within the eighteen provinces of China, it left the young Emperor Kanghi in face of those obstacles and difficulties with which a Chinese ruler will always have to cope. Neither the pacific inclination of the Chinese people, nor the pre-occupation arising from the formation of a new administration, could avail to avert the complications continually arising with turbulent neighbours and refractory dependents. The latter part of the 17th century found China engaged in dealing with the same problem which had forced itself upon her two thousand years earlier. It was not without reluctance that Kanghi felt himself compelled to establish the claims attached to his high office by recourse to the sword, both in Tibet and in Mongolia. Even he, great ruler as he was, and assisted by the talent of Feyanku and other able generals, failed to secure a durable peace. He overthrew his adversary Galdan, one of the most remarkable men the deserts of Asia have produced, but he did not obtain the enduring peace which was desirable, and even necessary, in the interests of China, and which could only be obtained on the basis of her supremacy. The full accomplishment of his designs was reserved for his grandson, Keen Lung, who extended the dominion of China to the Pamir, garrisoned Tibet, and defeated the mountaineers of Nepaul. It was he who enforced her suzerain rights among all her neighbours, who had been accustomed, in times past, to ask investiture for their rulers, and to implore aid in adversity as suppliants to the Dragon Throne. For the practical meaning of claims which some would have us disregard or treat as illusions, the Chinese, therefore, have only to go back for a period of less than one hundred years. In 1792, Keen Lung sent an army of 70,000 men to defend the people of Tibet against the turbulent Goorkhas, who had plundered one of their chief cities. The Chinese gained several victories, advanced to within a short march of Khatmandu, and imposed a humiliating peace. This was not the last occasion of China's interference, for in 1856, when the late Jung Bahadur had begun to encroach, the Chinese Amban then declared that unless he promptly desisted, he "would report all to the emperor, and bring down a large army to recover the Tibetan lands and to invade Nepaul, promising—with an oath repeated seven times—that in such case he would

ravage Nepaul, destroy its capital, and carrying off its malik, would send him to the emperor at Pekin, to be presented to the emperor in his most angry mood." Even so remarkable a man as Jung Bahadur was impressed by the power of China, and Sir Richard Temple has told us how he used to "feelingly recount the blows inflicted upon Nepaul by Chinese armies." Nor is there the least reason to suppose that the Chinese attach less importance than of yore to the policy of keeping, on the one hand, the landmarks of the empire as far removed from the centre as possible, and, on the other, of maintaining the buffer states which have separated China from India, and which have served to keep borders held by tribes more or less independent from falling away from their allegiance. The events of the last twenty years have shown that the Chinese attach no abated value to these possessions. In our own day we have seen three great rebellions repressed within the limits of China Proper. We have witnessed them followed by a campaign in the very interior of Central Asia, which, whether we like to sneer at some of the details or not, was triumphant, and triumphant over an opponent who had been considered by capable English officers likely to re-establish a vigorous dominion at the expense of China, and to offer a not ineffectual resistance to the progress of Russia. The effect produced by the campaigns of Tso Tsung Tang was increased by the bold attitude assumed towards Russia in reference to the province of Kuldja, and by the haughty refusal to accept a treaty that defrauded China of a portion of her rights. It is not in face of those events that the statement will be lightly accepted and believed that China is prepared to waive her rights in the states beyond her frontier. The whole lesson impressed upon us by her history is, that time fights on her side; because she has nothing to gain by being precipitate, therefore, her silence must not be construed as signifying an abandonment of her pretensions.

The history of China tells us much with regard to the past, but it may be said that it cannot inform us how the claims which originated at a remote period, and which were asserted by superior resources and determination, are to be made good in the face of the resolute aggression of a great military state like France. It is no use, it may be said, quoting the precedents of Keen Lung's campaigns—even that of the Goorkha overthrow in the passes of the Himalaya—for the simple reason that the French are different

from those opponents, and that they seem to be as resolute as they have shown themselves to be formidable. There would be greater force in this objection if it could be assumed that the Tonquin question is one that France will be able to settle in a single campaign. Two years have elapsed since Captain Rivière planted the tricolour on the citadel of Hanoi, and the interval has been taken up with unceasing military operations. Yet the French do not now command the whole country, within even twenty miles of that town. It is not at all clear, therefore, that the old qualities of pertinacity and endurance are not the most important towards effecting the solution of the present difficulty; and in them it is reasonable to believe that China is as well equipped as ever she was. At the same time the dangers of the situation, not merely in Tonquin but wherever the Chinese claims to predominance come into contact with the tendencies of strong Governments to encroach, are aggravated by the uncertainty felt as to the degree of importance attached by China herself to any one of these possessions, which sometimes are little more than sentimental. The wish to respect them is hampered by the doubt on this point, while the designs of those who seek to ignore or dispute them are facilitated. The lessons of Chinese history are almost as instructive in this matter as they are on the subject of how the empire acquired and retained the prizes of military prowess. The Pekin Government has evidently drawn a very nice distinction, although it declines to reveal the basis on which its judgments are formed, between those matters which are important and to be contended for, and those which are not worth a serious effort to retain. Thus we have seen it relinquish its hold upon Siam, acquiesce for the time in the loss of Loochoo, surrender the vast territory of maritime Manchuria, and facilitate the opening of the kingdom of Corea to all the trading nations of the world. Each one of these events involved an infraction of the rights of China as the paramount power. On the other hand, we have seen the Celestials cling with tenacity to rights that are certainly of no greater practical value than some of those she has waived, and giving increased meaning to dormant claims, by embarking upon protracted and arduous campaigns. It still remains to be seen under which category the Chinese consider that the question of their invaded rights in Tonquin should be placed, and the balance of peace and war depends on the decision arrived at in

Pekin, whether the operations of the French on the Songcoi are to be regarded with the calmness that acquiesced in the loss of maritime Manchuria, or with the indignation that decided for the recovery of Kashgar and Kuldja.

While the history of the empire affords precedents in support of both conclusions, the language of the Tsungli Yamên itself has revealed a certain amount of doubt upon the subject—not indeed with regard to the extent of the Chinese emperor's rights in Tonquin, but on the point of whether the empire would be seriously injured or not by the operations of France. There seems to have been a hope that even the loss of the Songcoi Delta might not deprive the southern provinces of Kwangsi and Yunnan of the protecting belt of independent territory which served to supplement the weakness and shortcomings of mandarin rule among turbulent subjects and on a disturbed frontier. But the much larger form which French operations have assumed in the course of the campaign, both in Anam and in Tonquin, has precluded the idea that the solution of the Red River question will be anything short of the absolute contact of the two countries along a frontier which, so far as China's pretensions go, will be one that is very much curtailed. It is not permissible in this society to pursue the inquiry any further; but there can be no question that such a climax of affairs is one most calculated to give the fullest weight to the original views of Chinese statesmen on the subject of their feudatories. Did the French only seek to found a second Hongkong at the mouth of the Songcoi, or were they even to be satisfied with a portion of the delta, the Chinese might, perhaps, acquiesce in an arrangement which averted the necessity of strong measures, and which left their relations with the Lolos and other border tribes undisturbed. If the situation be found to admit of a compromise, then possibly they will revert to the policy of concession which has been observed towards the chief foreign Powers during the last twenty-five years. But if there be no middle course practicable, then, undoubtedly, the Chinese will turn to that mode of action which is most in accordance with their historical traditions, and their own predilections.

A study of Chinese history teaches us something more than that the people and Government of the Celestial Empire have the instinct of superiority, and the great gift of governing subject

races. It shows that they are not devoid of the power without which great pretensions approach the ridiculous. Notwithstanding their strong partiality for peace, their unconcealed and, let it be said, very foolish contempt for the profession of arms, and their consistently acting on the assumption that the best of all remedies is the one attained without violence—notwithstanding this unequivocal declaration in the interests of peace, the Chinese have engaged in a large number of wars, and of wars, moreover, in which they were uniformly successful, until they came into contact with the superior knowledge and resources of Europe. It is assumed by those who will not take the trouble to inquire into the facts, that the last foreign war with China was one of the simplest affairs possible, that victory was achieved and the Pekin Government humbled in a single campaign, and that the Celestials proved themselves contemptible soldiers. The facts were indeed different. During a war which continued for four years, the English naval and military forces, although always possessing a natural and well-deserved superiority, were frequently reduced, after some signal success, to impotency, by the impossibility of reaching any vital spot of this singular empire. The possession of Canton failed to produce any decisive effect at the capital; and when the Peiho forts were carried, and a treaty was concluded at Tientsin, the Chinese employed the twelve months intervening between its signature and its ratification in strengthening those forts, and preparing for a resolute defence of the metropolis. When the English envoy sought to make his way up the river with what seemed to be a sufficient force, he was rudely repulsed; and it required another twelve months to enable a strong expedition to be fitted out and despatched to the North of China. Then the Chinese were vanquished as much by superior strategy as by superior strength; while the unanimous decision of every military authority who went through the campaign and who has left his views on record, from Lord Wolseley downwards, was that the Chinese soldiers fought with great intrepidity, and only required better weapons and more skilful leading to have made a more stubborn and, perhaps, an effectual resistance. In face of their opinions, it would be hard to say that China does not possess the power and resources necessary to engage in war on a large scale. But the indications of history with reference to the present situation do not cease with the campaign of 1860. We have the long

wars with the Taeping rebels to assist our judgment towards a just conclusion. We have the struggle against the Mahomedans in Yunnan on the one hand, and of Kansuh and the Central Asian provinces on the other. There was much in those wars, carried on by Chinese generals and officers, to show that China was moving, and that her military efficiency was far from contemptible. But in each and all of these contests the Chinese acted as if they had no better ally than time, and that the enemies they could not overthrow in a single encounter, they might vanquish out of sheer weariness. They afford no exact precedent, therefore, for the collision between China and a European Power which would rely upon the celerity of its movements as the surest way of worsting a cumbrous and unwieldy antagonist. But we are, fortunately, provided with a more exact parallel for this higher mode of warfare, in the achievements of that remarkable man, Chinese Gordon, who has proved himself, in more than one continent, the last support of enfeebled rulers and embarrassed administrations, and who now seems to have added a new chapter to the "Arabian Nights," by the spectacle of light and confidence which his mere presence has afforded in the midst of the dreary blackness of the Soudan. General Gordon's campaign in the country round Soochow, at the head of Chinese troops, of whom a portion were led into action by Chinese officers, went very near to completely demonstrate the fact that a Chinese army might be made as mobile as a European. But it may be said that the excellence of the "ever victorious army" consisted in its foreign leading and in the genius of its commander. Of course, the whole credit of the victories which entailed the dispersion and flight of the rebels along the Grand Canal belongs to General Gordon, but he has himself placed on record his opinion that "Chinese troops, led by Chinese officers, will fight very well," and that, as a matter of internal policy for China, they are to be preferred to placing Europeans and Americans at the head of the national forces. Although the matter does not admit of decisive proof, there is a large quantity of evidence, both in the actual facts of history and in the opinions of those who had direct practical acquaintance with the Chinese as combatants, to show that they possess all the essentials to form an efficient army, and that the shortcomings of military discipline might be compensated for by superior numbers, the advantages of position, and the dogged determination of the people.

There is, consequently, no reason to suppose that there can be any better guide as to what China will do on the present occasion in her dispute with France, than to ascertain by the light of history what she has done on similar occasions in the past. She has never been oppressed by any great feeling of timidity, although the threats used in her name are sometimes in excess not of her wish, but of her sensible perception of what is possible. She has made some progress in military knowledge. She has less reason now to be afraid than at any time since the death of Keen Lung. Her dominions are at peace. There is no other burning question to distract her mind. With England and with Russia she is in accord. She has collected a vast quantity of munitions of war, and she has acquired the nucleus of a disciplined army. When she had none of these things, when, moreover, she was torn to pieces by internal dissension, she presented a bold front to the demands of England and the other nations, and proved herself capable of a protracted, if none the less vain, resistance. Is there much reason to believe from these facts that the Chinese Government, however tardy its action may be, will submit tamely and without a murmur to the infliction of an injury upon interests that it cherishes without the least attempt at concealment? A French writer has very truly called the Chinese "monopolisers," and history tells us that, where they have once been supreme, they are expelled only with the greatest difficulty. Their memory is most retentive, their patience is above proof, and they are not easily diverted from the main point of a dispute to any side-issue. They have, on the other hand, it must be admitted, a way of extricating themselves from situations in which the preservation of peace seems next to impossible, and not merely of adapting themselves to altered circumstances, but of actually extracting personal advantage from a situation that seemed sure to entail their discomfiture. The French may be able to convince the Chinese that the rearrangement of Tonquin may yet be carried out without injuring their interests; but unless they can and will take the trouble to do so, there can be only one issue for the present complication. Chinese history of recent times contains, no doubt, instances of disagreeable surrender, but it is impossible to find one where the Chinese would have to withdraw more emphatic declarations, or to make greater concessions to an aggressor than in the case of a French conquest of Tonquin. For

that very reason, if the history of the past furnishes a sure clue to the events of the future, it must be said that China has gone too far to draw back, and that the decisiveness with which her opinions have been expressed betrays the absence of all inclination to retreat, and bow to the decrees of a harsh necessity.

THE RUSSIAN RAILWAY EAST OF THE CASPIAN.

IN a footnote on page 11 it is stated that the gauge of the Russian railway east of the Caspian is 2 ft. 4 in., and that the rolling-stock is exceedingly limited. This statement, although made at the time on good authority, is wrong. From the best available information, we now know that the gauge is the ordinary Russian gauge of 5 feet, that the line is a single one, and that there are ordinarily two passenger trains and five goods trains a week. In April the line was not open further east than Kizil Arvat, but General Annenkoff expected to have the section to Bami complete in May. The railway is to be continued to Askabad and Sarakhs as speedily as possible. With regard to the rolling-stock, there were, in 1882, twenty-five engines, of which thirteen burnt wood, although all now consume naphtha, and 250 vans and trucks. The administration of this railway is exclusively military, and the force has recently been doubled by the creation of a second railway battalion.

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