TALL TACTICS.

ENGLAND

AFFGHANISTAN.

CHIEFLY COMPILED FROM SPEECHES AND PUBLICATIONS.

1879.

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Before describing British transactions with Affghanistan, attention should be drawn to the main points of Tory Government action relating to the Eastern question in Europe.

Tory politicians represent that Liberals objected to war with Russia, because they looked with some approval on Russian conquest over Turkish power. But no Government is more opposed to Liberal opinions than that of Russia; and in fact Liberals so feared Russian dominion over Turkey, that they urged, as far as could be done, on the Tory Government, not to allow Russia to become the liberator of the population of Turkey, but that England should co-operate with the other great powers of Europe, who unanimously desired to force improvement of government upon Turkey.

But the English Liberals urged in vain. The Tory Government of England stood alone in their solitary

blindness to the inevitable result of a struggle between Russia and Turkey; and England, under Tory rule, was the fatal cause of that struggle which has cost so much life and such intense and prolonged suffering to Christian and Turk.

This blindness was the result of a policy of selfishness, a strong wish to achieve the impossible maintenance of the "integrity and independence" of the Turkish Empire, for the supposed sake of "British Interests."

Turkish government had become so impossible, that even her down-trodden tortured and helpless Christian subjects could stand it no longer.

The fatal persistence of Tory rule did, rather surreptitiously, and certainly without any demonstration of public support, encourage Turkey to resist the pressure put upon her by all other powers at the Conference at Constantinople in 1877.

Nor had Tory hints of English fitness for a succession of campaigns, &c., been wanting to fairly inspire in the mind of the Government of Turkey an undefined but thoroughly effective belief that England would, at the last extremity, support Turkey against Russia with an army as in 1854; and it is extremely probable that the Tory Government would not only have taken such a step, but that they harboured a wish and a hope that British public opinion might be educated up to the point of taking this step, by ministerial light talk of the Bulgarian massacres, and by vilifying Russia for her support of Servia trying to throw off the Turkish yoke.

The war brought the Russians to the gates of

Constantinople, which they were not prevented from entering by the presence of the British fleet, but by the knowledge that Austria, who could act on the flank of Russia from Bessarabia to the Ægean Sea, would not allow such a step.

The Russians made the Treaty of San Stefano with her mailed hand on the throat of Turkey. This Treaty gave to Russia the organization and almost a virtual protectorate over the chief part of the Turkish provinces situated to the immediate north of the Ægean and the Marmora Seas. It gave her, on the Black Sea, the highly important port of Batoum, the key to most eastern parts of Asiatic Turkey, it gave her permanent possession of the often won, and as often given back, city of Kars, and it gave her a not inconsiderable extension of territory in that district.

To revise this San Stefano Treaty, and thereby to modify the power it would give to Russia, the Berlin Conference met in 1878.

The English plenipotentiaries there had been deeply shocked at the secrecy of Russia's treaty with Turkey, but this did not hinder them from entering the conference with a secret treaty with Turkey in their pockets, by which, while the Berlin Conference conclusions left it widely incumbent on the powers of Europe in general to force upon Turkey a practically civilized rule in Asia, Lord Beaconsfield's treaty bound *England alone* to support Turkey in Asia against external attack, to induce her (no one knows how) to suppress the horrors of her rule in those regions, and to receive the feudal possession of the

Island of Cyprus, as a base of action for these benevolent but fanciful and impracticable projects in Asia Minor.

It may however be suggested that this treaty was not a secret from Russia, but rather the only sop attainable by Lord Beaconsfield, in compensation for the inevitable possession of the port of Batoum by Russia.

The further modifications in the Treaty of San Stefano, were the leaving it open to Turkey to give up a strip of her Greek provinces to Greece, if she should, in thinking over the matter, find herself in a humour to do so.

The Berlin Treaty gave over Bosnia and Herzegovina to the protectorate of Austria, an arrangement so strenuously objected to by the Bosnians themselves, that Austria has had to wage a sanguinary war against them in order to become their paternal protector.

And the Berlin Conference decided that the San Stefano Treaty should be further modified by not permitting all Bulgaria to exist as one province, but by arranging that Bulgaria north of the Balkans was to be completely free from Turkey, and Bulgaria south of the Balkans (to be called Eastern Roumelia) to be a feudatory of Turkey, with nominally a local government of her own. But to this arrangement, Eastern Roumelia has such insuperable objections, that it has become clear that, if Russian protection is withdrawn from that province, its inhabitants will fight against the Turks for the same independence as that won by Russia for Bulgaria north of the Balkan mountains.

It is manifest that not only have the modifications of the San Stefano Treaty been of no great practical importance, but that there are great obstacles to their ever being permanently fulfilled. Yet Lord Beaconsfield announced himself as returning from Berlin, bringing England peace with honour.

Where is the honour in leaving Russia nearly all she desired, after flourishing ironclads and sepoys in Eastern waters to check her? where is the honour in obtaining, avowedly for our own interests alone, the imposition of a detestable foreign sovereignty upon a persecuted population? where the honour in being the leading, if not the only, power which strove against Christian freedom from heathen persecution? where is the peace yet established in any province affected by English interference at the Berlin Conference?

Russia asked for a general guarantee of all the chief powers, for fulfilment of this Berlin Treaty; Lord Beaconsfield opposed this, thereby, it now seems, unintentionally leaving to Russia alone a door whereby to escape from some of its provisions.

The Tory policy towards Affghanistan has been guided by Tory wishes and watchings in Turkey in Europe.

The First Napoleon threatened to invade India. Afterwards it was considered that Russia might invade it. The city of Herat was considered the key to the entrance of India on the north-west—Affghanistan was ruled in different divisions of territory. In 1837 Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, sent Burnes to Cabul, by way of a Commercial Agent. Grant, Met-

calfe, and Tucker, Indian officials, opposed Burnes' going, lest the English should be entangled with Affghan political affairs.

The Sihk people had taken the city and district of Peshawur from Affghanistan. Dost Mahomed was on the throne at Cabul. Soojah, last of the legitimate line of rulers, was in exile with the Sihks. Kamran, of Soojah's family, ruled at Herat, but Persia was getting influence there, and Russia might dominate Persia. Russia also sent a Commercial Agent to Cabul. Dost Mahomed offered to turn the Russian Agent back, but Burnes declined that favour, and the Russian Agent offered Dost aid to fight the Sihks. Burnes in vain then advised Auckland to send Agents to all the provinces. Dost asked Auckland to protect Cabul and Candahar from the Persians, and to get Peshawur for him again, but to this Auckland would not consent. However, the Persians were repulsed from Herat.

Auckland, the Governor-General, and McNaughten, Torrens, and Colvin, officials in India, determined to restore Soojah to the Cabul throne.

Sir Claude Wade, an official in India, advised that Affghanistan should remain in divisions under separate rulers, because they would thus want English support, and because Kamran would yield Herat to the Persians rather than give it up to Dost Mahomed.

Burnes wished the English to support Dost, thinking, that by making him more powerful as the ruler over all, then Herat and Candahar could not be taken by Persia or Russia.

English troops then helped Sihks and Soojah

against Dost Mahomed. The Persians being driven away from Herat, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Wellesley, Elphinstone, and Metcalfe considered that English interference should cease; but Lord Auckland would proceed, and with difficulty he drove Dost Mahomed away, and placed Soojah on the throne at Cabul, but necessarily supported by English troops, who were at last overmatched by Akbar Khan, son of Dost Mahomed, they being suddenly attacked, some of them treacherously murdered, the whole 4,500 men, of whom 700 were English, were eventually glad to be allowed to leave Cabul, to return to India; but they were nearly all killed by the Affghans before they could get through the mountain passes.

Afterwards, General Pollock and British forces forced their way to Cabul; but Dost Mahomed returned, and reigned there after all, and for the rest of his life he was the firm and faithful ally of the British Government.

In 1855, Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, concluded a treaty with him, signed by Sir John Lawrence, by which the British Government engaged to respect the territories then in the possession of the Ameer, "and never to interfere therein." The Ameer engaged to be the friend of the friends and the enemy of the enemies of the East India Company.

In 1857, the British Government concluded a treaty with Dost Mahomed, referring to the British war against Persia for seizing Herat, to subsidize him, to send British officers to secure the expenditure of the money on purposes of defence, with particular obligation to withdraw them from Affghanistan when that

purpose was accomplished, and the British Government to appoint an agent at Cabul, on the condition that he was "not to be an European Officer," and this agent was also precluded from "advising the Cabul Government." These treaties were as binding on England in 1878 as they were in 1857.

Shere Ali, son of Dost Mahomed, succeeded his father in 1863. In 1868, he received £60,000 from the British Government. The most advanced military posts of Russia are not nearer Affghanistan now than in Lord Lawrence's time. The forces, 12,000, which were moved towards Affghanistan in 1878, on the English acquisition of Cyprus, were moved from territory which had been already acquired by Russia in 1869. Therefore facts do not make Lord Mayo's policy out of date, as is urged by Tories.

At Umballa, in 1869, Lord Mayo, the Governor-General, had a conference with the Ameer of Affghanistan, Shere Ali. The Ameer then complained of the treaty made with him by the British Government in 1855 being one-sided, since, while he was to be friend of our friends and enemy of our enemies, England was only to be hostile to those who attacked him from without, and then only on condition that he was not to be the aggressor. And the Ameer did not, in 1869, seem to think even of Russian attack or interference; he was engrossed with strengthening himself against rivalry for the throne of Cabul. But Lord Mayo then explained to the Ameer, that under no circumstances would British troops suppress civil or domestic contentions. Further, money and arms were then supplied to the Ameer by Lord Mayo's Government, and he

promised the Ameer that no European officers should be pressed upon him, to reside in Affghanistan.

Captain Grey's recent evidence, that the Ameer at this time evinced willingness to receive European residents, is fallacious; the Ameer spoke of European agent or engineer to construct forts, and "anywhere but in Cabul," and that he would receive an envoy European (but not a resident) "anywhere excepting at Cabul."

Mr. Seton Kerr was present at Umballa in 1869, and denies that the Ameer or his ministers expressed a willingness to receive British residents.

Lord Mayo deprecated absolute inaction as to matters in Affghanistan, but also meddling and interfering by subsidies and embassies. He advocated watchfulness and friendly intercourse with the Ameer. He avoided written communications with the Ameer at Umballa in 1869, because the visit was in a spirit of amity and good faith, and because, in a written treaty, terms would have been asked for which the British Government would not give.

Lord Mayo gave the Ameer no unconditional guarantees which he pressed to have, but pledged that the British Government would not interfere in his internal affairs, that they would support his independence, and that they would not force European residents upon him. He also gave general assurances of British support of the independence of Affghanistan.

The Ameer was pleased with the Umballa meeting, not because Mayo gave him more distinct promises than Northbrook, as some infer, but because he received money which enabled him to pay his troops

and establish himself on the throne, and because he had also gained the moral effect of British support, by which advantages he recovered Balkh and secured Badakshan, and very much because Lord Mayo engaged that no Europeans should be placed in his cities.

In 1869, began the negotiations of England with Russia, suggesting a band of independent territory between the Asiatic possessions of each country. Gortschakoff specified Affghanistan, and announced that he was authorized to declare that country as beyond the sphere in which Russia might have to exercise influence. It was agreed that the then existing extent of Affghanistan should be held to be the limit. There arose a difference of view as to whether Affghanistan extended to the Upper Oxus river, Russia contending that Bokhara extended to the south of that river. The settlement of this proposed neutral district extended over three years and a half; but in 1872, Russia admitted that the Upper Oxus should be the frontier for the northern boundary of Affghanistan. Like all other treaties, this one would become annulled in a state of war; nor did this agreement prohibit Russia from communicating with the Government of Affghanistan in such a way as would not interfere with the independence of that country, and such communications passed between Russia and Affghanistan without objection from the British Government, for seven years afterwards.

In 1873, as Russia was rapidly gaining territory in Central Asia, the Liberal Government in England notified to Russia that Affghanistan must not be attacked, to which Russia again replied that Affghanistan was outside of her influence in Asia.

In the spring of 1873, Lord Northbrook, Governor-General in India, proposed a meeting to give explanations to the Ameer, as to the Seistan boundary, and as to the frontiers of Affghanistan and Russia. Lord Mayo had decided the Seistan boundary question in favour of Persia, which decision, founded on justice, yet annoyed the Ameer, who claimed further territory. The Ameer did not ask for this meeting (as it is represented by Lord Lytton and by Lord Cranbrook that he did) in consequence of Russian advance in Asia, and of the complete subordination of the Khanate of Khiva to Russia; for this subordination did not occur till August 12th, 1873. Northbrook's request to the Ameer, for the meeting, reached Cabul March 27th, and the meeting was held in May. But the Ameer's Ministers, at this meeting at Simla in 1873, expressed apprehension of Russia.

The Tory argument is, that, in 1873, Northbrook should have conceded all the Ameer asked; but the Ameer appeared to be considering that Lawrence and Mayo had bound the Government to comply with any request preferred by himself; he demanded that the British Government should have an army at his disposal, and was anxious to know how far he could rely on British aid. Northbrook told him that the Government was prepared, if negotiation with his aggressors failed, then to help him with arms, money, and troops; and he told the Ameer that at present money and arms were unnecessary—recommended him to strengthen his Government—told him that England desired Affghanistan strong and independent, and that the British will keep to the policy of

Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo *(former Governors-General, whose policy had been to strengthen Affghan Government, to promise aid if that country was attacked, provided the Ameer acted by their advice, and not to interfere in the government of his country, nor to place English residents in it).*

Northbrook further informed the Ameer's Envoy, that Affghanistan had been strengthened by the settlement between Russia and England, as to his northern frontier, and as to their mutual rights; that the British Government, therefore, was now still more interested in the safety of the Affghan frontier. The Ameer preferred this communication being made to his Minister, instead of its being brought to Cabul by a European Envoy. The British had a native Envoy at Cabul, and the Ameer had one at Peshawur.

Now, at this meeting, the Ameer's Envoy was doubtful how far he could concede to Northbrook's conditions; and it appeared that the Ameer had sent this Envoy to see if Northbrook would concede his unconditional demands, but without authority to offer any others. The Envoy led them to believe the Ameer would not receive Europeans resident, and that he himself had no instructions even to discuss such a question, therefore Northbrook was obliged to postpone the negotiation till a time when he expected he could communicate directly with the Ameer; but a copy of the conversation held with the Ameer's Envoy, which assured protection to the Ameer, on the former conditions, was sent to him.

The Tory pretence, that the Ameer was then so anxious about British support against attack from

Russia, is inconsistent with the fact that he signified that it was *to the British interest* to give him that support; the condition he wanted, referred mainly to support in keeping his heir on the throne, termed dynastic support, though he also wanted *un*conditional guarantee against attack, whether unprovoked or not, and without the condition of his previously following British advice.

It is untrue that, as Lord Cranbrook infers in his statement, published November 18th, 1878, the (Liberal) Home Government prevented Northbrook from giving assurances to the Ameer which he had asked to give, and that the postponement of these questions resulted from the instructions sent from the Home Government.

The present Chancellor of the Exchequer admitted that this was the interpretation they put upon the telegrams which passed between Argyll and Northbrook, and that, in June 1873, the latter stated that Russia was influencing the independence of Affghanistan.

A Liberal Minister has stated that the Home Government telegraphed to Northbrook in reply, that he was to give the further assurances to the Ameer, which, by the advice of his Council, in India, he was prepared to give.

Northbrook actually gave, on July 24th, 1873, more unqualified assurance of aid to the Ameer, after he had received Government instructions, than he had given the Ameer on July 12th, before he had received them.

The Duke of Argyll, Liberal Minister for India, in England, instructed Northbrook to inform the Ameer,

that the British Government did not share his alarm (*Russia had assured England, that she would not interfere with Affghanistan*), but that they would maintain the previous settled policy to support Affghanistan, if the Ameer would abide by English advice, as to matters outside of Affghanistan. Northbrook informed the Ameer, that, if he was threatened with attack, he must refer to the British Government, who would try by negotiations, and by every means in their power, to avert hostilities; that they would not restrict the Ameer from repelling attack as an independent ruler, and they referred him to former conditions of British assistance, and assured him, that, if their negotiation failed, then they would assist him with arms, money, and troops, the Ameer abstaining from aggression himself, and taking British advice on matters external to his kingdom. (*It was necessary for the British Government to avoid promises which would enlist their assistance either against other neighbouring provinces, or in struggles for the throne of Affghanistan.*) But the Ameer asked for promise of protection without any conditions, and asked for money and arms, and also for British troops if he was attacked.

Further communication with the Court of Ameer was held by Lord Northbrook, in September 1873, apparently with allusion to the suggestion made to the Envoy in the conference of that year, as to sending a British officer and staff to inspect the frontiers, and to report to the Ameer. No pressure was put upon the Ameer, and the subject fell through. On November 13th, 1873, the Ameer replied, showing irritation at having got no more than had been pre-

viously offered, but he referred to his understanding with Lord Mayo, at Umballa, in 1869, as quite sufficient, and gave assurance that so long as the British Government continued friendly we might be assured of his friendship.

The Tory Government came into power early in 1874.

Pollock, Governor of the Punjaub, stated, early in 1874, that no unfavourable change whatever had occurred in the Ameer's disposition towards the British Government, and that the Ameer leaned upon it as much as ever. Lord Salisbury declares that the Ameer's objection to British residents was not the real cause of his discontent, yet facts attest that he only resorted to Russian negotiation later, and after he had been pressed to allow British residents in his country.

In January 1874, Russia repeated her assurances that she considered Affghanistan entirely beyond her sphere of action.

In December 1874, the British Government remonstrated with Russia that she had annexed part of Persia; Russia replied that it was an affair between her and Persia, and that it was similar to the change of the Seistan boundary by England.

In November 1874, Lord Northbrook remonstrated with the Ameer against his ill treatment of his son. The Sultan of Turkey also remonstrated.

It appears that Sir Bartle Frere, who has enforced the present unjust, unnecessary, disastrous, and expensive war in South Africa, inspired the Indian Government, in January 1875, with fear of Russia, and advised taking Quetta and occupying other places, in order to meet Russia on the western provinces of

Affghanistan. This was a proposal involving breaking faith with Affghanistan. Previous British policy had obstructed any meeting with Russia at all, and by assuring the independence of the frontier states, had made it the best interest of those states to keep Russia within her settled boundaries.

In January 1878, Lord Northbrook was urged by Lord Salisbury, the Minister in England for India, to press the Ameer to let British envoys reside at Candahar and Herat, in order to watch Russian doings. This was the first breach of the trustful and friendly British policy towards the ruler of Affghanistan, since 1842. And this desire to obtain an Indian Government agency at Herat, was so far from being founded upon necessity, that it actually arose from a recent proof that it was unnecessary; the news of Slamakin's proclamation of Russian authority in Turkestan in 1874, had come from Teheran, but the British agent there belonged to the British *Colonial* Government, which agency, though as useful to England as our Indian Government agency, was not so favourable to independent action of the Minister for India, without wholesome superintendence. Moreover a resident European agent in Affghanistan would not be so near as one at Meshed in Persia is at present, and from whence has been supplied most of the information on movements in Central Asia.

Northbrook showed Salisbury his objections to these above instructions of January 1875, to press for resident Europeans in Affghanistan—namely, that the Ameer, though displeased at not having got all he wanted in 1873, yet had followed British advice as to

Seistan—instead of that Mayo had given him specific assurances in 1869—that there was no evidence of any willingness to receive British residents, sufficient to found a new demand for them—that this reluctance did not show disloyalty—that the ruler of Cashmere had the same objections—that Sir R. Pollock was convinced the Ameer had no intentions to look elsewhere for aid, and that such a change of policy might throw Affghanistan into the arms of Russia; but he explained that if Russia assumed authority over all the Turkoman country, or moved upon Merv, that it would be necessary then to give more specific assurances to the Ameer against attack.

Lord Lawrence had been fully aware of the Russian progress in Asia when he signed the treaty some years ago, and in 1867, it was suggested that the treaty with the Ameer would become annulled if he was intriguing with our enemies.

It is apparent that European resident officials are only necessary if the British Government intends to domineer in Affghanistan, and the Indian native resident has always furnished sufficient knowledge of all that was necessary to meet any aggression of Russia.

Sir R. Pollock knew that the Ameer would not consent to official European residents in his country, and he well knew that the Ameer had hitherto had the strongest objections to receiving them.

General Taylor, Secretary to the Punjaub Government, reported that the Ameer and his advisers had more than once expressed themselves, "Do anything but force British officers on us."

The Ameer and the Affghans saw that placing English official residents in neighbouring states had regularly led to their subjugation to British rule, and he feared the irritation their presence would incur, involving danger to himself and to them.

Lord Northbrook's Council in India stoutly resisted the dangerous change of policy during the last two years of his Viceroyalty; yet Tories say the mischief had been done when they came into power in 1874.

Lord Salisbury replied in November 1875. (At that time the Eastern question was strongly agitating Europe.) He seemed to be erroneously fancying that Herat could be taken by the Russians without much warning, and he insisted, as before, on pressing on the Ameer a British mission at Herat, and on inducing him to receive *a temporary embassy at Cabul, not publicly connected with a permanent mission, but which might be advantageously ostensibly directed to some object of smaller political interest than a permanent mission, which (false object) it would not be difficult (in Salisbury's view) for Northbrook "to find, or, if need be, to create;"* and he added that Northbrook should warn the Ameer of risk in refusing the demand.

January 28th, 1876, Northbrook's India Government remonstrated, advising frank and full statement to the Ameer of the real purpose of the mission, alleging virtually that the proposal was a breach of promises made in 1869; that the Viceroy had no reason to apprehend Russian interference; that up to September 1875 the Ameer had conformed to British advice, and he deprecated Salisbury's instructions as seriously dangerous to British interests.

Lord Northbrook declares that when he left India (1876) the Ameer was loyal to the British Government, and that the discontent arose from the endeavour to force British agents upon him.

In 1876 Lord Lytton was sent out by the Tory Government to replace Lord Northbrook as Governor-General, soon after the Beaconsfield Ministry had been reluctantly compelled to sign the Andrassy note favouring intervention in Turkey.

Lord Lytton went out virtually instructed to offer the Ameer as little as possible in reality, and as much as possible in appearance, Salisbury's instructions fencing with the question of subsidy, and inferentially weakening, with the effect of shirking, Mayo's pledges to the Ameer in 1869; hedging interference in Affghanistan with the word "unnecessary," dealing with abstract propositions without nailing them to points in question—giving the Ameer an ostensible dynastic guarantee, hedged with so many conditions within conditions, that it could always be evaded; also virtually signifying that a British Viceroy's word was worthless, by his intimating that Northbrook's was only a "personal assurance," that his declaration to the Ameer in 1873 would have justified reproaches if he had been afterwards unsupported by British Government, and was yet too ambiguous to inspire his gratitude; then imposing the same contingent limits of support as Northbrook had necessarily imposed.

Salisbury instructed Lytton that for these illusory guarantees, demands were to be made, equivalent to transfer of the government of his country to the British. Agents to have undisputed access to frontier

positions. They were to confer with the Ameer, and their advice was to be attended to, and territories requiring British defence were to be open to British officers. That the Ameer was likely to have been wanting in confidence in British power, owing to previous expressions. Salisbury further declares that the Ameer's conduct had been so disregardful of British interests, that it was possible he might become quite alienated. (*But, in fact, the Ameer had done no more than try to hold the British Government to its word.*)

Now Tories admire this Salisbury Despatch, so pretentious of promises, which are hollow ones, and yet they pretend that Northbrook, in 1873, made the assurances of British aid to the Ameer too conditional.

As the present Tory Government found in 1874, as they now allege, that conditional promises of aid had done so much harm in destroying the alliance with the Ameer, why did they not make definite unconditional promises themselves, instead of taking those very steps which all sides knew would irritate and alarm the Ameer? They either thought, most indiscreetly, that they could terrify the Ameer into submission, or else they deliberately intended to seize his territory. And it is rumoured that in 1875 Russia sounded England as to arranging that she should take Bokhara and England take Affghanistan.

Then Lord Lytton (Viceroy) in 1876 reverted to the scheme of *ostensible pretexts*; and the Ameer learned on May 17th that, without his consent being asked, Sir Lewis Pelly would arrive on a Mission to Cabul, to announce to him the Queen's title of Empress, and the arrival of himself, Lord Lytton, in India. This

ostensible pretext being made, there then follows the information that Sir Lewis Pelly will be able to discuss with the Ameer matters of common interest, of which the chief one was to demand from the Ameer unrestricted permission to place European residents in Affghanistan. (Here it is to be observed that the papers read by Pelly to the Ameer's envoy differ essentially from the Government despatch report of May 10th, 1877.)

Norman, Hobhouse, and Muir, Members of Lord Lytton's (the Viceroy's) Council in India, protested against sending Pelly with such demands, that it would be a disastrous step.

A peremptory demand for British residents had never been made before, yet Lord Salisbury declared in Parliament, that he had not changed the previous policy observed by former British Governments towards Affghanistan.

Sir Lewis Pelly was no friend of the Ameer; for he had written a book on the necessity of taking Quetta with a view of advancing to Candahar.

The Ameer replied May 22nd. Delighted,—hoped Lytton's arrival meant additional security and repose. Saw no use in envoys; feeling that the former parleys were sufficient and efficient; and begged that his agent might be told what Lytton had to tell him.

After more than a month's consideration, Lord Lytton concluded to describe the Ameer's reply as one of "studied ambiguity;" and on July 8th, Sir Lewis Pelly, from Peshawur, wrote to the Ameer. He also wrote a covering letter to the British agent at Cabul, denouncing the apparent mistrust shown by the Ameer,

giving warning of the grave responsibility of rejection of advances, and angrily declining to receive the Ameer's agent.

To the Ameer himself Sir Lewis Pelly wrote, reiterating Lytton's *ostensible pretext* of Queen's title and Lytton's arrival, obscurely intimated benefits, hinted at dynastic guarantee, but took care to keep dark all the devised conditions by which Salisbury's guarantee was nullified, and threatened that refusal would make the Viceroy regard Affghanistan as isolated from British support and alliance.

The Ameer received this on July 20th. He became incensed and alarmed at this intention to break the promises of former Viceroys; and it was reported that he took counsel as to defending himself by a war promoted by religious fanaticism.

He replied September 3rd, 1876 (which six weeks' delay Lytton calls two months, and he delayed his own answer five weeks). The Ameer proposed either that the Viceroy should receive his envoy, or that the Viceroy's envoy should meet his at the frontier, or that the British native agent at Cabul should go to the Viceroy and explain and receive explanations.

September 16th, Lytton accepted the last alternative.

The Ameer sent word that he has nothing to add to his wishes expressed at Umballa in 1869, and by his minister in 1873.

The British agent being questioned, gave eight causes of the Ameer's dissatisfaction: viz., the boundary of Seistan—recent doings of the British in Khelat—the interference in favour of his son Yakoob—present

given by British to his feudatory the Khan of Wakhan —offence to a minister in 1873—the terms of Sir Lewis Pelly's recent letters—the continued British refusal of offensive and defensive treaty—and that the Ameer held our own interest to be sufficient security for his country.

The agent also related seven things which the Ameer desired: no English residents in Affghanistan, or at all events in Cabul—renunciation of British sympathy with son Yakoob, and a British guarantee to support his chosen successor to his throne—a promise to support him in attacks within and without—a permanent British subsidy of money—no British interference in the internal affairs of Affghanistan—that in any treaty, the alliance is to be made mutually offensive and defensive—and a new higher title for himself.

Lytton then saw the agent, told him his information was "quite new," that our aid which the Ameer seemed disinclined to seek or deserve might be welcome to his rivals; that an understanding between England and Russia might wipe Affghanistan off the map; that British power could be round the Ameer like a ring of iron, or could break him as a reed; that he was like an earthen pipkin between two iron pots; that Russia desired to come to an understanding with England at the Ameer's expense. And Viscount Cranbrook (lately Mr. G. Hardy) had the assurance to state in the House of Lords on December 10th, 1878, that there was nothing in the nature of compulsion in the message to the Ameer! that Lord Lytton's language was addressed only to his confidential messenger! Then what does Lord Cranbrook suppose to have been Lord Lytton's purpose in thus expressing himself to the native

agent he was sending to confer with the Ameer, or his Minister at Cabul ? Will any one believe that these expressions were never retailed there, and were never intended to be known there ?

Lord Lytton continued that he agreed that friends and enemies of either State should be those of the other, but only in case of unprovoked attack; that the heir chosen should be recognized, unless he was ejected from the throne ; but if in difficulties, such aid should be given which might be practically possible. But the Ameer's foreign policy was to be under British control, British officers were to reside at Herat and elsewhere on his frontiers. Affghanistan was to be open to Englishmen official and unofficial. Thus the Ameer was to grant all he had always dreaded, and to receive nothing which he really desired.

The Agent thus primed, returned to the Ameer with a written *aide mémoire*, which distinctly made all to depend on the reception of British officers in Affghanistan, and in which memoir the most limiting conditions and reservations are carefully restated.

Next, in Sir Lewis Pelly's instructions, as Envoy to the Ameer, Lord Lytton states that, the terms he now offers are the same as those the Ameer desired of Lord Mayo, in 1869, and which he also urged in 1873, and which were refused him. And then Lord Lytton actually admits to Lord Salisbury, that the concessions he had just offered the Ameer would not in reality commit the Government to more than those assurances given him by Lord Mayo.

Lytton and his India Council had Lord Mayo's despatch of July 1st, 1869, which showed them that

the guaranteed terms which the Ameer desired, and which Mayo refused, were *un*conditional ones.

Lord Cranbrook (Mr. G. Hardy) says that, in 1876, Lytton was instructed to offer the same active protection, which the Ameer *had previously solicited* from the British Government; and he also states, that it was impossible to enter into engagements in the sense of protection to the Ameer, without proof of the united interests of the two Governments. Now, as the proof required appears to have been the required reception of residents, the Salisbury offer of active protection was certainly *not* the engagement of protection which the Ameer *had previously solicited.*

The draft Treaty to be given to the Ameer, after he had accepted the bases, is a wilderness of saving clauses and qualifying words; and Lytton offered him £200,000 on the ratification of this Treaty, and an annual sum of £120,000.

In October 1876, Lytton commenced transforming the mission to Khelat into a permanent occupation of Quetta, stores were laid in at Kohat, and troops moved to Rawul Pindi. The ruler of Cashmere was bribed by Lytton to advance troops, and to establish authority over tribes claimed by the Ameer, who thus was threatened on three sides.

The British Agent returned to Cabul, October 1876. Lytton declares the Agent's subsequent reports studiously infrequent, vague, and unintelligible; yet from November 23rd to December 23rd, the Agent sent eight reports. In the first, he states, that the proposal to place British officers in Affghanistan filled that Government with apprehension; in two others, he

describes the Ameer expressing natural apprehensions. In his report, December 21st, 1876, to the British envoy at Peshawur, the agent shows that the Ameer was at last driven to agree to the residence of British officers on his borders, and he states the difficulty experienced by the Ameer in limiting duties of British agents, short of interference in his Government, and that the Ameer's envoy stated that the Ameer had now a deep-rooted distrust of the British, and, that he asked the agent, why was there all this fuss to get British resident officers, while we declared we had no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Affghanistan? And all this Lord Lytton conveniently designates vague and unintelligible!

At last, the Ameer, compelled to accept the hated basis, sent his Minister to confer with Sir Lewis Pelly, at Peshawur, on January 30th, 1877.

It has been made clear above, that the Ameer did not want this new Treaty, and that he was not dissatisfied with former still existing pledges; and the Cabul envoy or Minister, Noor Mahomed, now also repelled every insinuation to the contrary; he spoke of long terms of friendship with England, of the Ameer clinging to the British Government till his hand should be cut off, suggesting, with reference to the proposal made to break previous British pledges, whether a new Viceroy might not also declare he was not bound by a pledge from the present Viceroy; he asked clearly whether Agreements and Treaties from the time of Lawrence to that of Northbrook are invalid and annulled, and made a definite statement, claiming fidelity to former engagements; he contended that the Ameer

had been satisfied with Northbrook's confirmation of Lawrence and Mayo's promises, and affirmed that till Northbrook's departure, the previous course had been adhered to, and that the Ameer wanted nothing more than the assurances and engagements made by Lawrence and Mayo; he firmly expostulated against the proposal to send British officers to Affghanistan.

Sir Lewis Pelly replied on February 13th, 1877, that, if the Ameer rejected present offers, the Viceroy would not support him, even in external troubles, but would strengthen the frontier without regard to the Ameer; and discarding the pledges given by Lawrence and Mayo, Pelly referred only to the Treaty of 1855 as binding, and represented that this Treaty guaranteed no support to the Ameer, in troubles external or internal.

The Ameer's envoy replied on February 19th, referring to England's agreement with Russia as obviating external attack, insisted that pledges by former Viceroys must be held valid, as well as the Treaty of 1855, and he often insisted against the residence of British officers upon the frontiers, and that the basis laid by the previous (Home) British Government still existed.

On March 15th, Sir Lewis Pelly replied from the Viceroy that he regretted that the rude and stationary condition of Affghanistan under the Ameer caused the exclusion of a British envoy at his court; that the unsettled turbulence of the people and the weakness of Government had increased under the Ameer's reign; that the 1857 treaty, precluding the sending a European British agent to Cabul, had nothing to do with the

matter; he asserted that the envoy had avoided reference to English officers being received in other parts than Cabul *(but the envoy had seven times specified "on the frontiers" as being the British proposal).* And Lytton declared that the British Government believed that the advantages of British residents would be cordially welcomed and greatly appreciated by the Ameer (!), but that, if he was unwilling, the Government had no desire to urge an arrangement so extremely onerous to itself (!), and that the proposal was regarded by the Government as a great concession (!); that existing treaties formed no basis for further negotiation (while Sir Lewis Pelly himself had represented the proposed new treaty as a supplement to the old). Lytton further assumed that the treaty of 1855 referred only to the reception of a British envoy at Cabul (the fact being that it stipulates for the withdrawal of British officers *from the whole of the Ameer's country*, after the purpose of their arrival should be accomplished); and he declared that the treaties of 1855 and 1857 imposed obligation to support the Ameer against foreign or domestic enemies; that "utterances" by former Viceroys had not the force of treaties, and he virtually ignored any obligation but a "treaty stipulation."

It is, however, alleged that the distinctions drawn by Lytton between past written and verbal engagements, referred to the vagueness of the latter; but that which is most evident in Lytton's written treaty of 1875, is the supreme vagueness of all definite promise to the Ameer, for the adaptation of its clauses to future circumstances is made to remain completely at the discretion of the Viceroy.

Noor Mahomed, the Ameer's envoy, made despairing attempts at further discussion with Sir Lewis Pelly, who told him that he had imperative orders to treat no more, unless the basis (the admission of European resident officers) was accepted, and he was to give yes or no. Ten days afterwards, on March 26th, 1877, the Ameer's envoy died there.

The Ameer, hearing of his illness or death, determined to send another envoy (and it is reported), with authority to accept all the British conditions; and Lytton, though he admits he knew all this before March 30th, telegraphed to Pelly to "close the conference immediately," as the basis had not been accepted, and Lytton wrote that the Ameer seemed surprised and embarrassed by this step. The Viceroy (Lytton) appeared to fear, and even to bar acceptance of his own terms, for he also telegraphed that even if new envoys had arrived, further negotiation was still to be refused; and he said that the Ameer would now become more urgent in his advances towards Russia.

What possible conclusion is there but that Lytton purposed a war of aggression, obviously without visible necessity to the immediate interests of India, possibly injurious to them, and certainly burthensome to the taxpayers?

How can India pay for this war, and for the occupation of more and profitless territory, in her already overtaxed condition? The taxation is already immensely heavy with relation to the means of the people, and further taxation would be oppression not without danger.

In India there have been four famines in ten years. The fund to insure relief in case of famine is created by raising the salt tax forty per cent., and by taxing incomes of only £10 a year.

Beneficial works in India are stopped to pay for this war in Affghanistan.

The official persons in India are not taxed, and the tax increase falls on the Indian people. Government does not in that way tax the merchants of India, who could raise the masses in insurrection. The present taxes fall chiefly on Salt, Income, and Land. The British surplus arises from the monopoly of the opium trade with China. Were the opium trade with China stopped, the receipts of the Indian revenue would be less by 67 millions.

The rupture and withdrawal of the agent from Cabul, after March 1877, by Lord Lytton, was in direct breach of his promise at that Conference, that if the basis was refused by the Ameer, we should be on the same terms with him as before.

In consequence of reports that Russia was offering an offensive and defensive alliance as well as a commercial arrangement, Lord Lytton, in September 1876, remonstrated against Kaufman, the Russian general's letter to the Ameer, which letter Lytton had sent home to England two months before *without remark upon it.*

In September 1876, Lord Salisbury asked Lord Derby, then Minister for Foreign Affairs in England, to protest against this Russian document which Salisbury, as Minister for India, had forwarded to the Foreign Office, August 25th, *without complaint.*

The British Government first expressed alarm and disapproval of Russian communications with the Ameer, respecting that communication of August 1876.

Lord Derby, October 2nd, 1876, asked the British ambassador at St. Petersburg to protest against a communication from Russia, which Derby had forwarded to St. Petersburg, September 6th, *without objection.*

Therefore, since Lytton commenced the menacing Tory policy towards the Ameer in February 1876, it is proved by the above-dated incidents that this Tory change of policy was not in consequence of Russian interference, and that the Ameer first resorted to Russian negotiations after the only terms of British protection which he could accept were practically withdrawn from him by the Tory policy of Lord Salisbury.

The Tory Government urged necessity for European residents on account of the growing estrangement of the Ameer; but the Liberals have shown that his estrangement was owing to the pressure put upon him to receive such official residents.

In comparing dates it appears that the objections to Russian correspondence made by Lord Salisbury, Minister in England for India, were more attributable to irritation at the Tory Government not being supported by popular feeling in England, in their rendering that assistance which that Government desired to give to Turkey against Russia's determination to enforce freedom of life and property for the Christians in the Turkish provinces.

Russia never engaged not to extend her Asiatic

possessions, though it is asserted by Tories that she had so engaged. Her Government expressed intention not to extend them, but with the provisional intimation that it might be necessary to take steps against the predatory tribes on her borders in Asia, to maintain her predominance; and Russia clearly laid before the British Government that her action with respect to further advances depended on the course pursued by the native neighbouring states. It has been only in consequence of such anticipated attacks upon her subjects that her advance has since progressed, precisely as the British dominion has advanced in India.

On June 15th, 1877, the Duke of Argyll was answered in Parliament, by Lord Salisbury, that the Conference at Peshawur had been held at the Ameer's own request; that there had been no attempt to force an envoy at Cabul on the Ameer, and that British relations with him had not materially changed. What alarm then could the Government have felt in June 1877 of any hostile feelings or intentions of the Ameer?

From October 1877 to June 1878, no information is presented to Parliament as to events in India; but during that time the tide of war had steadily turned against the Turks in Europe and in Asia.

In June 1878, the Russian mission to Cabul was first heard of. This mission to Cabul was a justifiable infraction of her agreement with England, under the apparent probability of immediate war between the two countries. This probability arose from the threatening attitude of the Tory Government, which brought native Indian troops to Malta, and had obtained Cyprus by a

secret treaty with Turkey. It has been pointed out, in an early part of this paper, how unnecessary it was thus to cause the present war in Affghanistan, for that Constantinople had not been saved from Russian occupation, either by the presence of the British fleet, by the arrival of 7,000 Sepoys at Malta, and the occupation of Cyprus by a British force, too large for defending the island, and too few to act on the main land, but that Constantinople remained to Turkey, because both the interests and the power of Austria alone were sufficient to prevent Russia from attempting to hold that city.

Long before June 1878, Lord Lytton had begun accumulating forces on the frontiers of India, and formally occupying Quetta beyond British territory. The British Government taking steps so obviously for attack upon Russia in Asia, the Russian Government was fully justified in taking steps for defence.

The Ameer had seen his neighbours lose their independence to Russia one after another; he found Lytton would only defend him from Russia at the price of the surrender of his independence to England; and he justifiably tried to keep on good terms with Russia, never doing anything beyond this, which should not have incurred attack upon him by England. If the Ameer had refused the mission he felt he would have been between two enemies, having lost the support of England.

During the two months subsequent to the Russian mission going to Cabul, the prospect of war between England and Russia passed to the prospect of peace. By the end of July 1878, the Berlin Treaty was signed, and not till July 30th did Lytton state for certain that

the Russian mission was *at* Cabul, and he suggested whether the matter should not be dealt with by the Home Governments of Russia and England. Salisbury replied, Make sure of your facts. Lytton, on August 2nd, proposed to insist on a British mission being received at Cabul, *that thereby now our demands might be secured without price. (A rather illogical result of his past experience.)*

On August 14th, 1878, Lytton wrote to the Ameer that a British mission would be sent to Cabul, in the person of Sir Neville Chamberlain, on urgent affairs respecting events at Cabul and adjacent countries.

On the 17th August, the Ameer's favourite son and chosen heir died; it was necessary to wait the forty days of mourning, but during those days Lytton peppered the Ameer with a fire of messages through every conceivable channel, threatening him that his resistance to the mission or delay would be considered "open hostility." Such messages were also repeated to his subordinate officers at the posts on the road. All this was while Lytton knew the Russian Envoy had left Cabul, and when it was certain no hostile Russian movement was possible.

The Viceroy Lytton's messenger reaching Cabul September 10th, 1878, Sir Neville Chamberlain reported on the 17th, from Peshawur, from which report it appeared that the Ameer did not intend to refuse a mission, but that he objected to the "harsh words" and "indecent haste;" that "it is as if they were coming by force;" "it is as if they wished to disgrace me;" "I do not agree to the mission coming till my officers have received orders from me;" "I am

a friend as before, and entertain no ill will;" "I am still afflicted with grief;" and on September 18th—

The Ameer expressed his astonishment and dismay at these previous letters written in threatening terms. Now, Lord Cranbrook states that he never received these letters; thus Lord Lytton must have concealed from the Home Government those his communications with the Ameer which turned the balance in favour of war!

Lytton's "demand" on the Ameer was published long before November 26th, on which late day the Tory Government allowed publication of the Ameer's answer betraying the existence of the previous suppressed letters from Lytton; and this was after a war-cry had been raised and war feelings excited through England, by the Tories, on the false plea that the Ameer had insulted Great Britain! Lord Shaftesbury declared the Ameer's answer more humble than was expected.

Lord Beaconsfield ignored the above most vitally important threatening communications of Lord Lytton's, and told Parliament that Lytton's letters to the Ameer were kind, and that the Ameer had been treated like a spoilt child (!).

Sir N. Chamberlain reported from Peshawur, that the Ameer's minister intimated that the mission would be sent for, if it was not forced contrary to custom; and the Ameer denied having invited the Russian mission, "and believed that a personal interview with the British mission would adjust misunderstandings.

To all this Viceroy Lytton telegraphed on Sep-

tember 19th that it made no difference, and that Sir N. Chamberlain's movements were not to be delayed; so the mission advanced on September 21st to Ali Musjid, which some declare was on the ground of an independent tribe, but facts showed it was under the authority of the Ameer.

They arrived here actually five or six days before the end of the forty days' mourning, and there the British procession was stopped by the Ameer's orders.

Then there arrived in England a telegram conveying the false impression that England had been insulted by Cavignari's being stopped, and Lord Beaconsfield's Government allowed free circulation of this war-inspiring misconstruction.

On October 19th, a letter came from the Ameer, complaining of the "harsh and breathless haste," of "the hard words repugnant to courtesy and politeness." On receiving this appeal for courteous treatment, the Viceroy Lytton telegraphed to England that now "any demand for apology" "would be useless," "expose us to fresh insult, whilst losing valuable time," and he proposed immediate declaration of war, and advance of troops into Afghanistan.

The Home Government replied, Matters not "ripe for taking all the steps" mentioned, that a temperate demand for apology should be made, and also for acceptance of a *permanent* British Mission within Affghanistan, and military operations be continued. (Thus offering friendship nullified by hostility.)

During five days the Viceroy's Council met, and the newspapers published that they were struggling

hard against the English Ministry's instructions, which publicity appears to indicate that Lytton and his Council were appealing to popular opinion against the decision of the British Government in England.

Lytton sent an ultimatum letter to the Ameer on October 30th, stating the ostensible incorrect reason for the Mission, as just before shown; incorrectly complaining that the Viceroy's proposal had been left "long unanswered," and incorrectly asserting that the Ameer had refused the proposal on the grounds of danger to the British envoy in his country. The fact being that the Ameer, as above stated, had desired to postpone the British Mission because he had been perfectly satisfied with Northbrook's assurances in 1873.

Lytton further unfairly stated that the Ameer's excuses had been accepted, while, instead of his doing so, he had pelted the Ameer with imperious and insulting messages till all relations were suspended, and Lytton was now about to declare war because the Ameer had claimed the pledges given him on the good faith of the British Crown! War proceeded.

Although, in December 1878, the debate in the House of Commons had begun, Cranbrook did not publish Lytton's letter to Cavignari, *because the full text was to come by the next mail* (!). The letter was from Lord Lytton, saying that the Ameer's reply was no answer to the ultimatum, and the troops would have advanced even if it had been received earlier, although this said reply of the Ameer to Lytton's ultimatum actually expressed that he had no desire to quarrel with the

British, and expressed a readiness to receive a Mission with an escort of only twenty or thirty.

November 18th, 1878, Lord Cranbrook (lately Mr. G. Hardy) published a despatch setting forth the Tory Government's view of past negotiations with Affghanistan.

This publication had several weeks' start of any contradiction which could be given to the public in Parliament, and in it, Cranbrook inferred, as even the Tory papers understood, that Northbrook had, in 1873, first changed the longstanding policy of the British Government towards Affghanistan, that he had done so contrary to his own wishes, and by the Duke of Argyll, Liberal Minister in 1873, preventing him from giving those decided promises of aid to the Ameer, which he asked for when alarmed by the advance of Russia to Khiva. That the Ameer's letter to Northbrook, in 1873, showed his fear that the conditions attached to promises of British aid would render them useless, and he considered that the time for British aid had arrived, fearing he might become a prey to Russia, like his neighbours.

The Tory view also represents that both the Ameer's and Northbrook's letters evade satisfying the points sought by each, that Northbrook's assurances amounted to only a probability of British aid to repel invasion, that he laid stress on diplomatic efforts, and that his more definite expressions mean only money and arms. That Lord Northbrook's judgment was won by the Home Government, to prefer their more vague expressions as to aid. That Lord Mayo, in

1869, informed the Duke of Argyll, that if he used the words of the Home Government, it would render abortive what they wished to accomplish. That Northbrook's promises, in 1873, were shadowy. That Mayo wrote private letters to Argyll, against qualifications of promises of aid, which would render it hopeless to obtain the Ameer's good will; that the Ameer was pleased at the Umballa conference with Lord Mayo, because the latter set aside the suggestions of the Home Government, and that the Ameer was alienated, in 1873, because Northbrook and his advisers adopted expressions of the Home (Liberal) Government. That for two years before Lord Lytton went to India, in 1876, as Governor-General, the Ameer had changed, and no longer consulted the British Government as to his replies to Russia, and that he first received a Russian envoy, in 1875; that the Ameer's attitude was sullen, when Tory Government began, in 1874; that they were trying to cure a wound, caused by other Government; that, in April 1872, the Ameer raised no objection to receiving an envoy *(which does not prove that he had no objection to British residents)*. The Tory Government proposed (in 1876) a temporary mission to Cabul, to improve their relations with the Ameer, on the grounds that it was difficult to defend the Affghan frontier without British officers there to watch what might be going on; that they wished to test the feelings of the Ameer; that he then stated grievances against British transactions, and that he proposed a meeting of envoys from each side at Peshawur, where, although the Ameer knew beforehand that British residents would be insisted upon, yet his

envoy came without authority to agree to those conditions; and that the Ameer's language and conduct having become openly hostile, and since he was then inciting the independent tribes to hostility to British, and the Ameer's envoy dying, Lord Lytton ordered the negotiation to be closed—that the Ameer appeared to be only trying to gain time (but it has since been shown that the Ameer was sending another envoy with greater concessions). That then alienation ensued, and that notwithstanding that in 1876 the Ameer declined to receive a British envoy on the grounds that he might thus be able to refuse a Russian envoy, yet that in 1878 he received a Russian envoy at the time when there were indications of war between England and Russia; that Lord Lytton therefore demanded (and, be it observed, three days after Parliament was prorogued), in August 1878, the reception by the Ameer of a British envoy, that Lord Lytton did not anticipate any refusal, though it is admitted that he warned the Ameer that refusal would be hostility. That the Ameer, though he had received money and arms from England, and had obtained, through British interference, a boundary agreeable to him, and although he was bound by treaty to be enemy of our enemies, yet acted in a reverse way by receiving the Russian envoy.

But to the above Tory argument, it is replied on the Liberal side, that the papers making public the British transactions for some years past with Affghanistan, might have been published long before November 28th; that the Ameer's reply to Lord Lytton was no insult; that it was kept secret by the Tory Government, which published Lytton's letter

to the Ameer long before; and they raised a war cry on the strength of a telegram which was false so far as it justified any public exasperation against the Ameer.

Northbrook had represented that events might make it incumbent on us to render the Ameer material assistance; the Home Government answered that they did not object to the general sense of his paragraph, quoting to the Ameer from a despatch to Russia, stating that the independence of Affghanistan was so important to India, that the Government could not look upon an attack on Affghanistan with indifference, and that while he acted by our advice as to his neighbours he would receive material assistance; but Argyll added that, in assuring the Ameer of material assistance, great care was necessary not to raise unfounded expectations (the danger being that the Ameer had always chiefly pressed for assurances of dynastic support, and for a defensive and offensive alliance which would have placed the forces of India at his disposal in any war of aggression which he might have waged).

After some communication with the Ameer, initiated by Lord Northbrook (the Viceroy), the latter telegraphed to the Home Government that the Ameer was alarmed at Russian progress, dissatisfied with general assurances, and anxious to know definitely how far he can rely on help if invaded; and Northbrook proposed our assisting him with help by means of money, arms, and troops to repel invasion, if he acted by British advice in his external arrangements, and we to be the judge of the necessity for this help.

Argyll answered that the Viceroy should inform the Ameer we do not share his alarm, but he should assure him that we would maintain the settled policy in favour of Affghanistan if he abided by our advice, which, as intended by Argyll, was interpreted by Northbrook as sanctioning his proposed communication with the Ameer with the addition that his fears were not shared. And finally, on July 30th, Northbrook did inform the Ameer's envoy that if aggression was threatened, and British negotiation failed to avert threatened aggression, the British Government would aid him with arms, with money, and in case of necessity with troops; and the negotiation of any *further* questions was postponed for want of authority on the part of the Ameer's envoy.

These facts show the utter incorrectness of the Tory inference published by Lord Cranbrook, November 18th, 1878, that Argyll's instructions caused Northbrook to postpone conclusion of engagements with the Ameer, or that he was stopped by the Liberal Government from giving those assurances which he proposed to give. He gave even stronger assurances than those *general* assurances of support from external attack, which Mayo had given in 1869, and which, together with those given by Lawrence, the Ameer in 1873 termed efficient and sufficient.

Lord Canbrook intimated incorrectly, that Lord Mayo had never given any promise to the Ameer respecting aid against external attack, and he also stated that he did not know that Lawrence had promised material assistance. If the Liberal Government had conceded the Ameer's wish that aid against

Russian attack should be specified, such specification would have been an insult to Russia, after her repeated assurances that she would not interfere with Affghanistan; and the envoy was answered that that specification could not be adopted, for the British Government did not admit such a contingency.

And further, it is shown, that Russia never did interfere there, until the Tory Government threatened her Asiatic territory by war preparations on the British India frontier; that Northbrook did not postpone the conference to avoid giving assurances of aid, but because the Ameer's envoy had no authority to make conditions, unless the Ameer's wishes for unconditional support were conceded; that the Ameer did not apply for this conference of 1873; that it did not take place on account of the Ameer's fears of Russia; that any coldness of the Ameer arose from the various other causes above detailed, and from his not receiving unconditional promise of aid in internal and external troubles, which no political party would give him; that the published papers demonstrate that from 1874 to 1876 no suspicious communications were received from Russia by the Ameer; that in 1875 Salisbury and Schouvaloff settled affairs of Affghanistan boundaries, and Salisbury made no protest as to any such communications; that during 1875 and 1876, Salisbury sent only three despatches to the Viceroys Northbrook and Lytton, and in none of them is there a trace of any belief that Russia had entered into any adverse communications with the Ameer, nor did Salisbury intimate to Lytton that any such communications formed grounds for the new instructions to

coerce the Ameer; and that from 1870 to 1876 the Ameer communicated to the British Government all the Russian communications made to him, and the Government made no complaint of them; that if he did not always ask advice, yet he had already been advised.

In June 1876 Kaufman's Russian letter to the Ameer was communicated to the British native agent at Cabul.

The first Russian communication complained of by the British Government was that of August 8th, 1876.

The Liberal view, while admitting the greater advantage which would have accrued from British official residents in Affghanistan, was yet that to force them on the Ameer was certain to terminate in hostility; that so far from the Ameer having proposed a meeting to Lord Lytton, it was forced upon the Ameer; that the Ameer did not attempt to raise hostility among the hill tribes until he was alarmed by Lytton's imperious and menacing conduct; that Lytton's closing the negotiations when he knew another envoy with larger concessions had been despatched by the Ameer, was a breach of his own previous terms that the previously existing footing would be maintained; that Lytton's forcing a mission on the Ameer after the Russian mission was withdrawn was unnecessary, unless hostility was the object; that his not anticipating a refusal surpasses comprehension; and that, had the Ameer refused the Russian mission, he would have incurred Russian hostility without the hope of British aid, which Lord Lytton had withdrawn from him because he strove to the last to preserve the indepen-

dence of his country, and to obtain the observance of British good faith by a British Viceroy!

Respecting the best frontier at which to resist attack on the north-west of India, a mountain frontier is a bad one. British troops are more fitted for pitched battles in the plain than to fight among mountains.

If the principal passes are held by British, they will have to hold them among tribes who probably would be hostile to them. To hold these passes our forces must be divided—a risk well known to all competent officers.

To hold large fortified positions beyond them, and to preserve communications with the British India plains, will be no scientific frontier in the sense of requiring a smaller force than would be required to give battle to three armies debouching into the plain from the three principal passes; for troops cannot be taken at much greater disadvantage than when presenting a narrow front coming out of a pass. An invading army coming through the Bholan pass must find itself in a plain valley at a hundred miles from the British frontier.

Officers of local experience advise holding Candahar and Quetta, with a slip of country on the south leading to Beloochistan, thus keeping the main part of the mountain region and its 170,000 armed robbers to act as a buffer between Russians and British India. The old British policy of making Affghanistan our friendly wall of defence has been destroyed and lost to us by the glittering imperial views of Tory majority in the House of Commons.

It is contrary to the unwritten English constitution that the executive Government should commit the country to a new line of political action without consulting Parliament. Wars have been before begun without consent of Parliament, but not without knowledge and approval of the line of action which led to war.

The Crown may declare war, but only in a way not contravening Acts of Parliament. Personal government occurs when ministerial persons take action without the previous sanction of Parliament. Parliament has no power to bargain away the rights of the representatives of the people by sanctioning personal government.

Instead of informing Parliament what he purposed to do, Lord Beaconsfield only lets Parliament know what he has done, and what they must pay for it. He is using an imperial power and calling it constitutional.

The question of concealment by the Ministry of proper information from Parliament, *is not "a personal nor an unworthy discussion" to be brought forward in the House of Commons.*

Information has been concealed from Parliament. On the 9th August, 1877, Lord Salisbury stated, in the House of Lords, that he hoped the interchange of opinions between Sir L. Pelly and the Ameer's envoy had removed misconceptions and restored friendly terms. He also ridiculed all apprehensions, and conveyed that he would be no party to any change of policy. He said, "We have not tried to force an envoy on the Ameer at Cabul; our relations with the Ameer have undergone no material change since last

year; I do not believe that he is worse disposed towards us than hitherto, or that his feelings are in any way more embittered towards the British Government. If it is necessary to reopen the conference, it will be done under better auspices. There is no ground for any of the apprehensions to which the noble Duke (Argyll) referred, or for suspicions which are too absurd to be seriously entertained. But there is no reason for any apprehension of any change of policy or of disturbance in our Indian empire." And Lord Salisbury repelled the idea of Russia's approach to India, attributing such views to the misleading small scale of maps.

When Lord Salisbury affirmed, as above shown (in debate, 1877), that Government had not tried to force an envoy on the Ameer, he, at that very time, was in possession of Lord Lytton's despatch, of May 1877, so that, so far from there having been "no change of relations" since March 19th, 1877, every assurance of support given by Mayo and Northbrook had been withdrawn by Lytton; even the British native agent was withdrawn from Cabul. Diplomatic relation was suspended, and owing to this wonderful assurance of Salisbury's, in 1877, Lord Northbrook abstained from raising questions, which would have enlightened the country as to the real intentions of the Tory Government, in time for Parliament to approve or to stop them.

An Indian Board of Control Authority is required, now, that the powers of the East India Company have devolved upon Parliament, which, by omission of their exercise, leaves the Minister for India practical, if temporary, power over 50 millions of revenue and 200,000 armed men.

Tory Governments, imposing high taxation, desire foreign attractions for popular attention, the yearly public expenses being kept up to nearly 93½ millions sterling, even in these times of want and depression.

But all European trade would have revived, had the Tory policy of England not been the only obstacle to peace, by opposing the improvement of Turkey, under the joint constraint of all the chief European countries, which would have not only saved Russia and Turkey from a hideous and bloody war, but would also have prevented Russian influence and power being supreme in the greater part of the freed States of Turkey, and would have prevented the acquisition by Russia of Bessarabia to the mouth of the Danube, and of the chief eastern Black Sea port of Batoum, of Kars, and of much territory in Asia, near the Black Sea.

After years of stronger and more civilized government, a solid nationality would have grown and strengthened those countries lying between Russia and Turkey in Europe.

This inevitable kingdom will yet have existence, however delayed by Tory misrulers, vainly imagining that England, which gained her own liberties, would consent to enforce slavish oppression of a Christian race by a heathen one, as the (mistaken) means of advancing "*British interests.*"

A Tory Government, whose aim is outward Imperial glory before the world, receives support from those various classes in England whose interests tend steadily *against peace.*

There is the *Military* interest, to which war may bring promotion, titles, public and social distinction; this interest is strongly represented. Comparatively

few members of both Houses of Parliament have no military relatives, and there are about 230 peers in the House of Lords, and about 263 members in the House of Commons, who are or have been soldiers or sailors.

Many trades profit largely by war.

Threatened interests, such as the monopolies of drink, fund trusts, and the Established Church, will support war abroad to avert Parliamentary reform at home.

The Tory Government, which begun in 1874, owed much of its origin to the vice of drink, to the publican and beer and spirit vote given by those whose gains Liberal rule restricted.

Forty-and-a-half millions sterling are paid annually in taxes for beer, spirits, and tobacco, in the United Kingdom.

Distress by poverty has been principally prolonged in England and elsewhere, for the last two years, by the Tory maintenance of uncertainty of war, of unknown intentions, causing distrust, and checking enterprise and industry. Other countries have necessarily shared this distress. Bankers and merchants unite in declaring that distress has been intensified and prolonged by the extra expense incurred, and by the uncertainty inflicted by the aggressive policy of the Tory Government.

Tory principles do not aim at prosperity arising from the leisure and confidence of peace, and from the trade victories of cheapest and best manufactures, made easier by cheapness of living, through legislative economy lessening taxation—now nearly £4 per head of the population—which overweights British in the race against foreign labour.

Tory rule of England seeks trade openings by waging the wars of the Israelites, by removing our neighbours' land-marks; and it seeks support by opening more and more well-paid Government appointments to the upper and middle classes, in new territories won at the cost of penury to the lower classes at home, and by the sacrifice of their lives abroad.

The good of Great Britain and Ireland is the general good of all the people, to which private interests should be sacrificed.

The general good will not be the sole object of the Legislature, till all classes are equally represented in the governing body. This can never be while the second chamber (now the House of Lords), represents the rich and landed class only, and while it is hereditary instead of elective.

The general good will not be the sole object of the House of Commons, while classes and interests are unequally represented in its members, nor can they be equally represented till Members of the House of Commons are returned for equal numbers of people instead of for unequal numbers of acres; until soldiers and lawyers (Government officials excepted) are debarred from being Members of the House of Commons, while exercising their professions; until five years' Parliaments prevent members elected during former conditions from legislating under conditions unforeseen when they were elected; until the bribery of election expenses is nullified by throwing them on the electors; and until a lower franchise shall make the purchase of votes more difficult and less useful.

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