CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO

PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

LONDON:
PRINTED BY J. HARRISON & SON.

1839.
# CORRESPONDENCE

**RELATING TO**

# PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RELATING TO THE

AFFAIRS OF PERSIA AND AFGHANISTAN.

No. 1.—Mr. Bligh to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 15, 1834.)
(Extract.)
St. Petersburgh, January 3, 1834.

Intelligence has, I am assured, been received here, that the Shah
of Persia has appointed the eldest son of Abbas Meerza (Mahommed
Meerza) to the Government of the Province of Azerbijan, which was
held by his deceased father, and expectations were entertained, that the
Sovereign would also nominate that Prince as his successor to the
throne, though no positive decision had at the date of the last accounts
from Tabrees, been taken upon this subject.

Mahommed Meerza was still in Khorassan, but was expected to
arrive very shortly in that Capital.

I have reason to believe the above-mentioned appointment is consi-
dered satisfactory to the Russian Government.

No. 2.—Mr. Bligh to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Feb. 11, 1834.)
(Extract.)
St. Petersburgh, January 28, 1834.

Count Nesselrode seems apprehensive that Persia will be the
scene of civil discord upon the death of the Shah, and is anxious that
His Majesty’s Government should have a good understanding with the
Russian Government respecting that country, where he considers that
our interests are so very similar.

No. 3.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bligh.
(Extract.)
Foreign Office, June 16, 1834.

I had to-day a conversation with Prince Lieven upon the affairs of
Persia, with the substance of which it is right that you should be made
acquainted.

The Prince having called at this office at my request, I said, that I
wished to have some conversation with him upon the state of Persia.
That the death of Abbas Meerza, who had been named by the Shah as heir to the crown, had thrown the question of succession into uncertainty, until the Shah shall name another heir in the room of Abbas Meerza. That various candidates had started, and that various interests were at work in support of their respective claims. That England and Russia are both too deeply interested in maintaining the internal tranquillity of Persia, to allow either Power to be indifferent to complications which might tend to throw that country into a state of confusion and civil war; and that as each would necessarily be applied to by the rival parties, it would be a fortunate circumstance, if the wishes and good offices of both could be united in support of one and the same candidate. That our latest accounts from Persia led us to suppose that the Russian Envoy at Tehran had expressed the inclination of his Government in favour of the pretensions of Mahommed Meerza, son of Abbas, and that His Majesty's Government was disposed and prepared to take the same line, and to recommend the Shah to settle the crown upon that grandson. That some time ago, Count Nesselrode had mentioned this subject to you, and had expressed the willingness of the Russian Government to come to an understanding with that of His Majesty's as to a joint exertion of the influence of the two Powers in Persia, in favour of some one candidate. That at that time His Majesty's Government were not in possession of the information necessary to enable them to form a clear opinion upon this subject; but that they have now made up their minds; and, concurring with the Russian Government in thinking that Mahommed Meerza would, on the whole, be the most eligible choice, they intend that suitable instructions shall be sent out to the British Envoy at Tehran; and I added, that I wished Prince Lieven to make this intention known to his Government, and to express our satisfaction at finding that the two Governments were likely to act in unison in this matter.

The Prince said he should not fail to report to his Court what I had stated, and was sure that it would be received at St. Petersburgh with great satisfaction.

No. 4.—Mr. Bligh to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 12, 1834.)
(Extract.)
St. Petersburgh, July 2, 1834.

After receiving, by the post of yesterday afternoon, your Lordship's despatches, I called upon Count Nesselrode, at his country house, for the purpose of communicating to his Excellency, according to your Lordship's wishes, the contents of that of the 16th of June.

Count Nesselrode said, that he had been informed by Prince Lieven of his conversation with your Lordship on the 16th ultimo, and had heard with satisfaction that the Russian and English Governments were so likely to understand each other on the subject of the succession to the throne of Persia, a satisfaction that was increased when I read to his Excellency that part of the despatch which testified, in your Lordship's
own words, that Prince Lieven had rightly interpreted the view taken of this matter by His Majesty's Government.

No. 5.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bligh.

(Extract.)

FOREIGN OFFICE, AUGUST 5, 1834.

With reference to my despatch of the 16th of June, I have to acquaint you that Count Medem, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires at this Court, read to me a few days ago a despatch addressed to him by Count Nesselrode upon the affairs of Persia, in answer to a communication which I had made verbally to Prince Lieven on that subject some time previously.

Count Nesselrode expressed in that despatch the great satisfaction of the Russian Government at learning that His Majesty's Government took the same view as that of Russia, of the question of the succession to the Persian throne; and that the British Resident at Tehran would be instructed to recommend the Shah to name Prince Mahommed Meerza as heir to the crown; and Count Nesselrode said that orders should be sent to the Russian Ambassador in Persia, to co-operate in this affair with the British Resident.

No. 6.—Mr. Bligh to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 15, 1834.)

(ST. PETERSBURGH, AUGUST 6, 1834.)

Count Nesselrode told me at the same time, that he had instructed Count Medem to inform your Lordship that intelligence had been received here of the decision at length taken by the Shah of Persia to nominate Mahommed Meerza as the successor to his throne, which he said that he had not had an opportunity of communicating to me previously to the departure of the last steam-boat.

No. 7.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bligh.

FOREIGN OFFICE, SEPTEMBER 5, 1834.

Sir,

In acknowledging the receipt of your despatch, of the 6th of August, I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of expressing to the Russian Government the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the decision which has been taken by the Shah of Persia to nominate Mahommed Meerza as the successor to his throne; an event which, it is to be hoped, will avert the danger of civil war in Persia on the next demise of the Crown; and you will also say, that His Majesty's Government are gratified to find that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting, with regard to the affairs of Persia, in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain, not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia.

His Majesty's Government will at all times find a real pleasure in co-operating with that of Russia for such purposes; and instructions have been sent to the British Resident at Tehran, to communicate con-
fidentially with the Russian Representative, in furtherance of the common views of the two Governments.

I am, &c.

The Hon. J. D. Bligh. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 8.—Substance of a Despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Medem; communicated by Count Medem, August 22, 1834.

Nous attendons à voir les Représentans de Russie et d’Angleterre en Perse autorisés à agir d’un commun accord dans un esprit de paix et d’union, ainsi que la dépêche ministérielle du 30 Juin en a déjà témoigné le désir. L’importance de munir à cet effet les deux Représentans d’instructions analogues, n’est nullement diminuée par le fait seul de la nomination du Prince héritier. Cet événement, quelque satisfaisant qu’il soit, ne suffit pas néanmoins à lui seul, pour consolider le repos de la Perse, et pour en éloigner tous les élemens de discordie intérieure et de troubles. Nous persistons par conséquent à croire que la conformité de langage et de conduite des Représentans de Russie et de la Grande Bretagne, serait de toutes les combinaisons politiques celle qui contribuerait le plus efficacement à maintenir la tranquillité en Perse, et à préparer le Pays à un nouveau règne, sans exposer cet Empire aux désordres inséparables de toute succession, lorsqu’elle est contestée.

(Translation.)

We expect to see the Representatives of Russia and England in Persia, authorized to act in concert in a spirit of peace and union, as the despatch from my office of the 30th of June has already expressed the desire should be the case. The importance of providing, with this view, the two Representatives with corresponding instructions, is no wise diminished by the mere fact of the nomination of the hereditary Prince. That event, however satisfactory it may be, is nevertheless not in itself sufficient to consolidate the tranquillity of Persia, and to remove from that country all the elements of internal discord and disturbance. We consequently continue to think that a conformity of language and conduct on the part of the Representatives of Russia and of Great Britain, would of all political combinations be the one which would most effectually contribute to maintain the tranquillity of Persia, and to prepare the country for a new reign, without exposing that Empire to the disorders inseparable from any contested succession.

No. 9.—Mr. Bligh to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 5, 1835.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburgh, December 8, 1834.

I have just seen Count Nesselrode, who has given me some details respecting the death of the Shah of Persia. Count Nesselrode, seems to anticipate that Persia will inevitably become the scene of civil commotion, and expresses his satisfaction that under such circumstances, the
British and Russian Governments should have come to a good understanding upon this matter.

No. 10.—*Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Ellis.*

(Extract.)

*Foreign Office, July 25, 1835.*

You will especially warn the Persian Government against allowing themselves to be pushed on to make war against the Afghans.

Whether Persia is successful or not, her resources will be wasted in these wars, and her future means of defence must be diminished.

No. 11.—*Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Rec. Feb. 28, 1836.)

(Extract.)

*Tehran, November 13, 1835.*

It is unsatisfactory to know, that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Afghanistan, and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that the right of sovereignty over Herat and Kandahar is as complete now, as in the reign of the Saffavean dynasty. This pretension is much sustained by the success of his father, Abbas Meerza, in the Khorassan campaign, and by the suggestions of Colonel Borowski.

No. 12.—*Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Rec. April 7, 1836.)

(Extract.)

*Tehran, December 24, 1835.*

The language of Hajee Meerza Aghassee, on both occasions, was most unsatisfactory. He enumerated the different military expeditions that the Shah would undertake in the spring, one against Herat and Kandahar, another against the Belooches, and a third against the Rewandooz Beg.

No. 13.—*Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Rec. April 7, 1836.)

(Extract.)

*Tehran, December 30, 1835.*

I thought it desirable to bring again formally before Hajee Meerza Aghassee and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the views of His Majesty’s Government in respect of the foreign policy best suited to the actual condition of Persia; but they both protested against considering the Afghans as a Government or consolidated State, with whom relations of peace or equality were to be maintained. They declared that a large portion of Afghanistan belonged to the Shah of Persia, and that he was at liberty to decide how he would deal with the Afghans as being his own subjects.

Wishing rather to ascertain the exact pretensions of the Persian Ministers on Afghanistan, than to discuss the question of right, I inquired how far they considered the dominion of Persia to extend; their reply was, to Ghizni; on former occasions, the Hajee has mentioned the occupation of Herat as a proximate enterprise, and that of Kandahar as one not far distant.
Believing, as I do, that the prosecution of these schemes of conquest in Afghanistan, must affect the whole question of our connection with Persia, and being prepared to offer hereafter my opinions to your Lordship on the subject, I will now confine myself to a brief notice of the state of the relations of Persia with Herat.

That city and some neighbouring districts, are under the immediate authority of Kamran Meerza, whose father, Mahmood Shah, was for a short time King of Cabool. Kamran Meerza, without directly acknowledging the sovereignty of Persia, has been in the habit of paying annually a sum of money to the Shah of Persia, whenever the Governor of Khorassan, the province of Persia adjacent to Herat, was in a condition to threaten an attack upon Kamran Meerza's principality. The successes of His Royal Highness Abbas Meerza in his Khorassan campaigns, led to the contracting of certain engagements on the part of Kamran Meerza, the principal of which was the razing of the fort of Ghorian, the return of certain families to their domicile in Persia, and the payment of a sum of 10,000 tomauns annually to the Shah. The Herat Prince has failed in the performance of all, and the Shah has consequently a right to obtain redress by force of arms. Under such circumstances, even if the British Government was not restrained by the IXth Article of the existing Treaty, from interfering between the Persians and Afghans, it would be difficult to oppose an attack upon Herat, or to define the exact limit to which hostilities were to be carried against Kamran Meerza; but an attempt to annex Kandahar and Ghizni to the Persian dominions, upon pretensions derived from the time of Nadir Shah, has no such justification, and could not be looked upon with indifference by the British Government.

No. 14.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. April 7, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Tehran, January 8, 1836.

I yesterday ascertained, from authority on which I could rely, that the Russian Minister at this Court had expressed himself in very strong terms, respecting the expediency of the Shah losing no time in undertaking the expedition against Herat, and had assigned, as a reason for the immediate urgency of his doing so, the probability of the British Government discouraging the attempt, in pursuance of their known wish to see a restoration of the Afghan monarchy.

In former despatches, I have communicated to your Lordship the pretensions of the Shah of Persia over Afghanistan, and the disinclination of the Persian Ministers to attend to my suggestion regarding the maintenance of peace with the Afghans. I had hitherto confined myself to the simple expression of the pacific recommendations of His Majesty's Government on the subject, but when I found that the Russian Minister was about to hold, or had actually held, very opposite language, I determined to be more explicit with the Persian Ministers,
and I ventured to be so, from the knowledge which I individually had of the general views of the authorities in England, respecting Persia and Afghanistan. I accordingly had an interview, yesterday, with Hajee Meerza Aghassee and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and having recalled to their recollection, their declaration that the sovereign rights of the Shah extended in Afghanistan to Ghizni, I informed them that the official situation which I had held at the India Board, enabled me to say to them, with confidence, that the British Government would look with great dissatisfaction on the prosecution of any schemes of extended conquest in Afghanistan. I added, that I thought it more consistent with candour and real friendship to make this communication now, than to allow the Shah to commence the rumoured expedition against the Afghans, in ignorance of the sentiments of the British Government.

The Persian Ministers were much struck by this communication; and the Hajee asked, in reply; whether the conduct of the Afghans in coveting the carrying off Persian subjects by the Turcomans, and their violation of positive engagements, were to be tolerated? Meerza Massood alluded particularly to the breach of faith committed by Kamran Meerza; and I at once went through the statement of the Persian Ministers, adding, at the same time, that the Shah had the most absolute right to obtain redress from the Prince of Herat, but that the British Government would much prefer that the object should be effected by negotiation than by force of arms. I also expressed my opinion that, were an English gentleman sent by me to the Prince, charged with representations on the injustice of his conduct, he would not persist in behaviour that could only lead to his destruction.

Hajee Meerza Aghassee cordially acceded to my proposition, and said, that the Persian Ministers would be willing to take any course that appeared to me likely to prevent the recourse to war, an event always to be deplored, from the amount of human misery inflicted by it.

I expressed my satisfaction at the manner in which my communication and proposal had been received, and requested the Ministers to lose no time in making both known to His Majesty. They agreed to do so.

I think an advantage has been gained by thus early preparing the Persian Ministers for the remonstrance which may be hereafter made on the pretensions of the Shah to dominion in Afghanistan; and I hope that there will be less disposition to listen to the encouragement of the Russian Minister, now that they cannot plead the excuse of having been ignorant of the objections entertained by the British Government.

No. 15.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. April 7, 1836.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, January 15, 1836.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship a memorandum
that I have prepared, on the effect of the existing Treaty between Great Britain and Persia, upon the interests and security of the British Empire in India.

I feel quite assured that the British Government cannot permit the extension of the Persian monarchy in the direction of Afghanistan, with a due regard to the internal tranquillity of India; that extension will, at once, bring Russian influence to the very threshold of our Empire; and, as Persia will not, or dare not, place herself in a condition of close alliance with Great Britain, our policy must be, to consider her no longer an outwork for the defence of India, but as the first parallel from whence the attack may be commenced or threatened.

(Inclosure.)—Memorandum.

(Extract.)

The Shah of Persia lays claim to the sovereignty of Afghanistan, as far as Ghizni, and is fully determined to attempt the conquest of Herat in the spring. Unfortunately, the conduct of Kamran Meerza, in violating the engagements entered into with His Royal Highness the late Abbas Meerza, and in permitting his Vizier, Yar Mahommed Khan, to occupy part of Seistan, has given the Shah a full justification for commencing hostilities. The success of the Shah in the undertaking is anxiously wished for by Russia; and their Minister here does not fail to press it on to early execution. The motive cannot be mistaken: Herat, once annexed to Persia, may become, according to the Commercial Treaty, the residence of a Russian Consular Agent, who would from thence push his researches and communications, avowed and secret, throughout Afghanistan. Indeed, in the present state of the relations between Persia and Russia, it cannot be denied, that the progress of the former in Afghanistan is tantamount to the advancement of the latter, and ought to receive every opposition from the British Government that the obligations of public faith will permit; but while the Russian Government is free to assist Persia in the assertion of her sovereign pretensions in Afghanistan, Great Britain is precluded, by the IXth Article of the existing Treaty, from interfering between the Persians and Afghans, unless called upon to do so by both parties; and therefore, as long as this Treaty remains in force, the British Government must submit to the approach of Russian influence, through the instrumentality of Persian conquests, to the very frontier of our Indian Empire.

No. 16.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 29, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Tehran, February 4, 1836.

I was prepared for the Persian Ministers withdrawing the ready assent which they had given to my proposal of sending an officer to
Herat, charged with a letter recommending Prince Kamran to fulfil the engagements contracted with the Persian Government, and thereby to render the threatened attack upon Herat unnecessary.

My anticipations have been realized; and the reason assigned was, that the proceeding might be misconceived, and construed into an admission by the Shah of his inability to enforce the performance of the engagements contracted by Prince Kamran, or to chastise him for his breach of faith. The Ministers, however, consented to a letter being sent by me to Prince Kamran, provided it were despatched through the Persian authorities. To this I agreed. I inclose a translation of the letter to Prince Kamran.

Since the despatch of the letter, or rather its delivery into the hands of the Persian Ministers, intelligence is said to have been received, that Prince Kamran has put some of the Persian residents at Herat to death, and driven many families, of the same race, out of the city. It is probable, that the Prince may have adopted such measures, from a knowledge that a conspiracy existed among the Persian citizens of Herat, to rise against him, whenever the Shah's army should appear before the city.

Some days after the receipt of this intelligence, the Shah, at the public Salam or Levee, observed, that while the English Government never failed to attend to the interests of even an individual merchant, it was not to be expected that he should allow his subjects to be carried into captivity, or driven from their homes, by the Turcomans, and by one of his own subjects, who was in league with them.

(Inclusion.)—Translation of a Persian Letter from Mr. Ellis to Prince Kamran of Herat.

It cannot be unknown to that illustrious Prince, that the British Government, possessing as it does vast dominions in Hindostan, anxiously watches the occurrences in neighbouring countries, and uses the influence which its power gives, for the purpose of maintaining peace therein.

Although, from the dispensations of Providence, confusion has existed for some years in the country of Afghanistan, yet the British Government has remained on terms of friendship with the several Rulers of that country; and trade has been carried on between the subjects of the British Government and the people of Afghanistan.

Among the Rulers of Afghanistan, that illustrious Prince holds a distinguished station; and the British Government has always wished that his affairs should prosper. This friend, who has been sent by the King of England to congratulate His Majesty the Shah of Persia, on his accession to the throne, and now resides here as the Representative of the British Government, has learnt with extreme sorrow, that in consequence of failure in the performance of engagements entered into between that illustrious Prince and His Royal Highness the late Abbas.
Meerza, His Majesty the Shah of Persia intends to seek redress by force of arms, and to invade the territory of Herat. That illustrious Prince must be aware of the necessity of performing his engagements, and thereby averting the calamities of war; and this friend, therefore, as the Representative of the British Government, cannot refrain from pressing upon that illustrious Prince, the propriety of his sending a confidential and proper person to the Shah, both to compliment His Majesty on his succession, and to assure him that all the engagements which he has contracted, shall, without further delay, be completely fulfilled.

This friend believes, that if such a course be followed, His Majesty the Shah will not attack Herat, and the district belonging to it; but will maintain relations of amity with that illustrious Prince.

A true translation. (Signed) H. ELLIS.

No. 17.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 29, 1836.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, February 15, 1836.

I regret to say, that the Shah still talks of the expedition to Herat; but latterly he has dwelt more upon the necessity of chastising the Turcomans.

No. 18.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 29, 1836.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, February 25, 1836.

I have taken occasion to inquire from the Persian Ministers, whether any proposition for a defensive and offensive alliance had been made by Dost Mahommed to the Shah. Hajee Meerza Aghassee treated the notion as totally beneath the dignity of the Shah, whose subject he declared Dost Mahommed to be. He was pleased to add, that under any circumstances, such a proceeding would not be adopted without consulting with me.

I am convinced, that every effort will be made by the Shah to obtain possession of Herat, and to extend his dominions in the direction of Afghanistan, and that for this purpose, no opportunity will be lost of forming connections with the Chief of Cabool and his brothers, between whom and Kamran Meerza there is a blood-feud.

I cannot refrain from most earnestly calling the attention of His Majesty's Government, and of the East India Company, to the danger of the Shah of Persia, approaching, either by direct conquest, or by the admission of his right of dominion, the frontiers of India; for I can conceive no event more likely to unsettle the public mind in the northwestern provinces, and to disturb the general tranquillity of our Eastern Empire.
No. 19.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 29, 1836.)
(Extract.)

UZEEZ KHAN, an Afghan nobleman of rank, arrived here last month on a mission from Kohundil Khan, Rahmil Khan, and Sheerdil Khan, the brother Chiefs of Kandahar, to the Shah. The object of the mission has been to enter into an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Shah, and more especially to unite in the attack upon Kamran Meerza of Herat, between whom and the Chiefs of Kandahar, who are brothers of the Chief of Cabool, there exists a blood-feud.

The Chiefs of Kandahar have required from the Shah an acknowledgment of their independence in the internal administration of their country, and they only propose to submit themselves to him in their foreign relations.

The Envoy has been received with great favour, and the terms of the proposed alliance have been agreed to. He has already had his audience of leave, and returns with all expedition to Kandahar.

No. 20.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. July 15, 1836.)
(Extract.)

UZEEZ KHAN held the same language to me as he had undoubtedly done to the Shah and his Ministers, namely, that the whole of Afghanistan was, with the exception of Herat and its dependencies, ready to come under feudal submission to the Shah, who, in fact, might, with the aid of the Affghans, like Nadir Shah, push his conquests to Delhi. From the communications of Uzeez Khan, through a confidential channel, I have, however, learnt, that the sole object of seeking a connection with the Shah, is to protect Kandahar from the apprehended attack of Kamran Meerza, and from the growing power of the Seiks; but that the Kandahar Chiefs have no disposition really to become feudatories of the Shah, and that they would prefer effecting the objects in view through the protection of the British Government.

I have uniformly said to Uzeez Khan, that the object of the British Government was to maintain the status quo as to the limits of Afghanistan and Persia, and have explained to him that this desire was quite consistent with the utmost solicitude for the prosperity of the Shah and his dominions. I have also told him that the internal tranquillity and welfare of the Affghans was equally a subject of interest and anxiety to Great Britain.

I have not hesitated to proceed thus, from being quite convinced that the British Government can no longer, with safety to its possessions in India, refrain from intimate connection with the Affghans, whether they be subject to one Chief or divided into principalities.

The Shah of Persia may, and I begin rather confidently to hope will, be prevented, by want of means, from attacking Herat this year, and annexing it to his dominions; but he will not abandon the object unless
compelled to do so by the declared opposition of the British Government. His Majesty has been encouraged, and, I have been recently informed, has been promised positive assistance in this design, by the Russians, who well know that the conquest of Herat and Kandahar by the Persians, is, in fact, an advance for them towards India, if not for the purpose of actual invasion, certainly for that of intrigue and disorganization.

Hajee Meerza Aghassee has not unfrequently alluded to the grounds for hostilities given by Kamran Meerza, and has pressed upon me the impossibility of the Shah submitting to the alleged wrongs inflicted upon his subjects by that Prince, and the Turcoman tribes connected with him. I have never disputed the Shah's right to demand redress, but have shown that I consider the just assertion of that right to be very different from the annexation of Herat and its dependencies, to the Persian dominions. The Minister often disclaims any wish for conquest, and professes a preference for an amicable arrangement, but no reliance can be placed on such declarations, which are only uttered with a hope of diverting my attention from this fixed and unalterable purpose of the Shah.

I never see this Minister without receiving from him assurances, which, if sincere, would be exactly those suited to the past relations of the two Governments; but I know that on other occasions, and to the Russian Minister, he holds language entirely opposite; and that a few days since, after a long interview with Count Simonich, he declared to a number of official persons, that the British officers purposely delayed the improvement of the Persian troops, and that the military artificers which were required, must be procured from Germany or some other country, and not from England.

No. 21.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. July 15, 1836.) (Extract.)

_Tehran, April 14, 1836._

On the 13th instant, I went to pay a visit to Karaman Meerza, the favourite brother of the Shah, who has been Governor of Khorassan, and who is to proceed in a similar capacity to Azerbaijan; and I found the Russian Mission in the Prince's apartment. Soon after I had seated myself, he asked the Count whether he intended to accompany the Shah on his approaching expedition? The Count said it entirely depended on His Majesty's orders. Meerza Massood, who was present, said His Majesty had commanded the attendance of Count Simonich. The Prince then inquired, whether, as the expedition was directed against Herat, Kandahar, and Cabool, the Count would accompany the Shah throughout? The Count's answer was, that he would go wherever the road would admit of a carriage, and as long as his health permitted. The Prince had previously said, that the road from Tehran to Herat was perfectly safe for a carriage.
No. 22.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. July 15, 1836.)

(Extract.)

Tehran, April 16, 1836.

I called yesterday separately on Hajee Meerza Aghassee and Meerza Massood, in consequence of having received information that the Russian Minister had had a long audience with the Shah on the preceding day, at which those Ministers were present, when the subject of discussion was the expedition against Herat, in which the Russian Minister had recommended perseverance this year, on the ground that what now could be effected with 10,000 men, would not next year be practicable with a much larger force.

Hajee Meerza Aghassee said that the Shah would prefer submission on the part of Kamran Meerza, and security against a renewal of predatory incursions, to the necessity of seizing Herat.

Meerza Massood, held the same language as Hajee Meerza Aghassee.

So many difficulties beset the execution of the Herat expedition this year, that it may be said there is no ground for thinking it will take place. I have endeavoured to throw into the scale of difficulties, the risk of seriously disquieting the British Government, which the Shah and his Ministers cannot fail to see, must be the result of introducing the counsels or co-operation of any other European nation, into the design.

As I had heard that the Russian Minister had earnestly urged the Shah to persist in the Herat expedition, and would be prepared to give him, if necessary, his professional advice on the conduct of it, I called on Count Simonich this day, and I now report to your Lordship the substance of our conference.

I commenced by stating, that Afghanistan must be considered as frontier to our Indian Empire; that no European nation had relations, either commercial or political, with that country; and that, accordingly, I could not conceive that the British Government would view, otherwise than with jealousy, any interference, direct or indirect, in the affairs of Afghanistan. I trusted that the exposition of this principle would excuse me to the Russian Minister for inquiring from him, whether there was any foundation for the statement that had reached me, of the Russian Government having offered a body of troops to assist the Shah in the projected expedition against Herat, or aid of any other description?

The Count, at first said, that our respective Ministers at London and St. Petersburgh, would be best able to answer the question; he, however, afterwards distinctly declared, that the subject had never been mooted between him and the Persian Ministers. The Count must have perceived from some further remarks made by me, that I was aware of the discussion in the presence of the Shah respecting Herat, and he therefore said that, on that projected expedition, as upon all other sub-
jects, he gave such advice to the Shah as he deemed most conducive to His Majesty's advantage.

My reply was, that in my judgment, the settlement of the internal administration of the kingdom, was the most pressing subject for the Shah's attention, but that I did not presume to question the right of Count Simonich to give such counsel to the Shah as he might think fit.

No. 23.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. July 15, 1836.)
(Tehran, April 17, 1836.)

I had an audience of the Shah this day.

His Majesty observed that the strongest considerations of duty, both as a King, and a Mussulman, required him to proceed himself to Khorassan; that Kamran Meerza and the Afghans under his authority, had penetrated from Seistan into Khorassan, had carried away 12,000 persons, whom they had sold as slaves, and had compelled the Chief of Khain, his subject, to send tribute to Kamran Meerza; that the Chiefs of Khain and Khaf, both towns in Khorassan, had sent agents to say, that they must, unless immediately supported by the Shah, submit to Kamran; and that, under these circumstances, he was bound to postpone all other objects. I observed, that however pressing these considerations might be, the chastisement of the Afghans and Turcomans might be effected by His Majesty's servants, while the settlement of the revenue in the other provinces, could never be so efficaciously made as by himself in person.

No. 24.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. July 15, 1836.)
(Tehran, April 29, 1836.)

I saw Hajee Meerza Aghassee to-day, and in the course of our conversation he said, that the plan of the campaign was to march upon Herat in three divisions, the one from Kerman, by Seistan to Herat; the other under the personal command of the Shah by Subzawar and Khaf; and the third by Asterabad and Meshed; this latter is intended also to overawe the Turcomans.

I took occasion to allude to the declaration publicly made by Uzeez Khan, the Kandahar Envoy, that the Shah, with the assistance of the Barukzyee Chiefs, would push his conquests to Delhi; and I observed that if a Mahommedan Sovereign were seated, as formerly, on the throne of Delhi, such language and such preparations would necessarily excite alarm and apprehension. I appealed to Meerza Massood, who was present, and asked whether among the nations of Europe, armaments were not looked upon with great jealousy, and whether they did not give rise to very serious and pressing inquiry? The Hajee, in reply,
said, that the Kandahar Envoy must be mad, and, added that the Shah’s object was to punish the Affghans and Hazarehs for carrying off his subjects, and to render it impossible for them to renew their inroads. I observed that I was sure Kamran Meerza would, on hearing of the extensive preparations made by the Shah, hasten to offer every concession. The Hajee announced that means would be taken to leave that course open to him, and that the Shah would gladly avoid the extremity of actual war.

It was impossible for the Persian Ministers not to see the drift of my observations, and I feel assured that neither the Shah nor they are without uneasiness as to the possible effect on the British Government of the prosecution of the favourite scheme of annexing Herat and Kandahar to Persia. The probability of the expedition taking place is rather augmented; the regiments are arriving from Azerbaijan; having received six months’ pay; and the settlement of the south-western frontier certainly sets the Shah free for operations elsewhere. Hajee Ibrahim, one of the great Isphahan Mooshtehids, (Doctors of Divinity), has been induced to declare from the pulpit, that an expedition against the Affghans is a holy war, and that all who fall in it are entitled to the privilege of martyrdom. Still the season is advancing, and it is scarcely possible that the three divisions of the army can be assembled before Herat by the end of June, which all acquainted with the localities say is necessary to secure sufficient supplies for the men, and forage for cattle. Moreover all the persons employed in the Royal Household and Civil Departments, remain unpaid and utterly without means for preparing for the journey.

No. 25.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. July 15, 1836.)
(Extract)
Tabreez, June 2, 1836.

It will be in your Lordship’s recollection, that I recommended the Shah, on affairs of very high importance, to call in the aid of a Council, to be composed of a few of the principal nobles and officers of the Court. The Shah some days before my leaving Tehran, carried the suggestion into effect by summoning a Council thus constituted, to deliberate together, and to give him individually, and in writing, their opinion as to the expediency of his proceeding in person on the expedition to Herat. The opinion of the Council was, that the Shah should not in person even go to Khorassan, but should encamp in a pasture ground near Asterabad, and send the force which has been assembled, into Khorassan, under the command of one of his principal officers.

No. 26.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Oct. 17, 1836.)
(Extract.)
Tabreez, June 25, 1836.

I have the honor to transmit to your Lordship copies of two
letters received from Mr. Riach, and of a memorandum of instructions which I have addressed to him since the date of my last despatch.

Your Lordship will observe, that two expeditions are now contemplated by the Shah, the one to chastise the Turcomans and Oosbegs, who have lately committed depredations in Asterabad and the neighbouring districts, and the other against Herat. The Russian Minister has declared before Mr. Riach, in the presence of the Shah, that as these expeditions are undertaken for the purpose of permanently and completely putting down the traffic in slaves carried on by the Turcomans, Oosbegs, Hazarehs, and Affghans, the success of them will confer a great benefit upon Persia and Russia, inasmuch as the subjects of both are carried into captivity by these barbarians. Count Simonich has also said, that he considered himself one of the military servants of the Shah, and that he was, therefore, prepared to give His Majesty his professional aid and advice.

I am told that the advance of pay made to the troops that have marched under Feridoon Meerza, who is appointed to command the army destined to attack Herat, was taken, by the consent of the Russian Minister, from the first instalment of the crore, kept under the seals of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary to the Russian mission.

We have hitherto been singularly negligent of all the countries between the Caspian and India, excepting Persia, and we seem to have relied upon the obligation, incurred by Persia in the Treaty of Tehran, to resist the approach to India of an invading army, through the countries of Kharazm, Tataristan, Bokhara, &c., as a sufficient protection.

I have ventured to express the strongest doubts of the value of the security derived from the Treaty; and I think the good understanding subsisting between the Russian and Persian Government on the expeditions against Khiva and Herat, shows the necessity of our connecting ourselves with our neighbours and natural allies, the Affghans; and of our requiring from the Shah of Persia, an abandonment of any scheme of territorial aggrandizement, which obviously compromises the tranquility, if it does not endanger the security, of our Indian dominions.

I beg to inclose, for your Lordship's information, the translation of a memorandum which I have directed Mr. Riach to deliver to the Shah.

(Inclosure 1.)—Mr. Riach to Mr. Ellis.

(Extract.)

Tehran, June 1, 1836.

I told Hajee Meerza Aghassee, that I was directed by your Excellency to inform him of your great anxiety that the difference between the Shah and Herat should be settled by the pen rather than the sword; that so important did this appear to your Excellency, that you would gladly lend the assistance of a British officer now, as you had
before offered, for the purpose of being the medium of making an effort at reconciliation; and that if the Shah wished it, Mr. Todd should be immediately sent by your Excellency to Herat, and that he should act only under such instructions as His Majesty chose to give. Hajee Meerza Aghassee having already expressed his grateful sense of the sincere friendship your Excellency had on all occasions shown for the welfare of Persia, declared that in this instance too, your views and sentiments were entirely those of a true well-wisher of his Government; but that it was at present quite impossible for Mr. Todd to be spared from his duties with the artillery here; that as the Topghee Bashee must go against Herat with His Royal Highness Feridoon Meerza, Mr. Todd would accompany the Shah, who, with 25,000 men and 25 guns, would march in a few days towards Bostam, and from thence His Majesty would move by easy stages and attack Khiva. He said that if the Government of Herat sent proper submission to the Shah, of course no army would be sent against it; and he seemed to think that such submission was very likely to arrive soon; which he said would give him much satisfaction. He did not listen attentively to my remark, that the credit of the Persian Government would be entirely saved from any appearance of being the first to seek a settlement of the differences by amicable measures, by your Excellency sending a British officer to the Herat Chief.

(Inclosure 2.)—Mr. Riach to Mr. Ellis.

(Extract.)

Tehran, June 16, 1836.

On the 6th instant, I received a note from Meerza Massood, stating that I and the other officers, Captain Stoddart, and Lieutenants Farrant and Todd, should attend at the Palace in the evening. We went to Meerza Massood’s tent at the hour appointed; and shortly after us, Count Simonich and his first Secretary arrived. We all went to the royal presence together. His Majesty, having inquired after Count Simonich’s health, immediately turned to me, and said: “the officers are to attend me on my journey;” to which I replied, “of course, whenever His Majesty was pleased to order them.” He seemed gratified, and replied “certainly,” and then praised the officers and the British Government for all the acts of friendship he had received from the latter during a long course of years. He did not allude to where he was going; and it was only during a conversation he held with the Russian Ambassador about the rivers running into the Caspian, west of Asterabad, Khorassan &c., that Herat was mentioned. His Excellency, Count Simonich, expressed an earnest hope that His Majesty would march as soon as possible, trusted that the expedition against those people, who carried the subjects of the Emperor and of the Shah
into slavery, would be successful, as if so, the Shah would have con-
ferred a great boon, not only on his own country, but on Russia.

(Inclosure 3.)—Mr. Ellis to Mr. Riach.

(Extract.)
Tabreez, June 14, 1836.

A letter from me to the Shah, and a memorandum for His
Majesty’s perusal, are herewith forwarded; and I request that you will
solicit an audience from the Shah for the purpose of personally de-
delivering them.

Should the Shah inquire whether the British officers would accom-
pany an expedition against Herat, your answer should be, that, on a
former and similar occasion, during the lifetime of the Shah’s illustrious
father, the detachment had been withdrawn, that the withdrawal had
been approved of by the British Government; and therefore, until orders
to a different effect were issued, the officers must consider the orders
then given to be in force.

(Inclosure 4.)—Mr. Ellis to the Shah of Persia.

(Extract.)
Tabreez, June 13, 1836.

This well-wisher has learned that a body of the wicked, plundering
Turcomans and Oosbegs has attacked and ravaged various districts of
Asterabad, and that it is your Majesty’s intention to march to that
quarter with 25,000 men and 30 guns, to chastise that roving, maraud-
ing race; and also, that your Majesty has formed the design of pro-
ceeding to Khiva, to inflict chastisement on that nation, who, it appears,
were concerned in the above incursion.

Please God, from the propitious fortune of your Majesty, signal
punishment will reach these destroyers of the servants of the Almighty;
yet, in the humble judgment of this well-wisher, it seems advisable that
a detachment, formed of cavalry, infantry, and artillery, should be
despatched towards Asterabad; but, on account of the advance of the
summer, it neither should be very numerous, nor should it proceed to
a great distance. It rather seems expedient that it should remain in
the vicinity of Asterabad, and on the frontier; and I feel convinced that
its appearance there will cause extreme terror to that marauding race,
particularly if parties be despatched into their territories to retaliate the
outrages that they have committed. It is difficult for an army to
advance, in the middle of the hot season, into a desert destitute of
water, without meeting reverses. It appears to this well-wisher, that it
is unadvisable for your Majesty to proceed in person on this expedition;
and he entertains the hope that the exertions of your devoted servants
will be sufficient, without the presence of your Majesty, for the chas-
tisement of these lawless tribes.
No. 27.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Oct. 26, 1836.)
(Extract.)
Kara Aineh, August 22, 1836.

I have the honor to inform your Lordship that I have received a letter, dated the 28th of March, from the Secretary to the Government of India, transmitting copies of two letters from the Political Agent at Loodiana, dated 9th December, 1835, and 23rd February, 1836, forwarding extracts from reports relative to the overture made by Dost Mahommmed Khan, the Chief of Cabool, to the Shah of Persia. I have not thought it necessary to forward copies to your Lordship of these documents, as I presume such will have reached your Lordship through the East India Company.

It appears from the correspondence, that Dost Mahommed, on the 17th September, despatched an Agent, Hajee Ibrahim, with letters to the Shah of Persia, placing himself, his country, and its resources, at the disposal of the Shah; offering to co-operate in an attack upon Herat; and seeking generally the protection of the Shah against the Seiks.

No. 28.—Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received Oct. 24, 1836.)
(Extract.)
Kara Aineh, August 22, 1836.

I forward extracts of Mr. Riach’s reports.

(Inclosure.)—Mr. Riach to Mr. Ellis.
(Camp, near Feerooz-Kooh, August 4, 1836.

The Shah stated that he now felt perfectly certain that the cholera had entirely disappeared, both in, and on the road to, Khorassan; and that it was his intention to march from our present camp towards the Eilaks, near Bostam and Asterabad, on the 2nd of the ensuing Persian month (this being the 20th of the present month). Both the Russian Ambassador and Meerza Massood have in pretty plain terms told Sir Henry Bethune that, now that the Shah has marched thus far, and collected his troops, nothing short of the capture of Herat could possibly secure the tranquillity of Khorassan.

No. 29.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.
(Extract.)
Foreign Office, June 2, 1836.

It will be your duty on all occasions to discourage any ambitious schemes of foreign conquest on the part of the Shah, and to impress upon his mind the advantage which must result to Persia, from the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring States.

With respect to the relations between the Persian Government and Afghanistan, it will be necessary for you to keep in mind the Article of the Treaty of 1814, which bears upon that subject, so long as the relations between Great Britain and Persia are regulated by that Treaty; but as His Majesty’s Government would see with regret any
attack made by Persia upon Afghanistan, you are authorized to tender
to the Shah the good offices of the British Mission for the adjustment
of any points on which differences may arise between the two nations.

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No. 30.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.
Foreign Office, June 13, 1836.

(Extract.)

Mr. Ellis, in his despatch of the 4th of February, reports that
he has suggested to the Shah, that the desire of His Persian Majesty
to put a stop to the expeditions undertaken by the marauding tribes of
the northern districts of Central Asia, for the purpose of obtaining
slaves, might be more effectually accomplished by a negotiation at
Bokhara, than by an attack directed against Khiva.

Mr. Ellis was led to imagine that the Shah was not disinclined to
the adoption of this suggestion, and I have to instruct you to recom-
mand that course strongly to the Shah, in preference to a military
expedition.

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No. 31.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Nov. 11, 1836.
(Extract.)

Toorkmantchai, September 12, 1836.

There can be no doubt, I think, that the Shah has actually
marched on Herat, and that he has been encouraged, if not instigated,
to undertake this expedition by the Russian Minister at his Court.

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No. 32.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Dec. 12, 1836.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, October 8, 1836.

From Captain Stoddart’s reports of proceedings in the Shah’s
camp, which I have the honor to inclose, your Lordship will observe,
that His Majesty is expected to return to the capital for the winter,
and that all idea of prosecuting the expedition against Herat appears,
for the present, to be abandoned.

His Royal Highness Feridoon Meerza, who was detached with a
division of the army against the fortified town of Karakala, found that
place evacuated, as usual, by the tribes which inhabited it. They had
retired, as they have done on every occasion on which a Persian army
has been sent against them, to a mountain fastness, called Sooknak,
from which His Royal Highness has made an unsuccessful attempt to
dislodge them. His Royal Highness has sent for reinforcements,
on the arrival of which, the Turcomans will probably retreat into the
desert towards Khiva, with which Principality they are allied.

The Oosbega of Khiva have begun to collect their forces, and have
opened a communication with the Afghans of Herat, for the purpose of
arranging measures for their mutual defence, in concert with the
Turcomans.
Kalpoosh, September 15, 1836.

A not a word is said about going to Herat; indeed the Camp sent from Meshed to Koochaun appears conclusive on that score. On the other hand, the Russian Envoy has officially complained to the Shah against his not going. His advice has been most coldly received.

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Tehran, November 3, 1836.

I have the honor to report that His Majesty the Shah is still encamped within a march of Asterabad, and that the army is there enduring the greatest privations. The dearth of food is great. Barley sells in camp for ten times the price at which it can be purchased here, and wheat is not procurable at any price. A great number of the baggage-cattle have been carried off by the Turcomans, whose light horsemen hover around the encampment and keep up a continual alarm from dusk to daylight. Amongst the cattle carried away were 40 belonging to the Shah, and 180 which carried the baggage of the Russian Minister. The troops are much dissatisfied. In the meantime, having received no pay, and almost no rations, and having been disappointed in their hopes of plunder, they attacked and pillaged a portion of the Gokian tribe of Turcomans which had for many years been subject to Persia, a large portion of which was settled in villages, whose hostages were in the camp, and who had not only not fled on the advance of the army, but had supplied it with the greater part of the provisions it received. The Shah has disavowed the act, and has punished some of the delinquents; but the evil is irreparable, for all idea of accommodation between the Shah and the refractory tribes is now at an end.

Yet, in this state of things, the Russian Minister, as late as the 23rd ultimo, still continued to urge the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat, an enterprise which, even were the army in the best condition as to feeling and preparation, would be extremely hazardous.

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Foreign Office, January 16, 1837.

My Lord,

I transmit to your Excellency herewith,* a copy of a despatch from His Majesty’s Minister in Persia, dated the 3rd November, containing intelligence from the Persian army, at that time in the field, under the immediate command of the Shah; and reporting that Count

* See No 33.
Simonich, the Russian Minister in Persia, had urged the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat; and I have to instruct your Excellency to ask Count Nesselrode, whether Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions, in thus urging the Shah to pursue a line of conduct so diametrically opposed to His Persian Majesty’s real interests?

If your Excellency should learn from Count Nesselrode that Count Simonich is acting in obedience to his instructions, your Excellency will represent to the Russian Government, that these military expeditions of the Shah are, in the highest degree, unwise and injurious; that they lead him to embroil himself with neighbouring tribes, with whom, on the contrary, his sincerest friends ought to persuade him to remain in peace; and that they cause him to waste in fruitless war, those resources which would be so much more advantageously employed in the improvement of his own dominions, and in organising his civil and military establishments.

It would, however, be so contrary to all the professed principles, and declared system of the Russian Government, to have instructed Count Simonich to urge the Shah in the manner in which he is reported to have done so, that it must be assumed that the Count has been acting without instructions; and if that be the case, His Majesty’s Government cannot doubt that the Russian Cabinet will put a stop to a course of conduct, so much at variance with its own declared policy, and so adverse to the best interests of an ally, for whom the Russian Government professes friendship and goodwill.

I have, &c.  
(Signed)  
PALMERSTON.

His Excellency the Earl of Durham.

No. 35.—The Earl of Durham to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14, 1837.)

MY LORD,  
St. Petersburgh, February 24, 1837.

In conformity with your Lordship’s instructions, I spoke to Count Nesselrode on the subject of the conduct of the Russian Minister in Persia. His Excellency stated, that if Count Simonich had acted in the manner stated by Mr. Mc Neill, he had done that which was in direct opposition to his instructions. The Count had been distinctly ordered to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the present war at any time, and in any circumstances.

His Excellency said that he was convinced that our Minister had been misinformed, and that Count Simonich had never given any such advice to the Shah, as that which had been attributed to him.

Count Nesselrode further stated, that he entirely agreed with the
English Government as to the folly and impolicy of the course pursued by the Persian Monarch. I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) DURHAM.

No. 36.—The Earl of Durham to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14, 1837.)

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, February 28, 1837.*

Since I wrote to you my despatch of the 24th instant, I have had an opportunity of talking with M. Rodohintsinik, the head of the Eastern Department in Count Nesselrode’s Office, on the subject of the conduct of Count Simonich in Persia.

In answer to my complaints, he said he would bring me the original book, in which were entered all the despatches and instructions to the Russian Ambassador, which would prove to me how little the Count had attended to them, if he had acted in the manner stated by me.

I said that there could be no doubt of the fact: it had been mentioned so often, and by so many persons, that it was, I feared, indisputable; and I pointed out to him the inconvenience of the Russian Government being represented by a person, who either would not, or could not, act according to his instructions.

No. 37.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 30, 1837.)

(Extract.)

Tehran, December 2, 1836.

His Majesty the Shah has dismissed the greater part of his troops, and is on his way to the capital, where he will probably arrive about the 8th of this month.

An attempt was made by the Shah to negotiate with Herat; but His Majesty’s Plenipotentiary found the Deputy from that city already informed of the ill-success of the Shah on the banks of the Goorgaan; and when the Persian affected to disbelieve the statement, 200 prisoners, taken from His Majesty’s army by the Turcomans, were produced to vouch for its accuracy.

The final answer of the Herat Minister was to the following effect: “You demand hostages. We gave no hostages during the reign of the late Shah; and we will give none now. You demand a present: we are ready to give as large a present as we can afford. If the Shah is not satisfied with this, and is determined to attack us, let him come. We will defend our city as long as we can; and if we are driven from it, it will of course remain in your hands till we can find means to take it back again from you.”

The Shah summoned a council of his principal military servants in his camp at Shahrood, to decide what it behoved him to do. The council decided that His Majesty should return to the capital, and march to the
conquest of Herat in the spring. The troops that have been dismissed have, therefore, received orders to muster at the capital on the 21st of March, for the purpose of proceeding against Herat; but I confess it appears to me to be extremely doubtful, whether it will be possible, by any exertion, to collect next year such a force as would be at all competent to undertake the subjugation of Herat.

No. 38.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Mar. 16, 1837.)

Tehran, December 30, 1836.

Extract.

A few days ago, the Prime Minister avowed, in presence of not less than twenty persons, more than one of whom communicated his observations to me, that the Russian Minister had used every means in his power to induce the Shah to go to Herat this year, assuring him that the English would find means to prevent his going at all, if he lost the present opportunity; but the Prime Minister said that the course which the Russian frontier authorities had pursued in Talish during the Shah's absence, left little doubt of the views with which his Excellency had sought to carry the Shah to so great a distance; that the Russian Minister was much offended that his plan had not been acted upon, and was inclined to resent this opposition to his views.

His Excellency even went so far as to offer his services in a military capacity to the Shah, declaring that he desired to be regarded as one of His Majesty's military servants; and when he found that there was an intention to turn towards the Goorgan, instead of proceeding to Herat, his Excellency offered the utmost opposition to this plan, against which he loudly remonstrated.

The failure of the late attempt, the financial and other difficulties of this Government, and the state of affairs in Khorassan, may probably render it impossible for the Shah to attempt anything against Herat next year; but I am convinced that the enterprise will be renewed as soon as this Government can undertake it with a prospect of success.

In the meantime, the Persian Government has frequent intercourse with Cabool and Candahar, from which places, various agents have been sent, at short intervals, to conciliate the favour of His Persian Majesty, to propose co-operating with the Persian army against Herat, and to seek the protection of Persia against the Seiks.

In return for these missions to the Shah, Kumber Ali Khan, has been appointed to proceed on the part of His Persian Majesty to Cabool, and has been charged with presents for Dost Mahommed Khan, who is represented by this Court as having voluntarily sought the protection of Persia, and acknowledged allegiance to its Crown.
No. 39.—Mr. McNeill to Visct. Palmerston.—(Rec. April 28, 1837.)

My Lord,

Tehran, January 26, 1837.

I have the honor to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter which I have addressed to the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, on the present state of Affghanistan, and its relations with this country.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.  
(Signed)  
JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclosure.—Mr. McNeill to Mr. Secretary Macnaghten.

(Extract.)—Tehran, January 22, 1837.

With reference to your letter of the 23rd of May, 1836, I beg leave to offer a few observations on the state of Affghanistan, according to the best information I have been able to obtain here; and on the nature of its present relations with Persia. But the intercourse between these countries is very limited; and the arrival of a well-informed person from beyond Herat is rare.

Though the sovereignty of the Affghans has passed out of the hands of the descendants of Achmed Shah, the Dooramee tribe appears to maintain an undoubted ascendancy in the nation. The Barukzyes have usurped the greater portion of the power of the Suddozyes, but the latter family still maintains itself in Herat, and has a strong hold on the prejudices, if not on the affections, of a large part of the Dooramees.

The Barukzyes holding Cabool and Kandahar in independence, and Peshavur as tributaries to the Seiks, would appear not to have conciliated the attachment of the Dooramees, and to depend, in a great measure, for their power on influences foreign to that tribe. Dost Mahommed Khan, of Cabool, descended by his mother from the Kuzzilbashes, or Persians, who have for some generations been settled in Cabool, has connected himself with that powerful body, and in any emergency, must trust rather to them than to the native Affghans, for the means of pursuing conquests or repelling aggressions.

There appears to be no doubt that these hereditary soldiers would arm for the defence of the country, as they have hitherto been ready to do; but it would appear to be doubtful, how far they could be induced to march in pursuit of any enterprise on which their Chief might desire to lead them. I am informed, that the system of hiring substitutes has become so common, that a Kuzzilbash, unless unusually poor, never thinks of going on any ordinary service himself. They are, nevertheless, the substance of Dost Mahommed Khan's military strength; and as they are all Sheeahs, and have in some degree preserved their family, as well as religious connection with Persia, they are desirous of inducing their master to form an alliance which, they believe, would
strenthen themselves, and confirm their influence with their master, and their authority over the Afghans. Their influence is naturally great, because of their strength; but it does not appear to rest on this alone. His maternal descent from the tribe, his own predilections, and the devotion of the Kuzzilbash to his interests, have identified Dost Mahommed Khan with that portion of his subjects, in a manner that would seem to have almost obliterated all feeling of religious distinction, or national animosity, between him and the Persian Government or people. Pressed on the one hand by the Seiks, and on the other fearing that some member of the Suddozye family, either from Herat or from India, may unite the Dooramees against him, he has for some time been seeking to strengthen himself by a foreign connection.

Herat has gained strength; but it is rather in the connections its Government has formed with the surrounding Chiefs, than from any increase of its own integral power. The defences of Herat have been materially improved, and are represented to be of great strength. All the Sheeahs of any weight or influence have been obliged to fly from the town, or have been deprived of their power and their property. A large proportion of the irregular horse, furnished by the city and the surrounding country, has been converted into infantry; two foot soldiers being provided in place of one horseman; the control of the Government of Herat has been fully established, and large sums have been levied from all the wealthier inhabitants, to provide for the defence of the place.

By letters received this morning from Herat, it would appear that the Herat army, of 12,000 men, under Yar Mahommed Khan, accompanied by a son of Prince Kamran, has actually moved out of the city, preparatory, it is said, to an expedition against Kandahar.

It is perhaps more probable, that Yar Mahommed Khan will content himself with re-establishing Kamran’s authority in Seistan, from whence a nominee of the Herat Government was last year expelled by the people of Kandahar.

In the meantime, Prince Kamran, probably with a view to the assertion of his pretensions to the Throne of Afghanistan, has assumed the lofty title of Kebleh Alum, and has given to Yar Mahommed Khan and Sheer Mahommed Khan, the titles of Ausef-ud-Dowleh and Amean-ud-Dowleh.

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No. 40.—Mr. Mc Neill to Visct. Palmerston.—(Rec. April 28, 1837.) (Extract.)

Tehran, February 20, 1837.

I have the honor to inclose, for your Lordship’s information, translations of the written communications which have passed between the Persian Government and the Chiefs of Cabool and Kandahar.

I took occasion, in conversation with the Prime Minister, a few days
ago, to ask him whether he was aware that Taj Mahommed Khan, the agent from Kandahar, had been conducted to the Russian Minister's house by Meerza Massood, while, at the same time, he had been directed not to visit me; and that he had even been charged with a letter and presents from the Russian Minister to his master.

Hajee Meerza Aghassee protested, that he had not before heard of any of these things.

I told his Excellency, that as the Ministers of this Government had thought it proper to pursue such a course, and to become the medium of putting Russia in direct communication with the Chief of Kandahar, it might become necessary for the British Government to take measures to counteract the consequences of such a proceeding.

(Inclosure 1.)—Translation a Copy of a Letter from Dost Mahommed Khan, Chief of Cabool, to His Majesty Mahommed Shah.

Since in former times the Chiefs of my family were sincerely attached to the exalted royal house of your Majesty, I too, deem myself one of the devoted adherents of that royal race; and considering this country as belonging to the kingdom of Persia, I, on a former occasion, despatched Hajee Ibrahim to your Majesty's presence, with the object of explaining certain affairs connected with this nation. I crave permission to state, that the cause of my address, in the present instance, is the following:—Your Majesty is the King of Islam; yet, throughout these territories, disturbance and misery are caused by that detestable tribe the Seiks.

Although 400,000 families of the tribes of the Affghans, and the neighbouring tribes, wear the collar of obedience in subjection to this sincere well-wisher, my inability for the employment and arrangement of this multitude, limits my forces to 20,000 excellent horse, 10,000 foot, and 50 guns, which are in readiness at my capital, Cabool.

I have been long engaged in war with 100,000 horse and foot of the wicked infidels, and 300 guns; but, by the grace and assistance of God, I have not yet been subdued by this faithless enemy, and have been able to preserve the true faith. But how long shall I be able to oppose this detestable tribe, and how long shall I be able to resist their aggressions? Without doubt, an account of the difficulties of my situation has reached your Majesty; and your Majesty must have heard, that, in spite of the inferiority of my power, I am perpetually engaged in war with the wicked Seiks without a moment's cessation. As the noblest of cities, Kandahar, and the capital, Cabool, and the countries bordering on Khorassan, as well as the province of Khorassan, and the country dependant on the above places, form part of the Persian territory, and are among the kingdoms of the King of Kings, the misery or welfare
of those dominions cannot be separated from the interests of the Persian Government. Even if my affairs should fall into disorder, and even if your Majesty should not direct your attention to the condition of these countries, nevertheless, I shall persist in contending with the Seiks, as long as I am able; but should it prove that I am unable to resist that diabolical tribe, then I have no choice, and must connect myself with the English, who will thus obtain complete authority over the whole of Afghanistan; and it remains to be seen hereafter, to what places, and to what extent, the flame of the violence of that nation may be carried.

I considered it imperative on myself to represent these circumstances to the King of Islam. As for the rest, your Majesty will act as seems expedient to your royal understanding. All other affairs will be narrated by Mahommed Hoossein Khan, who is a trusty person attached to this well-wisher.

Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclosure 2.)—Translation of a Letter from His Majesty Mahommed Shah, to Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan, Chief of Cabool.

His Excellency, the repository of honor and glory, the most noble of nobles, the opponent of infidels, Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan, Lord of Cabool, is honored with our auspicious royal correspondence, and informed that the two addresses of his Excellency have been conveyed to our royal presence, by the hands of Hajee Ibrahim, and Mahommed Hoossein Khan. The contents of each, displaying the rectitude of the intentions of that receptacle of dignity, have been perused by us from the beginning to the end, and the objects and wishes of his Excellency have also been explained to us by the above messengers. All these circumstances being proofs of sincerity and purity of intention, they gave entire satisfaction to our royal mind, and disposed us to feel confidence in his devotion.

With regard to your representation on your connection with this never-ending Government, and with regard to your observations that Cabool is to be considered as one of the countries dependent on the kingdom of Persia, and that you are incessantly employed in war with infidels, notwithstanding whose superior strength you had hitherto been able to oppose them, and preserve those dominions from subjection; but that if you did not receive assistance, you would be obliged to seek aid elsewhere, in order that an end might be put to these disorders. In truth, these observations are written with sincerity; and it is apparent to our kingly mind, that your Excellency is a distinguished warrior of Islam, who fights with valour for the faith; most surely, both on account of his dependence on this never-ending Government, and for the protection of Islam, and for the defence of our kingdom and religion, and
from kingly generosity, we deem it imperative on us to hold that refuge of dignity under the shadow of our protection, and not to grudge or withhold from him assistance of any kind. Thus, before the arrival of the messengers of your Excellency, we had firmly resolved to march to Herat, and to convey every description of aid to your Excellency. We commenced our march from our capital, Tehran, with this intention. After our arrival at Bostam, it was represented to the Ministers of this haughty State, that the cholera was raging with violence throughout the cities of Khorassan. We, therefore, for the sake of change of air, and in expectation of the cessation of this malady, moved to a healthy situation, and halted some days in the plain of Kalpoosh. In the meantime, it was represented to us, that Mekhdoom Kooli, the Yamoot (Turcoman), having formed an alliance with Ali Kooli Khan (Chief of Khiva) had arrived at Karakala, which is situated near the Desert, with 20,000 horse, the flower of the Oosbeg and Turcoman horse; and having fortified himself in that position, was waiting for the opportunity of the absence of our conquering army to produce disorder and tumult on the confines of our dominions. When this intelligence reached us, we despatched our beloved brother, Feridoon Meerza, with 8,000 regular infantry, 4,000 cavalry, and 12 guns, to chastise these marauders. As soon as they became acquainted with the arrival of the troops, their courage failed them; and not daring to oppose our forces, they abandoned their provisions and stores, and fled into the Desert. Our brother followed in pursuit of this wicked tribe; and near Kirchool, the cavalry, and some of the infantry, overtook and attacked them. From morning until night the fire of war was in a blaze, but the affair terminated in the defeat of the Turcomans. The greater part were killed, some were captured, and the remainder fled into the barren deserts, and escaped from our warriors. After chastising this tribe, we halted some time at the river Goorgau, to arrange the affairs of that frontier, and then winter, and the season of rain and snow having arrived, it was impossible to continue the campaign. We despatched 20,000 horse and foot, and 40 guns, with ordnance and stores, to Khorassan, to be in readiness to march in the beginning of spring to Herat; and we have resolved to march, with the assistance of God, with the remainder of the army, towards Khorassan, after the festival of Noorooz. As there has been some delay in the advance of the victorious army, we have despatched Kumber Ali Khan to your Excellency; and we have sent a diamond hilted dagger to your Excellency, which is to be worn as the ornament of your faithful waist. We have commanded Kumber Ali Khan to detail the full extent of our royal favor towards your Excellency; and your Excellency will explain to Kumber Ali Khan your wishes and intentions, in order that they may be represented to us on his return.

*Written the in month of Shuwal, 1252.*

Translated by

(Signed) J. SHEIL.
(Inclosure 3.)—Translation of a Copy of a Letter from Kohundil Khan and Mehrdil Khan, Chiefs of Kandahar, to His Majesty Mahommed Shah.

The representation of the humblest of well-wishers.

To the attendant standing in the presence of your Majesty, the resplendent sun of the haughty State of Persia, holder of the seals of sovereignty, descended from a long line of monarchs, &c., &c., &c., may our souls be your sacrifice, it is represented; may we be the sacrifice or the dust of your auspicious feet. As it is the practice of devoted servants, and it is the duty of dependents, that they should at all times state their wishes and intentions to the sublime understanding of your Majesty, radiant as the sun, we presume to make this representation. From times remote, we have displayed that devotion which we considered suitable to our condition; and, as must have reached the ears of the Ministers of that Court, which is the centre of firmness, we have followed the practice pursued by sincere well-wishers. As the auspicious will of your Majesty continues in the same direction as before, it is becoming our sincerity to acknowledge your Majesty's royal favors. Therefore, that distinguished nobleman, Mahommed Hoossein Khan, our agent, will present our petitions, and will detail the state of affairs in this country, and in Herat; he is our agent in all affairs. This devoted servant will execute faithfully, with the aid of God, and through your Majesty's increasing favor, all services and commands that your Majesty may impose on him; and he will render conspicuous, in the manner that is suitable, the extent of his zeal and fidelity. With the grace of God, he will outstrip his contemporaries in the display of service, and will obtain for himself high honor.

Our solicitation is, that your Majesty will consider him as one of your most faithful and disinterested servants. Whatever commands this sincere well-wisher may be honored with, in reference to the affairs of this country, he will execute them with the most perfect fidelity.

Translated by

(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclosure 4.)—Translation of a Copy of a Letter, accrediting Uzeez Mahommed Khan, which was sent by the Chief of Kandahar.

We have despatched Uzeez Mahommed Khan from this country, and as we have given him charge of all our affairs, great and small, whatever he shall state is to be believed. In whatever relates to strengthening friendship, and to the arrangement of the affairs of Herat, and to other matters which he shall represent in the presence of his exalted Majesty, the shadow of God, together with what relates to the attainment of a promise of protection under the royal hand and seal, and to the formation of a Treaty, he is our sole agent.
Whatever Treaty or agreement he shall form, it is necessary that it should be concluded in the strongest and most positive manner, so that there shall be no change or deviation.

Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclusion 5.)—Translation of a Firman from His Majesty Mahommed Shah, to the Chief of Kandahar. Written in the year Zee Hijjah, 1251 (about a year ago.)

Let Kohundil Khan be apprised of our auspicious and royal consideration, and know that the petition bearing the marks of the truth and candour of that refuge of honor, which he had dictated from the purity of his intentions, and which he had despatched by that distinguished nobleman, Uzeez Mahommed Khan, has reached our Court. The contents of your representation, which from the beginning to the end bears the impression of candour and loyalty, have proved acceptable to our royal understanding. Your desire to obtain a declaration expressive of our favor, under the royal hand and seal, has been acceded to, and the document has been delivered to your agent for the purpose of being despatched to your Excellency.

It is notorious that the submission and allegiance of your Excellency are not of recent establishment; for you belong, from ancient times, to the tribes of the renowned kingdom of Persia. As your Excellency has been foremost in testifying your subjection and allegiance, you may entertain the most implicit confidence in our royal favor; and you may be assured that there is no grace or honor which we shall withhold from you; and in proportion as the loyalty of your Excellency shall become more conspicuous, so shall you acquire more distinguished marks of our unbounded royal favor.

As the conquering standards will, with the aid of God, speedily march towards the territories of Khorassan and Herat, it is necessary that your Excellency should be in readiness with your troops in the vicinity of Herat. After the arrival of the fortunate army, you will join the auspicious stirrup, and participate in the enjoyment of our royal favor.

Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclusion 6.)—Translation of a Copy of a Letter from the Chief of Kandahar to His Majesty the Shah.—(It was taken to Persia by Meer Hafiz Shah.)

By the chief of devoted servants, it is represented to the attendants on His Majesty, the centre of justice, the treasure of grace, noble as Sooleyman, may our souls and the souls of the universe be his sacrifice.
As it is the practice of devoted servants, that they should ever openly declare the condition of their affairs to their illustrious benefactors.

I therefore presume to represent my wishes. As the fidelity of this devoted servant is known to the Ministers of that Court, which is the centre of justice, and as my feelings continue unaltered, I solicit that suitable duties may be imposed on me, particularly with reference to the capture of Herat. After the arrival of the royal camp, with the assistance of God, whatever duty I may be appointed to by the King of Kings, with regard to the conquest of that fortress, shall be faithfully performed. Doubtless, the Chief of Khans, Mahomed Hoossein Khan, my agent, has represented my entire submission, and my solicitude for the service of your Majesty.

Their Excellencies Meer Hafiz Mahomed Shah and Meer Ali Akbar, who belong to the tribe of Besber, of the Hazarchs, and who speak Persian, and are highly respected in this country, are proceeding on a pilgrimage to Kerbela. I have great esteem for their Excellencies; they will make representations of my devotion, and relate the condition of affairs of this country.

The agent of Herat has also been empowered as the agent of this sincere well-wisher. He is the chief of a tribe in this country, and I beg that his representations may be credited.

Translated by

(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inlosure 7.)—Translation of a Copy of a Letter addressed by the Chief of Kandahar, Kohundil Khan, to His Majesty Mahomed Shah.—

(This Letter was conveyed to Persia by Taj Mahomed Khan.)

The representation of this suppliant to heaven.

It is represented to the attendants on the presence of his august Majesty, elevated as the heavens, exalted as the Pleiades, radiant as the sun, &c., &c., &c., &c. May God prolong his sovereignty. May my soul be his sacrifice.

May I be the sacrifice of the dust of your auspicious feet. My supplication at the court of the Creator of Mankind is, that these faithful and most humble of servants should at all times bear the burden of submission, and should, on all occasions, render obedience to the fate-decreeing firmans of your Majesty. The exalted servants, whose dignity equals Sikenders, of your august Majesty, will become informed of the innate fidelity of this truest of subjects. My hope is, that the Ministers of that haughty Government will count this sincere servant among the most devoted of its adherents, and regard him as a suppliant to heaven for the prosperity of this ever-enduring kingdom, and will exalt him with commands suitable to his condition. At this auspicious time, the fate-decreeing firman which was issued from the august Court, in honor of this humblest of servants, arrived at the happiest of hours,
and I have been exalted and rejoiced by its perusal. By the aid of God, and from the benevolence of your Majesty, the shadow of God, I have been exalted by the appreciation which has been given to my services.

The letter, expressive of confidence, which your Majesty, from kingly magnanimity, had written with your royal hand, for the satisfaction of the mind of this humblest of servants, has been received, and I have been exalted by its perusal. On the present occasion, Taj Mohammed Khan, Barakzye, of honorable rank, has been despatched to the dust of the auspicious feet of the slaves of your Majesty, the shadow of God. Some representations have been confided to the above person, which he will deliver to your Majesty; and he will recount the details of the defeat and flight of the troops of Herat, and the conquest of the districts of Khash and Bakverd. I shall presume to make no further representations. I offer up prayers for the prosperity of your Majesty's dominions.

Translated by

(Signed) J. SHEIL.

No. 41.—

Tehran, February 24, 1837.

I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter I have just received from the Government of India. I hope that it will be unnecessary for me to have recourse to the measures proposed by the Governor-General for the purpose of marking the friendly feelings of the British Government towards the Afghans; for I hope that the Shah will not undertake an expedition against Herat this year; but were it otherwise, I very much fear that any remonstrances I could offer would be insufficient to deter the Shah from prosecuting what he regards as a just war.

Putting aside the claims of Persia to the sovereignty of Herat, and regarding the question as one between two independent sovereigns, I am inclined to believe that the Government of Herat will be found to have been the aggressor.

On the death of Abbas Meerza, when the present Shah returned from his unsuccessful expedition against Herat, negotiations were entered into, which terminated in the conclusion of an agreement for the cessation of hostilities between the parties, and the demarcation of a line of boundary. From that time up to the present moment, Persia has committed no act of hostility against the Afghans; but on the death of the late Shah, the Government of Herat made predatory incursions into the Persian territories, in concert with the Turcomans and Hazarehs, and captured the subjects of Persia, for the purpose of selling them as slaves. This system of warfare has from that time been carried on without intermission by the Afghans of Herat, and Persia has not re-
taliated these acts of aggression by any hostile measure, unless the public annunciation of its intention to attack Herat should be regarded as such.

Under these circumstances, there cannot, I think, be a doubt that the Shah is fully justified in making war on Prince Kamran; and though the capture of Herat by Persia would certainly be an evil of great magnitude, we could not wonder if the Shah were to disregard our remonstrances, and to assert his right to make war on an enemy who has given him the greatest provocation, and whom he may regard himself as bound in duty to his subjects to punish, or even to put down. I therefore doubt whether the measures proposed by the Government of India would have the desired effect. I am disposed to believe that if the Shah found circumstances favourable to the success of an expedition against Herat this year, it would be necessary to resort to much stronger measures, before he would be induced to desist from the undertaking; and I am not quite satisfied, whether it would be advisable to produce the alienation which must result from the measures proposed, unless we are prepared to go further and to insure success, by convincing the Persian Government that we are prepared to act as well as to threaten.

At the same time, I am convinced that the Shah would act more prudently and wisely, if he were to seek to remove by negotiation the evils of which he complains; and I have already found an opportunity of offering to Persia the good offices of this legation, without formally tendering them.

No disposition has yet been evinced to seek our mediation with Herat; and I have continued to refrain from making the relations of Persia with that principality a subject of discussion; but in answer to some observations of the Prime Minister, I informed him some time ago, that the IXth Article of the Treaty of Tehran forbade England to afford any assistance to Persia, so long as she might be at war with the Afghans; and that before any assistance could be given, whether in the supply of arms or otherwise, either the Article in question must be got rid of, or peace must be concluded with Herat.

(Inclosure.)—Mr. Macnaughten to Me Neill.

Fort William, November 21, 1836.

(Extract.)

The political interests of Great Britain and of British India are even more concerned than their commercial interests in the exemption of the countries between India and Persia from foreign aggression from the westward. The lately contemplated expedition against Herat, if it was not prompted, was, as is well known, strenuously urged on the attention of the Persian Government by the Russian Ambassador; and the pertinacity with which the Persian Government has persisted in this design, in spite of the remonstrances of His Britannic Majesty’s Ambassador, and of his repeated offers of mediation, is of itself a sufficient
ground for apprehending the existence of some ulterior and unfriendly design towards our interests.

Under these circumstances, it seems impossible for the British Government, either in England or in India, to view with indifference the gradual encroachments of Persia in the direction of our Indian dominions; and the interest with which we must always regard this point has now been increased by the resolution which has been come to, with the sanction of the Home Authorities, to enter into friendly commercial relations with the intervening countries. The Government of India is also desirous not to incur the loss of character which must ensue, if there should be the slightest ground for suspicion afforded that British support has been granted to Persia, against parties with whom we are on terms of friendly intercourse.

His Lordship in Council therefore requests, that, provided the course now indicated is not inconsistent with the instructions which you may have received from His Majesty’s Ministers, you will use your best exertions to dissuade the Persian Government from prosecuting their hostile intentions against Herat. Topics will not be wanting to aid your endeavours for this purpose. You will naturally urge the recollection of past, and the anticipation of future, benefits to Persia from the connection with England; and it will doubtless occur to you to impress upon the mind of the Shah, the detriment which his interest must sustain, were the sincere and cordial friendship which has so long subsisted between the British and Persian nations to sustain any diminution.

You will of course offer your mediation, if it should be necessary to do so, for the settlement of the existing differences between the Shah and the Ruler of Herat; and if your offer is accepted, you might depute a British officer to Herat, to negotiate the terms of the settlement with Shah Kamran.

In case the Shah should persist in attacking Herat, in spite of all your remonstrances, you will then intimate to him your intention of remaining at the Persian Capital to await the instructions of His Majesty’s Ministers as to your future proceedings; and, in order to prevent any appearance of the expedition being sanctioned by the British Government, it will be matter for consideration with you, notwithstanding the importance which may be attached to the present position of the British officers in the service of Persia, whether you should not direct them to withdraw, not merely from the force intended to be engaged in the expedition, but from the whole of Khorassan, and the adjoining Persian provinces in the direction of Herat.

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No. 42. — Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. June 27, 1837.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, May 2, 1837.

In my letter to the Prime Minister, I have offered the mediation of
the British Government for the adjustment of the differences existing between Persia and the Afghans.

(Inclosure.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee.

(Extract.)

If the Ministers of this Government are desirous that the English Court should, agreeably to the terms of the Treaty, endeavour by its mediation, to put an end to the dissensions between Persia and Afghanistan, and make a permanent arrangement between these nations, the English Government is perfectly willing to employ its efforts, and will spare no exertion to accomplish this object. I am myself constantly intent on finding occasions for being serviceable to this Government, nor do I allow a moment to pass without meditating on the means of promoting its welfare. Nevertheless, it seems that the Ministers of this Government do not regard my advice as disinterested, or else they do not consider it in conformity with wisdom and prudence; for they pay no attention to it, and do not afford me an opportunity for soliciting from my own Court assistance in favour of this Government. In no point of view whatever have I had any excuse or pretext for making various solicitations to the British Government.

With regard to the opinion which you have requested from me concerning this affair, it is necessary that I should declare unreservedly to your Excellency whatever in my judgment appears to be for the benefit of this Government. In my humble opinion, it is expedient that the Ministers of this Government should this year devote their attention to the internal affairs of the kingdom, and endeavour to bring them into a state of good order, and give them stability. This course seems advisable, in preference to undertaking military enterprises in those countries. The road through Khorassan, praise be to God, is safe to an unprecedented degree. The army which last year accompanied His Majesty in his expedition in that direction, has brought friends and enemies to a just estimate of their position, and at this moment no one ventures to become the source of disorder or disturbance. Yet it will be highly proper that there should be a sufficiency of troops in Khorassan, for the protection of the frontiers. The remainder of the army, which, from frequent expeditions and employment in other duties, has become very backward, can be practised in drill. It is evident that the internal affairs of the kingdom are of deeper importance than any other questions. It is therefore expedient that this year the Ministers of this Government should make such arrangements that the expenditure of the kingdom should be balanced by the receipts. It is reported, that at the present moment the expenditure exceeds the revenue. Some of the provinces of the kingdom, for instance, Kerman, Mazanderan, Ispahan, Louristan, and
Arabistan, require to be brought into proper order. I have detailed to you the course which I sincerely consider to be for the benefit of the kingdom.

No. 43.—Mr. Mc Neill to Visct. Palmerston.—(Rec. July 28, 1837.)
(Extract.)
Camp, near Tehran, June 1, 1837.
In reply to the observation of Count Nesselrode, that I must have been misinformed as to the course pursued by Count Simonich in respect to the proposed expedition against Herat, I shall only say, that the accuracy of the information on which I ventured to state in my despatch of November 3, of last year, that the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary had urged the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat, has been fully confirmed by the concurring testimony of all the Persians with whom I have conversed on the subject, including the Prime Minister. In confirmation of the fact that Count Simonich proposed to the Persian Government to prosecute the campaign against Herat when the season was far advanced, I may mention that when it was objected that the crops must already have been collected, and placed in security, his Excellency replied that this was in fact an advantage, for that less would be wasted than when the grain was still in the fields.

No. 44.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.
(Extract.)
Foreign Office, August 4, 1837.
I have received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 3rd of June.
You will perceive by the despatch from Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode, of which a copy is inclosed in Mr. Milbanke’s despatch, sent to you herewith, that the Russian Minister has reported to his Government, that he has already urged the Shah to abandon, for the present at least, his expedition against Herat.

(Inclusion.)—Mr. Milbanke to Visct. Palmerston.—(Rec. July 24, 1837.)
My Lord,
St. Petersburgh, July 15, 1837.
M. Rodofinikin placed in my hands this morning a despatch from Count Simonich, giving some account of the present state of affairs between the Shah and the Prince of Herat, and of the preparations making by His Majesty for the prosecution of the expedition against that city.
I requested, to be allowed to take a copy of this despatch which I have now the honor to transmit to your Lordship.
I have, &c.
Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.
(Sub-Inclusion).—Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode.

Monsieur le Comte,

Ergovanie, le 28 Mai, 1837.

Au grand étonnement des courtisans de l'ancienne Cour, et au grand désappointement des Mollahs, Sa Majesté le Shah est sorti inopinément de la ville pour aller s'établir dans le jardin de Nigaristan. On se rappelait les nombreuses cérémonies qui précédéaient cet événement du temps de Feth-Ali-Shah : les uns s'étonnaient de tant de simplicité, les autres ne pouvaient cacher leur colère (c'étaient les prêtres) de se voir frustrés de la prérogative très-importante de fixer l'heure, de trouver le moment propice, et d'accompagner de leurs vœux et de leurs prières, le Souverain quittant sa Capitale. Autour de Nigaristan, comme l'année passée, s'élèvent les tentes des troupes qui commencent à se réunir. L'Envoyé de Hérat a été reçu par Sa Majesté, ainsi que les cadeaux dont il était porteur. A l'entendre, et d'après le contenu d'une lettre du Visir de Kamran Mirza, adressée au Premier Ministre, le Prince se soumettrait entièrement, consentirait à donner les otages, et à subir toutes les conditions qui lui avaient été imposées. Malgré cela, le Shah, pressé cette fois par le clergé de Meshed, qui demande à grands cris l'arrivée de Sa Majesté, afin de livrer leurs co-religionnaires de la tyrannie de Kamran, se propose de conduire en personne son armée. L'état délabré des finances aurait dû être cependant un puissant motif pour ne songer à autre chose cette année qu'à rechercher le fil de ces dilapidations, qui, tout en pressurant le pays, laissent le trésor à vide. J'ai fait les représentations les plus pressantes pour que Sa Majesté se contentât de la soumission volontaire du Prince de Hérat, et n'entreprit cette expédition, au moins avant d'avoir mis de l'ordre dans les affaires de son pays. Je ne puis pas assurer positivement votre Excellence d'avoir réussi, mais j'ai des raisons de croire que ma démarche produira un effet salutaire. Si Sa Majesté se décide même à partir de cet été, elle n'ira pas trop loin ; et surtout si les otages des Affghans arrivent, elle se contentera de cette preuve de soumission.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) COMTE JEAN SIMONICH.

S. E. M. Le Comte de Nesselrode.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

Ergovanie, May 28, 1837.

To the great astonishment of the courtiers of the ancient Court, and to the great disappointment of the Mollahs, His Majesty the Shah unexpectedly passed out of the city, in order to establish himself in the garden of Nigaristan. People called to mind the numerous ceremonies which preceded this event in the time of Futteh Ali Shah; some were astonished at so great simplicity, others (the priests) could not conceal their indignation, at seeing themselves deprived of the very important prerogative of fixing the hour, of discovering the propitious moment,
and of attending, with their good wishes and their prayers, the Sovereign on his departure from his capital. The tents of the troops who are beginning to assemble, are pitched in the neighbourhood of Nigaristan as in the past year. The Envoy from Herat has been received by His Majesty, as well as the presents of which he was the bearer. According to him, and from the contents of a letter from the Vizier of Kamran Meerza, addressed to the Prime Minister, the Prince would submit himself entirely, would consent to give hostages, and to subject himself to all the conditions which had been imposed upon him. Notwithstanding this, the Shah urged on now by the Clergy of Meshed, who loudly demand the arrival of His Majesty, in order to deliver their co-religionists from the tyranny of Kamran, proposes to lead his army in person. The dilapidated state of his finances ought, however, to have been a powerful motive for not this year thinking of anything else than of inquiring into the origin of those disorders, which at the same time that they press upon the country, leave the treasury empty. I have made the most pressing representations in order to induce His Majesty to content himself with the voluntary submission of the Prince of Herat, and not to undertake that expedition, at least before placing the affairs of his country in order. I cannot positively assure your Excellency that I have succeeded, but I have reason to believe that my proceeding will produce a salutary effect. Even if His Majesty should decide to set out this summer, he will not go very far; and especially if the hostages of the Afghans arrive, he will be contented with that proof of submission.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COUNT JEAN SIMONICH.

His Excellency Count Nesselrode.

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No. 45.—Mr. McNell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. July 28, 1837.)

(Extract.)

Camp, near Tehran, June 3, 1837.

I have the honor to inclose a translation of a note I received this morning from the Prime Minister, in answer to one I had addressed to His Excellency, stating that I had relied on the assurance given me by His Excellency on a former occasion that he would inform me as soon as anything should be decided respecting the Shah’s movements, and that now I found various preparations in progress, and even the day of His Majesty’s departure proclaimed by the public crier, without my having received any intimation from His Excellency: that I, therefore, begged His Excellency would let me know what was really intended.

(Ininclosure.)—Translation of a Note addressed by His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee, Prime Minister, to Mr. McNell.

You make inquiries respecting the Shah’s march. It is apparent
that I have never stated that which is not correct. The fact is, that His Excellency the Ausef-ud-Dowlah has demanded troops for the regulation of the affairs of Herat, Khiva, &c. His Majesty's orders have been issued to collect the troops. In the meantime, Futtuh Mahommed Khan arrived. By the intervention of the Ausef-ud-Dowlah it has been proposed to them (the people of Herat) to submit and give hostages, and the answer has not yet been received. After His Majesty decided on sending troops, it remained uncertain whether His Royal Highness Karaman Meerza should go with them, or whether His Majesty should proceed in person; therefore I have not troubled you. It is true that His Majesty has ordered the troops to prepare for the march. If the Chiefs of Herat should delay too long in giving an answer, and if His Royal Highness Karaman Meerza should be unable to move from Azerbajan, and should not have the means of marching, no doubt His Majesty will move towards Khiva, and Merve, and Meimuna, and Herat, and those parts, that he may relieve his subjects from the evils inflicted by marauders, and put an end to plunder and the taking of slaves.

As there was no other subject I give you no further trouble.

(Sealed) AGHASSEE.

Translated by  
(Signed) JOHN McNEILL.

No. 46.—Mr. McNeill to Visct. Palmerston.—(Rec. July 28, 1837.)

My Lord,  
Camp, near Teheran, June 3, 1837.

I have the honor to inclose, for your Lordship's information, a copy of a letter which I received on the 22nd ultimo, from the chief Secretary to the Government of India, and to be with the greatest respect, my Lord, &c.

(Signed) JOHN McNEILL.
Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

(Inclusion.)—Mr. Secretary Macnaghten to Mr. McNeill.

(Extract) Fort William, April 10, 1837.

We do not make ground of complaint of the circumstances attending the dismissal of the British officers from the camp of the Shah, because, as those officers could not take part in the attempt upon Herat, the King had a fair right to remove them from the army, which was proceeding in its march upon that city. You need not conceal, however, that his Lordship, in Council, cannot ask or expect the Company's officers to serve where they are not treated with becoming attention and respect; that he must view with umbrage and displeasure schemes of interference and conquest on our western frontier; and
that it is not for such purposes that the officers, the arms, and the friendship of England, and of India, are due to Persia.

Your Excellency's advice and influence will naturally be directed to dissuading the Shah from ruinous schemes of foreign conquest, and you willlay before him the necessity of retrieving the internal affairs of his country, of acquitting himself of his pecuniary obligations, and of introducing and maintaining good order and security, as indispensable to his own safety, and to that of his empire. Your Excellency will, of course, not have failed to communicate to His Majesty's Ministers any particulars connected with the advice offered by the Russian Envoy to the Shah, which may be worthy, possibly, of public notice, or evincing a determination to push on the enterprise against Herat, in a manner inconsistent with regard to the real condition and interests of Persia, and such, therefore, as to afford fair and obvious ground of suspicion of his motives.

In continuation of my despatch of the 21st November, I am directed to transmit to your Excellency a copy of a despatch of this date to the Honorable the Secret Committee, reporting the progress of the negociations on the differences between the Amirs of Sind and Maharajah Runjeet Sing. These negociations still continue, and may be for some time protracted; but his Lordship, in Council, indulges the hope of a peaceful and anicable result.

The subject of the policy to be observed in regard to Afghanistan, continues to engage the anxious attention of his Lordship, in Council. He is satisfied that there is yet no adequate motive for the interposition of the British power in the contests of the Seiks and Afghans; and he does not anticipate any further result, from the present mission of Captain Burnes, than the collection of accurate information, the extension of commercial intercourse, and the conciliation of friendly sentiments. The circumstance of the British Government having resolved decidedly to discourage the prosecution by the Ex-King, Shah Shooja-ool-Molk, so long as he may remain under our protection, of further schemes of hostility against the Chiefs now in power in Cabool and Kandahar, may, however, be found a means of useful influence in our favour.

No. 47.—Mr. McNeill to Visct. Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 30, 1837.)

(Extract.)

Camp, near Tehran, June 30, 1837.

I have the honor to inform your Lordship, that having waited upon the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary two days ago, his Excellency took that opportunity to enter into a conversation on the proposed expedition of the Shah against Herat, and to inform me that he had seen His Majesty the day before, and had endeavoured to dissuade him from proceeding in person against Herat. His Excellency further stated to me, in presence of Captain Sheil, that though he had been instructed by his
Government not to urge the Shah to undertake the expedition last year, he had himself been of opinion that it was advisable to do so. The Shah having just come to the throne, he had been of opinion, that any brilliant achievement, such as he might have effectcd last year had the army been properly conducted, would have tended to consolidate the Shah's power; that this year, however, he was of a different opinion.

His Excellency thus acknowledged, in substance, the truth of the statement I had made to your Lordship on this subject; and even justified what he represented as a deviation from the instructions he had received from his Government; but he did not represent these instructions as directing him to dissuade the Shah from undertaking the enterprise, or prosecuting the war; according to his Excellency's account he was only instructed not to urge the Shah.

No. 48.—Mr. Mc Neil to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 30, 1837.)
(Extract.)

Camp near Tehran, June 30, 1837.

After having communicated with Fiteh Mahmomed Khan, the Envoy from Herat, who called upon me here, I found that while the Vizier's letter to the Ausef was written in a strain of submission, Kamran Shah of Herat, in his letter to the Shah of Persia, had preserved the style and title of an independent Sovereign. Though he addressed the Shah with deference and respect, he did not address His Persian Majesty as his Sovereign, and his signet bore the inscription, which has been used for several generations by the royal family of the Afghans, describing him as "Shah dor Doran." The Envoy also informed me that there was no intention on the part of the Herat Government to relinquish its independence, that Kamran would not agree to renounce the title of Shah, or to coin the money, or to have prayers read in the name of Mahmomed Shah; and that even if Kamran had been disposed to accede to these terms, he did not dare to propose them to the Afghan nobles. At the same time he assured me that the Government of Herat was sincerely desirous to come to some arrangement with the Persian Government, which should put an end to hostilities between them; and that he was prepared to conclude such an arrangement, on the basis proposed by Yar Mahmomed Khan, if the Persian Government would give him security that it would act in good faith; but that he found it difficult to place any reliance on the assurances of the Persian Government, for that an arrangement had already been concluded with the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, who produced firmans, stating that he was fully empowered on the part of the Shah, and that now he found the Shah and his Ministers unwilling to ratify the Treaty which the Ausef had negotiated. He expressed great confidence in the views and feelings of the British Government, evinced by the refusal of the British officers to march against Herat last year; and concluded by stating that he was very desirous that I should
take a part in the negotiation, as the only means he could devise of obtaining some security that the Persian Government would fulfil the conditions on which he was authorized to conclude the arrangement.

Having occasion to wait on the Prime Minister, a few days after this conversation, I introduced the subject of the negotiations with Herat, and finding that His Excellency believed the mission to have been sent only for the purpose of gaining time, I stated to him my conviction that His Excellency was mistaken in this opinion. The Minister requested me to see the Envoy, and to ascertain the intentions of his Government, stating, that if I could feel assured of its sincerity, he would feel perfectly satisfied.

In consequence of this request, I had an interview with the Envoy, and reduced to writing the precise terms on which he was prepared to conclude a permanent arrangement with the Persian Government. This document, of which I have the honor to inclose a translation, I transmitted, without loss of time, to the Premier, and finding from His Excellency’s conversation with Captain Sheil, who had waited upon him at my request, that His Excellency had no intention to accept the proposed terms, I addressed to him the letter, of which the inclosure, No. 2, is a translation.

The following day I received a memorandum from the Prime Minister, commenting on the written proposals transmitted to him by the Herat Envoy, through me. A translation of this document forms the inclosure, No. 3.

After an interval of some days, I received from His Excellency the Prime Minister, in answer to my letter, a note, of which the inclosure, No. 4, is a translation; and the inclosure, No. 5, is my reply to this communication, after I had ascertained that the Shah was still making preparations to send a force against Herat.

It soon became sufficiently evident that the real question at issue between the parties, was the sovereignty of Herat, which the Shah of Persia claimed for himself, but which Kamran Shah was not prepared to relinquish; and this appeared to me to be precisely the question in which the British Government was most interested. I regarded it as of the utmost importance to our security in India, that Herat should not become dependent on Persia, in such a manner that it should follow the fate of this country, or become available to any Power which might obtain a control over the councils of the Shah. I therefore not only could not advise the Herat Envoy to concede this point; but I considered it my duty to say, that if this concession should be made, and the relations of Shah Kamran and the people of Herat to the Shah of Persia should thus become those of subjects to a sovereign, I could take no further part in the negotiation.

I had been instructed by the Government of India to dissuade the Shah from undertaking another expedition against Herat; and to inform
His Majesty that to prosecute this war might diminish the cordiality which had so long subsisted between England and Persia. In my despatch of the 24th of February, I expressed an opinion that the war which the Shah was prosecuting against Herat was a just war; and I ventured to question the advantage, under such circumstances, of endeavouring, by implied threats, to dissuade him from renewing it; but when the Herat Government offered terms so very advantageous, that I felt convinced Persia could not, by the conquest of the place, have gained so much in strength and security, it appeared to me that the war had from that moment become, on the part of Persia, an unjust war; and that, having been requested by the Persian Government to take a part in the negotiation, while the Herat Envoy had placed himself entirely in my hands, I could no longer with advantage maintain the reserve I had hitherto thought it advisable to maintain in regard to this question. I therefore determined to take this opportunity of making a stand; and to remove every excuse for mutual distrust, I ventured to engage, on the part of the British Government, that it would use its endeavours to get the terms fulfilled by both parties. While I was determined to maintain, at all hazards, the principle of the independence of Herat, I did not object to the concessions which were voluntarily made by Shah Kamran, because, so long as the Persian Government was precluded from interfering in the internal affairs of Herat, and marching troops into that country, Herat would form a barrier against the further advance of Persia in that direction, and one, too, which, by an engagement to look to the faithful observance of the proposed arrangement, we should have acquired the right of assisting to guard.

The pretensions of Persia to the sovereignty of Affghanistan appeared to me to be such, as we were neither called upon by a sense of justice, nor permitted by a due regard to our own security, to sanction or allow. I thought I could show, from our Treaty with Persia, that the Affghans were looked upon by the Persian Government itself, at the time when that Treaty was signed, as an independent nation; while the fact of our having concluded a Treaty of defensive alliance with their Sovereign in 1809, precluded the possibility, so long as they preserved their actual independence, of our being called upon to acknowledge them to be subjects of Persia.

In my letter recommending the Persian Government to accept the terms offered by the Herat Envoy, I had stated my fears, that if these terms were rejected, and troops were sent against Herat, the British Government might suspect that Persia had in view, in prosecuting the war, other objects than those which she had avowed. His Excellency refers to the perfect union of the nations as an answer to this statement. In my reply, I have thought it necessary to point out to him that the course pursued by the Government of the present Shah has not been that which was best calculated to secure to Persia the advantages of
that perfect confidence in her views and intentions which she expects the British Government to feel; and I have endeavoured to make His Excellency perceive, that if Persia is deterred by fear of others from rendering justice, or evincing her friendship to England, such a state of things must effectually destroy all confidence in her policy, especially as the increasing disorganization and weakness of the Government must tend to increase the evil.

I think it possible that this discussion may, for a time, produce some unpleasant feeling on the part of the Shah and his Minister towards myself; for everything done by a public servant here is looked upon as emanating from his own feelings, and becomes personal; but after very anxious deliberation, and keeping in mind the instructions I had received from India, I came to the conclusion that the announcement of the sentiments and opinions I have conveyed to this Government in these letters, was more important than my own personal position at this Court.

I was about to close this despatch, when I received from His Excellency the Prime Minister, in answer to my letter, No. 5, a note, of which the inclosure, No. 6, is a translation.

Judging from the Shah’s present feelings, I do not see much reason to hope that any arrangement will, for the present, be concluded; but the Envoy assures me, that on his arrival at Herat, he will be able to send me a copy of the proposed arrangement, sealed by Kamran Shah, and by his Minister Yar Mahommed Khan, with permission to exchange it for a similar copy, sealed by the Shah and Prime Minister of Persia, should they at any time be induced to accept the arrangement.

_Inclusion 1._—Translation of certain Propositions submitted to the Persian Government by Futteh Mahommed Khan, Agent from the Government of Herat.

1st Point.—There is to be a cessation of war and of marauding; the capture and sale of prisoners are to be utterly abolished.

2nd Point.—Should the King of Kings intend to undertake a military expedition against Toorkistan, and should he require troops from Shah Kamran, the latter is to supply troops to the extent of his ability, and they shall accompany the Governor of Khorassan on any expedition against Toorkistan. Should troops be required on the frontiers of Azerbaijan, Shah Kamran shall furnish them in such number as may at the time be practicable, and shall not withhold them.

3rd Point.—A sum of money in the shape of tribute shall be paid annually, at the festival of Noorooz, to the Persian Government.

4th Point.—Merchants from every quarter, who shall arrive in the territories of Herat and its dependencies, are to receive full protection and suffer no injury in persons or property.

5th Point.—One person, who shall be a descendant of Shah Kamran, and some other persons who shall be relations of Vizier Yar
Mahommed Khan, and of Sheer Mahommed Khan, shall reside for two years at Meshed as hostages. When the period of two years has elapsed, if the Ministers of Herat shall have performed the foregoing engagements, and shall have committed no infraction, the above hostages shall be despatched to Herat, and shall not be detained more than two years. Should any infraction of the above engagements have been committed, the hostages are to be retained until the time of their fulfilment.

6th Point.—A Vakeel or Agent from Shah Kamran shall always reside at the Court of the King of Kings.

I engage for the performance of the foregoing stipulations on the part of my master Shah Kamran, on condition that the following engagements shall be agreed to.

1st Point.—The King of Kings of Persia shall consider Shah Kamran as his brother, and treat him with regard.

2nd Point.—The Ministers of the King of Kings of Persia shall not interfere in any manner whatever in the succession of the posterity of Shah Kamran. Whichever of the descendants of Shah Kamran shall succeed him in his government and titles, and shall fulfil the engagements that have been here contracted, it is stipulated on the part of the King of Kings of Persia that these engagements shall continue in full force, and shall not undergo any alteration.

3rd Point.—Troops are not to be sent into the territories in the possession of Shah Kamran; war and marauding are to cease; and the capture and sale of prisoners are to be entirely abolished. The Government of the King of Kings of Persia is not to interfere in any manner whatever in the internal affairs of the territories in the possession of Shah Kamran; and to enable the Government of Herat to fulfil its engagements, the internal management of these territories is to be entirely under the control of the Government of Herat.

4th Point.—The English Government shall be mediators between the Persian and Herat Governments; and if there should be any infraction of these engagements by either party, it shall employ every exertion to obtain their fulfilment.

Translated by
(Signed) J.S HEIL.

(Inclousure 2.)—Draft of a Letter addressed by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghasee, Prime Minister, translated into Persian, and delivered on the 16th of June, 1837.

(Extract.)

In respect to the memorandum which I had the honor to send to your Excellency yesterday, by Captain Sheil, containing a draft of the terms on which the Envoy from Herat is prepared to conclude an
arrangement with the Persian Government, I beg leave to offer a few observations. When I had first the honor of conversing with your Excellency on this subject, I found that your Excellency regarded the mission of this person as intended only to gain time, and the propositions of which he was the bearer, as proffered in a spirit altogether insincere. I ventured then to express my belief that the Government of Herat was sincerely desirous to enter into an arrangement with this Government which should put an end to the evils of plunder, rapine, and the capture and sale of slaves on the frontiers of Khorassan; your Excellency assured me that it was the first and most anxious wish of His Persian Majesty's heart to relieve his subjects from these evils, and you requested me to endeavour to ascertain whether or not the Herat Government was really sincere in the proposals which its Envoy was instructed to make, and which I find his Excellency the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, vested with full authority on the part of His Persian Majesty's Government, had already accepted. Your Excellency was also pleased to say, that if I could so far satisfy myself of the good faith of the Herat Government in making these propositions, as to feel enabled to assure your Excellency of its sincerity, your Excellency would remain perfectly satisfied with this assurance.

Having inquired into the circumstances, and communicated with the Envoy Futteh Mahommed Khan, I found that an arrangement had already been concluded between His Excellency the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, on the part of His Persian Majesty, and the Government of Herat, and that Futteh Mahommed Khan had come to Tehran only to seek the ratification of that arrangement; but from the hesitation which his Persian Majesty's Ministers exhibited to ratify the engagement concluded by his Excellency the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, and from other causes, the Herat Envoy had begun to doubt the intentions of His Persian Majesty's Government, and had lost much of the confidence in that Government with which he had come to the Capital. I found also that he had been the bearer of letters from Shah Kamran, and from his Minister Yar Mahommed Khan to the Shah-in-Shah of Persia, and to your Excellency; and your Excellency did me the honor to put me in possession of a copy of a letter from Yar Mahommed Khan to his Excellency the Ausef-ud-Dowleh. On inquiring into the contents of these letters it appeared to me that there was a difference in the style and manner in which they were written, and that while Yar Mahommed Khan addressed the Ausef-ud-Dowleh in terms of great submission and respect, the letters from Shah Kamran to His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah, were written in a less humble style and manner. This at first excited my suspicion of the sincerity of the Herat Government, but on further communication with the Envoy I was satisfied that the difference in the style of the letters was not the result of any intention to deceive, and that the Herat Government was sincerely desirous to conclude an
arrangement with this Government, which should relieve both parties from the evils of the worst kind of war, and by uniting their interests, give strength and stability to Persia, and security to her Eastern frontier. Your Excellency had assured me on several occasions, and especially in a letter written a few days ago, that the object of His Persian Majesty, in prosecuting military expeditions to the eastward, was the security and relief of His Majesty’s subjects, and the tranquillity of His Majesty’s Eastern frontier; and when at your Excellency’s desire I entered into communication with Futtékh Khan, I kept these objects steadily in view.

As your Excellency had been pleased to say that you would rest satisfied with my assurance that the Government of Herat was sincere, the first part of my duty was to satisfy myself on this subject.

I found that the inferences drawn from these letters were in some respects correct, and in some the reverse; and I considered it necessary to ascertain what were the specific engagements which the Herat Government were prepared to enter into with a sincere desire to act up to them. These I reduced to writing in the presence, and with the concurrence of the Herat Envoy, and I immediately transmitted the paper to your Excellency.

Your Excellency will observe, that in this document all the engagements which imply exertion, or expense, or concession, are those which the Herat Government will be called upon to fulfil; and that the engagements which the Persian Government is here called upon to enter into, bind His Persian Majesty only to forbear from interfering in the internal affairs of Herat, but do not make it necessary to spend one farthing of money, or to make any exertion of any kind. That on the other hand, the Herat Government engages to give hostages, of which one is to be a son of Shah Kamran, and the others are to be relations of his Vizier and his brother,—that it further engages to give Peeshkush, —to furnish troops when required—to protect merchants—and, what is most important, to restrain all persons under its control from plunder and from the capture and sale of slaves. For the due performance of these engagements the Persian Government will have not only the solemn pledge of the Herat Government, but also the assurance that the British Government will use its best endeavours to get them carried into effect. As your Excellency entirely doubted the sincerity of the Herat Government, you will, no doubt, fully appreciate this part of the arrangement.

Let His Persian Majesty’s Ministers themselves decide whether it is more advantageous to the interests of Persia to conclude this arrangement, which secures advantages so great and so obvious, or to undertake military operations against Herat, which are disapproved by the British and other friendly Governments, and which cannot fail to entail an immense expense on this Government, and to exhaust its military
resources, while the result must still be doubtful. Whether it is better
to accept terms so honorable to His Persian Majesty, or to drive the
people of Herat to the necessity of making a determined resistance, and
thus incurring the hazard of failure, and the evils (may God avert them)
which must follow such a misfortune. It is also worthy of your Excell-
ency's wisdom and knowledge of affairs to consider whether, even in the
event of success against Herat, the Persian Government could derive
from the capture of that place, advantages so great and permanent as it
may secure to itself by accepting the present proposals, coupled as they
are with the mediation of the British Government.

In conclusion, I have to inform your Excellency, that as the proposals
which the Herat Envoy has submitted to your Excellency through me,
are calculated to afford security and permanent tranquillity to the eastern
frontiers of Persia; to give His Persian Majesty's Government the
greatest advantages in all its future arrangements in Toorkistan, and
thus to put an end to the evils which have so long afflicted His Persian
Majesty's subjects in the eastern provinces of this empire, I have no
hesitation in requesting your Excellency to accept the proposals; and
if they should be rejected, and military operations should be undertaken
after your Excellency has been put in possession of the sentiments of
the British Government on the subject of the expeditions to the east-
ward, and of its desire that the Persian Government should abstain from
these enterprises, I fear that such a step might lead the British Govern-
ment to believe, that the Persian Government has not in view, in
prosecuting these wars, the security of its subjects and the tranquillity
of its eastern provinces, which are the avowed objects, but that it con-
templates projects of a very different description. I need not inform
your Excellency, that if any such suspicion should be entertained by the
British authorities in England, or in India, it might have the effect of
diminishing (which God forbid) the cordiality which has hitherto
existed between the two Governments; and no one, I am convinced,
would be so much chagrined and mortified by such a result as your
Excellency and myself.

Your Excellency is also aware, that so long as Persia is at war with
the Affghans, the British Government is precluded by Treaty from
rendering any assistance to this Government; but if this obstacle were
removed, I should feel myself at liberty to give your Excellency
immediate proof of the readiness with which His Britannic Majesty
seizes every opportunity to evince the sincere desire by which His
Majesty is always actuated to promote the interests and improve the
army of Persia.

Moreover the arrangements now proposed have already in substance
been concluded by the Wully of Khorassan, fully empowered on the
part of His Persian Majesty; and I am convinced your Excellency

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will not consider it worthy the dignity and good faith of this Government, to set aside an advantageous arrangement thus formally concluded.

(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclusion 3.)—Translation of a Memorandum by Hajee Meerza Aghassee, Prime Minister, in answer to certain Propositions of Futtah Mahommed Khan, Agent from Herat.

The first point is that war, marauding, and the capture of prisoners shall cease. As all these things are opposed to obedience, it is evident that they will, as a matter of course, cease, when Prince Kamran acknowledges subjection to Persia. He who is obedient must be obedient under every circumstance.

2nd Point.—As Herat with its dependencies is one of the provinces of Persia, whenever the exigencies of the State require troops to be despatched in any direction, Herat, like the other provinces of the kingdom, must furnish troops and provisions.

Throughout the propositions of Futtah Mahommed Khan, the designation applied to Prince Kamran, is Kamran Shah. This is precisely the point which is the cause of the movement of troops, that these pretensions may be destroyed. Two Kings cannot dwell in one kingdom. The title of Feridoon Meerza, the Governor-General of Fars, which is ten times as large as Herat, is Ameerzadeh, son of a Prince (not Prince). This phrase conveys the impression of disobedience and refractoriness, and the remedy is to cease to employ such expressions.

3rd Point.—That tribute shall be paid annually at the Noorooz. He who is obedient must of course pay tribute and taxes; he must read the Khootbeh (prayers which imply royalty), and strike the coin in the name of the King, the Asylum of the Faith (King of Persia); and he must, at all times, and on all occasions, acknowledge his obedience and subjection; and he must avoid the inconsistency of endeavouring to form a Treaty, as if Persia and Herat were two separate kingdoms.

4th Point.—The protection of merchants. This clause resembles the preceding, for the greater question includes the minor points. The line of conduct for a person under subjection is this: he must protect the Ryots and merchants of the country entrusted to his charge; and if any property is destroyed, he must make good the loss; all persons who travel in his country must enjoy perfect security in the same manner as existed in the time of the Suffavean Kings (may God have mercy on them), nor must there be any occasion for their feeling alarm, or taking precautions for their safety.

5th Point.—Regarding hostages. Hostages selected from the principal persons of Herat and its dependencies, must come and reside
at Meshed, and when perfect confidence has been acquired of the submission and subjection of Herat, they will of course obtain leave to depart (nay, Herat itself may become a place for securing other hostages); but two persons, or five persons as hostages will not be sufficient.

In regard to the first proposition of the engagements by Persia, that the King of Kings of Iran, shall treat Prince Kamran as his brother.—The treatment of the King, the Asylum of the Faith, to Feridoon Meerza (the King of Persia's brother), is that of master to his servant. Let Prince Kamran be like Feridoon Meerza, for higher expectations would be presumptuous. It might, indeed, be proposed that he should be treated with more favour than His Majesty's brother; but no one can presume to aspire to be regarded as brother to the King of Kings; for all are the devoted servants of the great King.

In regard to the second proposition (of the engagements by Persia) after the acknowledgment of obedience, and the payment of the taxes, the Ministers of the Persian Government will not interfere in the affairs of Herat, and any deviation from this course will be contrary to royal justice; but if otherwise, beyond a doubt changes and alterations will be introduced, and the severest punishments will be inflicted on the people of that country.

In regard to the third proposition; why should military expeditious be undertaken against a country which has acknowledged its subjection? Troops are sent against the rebellious and refractory—not the submissive and obedient. Who would seek to inflict evil on his own dominions?

In regard to the fourth proposition,—the British Government, from the friendship subsisting between both States, is always listened to whenever it gives counsel beneficial to Persia and its provinces. After the acknowledgment of subjection by the people of Herat, and the performance of service, then whatever the British Government recommends, shall be without doubt assented to.

The language which Futteh Mahommed Khan held to your Excellency, varied exceedingly from the letters which Yar Mahommed Khan (Vizier of Herat) addressed to the Ausef-ud-Dowle, and which your Excellency has perused and taken a copy of; the propositions have no connection with that document; therefore no confidence is to be placed in the declarations of Futteh Mahommed Khan; and if any discussions were to take place, no reliance could be held in his assertions.

Undoubtedly your Excellency has heard the complaints against the Afghans which have been forwarded to this Court. Recently, too, the nobles and priesthood of Khorassan, for instance such persons as this—Meerza Eskereee, the chief priest, and Hajee Meerza Moosa Khan, and foreigners and natives, have made representations on this subject. I have sent these representations to your Excellency; and, after perusal,
I beg you to give me your opinion on the answer that ought to be written, and on the course that it is incumbent on His Majesty to adopt under such circumstances. In truth, it would be contrary to manliness to suffer such proceedings with patience. I need give no further trouble.

14th of Rublee-ul-Awal, 1253.

Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclosure 4.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Haji Meerza Aghassee, Prime Minister, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

A. C.

Your letter, written with the pen of friendship, has reached me: and I have perfectly understood the contents. I was in expectation of the arrival of intelligence from his Excellency, the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, that might inform you of the real state of things. On the day of the arrival of the agent from Herat, I despatched a messenger in haste, in order that, if the Rulers of Herat had any serious intention of submission, the Ausef-ud-Dowleh should desist from military expeditions, and from the expenditure of large sums of money. Yesterday, letters arrived from the Ausef-ud-Dowleh to the Master of the Ceremonies, demanding that troops and money should be sent to enable him to proceed against Herat. Since the Ausef-ud-Dowleh has made these demands, it is evident that he has lost all hopes of their submission, because on various occasions they have attempted similar deceptions by promising obedience; and then, when opportunity offered, they did not desist from taking prisoners, and undertaking military expeditions against Khain, Seistan, Furreh, and other places; and also from giving access to the marauding incursions of the Turcomans into Khorassan, so that those frontiers are deprived of all tranquillity, as your Excellency perceived the day before yesterday, from the letters of learned and holy men in Khorassan. Similar representations are sent here in great numbers; but the detail of them would be useless. In short, the affair is in this situation: the man considers himself an independent sovereign; he refuses to make submission, and does not desist from violence. Such being the circumstances, what is the duty of the Ministers of this State? Is the protection of the subject, the repose of the poor and wretched, the duty of royalty, or not? Could any monarch in your own country, tolerate such disorders in his dominions from a place like Herat, which usually has been the capital of the heir to the throne of Persia?

At the conclusion of your letter there are some remarks about alarm. I am in great astonishment at this declaration, considering the distance of four months' journey, and the great friendship between the two States, which, during this length of time, has never been interrupted by a hair's breadth on either side. What cause is there for alarm, or for these remote speculations which have never entered into the mind of any one,
nor ever will? Finally, as your Excellency is a sincere well-wisher of both States, I have given you this trouble.

Translated by

(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inlosure 5.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee.

After Compliments.

I have had the honor to receive your Excellency's communication, and have derived great satisfaction from the contents.

With reference to your statement of the despondency of the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, and of his demand for money and troops, that he may proceed against Herat; it is evident that his despondency can arise only from one of two causes. Either his Excellency the Ausef-ud-Dowleh is without confidence, that the Ministers of this Government will accede to the demands of the agent of Herat, or else he wants confidence in the declarations and promises of the latter; in either case his demand for money and troops is reasonable.

With regard to the plundering incursions of the Rulers of Herat, and their ill-treatment of the Ryots of Persia; it is evident that until some specific arrangement of their affairs has been made, they will not desist from this course; but if an arrangement were concluded, these disorders would cease, and the Ryots would live in tranquillity. It would seem that the Ministers of this Government are not very urgent for the removal of these disorders, and for the repose of the Ryots on that frontier, since they decline to make a specific arrangement.

This Government has declared that it has no confidence in the Rulers of Herat, notwithstanding that the English Government has interposed in this affair, and I have myself promised that it will use its endeavours for the fulfilment of the engagements that may be contracted. This being the case, I do not know from what cause the want of confidence on the part of the Ministers of this Government can arise. Besides this, Futtah Mahommed Khan has given a promise, that if the propositions he has offered be accepted and agreed to, within the period of fifty days, the hostages shall be delivered in Meshed, and all disorder shall entirely cease; and I have not the least doubt of the sincerity of his promises.

With reference to the alarm of the British Government, I believe that the phrase, "Alarm of the British Government," has not been employed in my letter. Thank God, up to the present time, the British Government neither has, nor ever has had, any alarm of any Government whatever. England has never yet met an enemy able to vanquish her; on the contrary, she has overcome her opponents. As I have been for a length of time a well-wisher of this Government, and as I have long dwelt in this country, when I perceive any probability
of this Government suffering injury, I myself individually feel apprehension and alarm, and I am forced, by my good-will to this Government, to point it out to the Ministers of this Court.

With regard to your observations on the friendship and opposition between England and Persia, from the time that His Majesty, by the succour and assistance of the British Government, became possessor of the crown and throne of Persia; and that your Excellency became Prime Minister, I put it to your Excellency’s candour to declare what circumstances have occurred to give satisfaction to the British Government, or give it assurance that nothing contrary to the rules of friendship has proceeded from the Court of Persia? Is it the respect shown to its Ambassador Extraordinary, or the removal of its officers from Camp, or the conclusion of a Treaty of Commerce, or the sanctioning the establishment of its Consuls, that can inspire the British Government with confidence? What single demand of the British Government has been complied with by the Ministers of this country, so as to enable the former to feel confidence? If the Ministers of this Court declare that their fears of another Government prevent them from acceding to the wishes of the British Government, and from complying with the rules of friendship, such a pretext would destroy the hopes of the British Government, and its hopelessness will be increased in proportion to the weakness of Persia. There are no evidences of the acquirement of strength and stability by Persia, on the contrary, there are daily indications of weakness. The revenues of the country are thrown away on unprofitable expenditure, and the Ministers apparently do not attend to the internal affairs of the kingdom in the manner that is their duty. The expenditure is very great, and on the other hand the revenue is not collected; consequently, it appears that the people in general are impoverished and discontented. All these circumstances will produce the weakness and decline of this kingdom.

According to the IXth Article of the existing Treaty, it is stipulated that if war should arise between the kingdoms of Persia and Afghanistan, the English Government shall, at the desire of both parties, mediate for peace between them. The document containing the propositions of the agent of Herat, which is in your Excellency’s possession, will evince on which side I have displayed partiality in this mediation, although, indeed, impartiality to both parties is the duty of a mediator. In answer to the above propositions, you asserted that these engagements were like a Treaty between two kingdoms. I should be glad to learn what kingdom of equal rank and dignity gives tribute, hostages, and troops. It is evident that a person who imposes these obligations on himself, does not make pretensions to equality, for if he did, he never would contract these engagements. Moreover, if the British Government were to engage the Ministers of this Court, to form a Treaty with the Afghans resembling the Treaties between two kingdoms, the
Ministers of this country could not with justice offer any objections; and such a proposition would not be without reason, because the purport of the Article of the Treaty between England and Persia, is that the former Government should mediate for peace, not that it should promote the subjugation of Affghanistan to this country. The stipulation in the Treaty, that England should mediate for peace, by the wish of both parties, is a proof that at that time the Ministers of this country acknowledged the independence of Affghanistan, and that it was not under subjection to Persia. For if Affghanistan had been subject to Persia, and if there had been any idea of its submission, in the minds of the Ministers of this Government, the latter would not have admitted such a stipulation; for, in a question of subjects and ryots, the mediation of another Government is not necessary. Besides this, twenty-eight years ago, when certain proceedings on the part of Persia, which were not evidences of friendship, had produced a diminution in the concord between England and Persia, the English Government in consequence formed a friendly and political alliance with the King of the Affghans; and this Treaty is a proof that the English Government considered the King of the Affghans independent, and it is therefore unable to deny the independence of Affghanistan. For some time after the conclusion of this Treaty with the Affghans, there were disputes and discussions between the Persian and English Governments; the English Government made military preparations in Hindostan; an Ambassador from the British Government arrived in this kingdom, who made his demands and announced that an army was under orders for the attack of this country. After the acceptance of the demands of the above-mentioned Ambassador, by the Ministers of this Government; and after the dismissal from Persia of the Ambassador of a State at enmity with England, then the British Government acquired confidence in this country, and the existing Treaty was concluded. At that time the Ministers of this kingdom were perfectly apprised of the Treaty between England and Affghanistan, yet notwithstanding their knowledge of its existence, they stipulated, in the existing Treaty between England and Persia, that the British Government should be, with the consent of both parties, mediators for peace between this country and Affghanistan.

I have always been a well-wisher of this Government, and I considered it incumbent on me (with reference to the duties imposed by loyalty) to conceal no circumstances from the Ministers of this country; on this account, I have detailed the sentiments which have passed through my mind, and I have fulfilled my obligations to this Government. The Ministers of this country are now at liberty to act as they deem proper; if they consider it expedient for their Government to act in such a mode as will give confidence to the British Ministers, they will do so; and if they do not consider it expedient, they may act as they think advisable: but in every case the British Government will not be neglectful of its
own interests, and the Ministers of this Court will in the end learn, and will themselves acknowledge, that the sentiments I have detailed have been announced solely from sincerity and loyalty.

I trust I shall have excited no unpleasant feelings in the mind of your Excellency.

The 23rd of the month Rubbee-ul-Awal, 1253.
Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclasure 6.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Haji Meerza Aghassee to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

After Compliments,

The answer in detail of your Excellency has enlightened my eyes and my heart. You have desired that an arrangement should be concluded with the Afghans of Herat. This is precisely the wish of the Ministers of this Government, and they are exceedingly gratified that your Excellency should also consider this course advisable for this country. At the time that the royal army invested Herat, the rulers of that city made many promises of service, and of leaving the ryots (Persian) in tranquillity, but they have performed none of their engagements. Even at this moment that they are in fear of the royal anger, and that they have written in the manner described to the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, and that they have made humble petitions to the King, they cannot rest in quiet, but have despatched troops against the Kandaharees from whom they have received a shameful defeat. We have also in our possession representations from the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, and the learned and holy men of Khorassan, giving details of their proceedings, and from their conduct it seems that their object is deceit in order to gain time.

You have made some observations in the shape of complaint. First. When his Excellency the Ambassador, Mr. Ellis, arrived, apparently all the consideration required by the friendship between both States was shown to him, and if it were otherwise, he would have complained of his treatment. Besides this, we are in possession of various letters of his, proving that he took his departure from this perfectly satisfied.

Secondly. With regard to commerce; agreeably to Mr. Ellis’s wishes, a Firman was issued, and an end was put to all discussion. If he was not content with this, he should not have accepted the Firman, and he should have refused to agree to the arrangement.

Thirdly. The Ministers of this Government are not aware, that up to the present moment there has been any breach of their engagements; on the contrary, both great and small strive daily to strengthen the friendship between Persia and England.

With regard to the independence of the Afghans; setting aside the histories and events of ancient times, and of former Kings (may God
have mercy on them), with which your Excellency is well acquainted, and which are not concealed from any one; we are in possession of petitions from Cabool, Kandahar, and Herat, and their dependencies, and we hold them as testimonies, that the rulers of those countries have styled themselves the ryots and subjects of Persia; and we have again recently had communications from Yar Mahommed Khan (Vizier of Herat), and Kohundil Khan, and Mehridil Khan (Rulers of Kandahar).

As the weather is hot, thus much is sufficient. I shall refrain from giving any further trouble to your Excellency; but shall reserve any further remarks for an interview with your Excellency.

Translated by

(Signed) J. SHEIL.

No. 49.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

SIR,

Foreign Office, September 7, 1837.

I have received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 30th of August.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of the course which you have pursued, with reference to the affairs of Herat, as reported in your despatch,* of the 30th of June.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 50.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sept. 30, 1837.) (Extract.)

Camp, near Tehran, July 28, 1837.

The Herat Envoy, Futteh Mahommed Khan, set out a few days ago, on his return to Herat, without having concluded any arrangement with the Persian Government.

As it appeared to me to be quite possible, that an attempt might be made to detain him on the road, I have directed an intelligent man, one of the horsemen attached to the mission, to follow him as far as Meshed, and if he should be detained, to return with all speed and inform me of the fact, when I shall publicly protest against such a violation of the law of nations.

On the 23rd instant the Shah marched, and as I thought it important to mark publicly the disapprobation of my Government of this expedition, I did not accompany the Shah, when he left the town. Your Lordship will perceive by Colonel Stoddart's letter, that His Majesty felt the intimation.

* No. 48.
Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.  
Ashruff, July 23, 1837.

The Shah expressed his hope that you were not displeased with his beginning the journey; he declared, "Saheb, the only thought I have in this journey, is to put a stop to the taking away into slavery of the people; three crores of prisoners are in Bokhara, Khiva, &c. I have this thought, as my first thought, it is now in my heart, and till this is put a stop to, it will not leave my heart. This, Saheb, is the sole object of my journey."

I replied, that His Majesty had much added to his former favor towards me, by using such words to me; and that it was my duty to convey His Royal words to you, that you might also be acquainted with His Majesty's statements.

No. 51.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir, Foreign Office, September 30, 1837.

I enclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch from Her Majesty's Minister, at St. Petersburgh, inclosing a copy of a despatch from Count Simonich, reporting the departure of the Shah for the expedition against Herat, which has been communicated to Her Majesty's Minister by M. Rodofinikin.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

(Mr. Milbanke to Visc. Palmerston.—(Rec. Sept. 19, 1837.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, September 8, 1837.

M. Rodofinikin has this day received, and communicated to me, a despatch from Count Simonich, of which I inclose to your Lordship a copy, giving an account of the departure of the Shah of Persia to take the command of the expedition against Herat.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) J. R. MILBANKE.

(Sub-Inclusion.)—Count Simonich to M. Rodofinikin.

(Ergo, le 23 Juillet, 1837.)

J'ai l'honneur d'Informier votre Excellence que Sa Majesté le Shah est parti pour le Khorassan, Dimanche dernier, le 11 de ce mois. Malgré le peu de succès qu'avaient eu mes précédentes représentations pour détournir le Roi d'entreprendre une expédition contre le Prince de Hérat, j'ai voulu faire encore une dernière tentative. En conséquence, j'ai présenté à Sa Majesté une Note, dans laquelle je ne combattais plus
l'inopportunité de cette campagne; je tâchais seulement de prouver qu'il serait beaucoup plus utile à ses intérêts de confier le commandement de ses troupes à l'un de ses frères, si l'expédition de Hérat était irrévocablement décidée, et de rester de sa personne dans la capitale, où sa présence me paraissait indispensable. J'insistais beaucoup sur l'état de sa santé, sur le danger qu'il y aurait à s'exposer pendant les fortes chaleurs à un si pénible voyage, et je demandais qu'au moins Sa Majesté remît son départ au mois de Septembre, en cas qu'elle trouvât absolument nécessaire, par des considérations que je pouvais ignorer, de s'approcher du théâtre des opérations. Je savais que si je parvenais à retenir ici le Shah jusqu'à l'automne, les différends avec Kamran Mirza auroient pu se terminer par la voie des négociations. Mais tous mes efforts sont restés infructueux. Décidé de partir, le Roi me fit appeler, et me donna verbalement la réponse à ma Note; et si Sa Majesté n'a pu me convaincre de la nécessité de faire la guerre à Kamran, elle me prouva du moins qu'elle était inébranlable dans sa résolution. Persuadé que tous mes arguments pour retenir le Roi, resteraient désormais sans effet, et ne voulant pas d'un autre côté que ma présence dans le camp pût être interprétée comme si le Gouvernement Impérial favorisait l'entreprise du Roi, je me suis décidé à ne pas accompagner Sa Majesté, et je me flatte de l'espoir que j'ai agi dans cette occasion dans le sens que me prescrivent mes instructions, et à l'entière approbation du Ministère Impérial.

(Translation.)

Ergovanie, July 23, 1837.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that His Majesty the Shah set out for Khorassan on Sunday last, the 11th of this month. Notwithstanding the little success which had attended my previous representations, with the view of dissuading the King from undertaking an expedition against the Prince of Herat, I was willing still to make a last attempt. I accordingly presented to His Majesty a note, in which I no longer combated the unseasonableness of this campaign; I only endeavoured to prove that it would be much more beneficial to his interests to entrust the command of his troops to one of his brothers, if the expedition to Herat was irrevocably determined upon, and to remain himself in the capital, where his presence appeared to me indispensable. I dwelt much on the state of his health, on the danger which there would be in his exposing himself, during the great heats to so fatiguing a journey, and I required that, at least, His Majesty should put off his departure until the month of September, in the event of his finding it absolutely necessary, from considerations of which I might be ignorant, to draw near to the theatre of operations. I knew that, if I succeeded in keeping the Shah here until autumn, the differences with Kamran Meerza might be terminated by means of negotiation; but all my efforts were fruitless. The King, being determined to set out, caused me to
be summoned, and gave me verbally the answer to my note; and if His Majesty was not able to convince me of the necessity of making war upon Kamran, he at least proved to me that he was immovable in his resolution. Being satisfied that all my arguments to detain the King would henceforth be ineffectual, and not choosing on the other hand that my presence in the camp should be interpreted, as if the Imperial Government favoured the enterprise of the King, I determined not to accompany His Majesty, and I flatter myself with the hope, that I have acted on this occasion in the sense prescribed to me by my instructions, and to the entire satisfaction of the Imperial Ministry.

No. 52.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sept. 30, 1837.)

(Extract.)

Camp, near Tehran, August 10, 1837.

I have the honor to transmit translations of correspondence which have recently passed between the Persian Government and the Government of Herat and its dependencies.

(Inclosure 1.)—Translation of a Letter addressed by Kamran Shah to Mahommed Shah.

As long as the throne and the crown possess grandeur, as long as monarchs obtain fame by justice and religion, as long as munificence is the ornament of the crown of exalted sovereigns, may the diadem of royalty, fortune, glory, and honor be adorned by the sway of the servants of your sublime Majesty, the dispenser of fate, exalted as the heavens, valiant as Behram, fortunate as Ouzmer, dignified as Saturn, glorious as Darius, renowned as Alexander, just as Nousheerwan, magnificent as Hormooz, possessor of the throne of Cyrus, who, beholding the victories of His Majesty, is desirous of participating in his destiny, with armies numerous as Feridoon's, who planted the standard of sovereignty on the star of victory; a King whose fortune is resplendent to all beholders, the ornament of the throne of the Kyanees, the unfurler of the Banner of Kawaah: may the Almighty preserve his kingdom.

After this expression of friendship and regard, and after this acknowledgment of the strength of our union and concord; it is declared with the pen marked with sincerity, that at the time that the sound of the fame of the auspicious accession of your Majesty overcame the clamour of the cymbals and trumpets of the rulers of Turkey and Russia, this sincere friend was in expectation that that ornament of the throne would, under every circumstance, fulfill his hopes by gladdening the heart of friendship by the royal communication of matters of importance; and he indulged an expectation that your Majesty would evince your favor, and not display any unkindly feelings. Your Majesty having omitted to make any inquiries regarding him, and not having
shown any tokens of your friendship, he has felt concern at this want of regard; and has, therefore, written this letter replete with sincerity, and he has despatched a person to your auspicious Majesty to discuss certain points, which, after he reaches your Majesty's presence he will represent, together with assurances of the sincerity of the attachment and regard of this friend. I have, therefore, despatched to your Majesty's presence as my Envoy, a young nobleman of high rank, named Futeh Mahommed Khan, of the tribe Alekozye, which is one of the most honorable divisions of the noble tribe of Dooraunee. I beg your auspicious Majesty to accept of his representations, which will be free from the garment of deceit, and will be clothed in the robe of friendship. I entertain an expectation that your Majesty will honor him with suitable commands bearing the marks of favor. May the days of sovereignty and conquest be perpetual.

Translated by

(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclusion 2.)—Translation of the Inclosure in the Letter from Kamran Shah to Mahommed Shah.

It is written on the page of vindication, that from the commencement of the time that the Prince of the age and the earth, the Shah-in-Shah, His Majesty, who is now dwelling in Heaven, Futeh Ali Shah, honored this person, professing sincerity, with the title of son, and that he reckoned Herat among the victorious kingdoms of his sovereignty, the conduct of this well-wisher has, up to the present moment, been regulated by friendship, and in conformity with the inclinations of the well-wishers of this ever-enduring kingdom, nor did he ever commit any violation of the harmony and alliance subsisting with this Government.

At the time that that ornament of the throne and crown, Mahommed Shah, seduced by worldly glory, had changed the relations of friendship and peace with this well-wisher into war, and by marching his troops into the territories of Herat, had indicated his avidity for their conquest, and thus altered that which had been fated, when at length the unpropriousness of unstable fortune had blackened the banner of the State by mourning for the death of His Royal Highness the late Naiib-oos-Sultanee, Abbas Meerza, and the arms and trumpets had made their lament for their Lord; in short, when joy-destroying grief was at its height; it was then visible to the whole world what the termination of the affair would have been, if this true well-wisher had been hostile to your Majesty, if he had not practised the duties of friendship and regard, and if he had not opened the door of peace and harmony to the well-wishers of this kingdom.

Setting this aside at the time that His late Majesty, when tired of
this life, departed to the kingdom of heaven, the Khans of Khorassan, both great and small, whether Tajiks or Turks, revolted from the authority of this Government and committed hostilities against your Majesty. If on that occasion this well-wisher had arrayed his troops with hostile views against your Majesty in imitation of those other tribes, it would now be apparent in what condition the victorious troops would have returned from these countries. Since at this opportunity such was the conduct of this friend, it must be apparent to all people of understanding, that on no occasion will he act contrary to friendship, and that he will at all times unfurl the banner of your Majesty in the field of affection and regard. In return for the friendship he professes, he entertains hopes of obtaining the favor of your Majesty, so that with the aid of the well-wishers of Persia he may subdue his hereditary dominions and overwhelm his rebellious enemies. After this he will make his kingdom, his crown, and his blood, a gift to your Majesty.

It was necessary to make these observations in my vindication. There are some other unimportant matters, into the detail of which this sincere friend feels himself unwilling to enter from a sense of his incapacity.

Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclosure 3.)—Translation of a Copy of a Letter from Yar Mahomed Khan, Vizier of Herat, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

EXALTED Brother, renowned as Aristotle, sagacious as Plato, wise as Sooleyman's minister. From the time that all-ruling fate had written the mandate of separation from this sincere friend, your Excellency, whose talent and skill in composition are so celebrated, has written no letters, with the pen of friendship, in remembrance of your old friends, nor have you made any inquiries regarding your former acquaintances.

Now that my uncle's son, Futteh Mahommed Khan, is about to proceed to the Court of His Majesty, as an evidence of our truth and submission, I have taken up the pen of friendship to give assurances to your kind heart of my affection and regard.

With reference to the affairs of this country, the above-mentioned Futteh Mahommed Khan, when he has the honor of waiting on you, will explain their condition. I am in hopes that, contrary to what has passed, you will write friendly letters in remembrance of this friend, and constantly communicate with him on subjects of importance, and thus keep open the door of brotherly love. I request you will convey your commands to me, written with the pen of wisdom, which, from your regard to the prosperity of both exalted States (Herat and Persia)
will prove agreeable; and I beg you not to renounce this sincere friend.

I request my remembrances may be made to all my friends.

Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.

(Inclusion 4.)—Translation of a Copy of a Letter from Kohundil Khan, Chief of Kandahar, to the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, Governor of Khorassan.

As long as the sun shines in the green expanse of the heavens, may the rays of the star of the fortune of the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, &c., &c., (a long catalogue of titles and epithets) may God protect him—gleam in the Eastern horizon of his fate! May the Lord of Mankind have him in his keeping!

After this detail of fortunate circumstances, it is notified to his friendly mind, that as this servant of the Creator (the writer) has the most favorable disposition towards that haughty State (Persia) and being desirous, therefore, of strengthening the union and concord between them (apparently between Kandahar and Persia), he conveys intelligence of the state of affairs in this country.

Kamran and Yar Mahommed have left Herat, with all their people, exceedingly ill-provided, and have arrived at the stage of Bekwah and have allowed themselves to be puffed up with presumption. This servant of God (the writer) with his brothers, and with troops and artillery, battalions, and other wicked fire weapons, has moved from the city of Achemed Shah (Kandahar), and arrived at the Heermund, where he is in readiness for the events of war.

My hope from the mercy of God and from the Prophet is, that Kamran and Yar Mahommed, who are now wandering in the plain of disgrace, will be driven into the desert of destitution. Hereafter the intelligence of all occurrences will be sent.

At this moment, Herat contains nothing but four walls, and some fighting men. If a movement were made from Persia, our object could be obtained without any effort, and the four walls of Herat would be added to the kingdom of Persia.

Please God, Kamran and Yar Mahommed will not escape with life from the clutches of my warlike horsemen.

It remains to be seen what God will dispose, and what futurity will reveal.

As this servant of God is a well-wisher of Persia, he has written these lines.

Translated by
(Signed) J. SHEIL.
No. 53.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Dec. 1, 1837)  
(Tehran, September 28, 1837.)

By the latest intelligence I have received, the Shah had advanced to Abbasabad, on the road to Meshed, and proposed to proceed, without halting, to Subzawar, where five days' provision for the army had been collected.

The Turkomans of Merve had pushed a plundering party as far as Sherrifabad, one stage on this side of Meshed; but are reported to have suffered some loss on their retreat.

Shah Kamran having failed in capturing the Fort of Lash, on the borders of Kandahar, which he had besieged for some months, and assaulted more than once, has returned to Herat, in consequence of the advance of the Shah of Persia. Kamran is said to have in his camp above 18,000 good cavalry; and about half that number of inferior infantry. The Shah mustered his army at Bostam, where it consisted of about 8,000 effective men of what is called the disciplined infantry, and about 1,500 cavalry; but the troops were in bad order in every respect, and a large proportion badly armed; besides this force, His Majesty had sent in advance four battalions and thirty guns, which were awaiting his arrival at Subzawar. The force with which the Shah will march from Subzawar, may, therefore, allowing for desertions, be estimated at about 10,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry, and thirty guns. The baggage-cattle are deficient in numbers, and the country, through which the army is to march, is deficient in supplies of every kind. If the Afghans, therefore, know how to use their great superiority in horse, it will be extremely difficult for the Shah to advance.

In the meantime, Aga Khan continues to hold out in the fortress of Bam, near Kerman, and has made some successful sorties against the besieging force.

No. 54.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Dec. 30, 1837)  
(Tehran, October 30, 1837.)

I have the honor to inclose extracts from the last letters I have received from Colonel Stoddart, giving an account of the state of affairs in the Shah's camp, and informing me of the Mission of Captain Vicovich from the Court of Russia to the Ameer of Cabool.

The Government of Herat appears to have made judicious arrangements for defence. The whole of the provisions which the country afforded have been removed into the fortresses, and all the forage which could not be removed has been burnt; even the grass on the plains, where it was dry enough to burn, has been set on fire, and all the villages within twelve miles of Herat, have been destroyed, the inhabitants having been removed to distant places, or to the fortresses. Ten
thousand chosen horse, whose families have been removed into Herat, are ordered to keep the field, and all the remaining troops have been employed to garrison that city, and the neighbouring places.

The season of the year is unfavorable to military operations, for rain and snow may be expected to fall very frequently in the course of the next two months, and the Shah will find it difficult, either to protect his army from the weather, or to procure supplies, in a country where so much trouble has been taken to put them beyond his reach. Moreover, the Persian army is very deficient in cavalry, and if the Afghans should act with as much spirit as they did when the Shah formerly besieged Herat, it is difficult to conceive how His Majesty is to complete the investment of so large a city, and to procure food for his army during the siege, or even to protect himself on the line of march.

In all such contests, especially between irregular armies, it is difficult to predict, with certainty, the result; but I continue to be of opinion, that every rational calculation of probabilities, must lead us to the belief that Herat will not be taken in this campaign, and that if the Shah is obliged to retreat, after an unsuccessful siege, the consequences must tend very materially to weaken the Shah's Government at home, and to shake his authority in several provinces.

On the other hand, His Majesty has intimated his intention, after taking Herat, to proceed against Meimuna and Balkh, and, having subdued them, he proposes to attack Khiva, advancing along the banks of the Oxus to that principality, where he expects to arrive in the course of next year, and where I am informed he expects the co-operation of a Russian force, from Orenberg, as well as the assistance of the British officers in the Persian service. Such, with the exception of the reference to the Russian force, is the language the Shah held to Major Rawlinson, who had been summoned to camp by the Shah, and who returned only a few days ago.

(Inclosure 1.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill. (Extract.)

October 14, near Nishapore.

Captain Vicovich of the Russian service, an Aide-de-Camp of the General at Orenberg, arrived here from Tehran and Resht on the 10th instant. He is gone on a mission to Cabool. Horsemen have been given to pass him to Toorbut, thence a change to Khain; thence again to Lash, from thence Kandahar. He left yesterday.

(Inclosure 2.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill. (Extract.)

Royal Camp, near Nishapore, Oct. 16, 1837.

The ten days' money, instead of rations, and twenty days' rations in kind, ending on the 12th Shabaun, have not yet been all paid and given. More than half has been issued; the Nizam regular troops have the
better part, so that the balance unpaid belongs to the rest of the camp. Humza Meenaz’s camp left yesterday for Kudumgah, four fursukhs Mahommed Khan went to-day in the evening, and we are positively to start after noon to-morrow. Your Gholam reached me at 10 A.M. yesterday (in eight and a half days); he was told at Abbasabad that they had certain information the Turkomans of that neighbourhood to the north, were only waiting for the Shah to march from Nishapoor to commence their attacks on the Khorassan road; they have selected and appointed a leader. I fear that the communications between the camp and Tehran, will be difficult and precarious, owing to parties returning from the camp, who have already stripped and robbed travellers whenever they can lay hands on them.

I hear that Khaf has been abandoned by the majority of its population, from fear of the Shah. The Chief of Khain will act according to circumstances.

No. 55.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Dec. 30, 1837.)

(Extract.)

Tehran, October 30, 1837.

With reference to the inclosure in my preceding despatch, which intimates the passage through the Shah’s camp, of Captain Vicovich, on a mission from the Court of St. Petersburgh to Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan of Cabool, I beg to say, that Vicovich had everywhere announced that he was sent to intimate the arrival at Astarabad of a large Russian force destined to co-operate with the Shah’s army against Herat.

Count Simonich has never on any occasion mentioned to me the name of this individual, or alluded in any way to the intercourse between Russia and Cabool.

No. 56.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Feb. 6, 1838.)

(Extract.)

Soolimaniah, November 25, 1837.

In my despatch of the 30th of June, I had the honor to inform your Lordship that the Envoy from Herat had given me to understand that, on his arrival there, he would be able to send me a copy of the Convention which he had proposed through me, for the acceptance of the Persian Government, sealed by Prince Kamran and the Minister of Herat, for the purpose of being exchanged for a similar copy sealed by the Shah and the Prime Minister of Persia, should they at any time be prepared to agree to the arrangement therein proposed, and I had also the honor, in my despatch of the 28th of July, to report that, thinking it possible that he might be detained on the road after he had been permitted to depart from the Capital, I had sent a confidential horseman attached to the mission, with orders to observe Futteh Mahommed Khan till he should have set out from Meshed.

I directed the horseman, whom I sent to Meshed, to await there
any communication Futteh Mahommed Khan might propose to send me from Herat. This precaution was the more necessary as a part of the Persian army had already marched for Khorassan, and it might therefore have been impossible for an Afghan messenger to make his way to me at Tehran.

It would appear, however, that, on his departure from Meshed, Futteh Mahommed Khan, either doubting whether he would be able to communicate with me by means of any messenger of his own Government—as any such person would probably have been seized by the Persians—or, desirous to convince me that the account he had given of the state of affairs at Herat, was correct, or for some other reason, which, as the man has not yet returned, I am not acquainted with, induced Ali Mahommed Beg, the horseman in question, to accompany him to Herat, where he was detained till the 16th of October. On that day he was despatched with letters from the Vizier Yar Mahommed Khan, from Futteh Mahommed Khan, and from the Vizier's son, to my address. These letters, of which I have the honor to inclose translations, authorize me, on the part of the Herat Government, to conclude an arrangement with the Persian Government on the terms proposed here by Futteh Mahommed Khan. Ali Mahommed Beg was also the bearer of a letter to me from Lieutenant Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery, who was travelling in Afghanistan by order of the Governor-General of India, and of whose arrival at Herat, Ali Mahommed Beg says, he had heard before he left Meshed for Herat.

When within about three stages of Meshed, after he had already passed the Persian army, then marching to Toorbut Sheikh Jaum, the caravan which Ali Mahommed Beg accompanied, was met by Mr. Borowski, who has been some time in the Persian service, and who was then on his way from Meshed to join the camp. Mr. Borowski having recognized the man, who was travelling openly and without disguise or concealment, accompanied by two horses and a pony, besides the horse he rode, and, having learnt that he was returning from Herat, reported the circumstance on his arrival in camp. Horsemen were immediately despatched to bring the messenger to camp. He was forced to return with them; a part of his clothes were taken from him; the horses, which he was bringing for me from Herat, were seized; he was dragged to camp, and there placed in custody. He succeeded, however, in making his way to the tent of Colonel Stoddart, and was by that officer conducted to the Prime Minister, who, after he had been informed by Colonel Stoddart, that the man was in the service of this mission, again placed him in custody, while Hajee Khan, an officer of the rank of Brigadier in the service of the Shah, not only used offensive language in addressing Colonel Stoddart in presence of the Prime Minister, but, after the messenger had been released by order of His Excellency, seized him again in the midst of the camp; stripped him to search for
any letters he might have concealed about his person; took from him Lieutenant Pottinger's letter, which was sent to the Prime Minister; used to the messenger the most violent threats and the most disgusting and opprobrious language; and took from him a portion of his accouterments.

The Prime Minister, having received Lieutenant Pottinger's letter to me, sent for Meerza Sauleh, one of the Persian gentlemen who was educated in England, and directed him to open and read the letter; but the Meerza declined to open the letter. The letter was, therefore, returned unopened.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter from Colonel Stoddart, in which the circumstances of this outrage are detailed.

I need not inform your Lordship, that in these countries, where the insecurity of person and property has still preserved a state of society in many respects nearly resembling that which prevailed in the feudal ages in Europe, the obligation on a superior to protect a dependent is more generally felt and acknowledged than in countries where the law, equally and impartially administered, affords a more perfect security; and that, consequently, the insult to the superior, from any violence offered to a dependent, is more obvious and more keenly felt than it would be where the law, and not the master, is the protector. Independent, therefore, of the violation of the law of nations, which the Persian Government has allowed itself to commit, the public infliction on a servant of the British Government, of such indignities, in the face of the whole camp, is, and according to the Persian feeling in regard to such matters, must be regarded as a grave insult to the British Government, as well as to me. I have little doubt that the object of the whole proceeding was to exhibit to the Afghans, and to the Persian army, an apparent contempt for the English, with a view to diminish the moral effect which might have been produced on either party, by the general belief that we were opposed to the conquest of Herat by the Persians.

The inclosed copy of a letter to Colonel Stoddart, and the translations of my letters to the Shah, and to the officiating Minister for Foreign Affairs, will inform your Lordship of the steps I have considered it my duty to take in consequence of this unpleasant affair. In these communications I have explained, in a very unreserved manner, to the Shah, the circumstances connected with Ali Mahommed Beg's journey to Herat; I have demanded an apology from the Persian Government for its own conduct, and the dismissal of Hajee Khan, requiring that he shall not be reinstated until the British Government shall have forgiven him. At a time when the Governor of Ghilan is ordered to be sent in chains to the Capital, and there placed at the disposal of the Russian Minister, for the purpose of being punished by His Excellency for having carried into effect the sentence of the law against a Mahomedan subject of Russia in Ghilan, I fear what I have demanded may not, here
at least, be thought a sufficiently ample reparation for the affront; but I have thought it advisable to lean to the side of moderation, and rather to require the smallest amount of concession that I can regard as sufficient, than demand the largest I might be justified in exacting. If my demand should be complied with, I am of opinion that the reparation will not be inadequate to the injury. But if this moderate demand should not be complied with, I shall suspend my official intercourse with this Government, and await your Lordship's instructions.

I have no hesitation in assuring your Lordship, that in my opinion it would be quite impossible for any British Minister to carry on the public business in a manner creditable either to his Sovereign or to himself, if reparation for this insult should not be exacted; and if it should not be accorded by the Persian Government on my demand, I think there are means by which it might be exacted.

(Inclosure 1.)—Translation of a Letter addressed by Yar Mahommed Khan, Vizier of Herat, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

As epistolary correspondence is a mark of friendship and a sign of unanimity, and as it is in every way the cause of strengthening, and the means of establishing and confirming the ties of amity and affection, it is now inscribed on the ornamented page of the volume of friendship and attachment; that upon the arrival of the noble and estimable Futeh Mahommed Khan, the state of affairs and the occurrences in Persia became known.

My kind friend, in consequence of the above-mentioned nobleman having constantly expatiated on your great kindness, and on all occasions, both in public and in private, the whole of the Dooranuus place the fullest reliance on you, and confide to you the direction of all their affairs. In like manner, the whole of the Affghans, appreciating your kindness, commit themselves and their country entirely to your judgment and discretion; and they will not, by neglect or remissness, act in opposition to whatever arrangements your enlightened judgment may deem it expedient to make, and they will follow no other course than that which you may propose.

With regard to the coming of the Kujur army to this country, I am not, and never shall be, in any way willing to give you trouble or annoyance. Should the Persian Government evince any great desire to come to Herat, do not prevent the advance of the army, or take any trouble in the matter. It is an affair of no consequence. Let them come, in order that they may prove what they are able to do. May it please God the merciful, by the grace and assistance of the Almighty, the steed of their wishes shall not accomplish the journey of their design. At this auspicious time, when the respectable and faithful Ali Mahommed Beg is about to travel over the desert that separates him
from your presence, it is incumbent on me to express somewhat of the sincere affection that I entertain towards you, and to assure you of my heartfelt amity and attachment.

(Inclosure.)

**My Kind Brother.**

In order that my letter may not be unaccompanied by a token of regard, I send you a good horse under charge of Ali Mahommed Beg. Please God, he will bring it in safety to you. I have nothing further to write, except my prayers for you.

Translated by

(Signed) D’A. TODD.

(Inclosure 2.)—Translation of a Letter addressed by Futtah Mahommed Khan, late Envoy from Herat, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

A.C.

As communication by letter is one of the necessary means of confirming the ties of friendship, I now write to you to express the affection which I entertain for you. From the time that I became deprived of the pleasure of your society, I have promised myself, by the grace of God, to follow for the remainder of my life no other course than that pointed out by the dictates of friendship and gratitude. After I had quitted you, and had arrived in the presence of His Excellency the Vizier, I represented to him your exceeding kindness and goodness, as well as your extreme goodwill towards us, and thus caused him to repose most fully and confidently in your kindness and friendship. He desires me to write to you, that nothing shall be done in opposition to what you may see fit to propose between the two States, because it must be apparent to the whole world, that the Government of England are everywhere desirous of promoting peace and goodwill. Should the Persian Government wish for peace, and consent to give up certain unjust demands, such as our not proceeding against Kandahar, and the like, we also, with your consent and approval, will offer no objection. If, however, their present demands be the same as they formerly made, let them do as they think fit. When I had the honor of seeing you, I explained that I had not been sent by His Majesty for the purpose of deceit or guile, but that the bonds of friendship and unanimity between our King and the Shah of Persia might be strengthened, and that we, on our part, ceasing to give further ground of offence, the Shah should countermand the march of his army. Now that such has not been done, let them judge for themselves. Since the Persian Government attribute our proposals to weakness, the will and permission of God must determine the event. It will be seen by you, and by the Persian Government, that what I stated was correct, the more so as it was
without boasting. Again we empower you to make the same arrangement, provided that the English Government be the mediator, and the Persian Government consent to it. If such be done, well and good, beyond that, if a hundred armies should come, we can listen to no other terms. We do not think it necessary that you should give yourself any further trouble. Whatever commands you may have in this country, pray write them, in order that, please God the merciful, we may not be in any manner remiss or to blame. With regard to other matters, the respectable Dara Shah Khan has been sent to you in order that he may, upon his arrival, inform you of them.

I hope that you will always keep me in your remembrance, and continue to correspond with me, so that under any circumstances our friendship may be strengthened and confirmed. My kind friend, in the event of the Persians being desirous of coming to Herat, do not give yourself the trouble of offering any remonstrances on our part. Let them learn the true state of the case themselves. Should His Majesty the Shah prohibit our army marching towards Kandahar, there can be no right understanding or bond of union between us; the terms of peace between States are known to every one.

Any commands that you may have you will be pleased to make known to Dara Shah Khan. May your dignity be perpetual.

(Inclosure.)

Respected Sir,

You will, please God, receive, by the hands of Ali Mahommed Beg and Dara Shah Khan, as tokens of friendship, three horses, one from myself, one from his Excellency the Vizier, and one from the Vizier’s son, Syud Mahommed Khan.* I conclude with prayers for you.

Translated by

(Signed) D’A. TODD.

(Inclosure 3.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stodart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

Toorbut Sheikh Jaun, Sunday, Oct. 29, 1837.

On arrival here with the royal camp yesterday, shortly after my tent was pitched, your Gholam, Ali Mahommed Beg, Moquaufy, came to me, saying, that “he was in arrest with your horses near the tent of Haji Khan Karabaughee.” I took him with me to the Hajiiee, leaving the horse he had been riding, in the hands of my men. The Hajiiee on receiving me asked me how I was; to which I replied, “Thanks to your kindness: till just now, I was quite well; but, to tell you the truth, I feel quite upset by the intelligence which has just

* These horses having been sent in return for some small presents made to the Herat Agent at Tehran on account of the Indian Government, were sold, and the proceeds of the sale carried to the credit of that Government in its account with Her Majesty’s mission.
reached me;” he inquired, “What?” I said, “A Gholam of His Excellency the Wuzeer Mooktaur of the Doulut Cauhira Angreez, has reported himself to me as being with some horses of the Wuzeer Mooktaur, in arrest (doostauk) near the tent of Hajee Khan Karabaughee.” He inquired of Hajee Khan how this was, and Hajee Khan replied, that the Gholam was in arrest near his tent, with Ali Khan Badanloo, Gholam Peeshkidmut; that he himself had nothing to do with it. I had requested the Hajee to give me over the Gholam, and all he had in his possession. The Hajee said he was a Persian subject, ordered him to be put into the charge of his guard, which was done; and my own man Mahommed, who stood with the Gholam, was violently struck and ill-treated by the Serbauz, who took the Gholam in charge, and wished to take Mahommed too. The Hajee afterwards released the Gholam, and ordered the horses and letter to be given to me. I went with the Gholam to get the horses; and Ali Khan refused to give them, though he had heard the Hajee’s order to him. Consequently I sent the Gholam back to the Hajee. Ali Khan accompanied him, and the Hajee ordered everything to be given up. On the road, Hajee Khan seized the Gholam, threatened to execute and torture him, took an English letter from him, directed to you, had him stripped naked, and, after finding no other letters upon him, and violently abusing him, let him go. Hajee Khan’s servants, however, stole from him by force, in Hajee Khan’s presence, a whip, a powder-flask, and a bag of shot, which Hajee Khan said he would return, but he has not done so. First, Ali Reza Beg Kohistaneef seized the Gholam and the horses, and stole the Gholam’s cloak, worth three tomauns; then Ali Khan Badanloo seized him, and brought him to camp in arrest, opened your letter, and still retains the Afghan Casaifa Bashee, with all the letters of the Indian merchants; he also still retains some of the horse-clothing, for which I have applied to Meerza Ali. Hajee Khan stripped the Gholam, and robbed him by force of his whip, powder-flask, and shot bag, with gross threats of violence and torture; and the Hajee, though he returned the English letter to me unopened, was acquainted that this conduct on Hajee Khan’s part was going on within 100 paces of the serapurdar of the Shah. The Hajee likewise indulged and permitted improper language and accusations of treason to be used to your man, himself put him in arrest after I had told him he was your man. In the course of conversation, the Hajee said he had permitted no one to go in the direction of Herat. “No one,” I said, “you have forgotten the Cossack you sent with horsemen, a short time ago, on the road to Cabool;” and I said, “the business of the Gholam he had better speak of to you: I could say nothing about it.” He complained of his leave not having been applied for. I said, “the man rode one of your horses, and did not go chuppyery. Every one had a right to send his servants where he liked, and till now those servants were protected.”
The reason the Hajee did not have the English letter opened was this. When Hajee Khan sent it to him, he sent for Meerza Sauleh (the Mustoofe col Nizam) and desired him to open it. Meerza Sauleh said, "I see it is directed to an Envoy at the Court of Persia. Everything belonging to, or sent for Ambassadors and Envoys, according to the law of all nations, is sacred, (canoon i humah dowil), and must not be touched. This is my explanation." The Hajee then ordered it to be sent to me.

(Inclosure 4.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart.

(Extract.)

_Tehran, November 15, 1837._

_I shall_ consider it my duty to demand reparation for the violence offered to a person in the service of the British Government by the Persian authorities; but to enable me to do so in the manner which I conceive to be most conducive to the public interests, it is desirable, previously to making that demand, to explain fully to the Shah and his Ministers, that the journey of the Gholam to Herat was not for any purpose that could militate against the interests of the Shah; that the Gholam was not the bearer of any letter or communication from me to any individual; that he accompanied Futteh Mahommed Khan from Tehran, and that he could not therefore have conveyed to Herat any information which the Herat Envoy was not himself in possession of, or which could not have been transmitted through him; while, on the other hand, to have brought information from Herat might possibly have been useful, but could not have been injurious to the Persian Government. Moreover, the Gholam left Tehran, and even Meshed, at a time when the negotiations between this Government and that of Herat were not yet broken off, and has returned with letters addressed to me by persons in authority at Herat, which, if the Shah had not determined to commence hostilities, might have facilitated an amicable adjustment of the differences between the Governments.

I have addressed a letter to the Shah offering these explanations, and I have to request that in delivering that letter to His Majesty, you will offer the reasons I have cited, to show that it was impossible that the Gholam could have gone to Herat for any sinister purpose. In the letter to His Majesty is a copy of Futteh Mahommed Khan's letter, and you will be prepared to show the original to His Majesty, should he desire it; but it is necessary that the document should be returned to you after His Majesty shall have had an opportunity of satisfying himself of the accuracy of the copy.

Having thus offered all the explanation that is necessary to the Persian Government, on the subject of the Gholam's journey to Herat, you will deliver to the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs the letters to his address, which demand reparation for the injury that has been offered to the British Government, in the person of one of its servants.
I have demanded an apology from the Prime Minister for the share taken by him in the transaction, and the punishment of Hajee Khan for the personal violence inflicted by him on Ali Mahommed Beg, after he had been recognized and announced by you as a man in the service of the British Legation.

In regard to the objection of the Premier, that I did not ask his permission to send a man to Herat, it is sufficient to answer, that I consider myself entitled to send a servant of the British Government to Herat, or any other foreign Court, under the protection of a mission returning to that Court, without asking any permission from the Persian Government, and that I cannot permit his Excellency to interfere with that right.

It is almost unnecessary to remind you, that a Persian subject, while employed by the British mission at the Court of the Shah, (and Ali Mahommed Beg has been so employed for nearly thirty years,) is entitled to the same security of person as if he were a British subject; and that in all countries, the couriers of a foreign mission are more especially under the protection of the law of nations, which has in this instance been violated in a manner peculiarly offensive.

P.S.—Fearing that you might have some difficulty in recovering the original letters from Herat, if they should be put into the hands of the Persian authorities, I have thought it more advisable to have the copies of these letters certified by Meerza Massood, which makes it unnecessary to send the originals to camp.

(Inclosure 5.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Majesty the Shah.

This undoubted well-wisher represents,

Impressed with the sentiment that the unbounded and unceasing favor and consideration of your Majesty towards me have elevated me to great dignity and honor, I beg permission to submit to the notice of your Majesty, that as at all times, peace and tranquillity among all nations, have been the anxious wish of the British Government, which desires that every country should be in a state of prosperity and repose, and as every breath which I draw has been accompanied by sincere hopes that this kingdom may flourish, I have considered it incumbent on the devotion which I profess to the Government of your Majesty, and in order to induce the attainment of the above objects, to use the most strenuous and disinterested efforts for promoting the strength and stability of this kingdom.

Therefore, when Putteh Mahommed Khan, the Envoy from Herat, obtained permission to return, and that it was obvious that his discussions with the Ministers of this Government were not finally concluded, and it was still uncertain what would be the termination of the disputes between this kingdom and Herat, I expressed my hopes to him that
although he had obtained leave to depart, he should, after his arrival at Herat, take steps to prevent the door of discussion from being utterly closed, so that, with the aid of God, a satisfactory arrangement might be at last concluded between both parties. On this account, I despatched one of my servants, in company with Futteh Mahommed Khan, to Meshed, where I directed him to remain after the departure of the former to Herat, in order that if any papers or intelligence should arrive from Futteh Mahommed Khan, he might convey them to the Capital. Agreeably to intelligence which has been received, it appears that after their arrival at Meshed, information reached them that an English gentleman, who was engaged in travelling, had arrived at Herat, where he lay ill, confined to his bed. Futteh Mahommed Khan, on this plea, carried my servant to Herat, in order that he might obtain information of the situation of this traveller. After their arrival at Herat, it appears that they found an English gentleman there who was ill. My servant remained some days at Herat, and then took his departure, having received letters from the above English traveller, from Yar Mahommed Khan, Futteh Mahommed Khan, and Syud Mahommed Khan, the son of Yar Mahommed Khan.

Although it is not incumbent, according to the laws and practices of nations, that I should explain to your Majesty my reasons for sending my servant to any part whatever of the world, yet my devotion and attachment to your Majesty induce me to do so. The Ministers of your Majesty’s Government having opened one of the above letters, they have become acquainted with its contents. The copies of the other letters which I inclose in this humble representation for your Majesty’s perusal, will place your Majesty in possession of their contents, and will render apparent, that, on every point, my object and purpose were, and are, solely the advantage and stability of your Majesty’s kingdom; moreover, at the time that my servant accompanied Futteh Mahommed Khan, there were no recent transactions or intelligence of which he could convey the detail, for Futteh Mahommed Khan himself saw and knew the state of affairs here; but when my servant returned from Herat, he was in truth well-informed regarding the state of affairs at that place; and if the Ministers of your Majesty’s Government had made inquiries from him, it is probable that he would have communicated intelligence (although it would have been improper in him to do so,) which would have proved useful. My object in transmitting the above correspondence to your Majesty, is to prevent factious people from imputing disloyalty to me, or to my servant: and that such persons may learn that I neither have acted, nor intend to act, in opposition to the rules of sincerity and faithfulness. From the terms of the letters alluded to, it will be obvious to your Majesty’s judgment, that my servant was not the bearer of any paper or message from me; and in proceeding to Herat he has not committed any impro-
priety with reference to the Persian Government itself; and his conduct has been in every respect unexceptionable.

Besides this, if I myself had despatched a person to Herat, it would not have been contrary to usage, for as I possess a right to send messengers to Constantinople and Bushire, so the same right exists with regard to Herat.

As many English travellers had experienced the kindest treatment at Herat, and as no persons from that country had ever made journeys into the English territories, to whom acknowledgments might be returned, at the period of the departure of Futtah Mahommed Khan, I made him some small presents, and I sent a fowling-piece for the son of Yar Mahommed Khan, in acknowledgment of the kindness and hospitality alluded to; and when my servant returned from Herat, they, in requital for my presents, sent me three horses.

From this detail, the judgment of your Majesty will be able to distinguish, to how great an extent the Ministers of your Majesty's Government have acted in opposition to the laws and customs of all nations, by seizing this man, and placing him in confinement, depriving him of the official papers which were in his possession, and using violence and threats to a person in my service, whom I had employed on an occasion arising solely from my attachment and devotion to this Government.

I have presumed to represent what was necessary.

Translated by
(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

(Inclusion 6.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

After Compliments.

Agreeably to intelligence communicated to me by Colonel Stoddart, it appears, that when one of my couriers was returning from Herat to the Capital, some horsemen where despatched from the royal camp (in pursuit of him) who prevented him from continuing his journey, and brought him to the camp, where he was treated with great violence and indignity. Subsequently, when Colonel Stoddart had waited on His Excellency the Hajee, and explained to him that the above person was in my service, and when the Persian Government was apprised that he was attached to my establishment, even then an order was issued for placing him in the guard, and he received extreme ill-treatment from Hajee Khan Karabaughhee, who used every description of threat towards him.

It fills me with astonishment, that in a place which His Majesty honors with his presence, proceedings of so highly improper a character should occur, and in truth, this conduct is not to be considered as directed towards me or my servant, but it is a disrespect which has
been offered to the British Government itself. I am at a loss to conceive what business Hajee Khan has to interfere in the affairs of the British Government, to attach suspicions to a servant of mine, to use threats towards him, and to seize letters to my address, which were in his possession. In short, since such a breach of propriety, which is also a breach of the customs and practice of all Governments, has been committed by Hajee Khan and the Persian Government; if the Ministers of the Government of Persia desire the friendship of Great Britain, the rules of friendship between both States require that the Persian Government should deprive Hajee Khan of his rank and employment; that it should itself apologize for its deviation from propriety, and that Hajee Khan should not be restored to employment until the British Government shall pardon the crime he has committed. If the Persian Government declines to act towards Great Britain in the manner consistent with friendship, I beg it will convey this information to me. What farther is necessary.

The month of Shaban, 1253.

Translated by

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

No. 57.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Feb. 6, 1838.)

(Extract.) Soolimaniah, November 27, 1837.

I have the honor to report that the Shah's camp was at Toorbut Sheikh Jaum on the 30th ultimo. The Persian army had been formed into four divisions, one of these, consisting nominally of 12,000 men and ten guns, under the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, had marched in the direction of Badkheis and Karateppa, where it was hoped that provisions might be obtained; and this movement was also intended to draw the powerful tribe of Hazareh from Herat for the defence of their own country, in which the two places above-mentioned are situated. Another division, of the nominal strength of 8,000 men, and six or eight guns, was to invest Ghorian, the frontier fortress of the Herat territory, forty miles from the Capital, on the road to Meshed. A third division, under Humza Meerza and Hassan Khan, formed the advance of the main army, which was under the personal command of the Shah. A large detachment had also been sent out to collect provisions in the districts on the right of the line of march, and was to rejoin the Shah before his arrival at Ghorian.

The intelligence I have received of the condition of the Persian army is very unfavorable; no discipline was maintained, no precautions are taken against surprise. The price of provisions in the camp being five or six times the prices at Meshed and Nishapour, which are only four or five caravan stages in the rear, indicates actual scarcity, and the army had still to perform nine marches before it could arrive at Herat. The whole of the provisions expected from the rear and from the districts
on the right of the line of march, did not exceed four days’ consump-
tion; and every mile the army advanced, was carrying it so much
further from the means of subsistence. The cold was already so great,
that the men had begun to suffer from it, and a Persian gentleman, in
writing to his father, states, that at night the cold was so intense, that
in the morning people could neither use their hands nor articulate dis-
tinctly. The horses were weak from exposure and fatigue and want of
forage, insomuch that Colonel Stoddart found it necessary to detain a
horse of mine, because none of his own could carry him at a trot. It
may be presumed that few horses in camp are better attended to than
Colonel Stoddart’s and that those of the common horsemen must be
reduced to a state of total inefficiency.

The Persian Government has openly expressed a belief that the
possession of Herat would give such a hold upon England, that she
would no longer be able to deny anything they might demand; for that
the possession of Herat would give the power to disturb us in India, or
to give a passage to our enemies, whenever the Persian Government
should think proper to do so.

No. 58.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Feb. 3, 1838.)
(Extract.)

Teheran, December 7, 1837.

I have the honor to report, for the information of your Lordship,
that Ghorian, a place of some strength, forty miles from Herat on the
road to Meshed, and the frontier fortress of the Herat territory towards
Persia, capitulated to the Shah on the 15th November, after a siege of
ten days.

Ghorian had not been breached by the fire of the Persian Artillery;
but the parapet and the top of the wall had been materially injured to a
considerable extent, and the approaches had been pushed by the be-
siegers to the crest of the glacis, when, on a promise, ratified by the
oath of the Prime Minister, that he should be well treated, Sheer
Mahommed Khan surrendered the place.

No. 59.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. McNeill.
(Extract.)

Foreign Office, February 12, 1838.

I have received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the
11th of December.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Her Majesty’s Govern-
ment entirely approve the course which you have taken, and the con-
duct which you have pursued in all the matters to which these des-
patches relate.

I delay sending you further instructions with respect to the affairs
treated of, until I hear from you what has been the answer of the Per-
sian Government to your very proper demand.
No. 60.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Mar. 14, 1838.)

(Extract.)

Tehran, December 16, 1837.

I have the honor to inform your Lordship, that by the latest intelligence I have received, Captain Vicovich had passed Khain, from whence he was escorted, by order of the Persian Government, to Jowein, on the road to Kandahar. I find that this person was furnished with letters of recommendation from the Persian Government to the several Chiefs in Afghanistan, with whom it is in correspondence; that he was supplied with funds by the Shah, and that he was treated with great distinction in the camp, where presents of some value were bestowed upon him.

It is reported and believed at Tehran, that the Russian Minister has announced the intention of his Government, if the Shah should succeed in taking Herat, to release Persia from the engagement to pay the balance of the debt due by her to Russia, and the reason assigned for this act of grace is, that the Emperor desires to contribute that amount towards defraying the expenses of the campaign.

I also learn from good authority, that Prince Karaman Meerza at Tabreez was publicly informed by Hoossein Khan, on his return from the royal camp, that the Russian Minister had lent the Shah fifty thousand tomauns to enable him to proceed on this campaign.

It is only a few days since Count Simonich, in conversation with a Persian, stated it as his opinion, that the capture of Herat by the Shah, could not fail to cause disturbances in India amongst the Mahometans of that country; and the Persian Government has lately been in the habit of despatching largely on the facility with which its disciplined infantry and artillery, aided by the Afghan horse, could overturn the power of the Seiks, and follow the course of Nadir Shah. The insecurity of the tenure by which the British Government holds India has become a frequent subject of conversation in camp since the army set out on this campaign against Herat. Orders have just been received from camp to cast 60,000 shot.

It appears by the communications which I have received from the Government of India, that it has been deemed advisable, in consequence of the effect produced in Afghanistan by the arrival of the Shah’s Envoy at Cabool, to give more of a political character to Captain Burnes’s mission; and I find that the tone of Dost Mahommed Khan’s letters to that officer had become less cordial after he had been informed of the arrival of the Persian agent at Kandahar. I learn, however, that the Persian Envoy has been persuaded by the Kandahar Chief to proceed beyond that place, and it is reported that he is about to return from thence without having visited Cabool. Should he not have set out on
his return, however, before the arrival at Kandahar of Captain Vicovich, it is probable that that officer may still induce him to proceed to Cabool.

No. 61.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Mar. 14, 1838.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, December 25—30, 1837.

In forwarding my despatches, I abstained from offering any unnecessary comment, because it appeared to me better that the first impression should be received entirely from a plain statement of the facts. But now that I have had some time to reflect on the course I have taken, and not only to talk the matter over with others, but to question myself on the subject, and to decide whether there was not some other course, which, if I had it in my power to revise my proceedings, I should now prefer to that I took, I think it right to say, that neither in my own deliberate opinion, nor in that of any one here whose judgment I value, could I have taken a less decided course, or demanded a smaller amount of reparation, without lowering the character of this mission and of the British Government, and not only rendering myself useless for service here (which would have been a very secondary consideration), but also making it exceedingly difficult for any one who might succeed me, to retrieve the character and position, in the sight of the Persians, which I must have sacrificed, had I submitted to an insult so flagrant and so publicly offered, that I could neither affect to disregard it nor endeavour to conceal it without letting it appear that I might be openly insulted with impunity. It was well known in camp that the man was one of the public messengers, who had served in that capacity with several successive missions; and he was perhaps more generally known in that character than any other man on the establishment, for he was one of the oldest and most confidential of the servants employed here, and being a man of great intelligence in his class, and of remarkable coolness and courage, he has often been employed, and sometimes as a volunteer, on services which particularly called for the exercise of these qualities. His conduct, after he was seized and carried to camp, appears to justify the opinion that had previously been formed of his fidelity and firmness.

It may be right to mention that the Persian Government has never at any time required that the messengers of either of the foreign missions here should receive its passports, or that any intimation should be given of their being despatched, unless when they travelled on the Government post horses, in which cases an order for these horses was given; but no European or Persian is expected or called upon to give any intimation of the despatch of a messenger on his own horse in any direction; and your Lordship will perceive, by Colonel Stoddart's letter, that the man
suffered the great violence to which he was exposed, after he had been announced by Colonel Stoddart to the Prime Minister as a servant of this mission.

I learn that Hoossein Khan intends to proceed on his embassy to England; and although I recommended to him to wait until this matter of the messenger should have been settled, he seems to be desirous to proceed, and I shall not attempt further to dissuade him.

I have the pleasure to inclose a copy of a letter I received a short time ago from Lord Auckland, together with an extract from a letter of mine to his Lordship.

(Inclosure 1.)—Lord Auckland to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

Calcutta, September 15, 1837.

By last accounts, Runjeet Sing had withdrawn his main army from Peshawur, leaving a sufficient force for defence, and has consulted our Political Agent upon the terms of peace which he should tender to Dost Mahommed, of Cabool. Our answer has been to the effect that national differences were generally best determined without the interposition of third parties,—that we were satisfied of his moderation, &c.,—and that if he should desire it, Captain Burnes should be instructed to convey from him any reasonable proposition to the Ruler of Cabool. Our last letters from Captain Burnes left him advancing towards the frontiers. He had received one most cordial and another less cordial letter from Dost Mahommed; the latter being written after the announcement of the near approach of a Vakeel (Agent) from the Shah of Persia, accompanied, as was supposed, by a member of the Kandahar family, and announcing the expectation also of a mission from Bokhara. All this has given us reason for apprehension that Dost Mahommed will once more lose all moderation in his views and postpone the chance of pacific settlement in these countries and possibly hasten his own destruction. We have instructed Captain Burnes to point out to him the worthlessness of all promises of military or pecuniary aid from Persia, and the danger of his present position, and the impossibility of our good offices being continued to one whose only object seems to be to collect means of disturbance; and, indeed, at once to state that we can admit no right of Persian interference on that frontier.

I can have no objection to your using towards the Government of Persia the strongest language of remonstrance upon the waste of all the resources which should be husbanded for useful purposes, and their application to the fomenting of intrigues and the disturbance of tranquillity upon the Indian frontier.

I conceive your position to have been much improved since your arrival, and I hope that it may be strong enough to justify you in entering upon the frankest exposition of the measures which may
strengthen, or which must lead to the dissolution of British and Persian Alliance.

(Inlosure 2.)—Mr. McNeill to Lord Auckland.

(Extract.)

Tehran, July 4, 1837.

I see no reason why we should conceal from Persia that we cannot rely with sufficient confidence on her means, to entrust her with the defence of all the countries lying between the Arras and the Indus; and that the necessity of providing for our own security, compels us to require that she should abstain from injuring our defences and weakening our position. That the terms offered by the Herat Government, secure to her all she had a right to demand, and that the British Government could neither sanction nor permit the prosecution of a war against Herat for the purpose of demanding more. That we desire the strength and security of Persia as a means of security to ourselves, and should therefore endeavour to make our intercourse and connection with the Affghans conducive to that end; but that if the strength of Persia should at any time be employed in a manner injurious to our interests, we must then desire to see her not stronger, but weaker.

No. 62.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. March 14, 1838.)

My Lord,

Tehran, December 28, 1837.

I have the honor to transmit, for your Lordship's information, an account of the seizure and detention of Ali Mahommed Beg, Gholam in the service of Her Majesty's mission, taken down from the Gholam's verbal statement by Major Todd.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclusion.)—Statement of Ali Mahommed Beg, Gholam in the service of the British Mission, regarding his seizure on the road to Tehran, and detention in the Royal Camp at Toorbut Sheikh Jaun.

When I had arrived within fifteen fursukhs of Meshed, I met Mr. Borowski who recognized me, and asked me various questions regarding my journey—whither I had gone?—for what purpose? &c., &c. I said, that, being at Meshed and hearing that an Englishman was sick at Herat, I had gone to that place in the hope of being able to render him assistance, and that I was now on my return to Tehran. Mr. Borowski, observing some led horses with me, asked me to whom they belonged. I told him that two of them belonged to myself, and that the third was sent by the English gentleman at Herat to Mr. Mc Neill. After some further conversation, he pursued his way to the royal camp, which was about eight fursukhs distant.
On the evening of the same day, having arrived at a Caravanserai, within twelve fursukhs of Meshed, I was seized by Ali Reza, Gholam of the Shah, who had come from the royal camp, accompanied by eight or ten horsemen, and who said, on my remonstrating with him, that he had the Shah's orders to seize and carry me to camp.

Soon after this, Ali Khan, Gholam Peeshkhidmut of the Shah, arrived at the Caravanserai from Meshed, on his way to camp; and I was made over to him by Ali Reza, who went off with his followers to camp. On the morning of the next day; we left the Caravanserai; and on the second day, when we were within two miles of Toorbut Sheikh Jaum, we came up with the Prime Minister, Hajee Meerza Aghassee. Ali Khan rode up to him and told him of my being seized; and I was ordered to accompany the party to camp. When we arrived at the ground, I was directed to remain near the tent of Ali Khan, who ordered his servants to look after me, whilst he went on to the Minister's tent. I found an opportunity of going to the tent of Colonel Stoddart, to whom I related the circumstances of my being seized and brought back. Colonel Stoddart, on hearing my story, immediately proceeded to the Minister's tent, and took me with him. A large party was assembled at breakfast there, amongst whom were Hajee Khan, Sirteep; Hoossein Ali Khan, Treasurer; Ali Khan; Gholam Peeshkhidmut; Hatim Khan, Chief of the Arsenal, and many others.

On reaching the Minister's tent, Colonel Stoddart asked me, in the presence of the party, where my horses and baggage had been taken to. I answered, that they were at the tent of Hajee Khan; Colonel Stoddart then turned to Hajee Khan, and asked if this were true. Hajee Khan answered that it was. Upon this, an altercation ensued between Colonel Stoddart and Hajee Khan. The Minister then questioned me on the subject of my journey; and I gave him the same account as I had before given to Mr. Borowski. The Minister, on hearing my story, gave orders that I should be taken away and placed in confinement. Upon this, Hajee Khan got up and ordered his people to carry me away. A Captain of his regiment seized me by the beard, and I was dragged to Hajee Khan's tent. An Afghan, Dara Shah Khan, who had come with me to Herat, and had been seized and brought with me to camp, was placed under a separate guard at some distance from the place where I was confined.

In about half an hour, Hajee Khan left the Minister's tent, and came to the place where I was under the guard of seven or eight soldiers. A large crowd had by this time assembled round me.

Hajee Khan, on coming up, ordered me to give him any papers that I might have about me. I told him that I had none. He insisted that I had, and threatened, if I did not instantly produce them, that I should be put to death. I said that I could not be put to death without just
cause. He repeated what he said before, to which I gave the same answers.

He then ordered me to be stripped; all my outer garments were taken away; and I was left standing in my shirt and trousers. Hajee Khan then turned to me, and threatened me with instant death. I demanded the reason; but he gave me no other answer than abuse, calling me a traitor and a rascal, and said that he himself would be my executioner. He then began to unbutton his coat sleeves, threatening me all the while, and every now and then half unsheathing his dagger, "I will be your executioner myself," said the Khan; "if there be an enemy to the English, I am the man;—you are a traitor and a rascal; your eyes shall be plucked out; the Shah has ordered me to kill you; I will first cut off your hands; you must have papers from Herat; and unless you instantly deliver them up, you shall be cut to pieces." Hajee Khan went on in this strain for a long time, during which I was stripped nearly to my skin, the air being so cold, that water, on being exposed, instantly froze. I was silent under all these threats and demonstrations, merely observing, that, having such a noble executioner as Hajee Khan, I was content to die, and that I hoped the office would remain in his family. At last, finding that he had failed to intimidate me, he put up his dagger, and asked me whether I had not any English letter from the gentleman at Herat. I answered, that of course I had. "Why did you not tell me this before?" said the Khan, "why have you not produced the letter?"—"Because," I replied, "the letter is addressed to Mr. Mc Neill, at Tehran, and not to you. If it had been addressed to any one in camp, I should have produced it." On hearing this, Hajee Khan ordered me to give him the letter. I sent for my saddle and took out the letter. On my doing this the saddle was seized and torn to pieces by Hajee Khan's people, who expected to find some Persian papers concealed in it. None, however, were found. I had before taken an opportunity of giving to Colonel Stoddart some Persian letters that had been confided to me in Herat, to the address of His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill. The moment that Hajee Khan was in possession of the English letter, he went off with it to the Minister's tent. He returned soon afterwards, and sent for Meerza Sauleh, who went with Hajee Khan to the presence of the Shah.

They were about half an hour before the Shah. Hajee Khan came back with the letter unopened in his hand, and, taking me with him, went to the Minister's tent. Before going in, my clothes were returned to me; but some of my things had been taken away. Colonel Stoddart was not there; but there were a great number of Persians assembled in the tent. The Minister immediately began to question me, but had not proceeded far, when Colonel Stoddart came into the tent, and inquired of me what had occurred, upon which I related to him the circumstances above detailed. He merely remarked, "let it be, let
it be, for the present.” The Minister asked me to what tribe I belonged. I told him that I was of the tribe of Maaffee. Upon hearing this, he sent for some Maaffees, who were in camp, and questioned them upon the subject; they satisfied him that I really belonged to the tribe, and would have taken my part openly, and perhaps have caused disturbance, had I not desired them not to interfere; upon which they remained quiet. The Minister asked me why I served the English. I replied, that I had been in their service since I was a child, that I had grown up in their service, that I had eaten their bread for thirty years, and that I did not see why I should now be unfaithful.

Mr. Borowski, who was sitting in the tent, bore witness to the truth of what I said. The Minister then said, “Why have you served the English? You have done wrong to serve them. Could you not serve your own Shah? You are his subject; you are his servant. You might have now been high in his service. Even now, if you will give up the service of the English, I will make you a tofungdar (gun-bearer) and give you a hundred tomauns yearly pay, and an extra allowance of five tomauns a month.”

To all this I replied that it was too late for me to think of changing masters; that I had served the English for thirty years, and would continue to serve them during the remainder of my life.

After some conversation between the Minister and Hajee Khan, the English letter was returned to me; and I was told that I was at liberty. Amongst the subjects that were discussed by the Minister and Hajee Khan, was the necessity of preventing the circumstances which had occurred, from reaching the ears of His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

This discussion was carried on in Turkish. The Minister turned to me, and, in a coaxing manner, asked me if I did not want a passport to prevent my being again interrupted on my journey to Tehran. I answered that it was not necessary, and added that I had already experienced his kindness sufficiently.

I represented to Colonel Stoddart that some of my property, which had been seized, had not been returned to me, but he told me that I need not at present trouble myself about the matter.

Two days after this, I left the Shah's camp, and returned to Meshed, where I was detained by sickness for twenty days. I believe that my illness was caused by my having been kept nearly naked, exposed to the cold for upwards of an hour, at the tent of Hajee Khan.

Before leaving camp, I ascertained that the Afghan Dara Shah Khan was still in confinement; but I could not hold communication with him.

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.
No. 63.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Mar. 14, 1838.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, December 30, 1837.

I have the honor to inclose copies of letters from Colonel Stoddart, which contain the latest intelligence I have received of the Shah’s military operations. On the 11th instant, the date of the more recent of these letters, the Shah had already been before Herat twenty days, and the trenches had been advanced to the vicinity of the ditch, yet three of the five gates of the town were still open, the cattle of the besieged were daily sent out to graze, firewood was brought in, and a caravan from Bokhara appears to have entered without difficulty. No overtures appear to have been made on either side, and it is not, I fear, very probable that any accommodation can be arranged between the parties for the present.

It does not appear that any troops have as yet been sent from Kandahar to aid the Shah, and the only Afghan Chief who appears to have joined His Majesty is Shumsadeen Khan, Ex-governor of Furrah, who was removed from his Government some months ago.

I learn through native channels of information, which are not unworthy of credit, that a large body of horse, consisting of many thousands, had marched from Khiva two months ago to the aid of Kamran, and that, after long doubt and hesitation, the Government of Bokhara had at length decided on sending a considerable body of horse to Kamran’s assistance. This force, the number of which was not stated, had, it was said, been paid and mustered at Bokhara, preparatory to its setting out for Herat, when the letters containing this information were written. The same informant states, that all the Principalities bordering on Persia, to the eastward, having become alarmed for their own safety, had determined to send succours to Herat, believing that if that city fell they should have to defend themselves in their own territories. A general, indeed an universal, opinion prevails in all those countries, that Persia is pushed on and supported by Russia in her schemes of conquest; and, I must confess that the demonstrations of joy which Count Simonich manifested on the fall of Ghorian, were well calculated to confirm that impressions, for they far exceeded the expressions of gratification which might have been expected, even form the Persian Government itself.

The messenger who carried my letters, demanding redress for the violence offered to Ali Mahommed Beg, had not yet arrived in camp.

(Inclosure 1.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.
(Extract.)

Shah’s Camp, before Herat, December 10, 1837.

This being the 19th day, the trenches have been advanced to the neighbourhood of the edge of the ditch, but no advantage can be drawn from them that could not be drawn in marching a day’s march to the attack. The Afghans stand bravely, make sorties every night, carry
off the people from the trenches, cut off the stragglers during the ill-arranged foraging parties, and, in short, do as they like, having three of the five gates open, through which they daily bring in wood, send out their cattle to graze, &c. Bread and rice, &c., are become very scarce; the bazaar price of the former being from 30 shahies, to 2½ kerauns, according to the quality. It has likewise become extremely cold. The Shah has built a hut for himself, and five or six of the chief people have followed the same plan. He has expressed his determination that, let what will happen, he will remain where he now is (even if he takes the city) till the end of Ramazan, 29th December.

No money has yet reached camp, though 5,000 tomauns are said to be on the road. Yesterday morning and this morning rain fell; to-day very heavy; a great many of the irregulars have deserted back to Persia, and no doubt many more will follow; the soldiers are literally starving; the murder of forty-three Syuds, in a Syud village, by a foraging party, has prevented anything coming to camp but from Ghorian; 500 rounds of gun and mortar ammunition arrived recently from Meshed, and the Shah has ordered 300 rounds only daily to be fired, in order that it may last out some time. The Afghans repair all damage, which it is necessary to repair, daily; they have two lines of parapet, one at the foot of the Khalb Reez, the other half-way down, and where the wall is destroyed, none of the town is visible. The ditch is wet, and cannot be drawn off further than they have drawn it off, viz. one yard. It is said that the Afghans have constructed barricades in the streets. The part attacked is furthest from the ark (citadel.) Hassan Khan has been detached with 3,000 irregular infantry, 1,000 horse, and 6 guns, to fire at a weak part of the wall to the south-west of the city.

(Inclosure 2.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.
Camp, before Herat,
9 A.M. December 11, Monday, 1839.

There is nothing new last night in the trenches. Shumsadeen Khan, who joined the camp a fortnight ago, having been deprived of his Government at Furrah by Yar Mahommed Khan, is made use of as guide to the foraging parties. A large party of 7,000 persons, went out in the direction of Oba, three days ago, but are not yet returned. Moostafa Kooli Khan, of Semnoon, has charge of them. The Nogra Khaneh (the royal kettle drums and trumpets) of Kamran, beat well this morning, and is heard morning and evening in this camp, a distance of 2,500 yards. The night of the 9th the Afghans carried off four men and wounded six or seven, killing two more in Sampson's (Colonel of the Russian regiment of deserters.) This night four men are missing, who were in advance in Waly Khan's trench; but they give out, that perhaps they have deserted. Semino is with Mahommed Khan Makooy.
where they have done nothing, but been attacked many times by the Afghans, and their men killed, wounded, and taken prisoners. Hajee Khan’s trench has suffered more than any from the balls of the town. The Heratees in camp declare, that the inhabitants of the town will hold out to the last drop of their blood; and they have told the Hajee, that if he takes the wall, he will have to fight every house and every street. This is the twentieth day.

No. 64.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. March 14, 1838.)

(Tehran, January 1, 1838)

I have the honor to inclose, for your Lordship’s information, a translation of a letter I have recently received from Futteh Mahommed Khan, late Envoy from Herat to the Court of the Shah of Persia.

(Inclosure.)—Translation of a Letter from Futteh Mahommed Khan, late Envoy from Herat, to His Excellency John Mc Neill, Esq.

(Extract.)

The true state of affairs is exactly as I represented it to be when I had the pleasure of seeing you. We place ourselves entirely in your hands, and adhere to the same arrangement that I explained in your presence. We do not draw back in the least from it; and if the Persian Government are extravagant in their demands, the event will be seen.

My kind Friend, I myself brought your servant Aga Mahommed Beg with me from Meshed. What more can I write to you? The Vizier and all the Afghans subject to the Shah (Kamran) will only act in conformity with your orders. There can be no doubt with regard to myself. What more can I say?

Translated by

(Signed) D’Arcy Todd,

No. 65.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 16, 1838.

I have received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 2nd of January.

As the result of your application to the Shah for reparation for the insult offered to your messenger was not known to you at the time when you sent off these despatches, I am unable to send you by this messenger any precise instructions for your guidance in the event of your demand not being immediately complied with; because the non-compliance of the Persian Government may be attended with so many different modifications of refusal, that it is unlikely that I should be able by anticipation, to suit my instructions to the precise circumstances of the case. But I place such entire confidence in your judgment, discretion, and firmness, that I am satisfied that you will adopt provision-
ally, and until you can receive further instructions from me, that course which, under the circumstances of the case, will be most conducive to the interests of Great Britain and most consistent with her honor and dignity. That, on the one hand, you will not precipitately, or unnecessarily, widen the breach; that, on the other hand, you will do nothing which may lead the Persian Government to think that you can recede from your demand, or that you are in any way doubtful that your Government will support that demand with firmness.

Therefore, in the event of the Shah not at once acceding to your demand, I leave it to you to determine, whether it is expedient either to renew the demand, and continue your functions until a further answer is received; or at once to declare your functions at an end, and to break off your diplomatic relations with the Persian Court.

If you should consider the latter course necessary in consequence of the Shah's refusal, you might either continue for a time at Tabreez in order to give the Shah an opportunity of revoking his decision, or you might at once retire into the Turkish territory, and there wait for further instructions from me.

You will, however, always bear in mind that the object of Her Majesty's Government is not to seek an occasion for a rupture with Persia; but to prevent such a rupture, if it is possible to do so consistently with national honor.

If the Persian Ambassador should arrive here before Her Majesty's Government have been informed that the Shah has made full reparation for the outrage committed upon the person of the messenger; I shall feel it my duty to inform that Ambassador, that in such a state of things I cannot present him to Her Majesty, nor even receive him in any official capacity, nor hold any communication with him upon any matter of business whatever: and that he can only be looked upon as a private individual.

If you should deem it necessary to withdraw from the Persian territory into Turkey, I authorize you to use your discretion as to calling upon Sir Henry Bethune, Colonel Stoddart, and all the British officers, and non-commissioned officers, to do so likewise, or to permit them provisionally to remain. But as long as you think it expedient to continue within the Persian territory, it would not be advisable to require any of those persons to retire from the Persian service.

I am, &c.

John McNeill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 66.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. April 10, 1838.)

MY LORD,

Tehran, January 26, 1838.

I have the honor to report for your Lordship's information, that no official intelligence has been received from the army before Herat, of
a later date than that communicated in my despatch, of December 30, of last year; but some individuals who have returned from the camp, have brought information to the 24th of December, up to which time nothing of importance had occurred. With the assistance of Shums-deen Khan, an Afghan, who had joined the Shah's army, two successful expeditions had been made to collect provisions in the districts around Herat. These consisted of 6 or 7,000 men each, and had brought in a quantity of grain, which, together with the magazines captured at Ghorian, had been sufficient to feed the army, if not abundantly, at least in such a manner as to prevent any actual suffering from want. The camp had not been molested by the Afghan horse; and the sorties made by the besieged had not been attended with any very marked success. A gallery for a mine, it was said, had been carried under the ditch to one of the towers of the fort. No snow had fallen; and though the cold, especially at night, was of considerable intensity, firewood was abundant. There did not, therefore, appear to be any reason why the Shah should not continue the siege.

On the other hand no overtures for an accommodation had been made by the besieged. They continued to preserve their communication with the surrounding country, and to defend themselves with every appearance of confidence. The ammunition of the Persian army, at least that which was suited to the purposes of the siege, had begun to be deficient; about 16,000 rounds of shot had been fired from the batteries, yet no practicable breach had been made; and it did not appear that the siege had been advanced in any way nearer to a successful result on the 24th, than it had been on the 12th, when the trenches had already been carried to within a few yards of the ditch. The only new operation undertaken appears to be the mine. The person who reported the circumstances here states, that some days before he left camp, he had himself visited the gallery, which had been carried nearly to the centre of the tower it was proposed to blow up. Yet if any success had been achieved before the 7th instant, that is from fourteen to twenty days after the mine was said to have been so far advanced, the intelligence must have been received here by this time. There is reason to believe that Herat is provisioned for many months, probably for a year or more; and there does not appear to be any obvious reason why it may not still hold out for an indefinite length of time. As no intelligence has yet been received of its surrender, we may, I think, safely conclude, that up to the fiftieth day of the siege, the place still continued to be defended.

The communication between Meshed and the camp has become precarious and difficult, from the numbers of predatory horse who infest the roads. A hundred Persian horsemen do not venture to attempt the march; and no smaller body than 2 or 300 men considers itself secure. It is probable, therefore, that a courier will not be sent,
unless with intelligence of some important event; and I fear that the messenger, whom I despatched on the 19th of November, may not have been able to advance beyond Meshed until the 2nd of this month, when I learn that a strong party proceeded from thence to conduct treasure to the camp.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

No. 67.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Foreign Office, April 7, 1838.

I take this opportunity to acquaint you that I learn from St. Petersburgh that Colonel Duhamel, who has been appointed to succeed Count Simonich, will proceed to Persia as soon as the season will permit.

No. 68.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. April 10, 1838.)

Tehran, January 31, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose copy of a communication I received a few days ago from the officiating Resident at Bushire, by which your Lordship will perceive that a threat of exciting the populace to commit violence, with an allusion to the massacre of the Russian mission,* has been held out by the Government of Bushire.

(Inclusion.)—Dr. Mackenzie, Acting-Assistant in charge of the Residency at Bushire, to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir,

Bushire, December 27, 1837.

An event having lately occurred, which, though of little importance in itself, has, in the consequences that have resulted from it, become of rather a disagreeable nature, I do myself the honor of submitting the circumstances connected with it to Your Excellency.

On the evening of the 17th instant, report was made to me by the Naique of the Residency-gateway, that a man was lying outside in a dying state, from blows inflicted on him by Mr. Gerald, the apothecary attached to the Residency; a report, which, from the universal good character and quiet demeanour of Mr. Gerald, I found it difficult to believe. I however directed that the man should be taken inside, that his case might be examined into; but in a couple of minutes the Naique returned, and reported that the man was actually dead, which I hesitated to credit; but on its being positively asserted, I also hesitated to receive

* In February 1829, a dispute having arisen between the populace of Tehran and the Russian mission, the former attempted to force an entrance into the Russian Minister's house, in order to rescue two persons supposed to be forcibly detained there. The Russian servants fired upon, and killed one of the mob; whereupon the populace broke into the house, and put to death the Minister himself, and every Russian subject in his suite except one.
inside the Residency the corpse of one of whom I knew nothing, and supposed to have been killed under such circumstances. I however determined to proceed to the spot, and ascertain the real state of the case; but before I could reach, his friends had carried him away, and, as I was told, to the Sheikh's house, some saying that he was dead, others that he still breathed.

On inquiry into this perplexing affair, it appeared that Mr. Gerald on proceeding to a small Mosque or monument near the Residency, erected over the remains of a relation of Sheikh Nassir, (and which it would appear had been kept in repair for some years by contributions from the Sepoys and Mr. Gerald,) to ascertain what repairs were now required, he found it occupied by an Indian Dervish, who was also a descendant of Mahommed, or Syud. This man, apparently under the influence of the intoxicating drug (bang) Indians are in the habit of smoking, without any provocation, repeatedly made use of insulting language to Mr. Gerald, and also knocked off his cap, which Mr. Gerald resented, by kicking him, but apparently without inflicting any serious injury.

I now perceived that the Syud was acting a part in the hope of extorting money, and although it did not appear to me that Mr. Gerald, considering the great provocation he had received, was much, if at all, to blame, I thought it would be better if the affair could be settled privately, and the trouble and annoyance likely to result from it prevented. I therefore told Mr. Gerald that I did not approve of his conduct, that it was likely to be made the cause of disturbance, and recommended him to make some arrangement with the Syud, and put a stop to his complaints, for I well knew the estimation in which those descendants of Mahommed are held by some, and the influence they possess, however worthless they may in reality be.

With as little delay as possible, I sent a message to Sheikh Nassir, by the Moonshee of the Residency, acquainting him with the circumstances of the case, and expressing a hope, that if a little time were allowed, the affair would be quietly and satisfactorily settled.

Next day I learned that no apprehensions of the Syud's life were entertained, that the treatment he had been subjected to, although not altogether approved of, did not excite much interest; but I also learned that the Sheikh, to whose house he had been conveyed, was that of the Cazee, instead of the Governor, which made me still more anxious that some private arrangement should be made; but the measures adopted did not suffice to effect it, and I am inclined to think that it should not have been done.

On the 19th instant I was waited on by a man from Sheikh Nassir, who delivered a note to me, and asked whether I had heard of the affair in which Mr. Gerald was implicated; I told him that I had, but that I hoped it would be settled. He then, after many allusions to the high
descent of the Syud, and the seriousness of the offence in the eyes of
the professors of the Mahometan religion, referred to the often told tale
of the Russian Ambassador, by asking me whether I supposed Futteh
Ali Shah assented to the assault made by the mob on that unfortunate
occasion. I replied that I did not conceive that to be a matter of which
to boast, but on the contrary of which, to be ashamed, and inquired
whether it was again alluded to with the hope of terrifying, if so, that
he should fail in his object. He affirmed that such was not his inten-
tion, but his language, and the expression of his countenance did not
correspond.

I had not yet an opportunity of reading Sheikh Nassir's note,
(translation and copy of which forms inclosure No. 1) and did not
perceive the full purport of the allusion to the assault on the Russian
Embassy; and on perusal, I was somewhat surprised to find intimated to
me, that I was either required to deliver up Mr. Gerald, that justice
might have its course on him, or in the event of this requisition not
being complied with, was threatened with a general assault, for the con-
sequences of which I was not to look to him:—and I was still more
surprised on learning that late on the afternoon of the preceding day,
he had, in taking a walk round the town, on arriving near Mr. Gerald's
house, sent for him, heard his statement of the affair, and expressed
himself satisfied with the explanation offered.

It not being expected that the threatened assault would be made
until an answer should be received, I, in the meantime, directed Mr.
Gerald to remain inside the Residency, took such other precautions as
were thought necessary, and delayed replying to Sheikh Nassir's note
for two days, with a view of allowing the excitement supposed to exist,
to subside; the Syud time to tire of acting the part of the dying man;
to ascertain the actual state of parties; and that Sheikh Nassir might
reflect on the part that he had acted in tamely yielding himself the
instrument of making a requisition which he well knew could not be
complied with, in demanding the person of a British subject, and one of
whose conduct he had, at the utmost, a few hours previous, publicly
approved, or at all events expressed himself satisfied with; and con-
voying to the Residency, to say the least of it, a very unfriendly inti-
mation.

Although, as above stated, it did appear to me that Mr. Gerald was
not much, if at all, to blame, in answering Sheikh Nassir's note
(No. 2), I did not consider it of any consequence whether his conduct
was defended, or not, being perfectly satisfied that no arguments would
have the least weight with those who were the instigators of the dis-
turbance; and it appeared desirable, as much as possible, to deprive them
of all plea of aggression, not on the Residency, of which there was little
or no apprehension, but on those under the protection of the British
Government, while engaged anywhere about the town. I, therefore, admitting the fact of the Syud having been beaten by Mr. Gerald, intimated to the Sheikh that his requisition could not be complied with, affected to discredit all intentions of a general assault, but informed him, that since he was the Governor of the place, it was to him that I must look, and on him must the responsibility rest, in the event of any molestation to any one connected with the British Government.

After the delivery of my reply to Sheikh Nassir’s communication, no further steps having been taken by the Syud, or on his behalf, for some days, I had hoped that this unpleasant affair was terminated; but the Syud, disappointed in not realizing the expectations he entertained from the part he at first acted, determined to arm himself with a hatchet, and try to enforce compliance with his wishes by assaulting some of the people of the Residency. Fortunately no injury was sustained, perhaps none was intended; but on the circumstance becoming known to me, I addressed a note (No. 3) to Sheikh Nassir, expressing a hope that the bare mention of the circumstance would be sufficient to induce him to adopt measures to put a stop to such a disgraceful proceeding.

In his reply (No. 4) he promises to comply with my request, but expresses a wish that something should be given to the Syud; but to this I have no intention of acceding, any concession in the present state of the business, and after what had already occurred, appearing unnecessary and very objectionable, from the construction of which it would be susceptible, as well as in its tendency.

The instigators of this disturbance, I have no doubt, are Hajee Zeinul-Abadeen and the Mujahed of Bushire, the persons named in Sheikh Nassir’s note. The cause of the inimical demonstrations towards the Residency on the part of the former, I am at a loss to understand, having never, so far as I am aware, come in contact with any one connected with it; but for the conduct of the latter, or more properly his nephew, Sheikh Sulman, there is less difficulty in accounting, he being the person referred to in Captain Hennell’s letters, dated 12th May and 8th August last, addressed to Your Excellency. That there was any serious intention actually entertained of attacking the Residency I do not believe, but I would respectfully submit, that if these malicious personages are to be allowed to manifest their bigotted aversion whenever they may feel disposed, and Sheikh Nassir, to lend himself as the easy medium of expressing their sentiments with entire impunity, much trouble is likely to result.

I regret that Your Excellency’s valuable time should be so much encroached upon with this comparatively unimportant affair; but having been informed that representations on the subject have been made from other quarters, it appeared advisable that the circumstances connected with it should be detailed; and I would only further remark, that I con-
sider the matter as left in a state from which it can be dealt with as may be deemed proper, and decided upon when found convenient.

I have, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq.  
(Signed)  
T. MACKENZIE.

(Sub-inclosure 1.) — Translation of a Note from Sheikh Nassir, Governor of Bushire, to the Acting-Assistant in charge of the Residency in the Persian Gulf. — (Dated 20th Ramazan, or 19th Dec. 1837.)

Relative to the injury and suffering inflicted by Mr. Gerald on a person, a Syud descendant of the prophet of God; he struck and hurt him to an extent that he is near dying, and this has been done on the part of the doctor, contrary to the decrees of the law and of Government. On this account, a number of Mussulmans assembled in the presence of their High Holinesses Sheikh Hassan and Hajee Zein-ul-Abadeen, and reported the circumstances, and their Holinesses above-mentioned, signified to me, that being Governor of this quarter, appointed to the office by the Firman Firma, I should write to you, requiring that the doctor should be sent to their presence; that after inquiry and confirmation of the fact, the law may have its course on him, that others may fear and be deterred from acting disorderly; should it not be so, and the doctor not be sent, the faithful will make a general assault, there will be no remedy, and of course they will make representations to the presence of the Firman Firma, and I shall be called to account. Should he (Mr. Gerald) not be sent, perhaps there will be a general assault, and irregularities will be perpetrated, for which you will not then look to me. True Translation.

(Signed)  
T. MACKENZIE,  
Acting-Assistant in Charge, &c.

(Sub-inclosure 2.) — Draft of a Note from the Acting-Assistant in charge of the Residency in the Persian Gulf, to Sheikh Nassir, Governor of Bushire. — (Dated 21st December, 1837.)

A. C.

In reply to your note of the 19th instant (Ramazan), handed to me by Hajee Hoossein Alidad, allow me to express the hope that the Syud, who it seems was beaten by Mr. Gerald, has not sustained any serious injury, and that he will soon recover, and be able to pursue his usual avocations. Should it happen otherwise, I shall regret it much. What is required by you relative to Mr. Gerald, you are well aware is contrary to custom and existing agreements; the circumstances of the case will, however, be duly reported to higher authority, and the affair will be settled in a just and proper manner; but even should justice be denied by me, you cannot be ignorant that Mr. Gerald is a British subject, and
that the Syud is an Indian, therefore he can have no difficulty in getting his wrongs redressed, and the great trouble taken in this affair would not appear to be particularly called for. In the warning you give me relative to a general attack, I am somewhat at a loss to understand what is meant, but probably it is of little consequence, for I cannot think that the long existing friendship between the two States, is to be so inconsiderately disturbed. I would, however, intimate to you, that since you are the Governor of Bushire, I must look to you in the event of any injury to any one connected with the British Government at this place, and notwithstanding the intimation given by you, it is upon you the responsibility must rest without doubt. This is intimated for your information.

True Translation.

(Signed) T. MACKENZIE,
Acting-Assistant in Charge, &c.

(Sub-inclusion 3.)—Draft of a Note from the Acting-Assistant in charge of the Residency in the Persian Gulf, to Sheikh Nassir, Governor of Bushire.—(Dated 26th December, 1837.)

A. C.

I had hoped that the dispute relative to the Indian Dervish and Mr. Gerald was at an end for the time being, until the pleasure of higher authorities on the subject might be known; but I regret to have to inform you, that the Dervish moves about the streets, and in the direction of the Residency, with a hatchet in his hand, with which he endeavours to strike and injure people attached to the Residency. Such conduct being altogether at variance with good order, and the protection which ought to be enjoyed under a good Government, I hope the bare mention of the circumstance will be sufficient to induce you to adopt measures for putting a stop to a proceeding so disgraceful.

True Translation.

(Signed) T. MACKENZIE,
Acting-Assistant in Charge, &c.

(Sub-inclusion 4.)—Translation of a Note from Sheikh Nassir, Governor of Bushire, to the Acting-Assistant in charge of the Residency in the Persian Gulf.—(Dated 27th Ramazan, or 26th December, 1837.)

Relative to the affair of the Indian Syud whom Mr. Gerald struck, and regarding which it is decided that the authorities of the State (British) should be written to, that their orders on the subject may be received, and that the Syud after recovery is inclined for mischief, and has taken a hatchet in his hand: I called the Syud, and positively forbade him to have the hatchet any more in his hand, and give no molestation. But it is necessary that you should punish Mr. Gerald;
and that something should be given to satisfy the Syud, will be of no consequence or detriment to you.

True Translation.

(Signed) T. MACKENZIE.
Acting-Assistant in Charge, &c.

No. 69.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Foreign Office, April 14, 1838.

SIR,

With reference to your despatch of the 31st of January, upon the subject of the threats uttered by the Governor of Bushire against the gentleman acting as the Resident of the East India Company in that city, I have to instruct you, if you should be still in Persia when you receive this despatch, to state to the Persian Ministers, that Her Majesty's Government demand and expect protection for the Resident at Bushire, and will hold the Persian Government responsible for his safety.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 70.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 14, 1838.)

(Extract.)

Tehran, February 23, 1838.

I have the honor to report that the Shah perseveres in the siege of Herat, but that, up to the 20th January, the date of the latest authentic information I have received, no considerable progress had been made. His Majesty had then been two months before the place. The Persian army continued to obtain provisions by sending strong foraging parties, with artillery, into the districts around Herat; but these parties had been guilty of atrocities which had driven even the Sheeah peasants to seek safety in flight, or to take up arms, and treat their co-religionists, the Persians, as enemies. The winter had been unusually mild, inso- much that the Persian army had suffered no serious inconvenience from the cold, and no snow had fallen. The division of the Ausef-ud-Dowlah had penetrated to the vicinity of Meimuna, and had thus succeeded, in a great measure, in paralyzing the powerful tribes inhabiting the country between Herat and Meimuna, which, but for the presence of this force in their own country, would probably have marched to the relief of Herat, and might have made it impossible for the Shah to supply his army as he had hitherto been able to do.

On the other hand, the besieged continued to defend themselves with every appearance of confidence, and still preserved their communication with the surrounding country; provisions were abundant in the town, where bread sold for one-fourth of the price at which it was selling in the Shah's Camp. The Persian trenches were attacked almost every night, and sometimes more than once in the same night, by small parties, which appear almost uniformly to have succeeded on each occasion in killing, wounding, or taking prisoners, eight or ten of the Persians,
with hardly any loss to themselves. A Persian party, led by Hajee Khan, had crossed the ditch, and attempted to storm the first line of the entrenchment beyond it, but had been repulsed with the loss of 45 men killed. Hajee Khan himself, and a renegade Affghan, who was his guide, had been wounded. The Persians having expended the greater part of their heavy ammunition, the fire from their batteries was only occasional, and the Affghans had succeeded in building up, in a substantial manner, all the breaches which the more sustained fire of the batteries, in the early part of the siege, had made. The Affghan horse, had succeeded in capturing several caravans proceeding to camp, and had cut to pieces three or four parties of Khorassan matchlock-men, who conducted them. The loss of the Persian army, including all the casualties caused by the enemy, would appear, on an average, about 30 men daily; that of the Affghans hardly one daily. The Rulers of Kandahar had not sent troops to aid the Shah, fearing, they said, that he might suspect them of an intention to aid Kamran Shah. Neither had any of the neighbouring tribes afforded any considerable aid to Kamran; so that hitherto the contest has been between the army of the Shah on the one side, and the people of the city of Herat on the other.

A messenger, who arrived a few days ago, has brought orders to the Governors of the Provinces, to collect and send to camp, reinforcements to the aggregate number of nearly 70,000 men, and also to raise and transmit a considerable sum of money. These reinforcements, even if it should be found possible to put a considerable part of them in motion, cannot arrive in camp in a less time than three months; and it is more than probable that 5,000 men will not have joined the Shah in five months. Orders have also been sent to forward to camp a large supply of ammunition, for the guns of the larger calibres; but this ammunition cannot, by any exertion, be made to arrive in camp before two months.

These orders, while they indicate a determination, on the part of the Shah, to persevere in the enterprise he has undertaken, appear at the same time to afford sufficient evidence, that His Majesty considers the means, now collected in the camp, as inadequate to the accomplishment of his object.

The only attempt at negotiation, which has been made, was unsuccessful, and served rather to show how impossible it was that the parties could agree upon any arrangement, than to produce an approximation; for the Shah demanded that Kamran should come to the Persian camp, and there offer his submission and surrender the place, while the Government of Herat, on the other hand, refused to conclude any Treaty till the Shah should have retired to Meshed.

The defence which Herat has made is very creditable to its inhabitants; and considering the amount of the means which the Shah succeeded in collecting before it (nearly 40,000 men and 80
guns), the want of artillery in the town, the facility with which His Majesty has obtained supplies, the depressing effect upon the Heretees of the fall of Ghorian, the failure of all their allies to afford them efficient succour, and the unusual mildness of season so favourable to the operations of a siege, I confess the value of Herat has been greatly enhanced in my estimation; and although I have always regarded it as a most important position, with reference to the security and tranquillity of India, I was not prepared to look on it as so strong and defensible a place, or as one so capable of being made a barrier to the advance of any hostile Power; and I feel that, if Herat should fall into the hands of any such Power, it would be an evil even greater than I had hitherto believed it would be.

On the other hand, the fact that the Shah has been able, for above two months, to feed 40,000 men in his camp before Herat, notwithstanding the efforts that were made by the Herat Government to carry off and destroy the supplies which the country afforded, is a proof that a hostile army might move through that country without suffering from want, and gives great additional importance, as it appears to me, to the position of Herat, and to the influence which the Power that holds it may exercise over the future security of India, with reference not only to its internal tranquillity, but to the possibility that such a position may be occupied by a hostile Power.

From these considerations, I am led to believe that it may be of the very highest importance to preserve the independence of Herat, or at least to prevent its being incorporated with Persia, and that if the Shah should succeed in taking Herat, we shall have reason to regret not having interfered to prevent it. It appears to me, that success at Herat must inevitably lead the Shah further into Afghanistan, where he will come into collision with our influence, if not with our actual power; and that the possession of Herat by the Shah, would therefore probably hasten the time when Persia would be openly opposed to our views, under circumstances which would hold out no promise of a speedy reconciliation, and at a time when Persia, already in possession of Herat, would have acquired the means of making her opposition to us more formidable, as her power to injure us would be immensely increased; but I am inclined to believe, that if Great Britain were to interfere to preserve Herat, the fact that all further progress in that direction was arrested, would preclude the future and constantly recurring causes of irritation and opposition which a struggle for superior influence in Afghanistan, after the fall of Herat, would certainly involve.

I am therefore of opinion that there is a greater possibility of our being able to preserve for many years our alliance with Persia, if the Government should decide upon preserving the independence of Herat, and forcing the Shah to accept equitable terms from that Government,
than if we should stand aloof, and allow him to subdue Kamran. This one act of interference would doubtless cause some immediate irritation, but it would cause less than would be produced by our interfering to protect Kandahar after Herat shall have fallen; and if we must ultimately arrest the progress of Persia in Afghanistan, it appears to me that it can be most advantageously done for the preservation of the whole country, including so valuable a position as Herat.

If the Shah should effect the subjugation of any portion of Afghanistan, he will employ the influence of the chiefs, who may have submitted to him, to disturb the power of those who have not; and when he has been elated with success, and has secured a footing in that country, from which it may be difficult to drive him, I fear that apprehension of a rupture with England would no longer deter him from prosecuting his conquests; and, though he might hesitate to seek foreign aid for the purpose of getting possession of Herat, he might not improbably be induced to have recourse to it for the purpose of enabling him to retain a conquest which he had already made.

The most obvious impediment to the interference of Great Britain, in the quarrel between Persia and Herat, is the stipulation contained in the IXth Article of the Treaty of Tehran; but it can hardly be argued that this Article binds us to permit the unjust and wanton destruction by Persia of the most valuable defences of India, while the Shah appears to be acting in concert with, and promoting the influence in those countries of that very Power, whose exclusion from them has become the chief object of the alliance with His Persian Majesty.

No. 71.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 14, 1838.)
(Extract.)

Tehran, February 27, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose the translation of a letter I have received from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in answer to the letter in which I demanded reparation for the violence offered to the messenger Ali Mahommed Beg.

Your Lordship will perceive that the seizure of the messenger, knowing him to be such, his being forced to return to camp, and his being there put into confinement, are facts admitted by the Persian Government, which it even attempts to justify on two grounds:—First, that to hold any communication with the people of Herat was a violation of the neutrality which Great Britain, in the event of a war between Persia and the Afghans, is bound by Treaty to observe; and, Second, that, as Ali Mahommed Beg is a Persian subject, though in the service of the British mission, the Shah is entitled to treat him, and all other Persian subjects similarly situated, in any manner he may deem proper, and even to put them to death, without thereby affording me any right to inquire the reason of such a proceeding.

It is unnecessary for me to comment on an interpretation of the
Treaty so obviously absurd, or on pretensions so totally inadmissible. In my reply to the Deputy-Minister, I have put the refutation of both arguments in the shape that appeared to me most likely to be intelligible to the Shah and his Ministers.

I have not transmitted to your Lordship the inclosure in Meerza Ali's letter, professing to be a copy of the written apology of Colonel Stoddart to Hajee Khan, for I have great doubts of its accuracy, and have therefore sent it to that Officer, that he may favour me with any observations upon it which he may desire to offer.

I shall not trouble your Lordship with any remarks on the more minute, and less important details of Meerza Ali's letter, except that he misrepresents my letter to him, when he professes to believe that I have demanded the dismissal of the Prime Minister.

I have directed Colonel Stoddart, if redress is not afforded within a limited time, to leave the Shah's camp and return to Tehran, when I shall formally announce the suspension of my official intercourse with this Government, until I shall have received instructions from your Lordship.

I have the honor to inclose a translation of a letter I received from the Shah, in answer to the explanation regarding Ali Mahommed Beg's journey, which I addressed to His Majesty, and also a translation of my reply.

(Inclosure 1.) — Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. McNeill.

A. C.

I have received your Excellency's friendly letter; and it affords me pleasure and delight to learn that you are in health and safety.

In reply to the letter which you addressed to His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah, the Asylum of the world (may the souls of the faithful be his sacrifice), the commands of His Majesty are as follows:—

That, according to repeated Treaties, the Ministers of the exalted Government of England, shall not, in the time of war and contest with the Afghans, interfere in any possible way.

At the time of arriving at Toorbut Sheikh Jaum, it was heard that your Excellency held communication with the people of Herat. About this time, the high in rank, Ali Khan Badanloo, saw some people on the road travelling towards Meshed. After inquiry he ascertained that one person, a servant of your Excellency, and another person, a Persian, by name Ali Mahommed, were on their way from Herat. He observed that, in these times, when war had been declared, this intercourse would be the means of strengthening and encouraging the Afghans, notwithstanding in repeated Treaties the term "in any possible way" had been expressed. This is one of "possible ways." In like manner it was apparent from the copies of the letters, that verbal communications and oral intercourse had been held beyond what was written. He brought these people with him to the royal camp.
In the presence of a multitude the letters were returned untouched to your Excellency's servant, who was himself despatched with them. Ali Mahommed, who is a Persian subject, and the mover of this chain of discussion, was detained, in order that he should not make his escape; but he also, whom it was wished to detain, was afterwards set at liberty and sent off, that he might appear before your Excellency, and explain that this was not the time for holding intercourse with, and strengthening the Afghans. Because Ali Mahommed, teaching them the art of defending fortresses, and giving other advice, has been the means of making them presumptuous, notwithstanding all the evil which they have brought upon these kingdoms, so that now, in these borders and parts adjacent, there remains not a person to be bought or sold, and there is no country which has not been laid waste.

In fine—from the day that the exalted Government of Persia, withdrawing from the friendship of all other States, dismissed from Persia certain persons sent by the Government of France, and entered into friendship and alliance with the exalted Government of England, nothing at variance with friendship, has been attempted by the exalted Government of Persia towards the exalted Government of England. The strictest friendship and alliance between the two States has been preserved for years; and it was expected from your Excellency, that you would not send such a worthless and useless person as Ali Mahommed to the Afghans. Nothing contrary to custom has been done, and no annoyance has been given to any of your Excellency's people. It is necessary that your Excellency should endeavour to punish and correct such people as Ali Mahommed, and not make complaints and remonstrances in writing. With regard to what you wrote, that the letters had reached you open, if a person in the presence of the Ministers of this Government had touched the letters and perused their contents, it would have been altogether improper. Pray ascertain the fact, and inquire of the high in rank, Colonel Stoddart, in order that the truth may appear, that in no way the exalted Government of Persia acted contrary to established rule or repeated Treaties, and that no person has insulted or interfered with any of your Excellency's servants, although your Excellency has made many complaints and remonstrances in your letter. But the real state of the case is this, that your Excellency's servant has never been and never will be insulted.

The people of Europe are free until convicted of a fault; but the Monarchs of Persia, as far back as memory reaches, or is preserved in history, have always been despotic over Persian subjects, in like manner over their lives, and property, and families, and reputations, and lands, and goods; so that even if they should order a thousand innocent persons to be put to death, it would be in no one's power to call them to account. Although, praise be to God! His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah (may the souls of all the faithful be his sacrifice) has always been pleased
to act according to justice, indeed, has pardoned and overlooked various crimes; your Excellency has not the power of calling to account His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah, should he put to death a Persian subject, even though innocent.

Ali Mahommed and the like are all Persian subjects.

If, indeed, an English subject were to be treated with indignity or punished without reason, then your Excellency would have ground and cause of complaint and displeasure. If the servant of your Excellency, who went to Herat, had not some secret purpose, why was his going not represented to His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah? and why, on his return, did he not pass by the royal camp? or why deny having come from Herat?

The commands of His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah are fulfilled.

With regard to the affair of the high in rank, the distinguished by royal favour, Hajee Khan Ameer Bahadur Jung, the truth is this, that the high in rank, Colonel Stoddart, in the assembly of His Excellency the illustrious Hajee (may the peace of God be ever with him), in a manner unbecitting a member of society, without cause, gave the Ameer Bahadur Jung gross abuse, in terms which I have detailed in the inclosure of this friendly letter. Notwithstanding that His Excellency the Hajee might have said, “it is not proper to give gross abuse in my assembly without cause,” he was pleased to remain silent, that your Excellency should have no grounds of complaint or remonstrance. And the high in rank, Colonel Stoddart, himself apologized to the high in rank, Ameer Bahadur Jung in terms which your Excellency will peruse in detail. Had Colonel Stoddart taken rank and station into consideration, he would not have made use of these expressions, especially in such an assembly, and particularly to a person like the Ameer Bahadur Jung, who is decorated with so many orders and badges, and who understood nothing about the affair, and had no knowledge of the matter. In short, let your Excellency ascertain the facts, which are no other than have been stated. It is expedient that your Excellency, in consideration of the friendship and alliance between the two States, should overlook such occurrences, and inflict severe punishment on your own people, and not write that the Hajee ought to be dismissed, and Hajee Khan Ameer Bahadur Jung punished.

His Excellency the Hajee, after perusing your letter, smiled and said, “I do not at present hold any situation from which I could be dismissed, and there is no fault committed that I should be subject to punishment; but if they follow the way of justice, persons of rank, who, before arriving at the truth, quickly take offence, and write such things as there are in these letters, which will fall into the hands of people of other countries,—and they will fall into such hands,—after the matter is explained, and the truth made manifest, what will they then be able to say for themselves?”

Again—His Excellency the Hajee (on whom be the blessing of God)
has given over the Afghan to the care of the high in rank, Colonel Stoddart; that he may remain, and not make his escape, and not be the cause of fresh trouble. Translated by (Signed) D’ARCY TODD.

Written on the 8th of Shweal, A. H. 1253.
6th January, 1838.

(Inclousure 2.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. McNeill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A. C.

I have received that friend’s letter, and I have perused it with great attention. If, in regard to this grave matter, the neglect of which may cause a diminution of cordiality between the two States, I should enter into details, and write at some length, you will forgive me.

You have represented the contents of my letter inaccurately, when you state that I have required the dismissal of His Excellency the Hajee. I have never made any such request, and no such proposition was contained in my letter to you. It would appear, therefore, that what you have written respecting His Excellency the Hajee’s observations, and his smiles, was merely a pleasant story which has no connection with the business in question. In regard to the “punishment” of Hajee Khan, I have only to observe that the word “punishment” does not occur in my letter.

You say that, without having ascertained the facts, I permit myself to get angry. If I was not fully informed when I first wrote to you on this subject, I must say that all the information I have been able since that time to obtain, has tended to put the matter in a worse light than that in which I had at first regarded it; but from your letter, it would seem that that friend has not yet made himself acquainted with the circumstances, and has not taken the trouble to examine them carefully. From what you state, it would appear that Ali Khan Badanloo, who was on his return from Meshed to camp, was the first person who seized Ali Mahommed Beg: but this is not the fact. Ali Reza Beg set out from camp, and previous to his departure, it was currently reported that he was proceeding to seize and bring to camp the messenger of the British Minister; and Ali Reza Beg was in fact the first person who seized Ali Mahommed Beg, who was afterwards transferred to the custody of Ali Khan. Are we to presume that Ali Reza, as well as Ali Khan, were present at the conclusion of the Treaty, or had learnt its stipulations by heart?

You write that there was a man of mine, and a Persian, by name Ali Mahommed. This Persian by name Ali Mahommed, and my man, were one and the same person, not two persons.

You assert that no indignity was offered to my servant. The facts of the case are these:—Ali Reza Beg first seized my servant, and
plundered him of a portion of his clothes; then Ali Khan carried him forcibly to camp, where he was imprisoned; thereafter by order of Hajee Khan, he was stripped and forced to stand in the cold with no other covering than his shirt and trousers. Hajee Khan himself threatened him with personal violence, saying, "I will maim you—I will take out your eyes;"—and after all this outrage, when he was dismissed, some of his accoutrements were retained, which still remain in the possession of Hajee Khan, or his servants. If such conduct and such language is not to be considered violence and indignity, I am at a loss to conceive what indignity in your estimation really is.

The great evil in all these matters is, that such things occur, and no one will represent the truth to His Majesty the Shah.

In regard to what passed between Colonel Stoddart and Hajee Khan in the tent of His Excellency the Hajee, I have to observe that you have not stated the occurrences with accuracy: you have written that, in the presence of His Excellency the Hajee, Colonel Stoddart had, without cause, used gross and offensive language to Hajee Khan. The truth is that Hajee Khan was the aggressor, as he was the first to use offensive terms, such as it was unworthy to any member of society to use. He applied the term "traitor" (which of all offensive terms is the most offensive) either to Colonel Stoddart or to my messenger; and His Excellency the Hajee remained silent, and did not forbid Hajee Khan to use these insulting words. After Hajee Khan had denied having applied this offensive language to Colonel Stoddart, then Colonel Stoddart made an apology for the words he had used, and also apologized to His Excellency the Hajee. But what connection has this discussion between Hajee Khan and Colonel Stoddart, and their disputing and apologizing one to another, with the matter in question, the seizure of my messenger?

You have written that Ali Mahommed Beg, had been instructing the people of Herat in the defence of the place, and in other matters. In reply, I shall only observe that every one who has seen Ali Mahommed Beg, and many persons about the Court are acquainted with him, must be perfectly aware that he is not a person capable of undertaking such a task; in fact, you have yourself stated that Ali Mahommed Beg is a useless person. He has not, nor never has had, any knowledge of engineering.

You inquire if Ali Mahommed Beg, in going to Herat, had no secret object, why, at the time of his departure, the fact was not represented to His Majesty? and why, in returning, he did not come through the royal camp? and why, at first, he denied having come from Herat? The answer to the first question will be found in the letter which I had the honor of addressing to His Majesty the Shah. The answer to the second question is this: that Ali Mahommed Beg travelled with a caravan on the direct road from Herat to Meshed, which is the road
followed by all passengers; and the proof of this will be found in the fact, that General Borowski and Ali Khan, who were both travelling by the direct road from Meshed, encountered the caravan on that road. If Ali Mahommed Beg had not followed the direct road, how could they have met him on that road? If his object had been to come secretly, nothing could have been more easy than to have done so. He might either have avoided the road, or he might have disguised himself; but he did not do either the one or the other. In answer to the third question I have to state, that it does not appear to be impossible that after he found himself exposed to so much violence, he may, from fear of his life, have denied the fact; otherwise there was no reason why he should either deny or conceal the truth.

In short, if I should examine and refute in detail all the statements and arguments contained in your communication, though the task would be an easy one, this letter would become a volume, and I should be giving you unnecessary trouble. The facts, which are of real importance and consequence, require no evidence or argument to establish them; for in your letter you have unreservedly acknowledged and avowed, that Ali Mahommed Beg, who is a servant of the British Government, was seized and carried to camp, and there put into confinement, that he might not escape; that is, you acknowledge that the servants of the Shah seized on the highway, and forcibly carried off and imprisoned, a servant of the British Government; nay, you even adduce arguments to prove that this proceeding was not contrary to the laws and usages of nations.

You have attempted to justify this proceeding on two separate grounds; first that the intercourse of the British Government with the people of Herat is a violation of the existing Treaty; and second, that if His Majesty the Shah should order Ali Mahommed Beg, or other persons like him, who are subjects of His Persian Majesty and servants of the British Government, or the British mission, to be put to death, even though they should be innocent of any crime, I should have no right to inquire the cause of such a proceeding.

In answer to the first argument I have to state, that at the time when Ali Mahommed Beg went to Herat, there was as yet no war between the Persians and the Afghans, but, on the contrary, negotiations were still carried on; and even if hostilities had already been commenced, to hold intercourse with Herat would still have been no violation of the Treaty; for, according to the existing Treaty, Great Britain is bound, in the event of a war, to assist neither party, and to act with perfect equality towards both parties in such a manner that neither party shall have been aided or strengthened. If the Persian Government regards any intercourse the British Government may have with Herat as affording them aid, and therefore as a violation of the neutrality we are bound to observe, then it follows that the intercourse of Great Britain
with this Government must in like manner be regarded as affording aid to Persia, and therefore as a violation of the neutrality. But such is not the fact. The British Government may preserve its intercourse with both without violating its engagements, and may have friendly relations with both. If the British Government had even desired to send a Minister to Herat to reside there, in the same manner as up to this time its Minister has resided here, this would have been no violation of the Treaty.

In respect to the second argument, I beg leave to state, that this right which the Persian Government claims with reference to Persian subjects who may be employed by foreign Governments, or in the service of foreign missions, is opposed to the laws and the practice of all nations whatsoever, and even to those of this Government as they have hitherto existed. If the Persian Government seriously contemplates asserting this claim, or considers itself justified in so doing, it is quite impossible that I, or any other foreign Minister, can reside in this country. According to the laws and the practice of all nations, the subjects of the State which are in the service of a foreign mission, and in actual employment with that mission, are regarded in the same light as the subjects of the State from which that mission was sent; and the Sovereign, whose mission they are serving, has a right to require that they shall enjoy the same security and protection which is enjoyed by his own subjects; and so long as they are actually in the service of a foreign mission, if they should even commit an offence, or be guilty of a crime for which they deserve to be punished, the Government of the country at whose Court the mission is residing, cannot, without the knowledge and concurrence of the Minister whom they serve, subject these persons to punishment.

The truth is, that it is useless to adduce more arguments, and it is not my desire to give that friend unnecessary trouble; my only object has been to demonstrate the perfect nature of the obligation that rests on the Persian Government. It is a fact notorious to the whole world, that the servants of the Shah seized, and forcibly carried off, and imprisoned, a person in the service of the British Government; and if the Persian Government does not intend to offer an indignity to the British Government, it will make reparation in such a manner that it shall be publicly known.

The persons who have been guilty of this misconduct either acted by order of the Persian Government, or they committed an unauthorised act of violence. If they acted by order of the Government, and the Government avows the act, I have no complaint to make against those individuals; they were servants who obeyed the orders they received; but in that case the Ministers of the State must hold themselves responsible for what has occurred. If, on the other hand, the persons who were guilty of this misconduct, committed an unauthorised act of
violence, which was an injury to the British Government, and if the Persian Government has not contemplated, and does not contemplate, estrangement from Great Britain, and insincerity in its friendship, His Persian Majesty's Ministers ought not to protect and defend culprits who have injured a friendly State. How can the Persian Government reconcile to its own feelings to permit such an indignity to be offered to England, and not to have recourse to one act of reparation or redress?

You say, that in consideration of the intimate alliance and friendship between the two Governments, such matters should be passed over unnoticed.

If the Persian Ministers had evinced any disposition to punish the offenders, or to offer any reparation, I too would have used my best endeavours to represent to my own Government in the least unfavourable light, the impropriety that had been committed, and to pass over the affair as slightly as possible; but I have seen no evidence of any such disposition on the part of the Persian Government. On the contrary, when my messenger was dismissed, after having been subjected to all this ill-treatment, no attempt was made to conciliate or to offer any explanation or palliation of the indignity that had been offered to me and to my Government. The Persian Ministers did not even allude in any manner to what had occurred; they did not express the smallest degree of regret, or offer the slightest explanation or apology; even up to this time they have done nothing but bring forward arguments to justify the conduct of the guilty. I was therefore forced to represent the whole matter openly to my own Government, and to apply to the Persian Government for redress.

I beg leave to repeat that an indignity has been offered in the face of the whole world to the British Government; and that if the Persian Ministers do not contemplate alienation from and opposition to the British Government, they ought to make adequate reparation for what has been done, and in such a manner that the redress shall be as public as the indignity is notorious. Please God, this will ultimately be done; but it is my most anxious desire it should be done in a spirit of kindness and in friendship.

It is now more than three months since these events occurred; and there has as yet been no indication of a desire or intention on the part of the Persian Government to redress the injury of which I complain. If His Persian Majesty's Ministers should not speedily make arrangements for giving adequate reparation, I shall have no alternative but to pursue that course which may appear to me to be necessary, and best calculated to maintain the dignity of my own Sovereign.

(Sealed) by JOHN Mc NEILL.
Translated by
(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
(Sub-Enclosure.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A. C.

I have received the letter which you wrote in answer to my last communication, and forwarded by my messenger. I have thoroughly understood its contents; and my reply in detail is sent by the present courier, who is despatched to the royal camp. As you will peruse my letter, I have now little to say, and will not therefore further trouble you. May the season of friendship be perpetual!

Translated by

(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

(Inclusion 3.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lieut.-Colonel Stoddart.

Tehran, February 17, 1838.

Sir,

I have the honor to inclose, for your perusal, previous to their being delivered, a letter to His Majesty the Shah, two letters to His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee, and one for Meerza Ali, the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs. You will be pleased to solicit an audience of the Shah, and interviews with the Minister and Deputy-Minister, for the purpose of presenting these letters, and renewing the request for compliance with the proposal, contained in my former letter to Meerza Ali, that Hajee Khan Karabaughee should be dismissed, as a punishment for his conduct towards a public messenger of this mission, and that the Persian Government should make an apology to the British Government for the share the Prime Minister had in the transaction.

If the Persian Government should not decide on affording redress for this outrage, you will use every endeavour to induce them to comply with the demand; and should they still withhold the due reparation, you will fix some reasonable time, after which, if reparation should not be given, you will leave the camp, and return to join me here.

I have, &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclusion 4.)—Translation of a Firman addressed by His Majesty Mahommed Shah to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

A. C.

Let it be known to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the exalted Government of England, being distinguished by and confiding in the plenitude of our princely favours, that His Excellency's letter has reached our royal presence; and its contents, founded on sincerity, have been made clear to our enlightened mind. The favourable consideration in which we have heretofore held His Excellency is still further increased. With regard to intercourse with the people of Herat, the sentiments of His
Excellency in detail have been fully and thoroughly understood by our royal mind, and we have been pleased to make known our commands in this particular to the high in rank, the distinguished amongst nobles, Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, who will transmit and convey them to His Excellency. He has doubtless, in obedience to our royal commands, conveyed them; and His Excellency, fully considering and comprehending them, will be satisfied with our royal favor and justice.

His Excellency ought, under all circumstances, confiding in and acquainted with our kingly favour and kindness towards him, to consider them as complete and abundant, and to make known daily his requests at our ancient and kingly throne.

Written in the month of Shuwalool Mukarrum, A.H. 1253.
January, 1838.

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

(Inclosure 5.)—Translation of an Areeza addressed by His Excellency Mr. McNeil to His Majesty the Shah.

A. C.

The representation of your Majesty's ancient well-wisher, that in a happy and auspicious hour I have been honored by the receipt of your Majesty's Firman, and have felt myself exceedingly favoured and distinguished by the perusal of its contents, which have increased the measure of my devotion and sincerity.

With regard to the commands which your Majesty desired should be conveyed through the distinguished amongst nobles, Meerza Ali, Deputy-minister for Foreign Affairs, your Majesty's commands have been made known to me in obedience to your Majesty's orders; and I have addressed to the above-mentioned a letter in reply, the contents of which will be laid before your Majesty. As, for years past, I have been, as I still am, a sincere well-wisher to this exalted Government, and as, up to the present time, I have not stepped aside from the broad path of sincerity and good faith towards this exalted Government, I deem it necessary, and indeed incumbent on me, in the way of sincerity and good faith, not to pass by a single opportunity of proving my devotion to your Majesty, and not to spare myself from any mode of evincing my sincerity.

As a sincere well-wisher, therefore, it would not be possible for me, in the event of foolish persons of your Majesty's Court being guilty of certain improper actions, or the cause of a few unworthy deeds, to attribute them to your Majesty. God forbid! or to conceive or imagine that your Majesty should have any knowledge or intelligence of the actions of foolish people.
My hope in your Majesty's royal favour and kindness has ever been, and is, that such foolish persons may meet with the chastisement and retribution due to them.

I will not intrude further on your Majesty. May your Majesty's commands be obeyed.

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

No. 72.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 14, 1838.)
(Extract.) Tehran, February 28, 1838.

With reference to my despatch of the 31st of January, respecting threats which had been used to the Honorable East India Company's Resident at Bushire, I have the honor to enclose a translation of a letter which I have addressed to His Persian Majesty's Prime Minister on this subject.

(Inclosure.)—Translation of a Letter from Mr. McNeill to His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee.

A. C.

It is necessary that I should acquaint your Excellency with certain occurrences which have lately taken place.

A person, who is an Indian Syud, being under the effect of intoxicating drugs, and his brain thereby disordered, insulted Dr. Gerald, who is attached to the Resident of the exalted Government of England at the port of Bushire, and knocked off his hat with the blow of a stick. Dr. Gerald having no stick in his hand, kicked him with his foot. The Syud above-mentioned, either under the influence of intoxication, or intentionally, feigned himself to be dead, or dying before the gates of the Residency, and threw himself down as if in a state of insensibility. A number of persons came, and lifting him up, carried him to the house of Hajee Sheikh Hassan, where Hajee Zein-ul-Abadeen also resided. Sheikh Nassir then sent Hajee Hoossein Alidad, one of his own people, to the English Resident with a note, a copy of which is inclosed for your perusal, which he was to deliver with a verbal message, desiring the Resident to call to mind the assassination and plunder of the Russian Ambassador; and he also wrote, that if Mr. Gerald were not given up there would be a general rising of the people, and this and that would be done: notwithstanding that Dr. Gerald and the Syud were both English subjects, the Doctor being a servant, and the Syud a subject, and neither of them a servant of this Government, that it should interfere, or that the Ministers of this Government should have any concern in the matter.

Some time ago, a complaint was made against the people of Sheikh Hassan, which was forwarded to your Excellency, and who doubtless remembers it; and your Excellency promised that he should be removed
from the port of Bushire, and sent to Tehran. Your Excellency's promise and agreement was not fulfilled.

Again, complaints and remonstrances against the conduct of Meerza Ali Akber, newswriter, were forwarded to your Excellency. In that affair also your Excellency ordered that he should be removed, and another appointed to his situation; but this promise and engagement also has not yet been fulfilled.

The object in view was, that a change might take place in the conduct of people towards the exalted Government of England; but although a change has taken place, it has been for the worse. It is clear that Sheikh Nassir is not of himself a person who could act with this boldness and presumption, unless that he relies upon countenance from some other quarter. What can the Ministers of the exalted Government of England infer from such words and actions? They can only suppose that the Ministers of the exalted Government of Persia intend in every place to treat the British Government with insult and injustice.

After that on two of the frontiers of the kingdom, namely, in Khorasan and in Fars, such occurrences take place, how can the protestations of friendship of this exalted Government towards them (the English) be believed?

In short, let it be known to the Ministers of this exalted Government, that in the event of any person acting in this way, and using violence against the Resident of the port of Bushire, or his people, and should a disturbance happen in that place, it will not be in my power from this day forward, to render any account of it. In every way I must hold myself irresponsible for the consequences.

It must be apparent that whenever force and violence are used against the Resident in that place, he will repel them by force and violence.

Postscriptum:—I must again trouble you. It is at this time currently reported that this exalted Government have appointed His Royal Highness Bahman Meerza to the Government of Fars, and have named him Firman Firma of those parts. Should this report prove true, I trust, please God, that whatever engagements and promises this exalted Government have made, or may hereafter make, will be performed. As the Ministers of this exalted Government appear determined not to consent to any proposal that I may offer as a well-wisher, I do not therefore propose any thing; but I have deemed it necessary to afford information and intelligence.

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

No.73.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 14, 1838.)
(Extract.)

I regret that I have not yet received the instructions from the
Government of India to which Mr. Leech refers, but it would appear from that Officer's statement that the Governor-General had already directed me to attempt to withdraw the Shah from Herat, by Treaty or otherwise; and as I find that the Government of India entertains the opinion that the preservation of the integrity of Herat is of vital importance, I have determined to proceed to the Shah's camp, and to endeavour by every means in my power to induce his Majesty to conclude a Treaty with Shah Kamran, and to raise the siege of Herat.

The intelligence which I have received from Colonel Stoddart up to the 10th February, leads me to believe that the place will probably hold out until I can arrive there, and a note from Lieutenant Pottinger to Colonel Stoddart, tends to strengthen this belief.

On the 8th February, Lieutenant Pottinger had conveyed a message from the Government of Herat to the Shah and his Minister, deprecating the continuation of hostilities, and proposing to negotiate, but stating that if the Shah insisted on continuing the war with them, they would fight to the last man. The answers were unfavourable both from the Minister and the Shah, who said they would listen to no terms but the possession of the Boorj Cadaug, (the Palace of Kamran) and placing a garrison in Herat. These answers Mr. Pottinger will deliver in Herat, which Colonel Stoddart saw him enter in safety on the 10th February.

Colonel Stoddart had considered it his duty, on receiving the communication from Lieutenant Leech, to acquaint the Persian Minister, confidentially, that the Governor-General of India had instructed me to mediate between the Shah and the Government of Herat; that his Lordship required that the integrity of Herat should be preserved, and proposed to withdraw the Shah from Herat by treaty or otherwise. The Minister had replied to Colonel Stoddart's note inclosing this communication, by stating that he was not the person through whom such communication should be conveyed to the Shah, and recommending that Colonel Stoddart should use some other channel, adding, however, that in any other matters he should be happy to attend to Colonel Stoddart's wishes.

I hope to arrive in the Shah's camp on the 5th or 6th of April, and if Herat should hold out so long, and no terms should already have been agreed upon, I shall endeavour to effect what appear to be the Governor-General's wishes, and although I do not feel confident of success, I still think there is a prospect of my being able to withdraw the Shah, sufficiently promising to justify the attempt. I should have awaited the receipt of the Governor-General's instructions, had I not feared that the delay might have caused me to arrive too late, and it is still possible that they may overtake me before I can arrive at Herat.
No. 74.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, May 21, 1838.

I have received your despatches to the 8th of March, reporting the progress of events in Persia, and stating your intention of setting out to the camp of the Shah before Herat, in order to endeavour to prevail upon the Shah to abandon the attack upon that town and its territory; and I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the step which you were going to take.

If when you receive this despatch, you shall have succeeded in inducing the Shah to retire from Herat, either with or without an arrangement with the Ruler of Herat, you will have accomplished an object of great importance to British interests in the East; and you will then only have to express to the Shah the lively satisfaction which Her Majesty's Government will derive from this proof of friendly deference on the part of the Shah to the wishes of the Government of Great Britain.

But it is possible that you may have failed in the object of your journey, and that when this despatch reaches you, the Shah may be still engaged in besieging Herat; or may have taken it, and not have advanced beyond it; or having taken it, may have marched further into Afghanistan.

In either of these cases, you are instructed to proceed at once to the Shah; and to declare to him explicitly, that the British Government cannot view with indifference his project of conquering Afghanistan.

That the British Government must look upon this enterprise as undertaken in a spirit of hostility towards British India, and as being wholly incompatible with the spirit and intention of the Alliance which has been established between Persia and Great Britain. That, consequently, if this project be persevered in, the friendly relations which up to this time have so happily subsisted between Great Britain and Persia, must necessarily cease; and that Great Britain must take such steps as she may think best calculated to provide for the security of the possessions of the British Crown.

You will lose no time in informing the Governor-General of India of the result of the communications which you may hold with the Shah in consequence of this despatch.

You will explain to the Shah that this question about Afghanistan is independent of, and separate from, the question of satisfaction for the outrage committed upon your messenger, for which outrage Her Majesty's Government demand and expect to receive full redress.

No. 75.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. May 31, 1838.)

(Extract.)

Mezinan, March 22, 1838.

I have the honor to report for your Lordship's information, that I
set out from Tehran for Herat on the 10th instant, and this morning arrived at this place, from whence I hope to get to the Shah’s camp in twelve or thirteen days. The evening on which I moved to a garden without the walls of Tehran, I despatched a messenger to camp with the three letters, of which I have the honor to inclose translations, addressed to the Shah, the Prime Minister, and the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, announcing my having set out with the hope of being able to render some services to the Shah, in consequence of the orders I had recently received from my own Government.

Count Simonich has not decided on proceeding to Herat, and has contented himself with despatching a messenger, and with inducing Meerza Massood to address me a letter, remonstrating against my going to camp, on the pretext that from the opinion entertained by people generally of the views on which I act, my presence in camp will tend to strengthen the Afghans, which will be injurious to the Persian Government.

To this letter of which I have the honor to inclose a translation, I have returned no answer.

(Incloure 1.)—Translation of an Areeza, addressed by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Majesty Mahomed Shah.

The representation of your Majesty’s sincere well-wisher.

That your Majesty’s well-wisher, by order of his own Government, has been directed to repair to your Majesty’s presence in order to convey to your Majesty certain representations to conclude certain matters, and to make known to your Majesty the wishes and desires of his Government.

Accordingly, on Saturday the 13th of Zee Hujj (10th March), he proceeded on his journey to your royal stirrup, and will shortly have the honor of arriving in your Majesty’s presence and be distinguished by your Majesty’s boundless kindness and favour.

As the object and desire of your Majesty’s well-wisher has been and is, on every account, and under all circumstances, the stability and advancement of your Majesty’s Government, he therefore deems it incumbent on him in sincerity, as heretofore, not to step aside from the broad path of attachment to your Majesty’s Government, and in this journey to act according to the dictates of sincerity; and he entertains the fullest confidence that the friendship and unity which has now for many years past subsisted between the forefathers of your Majesty and the former kings of England, and which still exists between your Majesty and the present Sovereign of England, will remain for ever firm and established.

Although this well-wisher hopes to arrive in your Majesty’s presence in the course of three or four days after your Majesty receives this representation, nevertheless he has deemed it expedient before his
arrival and audience, to convey to your Majesty intelligence of his appointment and journey.

He will not further intrude on your Majesty.

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

(Inclosure 2.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Excellency Hujee Meerza Aghassee.

A.C.

As I am despatching a messenger to-day to the Royal Camp, I trouble you with this friendly letter to inform your Excellency, that in conformity with the orders of my own Government, I am about to proceed to the presence of His Majesty the Shah, to make certain representations, and to convey certain requests to His Majesty. Accordingly, on Saturday the 15th of Zee Hujj (10th March), I left the Capital and set off for the Royal presence. Please God, the merciful, I shall shortly be honored with an audience, and shall also enjoy the pleasure of your Excellency’s society.

It must be apparent to your Excellency, that my object and desire under all circumstances, and on every account, has ever been and still is the stability and well being of His Persian Majesty’s Government; and as my former services, by reason of the time that has elapsed, have almost been forgotten, I feel bound to perform fresh service in this journey of auspicious omen, that my former services may perchance be recalled to mind.

I feel that if your Excellency also will co-operate with me in the duty which I contemplate, I may be able to render certain services which will be of benefit to the two Governments, and be the means of increasing afresh the friendship which exists between the two Governments.

As in times past I have been engaged in several important affairs, and as those affairs were terminated with ease and facility, I have therefore undertaken this matter; and I feel confident that, with the aid of your Excellency, I shall be able to perform this service; that the friendship and unity which has for years past existed, and which still exists between the two Governments, may not be interrupted, and that with the consent, and approval of both Governments, the affairs may be settled, and be the means of increasing friendship and strengthening unity and amity.

Translated by
14 Zee Hujj, 1253.
11th March, 1838.

(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.
(Inclosure 3.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Excellency the Ausef-ud-Dowlah.

A.C.

I beg to inform your Excellency that I have been directed by my own Government to proceed to the Royal presence in order to represent to His Majesty certain affairs and requests. I feel certain that as your Excellency gave me your assistance and concert in certain matters and particulars which had for their object the stability of His Persian Majesty’s Government, you will, in these affairs which tend to the welfare of the two Governments, give me your assistance and concert.

As the time of our meeting is near, I will not trouble you further.

14 Zee Huji, 1253. Translated by
11th March, 1838. (Signed) D’Arcy Todd.

(Inclosure 4.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Meerza Massood to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

A.C.

According to what you yesterday mentioned verbally in the apartment of His Excellency the Beglerbeggee, it would appear that you intend speedily to proceed to the camp of His Majesty, &c., &c., the Shah; and as in consequence of certain circumstances which have occurred, and of certain others which friends and enemies have conjectured and imagined to be connected with these, your Excellency’s presence during the siege of Herat will certainly and undoubtedly produce greater confidence and resistance on the part of the besieged, and this is obviously injurious to the interests of this proud and ever-enduring empire, and the British Government certainly cannot desire to cause an injury to this State; therefore I request your Excellency, if possible, to abandon this journey, or to postpone it for a time, till instructions on this subject can be received from His Majesty the Shah.

Why should I give more trouble.

Sealed by Meerza Massood.

Written 12 Zee Huji, 1253. Translated by

No. 76.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. June 18, 1838.)

(Extract.) Camp, before Herat, April 11, 1838.

I have the honor to report for your Lordship’s information, that the Shah continues to prosecute the siege of Herat with the greatest perseverance; but that from the gallantry with which it is defended, and the want of skill in the Persian Officers, no great progress has yet been made towards its reduction; and it appears to be very doubtful whether the Shah will be able to obtain possession of the place by any other means than a protracted blockade; but if His Persian Majesty
can subsist his army in its present position for an indefinite length of time, it is obvious that the town, which is now completely invested, must ultimately fall. This country is nearly exhausted of its supplies of every kind, and the Persian troops are suffering great privations, many of them subsisting upon the herbs which at this season spring up in this fertile soil; still they continue to do their duty in the trenches, and have evinced devotion, perseverance, and power of endurance, to an extent of which I believe there have been but few examples in the military history of Asia. Without pay, without sufficient clothing, without any rations whatsoever, the same troops remain day and night in the trenches, which have, on some occasions, been knee-deep with water or mud, and in which they lose from ten to twenty men daily, by the fire of the place or the sorties of the garrison; but their spirits, or rather their powers of endurance are beginning to fail; and if the Shah should not succeed in making arrangements for the regular supply of a considerable amount of provisions, the enterprise must be abandoned; great exertions will, however, be made to remedy this evil, and on the success of these would appear to depend the fate of Herat.

I have had the honor to report to your Lordship, that more than one attempt at negotiation had failed; and within the last few days, the Ausef-ud-Dowleh had an interview with Yar Mahommed Khan, the Minister of Herat, for the purpose of endeavouring to bring about an amicable adjustment of the differences between the parties, which the Ausef continues to regard as the course which promises to be ultimately beneficial to Persia. The demands of the Shah were of a nature which the Government of Herat would not accept, and the Shah could not be induced to consider favourably the terms proposed by the besieged which were in substance the same as Futteh Mahommed Khan had offered at Tehran.

In the meantime, Captain Vicovich continues to remain at Cabool, and I learn from Captain Burnes's communications, that the success of his negotiations there will in a great measure depend on the failure of the Shah's enterprise against Herat. At Kandahar, our position is even more precarious; and I have the honor to inclose a translation of a draft of a Treaty between the Shah and the Chief of Kandahar, which it is proposed to conclude by the mediation and under the guarantee of Russia, and which has for its object to unite Herat and Kandahar under a Chief, who shall be nominally subject to Persia, but actually under the protection of Russia. I am unable to inform your Lordship what progress has been made towards the conclusion of this Treaty, or what view the Shah may have taken of the position in respect to these countries, in which, by this arrangement, he would be placed; but the Treaty is said to have been signed by Kohundil Khan, and I am not without very serious apprehensions, that even before the fall of Herat, Kohundil Khan may be induced to co-operate with the Shah; while in the event
of Herat's being reduced, I cannot doubt that the Chief of Kandahar will consider it to be for his advantage to connect himself with Persia and Russia rather than with England. I, therefore, continue to be of opinion that the fall of Herat would destroy our position in Afghanistan, and place all or nearly all that country under the influence or authority of Russia and Persia. I need not repeat to your Lordship my opinion as to the effect which such a state of things would necessarily have on the internal tranquillity and security of British India; and I cannot conceive that any Treaty can bind us to permit the prosecution of schemes which threaten the stability of the British Empire in the East. The evidence of concert between Persia and Russia, for purposes injurious to British interests, is unequivocal, and the magnitude of the evil with which we are threatened is in my estimation immense, and such as no Power in alliance with Great Britain can have a right to aid in producing. Our connection with Persia has for its real and avowed original object to give additional security to India, and it has been maintained for the purpose of protecting us against designs of the only Power which threatened to disturb us in that quarter; but if the proceedings of Persia, in concert with that very Power, are directed to the destruction of the security and tranquillity which it was the sole object of the alliance with Persia to maintain; and if they obviously tend to promote and facilitate the designs which the alliance was intended to counteract, I confess I cannot believe that we are still bound to act up to the letter of a Treaty, the spirit of which has been so flagrantly violated. I do not hesitate to repeat my conviction, that if our only object were to preserve as long as possible the alliance of Persia, that object could best be effected by preventing her from taking Herat.


I, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government at the Court of Persia, guarantee the fulfilment of the following conditions of Treaty between His Majesty Mahomed Shah, and the Sirdar of Kandahar.

I. The Principality of Herat to be bestowed by the Shah on the Rulers of Kandahar, as a reward for their faithful services performed to him since his accession to the throne of Persia.

II. The territories and tribes at present subject to the Sirdars of Kandahar to be preserved to them free of violence, injury, or confiscation.

III. The Persian Government in no way to amalgamate with their own subjects, any of the Afghan Tribes, great or small, nor to employ them upon service unconnected with their own affairs,—and all business
relative to the Afghan States to be submitted by the Persian Government to the Rulers of Kandahar.

IV. The Prince Kamran and his Minister Yar Mahommed Khan to be excluded from all participation in the Councils of Persia.

V. Should any hostile movement be made against Kandahar by Shooja-ool-Molk, the English, or the Ameer of Cabool, aid to be afforded by the Shah to the Sirdars.

VI. In the event of the sons or brothers of Kohundil Khan coming with an auxiliary force to the royal camp, no violence or injury to be in any way offered to their persons or property of them or their followers, and none of them to be detained as hostages, with the exception of a single son of Kohundil Khan's, who will always remain in the service of the Shah.

VII. A contingent of 12,000 horse and 12 guns to be supplied by the Kandaharees to garrison Herat,—receiving pay and rations from them, and to assist the Shah on occasion of service.

VIII. On the arrival of the Treaty duly ratified at Kandahar, Mahommed Omar Khan to be immediately despatched to the royal presence.

IX. After the presentation of this prince, the necessary money for the outfit of the horse and artillery to be made over by the Persian Government to the Sirdars of Kandahar; Sirdar Mehrul Khan to be then sent with a thousand horse to the royal camp. This Prince being presented, and mutual confidence being established between the Shah and the Sirdars, no other demand to be made upon the Kandaharees by the Persian Government than that of military service.

Should Mahommed Shah fail to fulfil any of these several conditions, or depart in any way from the stipulations, I, as Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government, becoming myself responsible, will oblige him in whatever way may be necessary, to act fully up to the terms and conditions of the Treaty.

This memorandum is framed as a draft of the proposed terms of Treaty.

True Translation.

(Signed) H. C. RAWLINSON, Major.

No. 77.—Mr. Mc Neill to Mr. Backhouse.—(Received June 18, 1838.)

(Extract.) Camp, before Herat, April 12, 1838.

I INCLOSE, for Lord Palmerston's information, a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Lord Auckland.

(Inclosure.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lord Auck'and.

(Extract.) Camp, before Herat, April 11, 1838.

In pursuance of the intention which I intimated to your Lordship in my letter of about this time last month, I set out from Tehran, and arrived
here on the 6th instant, having been twenty-seven days on the road. At Ghorian I received a letter from the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, conveying to me the Shah's desire that I would not advance beyond that place, as my presence could not fail to encourage the Heretees in their resistance. I replied, that my duty to my own Government, and even to the Shah, precluded the possibility of my complying with his Majesty's requests, which I greatly regretted, as it was at all times my anxious desire to comply with the wishes of the Shah. Next day I came in one march to camp. All the attentions usually paid on such an occasion were omitted; and I have reason to believe that all my acquaintances in camp were either directly forbidden to visit me, or received hints to the same effect which could not be misunderstood. I took no notice of these slights; but as I had not yet had an audience for the purpose of presenting my Credentials from the Queen, I demanded one for that purpose, and required that the usual ceremonial should be observed. This was granted. Yesterday I remained in my tent that I might learn the impression produced by my interview, and to-day I called on the Prime Minister, who received me with great cordiality. With His Excellency I touched but slightly on business, and not at all on the affairs of Herat. I find that His Excellency was much pleased with the tone of my conversation, in which he expected to have found more asperity. He expressed a wish to see me in private, and the day after to-morrow is fixed for our interview. I have demanded an audience of the Shah to-morrow, which the favourable impression made on the Minister will probably incline him to grant. In the meantime, I believe I have got over all the irritation caused by my advance in opposition to the Shah's wishes; but I cannot yet pretend to have acquired any greater confidence of success in my endeavours to induce the Shah to accept my mediation for the purpose of concluding an arrangement with Herat. One great impediment to success is the advance of Count Simonich, the Russian Minister, who left Tehran twelve days after me, and may be expected here in a fortnight or twelve days. This country is exhausted, and the Shah must now draw his supplies from a great distance. The troops already subsist themselves with difficulty; and the line of communication by which supplies must hereafter be brought, is long, and incapable of being protected by any means the Shah can command. The defence of the town is still gallantly maintained; and though the Shah talks of an assault, as there is no breach, and no probability that one will soon be made, I apprehend that the troops will hardly be induced to make an attempt, the success of which is so improbable. I have not yet had any communication with the town, but I see no reason to believe that it is so straitened as to threaten its speedy surrender; and this opinion is strengthened by the fact, that when a few days ago the Ausef-ud-Dowleh had an interview with Yar Mahommed Khan, for the purpose
of endeavouring to conclude an arrangement, the Minister of Kamran refused to accept the only terms which the Shah was disposed to grant. The point on which the negotiation broke off was, I believe, the demand of the Shah, that Shah Kamran and Yar Mahommed Khan should wait upon him in his camp, and there make their submission to him. I learn that the Persians did not, as on a former occasion, require that a garrison of their troops should be admitted into the town.

It appears to me very doubtful whether the Shah can take Herat by any other means than a protracted blockade; but it is obvious, that if he can maintain his troops in their present position for an indefinite length of time, he must ultimately succeed in reducing it, and in that event, Captain Barnes's correspondence will have informed your Lordship how precarious our position at Cabool may become; while from the * inclosed copy of a draft of a Treaty between Mahommed Shah and Kohmundil Khan, under the mediation and guarantee of Russia, your Lordship will perceive, that there is little probability of Kandahar's remaining independent, or in a position to be influenced by us. What has been done in this Treaty I am unable to inform your Lordship; but if it has been accepted by the Shah, as it is said it has been, Persia has bound herself to defend Kandahar against us, admitting at the same time the right of Russia to force her to do so. I hope that Mr. Leeche will be able to discover at Kandahar what progress has been made in this Treaty, which it would appear that Kohundil Khan had actually signed (sealed.)

The question of Herat seems, therefore, to be the question of all Afghanistan; and if the place should fall without any attempt having been made to save it, I feel convinced that the moral influence of that event would have a most prejudicial effect on our national reputation in all these countries; for it is no secret to any one that the British Government has been desirous to prevent its fall; and that Russia, on the contrary, has been solicitous to see it in the hands of Persia. All Central Asia will regard it as a question between the greater Powers; whose views are so publicly spoken of, that I did not converse with a villager between Tehran and this place, who did not ask me whether the Russians did not favour, and the English oppose, the Shah's enterprise against Herat.

It is my intention in my interview with the Minister and my audience of the Shah to point out to them, that as we sought the alliance of Persia for the purpose of giving security to India, the proceedings of this Government in Afghanistan must be regarded as a flagrant violation of the spirit of the Treaty, and as destructive of the whole objects of the alliance. That the British Government would, therefore, be fully justified in declaring the Treaty to be at an end, and in taking such active measures as it may find necessary to protect itself against the evils

* See inclosure in No. 76.
which Persia, for the furtherance of her own unjust ends, is bringing upon us. That I therefore cannot undertake to say, that if the Shah perseveres in the siege of Herat, the British Government may not feel itself called upon, as a measure of self-defence, to remove the Persian army by force, if necessary. That I am ready, however, to mediate and to procure for Persia terms as favourable as she has any right to demand, or ought to desire.

A report has reached me here, but on what authority it rests I am unable to discover, that Captain Burnes has succeeded in arranging the differences between Cabool and Lahore, that a Seik agent had arrived at Cabool, and that Dost Mahommed Khan having granted a passage for English and Seik troops through his territories, a combined force is actually on its march, and must by this time, have arrived in the vicinity of Kandahar. I have not heard that this report has found its way to the Persian authorities; but it does not appear to me to be certain that it is altogether unfounded, and although I may personally be of opinion that a small force might suffice, by cutting off communications and supplies, to force the Shah, after a time, to raise the siege; there can be no doubt that the effect of the march of a far stronger body in this direction would be infinitely greater and more beneficial as a means of establishing our influence in Persia, as well as in all Central Asia. It would convince the Governments of all these countries that they are within our reach, a fact of which they are yet not aware. The actual distance from hence to our frontier, and to Tabreez, from whence the greater and more efficient portion of the Shah’s army has marched, and from whence he has recently required reinforcements, is almost exactly equal; but it does not appear to have entered into the mind of the Persian Government to conceive the possibility of seeing our troops advance in this direction. I am aware that your Lordship would feel very reluctant to have recourse to so decided a measure, and I am unable to say what might be the views of Her Majesty’s Government on this subject; but when I look to the evidence of concert between Persia and Russia in their proceedings in Afghanistan, which has transpired, and to the probable consequences of the success of these proceedings to the security and to the internal tranquillity of British India, I can have no hesitation in expressing my personal opinion, that notwithstanding the terms of the Treaty, the British Government would be fully justified in taking up arms to protect its own interests in this quarter; and I have no doubt, that to prevent the Shah from taking Herat, would be in every way more advantageous, than to allow him to take it, and thereafter endeavour to counteract the evils to which, in my humble opinion, we should necessarily be exposed as a consequence of his success. In former letters I have explained myself so fully on the subject, that I shall not trouble your Lordship with any further argument or details.
I have thought it my duty to put these my personal opinions before your Lordship. If circumstances should lead your Lordship to put in motion a force of British troops, or of British combined with any others, there does not appear to be any great probability that the Shah would or could abide their arrival here; and the probability is, that their advance from Kandahar would enable me to carry into effect the wishes of Government here; but if any other than a British force should march in this direction, the Shah's contempt for Seiks and Afghans would probably induce him to try his fortune in battle.

I ought perhaps to apologize to your Lordship for having so freely offered my opinions on matters which it will rest with your Lordship to decide, but I am sure you will more readily forgive me for having been unreserved, than you would for being too fastidious in putting before you the result of my own observations and reflections.

No. 78.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston. (Receive, June 18, 1838.)
(Camp, before Herat, April 13, 1838.

I have had an audience of the Shah, during which I had an opportunity of stating all I proposed to say to him; it lasted above two hours. His Majesty professed, in the most solemn manner, his desire to maintain friendly relations with Great Britain, and protested that he had never contemplated anything injurious to the British Government. I pointed out the consequences which it appeared to me must necessarily follow a perseverance in the system of concert with other Powers, for the purpose of breaking down our defences, and disturbing our frontier.

The interview with the Prime Minister passed off in a similar manner, but with him I was even less reserved. He was also full of the most solemn protestations, and the most friendly professions to me personally, and to the British Government, and seemed disposed to treat with Herat; but I fear there is little chance that any terms can be agreed upon.

I am to see the Shah to-morrow, to take his pleasure on my attempting to mediate, which the Minister seems disposed to agree to.

No. 79.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. McNeill.

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 22, 1838.

I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings, as far as they have been made acquainted with them by your despatch of the 11th of April.

I wait for further information from you to see whether it will be necessary to give you any additional instructions besides those already sent to you.

I am, &c.

John McNeill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.
No. 80.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Foreign Office, July 27, 1838.

SIR,

I have to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport of the Treaty between Persia and Great Britain, is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears, on the contrary, that the Shah is occupied in subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British possessions; and that in these operations he has openly connected himself with an European Power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests; that under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above mentioned Treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that Treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests, and the security of her dominions may suggest.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 81.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 11, 1838.)

Camp, before Herat, May 12, 1838.

I have the honor to report, for your Lordship's information, that a few days after the date of my last despatch, the Shah agreed to let me send Major Todd into Herat to ascertain the views and feelings of its Government, and the probability of being able to bring about an accommodation. I proposed, that if the Herat Government should be disposed to negotiate, a person should be sent out for that purpose, who might be entrusted with conducting the negotiation on the part of the Herat Government, offering at the same time to afford him every assistance in my power. Major Todd, after having failed in an attempt to enter the place, in consequence of his having been conducted to a point respecting which the Afghans were particularly jealous, succeeded next day (the 19th April) in gaining admission. He was very well received, and found Yar Mahommed Khan (the Vizier) and Prince Kamran not only disposed to attend to any advice I might have to offer, but desirous to entrust the whole negotiation to me, and to conclude an arrangement on the basis I had been permitted by the Shah to propose. His Persian Majesty had considerably modified the terms he had hitherto demanded, for he no longer insisted on placing a garrison in Herat, or assessing and appropriating the revenues of the country, which, previous to my arrival in camp, he had stated to be indispensable conditions in any arrangement that might be entered into. But he still required that Kamran should renounce the title of Shah, and that Yar Mahommed Khan should come to wait upon him in camp.
Major Todd on his return next day, brought a letter from Yar Mahommed Khan (1) giving me full powers to conclude for the Government of Herat any arrangement I might consider advisable, but requiring that the British Government should guarantee the observance of the Treaty by Persia; the Shah having also demanded that I should guarantee on the part of my Government the observance of the engagements entered into by the Afghans. Major Todd’s conversations with Prince Kamran and with Yar Mahommed Khan lead him to believe that the two points to which the Shah attached so much importance, might be arranged if I could obtain access to the town.

Major Todd having reported to the Shah and the Prime Minister the result of his visit to the town, His Majesty immediately sent for me and proposed concluding an arrangement on the spot, but demanded that Prince Kamran should wait upon him in camp, and give a written acknowledgment that Herat is Persian Territory. This amounted to an acknowledgment that Herat was dependent on Persia. I replied that the people of Herat were now fighting for their independence, and that I saw no prospect of their being induced to agree to a proposal which went to sacrifice it. The Shah had ordered his troops to prepare for a general assault that night. The orders to that effect had been circulated in the Persian trenches, and the men were in good spirits. The besieged also were on their guard, and confident in the strength of the place, and their own courage; and though it seemed most probable that the Persians would be repulsed, the result, as on all such occasions, was doubtful, and nothing seemed to be certain, but that much blood must be shed; and as I was willing, if by any exertion of mine it could be accomplished, to save the lives of so many men, I proposed to the Shah to go into the town, and ascertain whether or not Prince Kamran and his Minister would agree to the Shah’s proposition, stating however my conviction that they would not. The Shah consented. The Minister assured me, as he had done on former occasions, that I was at liberty to conclude the matter in any manner I might think advisable, and that I had as full power to act for the Persian Government as I had for my own; while the Shah entreated rather than insisted that Herat should be acknowledged to be Persian ground. A truce was concluded till I should return from the town, and Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart and Majors Farrant and Todd proceeded to the Persian trenches, to see that it was faithfully observed by the Persian army.

When I passed from the Persian to the Afghan trenches, the night was already far advanced, and everything was prepared on both sides for the intended assault. I was received by my friend Futeh Mahommed Khan, who had been Envoy in Persia, and whose trenches I entered. There I found the Afghans full of courage and confidence; and I was astonished by the strength and extent of the works which they had constructed since the commencement of the siege, and which
seemed to me, at the only points at which I saw them, to be capable of being defended against better troops than those which had been about to assault them.

I spent the remainder of the night in conversation with Yar Mahommed Khan, certainly one of the most remarkable men of his age and country; and arranged with him a Draft of a Treaty (2.) which conceded all the demands of the Shah, except that which went to sacrifice the independence of Herat.

On the morning of the 20th, before I had yet left the town, I heard of the arrival of Count Simonich in camp; and I ceased to hope that the adjustment of the differences between Persia and Herat was on the point of being effected. On my return to camp, I found the Shah's views had undergone an important change: his manner was more abrupt and peremptory; and he at once rejected the proposed agreement, and spoke of prosecuting the siege. In the course of the evening, His Majesty addressed me a note, stating, that if I would undertake on the part of Prince Kamran to acknowledge Herat to be Persian territory and to bring His Highness to camp to wait upon the Shah, His Majesty would accept the Treaty, but if not, that he must proceed with the siege.

I replied that, in regard to the first point, I could distinctly state my inability to agree to the demand; but that, in respect to the second, I could say nothing decided; for that, while in the presence of Kamran Shah, after having urged and induced him to consent to abandon that title, and when I saw before me the frail old man, and called to mind the dignity of his family, and the fame and glory of his ancestors, my feelings had not permitted me even to propose to him the further humiliation of making a personal submission to another Sovereign.

After having received this answer, the Shah sent to inform me that the Afghans were working in the breaches, and that he should be obliged to fire upon them; to this I could offer no objection; but I proposed, if His Majesty preferred it, to send a person into the town to prevent the work from being carried on. In about an hour the firing recommenced; and from that time the siege was prosecuted with renewed activity; for Count Simonich gave his advice as to the best manner of conducting it, and employed an officer of the Etat-Major, belonging to his suite, to construct batteries, and to carry on other offensive operations against the town. The Shah again became elated with the hope of success. The Russian Minister furnished a sum of money to be given to the Persian soldiers; and his countenance, support, and advice, confirmed the Shah in his resolution to grant no conditions to the Afghans of Herat. Nevertheless, I thought it desirable to keep open the negotiation, if it should be practicable to do so; and in my letter to Yar Mahommed Khan, (3.) intimating the Shah's objections to the proposed Treaty, I called upon him for an answer, (4.) which, however, I did not receive till after some days, when the Persian Go-
government was no longer disposed to negotiate or to permit any communication with the town.

In this state of things, I came to the resolution of addressing to the Persian Ministers the official note which forms the inclosure, No. 5; and though the language may be considered stronger than any I had been specially instructed to use, I believe it contains nothing that is not sanctioned by the communications I have received from Her Majesty's Ministers or from India.

The reply of the Persian Ministers, (6.) the tone of various parts of which is so inconsistent, made it necessary for me again to address them a letter, (7.) which the Prime Minister now entreats me not to call upon him to answer.

For ten days I had withdrawn myself from all personal communication with the Shah and his Ministers, when I received the inclosed note from the Minister, (8.) inviting me again to take a part in the discussion, and to arrange matters in any way that I should think proper. In consequence of this invitation, I waited on His Excellency, who protested that the Persian Government had now no other object than to obtain security for its own territory and its subjects, and to procure the restitution of the prisoners now in bondage amongst the various tribes subject to Herat.

The Treaty proposed by me on my return from the town, had provided for these objects, and after a very short discussion, the Prime Minister accepted it with some trifling modifications to which I offered no objections; but he again insisted that security could not be obtained without the guarantee of the British Government, and that he would enter into no engagements with the Affghans on any other condition. I was very reluctant to incur so great a responsibility without having received specific instructions on the subject; but it was sufficiently obvious that no Treaty could be concluded, unless the parties obtained a higher security than either of themselves could offer. The position of affairs at Kandahar and even at Cabool was precarious, and depended in a great measure on the success or failure of the Shah at this place; and I felt that, if I could succeed by any means in preserving the independence of Herat, I should have secured from danger our influence in all the countries between the frontiers of Persia and the Indus.

Under the circumstances, I agreed to incur the responsibility of guaranteeing in the name of Her Majesty, the Treaty which I had proposed, and which the Shah and his Minister had accepted. There now appeared to be nothing more necessary, but that I should go into the town to obtain its formal acceptance and ratification by Prince Kamran. But this step, the Persian Government on various pretexts evaded sanctioning, and then required that I should engage, in the event of the Government of Herat refusing to ratify the Treaty, that I would no longer conduct its negotiations, promising however at the same time, that
on my having written a note to this effect, a man should immediately be sent to conduct me to the town. To this I assented, on condition that the Shah would pledge himself not to remain more than five days in his present position, and to evacuate the territories of Herat within ten days after the Treaty should have been accepted by Prince Kamran. No answer was returned to my note, and no man was sent. On my pressing him for a reply, the Minister informed me that it was necessary for him to communicate with the other civil and military Officers of the Shah, but at the same time he pledged himself to send a man to conduct me to the town next evening. This promise was not observed, and when I asked for an explanation, I was told that the Shah required to be indemnified for the losses he had sustained, or at least that he should receive a sum of money to give to his troops, who had suffered great privations. I remonstrated against this attempt to annex new conditions to a Treaty which had already been agreed to, not only by the Persian Prime Minister, but by the Shah himself, and the formal conclusion of which had been prevented only by the impediments opposed to it by the Persian Government itself, in violation of the written promises of the Prime Minister.

This morning I received a note from His Excellency in answer to this remonstrance, stating that the Treaty could not be regarded as binding on Persia, because the Afghans still continued to fire and to make sorties; declaring that the losses of Persia in this campaign had amounted to five or six crores (two and a half or three millions) of tomauns; expressing his conviction that the British Government could not desire to see Persia exposed to so great a loss; and concluding by what he said was mentioned merely in jest, viz. that as I was reported to have given 8,000 tomauns to Yar Mahommed Khan, when I visited the town, he thought it hard that he should not have benefited by me to the value of 8,000 farthings. In reply I informed him, that as the Persian Government had not permitted the fact of a Treaty having been agreed upon to be communicated to the Afghans, I could be in no way responsible for the observance of the Treaty by them, and no longer considered myself bound to guarantee it; that the British Government certainly by no means desired that Persia should suffer so great a loss, and that the best evidence of the sincerity of this statement was to be found in the representations and arguments by which I had endeavoured, previous to the Shah's march from Tehran, to dissuade the Persian Government from exposing itself to these losses; that in regard to what His Excellency mentioned of my having been reported to have given 8,000, tomauns to Yar Mahommed Khan, I was ready to pay His Excellency 100 tomauns for every tomaun I had taken into the town, and given to Yar Mahommed Khan, provided the Persian Government would accept that amount, whatever it might be, in repayment of its losses.
The cause of the change in the Shah's views, and of the increased confidence which led him to demand more favourable terms, was the arrival of a messenger from Kandahar, with letters from Kohundil Khan, promising to aid the Shah against Herat, or at least offering his services generally, and announcing his intention to send his son Mahomed Omar Khan to the Shah’s camp with some troops. The bearers of these letters also assured the Shah that there was no probability of any attempt being made by the Afghans of Cabool or any other part of the country to relieve Herat, and that he had therefore nothing to fear from that quarter in pursuing his own views.

Relieved from the serious apprehensions he had entertained on this subject, and urged on by the Russian Minister with so much eagerness that the Shah feared it would give umbrage to the Russian Government, if he desisted till Herat should have been taken, it would not be wonderful if he should decide on prosecuting the siege.

In the meantime, the Heratees made a sortie in force, and captured from the Persians a trench which they still retain, having held it for above two days; and yesterday morning a party of predatory horse succeeded in carrying off about 100 horses from the pastures in the vicinity of the camp. About 2,000 indigent persons have been turned out of the town, which it is said now contains provisions enough to feed the remaining inhabitants for six months; but it is reported today that dissensions have taken place in the town, and that an action has been fought within the walls between the two parties. These reports are circulated by deserters, on whose veracity it would be hazardous to place any reliance; if however they should ultimately prove to be correct, the fall of Herat cannot be far distant. But if no dissension occurs in the town, I am of opinion that there is little probability, notwithstanding the aid afforded by the Russian mission, of the Shah's being able to take it, otherwise than by a protracted blockade. It would now be difficult to induce the Persian troops to assault with vigour; on the night of the 20th ultimo the attack would probably have been energetic; but as I anticipated, the troops have not again got up the same firmness of resolution, or energy of purpose; and I doubt whether they will be in the same temper again; but extensive desertion, or any division in the town, would be fatal to the defence; and there can now I think be no doubt that the fall of Herat would bring after it the real as well as the nominal submission of Kandahar.

(Inclusion 1.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Yar Mahomed Khan, Vizier of Herat, to His Excellency Mr. McNeill. A.C.

At this time, Mr. Todd, your Excellency’s Secretary, whom you had despatched, having arrived in the city, I have been extremely delighted by the perusal of your letter, and by hearing of your arrival in
camp. I have enjoyed unbounded pleasure and gratification from the consideration of our ancient friendship, and also in consequence of the great kindness which you showed to my relation Futteh Mahommed Khan. You have also at the present time evinced the kindest feelings. May it please God, the merciful, during the term of our existence, that the bonds of friendship and the ties of unanimity may be strengthened. I shall never be satisfied if I fail in any way myself in the performance of these obligations. With regard to what your Excellency has stated, that you have always desired the welfare of God's people, and that you do not wish evil to any of the servants of the Almighty, this is indeed evident, and it is as clear as the sun that you are the well-wisher of all people; and in particular, I know, as I have always known your friendship, and kind feeling towards myself, your Excellency's mediation in this affair is most valuable and desirable, and you may consider us, in fact, and in truth, as entirely at your disposal, especially with regard to the question at issue.

With respect to the restitution of prisoners, such prisoners as are in our hands, or in the possession of those under our authority, certainly let the prisoners on both sides be liberated and restored.

With respect to plunder and devastation, these should entirely be put a stop to, that there never being hereafter warfare or contention, no damage or loss may be inflicted on the King's dominions or territories, and plunder and devastation shall cease, neither party interfering with the country of the other.

With regard also to His Majesty having agreed not to place troops in Herat, it is necessary and indispensable for the satisfaction of both parties, that His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary of the British Government, should become the mediator between the two parties, and guarantee to both in the performance of the above stipulations; and in the same manner that His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary becomes responsible on our part to the Persian Government, so on the part of the Persian Government, shall His Excellency, as the Representative of the British Government, be the guarantee of the Afghan nation, in order that hereafter no aggression may be offered by them (the Persian Government) to the Afghan people. Under these circumstances, it will be necessary that His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary should have the kindness to visit the city, in order that the above affairs may be arranged.

Mr. Todd has at this time been honored with an audience of His Majesty the Shah, (Kamran,) and after much conversation and discourse, His Majesty commanded that "in the same manner as His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary of the British Government, exercises from his own Government, the office and functions of Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia; so in like manner on my part is he the Minister Plenipotentiary to the Persian Government, and Vizier with unlimited authority in all concerns and affairs of the
greatest or the least importance; and regarding the welfare of my Government as he does the welfare of his own, let him in any way that he deems advisable, use his best endeavours to arrange my affairs."
The above-mentioned gentleman will inform your Excellency in detail of other matters which have been made known to him. You will consider what he says as from us.

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

(Inclosure 2.)—Translation of a Draft of a Treaty agreed to by the Government of Herat, and proposed to the Persian Government by His Excellency Mr. McNeill.
Stipulations which His Highness Kamran Meerza will engage to perform.

I. HOSTILITIES and plunder shall cease, and the capture and selling of slaves shall entirely be put a stop to.

II. The subjects and dependents of the Shah-in-Shah of Irán shall in no way be annoyed, and no attempt shall be made to injure them, and no disturbance shall be created on the frontier of Khorassan.

III. Every possible endeavour shall be used to prevent the Turcomans or others from plundering in the territory of the Shah-in-Shah of Irán, and in the event of these tribes offending, should the Shah-in-Shah of Irán desire to chastise and punish them, this Government shall furnish troops to the extent of its ability to co-operate with the troops of the Shah-in-Shah of Persia, for the chastisement of the above-mentioned tribes.

IV. Whatever number of slaves may be in bondage with the Afghans of Herat and its dependencies, all that are within reach, or that they may be able to restore, shall be restored.

V. Whatever persons of the Afghans may have joined the Shah-in-Shah of Irán, shall not in any way be molested or injured.

VI. Hereafter Prince Kamran shall not give himself the title of Shah, but shall content himself with that of Shahzadeh.

VII. Merchants from all parts who shall enter the territory of Herat and its dependencies, shall be in every respect protected, and shall not be molested in life or property.

VIII. The tribe of Hazareh shall not be restored, but this Government shall do all in its power to remove them to their former abodes in the Persian territory.

Demands of His Highness Kamran Meerza.

I. His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah of Irán shall treat Prince Kamran as one of his own brothers.
II. The Ministers of the Persian Government shall in no possible way interfere in the internal affairs of the dominions in possession of Prince Kamran; but these affairs shall be left under the entire control of the Ministers of the Government of Herat, that they may be able to fulfil their engagement.

III. Ghorian shall be given over to Sheer Mahommed Khan, and Sheer Mahommed Khan himself shall at all times remain with the Shah-in-Shah of Irán.

IV. The Shah-in-Shah of Irán shall not send troops to the territories in possession of Prince Kamran, and shall prohibit his governors, and soldiers, and subjects, from plundering.

After the above terms have been agreed to and ratified, and the Persian army has been removed from the immediate vicinity of Herat, Yar Mahommed Khan shall himself come to the presence of His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah of Irán, and shall present a Peesh-kush to His Majesty.

This well-wisher of the State (His Excellency John Mc Neill, Esq., Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia) engages that in the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of these stipulations, the British Government shall act as judge; and in the event of either party failing to perform its engagements, it (the British Government) shall use its best endeavours to make such party fulfil the above stipulations.

Translated by
(Signed) D’ARCY TODD.

(Inclusion 3.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Excellency Yar Mahommed Khan, Vizier of Herat.

A. C.

I have made known the stipulations and requirements of His Majesty Kamran Shah, as contained in the accompanying memorandum, to His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah of Persia.

In reply, His Majesty’s commands were:

"Either the whole people of Herat shall make their submission and acknowledge themselves my subjects, or I will take possession of the fortress by force of arms, and make them obedient and submissive."

As I had no authority of any kind to consent to this, I was obliged to represent in reply, that I had it not in my power to accede to His Majesty’s demands.

The arrangement of which I had wished to become the mediator has therefore been rendered null. If, after being made acquainted with the commands of His Majesty the Shah of Persia, you find it in your power to agree to more than you gave me authority to conclude, pray inform me of it; and also in the event of your not being able to do so, that I may break off my mediation, and cease to hold any further conference on the subject.

As it was arranged at our meeting that I should inform you of what-
over His Majesty might command in reply, I have therefore written these few lines.

What more can I write?

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

(Inclusion 4.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Yar Muhammed Khan, Vizier of Herat, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.
A. C.

I have received your Excellency's letter and understood its contents; with regard to the Persian Government not having agreed to the terms proposed, it matters not.

Although from the first I knew that this matter could not be arranged, according to your request I placed it in your hands; as I knew that your Government was a mighty Government, and that you were actuated by the kindest feelings towards us, we placed ourselves unreservedly at your disposal.

Even now, if it be possible, and you are able to arrange the affair, as it is incumbent on you to act with justice to all parties, it is necessary that the advantages and results of that justice should be made apparent.

But if they (the Persians) will not attend to your words, we must answer with our bodies, and leave the result to God. Be not distressed. Now that we have suffered so many injuries; and have been kept back from our tillage and cultivation, and have suffered that loss which should not have befallen us, what have we now to care for?

I have not written more. To conclude, may the season of honor and dignity be perpetual.

Translated by
(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

(Inclusion 5.)—Mr. Mc Neill to His Persian Majesty's Ministers.

The Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentuary at the Court of Persia, has the honor to inform His Persian Majesty's Ministers, that having endeavoured by the desire of both parties, and in conformity with the terms of the Treaty of Tehran, to mediate between the Persian Government and the Afghan Government of Herat, for the purpose of terminating by an amicable adjustment, and by the conclusion of an equitable Treaty, the differences which unhappily exist between these high Parties; and finding that the only impediment to the success of his mediation is the demand of the Persian Government, that Herat and its dependencies shall be acknowledged to be Persian territory, and that the Sovereign and the people of Herat shall acknowledge themselves to be Persian subjects, it becomes the duty of the Undersigned to state with frankness and perfect sincerity, that the British Government, having in times past contracted alliances with the Sovereigns of Afghanistan, by which it
recognized their independence, and that of the Afghan nation; finding also that the Government of Afghanistan is mentioned in the Treaty of Tehran in terms which leave no doubt that the Afghan nation, at the time of concluding that Treaty, was regarded by the Persian Government as an independent State; and keeping in mind that the affairs of Herat have, de facto, been administered up to this time by a Government exercising an independent jurisdiction over its own subjects; Her Britannic Majesty’s Government can neither take part in, nor countenance any attempt to subvert the independence of a State, however small may be the extent of its territory, which, like Herat, has sought an equitable adjustment of its differences with the Persian Government, and has repeatedly offered, through the channel of the Undersigned, to make to His Persian Majesty every reasonable concession, and to satisfy every just demand.

The British Government sees, with extreme regret, that His Persian Majesty is wasting in enterprises which, even if successful, can neither contribute to the stability of his Throne, nor to the prosperity of his kingdom, resources which every friend of Persia must desire to see employed in maintaining the internal tranquillity, and providing for the security of His Persian Majesty’s Empire; and notwithstanding the desire which the British Government has ever felt and substantially evinced to add to the strength and security of Persia, Her Britannic Majesty would not consider herself justified in continuing to afford assistance to Persia if it is to be directed by the Persian Government against its neighbours, and to be employed, not for purposes of defence, for which alone it was intended, but for purposes of aggression or territorial aggrandisement.

The Undersigned has the honor further to state, that the British Government cannot view with indifference the persevering attempt of His Persian Majesty to subdue, to overturn, or to disturb all the existing Governments in the various States or Principalities which intervene between the Persian frontier and the British dominions in India; and that it cannot regard the policy which the Persian Government has lately pursued in these parts, as conducive to the true interest of Persia, consistent with the spirit, of her Treaty with England, or calculated to give a character of cordiality or stability to the alliance which has so long, and hitherto so happily, subsisted between the Sovereigns of Great Britain and Persia. His Persian Majesty’s Ministers are well aware that the object which Great Britain proposed to herself in her alliance, with Persia, and the purpose of the stipulations of the Treaty which established that alliance, were the tranquillity and security of these frontiers, and their protection from the disturbing attempts of other nations; but now the Persian Government itself becomes the cause of producing the very evils which it was the object of the alliance, and the chief purpose of the Treaty to prevent.
The Undersigned is unwilling in this place to touch on a variety of circumstances not unknown to the Persian Government, which have occurred within the last two years, and which assuredly have not tended to give the British Government greater confidence in the feelings or intentions of the Government of Persia; but the Undersigned feels himself called upon especially to mention an official letter* from the Persian Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which it is distinctly announced, in the name of the Shah, that the Persian Government no longer considers itself bound to fulfil the stipulations of the Treaty with England. The Undersigned was willing to believe that this statement was made by mistake; but to the letter† in which he required an ex-

* Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali to Mr. McC Neill.

(Extract.)
18th Rubbes-oos-Sanee, 1253, July 11, 1837.

I have received your Excellency's letter which has been laid before the King (may God preserve his Kingdom and Sovereignty), His Majesty has commanded me to answer; First, that the auspicious Treaty no longer continues in its original form, for every Article that contained advantages to Persia, and which was of detriment to England, has been abrogated; therefore it does not seem incumbent on the Persian Government, that it should ratify or acknowledge to be in force, whatever is to the detriment of Persia and to the advantage of England.

† Translation of a Letter from Mr. McC Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Extract.)
20th Rubbes-oos-Sanee, 1253, July 13, 1837.

I have received your letter written with the pen of friendship. First, you have stated that the auspicious Treaty "no longer continues in its original form, for every Article that contained advantages for Persia, and which was of detriment to England, has been abrogated; therefore it does not seem incumbent on the Persian Government that it should ratify or acknowledge to be in force whatever is to the detriment of Persia and to the advantage of England." This is my reply; whatever changes have been introduced, and whatever Articles have been abrogated, they were both done by mutual consent. A Ruckum by the late Prince Royal and a Firman by the late King in ratification, were issued on this point, and are a proof of the concurrence of both parties. The Ministers of the British Government never imagined that the Ministers of Persia would not consider it incumbent on themselves to fulfil the obligations incurred by them in the Articles of the Treaty which remain in force, and it is very probable that the announcement of such sentiments will do injury to the credit of this Government. Now that the Persian Government has declared these sentiments, it becomes incumbent on me to demand, with the least possible delay, an explanation on this subject from the Persian Government, and to bring it to the knowledge of my own Government, in order that the English Government, if it trusted to the Persian Government for the accomplishment of certain objects in the Treaty, might be relieved from this error, and endeavour to find a remedy in another quarter; particularly now that His Majesty proposes to march into the dominions of the Affghans. From the unbounded confidence I feel in the good faith and honor of His Majesty, the sentiments you have conveyed to me appear very extraordinary; and I think it probable that you expressed them by mistake. I beg you will be so good as to inform me speedily, if the conjecture I have formed is correct, or whether the sentiments of the Persian Government are really such as you have stated to me.
planation of this remarkable assertion, the Persian Government did not even deign to vouchsafe a reply. Nevertheless, it is still the anxious desire of Her Britannic Majesty's Ministers to see every cause of coldness and alienation between the Governments speedily removed, and to feel themselves again at liberty, without fear of injuring the interests of their own nation, to afford to Persia the full support and the assistance which they are reluctantly compelled in the present position of affairs to withhold.

In conclusion, the Undersigned begs leave to express a hope that His Persian Majesty, consulting the real interests of his own kingdom and those of his alliance with England, may still be induced to conclude an equitable arrangement with the Government of Herat, and to abstain from causing further disorder on these frontiers: thus putting an end to hostilities, and preventing the effusion of much innocent blood, from which Persia can ultimately derive no advantage. He hopes that His Persian Majesty will prefer the ascertained advantages of a cordial alliance with Great Britain, to the very questionable and temporary gratification which His Persian Majesty may hope to derive from prosecuting an enterprise, in which success could now bring him no accession of renown, but in which, if he presses it further, a failure, which is the more probable result, cannot but tarnish the reputation of his arms, and may not improbably lead to other evils of greater magnitude.

The Undersigned, at all times desirous not only to preserve entire but to draw more close the bonds of friendship and unity between the British and Persian Nations, which he has spent the greater part of his life in endeavours to strengthen and improve, trusts that the reply of the Persian Ministers to this communication will be such as to give him confidence in the cordiality and stability of the friendship which has hitherto united the two nations, and will relieve him from the anxiety he feels, lest his zealous labours for twenty years in the service of this State should prove to have been of no avail.

The Undersigned, with sentiments of the highest consideration for His Persian Majesty's Ministers, has the honor to be, &c.

(Signed)  JOHN Mc NEILL.

Camp, before Herat, April 24, 1838.

(Inclusion 6.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

The Ministers of the Persian Government in answer to the Letter of His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the Government of Great Britain and India, beg leave to state, that in respect to the question with the Afghans of Herat, the Persian Government was not willing that His Excellency
should take the trouble of coming to, or remaining in the royal camp, or of discussing these matters either verbally or by written official communications; according to the existing Treaty it is necessary that the Ministers of the Persian Government should furnish His Excellency with an official document to enable him to mediate in these matters; but nothing of this kind has been done.

His Excellency himself proposed to visit the fortress in order to ascertain the views and desires of the Afghans, and to hear what they had to say for themselves, who had inflicted so much injury of all kinds on the Persian Government, carrying off its subjects into slavery, plundering its property, removing its wandering tribes; and who had never ceased to do all in their power to ruin Khorassan. The Persian Government, after the urgent requests of His Excellency, consented to his making these inquiries in consideration of the friendship between the States. After His Excellency’s return from the fortress, it became apparent that this permission had become the means of increasing the strength of the Afghans. Formerly they had consented to give indemnity for injuries, which they now refused.

With regard to what His Excellency has written respecting Prince Kamran acknowledging Herat to be a dependence of Persia, it is indeed evident and apparent to the whole world that Herat is one of the cities of Khorassan, and is represented as such in the maps of all countries, and this fact is stated without concealment in the histories of all States.

Amongst the evidences of this are their own papers, which were brought to Tehran by Futteh Mahommed Khan; and the authority of Prince Kamran is derived from a Firman of His late Majesty Futteh Ali Shah. The Afghans themselves do not deny that Prince Kamran came to the presence of His late Majesty Futteh Ali Shah, at Tehran, and after making submission, received by Firman the Government of Herat. If the friendship of the British Government with the Afghans be made the means of separating this country from Persia, so, as the British Government, in consequence of the friendship between the States, has intercourse with all parts of Persia, ought all those parts in like manner to be separated from Persia?

Although it is stipulated in the existing Treaty that the British Government shall not, in the event of a war, concern itself with the Afghans, nevertheless the Persian Government, in consideration of the friendship between the States, remained silent, and did not forbid communication.

Hitherto the Afghans have never regarded themselves as an independent State, having repeatedly made submission, and given Peesh-kush.

In like manner, in the year of the decease of the late heir-apparent, when His present Majesty succeeded as heir to the throne, he came to
these parts, and at that time never did they (the Afghans of Herat) assert such pretensions, nor did other Governments put forward such statements as these.

The Persian Government has never requested the British Government to become a party in obtaining the restitution of prisoners (slaves) or tribes, or in relieving these countries from the disturbances of this people, although it (the Persian Government) is always desirous in time of need, when any one without just cause should attack the Persian Territory, that the British Government, in consideration of the friendship between the States, should to the utmost of its ability prevent the aggression, and render assistance to the Persian Government.

The British Government, in its exceeding kindness and anxiety on our account, have not deemed it advisable that the resources of the Persian Government should be expended on trifling occasions. This is supposing that the territory of Persia be secure from plunder and rapine, slavery, massacre, and destruction, that then the Government should occupy itself in the improvement of other places.

At the present moment, when 100,000 Persian subjects are in the slave markets of Toorkistan, and countries have been utterly destroyed, delay in punishing the offenders would be to sacrifice the existing resources of the country, and to diminish its resources for the future.

How can the British Government, notwithstanding the present friendship and alliance between the States, consent to this disturbance and ruin in the Persian territory, that there should be no repose in the country, which is conquered, and trodden down, and oppressed on all sides?

If it (the British Government) is satisfied with this state of things, it is evident that it has some other object. It will then be necessary for the Persian Government to consider by what means it can remedy the evil, and after it has dispatched a judicious and intelligent Envoy, and having heard such statements from the Ministers of the British Government, to take some other means for its own protection and security. The Persian Government has no other object in view at present, than the tranquillity of its frontiers, and the prevention of plunder and slavery. In the same manner as it did last year with the Turkomans of the Goorgaun and the Attruck, so this year it must carry into effect its determination of preventing the disturbances of the Afghans of Herat, and the Turkomans of Merve and the adjacent parts.

If the execution of these designs should be regarded by foreign States as contrary to the true interests of Persia, and a cause of offence to themselves, to what can this be attributed?

If in consequence of these trifling matters, with which other Governments are undoubtedly acquainted, the British Government should feel a want of confidence and security, and should attribute them to
other intentions, it will be apparent that the British Government does not desire the stability of this Government, and it (the British Government) will become the cause of bad feeling between the Governments. Let it not be supposed that the Persian Government will let this matter remain unknown, or fail to communicate it to other Governments. With regard to certain writings, although the writer failed to express himself accurately, and to convey his meaning distinctly, yet as the words he used contained nothing that could evince unfriendly feeling on our part, it should not be attributed to any unfriendly motive. The true meaning was, that the Ministers of the British Government, without the sanction of their Government, with a view to their own interests, will not carry into effect certain stipulations of the existing Treaty; but whenever it is to their interest, they say that they are ordered to carry them into effect, and without any bond or obligation from this Government. But on the part of the Ministers of the Persian Government, thanks be to God, no word or letter of the existing Treaty has been perverted or violated; and henceforth, so long as this Government shall exist, nothing shall be done contrary to existing Treaties with any Government; indeed, it is evident that to act in violation of a Treaty is unworthy of the dignity of mighty sovereigns.

If certain Ministers and Envoys, for their own purposes, should misrepresent things to their own Governments, no doubt the misunderstanding will be easily removed, and no signs of coolness or decrease of friendship will at any time, or in any way, be displayed.

With regard to the request which His Excellency has made to the Ministers of the Persian Government, that just and equitable terms may be accorded to the people of Herat, and that thus hostilities may be terminated, and the shedding of innocent blood prevented, the plain answer is this, that in perfect friendship between the States, and His Excellency, a wise and learned person, being on the spot, if the object be to put an end to the war, it is necessary that the Ministers of the Persian Government should acquire a feeling of perfect security with respect to these parts, and then return; and that is conditional upon the restitution of prisoners; the restoration to their own land of the wandering tribes that have been removed from (Persian) Khorassan; the giving security to the Persian Government, either by hostages or trustworthy guarantee, that whether in prosperity or adversity, in tranquillity or trouble, the Afghans shall take no step that may cause uneasiness to our minds, and that they shall not be rebellious subjects: otherwise so long as it may be in the power of the Persian Government, it will not cease its endeavours to obtain this security.

And on this account no diminution or loss of friendship shall in any way be caused. Indeed, after these hostilities have been put a stop to, they (the British Ministers) will have reason to feel assured, that in consideration of the extreme friendship between the States, they
ought to have afforded us ample assistance and support in the prosecution of this enterprise; now that they have withheld it, they are themselves the best judges.

His Excellency need feel no anxiety or uneasiness on this account. Let him consider the stipulations of the existing Treaty more binding than in former times, and let him feel assured that every day of the twenty years during which His Excellency has faithfully served the two States, will in the eye of affection appear as one or even two hundred years, and will all be acceptable and agreeable to the exalted States.

(Sealed by) MEERZA ALI.

Translated by

2 Month of Suffer, A.H., 1254. (Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

Corresponding with April 27, 1838.

(Inclosure 7.)—Translation of a Letter addressed by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to the Ministers of the Persian Government.

I have had the honor to receive the answer of the Ministers of the Persian Government to my letter, and have thoroughly understood its contents.

My object in writing that letter was to afford information to the Ministers of the Persian Government, in consequence of my instructions to that effect; and now that my communication has been answered in this manner, I shall of course forward the answer to the Ministers of my own Government, that they may give their especial consideration to its meaning.

But as there are certain things in the answer which call for reply, I proceed to state, first, the Ministers of the Persian Government have declared that they had not in any way consented to my coming to or remaining in the royal camp. It is for the Ministers of the British Government to decide whether this statement indicates extreme friendship on the part of the Persian Government, or unfriendly feeling towards the British Government. If the Ministers of the Persian Government had not some object in view, and did not wish to change their conduct towards the British Government, why should they prohibit Persian subjects, contrary to former usage, from visiting its Minister? This prohibition proves that the Ministers of the Persian Government have in view some object, regarding which they do not deem it advisable to have information conveyed to the agents of the British Government. There can be no other construction put upon it; but there have been so many similar signs and evidences given of the friendship of this Government towards the British Government, that these now amount to demonstration.

Secondly; with regard to my not having permission to mediate, which has been stated, the truth is this; that although I have no written paper from the Ministers of the Persian Government to this effect to produce as my authority, yet if the Ministers of the Persian
Government place the same reliance on their own words that I did, the powers intrusted to me by the Persian Government exceeded those of a mediator.

It is also stated that my visit to the fortress was the cause of strengthening the Afghans. I had two objects to carry into effect, one was to induce Shah Kamran to relinquish the title of Shah, and to content himself with that of Shahzadeh (Prince); the other was to persuade Yar Mahommed Khan to come to the presence of His Majesty. Neither of these was without difficulty; but both were amongst the principal requirements of the Persian Government.

If to evince a desire to carry these into effect, and to induce the Afghans to accede to these two demands, could be the means or cause of strengthening the Afghans of Herat, then the statement of the Ministers of the Persian Government is true.

Thirdly; it is stated that in histories and maps, Herat is described and laid down as belonging to the territory of Persia. The statement is correct; but Georgia, Shuukee, Shumakheeh, Erivan, Karabaugh, and even Mosul, and Baghdad, have been also numbered amongst the hereditary dominions of Persia; but these places are now in the possession of others, and no longer belong to the Persian Government.

This fact is certain, that from the period of the accession of the dynasty of Kujurs to the throne of Persia, up to the present time, the Afghans have been independent.

Suppose that in consequence of the kingdom of the descendants of Ameer Timoor having come into the possession of the Monarch of Great Britain and India, the British Government were to take possession of the whole of the territories which had been subject to Ameer Timoor, would they be justified in doing so, or not?

Fourthly; with regard to what is stated respecting the writings which were brought to Tehran by Futteh Mahommed Khan, the Envoy from Herat: if the Ministers of the Persian Government believed these writings to be true and authentic, it is evident there would have been no necessity for this advance and movement of troops; but after the Ministers of the Persian Government themselves did not believe these writings to be true or worthy of credit, and in consequence of their disbelief in, and discredit of, these writings, they marched an army in this direction, what possible reliance or confidence can be placed in these writings that they should be produced as evidence or testimony? However, the contents of the Treaty concluded between the two Governments afford a clear demonstration that the Ministers of the Persian Government acknowledged the independence of the Afghans.

Fifthly; it is stated with regard to the Envoys of the British Government that they do certain things for their own ends and purposes. Should it be known, or become known to the Ministers of the British Government, that their Envoys or Agents in Persia, or elsewhere, have
acted contrary to established rule, or, without the consent of their own Government, have attempted to arrange any affair, such conduct will be investigated and disapproved of; but the investigation of such matters is with their own Government.

Sixthly; with regard to the statement regarding an arrangement with the Afghans of Herat: if the wish and desire of the Ministers of the Persian Government be really the tranquillity of the people, and the peace of the country subject to Persia, and the restitution of prisoners as far as may be practicable, and the possession of security against the disturbances of the Afghans on the frontiers of Persia, and the assistance and endeavours of that people to prevent others from disturbing or injuring the hereditary dominions of Persia, these objects would be gained and this tranquillity secured by the very Treaty the draft of which I laid before His Majesty a few days ago, and the conclusion of which I was desirous to mediate.

The only apparent obstacle to the arrangement of these matters are certain unreasonable propositions, impossible to be carried into effect, which have been made by the Ministers of the Persian Government to the Afghans.

It appears probable that every delay and procrastination that occurs in settling this affair will render the ultimate arrangement of it more difficult and troublesome, and may be the cause of still further loss to the Persian Government.

In conclusion; if the wish and desire of the Ministers of the Persian Government be to obtain security from the Afghans, and to put an end to disturbance and aggression on their part in the hereditary dominions of Persia, the matter can be arranged with facility; but if the Persian Government has other objects, that is a separate affair.

Translated by
D'ARCY TODD.

Written on the 10th of the Month Shavver-ool Muzzaffur, A. H. 1254.
Corresponding with May 1, 1838.

(Inclosure 8.) — Translation of a Note from His Excellency Haji Meerza Aghasee to His Excellency Mr. McNeill.

A.C.

I have perused your Excellency's letter. My heart longs to write you a few words, and these words are not on matters of business which involve a thousand discussions and altercations, but in faithfulness and friendship and disinterestedness.

"Alas for thee who knowest not thy faithful friend! I am thy friend, and thou knowest me not!"

You hold yourself aloof from me who am a Dervish, and however much I keep myself aloof from affairs of Government, you still draw
me by force into them; and although I have submitted the affairs of both Governments to your discretion and disposal, you speak to me only in the way of mockery and derision and anger. Although it has been said, "I must submit to your coquetry because you are lovely, but coquetry must be proportioned to the lover’s power of endurance." I swear by my life that I have never had anything concealed from you in my heart, and I have never desired to do anything without your approval and consent; and I have always written that having such a person of wisdom as your Excellency in Persia, you may do anything you may deem for the welfare of the two Governments. I know not what evil-disposed person talks to your Excellency, and makes your Excellency angry with me. However, give not ear to this and that person, but do whatever you think for the welfare of the two Governments, and liberate us from the confusion of this wretched place. We have a thousand wounds to heal. We ought to return and take thought for our provision for the future, so that this may not be added to the load of our difficulties. I swear by your precious life that these affairs can be settled with ease and facility, and after our return the Ministers of the British Government will have nothing to complain of, and will not only understand our object and desires, but will give us praise and commendation. To conclude—the answers to your Excellency’s two letters, after they have been submitted to the consideration of His Majesty the Shah, shall be written and forwarded to you. I have been unwell for two days, and could not transact any business. I will not trouble you further. May the season of honor be perpetual.

Translated by
(Signed) D’ARCY TODD.

No. 82.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 11, 1838.)
(Camp, before Herat, May 14, 1838.)

HITHERTO I have been unable to obtain redress for the ill-treatment of the messenger, or for the threat to the Resident at Bushire. The Commercial Treaty has again been agreed to by the Shah, and he has even promised a Firman acknowledging Mr. Bonham as Commercial Agent to the British Government at Tabreez; but the execution of these promises is put off from day to day. Strict orders have been issued to all persons in camp not to visit me, a thing hitherto unheard of in Persia; and from day to day, stories fabricated by the officers of the Government, and discreditable to the English, are circulated in camp. It is true they are not generally believed, for we are generally known, and, I am happy to say, respected.

To such an extent has the system of annoyance been carried, that I sometimes doubt whether I am justified in submitting to it any longer; but I await your Lordship’s replies to the letters carried to England by Colonel Sheil before I venture to decide.
No. 83.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 11, 1838.)

(Extract.)

Camp, before Herat, May 15, 1838.

As I did not express great confidence of being able to withdraw the Shah from this place, I hope my not having succeeded in doing so will not cause much disappointment. Had Count Simonich been delayed a few days, or had the Kandahar emissaries not arrived when they did, my own impression, and indeed the general belief is, that I should have succeeded; but then I had fears lest my having agreed to guarantee the Treaty might not have been approved; and as I see no immediate prospect of the fall of the place, I shall abstain for some time from putting myself prominently forward.

Nothing can have been more determined than the defense of the town, or more respectable than the steadiness with which the Afghans have adhered to the same proposals for an accommodation. Yesterday the Persians were elated by reports of dissensions in the town, and this morning they are equally depressed by having had several hundreds of their men killed, wounded, or taken, and two guns carried off from their batteries by the Afghans, in a sortie, which they made early in the night. The Afghans appear to have lost only three or four men. The Afghans have now, since my arrival here, carried off and thrown into the ditch seven of the Shah’s guns. Their sorties are made by bodies of from 50 to 300, and always sword in hand. A considerable quantity of gun ammunition will probably arrive in a few days, and it is the Shah’s intention with this to bombard the town from two cavaliers or raised bastions, constructed by Captain Blarenberg. If this fails, His Majesty proposes to storm, and if he should be repulsed, to retreat.

The latest letters I have seen from Captain Burnes and Lieutenant Leech, have been of the 6th and the 1st of March, respectively. The former I mentioned in my last letter to your Lordship, and I have now the honor to inclose a copy of the latter.

(Inclosure.)—Lieutenant Leech to Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart.

(Kandahar, March 6, 1838.)

A despatch, of seventeen days’ date, was yesterday brought for the Sirdars from the Persian camp, from the Kandahar Elchee, Alladdad, containing the following letters:—1st, from Mahommed Shah; 2nd, from an Officer of the Russian Embassy, signing himself Le Conseiller Honoraire Goutte; 3rd, from Major-General Borowski; 4th, from Kumber Ali, the late Persian Elchee to this Court; 5th, from Hajee Aghassee; 6th, from the son of Meerza Massood; 7th, from Shah Pasand Khan; 8th, from Alladdad Khan.

Letters, Nos. 5 and 6, were approvals of the Treaty drawn up here
by Kumber Ali (copy of which I have already forwarded), saying, however, that the Treaty would not be signed until Mahommed Omar Khan (son of Kohundil Khan) should be despatched to the camp. No. 4 entreated the Sirdars to despatch Mahommed Omar Khan without delay. No. 1 said that the Shah was anxious for their friendship, and led them to hope for advancement, if they should enter his service. No. 2 was to inform them, that he had sent to Tehran to Count Simonich, for his guarantee for the cession of Herat in the Sirdars' favour, assuring them of his friendship, offering guarantee for the security of Mahommed Omar Khan, and saying he saw the greatest advantages in the Sirdars sending their son to the Shah. No. 3 was to the effect of No. 2. No. 8 stated that he had been well received by the Shah, M. Goutte, and Borowski; for the latter he begged the Sirdars would send a letter by the next opportunity, as he was a friend to M. Goutte, and in the honor and confidence of the Shah; he begged the Sirdars to treat the Cossack Omar Khan* with great distinction, if he returned to Kandahar, and to send Mahommed Omar Khan, the Sirdar's son, with him; that the Ausef-ud-Dowleh had returned to camp, having defeated the Hazarehs and Meimunees, having formed a Treaty for a cessation of arms with them, and bringing, as hostages, Shah Mahommed's brother, and several relations of the Wally of Meimuna. The Shah praised the Sirdar to him in the highest terms, and said Sirdar Kohundil Khan was worthy to hold Herat, and he was desirous of having such nobles in his service as the Barukzye Brothers. In none of the letters is the English name mentioned in any way.

No. 84.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerton.—(Rec. Aug. 11, 1838.)

(Extract.)

Camp, before Herat, May 17, 1838.

The packet had been closed, and the monthly messenger was on the point of starting, when I had the gratification to receive your Lordship's letter of the 12th of February; and I need not attempt to say how much pleasure it afforded me to find that my conduct had been approved.

As soon as I had finished reading my letters, I requested an audience of the Shah, and yesterday afternoon I had a long conversation with His Majesty, too long to be given in detail. I presented to him a memorandum, stating the demands I made on the part of my Government, a translation of which I inclose. This, as I expected, led him to comment on the state of affairs, and especially on the question of Herat, which he persisted in regarding as the only real question at issue; the others, he said, arose out of it. I expressed my extreme anxiety lest the friendship between the Governments should be interrupted, and my conviction, that if he persevered in the course he had lately been pur-
suing, it must terminate in a rupture with England: that I had come out to Persia, in my present situation, rejoicing in the hope that I should have it in my power to strengthen Persia, and to contribute to the preservation of her independence; and that such having been my own wish, and the intention of the British Government, it was most painful to me, personally, to see His Majesty permit himself to be urged on from one step of an unfriendly character to another, till now I could not venture to say, or pretend to feel, that with any exertion I could make to preserve this ancient friendship, there was not imminent danger of its being lost for ever. The Shah complained of our opposing him in Afghanistan, whereas in the days of his grandfather we had taken no interest in Herat. I told him that in the days of his grandfather we felt confident in the feelings and views of the Persian Government, and considered its strength or weakness as our own: but that now it was different, and that I hoped he would not so act as to force us to regard his weakness as our strength. I urged him for his own sake to conclude an equitable arrangement with Herat, telling him his doing so would be acceptable to the British Government, and the first step towards the restoration of confidence. He said if they would acknowledge themselves Persian subjects, he would conclude the agreement on the terms I had proposed. I replied that the Heratees would not consent to this; that I could take no part in urging them to surrender their independence, which they had so gallantly defended, and that such acknowledgment would, I feared, cause embarrassment even to the Shah, for that as soon as Herat was acknowledged to be Persian territory, all the rights and privileges which Foreign Powers had acquired by Treaty in those territories, would extend to Herat; and that this would involve him in fresh discussions. At length he admitted that he would be unable to keep Herat, if he took it, and that it was his intention to give it up, when taken, to Kohundil Khan, the Chief of Kandahar, with whom he had concluded an agreement to that effect under the guarantee of Russia; (this is the Treaty, a translation of which I sent by the last messenger). I expressed without reserve the mortification which this announcement caused me, and the apprehensions I felt that he had already placed himself in a position in respect to the British Government, from which it would be very difficult to extricate him. The conversation terminated in his agreeing to abandon his claim to the sovereignty of Herat, and accept the Treaty which I had proposed, if he could be furnished with any reason which would enable him to withdraw with honor. I told him that no reason could be better than the fear of losing the friendship of England. He said if he was at liberty to announce that we would attack him, if he did not retire, no one could find fault with him. I said he was at liberty, of course, to say to his own subjects whatever he might think proper; but that it appeared to me the fear of losing the friendship of England, was a
reason for abandoning the enterprise which every one must admit to be valid. To this he assented, and promised to conclude the agreement with Herat, assigning that reason for his doing so.

The question of most immediate urgency, however, appears to me to be the Treaty with Kandahar, by which Russia acquires a right to interfere directly in the affairs of that country, and to force Persia to defend it against us or any one else who may attack it. But Persia cannot defend it; and I am of opinion that the Indian Government must feel the necessity of putting an end to this Treaty on any terms.

If the Shah is forced to retreat without having taken Herat, or if he concludes the Treaty as he has promised, I do not apprehend that there will be any great difficulty in recovering our proper position in Afghanistan; but if Herat falls and becomes united, as it then must, with Kandahar, in one Principality, nominally subject to Persia, but actually under the protection of Russia, I confess I can see no prospect of tranquillity for India, and no way but one of dealing with such a Gordian knot. I would, therefore, if I could venture to do so, save Herat, which would be saving all Afghanistan.

I ought to mention that Hajee Khan, the person so conspicuous in the ill-treatment of the messenger, has been wounded, and is lying dangerously ill in his bed. I have not therefore thought it necessary or proper to press the Shah on this point at such a moment. If he should not recover, I shall content myself with an apology from the Persian Government, and a Firman renouncing the right to punish our Persian servants without reference to the Minister. This I think will be given.


I. That the Persian Government shall conclude an equitable arrangement with the Government of Herat, and shall cease to weaken and disturb these countries.

II. That the Persian Government, according to the stipulations of the general Treaty, shall conclude a Commercial Treaty with Great Britain, and that it shall place the commercial agents of Great Britain, on the same footing with respect to privileges, &c. as the Consuls of other Powers.

III. That the persons who seized and ill-treated Ali Mahommed Beg, a messenger of the British mission, shall be punished; and that a Firman shall be issued, such as may prevent the recurrence of so flagrant a violation of the laws and customs of nations.

IV. That the Persian Government shall publicly abandon the pretension it has advanced, to a right to seize and punish the Persian servants of the British mission, without reference to the British Minister.

V. That the Governor of Bushire, who threatened the safety of the British resident there, shall be removed; that the other persons con-
cerned in that transaction shall be punished; and that measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of such proceedings.

No. 85.—*Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.*—(Rec. Aug. 24, 1838.)

*Extract.*

Your Lordship is aware, that an audience with which the Shah honored me on the 16th ultimo, led to a promise, on the part of His Majesty, to conclude the Treaty with Herat, which had I proposed, and which the Persian Government had once before agreed to accept; but that to this promise His Majesty annexed the condition that I should furnish him with such a reason for concluding that arrangement, as might enable him to relinquish with honor the enterprise in which he was engaged; and that the Shah proposed that the British Government should threaten to attack him if he did not march back his army into Persia. I represented, verbally, to His Majesty, that the fear of losing the cordial friendship and support of Great Britain was a valid reason for pushing the enterprise no further, and one which it appeared to me would not only completely protect His Majesty’s honor, but must, by every man who wished well to Persia, be regarded as a wise and prudent consideration. His Majesty appeared to acquiesce in these opinions; but at another audience, with which I was honored a few days subsequent to that above-mentioned, His Majesty required that the British Government should threaten him if he did not return; and further demanded, that this threat should be conveyed in writing; that he might, as he stated, have it in his power to show the document as an evidence that he had not lightly abandoned the expedition he had undertaken.

On His Majesty’s assurance that after he should have been furnished with such a document, there would be no further impediment to the conclusion of the Treaty with Herat, in the precise form which had already been agreed to, I consented to furnish His Majesty with the reason he professed to desire; and added, that I should, on the one hand, hold out a threat, and on the other, a prospect of benefit; that the grounds might be more strong and unexceptionable on which His Majesty would have to act.

In accordance with this arrangement, I addressed to the Shah a letter in Persian, of which the Inclosure No. 1 is a copy of the Draft in English, and directed Major Todd to deliver the letter into His Majesty’s own hand.

I determined in framing the letter which the Shah had required, to introduce into it not only the question of Herat, but also the other substantial grounds of complaint for which I was called upon to demand redress.

The Shah read the letter immediately it was presented to him, and his first observation to Major Todd was, that this was not what he wanted; that I had introduced a variety of other matters into my letter,—
that what he required was a single statement on the subject of Herat, on a small bit of paper, which he could carry about with him, and show to every one—not a great paper like that I had sent. The Prime Minister was present, and commented on the various demands and statements; and amongst other observations addressed to Major Todd, expressed his belief that, by the terms “ample means,” which I had used in my letter, I must mean money.

On learning from Major Todd the result of his audience, and the observations and objections of the Prime Minister and the Shah, I requested another audience. On this occasion, the Shah required of me that I should give a written statement, such as he had demanded of me through Major Todd. I replied that I could not take it upon me to separate the question of Herat from the other questions. The Shah said he would separate them, for that he would agree to all the demands except that which had reference to Herat, I replied that I would offer no objection to such a course being pursued by His Majesty, and that I should even regard it as to a certain extent satisfactory. The Shah immediately dismissed me with an assurance that he should adopt that course; but before I had left the area on which the royal tent was pitched, he called after me, that on his agreeing to the other demands he should expect me to avoid all further discussion of the affairs of Herat, and to order Mr. Pottinger to quit that city. In answer, I represented that I could not tie up the hands of my own Government in respect to the question of Herat, and that Mr. Pottinger was not under my orders.

On the following day, the 19th May, I received the inclosed letter, No. 2, from the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs. Fearing that this letter of the Persian Ministers might not be easily intelligible, I have added to the translation some marginal notes.

It was now obvious that the Persian Government had no intention to avail itself of the reason with which I had furnished it for terminating the expedition, and that there was no disposition to follow out the course which the Shah had himself subsequently adopted, viz., to comply with all the demands except that which had reference to Herat. It was also sufficiently apparent that the object of the Persian Government was to obtain a large sum of money as the price of abandoning the enterprise against Herat.

In my reply to this letter (which is the Inclosure No. 3,) I did not think necessary to enter on any detailed refutations of the assertions or pretensions of the Persian Government, but contented myself with distinctly assuring the Ministers that the hope of extorting money by such means was futile.

Ten days elapsed, during which no notice was taken of this letter, and no other communication took place between me and the Persian Government; but on the 30th May, I requested another audience of
the Shah, and pointed out to His Majesty that the written communication I had received from the Ministers, was totally at variance with what His Majesty had agreed to, and promised to perform. The Shah answered that he agreed to the demands, and that a letter had been written to me to that effect. I replied, that the letter I had received was of a very different tenor. His Majesty said, that he agreed to the demands, and would write to say that he agreed to them.

On the 1st June, I received the Inclosure No. 4, which, with a show of making some concession on the other points, and an assurance of the Shah’s desire to maintain his ancient alliance with England, asserted, in a very formal and somewhat elaborate manner, his right to prosecute the enterprise against Herat; treating as an invasion of his independence, the terms I had employed at his own desire to furnish him with a reason for accommodating matters with Herat, and to which his first objection had been, that they were not sufficiently explicit and unequivocal. It also contained a passage referring me to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, then at Tehran, for the further discussion of the Commercial Treaty. This letter bore strong internal evidence of being a translation into the Persian from some European language.

The conduct of the Persian Government, with regard to the Treaty with Herat, which it first accepted and then refused to conclude; and the use which had been made of my letter affording the reason, with which on his own proposal I had furnished the Shah, to enable him to return into his own country, together with the perseverance of the Persian Government in its resolution to prevent any of its servants, except the Prime Minister and the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, (a youth of eighteen years of age) from holding any intercourse with me, while no such restriction was enforced in regard to the Russian mission; and the growing impression amongst men of all ranks in camp, of which I was not ignorant, that the British mission was falling into a discreditable position by submitting to the slights and disrespect with which it was treated, as well positively as in comparison with the other mission at the Court: the knowledge too that similar sentiments were entertained, if not expressed, by the officers who accompanied me, and even by the servants of the mission; made me feel that the time was come when I must either obtain reparation and satisfaction for the indignity which had been offered to my Government by the treatment to which the messenger had been subjected, and by this public exaction of redress restore the mission to its proper position, or quit the Court. I had endured every thing rather than break with the Persian Government, until I should have received the decision of Her Majesty’s Government on the course I had adopted in regard to the affair of the messenger; and now that I was fortified by that decision, I determined to bring the matter to an issue.
With this intention I addressed to the Persian Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs the letter of which the Inclosure No. 5 is a copy, and after detailing my reasons for having recourse to such a measure, requested that a Mehmendar might be appointed to conduct me to the frontier.

From the answer to that letter (Inclosure No. 6), I confess, that though the Persian Government still continued to hold the same language in regard to the demand which I made for the punishment of the persons who had offered violence to the messenger, I was led to hope, from the repugnance which the Shah expressed to permit me to depart, and from the invitation contained in the commencement of the letter, to state some specific form and manner of reparation, that there was a prospect, however precarious, of at length effecting some adjustment of the matters in question, which might enable me to remain at Court. I therefore prepared a memorandum, of which I inclose a copy, No. 7, and having requested an audience of the Shah, presented it to His Majesty, intimating at the same time, that if the reparation therein specified was not granted within the prescribed period, viz., three days, I should not consider myself at liberty to remain any longer at his Court. The Shah, after perusing the memorandum with some care, stated that Hajee Khan, he was assured, had offered no violence to my messenger, and that Hajee Meerza Aghassee had not placed him under a guard. I stated the circumstances of the case as they had actually occurred, and referred to Colonel Stoddart, who was present, for the accuracy of my statement, which that officer fully confirmed. I also informed the Shah that the inquiries which I had instituted since my arrival in camp, had established in every particular the accuracy of the information I had formerly received and transmitted to the Persian Ministers; and I begged His Majesty to keep in mind that the acts had been too public and too notorious to make it possible for me to accept the Persian Government's denial of facts, which were known to almost every one in camp; and the most offensive of which, especially the violence offered by Hajee Khan, had been witnessed by many. That His Excellency the Hajee had ordered the messenger to the guard in the presence of Colonel Stoddart, one of whose servants had not only seen him seized by the beard, and beaten on the head by the officer commanding the guard, but had also been exposed to a portion of the violence from which he had suffered. On receiving this statement which I had once before made to His Majesty, he appeared to press his objections no further, and proceeded to comment upon the Draft of a Commercial Treaty which accompanied the memorandum. As these comments were repeated in the correspondence which subsequently took place on this subject, I shall not unnecessarily extend this despatch, already I fear too voluminous, by detailing them here, and shall only observe, that in a
conversation with the Shah some weeks before, I had intimated my readiness to make the arrangement respecting the flag of the Consul at Tabreez, which your Lordship is aware I had in contemplation when I recommended that the Mission House at Tabreez should be occupied by Mr. Bonham.

About an hour after I had returned to my tent, I received a letter, of which the Inclosure No. 8, is a translation, stating an objection which the Shah had raised to the Draft of the Commercial Treaty, and which I had verbally agreed to sustain. The succeeding Inclosures, No. 9 to 14 inclusive, have reference solely to this objection, which was to the establishment of a commercial agent at Tehran; but I had no sooner acceded to all the Shah demanded on this point, than a fresh objection was started in a letter from the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs; and what appeared to me to be a very unfair use was made of my proposal respecting the flag of the Consul, which I had communicated to the Shah as an arrangement, calculated to overcome objections on both sides, but which it had not of course entered into my mind to make a stipulation of a Treaty, and which could not by any interpretation be made to imply, that I did not claim for the British commercial agent at Tabreez the rank and privileges of Consul. Having reason to suspect from this correspondence that it was the intention of the Persian Government to lay the whole weight of the discussion on the question of the Commercial Treaty, and probably to reject the demands on some point of difference which might arise in the course of the correspondence on this one subject, I determined to do what from the first I had been prepared to do, and accordingly addressed to the Deputy-Minister a letter (of which a translation is the Inclosure No. 16), intimating that I would not insist upon the immediate conclusion of the Commercial Treaty as a condition of my remaining, but would make my remaining conditional solely on the compliance of the Persian Government with the demands I had made for reparation and satisfaction; that it might be ascertained whether or not it was the intention of the Persian Government to persevere in the indignity it had offered to the British Government; and I stated at the same time, that I would not discuss the matter any more, either verbally or in writing, but I should await the appointed time, or an earlier intimation from the Persian Government, and that if the demand for reparation was not complied with, I should depart.

The answer to this letter was an unequivocal denial that any indignity had been offered, or that there was any foundation for the statements I had made on this subject, and it called upon me to prove them. No facts could well be more notorious than these, or under other circumstances more easy to be established by testimony; but the only European who had witnessed the transaction, so far as I am aware, was Colonel Stoddart, and to call upon me to prove, by the public testimony
of the Persian Government, the delinquency of the Prime Minister of Persia, was preposterous.

The answer to this communication (No. 18) was simply a request, that a Mehmendar might be appointed; for after this broad and unequivocal denial had been given, subsequent to the statement I had made to the Shah and after the testimony of Colonel Stoddart, it was vain to hope for reparation.

Of the accuracy of the statements I have made to the Persian Government regarding the treatment of the messenger, and which have also been transmitted to your Lordship, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt; and a comparison of the various accounts of this transaction contained in the official communications of the Persian Government, will show a discrepancy. Amongst other instances of this contradiction, I would beg leave to attract your Lordship’s attention to Meerza Ali’s letter to me, transmitted in my despatch of the 27th of February last, wherein it is acknowledged that the messenger was known to be mine, for it is distinctly stated, that he was seized because I had violated the Treaty by sending him to Herat; and I would beg leave to contrast that assertion with the statement contained in the Inclosure No. 20 to this despatch, wherein it is declared that His Excellency the Hajee did not at first know my messenger was there; and that it was only after the messenger had been surrendered to Colonel Stoddart that His Excellency was aware that he was in my service.

In answer to this my second request, that a Mehmendar should be appointed, I received the letter, a translation of which is Inclosure No. 19, deprecating my intention to depart, and proposing that I should fix a time for a meeting with His Excellency the Hajee, who, it was said, proposed to arrange “in some manner” in respect to all the demands, so as to remove my displeasure. Though it was vain after all that had passed, and especially after the denial of the facts, to hope that any advantage could be derived from an interview, I hesitated for some time what course to pursue; and at length reflecting that I had announced my determination to discuss the matter no more either verbally or in writing, and that it was not even proposed to grant the reparation I demanded, I determined, instead of sending a written reply, to direct Major Farrant to inform the Deputy-Minister that I could have no discussion with the Hajee upon the subject, unless a promise were first given under the Shah’s seal, that the reparation and satisfaction I had demanded would be granted; and that if such a document were sent to me I should be glad to see the Hajee, and to postpone my departure which was now fixed for the next day.

Instead of the document, I received the Inclosure No. 20, from the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, which left no doubt of the determination of the Persian Government to evade a compliance with the
demand I had made, and to continue to shelter itself under the denial of notorious facts.

I therefore set out next morning the 7th. On my arrival at the first stage, I addressed a letter to the Shah, taking leave of His Majesty, and another to the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, intimating the suspension of my official functions, and my intention to proceed to the frontiers of Turkey, there to await instructions from your Lordship. In the evening of the same day, I was joined by Mehmendar, who had been appointed, and who was the bearer of the letter, a translation of which forms the Inclosure No. 23.

The indignity for which I demanded reparation had been most publicly offered, and the course pursued by the Persian Government subsequent to that transaction, and especially since my journey to camp, had made it necessary for the purpose of preserving, not the dignity but the respectability of the mission, that some public act of reparation should be performed, such as might be equally notorious with the indignity offered; otherwise no real benefit would have accrued from it, and the mission would not have been restored to such a position as would have enabled it, either with credit or advantage to Her Majesty’s Government, to have remained in this country. I have no doubt, though I have no means of establishing the fact, that the course pursued towards me in camp, and throughout this whole transaction, was dictated by the same feelings which led to the seizure and ill-treatment of the messenger, viz., a desire to affect a disregard or contempt of the English in presence of the Afghans, and to exhibit the British Mission to that people in as unfavourable a position as possible, especially as contrasted with the Russian Mission.

I deeply lament the result of these discussions. I have spent by much the better part of my life in this country, and during the whole time, now nearly 20 years, that I have been employed here, I have laboured unremittingly for the welfare of Persia, and therefore for the improvement of her relations with England. I owed many obligations to the father and grandfather of the Shah, and for himself I have felt that strong attachment which grew out of early intimacy, and the success of the efforts I had often made to promote his interests. But step by step I have been driven to the necessity of adopting the measure I have resorted to, or of submitting to be placed in a position which was not consistent either with the honor of Her Majesty’s Government or with my own. The discussions in which I have been engaged might no doubt have been conducted with more skill and ability, but not with a more anxious desire to bring them to a favourable result; and I feel, and hope that your Lordship will be of opinion, that I have exhausted all the means at my command, to induce the Persian Government so to act as to enable me to remain without dishonor.

Had I not had an opportunity of personal communication with the
Shah and his Ministers, and of satisfying myself that there was no chance of inducing them to repair the injury they had offered, I might have thought it sufficient to have suspended my official functions, and retired to Tabreez or remained at Tehran; but in the circumstances in which I have felt myself compelled to leave the camp, I have thought it in every way more advantageous to proceed to the frontiers of Turkey, and to carry with me all the British officers and non-commissioned officers employed in this country; but I have not yet decided upon calling on the British merchants to retire from Persia, and I shall not venture to do so, until I shall have had an opportunity of communicating with Mr. Bonham at Tabreez, when I shall be better able to decide how far this step may be necessary.

It remains for me to apologize to your Lordship for the unusual length to which this despatch has been extended, but I have thought it better to place before your Lordship one connected narrative than to attempt to divide it into several separate letters. If the details should appear to be unnecessarily minute, I beg your Lordship to attribute it to my anxiety to give Her Majesty's Government the means of forming a correct opinion, not only of the state of affairs, but also of my own conduct.

(Inclosure 1.)—Draft of a Letter addressed to His Majesty the Shah by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

May it please your Majesty,

Two days ago I had the honor to present to your Majesty a memorandum of certain demands on the part of the British Government, which have doubtless received your Majesty's serious consideration. I trust that your Majesty has come to the resolution to comply with demands so just on the part of a Government which has never ceased to evince the most lively interest in the security of the Persian throne and the prosperity of the Persian nation.

A series of events which have occurred within the last two years, and the general course of policy lately pursued by the Persian Government have destroyed, I hope only for a time, the confidence which the British Government had, up to that period, reposed in the sentiments, views, and intentions of Persia.

The march of Persian troops against Herat, after its Government had offered, through me, a Treaty which secured to Persia every advantage she had a right to demand, and perhaps even more, was an act of aggression on a weaker neighbour; and the perseverance of the Persian Government in this course after the repeated remonstrances which I had the honor to present on the part of the British Government, evinced a disposition to injure the interests of the British Government, and to frustrate the purpose of its Treaty of Alliance with Persia; for it was obvious that the expedition promised to Persia, even if Herat should be
taken, no avowed advantage beyond what would have been secured to her by the proposed Treaty.

In the general Treaty between England and Persia, it is announced that a Treaty of Commerce will hereafter be concluded; but the Persian Ministers, on various pretences and after repeated promises to conclude it on equitable terms, have hitherto evaded the conclusion of this Treaty, and, in the course of the negotiations on the subject, have even made propositions of an offensive description.

A messenger of the British Government, bearing official communications from a foreign Government to the British Minister at Tehran, while peaceably prosecuting his journey, has been seized and publicly treated with gross insolence and violence by the servants of the Persian Government. Yet every demand for redress or satisfaction for this public insult and flagrant violation of the law of nations has been disregarded by the Persian Government.

A pretension has been advanced by the Persian Government to a right to seize and punish, or put to death, without reference to the British Minister, the Persian servants who may be employed by him; and hitherto, notwithstanding the remonstrances which have been addressed to the Persian Ministers, no reply has been given; and this pretension, which is at variance with the laws and usages of all nations, has not been renounced.

A letter, threatening violence, has been addressed by the Governor of Bushire to the British resident there, and that, too, in reference to circumstances in which the Governor had no right to interfere. Yet no answer has hitherto been returned to the demand for redress which I considered it my duty to transmit to the Persian Ministers several months ago.

I earnestly hope that, by an early compliance with these just demands, your Majesty will restore to its ancient cordiality and intimacy the alliance between the two States, and thus further the British Government with an opportunity, of which it would gladly avail itself, to afford to Persia the support and assistance which it so long continued to offer, and which the course lately pursued by the Persian Government has compelled it for some time to withhold. But my duty to your Majesty, as well as to my own Government, makes it imperative on me to warn your Majesty, that, in the event of a refusal to comply with these demands, the British Government can pursue no other course than, by employing the ample means at its command, to oblige the Persian Government to render it justice, and to abstain from further injuring its interests, and frustrating the objects of the alliance between the two States. But I feel the greatest confidence that your Majesty’s wisdom, sense of justice, and regard for the welfare of your Majesty’s loyal subjects, will induce your Majesty rather to preserve the alliance with Great Britain; and that, by concluding a Treaty with the Govern-
ment of Herat, and withdrawing the Persian forces from this territory, as well as by speedily satisfying the other just demands of the British Government, your Majesty will relieve it from the necessity of having recourse to measures which it would resort to with extreme reluctance.

Translated by

(Sealed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

May 18, 1838.
25th Suffer, A. H., 1254.

(Inclusion 2.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

A. C.

I am commanded by the Shah to return the following answer to the letter your Excellency addressed to His Majesty.

In the year 1222, 1223 of the Hejira, the late Shah, with the concurrence of the late Prince Royal, broke off his connection with other Governments, whether near or distant, and concluded a firm Treaty with the King of England. In consideration of this existing Treaty, whatever description or manner of demands were made by the British Government, the Ministers of this State agreed to them. In consequence of this, other powerful States, which had no friendly feelings towards the British Government, commenced hostilities with the Persian Government, and inflicted on Persia all the injury they could, both by destroying life, and seizing property; and at length reduced this State to such a condition that it had no longer power to resist, or strength to endure. The Persian Ministers, from that time till now (which is the year 1254) have not withdrawn themselves from the friendship of the British Government, and have submitted to the evils which have been in-
1st. Whatever claim Persia may have to this sum of money, on the ground that she holds an obligation of Sir John Macdonald’s for 250,000 tomauns, nothing can be more distinct than the terms in which it is stated in the late Prince Royal’s ruckum, agreeing to abrogate the Articles, that this change in the Treaty is agreed to, in consideration of a payment of 200,000 tomauns. Persia, therefore, though she may have a claim to consideration, in consequence of the circumstances attending the transaction, cannot by any means establish a right to the greater sum, when she subsequently agreed to accept, and acknowledges that she has accepted, the less sum as the price of the sacrifice she made.

2nd. The war commenced in the summer of 1826, and the Treaty of Toorkmantehai was signed in February, 1828, being about one year and a half.

This statement is incorrect. I

2nd. In regard to the 600,000 tomauns for the three years of War which was stipulated in the existing Treaty: your Excellency yourself acknowledged to the Persian Ministers, in presence of Major
admitted, and who can deny, that the Russian troops had occupied a portion of uninhabited ground, which by right belonged to Persia, but I combated the opinion that this insulated fact constituted the case of aggression contemplated in the Treaty of Tehran.

3rd. The circumstances here alluded to appear to be these:—When the Russian army entered Tabreez, the muskets remaining in store there, were in the custody of Major Hart, who, on being called upon by the Russian officer commanding, was of course obliged to surrender them. The Persian Government now wishes to make the British Government responsible for arms which could have been in Major Hart’s custody only in his quality of servant to the Persian Government. The arms were bona fide the property of the Prince, and, therefore, lawful prize.

4th. The Persian Government has all along insisted on regarding the terms of the Treaty as prohibiting the British Government from holding any intercourse whatsoever with the Afghans; and the support here alluded to, refers to the Missions to Cabool and Kandahar, and to imputed proceedings of Colonel Taylor at Bagdad, as well as to my intercourse with the Government of Herat.

Todd, that the aggression was made by them (the Russians); and they themselves do not deny this fact. Your Excellency ought at least, during these ten years, to have solicited this Government in a becoming manner to forgive the British Government the payment of this sum; but during all this time you have taken no notice of it.

3rd. In regard to the muskets and military stores which were entrusted to Major Hart as a deposit for which he was responsible, and which were all carried off by force: it was incumbent on the British Government to replace less or more of these articles, that it might be relieved from the responsibility for their security which it had incurred, and thus have given support to this Government, which had for years been subjected to injury, in consequence of its friendship with England; and, at the same time, have taken the best means to protect the British frontiers; for this Government was at least a sentry in advance of the British Government.

4th. In regard to the Afghans, respecting whom it is stated in the existing Treaty, that the British Government shall have nothing to do with them; nevertheless, though it has been made obvious to every one far and near, that it has given the greatest support, and that it has interfered everywhere, the Persian Government has in friendship submitted to it, and has not, in any way, withdrawn its friendship, nor stepped beyond the limits of the Treaty, one hair’s breadth; but to what is it to attribute such proceedings, which are a direct viola-
1st. These mortars were applied for by Sir H. Bethune, to enable him to reduce some of the hill forts in Fars, which however had surrendered before the mortars arrived at Bushire, where they were permitted to lie unnoticed by the Persian Government for several months; in fact, until they were carried back to India. I am unable to say, whether they were intended to be a present to the Persian Government, or were only to be lent for a particular service. From the fact of their having been carried back, it is fair to presume that the latter had been the intention of the Government of India.

2nd. The circumstances in which these rifles were retained are well known to the Persian Government; and it is perfectly aware, that they were not intended for sale. No proposition to purchase them was made by any one.

3rd. The Persian Government does not affect to have any other grounds to go upon in this accusation, than its own conjectures as to the cause of Mr. Burgess’s detention.

2nd. 2,000 rifles were brought to the centre of Persia, and were not given to the Persian Government; although it is in the power of the Persian Government to purchase 100,000 muskets at a small price from other Governments. It is not known why the Persian Government should have received such an insult, in presence of all other Governments, which every one far or near must attribute to unkindness. The utmost that could be expected was, that the price of these rifles should have been taken from the Persian Government.

3rd. It is now nearly a year and a half, that Mr. Burgess received from the Persian Government goods and money, engaging in the space of six months to furnish the Persian Government with 25,000
The allusion in the latter part of the paragraph, to the quarter from whence cheaper muskets might be procured, refers to Russia.

4th. It would appear from what the Shah stated to me verbally, that the Persian merchants at Bagdad had written to the Persian Ministers to this effect. I assured the Shah more than once, that I had not the slightest reason to regard these reports as well-founded.

stand of arms, and he has derived a large profit from that money and these goods; and numerous messengers have gone to England, but no inquiry has been made of him, why he has delayed to bring the arms. It is obvious that he is a merchant, and would not endeavour to injure his own credit. It is therefore thought probable that impediments have been thrown in the way by the British Ministers, and that thus an indignity has been offered to the Persian Government in the face of other States, notwithstanding that it was possible to have purchased the arms at a cheaper rate from other Governments. Now they say, what sort of transaction was this?

4th. According to letters which have been received, it would appear that the British Resident at Bagdad was the instigator of the Pasha of Bagdad's attack on Mahumrah. The Persian Government had hoped, that if he (the Pasha) had proposed to undertake such an expedition, the British resident would have forbidden him, and would have said, "The Shah of Persia is now engaged on an expedition, wait till His Majesty shall have returned to his Capital, and if then you have any political representations to make, prefer them, and afterwards show this boldness and attack Mahumrah." If such things are not to be attributed to unkindness, to what ought they to be attributed? Justice is the best of qualities. Notwithstanding all these occurrences, the Persian Government did not withdraw its friendship, and took no step
The Afghans of Herat offered Persia all she had a right to demand before the Shah set out on this expedition; and to commence a war after just terms and ample satisfaction had been offered is certainly of the nature of an aggression.

beyond the bounds of the existing Treaty. The British Government, without cause, subjects the Persian Government to these indignities, and yet people write that no confidence (in the Persian Government) remains to the Government of Great Britain. What better grounds of confidence could there be than these trials, and who is there who interferes in the friendship between the Governments? If your Excellency had not written of want of confidence, the mention of these matters in a written document would not have been agreeable to the Ministers of this Government, that others might not become more fully acquainted with them, and consider them as indignities offered to this Government in the presence of all men, far and near.

The answers to your Excellency have been given separately to the number of five.

The answer to the first matter is this, that the people of Herat have done everything in their power for a series of years, by plunder and rapine, and removing the tented tribes, and the sale of captives and otherwise, to injure the ryots and inhabitants of Khorassan. To call inflicting retribution and punishment on these people an aggression, is far from being just, and to consider this proceeding as injurious to the interests of England, is an act of oppression; and what result except concurrence in the ruin of Khorassan can be derived from your Excellency’s coming and discussing these matters, notwithstanding the
The Deputy-Minister here only gives the assurance, that if the Shah is allowed to do what he chooses in Afghanistan, he will not seek a quarrel with any one.

great losses which have been sustained from these people, who have been continually subject to the late Shah, and former sovereigns, and against whom, in consequence of their misconduct, armies have been continually employed which have punished them, and extorted Peeshkush, and returned. Let them restore the captives and the tented tribes, and give indemnity for the losses they have caused, and let them engage not again to be guilty of such conduct, and let the views of the Shah, in regard to the security and tranquillity of these countries be carried into effect, then certainly, without dispute, His Majesty will return. He will then neither injure the interests of any one, nor will he act in opposition to the will of any one.

The answer to the second matter is this, that His Excellency Mr. Ellis came, and concluded and terminated the matter, and went away, and at this moment his letter expressing his satisfaction is in our hands, and the matter was well and agreeably settled. Afterwards when your Excellency came, you preferred another request, viz. that one Agent for Commercial Affairs should reside at Tabreez, and that he should not have the attributes and privileges of a Consul. In consideration of the friendship between the States, this too was agreed to. What other demand then is this that you make, and what further trouble is this that you give the Persian Ministers?

The answer to the third matter
touching on the most offensive part of the transaction, it is unnecessary to offer any comment. The proposed apology of Ali Khan was a mere mockery of redress, even for his share in the transactions, and that was a small and not by any means the most offensive part.

This answer was plainly intended as an evasion of the demand I had made, or at least to enable the Persian Government to evade immediate compliance.

The Deputy-Minister in here alluding to the "former words and suggestions," as he calls them, means the right to which the Persian Government pretended to punish its own subjects while serving a Foreign Mission.

This answer would have been satisfactory, if other information had not led me to believe that there was no intention in any case to punish the Governor of Bushire in any manner whatsoever, but, on is this, that the high in rank, Ali Khan Badanloo, on the road, saw that a Persian was proceeding by bye-roads from Herat to Meshed. He seized him, and brought him to camp. After his arrival at the royal camp, without having examined his letters, subsequent to the announcement of Colonel Stoddart, he was handed over to that officer. Ali Khan is present, and will repeatedly call on your Excellency, and in any way which may be agreeable to you will apologize for this act, which causes him to feel shame.

The answer to the fourth matter is this, that in every State there are many foreign Ministers who have employed servants belonging to the country in which they reside. Whatever rules they may have established will also be confirmed by this Government. Inquiries have been made of other Governments, and if this Government should deviate from these rules, your Excellency's complaints will then be well founded, and if, (God protect us) according to our former words and suggestions in regard to this matter, we had proceeded to act, and anything wrong had been done, then it would have been impossible in any manner to have satisfied your Excellency; but thank God, up to this time nothing has occurred to cause your Excellency any annoyance.

The answer to the fifth matter is this, that the Government of Bushire is distant two or three months' journey. If from folly he has written a threatening letter to the Resident, it is easy to punish
the contrary, that the Governor of Fars was to send a report exculpating him.

and threaten him in a decided manner. Immediately on receiving your Excellency’s intimation, repeated letters were addressed to the Firman Firma of Fars, to ascertain the truth of the matter, and if the Governor of Bushire is in fault, to punish him, and to get a letter from the Resident, expressing his satisfaction; and if the fault is on the side of the Resident, to represent it to this Government, that it may be explained to the British Government.

These matters have been easily arranged, and some of them, after the receipt of letters from Bushire and elsewhere, will be arranged in the best manner.

In short there was no cause why the British Government, should have withheld, for these two years, its aid from the Persian Government, and the Persian Government has done nothing contrary to usage or to the existing Treaty, that the British Government should employ its ample means; and if without cause or reason, they should act on the threat which has been written, the Ministers of this Government on their side have no quarrel with any one, and they will not act in a manner contrary to the terms of the Treaty, until it shall be obvious to the whole world, that in regard to this matter, no impropriety has been committed, and that they have not from their own personal feelings converted the friendship of many years into resentment. Therefore other means may be contemplated to make it known to the

From this statement it would appear, that the Persian Government did not regard the terms “employ the ample means at its command,” as implying a resort to actual hostilities, but only to some other less violent mode of obliging the Persian Government to render us justice, &c.

The Persian Government was perfectly well aware of the intercourse between Hajee Ibrahim
Khan, Dost Mahommed Khan's Agent, and the Russian Minister at the Shah's Court. It was fully aware of the Mission of Vicovich; it employed the mediation, and sought the guarantee of Russia in its engagements with Kandahar, and has acted by the advice and desire of the Russian Minister in engaging in an expedition against Herat, and in rejecting all terms of accommodation with its Government. Although both the Shah and his Ministers are aware, that in prosecuting this enterprise, they are doing what is not only disagreeable to England, but also essentially injurious to British interests in the East.

Ministers of the British Government, that no injury whatsoever has been done to the interests of the British Government, and that we were in no wise willing to cause displeasure to the British Government; and if they consider the interference of persons belonging to other Governments in the affairs of Afghanistan, a cause of want of confidence, we have to state, first, that the Persian Government was not in the first instance aware of the intercourse between the Afghans and other Governments; and second, that no one exercises any interference in the affairs of Afghanistan; they have only called on them (the Afghans) to serve the Shah of Persia, and seek support from him. Beyond this nothing has been heard from others.

In fine, if the stipulations of the existing Treaty are fulfilled, and if the captives are restored, and indemnity paid for losses sustained, if then the Shah does not return, or if any discussion with others, or with Foreign Powers should occur, which should cause injury to any one far or near, let your Excellency then find fault.

The “stipulations” here referred to, are those of the abrogated articles of the Treaty of Tehran, in virtue of which Persia pretends to claim 600,000 tomauns or £300,000 subsidy. The smallest amount of indemnity she has demanded from the Afghans is £1,250,000, making together with the 50,000 toms, claimed on Sir John Macdonald's note, the sum of 1,600,000 pounds sterling, which Persia demands as the price of the return of her army from Herat. This sum exceeds the whole amount of revenue received by the Shah since he mounted the throne.

This invitation is equivalent to asking what proportion of the sums above-mentioned I was prepared to give, to procure the arrangement of the affairs of Herat. I will trouble your Excellency to devise the means of arranging the affairs of Herat, and intimate it in writing. The five matters, the Persian Government, accord.
The Deputy-Minister affects to regard the whole demands as complied with, except those the decision on which awaits information from Bushire, and from the foreign Governments who have been applied to.

26 Sudder, 1254. Translated by
May 19, 1838. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclusion 3.—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A. C.

I have received your friendly letter, written in detail, and I have perfectly understood its contents.

The exceptions which you have taken to the proceedings of the British Government, and which you have thus communicated, are partly without foundation, partly in regard to matters unconnected with the affairs of the Government, and partly such as have been repeatedly brought forward by the Persian Government, and to which specific answers have more than once been given by the British Government. I therefore consider it unnecessary to repeat those answers.

From the nature of this communication it would appear, that the object of the Persian Government is to obtain money from the British Government, and from the Afghan people; and judging from the proceedings and measures of the Persian Ministers in the management of the affairs of the Government, and especially in regard to their receipts and expenditure, it was to be expected that in the end such must be the result; but if the Persian Ministers expect by taking these exceptions, and preferring unimportant claims, or by acting in opposition (to the British Government,) to reap advantage from the British Government, they can gain nothing by pursuing such a course.

I have communicated to this Government the demands of my own Government, and have requested that they might be complied with, and have pointed out to the Persian Government the advantages of compliance, and the disadvantages of rejecting them. No doubt, after taking into consideration these advantages and disadvantages, the Persian Government is at liberty to decide, and will pursue whatever course it may consider most beneficial to itself. My object has been, in conformity with the duties entrusted to me by my own Government, to give the Persian Government full information, that if hereafter anything should occur, the responsibility may rest on the Persian Ministers themselves, and I am relieved from it, for I have discharged my duty.
You have written respecting the affairs of Herat. The fact is that I arranged, and would have concluded the affair of Herat in a manner which the Persian Government itself agreed to; but afterwards the Persian Government changed its mind, and refused to conclude that arrangement which it had accepted. No doubt it expected to derive some advantage from this change of purpose; but even now, if it will permit me to conclude the matter in the same manner, there is reason to believe that, please God, I shall still be able so to conclude it. What more shall I write?

27 Suffer, 1254. (Signed) JOHN MC NEILL.
May 20, 1838.

(Inlosure A.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

A. C.

As your Excellency has required a fresh answer to the written demands, therefore, by command of His Majesty the Shah, &c., &c., I write these lines.

In regard to the seizure of your Excellency’s messenger, as the Persian Ministers have written letters in detail, it is unnecessary to say more than these few words. The Persian Government never intended, either in regard to this matter especially, or to any other, to offer an insult, or to cause displeasure, either to the British Government or your Excellency. In truth, the causes and circumstances which led to the seizure of Ali Mahommed Beg were the precautions, the observance of which in the vicinity of an enemy’s country is necessary. Though His Majesty’s army was in his own country, yet in consideration of the necessity of taking precautions in their march, the advanced guard of the army met three persons coming from the enemy’s country, who wished to go by secret ways. Without knowing who they were they seized them and brought them to the Royal Camp. Two of them were people of Herat, and one was your Excellency’s messenger. As soon as they were recognized, he was dismissed, and sent to Colonel Stoddart, with all the papers of which he was the bearer, without any one’s having become acquainted with their contents. These are the facts of the case. If ill-disposed persons should desire to represent to your Excellency, in a contrary sense, the sincere and disinterested proceedings of this Government, your Excellency ought not to credit their statements: and the servants of the Government, in taking the steps they did, fulfilled their duty, and acted up to the orders of the Shah. It is therefore unnecessary that they should be found fault with or punished. If Colonel Stoddart, previous to the arrival of the Royal army at Teorbut Sheikh Jaum, had informed the Persian Ministers that a messenger of the British Government was at Herat, and would return, or if the messenger himself had travelled by
the direct and frequented road, and had presented himself at the outposts of the army, we should have escaped all these writings and arguments. His Majesty the Shah feels confident that after the perusal of these sincere statements, which by command of His Majesty I have written, all the feeling of irritation and dissatisfaction which had arisen will be removed, and that your Excellency will be entirely satisfied and gratified. Moreover, His Majesty has commanded that Ali Khan Badanloo should also, for the purpose of satisfying your Excellency, come and apologize.

In regard to the Commercial Treaty, on which subject your Excellency is urgent: although His Majesty, by means of an arrangement which the Persian Ministers two years ago concluded with His Excellency Mr. Ellis, agreed to and complied with all the expectations of the British Government, and sent His Excellency away satisfied; nevertheless, solely in consideration of the request which your Excellency made, instructions for concluding the affairs connected with commerce, together with powers of agency were granted to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he might arrange the matter according to the fresh demands made by your Excellency. His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, after receiving the royal commands, proposed to your Excellency to conclude the business. Your Excellency did not agree to this, but made the discussion of this matter conditional on this, that the Persian Government should grant satisfaction for the seizure of your Excellency's messenger. From this it is apparent, that in regard to placing a Commercial Agent in Tabreez, according to your Excellency's desire, the Persian Government has in no wise delayed, or postponed, or procrastinated; and now, if your Excellency desires to conclude this matter, let him converse with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who still retains the powers formerly granted him for that purpose; and, moreover, this matter has been arranged and adjusted here.

You have written regarding the Governor of Bushire, that because he has written a threatening letter, in respect to a certain matter, to the British Resident, he must be called to account and punished. His Majesty the Shah, has commanded, that we should never consent that the meanest subject of the British Government shall encounter, in our dominions, oppression or insult, still less the British Resident. In regard to this matter, a special messenger has been sent, and his Highness Feridoon Meerza has been written to, to examine this affair with the greatest accuracy; and if the Governor of Bushire is in fault, to give your Excellency full satisfaction.

After all these written statements, which are evidences of the justice and candour of His Majesty, the shadow of God, and the boundless condescension of His Majesty towards your Excellency, His Majesty has ordered me to state, that in respect to the other matter men-
tioned in your Excellency's letter, His Majesty has given the answer, which you will regard as coming from His Majesty himself. Your Excellency requests, that His Majesty's army may return from this expedition; and states, that the advantages and benefits to be derived from complying with the wishes of the British Government are greater than can be obtained from the capture of Herat. If your Excellency's statements had been confined to this one representation of the best policy to be pursued by the Persian Government, His Majesty would have attributed this representation to sincerity and goodwill; but your Excellency mixes up this representation with threatening expressions. Your Excellency states, that because the punishment of the mischievous inhabitants of Herat, who have committed numerous acts of plunder and slave dealing, is contrary to the views of the British Government, that Government, for the purpose of opposing and preventing this expedition, will employ its ample means. In all sincerity, I cannot see the justice of your Excellency's making such a representation, because this is an affair of State, which the Persian Government consider advisable, for the purpose of giving security and tranquillity to its own subjects. By the will of God, and his own fortunate star, His Majesty has been seated on the throne of his ancestors and predecessors; and he considers himself like other sovereigns, independent and free to follow his own will, to put an end to the mischievous persons who have committed many acts of plunder, and rapine, and slave dealing; and in matters regarding which the Persian Government has contracted engagements with other States, no breach or violation shall occur. His Majesty will pursue his own views of what is the best policy. To make this proposition, is to change the accepted mode of proceeding between States which all other Governments have adopted; and it is obvious that the British Government will not sacrifice this honorable feeling for all the world; and the British Government is the oldest friend of Persia, and will never consent that those bonds of friendship and union, which His Majesty the Shah regards as firm and binding, and which have existed from ancient times, should be broken; and will not turn back from those usages and arrangements which their ancestors and predecessors established and acted upon. It is the wish of His Majesty's heart, that the ancient friendship between the States should day by day become more firmly established, and he will never forget the evidences of goodwill and kindness which the British Government has displayed towards the Government of Persia, more especially after the death of the late Shah, and the late Prince Royal; and as the punishment of the wicked Afghans, who have taken many captives and much plunder, especially concerns the Persian Government, that punishment can never cause a change in the ancient kindness and friendship. His Majesty the Shah, in regard to this question, has perfect confidence in his own justice and
equity, and in the high and royal liberality of the Sovereign of England, and consequently refers this matter to the Ministers of the British Government. I have, therefore, to request, that your Excellency will communicate this letter to Her Britannic Majesty’s Ministers.

What more trouble shall I give?

9 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. Translated by
June 1, 1838. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclosure 5.)—Draft of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. McNieill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have received your letter, and have understood its contents.

In reply I have to inform you, that certain indignities and insults have been offered to the British Government by the servants of the Shah, and certain just demands of the British Government have been evaded, or neglected, by the Government of Persia. I undertook a journey to the Shah’s camp, for the purpose of endeavouring to induce the Persian Government to accede to these just demands, and to give the reparation and satisfaction for the insults that had been offered, which I had hitherto demanded in vain. When setting out on this journey, I announced to the Shah and his Ministers, that my object in proceeding to Camp was to prevent a misunderstanding between the Governments.

But when I arrived here, and even before my arrival, I found that fresh evidences of disrespect were prepared for me, and that the Persian Government had determined to subject me to unworthy treatment, such as no British Minister was ever before exposed to at the Court of a Shah of Persia. Nevertheless, I persevered in my intention to prevent, if possible, the interruption of friendly intercourse between the Governments, and with that view, I represented the whole state of affairs to the Shah in person; but, unfortunately, on this, as on some former occasions, I found that whatever the Shah personally, in conversation, agreed to, the written communications of the Ministers invariably rejected.

Now, therefore, that the Persian Government continues to withhold the reasonable reparation and satisfaction which I demanded, for the first of this series of indignities it has offered to the British Government, and evades or rejects the other just demands, I feel that it would be inconsistent with the honor or the interests of my own Government, that I should continue to maintain an official intercouse with this Court, and I therefore have to request that a Mehmendar may be appointed to conduct me, and the other Englishmen who accompanied me, in security to the frontiers of the Turkish territory, between Khoi and Bayazed, where I shall await further instructions from England.

It is my intention to set out to-morrow.

I feel myself called upon to inform you, that until the reparation and
satisfaction I have demanded, for the indignities already offered, shall have been fully given, the Queen of England cannot receive at her Court any Minister who may be sent thither by the Shah of Persia.*

_Camp before Herat,_    **(Signed)**    JOHN MC NEILL.
_Sunday, June 3, 1838._

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(Inclosure 6.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. McNeill.
A. C.

Your letter has been received, and has been laid before His Majesty the Shah. His Majesty has commanded me to communicate to your Excellency His Majesty's orders to this effect:—1st. That we do not know what is your Excellency's object in all these writings, and what you propose to yourself, and what you desire; and, 2dly, that there has been no breach of Treaty or engagement, on the part of the Persian Government; and no indignity or disrespect has been offered to your Excellency, which should cause you offence. In regard to the demands which your Excellency represented to His Majesty in the presence, one of them had reference to your Excellency's messenger, the details of which matter have repeatedly been written to your Excellency, and the truth of which has been stated by the Ministers of this haughty Government, viz. that although it was contrary to the Treaty that your Excellency should hold intercourse with the Affghans, nevertheless no indignity or disrespect was offered to your Excellency's messenger: and as soon as he was recognized, he was sent to Colonel Stoddart. It is obvious to every one, that in regard to this matter, the Persian Government violated no Treaty or engagement: and if a violation of usage and of respect had occurred, the Ministers of this Everlasting Government have repeatedly apologized for it; and in the last letter which I wrote, by order of His Majesty, an ample apology was written. Moreover, Ali Khan Badanloo, who seized the said messenger, was directed to wait on your Excellency, and apologize in any manner you might desire.

The second point was in regard to the Commercial Treaty, which the Ministers of this Government had arranged with His Excellency Mr. Ellis: and they have in their hands a letter from him expressing his satisfaction. Solely in consequence of your desire, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was ordered to discuss the matter with your Excellency in the Capital; and moreover your Excellency's request, which was, that a Commercial Agent should be placed at Tabreeez, was merely from the favour of His Majesty agreed to.

The third point was, the threats and disrespect of the Governor of Bushire to the British Resident. Orders have been repeatedly issued

* See Appendix.
by His Majesty, that in the event of the truth of these statements being established, the Governor of Bushire should make an apology, and give full satisfaction.

The fourth point was the matter of Herat; in respect to which the Ministers of this haughty State have repeatedly given their reply; and though the interference of your Excellency was not in conformity with the Treaty, still whatever your Excellency said in regard to this matter was agreed to, and we placed reliance on the loyalty and sincerity of your Excellency. His Majesty’s return from these countries seeing they have always been dependencies of Persia, is conditional on the restitution of the captives and the tented tribes and our losses (or expenses.) Surely the British Government will not consent to this loss and injury, and to the destruction of the Persian dominions, and as it has an ancient union with this Government, it will consider the gain and loss of this Government indirectly as gain or loss to itself. If they (the Afghans) will now give back the prisoners, and pay indemnity for the losses, the Persian Government will ratify the arrangement which it previously made with your Excellency. Notwithstanding all these things that your Excellency should complain and feel offended, is a cause of surprise and astonishment. His Majesty as soon as he read your Excellency’s letter was exceedingly surprised, and issued his commands (as follows):—“God protect us, never and in no manner do I consent to His Excellency going away. After all the faithful services and loyal exertions of His Excellency, it is very strange that he should himself consent to take such a step. So long as these two stable Governments are in existence, the intercourse of friendship must daily be improved, and we do not in anywise consent to this measure. So long as we live, the standards of friendship and union must be raised, and the causes of difference must be removed.” Independent of the friendship and union of the States, your Excellency has rendered great services to this State. In regard to these demands which you have represented, His Majesty has issued orders in conformity with usage, and with the terms of the Treaty, and your Excellency ought to have no further complaint or grievance in regard to these matters. If any thing else besides these things has occurred, which has given offence to your Excellency, you will make it known, that the Ministers of this Government may exert themselves as much as possible to make reparation, and to apologize, and may preserve the friendship of these two stable Governments. What more trouble shall I give? I request that your Excellency will communicate this letter to the British Ministers.

11 Rubbee-ul-Awal, 1254.       Translated by
June 3, 1838.                 (Signed)         JOHN Mc NEILL.
(Inclosure 7.)—Translation of a Memorandum presented to the Shah on the 4th of June, 1838.

The Persian Ministers having written, stating that His Majesty the Shah has not fully understood the demands and wishes of this well-wisher of the State, I have therefore written my requests, one by one, in this memorandum, and represent them to His Majesty the Shah.

First.—That the high in rank, Hajee Khan Karabaugee, who used violence towards Ali Mahommed Beg, the messenger of the British Government, shall be removed from his office, and shall not be reinstated until the British Government shall have forgiven his offence.

Second.—That His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee, who, knowing that Ali Mahommed Beg was a messenger of the British Government, ordered him to be placed under a guard, shall come to my tent and make a suitable apology.

Third.—That a firman shall be issued, commanding the servants of His Majesty the Shah not in any way to interfere with the servants of the British mission, whether natives of Persia or foreigners, and ordering that if any of these servants should be guilty of an offence, they shall not be punished without the knowledge and concurrence of the British Minister.

Fourth.—That after it shall have been ascertained that what the high in rank, the British Resident at Bushire, has written, respecting the conduct of Sheikh Nassir, is correct, Sheikh Nassir shall be removed from the Government of Bushire.

Fifth.—That a Commercial Treaty, according to the Articles which are written separately, but which are presented to His Majesty the Shah along with this memorandum, shall be concluded and ratified.

Sixth.—That the first, second, third, and fifth demands (or requests) shall be carried into effect in three days from this day; and that the fourth demand, after the accuracy of the statement of Sheikh Nassir’s conduct have been ascertained, shall be carried into effect without delay.

Translation of the Articles of the Commercial Treaty referred to in the preceding Memorandum.

ART. I. The merchants of the two mighty States are reciprocally permitted and allowed to carry into each other’s territories their goods and manufactures of every description, and to sell or exchange them in any town of the respective countries; and on the goods which they bring into or carry out of the country, the same amount of custom duties shall be demanded once for all, on entering the country, which is demanded from the most favoured European nations; and, in like manner, in goods taken out of the country; and, except this, no demand shall be made on the merchants of the High Contracting Parties, in each other’s dominions, on any pretext or under any denomination; and the merchants and other persons dependent on or connected with the High Contracting Parties in each other’s dominions, mutually, shall en-
joy the same aid and support and the respect (or honors) which are enjoyed by the subjects of the most favoured European nations.

II. As it is necessary for the purpose of attending to the affairs of the merchants of the two parties, respectively, that from both Governments Commercial Agents should be appointed to reside in stated places, it is therefore arranged that two Commercial Agents on the part of the British Government shall reside one in the Capital, and one in Tabreez, and in those places only; and on this condition, that he who shall reside at Tabreez, and he alone, shall be honored with the rank and privileges of Consul; and as for a series of years a Resident of the British Government has resided at the Port of Bushire, the Persian Government grants permission that the said Resident shall reside there as heretofore; and in like manner two Commercial Agents on the part of the Persian Government shall reside, one in the Capital of London and one in the Port of Bombay, and shall enjoy the same rank and privileges which the Commercial Agents of the British Government shall enjoy in Persia.

This Commercial Treaty we, the Plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting Parties, have agreed to, and in witness thereof, thereunto set our hands and seals.*

(Inclusion B.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. McNeill.

His Majesty the Shah, in answer to the writing which you just now presented to His Majesty, has issued his commands, that in respect to the affairs (Treaty) of commerce, which your Excellency comprised in two Articles, there is no ground for objection to the first Article; but in the second Article, what you have written, that a Commercial Agent should be resident at the Capital in the same manner as at Tabreez, is contrary to the former arrangement, and your Excellency yourself, in the presence of His Majesty, represented that as this was copied from a document formerly written, it was here inserted by mistake; therefore, let your Excellency change this, and let it be written in the form in which the Persian Government formerly agreed to it, and it shall be ratified; and the answer to the remainder of the written demands also, by God's will, I shall send according to the commands of His Majesty, to-morrow.

What more shall I write?

12 Rubber-ul-Awul, 1254. Translated by
June 4, 1838. (Signed) JOHN McNEILL.

* Note by Mr. McNeill.—This is a copy of the Draft agreed to by Meerza Massood and myself at Tehran, which was rejected by the Shah. The Draft was, in fact, prepared by His Excellency Meerza Massood, not by me.

Meshed, June 23, 1838. (Signed) J. McNeill.
(Inclosure 9.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have received your friendly note, and have become fully acquainted with the commands of His Majesty the Shah. I will dispense with the placing a Commercial Agent at the Capital, on condition that the Persian Ministers will arrange the other matters in question, and carry them into effect. In the event of the other demands being accomplished, I shall not press the placing a Commercial Agent at the Capital Tehran.

What more shall I write?

Translated by
12 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 4, 1838.

(Inclosure 10.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

I have received your Excellency’s note, and I have laid it before His Majesty the Shah. His Majesty has issued his commands, that according to what was formerly arranged and to what the Persian Government agreed to, and settled at the request of your Excellency, and to what your Excellency heard verbally from His Majesty; and your Excellency admitted that it had been written by mistake; the two Articles of the commercial affairs, (Treaty) in conformity with what was formerly arranged, viz. the placing a Commercial Agent in Tabreez only, must be written anew, and sealed, that the answer to the other matters also, in the manner in which it has frequently been given, may be given, that this affair may be settled.

Translated by
12 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 4, 1838.

(Inclosure 11.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

In regard to the affairs of commerce, the objection which His Majesty the Shah made was just, and I also adhere to what I said, and agree to sustain His Majesty’s objection, and I have written a sealed note to that effect. If His Majesty is prepared to conclude it (the Commercial Treaty) in this manner let me know, and if not, also inform me; and in regard to the other matters likewise, if His Majesty agrees to them, let me know; and if His Majesty will not agree to them, write to me to say so.

What more shall I write?

Translated by
12 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 4, 1838.
(Inclosure 12.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. McNeill.

I have received your note, and I have submitted it to His Majesty the Shah. His Majesty has issued his commands, that although your Excellency adheres to the statement you made, and though you have avowed that it was there written by mistake, but your Excellency must write the commercial affairs in two Articles in a separate paper, and in the second Article distinctly state that there shall be one Commercial Agent at Tabreez, and one at Bushire, and there only, and having sealed it, send it, that that draft which your Excellency yesterday presented to His Majesty may be changed, and that this one may be ratified, and that the answer to the other demands also, according to the positive orders of His Majesty the Shah, may be sent.

My haste in regard to this matter is in consequence of your Excellency's request, that in the space of three days the answers to all demands may be given.

What more shall I write?

12 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 4, 1838.

(Inclosure 13.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. McNeill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I inclose the Articles of the Treaty of Commerce written in the manner you desired, but it is very necessary that the Persian Ministers, in conformity with what His Majesty the Shah commanded, should write to me to-day, stating that they agree to the remainder of my demands, and will carry them into effect. Certainly after the promise you gave me yesterday, and what you have written to-day, you will not disappoint me.

Translated by
12 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 4, 1838.

(Inclosure 14.)—Written on the margin of the amended Draft of the Commercial Treaty.

These two Articles on commercial affairs I agree to substitute for the two Articles on commercial affairs which, together with the other demands, I presented to His Majesty the Shah, yesterday; on this condition that the other demands which yesterday I submitted to His Majesty the Shah, and the whole of which His Majesty agreed to, shall have been carried into effect at the time appointed.

Translated by
12 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 4, 1838.
The amended draft of the two Articles of the Commercial Treaty was in every respect the same as that presented with the memorandum on the 4th June, except that for the words in the second Article, "it is therefore arranged that two Commercial Agents on the part of the British Government shall reside, one at the Capital, and one at Tabreez, and in those places only, and on this condition, that he who shall reside at Tabreez, and he alone, shall be honored with the rank and privileges of Consul," the following words were substituted, "it is therefore arranged that one Commercial Agent on the part of the British Government shall reside at Tabreez only, and on this condition, that he shall be honored with the rank and privileges of Consul."

(Signed) JOHN McNEILL.

(Inclusion 15.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. McNeill.

I have received your Excellency's note, together with the Articles of the Treaty of Commerce, and I have submitted them to the analyzing glance of His Majesty the Shah: His Majesty has issued his commands, that your Excellency has again, in the second Article, written what is at variance with what has hitherto been written and spoken; and to what your Excellency represented in the presence; for it has been frequently written, that the Commercial Agent established at Tabreez shall not have the privileges and rank of Consul; and your Excellency also, in the presence of His Majesty the Shah, agreed that the flag of the Mission should be only on the Mission-house. In the second Article you have again written what is contrary to this, and have specially stated that he shall be honored with the rank of Consul. After that this expression shall have been changed, and according to what you yourself agreed to, and to what has repeatedly been written and sent, stating that the Commercial Agent at Tabreez shall not have the privileges and rank of Consul, we shall give a reply on the affairs of commerce and other affairs.

What more shall I write? Translated by

12 Rubbee-ul-Avul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN McNEILL.

June 4, 1838.

(Inclusion 16.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. McNeill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have received your note and have understood its contents. I never represented to His Majesty in the presence, that the Commercial Agent of the British Government, who should be established at Tabreez, should not have the rank and privileges of Consul; and I have no authority from my own Government to agree to such an arrangement. And it is apparent, from His Britannic Majesty's commission to Mr. Bonham, which I placed before His Majesty the Shah, that the British
Commercial Agent, established at Tabreez, should have the rank and privileges of Consul; but as I perceived that the Persian Government entered into discussions on the question of his hoisting a flag, and even objected to his doing so, I stated that the British Commercial Agent who should reside at Tabreez, should not hoist a separate flag, that thus there should be no more flags than one; but that he should content himself with the flag which is now hoisted over the Mission-house, and that it should be exclusively his.

But the arrangement of the commercial matter (Treaty) appears to me to be of small importance, compared with making reparation and giving satisfaction, for the indignity and disrespect which has been shown towards the British Government, and that in the manner stated in the written demands which I submitted to His Majesty the Shah. I will take upon myself to separate the present conclusion of the Commercial Treaty from the other matters; and I shall not make the conclusion of this matter, at the present time, a condition of my remaining; that it may be made apparent and obvious, whether or not it is the intention of the Persian Government, to persevere in the indignity and disrespect it has offered to the British Government.

Finally, I shall write no more, and I shall engage in no further verbal discussion regarding the matters (demands) which I submitted to His Majesty the Shah. If, by the day after to-morrow, which will be Thursday, they (the Persian Government) shall have carried into effect those demands which are required to be immediately complied with, and shall have agreed to carry the others into effect, it will have accomplished my most anxious wish, and if not, I shall set out on my journey and go away.

If it is the intention of the Persian Government to comply with these demands, I beg they will state it, that I may be informed; and if they have not the intention to comply with them, I beg they will also acquaint me with it, and that, according to my former request, they will appoint a Mehmendar.

Translated by

12 Rubbee-ul-Awal, 1254.
Tuesday, June 5, 1838.

(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

[In consequence of a doubt as to the day on which the moon was visible, Monday had been considered as the 12th of the month, but at length it was ruled that Tuesday was the 12th.]

(Inclusion 17.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

I have received your note, and I have laid it before His Majesty the Shah. His Majesty issued his commands, that your Excellency, in the presence of His Majesty, represented, that the mission flag should
be considered sufficient; and besides it, that there should not be another flag; and I also wrote exactly this in my letter; and your Excellency's representation in the presence was confined to this, and I did not write more than this.

And in regard to what you have written, stating that indignity and disrespect has been offered to the British Government, His Majesty has issued his commands, that until this time no indignity has been offered, and no insult has occurred; and of the things which you have written, not one of them has taken place, and they have not been proved in our presence; but because it was a hostile expedition, and because, according to the existing Treaty, it was not to be expected that your Excellency should hold any intercourse with the Afghans, the outposts of the army, in conformity with discipline, seized a person who was coming from the enemy's country, and brought him to the Royal Camp; and they did not know that he was your Excellency's man; after it was ascertained that he was a person sent by your Excellency, he was subjected to no insult or indignity, and was not put in the guard, and he was not stripped of his clothes. They all deny these things; and without our having done anything contrary to rule and custom, he was handed over to Colonel Stoddart. Your Excellency must prove these things which you assert. What more trouble shall I give?

His Majesty the Shah issues his commands that your Excellency shall transmit this letter to the British Ministers.

Translated by

13 Rubbee-ul-Awul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL. 
June 6, 1838.

(Inclusion 18.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have received that kind friend's note, and I have apprehended its meaning. I have to request, that a Mehmendar may be appointed to-day, that he may be ready and in attendance, and to-morrow, please God, accompany me on my departure. As it was necessary to mention this, I have acquainted you with it.

Translated by

13 Rubbee-ul-Awul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL. 
June 6, 1838.

(Inclusion 19.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

I have received your Excellency's note, and I have submitted it to His Majesty the Shah. His Majesty issued his commands that, "No, never shall we consent to the departure of His Excellency, let him by all means lay aside this intention, and let him not allow this idea to enter his mind." Let your Excellency fix some time that His Excellency, &c., &c., the Hajee, may meet your Excellency, and in respect to all the
demands he will arrange in some manner, which shall be the means of removing your Excellency's displeasure. I expect your Excellency will take the trouble to fix a time, and acquaint me with it, that I may represent it to His Majesty the Shah.

Translated by

13 Rubbee-ul-Avrul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 6, 1838.

(Inclosure 20.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

The message which you sent by Major Farrant has been represented by me to His Majesty the Shah. His Majesty has issued his commands, that we have agreed to all His Excellency's demands, according to his own writing, and nothing else remains. In regard to the affairs of commerce, we said that a Commercial Agent may be established at Tabreez, and content himself with the mission-flag according to the representation and request of His Excellency; and in regard to the insult and indignity, thank God, until now, no indignity has been offered.

The day before yesterday in the presence, you represented that His Excellency the Hajee had ordered your Excellency's messenger to be put under a guard; although His Excellency did not issue such an order, or do such a thing, and though he never gave any such orders, still he himself is desirous and anxious to meet your Excellency, and has represented this to His Majesty, and you represented to the Shah that Hajee Khan had stripped your Excellency's messenger; this has not yet been proved to us. After it shall have been proved, we shall no doubt take him to task. Colonel Stoddart himself knows that at first His Excellency the Hajee did not know that your Excellency's man was there, and His Excellency supposed that there was one person, and that he was an inhabitant of Herat. After he had been handed over to Colonel Stoddart, it was ascertained, and His Excellency became aware, that there were two persons, not one person, as Colonel Stoddart himself is aware, and he had previously been handed over to that officer. Notwithstanding all these things, His Excellency is desirous to meet your Excellency. If your Excellency is disposed, let a time be appointed, and let information be given; and I have to request that you will transmit this letter to Her Britannie Majesty's Ministers.

Translated by

14 Rubbee-ul-Avrul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 7, 1838.

(Inclosure 21.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to His Majesty the Shah.

After thanks and compliments

I HAVE the honor to represent to your Majesty, that I had the
greatest desire and anxiety to have the honor of being presented to your Majesty, for the purpose of begging, in all sincerity and attachment, that your Majesty and the Persian Government would forgive me all the trouble I have given for nearly twenty years, and of expressing my gratitude for all the favor I have experienced from your Majesty. But as it was to be feared lest during my audience certain commands of your Majesty, or certain representations from me on public affairs might occur, which might cause additional vexation and annoyance between the Governments, I therefore did not take the liberty of seeking an audience. I have the strongest hopes from the condescension and liberality of your Majesty, that if during these twenty years, there has been any defect or imperfection in my services to this Government, your Majesty, from your Majesty’s generosity and kindness, will forgive it.

I shall not intrude further.

14 Rublee-ul-Awul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 7, 1838.

(Inclosure 22.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I have received your friendly letter and I have understood its contents.

As the Persian Government has not thought fit to make reparation and give satisfaction for the indignities offered to the British Government, it became necessary for me to leave the Court of His Majesty the Shah. I have therefore relieved you from further trouble, for I felt unable any longer to endure or submit to the indignities offered to my Government; therefore to maintain the honor and dignity of the British Government, and to protect its interests, I have considered it advisable, for a time, to put an end to my official intercourse, on behalf of my own Government, with the Government of Persia, and to my mission, and to proceed to the frontiers of Turkey, there to await further instructions from my own Government, that I may thereafter proceed according to directions they may contain.

Finally, I have still the desire that the Persian Government should, by favourable circumstances, come to a right understanding of its own true interests, and that it should not so act as to subject itself to serious loss and injury.

What more shall I write?

Translated by

14 Rublee-ul-Awul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
June 7, 1838
(Inclosure 23.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

Your Excellency previously wrote requesting that a Mehmendar might be appointed to accompany your Excellency to the frontiers of Turkey. His Majesty has issued his commands that though your Excellency has not gone with His Majesty's consent, and has acted contrary to His Majesty's wishes, nevertheless, in consideration of the respect due to your Excellency, and the fullness of His Majesty's kindness towards your Excellency, the high in rank, &c., &c., Achmed Khan, Deputy-Master of the Ceremonies, with some of the marshalmen of the camp, have been ordered to accompany your Excellency to the Capital Tehran, and, in obedience to His Majesty's commands, do all that is necessary that your Excellency's comfort may be attended to, and the respect due to your Excellency may be observed at each stage. And from the Capital to the frontiers of Turkey, positive orders have been issued to the Beglerbeggee of Tehran, that in concurrence with His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, he may select a proper Mehmendar to accompany your Excellency to the extreme frontiers of the Persian territory.

What more shall I write?

Translated by

14 Rubbee-ul-Awul, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

June 7, 1838.

No. 86.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 21, 1838.)

Meshed, June 25, 1838.

I have the honor to report, for your Lordship's information, that in consequence of a proposition to that effect from the Government of Herat, an attempt was made by the Persian Government to negotiate an arrangement of the differences between Shah Kamran and the Shah of Persia; but the attempt was unsuccessful because the Herat Government would not agree to two conditions, the acceptance of which Mahommed Shah declared to be indispensable.

The first of these conditions was, that Herat should be acknowledged to be Persian territory, and Shah Kamran and the inhabitants of Herat to be Persian subjects.

The second was, that the Government of Herat should engage not to hold any intercourse of any description with the English.

During the relaxation of vigilance in the Persian trenches, which was a consequence of the knowledge that negotiations were in progress, though no trace had been agreed upon, the people of Herat succeeded in purchasing, and conveying into the town, a considerable quantity of salt, an article which had begun to be deficient.

The negotiations were broken off about the 4th instant, and on the 6th a body of above a thousand horse of the Hazareh and Jemsheedee
tribes, descending from the hills to the north of the town, about nine o'clock in the morning, swept the pastures to the eastward of the walls, in which a great number of cattle belonging to the Persian camp were grazing. The accounts most worthy of credit which I have received, lead me to believe, that between 1 and 200 head of horses and mules were carried off. Of these, several hundreds belonged to the Persian artillery, and seventeen or eighteen to the Russian Minister. About 3 or 400 persons, who were employed in guarding and tending the cattle in their pastures, were made prisoners, and about twenty-five or thirty killed.

As soon as intelligence of this occurrence was received in camp, a body of horse was sent in pursuit of the Hazarehs and Jemsheedees, but it found them too strong to be attacked, and was therefore forced to permit them to retire, almost unmolested, with their plunder and the captives.

Reinforcements from Tabreez, and from more distant parts of Azerbaijan, to the number of above 1,000 foot and 200 horse, have arrived in this vicinity, on their march to camp, and about 3,000 men from the same province are on the road, and will probably join the Shah in about a month.

Provisions were not deficient in the Shah's camp, and the new crops of the neighbouring districts are now beginning to be available: there does not, therefore, seem to be any immediate prospect of the Shah's being forced, by want of provisions, to raise the siege.

No. 87.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Aug. 24, 1838.)

Meshed, June 25, 1838.

After having exhausted all the means I could devise to induce the Persian Government to grant me reparation and satisfaction for the violence offered to the messenger; and finding that I could obtain nothing, I felt compelled, not only in consequence of the evident determination of the Persian Government not to grant what I demanded, but also because of its perseverance in a course of proceeding towards me in camp, which I felt was lowering the character of the mission in the estimation both of Persians and of Afghans, to quit the Court; and I am now on my way to the Turkish frontier, where I shall hope to receive further instructions from your Lordship. What course the Persian Government will now pursue, I know not; some public act of reparation, which will prove to the people of Persia and of Central Asia, that we are not with impunity to be insulted, is in my opinion, indispensably necessary, I will not say to restore us to our former position, but to enable us to retain one of any credit or respectability. Both the Persians and the Afghans in the Shah's camp saw with amazement the Persian Government treating a British Mission as a proscribed body and punishing persons who ventured to hold even a casual intercourse
with it; while some of the members of the Russian Mission took to task, and threatened to get punished for that offence, persons who occasionally visited at my tent, taking some precautions to prevent their being discovered. I feel, that by remaining so long as I did in such a position, I lost something in the estimation of all the Asians who witnessed the state of things; but I was determined not to precipitate anything; and, in my despatch of the 14th May, I had announced to your Lordship my intention to await the decision on the course I had taken in the affair of the messenger, before resorting to any decided measure. It is a remarkable fact, that neither verbally nor in writing have the Persian Government ever used to me any expression of regret for what had occurred; and they have continued to intercept Captain Burnes's cossids, and to open the packets of private letters of which they were the bearers, but which, until they were opened, they could not certainly have pronounced not to be official communications. I demanded the release of two of these cossids, who had been seized between Furrah and Herat before my arrival in camp; but though I was well informed, that they were then in confinement in camp, the Minister declared there were no such persons, and next day removed them from the camp to a more distant place of confinement; and I was at length deterred from pressing the matter any further by the fear that the men might be destroyed the more effectually to conceal their capture. Had the Persian Government felt any regret for the offence it had given, it would have endeavoured, I must presume, to have in some degree removed the unfavourable impression it had made; which it might have attempted to do by treating me with more than usual personal kindness, or still more effectually by a display of greater public consideration for the Mission; but it took the opposite course, and seemed to have no other object in its proceedings than to place me in as depressed a position as possible, and to show its total indifference to the displeasure of my Government.

The key of all Afghanistan towards the north is Herat; and though I can have no right to press my personal opinions upon your Lordship after having already stated them, and although I must necessarily be ignorant of the many important considerations not immediately connected with this question, which must influence the policy of Her Majesty's Government, still I cannot refrain from saying a few words more regarding the importance of preserving the independence of Herat.

I have already informed your Lordship publicly, that the country between the frontiers of Persia and India is far more productive than I had imagined it to be; and I can assure your Lordship that there is no impediment, either from the physical features of the country, or from the deficiency of supplies, to the march of a large army from the frontiers of Georgia to Kandahar, or, as I believe, to the Indus. Count Simonich being lame from a wound, drove his carriage from Tehran to
Herat, and could drive it to Kandahar; and the Shah's army has now
for nearly seven months subsisted almost exclusively on the supplies
of the country immediately around Herat and Ghorian, leaving the still
more productive districts of Subzar and Furrah untouched. In short,
I can state from personal observation, that there is absolutely no imped-
diment to the march of an army to Herat; and that, from all the informa-
tion I have received, the country between that city and Kandahar not only
presents no difficulty, but affords remarkable facilities for the passage
of armies. There is, therefore, my Lord, no security for India in the
nature of the country through which an army would have to pass to
invade it from this side. On the contrary, the whole line is peculiarly
favourable for such an enterprise; and I am the more anxious to state
this opinion clearly, because it is at variance with my previous belief,
and with statements which I may have previously hazarded, relying on
more imperfect information.

Under such circumstances, it appears to me that it would be a most
hazardous policy to allow Persia to act as the pioneer of Russia, and,
under protection of the Article of the Treaty, to break down the main
defence of Afghanistan, and thereby make the country untenable to us,
at a moment when the concert between Persia and Russia in these
operations is avowed. I shall therefore urge Lord Auckland, by every
argument I can call to mind, to take a decided course, and to save
Herat.

In the meantime, I have every confidence that Herat will continue
to defend itself; and I have not only not called on Mr. Pottinger to leave
Herat, where his presence appeared to me to be an immense advantage,
but I have written to him, recommending him to remain; and I have
officially announced to the Persian Government, that he is there as agent
for the Indian authorities.

It is currently reported, and believed here, though I cannot say on
what grounds, that there is a secret arrangement between Persia and
Russia, to exchange Herat for some of the districts beyond the Arras,
which formerly belonged to Persia. This report was first mentioned to
me at Tehran, in March last; but I then paid no attention to it, because
I could not see how Russia was to get at Herat; and I still am inclined
to regard it as probably unfounded, though Count Simonich certainly
threatened Mahomed Ameen, a servant of Yar Mahomed Khan,
(who was sent with a message from his master to the Persian camp,) that
if Herat did not surrender to the Shah, he would march a Russian
army against it.

I mentioned some time ago, in a letter to Lord Auckland, of which I
think I sent your Lordship a copy, that, in a conversation with a Persian
gentleman at Tehran, Count Simonich had stated his having advised
the Shah after the fall of Herat, to turn his attention to Sinde. This
advice, at the time I first heard of it, appeared to me to be unintelligible; but after I became acquainted with the arrangements entered into with Kandahar, the mystery was solved.

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No. 88.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. McNeill.

SIR,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1838.

I lose no time in acquainting you that Her Majesty’s Government entirely approve the course which you pursued, as reported in your despatch of the 25th of June,* both in having remained at the camp of the Shah so long as there was the least chance of a change of conduct on the part of His Persian Majesty; and in having left the camp, when it became apparent that the Shah was only trifling with you, and endeavouring to expose you to degradation, by inducing you to prolong your stay, although the Persian Government had taken its determination not to grant your demands.

I am, &c.

John McNeill, Esq.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

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No. 89.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sept. 22, 1838.)

(Extract.)

Camp, near Thiran, July 30, 1838.

On the 10th instant, at Shahrood, I had the honor to receive your Lordship’s despatch of the 21st of May; and as I had already left the Shah’s camp under circumstances which made it impossible for me to return thither, I determined to entrust Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart with a message to the Shah, founded on the communication which, in that despatch, your Lordship had instructed me to make to His Majesty.

To prevent the possibility of mistake, I gave Colonel Stoddart that message in writing, and directed him, after having delivered it verbally in Persian, to give the Shah a Copy in English, if His Majesty should desire it.

The terms in which this message is expressed, may appear to your Lordship to be stronger and more decided than those I was instructed to employ; but as Her Majesty’s Government, when these instructions were written, had not yet become acquainted with the Treaty, negotiated under the mediation and guarantee of Russia, between Persia and Kandahar; nor with the nature of the proposition, made by the Shah to the Herat Government, reported in my despatch of the 25th of June, from Meshed; nor with the language I had already ventured to hold to the Shah; nor with the circumstances which had forced me to leave the Shah’s camp; nor with the failure of the negotiations at Cabool and Kandahar, and the return of Captain Burnes to India; nor with the arrival of the troops from India at Karrak; I hope your Lordship will

* No. 85.
be of opinion that these important changes in the state of affairs, justified me in addressing the Shah in the terms I have employed. I have directed Colonel Stoddart not to enter into any discussion of the questions which have arisen between the British and Persian Governments; but I have furnished him with a copy of the Draft of a Treaty or agreement between the Shah and the Government of Herat, nearly similar to that which I had proposed to His Majesty after my visit to that town, and of which I have the honor to inclose a translation; and I have instructed him, if the Shah should express a desire to conclude an amicable arrangement with Herat, to inform the Persian Government that he will use his best endeavours to induce Shah Kamran to agree to the terms of the arrangement I have proposed.

I have further directed Colonel Stoddart not to remain in the Shah’s camp more than five days, unless before the expiration of that time he should have received a favourable answer to the message of which he is the bearer.

Colonel Stoddart will also communicate to me, and, if possible, directly to the Governor-General of India, the answer of the Shah to the demands which I have now made.

(Inclosure 1.)—Message to be delivered by Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to the Shah.

I AM directed by Her Britannic Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary to state that he has been entrusted by Her Majesty’s Ministers to inform your Majesty, that the British Government look upon this enterprise in which your Majesty is engaged against the Afghans, as being undertaken in a spirit of hostility towards British India, and as being totally incompatible with the spirit and intention of the alliance which has been established between Great Britain and Persia. That consequently if this project is persevered in, the friendly relations which up to this time have so happily subsisted between Great Britain and Persia, must necessarily cease, and that Great Britain must take such steps as she may think best calculated to provide for the security of the possessions of the British Crown.

I am further directed to inform your Majesty, that if Herat should have surrendered to your Majesty, the British Government will consider your Majesty’s continuing to occupy that, or any other portion of Afghanistan, as a hostile demonstration against England.

Her Majesty’s Minister Plenipotentiary anxiously hopes that by speedily withdrawing the Persian army into your Majesty’s own dominions, your Majesty will avert the inevitable consequences of persevering in a course of hostility to England.

The British Government also demands reparation for the violence offered to its messenger, which is a matter quite distinct from the ques-
tion of Herat. Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary trusts your Majesty will grant that reparation in the manner which he pointed out and thus relieve the British Government from the necessity of having recourse to other measures to exact it.

Your Majesty is no doubt informed by the Government of Fars, that a body of British troops, and a naval armament consisting of five ships of war, have already arrived in the Persian Gulf, and that for the present the troops have been landed on the Island of Karrak. The measures your Majesty may adopt in consequence of this representation will decide the future movements and proceedings of that armament; but your Majesty must perceive from the view which Her Majesty's Government has taken of the present state of affairs, and from the effect which must have been produced on the minds of Her Majesty's Ministers and the British authorities in India by the subsequent proceedings of the Persian Government, with which they were not then acquainted, that nothing but the immediate adoption of measures to comply with the demands of the British Government can induce the authorities acting under the order of that Government to suspend the measures which are in progress for the defence of British interests, and the vindication of British honor.

In the meantime, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary will pursue his journey to the Turkish frontier, and will remove all the English from the Persian territory; but he trusts that the bad counsel of the ill-disposed persons who have induced your Majesty to persevere in a course which has placed affairs in this position will no longer influence your Majesty; and that guided by your own wisdom, and by a regard to the true interests of Persia, your Majesty will adopt such measures as will enable Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary to return to your Majesty's Court and to restore to its former footing of cordiality the alliance between the two Governments.

Your Majesty has seen that all Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary has stated to your Majesty in regard to these matters, has been dictated by sincerity and truth, and by an anxious desire to avert the evils which it was obvious must result from a perseverance in the course which the Persian Government was pursuing; and he again assures your Majesty that nothing but immediate danger and injury to Persia can result from rejecting the demands of the British Government.

That God may guide your Majesty to a wise decision, and that he may forgive those whose evil counsels have led to such a state of things, is the earnest prayer of an old and faithful servant, who has ever been a sincere well-wisher of the Shah and the Persian Government.

Translated by
(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
(Inclosure 2.)—Translation of a Draft of a Treaty agreed to by the Government of Herat, and proposed to the Persian Government by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

Stipulations which His Highness Kamran Meerza will engage to perform.

I. Hostilities and plunder shall cease, and the capture and selling of slaves shall entirely be put a stop to.

II. The subjects and dependents of the Shah-in-Shah of Irán shall in no way be annoyed, and no attempt shall be made to injure them, and no disturbance shall be created on the frontier of Khorassan.

III. Every possible endeavour shall be used to prevent the Turco-mans or others from plundering in the territory of the Shah-in-Shah of Irán, and in the event of these tribes offending, should the Shah-in-Shah of Irán desire to chastise and punish them, this Government shall furnish troops to the extent of its ability to co-operate with the troops of the Shah-in-Shah of Irán for the chastisement of the above-mentioned tribes.

IV. Whatever number of slaves may be in bondage with the Affghans of Herat and its dependencies, all that are within reach, or that they may be able to restore shall be restored.

V. Whatever persons of the Affghans may have joined the Shah-in-Shah of Irán, shall not in any way be injured or molested.

VI. Hereafter Prince Kamran shall not give himself the title of Shah, but shall content himself with that of Shahzadeh.

VII. Merchants from all parts who shall enter the territory of Herat, and its dependencies, shall be in every respect protected, and shall not be molested in life or property.

VIII. The Government of Herat shall not oppose the removal of the tribe of Hazareh to the Persian territories.

Demands of His Highness Kamran Meerza.

I. His Majesty the Shah-in-Shah of Irán shall treat Prince Kamran as one of his own brothers.

II. The Ministers of the Persian Government, shall in no possible way interfere in the internal affairs of the dominions in possession of Prince Kamran, but these affairs shall be left under the entire control of the Ministers of the Government of Herat.

III. Ghorian shall be given over to Sheer Mahommed Khan, and Sheer Mahommed Khan himself shall at all times remain with the Shah-in-Shah of Irán.

IV. The Shah-in-Shah of Irán shall not send troops to the terri-
ories in possession of Prince Kamran, and shall prohibit his Governors, and soldiers, and subjects, from plundering.

The well-wisher of the State (His Excellency John Mc Neill, Esq. Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia), engages that in the fulfilment of these stipulations, the British Government should act as judge, and in the event of either party failing to perform its engagements, it, (the British Government), shall use its best endeavours to make such party fulfil the above stipulations.

Translated by

(Signed) D'ARCY TODD.

No. 90.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sep. 22, 1838.) (Extract.)
Camp, near Tehran, July 31, 1838.

Colonel Stoddart set out on the 12th instant for the Shah's camp, and on the 16th had advanced as far as Subzawar: I therefore conclude that he will arrive at Herat about the 2nd or 3rd of August, and that I may expect to receive an answer to the demands I made on the Shah, before I shall have crossed the Persian frontier into Turkey.

No. 91.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sep. 22, 1838.) (Extract.)
Camp, near Tehran, July 31, 1838.

I have the honor to report for your Lordship's information, that on or about the 23rd ultimo, the Shah's army, after six days' incessant battering, assaulted Herat and was repulsed with considerable loss. The number of the killed and wounded of the Persian army is variously stated, but the best information I have been able to obtain, leads me to believe that it must have amounted to 1,700 or 1,800 men. The loss in Officers, and especially those of the higher ranks, has been very great in proportion to the whole number killed and wounded. Major-General Borowski, and Sirteps Wully Khan, and Nebbee Khan, have been killed. Sirteps Samson Khan, Hoossein Pasha Khan, and Jaffier Kooli Khan, have been wounded, and almost all the Field-officers of these brigades, have been killed or wounded.

The Persian troops are represented to have assaulted with gallantry, and to have planted their standards three several times in the breach, but they were unable to maintain their position. The Afghans attacked them sword in hand, with an energy and determination that is represented as having been irresistible, and drove them with great slaughter across the ditch. Of the killed and wounded in the Persian ranks, more than three-fourths are stated to have received sabre wounds.

Count Simonich would appear to have planned the attack, but I understand His Excellency complains that all his directions were not
attended to, and that there was a want of combination in the movements of the Persian columns. In his letters to Tehran, however, he anticipated considerable advantage from having proved to the Afghans that the Persian troops can be brought to attempt an assault.

What may be the determination of the Shah as to his future proceedings, does not appear to be known here. I learn that the son of Kohundil Khan of Kandahar, has actually arrived in the Shah’s camp, accompanied by Captain Vicovich, who has returned from Cabool, having, it is said, concluded a Treaty with Dost Mahommed Khan. The hope of receiving the submission of all Afghanistan, will be a very strong inducement to the Shah, to persevere in the enterprise in which he is engaged. At the same time it may be feared, that the disappointment which the Herat Government must experience, on learning that Cabool and Kandahar are to all appearance combined with Persia and Russia against it, and that even an unsuccessful assault has not forced the Shah to raise the siege, may depress the spirit of the gallant defenders of Herat, and lead them to submit to Persia.

That submission would now certainly be followed, if it has not been preceded, by the submission of both Cabool and Kandahar.

On the other hand, the arrival of even the small force which has occupied Karrak, has caused a great sensation all over Persia. The intelligence of that event must already have arrived in camp direct from Shiraz, and the loss sustained by the Persian army in the assault, especially the loss of its most efficient and bravest officers, may perhaps prepare the Shah to attend to what Colonel Stoddart is instructed to state to him; but I am not sanguine in hoping for this result; the failure of the missions from the Indian Government to Cabool and Kandahar, and the success of the Russian negotiations with the Chiefs on our very frontier, must give the Shah a more exalted opinion than even he has hitherto entertained of the superior power of Russia as compared with that of England. He sees an unknown Captain of Cossacks from the banks of the Volga or the Emba, ride up to Cabool without pomp or retinue, and he sees him apparently driving out of Afghanistan the Agent of the Governor-General of India, and that Agent, Captain Burnes, who enjoys a reputation as high and as extensive as any officer who could have been employed upon that duty.

It is now certain that Captain Burnes’ departure from Cabool, or at least the determination of Dost Mahommed Khan, which led to his departure, was known in the Shah’s camp long before I left it, though I did not then credit the reports to that effect which were brought by the emissaries from Kandahar; and I therefore cease to wonder at the course pursued by the Persian Government in regard to the demands I made upon it, and to the Treaty with Herat which it had accepted, and which on the arrival of intelligence from Kandahar it hastened to reject.
No. 92.—Mr. McNell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sept. 22, 1838.)
Camp, near Tehran, August 1, 1838.

MY LORD,

I have the honor to inclose for your Lordship’s information a translation of the Treaty which has been concluded and ratified between the Shah and the Sirdars of Kandahar, and which Count Simonich has guaranteed. It appears to me, however, to be somewhat remarkable, that Count Simonich does not guarantee this Treaty in the name of his Government, though he uses his official designation.

I would further beg leave to observe, that as the Shah engaged unconditionally to put the Sirdars in possession of Herat, (at least, I presume, the second Article must be so understood), and as Count Simonich has made himself responsible to the Sirdars for the fulfilment of the engagements contracted by the Shah, he has, in fact, as I understand the Treaty, engaged to see the Sirdars put in possession of Herat.

The indefinite nature of the engagements contracted by both parties, and the very vague manner in which the terms are expressed, even in the Persian language, must at all times afford sufficient ground for difference and dispute, and therefore for Russian interference.

Persia engages to defend Kandahar against any enemy that may attack it, and if the Shah should fail to do so, Count Simonich engages to compel him to do so; at least this, I presume, is the meaning of the guarantee, if it means anything.

The common arrangement of the Commercial Stipulations of Persia and Russia with a principality which is a dependency of Persia, according to the terms of the Treaty, is not the least remarkable feature of this very curious document. It is even doubtful from the construction of the sentence in Persia, whether the commercial agent is not to be the common agent of the two Powers.

Finally, the effect of the Treaty would be to raise up a powerful principality in Afghanistan, which shall be nominally subject to Persia, but which must always look to Russia for protection; which hangs so loosely to Persia, that Russia could at any moment, when she might desire it, put an end to the connection, and turn against Persia the strength with which the Shah proposed to endow the Sirdars. On the other hand, Russia could probably at any time make the defence of Kandahar a pretext for engaging the Shah of Persia in a quarrel with those Chiefs whose territories border on Kandahar.

In short, if Herat should fall, and if the Treaty has really been guaranteed by Russia, and not by Count Simonich personally, Russia becomes by it indisputable mistress of the destinies, political and commercial, of all Central Asia; Great Britain, having been forced back to the Indus, Khiva and Bokhara must submit if they are attacked; while Persia and Afghanistan will already be entirely at her disposal.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
P.S. I have the honor to inclose a copy of the Treaty (in Persian)
concluded between His Majesty the Shah of Persia and the Sirdars of Kandahar.

(Inclosure.—Translation of a Treaty concluded between His Majesty the Shah of Persia and Kohundil Khan, and the other Sirdars of Kandahar.

(L. S.)

MAHOMMED SHAH.

(Written with the Shah’s own hand.)

“It is agreed to—Please God we shall so conduct (matters) that it shall be an object of envy to all the world.”

I. The Sirdars (of Kandahar) shall not act in opposition (to the Shah) and shall not connect themselves with any one else, but shall serve truly and faithfully; they shall be friends of the friends of Persia, and enemies of her enemies, and they shall not hold a friendly intercourse with persons who are opposed to (or at enmity with) the Persian Government; and they shall not act deceitfully or unfaithfully, and if they should so act, this Treaty is null and void.

II. We, (the Shah), have given the territory of Kandahar, and the territory of Herat with their dependencies, to the Sirdars, with the exception of Shekkiwan, and the territory beyond it, (towards Persia), and so long as they shall not have committed any act of opposition (or hostility), these territories shall be in their possession, and in that of their heirs; and if they should commit any act of opposition (or hostility), the circumstances shall first be communicated to the Sirdars, when if they rectify the error (or make reparation) it is well; but if they do not, then they shall be dealt with in whatever manner the haughty Government (of Persia) shall consider expedient.

III. The Sirdars shall not attack (or invade) any other territory without the consent of His Majesty the Shah; but if any of the subjects (dependents) of Kandahar or Herat, should not submit to their authority (or rebel) they are permitted to punish such persons.

IV. The Sirdars shall treat the Ryots and especially the Sheeahs with justice and equity, and shall protect them, and shall make no distinction between Soomees and Sheeahs, and shall consider them all true believers and followers of the seal of the Prophets—the blessed—and they shall not, without cause, subject them to pain or injury, whether injury in person or in property.

V. If an enemy should appear from any quarter, and if the Sirdars should themselves be unable to repel him, the Shah binds himself (or becomes responsible) to supply them (the Sirdars) with troops, artillery, and money, to whatever extent may be necessary, and not to withhold any description of assistance or support.

VI. Each of the Sirdars and the chief Nobles shall give trustworthy hostages to the Shah, that confidence may be established between the parties.
VII. If a Commercial Agent and a trustworthy (or responsible) person on the part of the exalted Governments of Persia and Russia, should reside in Herat and Kandahar, they (the Sirdars) shall treat him with all honor, and shall credit his statements on commercial affairs, and if the property of merchants should be made away with, they (the Sirdars) shall exert themselves to recover it.

VIII. They (the Sirdars) shall not molest or interfere with the merchants and subjects of the two States, (Persia and Russia) and they shall levy no more than the rate of custom dues which shall hereafter be specified, from the merchants of the exalted Government of Russia, and from the inhabitants of the Persian territory, that is to say (the territory) beyond (west of) Ghorian.

IX. A Peesh-kush (present or tribute) according to their means, shall be sent by them (the Sirdars) yearly, to the presence of the Shah, as an evidence of their submission and allegiance, and the Persian Government shall make no other demand of the Sirdars except service (allegiance).

X. The Afghan tribes connected with Kandahar and Herat shall be given over to the Sirdars, and no one shall interfere with them, and if in time of need, troops should be required from them, a small body of troops, with an Afghan nobleman, shall be sent to the stirrup of the Shah. For the pay and expenses of these troops, the Persian Government is responsible, and after the termination of the service, they shall be sent back to the Sirdars.

I, who am the Minister Plenipotentiary of the exalted Government of Russia, will be guarantee, that neither on the part of His Majesty, &c, &c, &c., the Shah of Persia, nor on the part of the powerful Sirdars shall there occur any deviation from, or violation of, this entire Treaty and these engagements.

\[\text{(L.S.) COUNT SIMONICH.}\]
\[\text{Minister Plenipotentiary of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia.}\]

I, who pray for the stability of His Majesty’s Government—the pilgrim of the House of God, Meerza Aghassee, am guarantee (or responsible) for the preceding matters, so that if there should be any deviation (from the Treaty) on the part of the Government of His Majesty, &c, &c, &c., the Shah, this slave shall be guilty in the sight of God and man, and shall be the scorn of those who have gone before and those who come after.

\[\text{(L.S.) HAJEE MEERZA AGHASSEE.}\]
\[\text{Chief Minister of the Shah of Persia.}\]

Translated by (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
No. 93.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sep. 23, 1837.)
(Extract.)
Camp, near Tehran, August 2, 1838.

I do not feel able to offer any decided opinion as to the course the Shah will pursue, on receiving Colonel Stodart’s message; for the state of affairs in Afghanistan is so much changed by the Kandahar Treaty, the success of Captain Vicovich, and the dismissal of Captain Burnes from Cabool, and Mr. Leech from Kandahar, that the Shah finding things going so very prosperously with him to all appearance, under the auspices of Russia, may be deterred by the prospect of concluding the business of Afghanistan by the capture of Herat, from attending to what otherwise would, in all probability, have sufficed to recall his expedition.

We have no intelligence of any interest from Herat since the place was assaulted, and the Shah’s intentions are still unknown. By some accounts he is represented to be engaged on lines of circumvallation, and by others, to be preparing for another assault. Count Simonich writes, that the Minister seemed to be rather pleased than otherwise with the failure of the recent attempt, and that he believes the cause of this feeling was, that the measure had been recommended, and the plan prepared by him (Count Simonich.)

No. 94.—Mr. McNeill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Sept. 22, 1838.)
(Extract.)
Camp, near Tehran, August 3, 1838.

It is reported here that Kohundil Khan, of Kandahar, with a considerable force, has besieged Furrah, one of the dependencies of Herat; and some of the Kandaharees who have accompanied Omar Khan, the son of Kohundil Khan, to the Shah’s camp, accompanied the storming party of Persians which led the assault against Herat. The arrival of Omar Khan is a consequence of the conclusion of the Treaty between the Shah and the Sirdars of Kandahar.

It has also been asserted in letters from the camp, that Dost Mohammed Khan of Cabool, has agreed to send an auxiliary force to cooperate with the Persian army against Herat; but I hope and believe that this statement is at least premature. Yet I am not free from apprehension on this subject, for I learn that Captain Vicovich returned to the Shah’s camp with Kohundil Khan’s son, and the perfect success of his mission is publicly spoken of.

At this moment the united influence of Persia and Russia would appear to be established in all the Afghan dominions, with the single exception of Herat; and the existence of that influence in those countries, viewed in conjunction with the course which these Powers have recently been pursuing, and the measures that have resulted from their joint diplomatic exertions, is so obviously incompatible with the tranquillity of India, and even with its security, that no measures can be more unequivocally measures of self-defence than those which the British Government is called upon to adopt, for the purpose of counter-
acting the evils with which India is threatened. Persia has no provocation to complain of. The course pursued by the British Government towards this Government has been one of uniform friendship and forbearance; and it appears to me, that it would be an inefficient as well as a hazardous and costly line of policy to adopt, were the British Government any longer to permit Persia, under the shelter of her Treaty with England, to open the way to India for another and far more formidable Power.

While the Persian Government is prosecuting schemes of almost undisguised hostility against England, and disregards the laws of nations and the usual courtesies in its proceedings towards me, it has been peculiarly gratifying to me to have received from all my friends, many of them men of the highest rank in the country, and many also connected with the present Government, while others belonged to the Court of the late Shah, the most unreserved assurances of their continued regard for and attachment to myself, and of their entire conviction, that no man in Persia could have laboured more anxiously than I have done to prevent a misunderstanding between the Governments.

No. 95.—Mr. Mc Neill to Mr. Backhouse.—(Rec. Sept. 22, 1838.)
(Extract.)
Camp, near Tehran, Aug. 4, 1838.
I inclose for Lord Palmerston's perusal, a copy of a letter which I wrote some time ago to Lord Auckland.

(Inclosure.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lord Auckland.
(Extract.)
Meshed, June 25, 1838.
On the 7th instant, the day on which I quitted the Shah's Camp, I wrote to your Lordship, announcing that in consequence of the Persian Government withholding redress for the violence offered to the messenger, I had felt myself compelled to suspend my official intercourse with this Court, and to proceed to the frontiers of Turkey, there to await further instructions.

The hostility of the views of Persia, or, at least, their hostile influence on our interests, can no longer be doubtful. She herself takes no pains to conceal this fact. At a moment when she has been warned of the danger of a rupture with England, as a consequence of her proceedings in Afghanistan, she permits me to leave the Court rather than afford me the reparation and satisfaction I had demanded, and which she could not have withheld from the Russian Minister in similar circumstances for one day.

Persia has systematically pursued a course which has continually tended to depress the British Mission, and to destroy British influence, not only in the Court but in the country. From these petty acts of annoyance she has proceeded to an invasion of Afghanistan, in opposition to the views of England, and disregarding the formal intimation that such a course, if adopted, might diminish the cordiality between
the States. Not content with this, she seizes the first opportunity to offer a public insult to the British Mission and Government by the treatment that was inflicted on the messenger, and the threat which, though subsequently retracted, was certainly held out against my life.

At Bushire, the Resident is threatened; and at Tabreez the gentlemen of the Mission and of the detachment residing there, as well as the merchants, can barely extort from the authorities enough of civility and respect to make it possible for them to remain. On my proceeding to camp, fresh evidences of alienation, of coldness, and disrespect, were rendered more marked by the contrast which the conduct pursued towards me exhibited, as compared with the treatment experienced by the Russian Mission. Every argument, every remonstrance on the subject of Herat, was disregarded, and not only disregarded, but followed by a distinct proposition to the Government of Herat to engage that they should hold no intercourse with the English, as an indispensable condition of the arrangement of the differences between the Governments: engagements are entered into with Kandahar, which are framed for the express purpose of placing that country and Herat under the influence, and even under the control of Russia, while at the same time, they make Persia responsible to Russia in a new capacity, and bind her to admit Russia's right to interfere in an authoritative manner in the affairs of what she calls her Afghan provinces; finally, she refuses reparation for the indignity offered to the British Government, and permits the British Mission to leave the Court, without evincing the slightest concern for the step I was forced to take.

No. 96.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Oct. 17, 1838.)
(Extract.)

Camp, near Tabreez, Sept. 6, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose, for your Lordship's information, extracts from a journal which I have received from Tehran.

(Inclusion.)—Extracts from a Journal, transmitted from Tehran.

Tuesday, August 15.—A messenger, employed by the merchants, came in to-day from Shiraz, and a report was immediately spread over the town of the occupation of the port of Bushire by the English troops.

Thursday, August 17.—A Russian Minister came in to-day from Kermanshah, with 12,000 tomauns collected from that province for the Russian Ambassador. Of this sum, 4,000 ducats are to be taken on immediately to the Russian Ambassador in camp, and the remainder is to be deposited in the hands of merchants at Tehran.

Monday, August 21.—Another report that is prevalent to-day in Tehran is, that ten Russian regiments are about to be transported across the sea of Astrachan (the Caspian) to march to the Shah's as-
sistance, and that they may very shortly be expected to disembark and proceed to Herat.

No. 97.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Oct. 17, 1838.)
(Extract.)

Camp, near Tabreez, Sept. 8, 1838.

On my arrival here, I found that Hoossein Khan had not yet set out; but a few days ago, letters from the Shah’s camp, were received by the Khan directing him to proceed immediately to England, on the mission to which he had been nominated. I am led to believe that these letters had been despatched before the receipt in camp of intelligence of the arrival of troops at Karrak, and before the arrival of Colonel Stoddart in the Shah’s camp.

Hoossein Khan having written to me requesting to be informed whether or not I had communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he, the Khan, would not be received at the Queen’s Court, and having also applied to me for letters of introduction to my friends in England, I requested Mr. Bonham to call on him, and to make to him, privately, the communication which your Lordship had directed their Excellencies Her Majesty’s Ambassadors at Paris and Vienna to make to the Khan, should he arrive at either of those Capitals.

The Khan informed Mr. Bonham that as he was accredited to the Courts of Vienna and Paris, as well as to that of London, it was his intention, now that he has received positive orders, to set out immediately; and having proceeded as far as Paris, to send his Secretary of Embassy to England, to ascertain whether or not he would be received.

No. 98.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Oct. 17, 1838.)
(Extract.)

Camp, near Tabreez, Sept. 11, 1838.

All my arrangements had been made for marching to-day towards the Turkish frontier, when yesterday afternoon a messenger arrived from Colonel Stoddart with letters informing me that the Shah had given a favourable answer to the message of which that Officer was the bearer. His Majesty had given a verbal promise to comply with the demands of the British Government; and a letter from Meerza Ali, the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which I have the honor to inclose a translation, conveys to me, on the part of His Majesty, an unconditional written promise to the same effect.

I learn from Tehran, that an intimation of these His Majesty’s intentions, has been made to the official authorities there; and His Excellency the Ameer Nizam called upon me this morning to inform me that he had been specially instructed by the Shah to induce me to suspend the prosecution of my journey, and not to leave the Persian territory.

I have determined to remain here for some days, expecting the arrival
of a messenger with the intelligence that the Shah has concluded the proposed arrangement with Herat, and has withdrawn his army from the Herat territory. Should no such intelligence arrive within seven days, I shall proceed by easy marches towards the frontier.

Should I receive intelligence of the return of the Shah and his army, after having concluded an arrangement with Herat, and should I learn at the same time, that Hajee Khan has been dismissed, which your Lordship will perceive has also been promised, I propose immediately to return to Tehran.

Colonel Stoddart would appear to have carried into effect with great precision the written instructions I gave him.

I have only further to state, that the intelligence of the Shah’s having agreed to the demands of the British Government, of which our messenger was the bearer, appears to have produced the utmost gratification in every town and village through which the messenger passed.

Colonel Stoddart mentions that Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabool had intimated to the Shah that hostile preparations against him were in progress both on the part of the English and the Seiks. If this information be correct, he will have an opportunity of testing the value of the alliances he has recently formed, as compared with that of a friendly connection with England.

(Inclosure 1.) - Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

Royal Camp, before Herat, August 12, 1833.

I have the honor to inform you that I arrived yesterday, at 11 A.M., and proceeded direct to the Hajee’s tent. Omar Khan, the son of the Kandahar Chief, Kohundil Khan, with eight Afghans, were there. The Minister himself was with the Shah, and on his return received me in a very friendly manner, ordered a tent for me in my old quarters, near my stable, made me his guest, and fixed to-day for my reception by the Shah. He inquired what news there was, and I told him I should have been here two days before, had not Thamasp Meerza thought proper to send seven horsemen, with Mahomed Khan Jalewund, after me from Ghorian, who detained me by force, which indignity he excused by saying he considered it the interest of Persia to detain me, without having any orders to do so. This I should represent to you I said, as I was not at liberty to enter on any other subject than those with which I was specially charged.

To-day, at half-past 10 A.M., I received an official note from the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Meerza Ali, requesting me to accompany him, agreeably to the Shah’s directions, to the royal presence. I accordingly went, and was handsomely received. After delivering your letter I delivered the message in Persian. On my coming to a pause, in the part requesting him to turn from ill-disposed advisers and refer to
his own wisdom for the interests of Persia, His Majesty said, "The fact is, if I don't leave Herat there will be war, is not that it?" I said, "It is war; all depends on your Majesty's answer. God preserve your Majesty!" handing the original English written message, he said, "This was all I wished; I asked the Minister Plenipotentiary for it, and he would not give it, alleging that he was not authorized." I said, "He was not then, but now he is ordered to give it. No one could give such a message without especial authority from our Sovereign." He declared again that such a paper was all he had wanted, and turned for assent to his chamberlains. He complained the paper was in English, which he could not read, and three times requested me to give him what I had read from in Persian, or to translate it for him, which I declined, referring him to the original. I said that was according to our custom, and requested His Majesty would soon favour me with an answer, that I might forward it without delay. He said, "Immediately and without delay, they shall translate it for me. Meerza Baba and Meerza Sauleh shall translate it, and the answer shall be given immediately, it will not take long, to-day or to-morrow." His Majesty then read your letter, and I took my leave. The Shah's manner throughout was marked by more than his usual kindness, both towards myself and in inquiries after you. He was in a raised room, up six or seven steps; the room was small and full, and the Deputy-Minister did not take me into the room, but the Shah made me come up close to him, and as His Majesty spoke very kindly in welcoming me, I did not think it a fit occasion to stickle for ceremony; otherwise I would not have delivered the message without entering the room.

Inclosed herewith are the instructions you honored me with.

(Inclosure 2.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart.

Shahrood, July 10, 1838.

On your arrival in the Shah's camp, you will as speedily as possible obtain an audience of the Shah, and deliver to His Majesty the letter to His Majesty's address, of which you are the bearer, and having done so, you will deliver to His Majesty at the same audience, the written message of which you have received charge. You will then request to be furnished with an answer to that message, either verbally or in writing, and you will lose no time in communicating that answer, whatever it may be, to the authorities in India, if that be practicable, and at all events, to me. One of the public messengers will accompany you for the purpose of bringing back to me that communication.

You will avoid and decline discussing with any one the questions which have arisen between the British Government and the Shah, and you will carefully and strictly confine your intercourse with the public authorities in the Shah's camp, to the delivery of the message with which you are charged, and the receipt of the answer which may be
given. You will not remain in the Shah's camp more than five days, if a favourable answer should not by that time have been given.

Should the Shah propose to conclude a Treaty or agreement with the Government of Herat, and should he desire the intervention of the British Government, I have no objection to take the share I formerly took in the arrangement, a copy of which, and of my engagements on the part of my own Government, has been furnished to you; but you are not authorized to propose any arrangement, but only to assent to it if proposed.

Should the Shah propose to send you into the city of Herat, for the purpose of negotiation, you will decline any such undertaking, unless the Shah will agree to, and seal the arrangement originally proposed by me, a draft of which you possess.

You will oblige me by making a copy of these instructions in the course of your journey to camp, and transmitting to me that copy by the Gholam, who will be sent to me from thence.

(Inclusion 3.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill. (Extract.) Royal Camp, before Herat, August 14, 1838.

I have the honor to inform you that the Shah summoned me to an audience this morning, at which His Majesty formally gave an answer to the message I had the honor of delivering in writing on the 12th instant. His Majesty stated, "we consent to the whole of the demands of the British Government. We will not go to war. Were it not for the sake of their friendship, we should not return from before Herat. Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of their friendship, we certainly would not have come at all."

I replied, that I thanked God, His Majesty thus regarded the true interests of Persia.

His Majesty then said, "The British will I trust, arrange for us this matter of Herat." I replied, I was commanded, in case of His Majesty desiring British mediation between Persia and Herat, to acquaint him, that I was empowered to conclude, on your part, the original arrangements that had been made; and drawing the paper of terms out of my pocket, I said, "Here are those terms, by which the Envoy Extraordinary is still ready to stand." His Majesty read them, and said, those were his own terms, and added, "All we want is one thing, that they should not make incursions into Khorassan. There is a great Mollah come to camp from Herat, with whom we will arrange the matter." I replied, "It is most easy;" and assured him, that the British Government was most anxious to put an end to this slave taking. He wished to retain the paper of terms, but I told him I had not another copy, and would give him a copy of it, which in the afternoon I furnished to the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, for His Majesty.

On coming from the Shah's presence, I acquainted the Deputy-Minis-
ter, that as far as it went, the answer of the Shah was most satisfactory; but that we now looked to the fulfilment of His Majesty's words; and I hoped no delay would take place, as every hour was valuable, and I could not undertake to say the operations of our troops would be suspended by anything less than the Shah's actually carrying into effect what he was called upon to do by the British Government. The Deputy-Minister saw this in the light I desired, and on my returning his call in the evening, said the Shah had given orders about returning hence; and that His Majesty would probably place the arrangement with Herat in my hands, and that respecting the preparation for the treatment of the Gholam, His Majesty was considering it, and would order it as soon as he had decided what to do with Hajee Khan. The Deputy-Minister assured me the whole would be carried into effect immediately.

(Inclusion 4.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

Royal Camp, before Herat, August 15, 1838.

I have the honor to inform you, that finding the musketry fire continued about noon to-day, I waited on the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to express to him my dissatisfaction at the continuance of hostilities, after His Majesty had expressed his consent to the demands of the British Government; and I requested him to make known to His Majesty, how inconsistent this continuance of operations was with his consent to the demands of yesterday. All this with the copy of the paper of terms, the Deputy-Minister laid before the Shah, who repeated his intention to carry into immediate effect what had been demanded of him. I had recommended the Deputy-Minister on his own account, to ask His Majesty for a Firman directing the Azerbijan Government to treat you on your return to the Court with such honors as were suitable to the occasion, and I inclose a copy and a translation of his answer. This recommendation I made to the Deputy-Minister to show the sincerity and frankness with which we desired the matter to be well concluded. I requested the Deputy-Minister to tell me frankly as far as he felt at liberty to do so, the intentions of the Shah in carrying into execution what he had agreed to. He assured me His Majesty will deprive Hajee Khan of his rank (destituta le Sirtip Hajee Khan;) and will through me conclude the matter with Herat on the terms you had empowered me to say you would stand by; and that the camp would move hence in two or three days.

To conclude, Yar Mahomed Khan and Herat are firm, and show no signs of surrendering. The Kandahar people in camp are disgusted at all around them, and are become very slack since the 9th instant, when news reached them from Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabool, that warlike operations on the part of the English and the Seiks against him were on foot. This camp is in a totally unserviceable state.
I inclose herewith by the Deputy-Minister’s request his official letter to you; a copy of which I have taken with his knowledge for the Governor-General of India.

(Inclosure 5.)—Translation of a Letter from the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs to Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart.

A. C.

I have finished and sent to you the necessary papers for the going of your courier, that he may start whenever you choose. I submitted to the Shah to-day that a Firman should be sent as you wished, and His Majesty’s reply was, that as soon as the terms are concluded with Herat, and after he has sent the detail of the carrying into effect the British Government’s demands, he will send a Firman to Karaman Meerza and the Ameer-i-Nizam.

(Inclosure 6.)—Translation of a Letter in the hand-writing of Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the address of His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, dated Herat, 24th Jumadee-ool-Awal, 1254. or 15th August, 1838.

A. C.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart having arrived in the royal camp, has had an audience of His Majesty the Shah, at which he stated the demands which your Excellency has made on the part of the British Government.

His Majesty fully comprehended these demands, and His Majesty (may his Government and Kingdom be lasting) on account of the union and friendship which exists between the two Governments, and also for the great esteem His Majesty entertains for your Excellency, has fully agreed to the demands and wishes of the British Government, and with his royal lips His Majesty gave the following orders to Colonel Stoddart, “We accede to the demands of the British Government, and we shall return from this. Our desire was, that the Afghan tribes should be prevented from plundering and ravaging our dominions. Please God, we shall make an arrangement with the people of Herat and return speedily.”

In conclusion, let it be known to your Excellency, that the wishes of the British Government are complied with, and that in the course of two or three days the particulars and manner of this compliance in accordance with the commands which His Majesty will issue, shall be communicated to your Excellency.

For the information of your Excellency, and according to His Majesty’s commands, this communication is made on the 24th Jumadee-ool-Awal, 1254, August 15, 1838.

Translated by
(Signed) J. P. RIACH.
Attached to the Mission.
No. 99.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Dec. 10, 1838.)

My Lord,

Camp, near Tabreez, October 6, 1838.

I have the honor to report for your Lordship’s information that in conformity with the instructions conveyed in your Lordship’s despatch of the 27th of July, I addressed to His Majesty the Shah on the 15th ultimo, a letter, on which the inclosure is a copy, and transmitted it to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tehran, for the purpose of being forwarded to the Shah’s Camp. I have received from His Excellency an acknowledgment that the letter was safely delivered to him, and an intimation that it had been despatched by an express courier to the Shah’s Camp on the 20th ultimo.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B.

(Inclusion.)—Mr. Mc Neill to the Shah of Persia.

May it please Your Majesty, Camp, near Tabreez, Sept. 15, 1838.

I have the honor to inform your Majesty that I have been instructed by the Ministers of the British Government to state to your Majesty, that whereas the spirit and purport of the Treaty between Great Britain and Persia is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British dominions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears, on the contrary, that your Majesty is occupied in subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British Possessions, and that in these operations your Majesty has openly connected yourself with an European Power for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile to British interests. That under these circumstances, and as your Majesty has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned Treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that Treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests and for the security of her dominions may suggest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN Mc. NEILL.

No. 100.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Dec. 10, 1838.)

(Extract.) Camp near Tabreez, October 6, 1838.

It affords me the greatest pleasure to have to report to your Lordship, that the Shah and the Persian army marched from before Herat on the 9th September, and that the messenger whom Colonel Stoddart despatched with this intelligence, accompanied the Persian army to a place some miles on this side of Ghorian, and 50 miles from Herat, where he left it on the 12th ultimo.
The inclosed letters from Colonel Stoddart contain all the details of that Officer's negotiations, and of the state of affairs, with which I am acquainted. From these communications it would appear that the Shah has concluded no Treaty with Herat, but that the Heratees had not in any way molested the Persian army when it retired, and your Lordship will observe that the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary is represented to have made great exertions, and even to have used vague threats, to deter the Shah from complying with the demand of the British Government, that he should retire within his own dominions. It is also stated that Count Simonich has sent messengers to the tribe of Hazareh, to Kandahar, and to Koorrookh, a fort about a day's journey from Herat, though for what purpose these messengers have been despatched does not appear. It is also asserted that a sum of 12,000 tomans was to be given to the Chiefs of Kandahar, and that the troops of that place were to continue to occupy Subzar and Furrah, dependencies of Herat; but it is probable that the movements of the troops from the side of India may induce or force the Kandaharees to evacuate these places.

It would appear that the Shah proposes to defer the conclusion of any definitive arrangement with Herat until his return to Tehran, where he intends it is said, to communicate with me upon the subject; but I regret to find, though Colonel Stoddart in his letters of the 25th, 26th, 27th August, leads me to expect that the reparation for the violence offered to the messenger would be immediately granted, and even led me to infer that Hajee Khan had already been dismissed; that his more recent letters make no mention of this circumstance; and the messenger informs me that when he parted from the camp, Hajee Khan was still in command of the Shekakoo battalions; but he added, that it was understood to be the Shah's intention to dismiss that officer on his arrival at Tehran.

Had it not been for this impediment, it was my intention to have proceeded at once to Tehran, there to have awaited the Shah's arrival; but as this part of the demands which I made has not yet been complied with, it is my intention to send Colonel Sheil to the Shah, for the purpose of endeavouring to arrange this matter; and in the meantime I shall move slowly towards the Persian capital, hoping that the Shah, having fulfilled his promise respecting his return from Herat, will not permit the renewal of official and friendly intercourse between himself and the British Government to be interrupted, by delaying to make a concession so much inferior in importance to that which he has already made. I rely with perfect confidence on the judgment and address of Colonel Sheil to obtain from the Shah, if it be practicable to do so, without giving rise to further irritation, this act of redress, without which I do not think I can return advantageously to the Court; and at the same time I am exceedingly desirous that the minor questions
which are still subjects of discussion, should be disposed of before I come again into personal communication with the Shah. If these questions should be satisfactorily adjusted, and a definitive arrangement should be concluded between the Shah and Herat, I trust that all collision of interests between Great Britain and Persia will have ceased, and that the time will have arrived to which I have long looked forward with anxious hope, when Her Majesty’s Government may safely strengthen Persia, and afford her the most efficient support, with the confidence that, in so doing, they will be promoting the interests of Great Britain, and providing for the security of India.

In concluding this despatch, I hope I may be permitted to solicit the favorable consideration of Her Majesty’s Government for Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who have both, during this protracted siege, been exposed to all the hardships and privations, the one, of the besiegers’ camp, the other of the besieged city. Colonel Stoddart has brought to a successful conclusion his duties in camp, and Lieutenant Pottinger has thwarted all the military efforts of the Russian Officers of superior rank, who, for some months conducted the siege, and all the intrigues by which the Russian mission sought to sow dissension and excite alarm amongst the defenders of Herat.

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(Inlosure 1.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

Royal Camp, before Herat, Sunday, Aug. 19, 1838.

By Rasheed, a Cossid, I take the opportunity of saying, that I despatched my own man Mahommed hence to you on the 16th instant, with my letters of the 12th, 14th, and 15th instant, detailing the favourable answer given by His Majesty to the British demands. I learned yesterday that on the 12th instant, after the delivery of the message, Firmans were sent by the Shah to Meerza Massood and the Beglerbeggee at Tehran, directing them to use every persuasion to detain you there: however, if your march was regulated in the way proposed when I left you, the courier who bore these Firmans would not reach you short of Zunjan. I trust Mahommed may reach you before you reach Khoi. On the 17th, I waited on the Shah, to tell him that I had despatched his answer to you, and to give him an opportunity of mentioning anything he might wish. His Majesty was very kind, but did not allude to business. He inquired particularly where you intended to halt; he had understood at Awardjik. Yesterday afternoon the Shah sent Meerza Ali to me to say that he had been in negotiation with Herat, by desire of the Herat Government, and he had assented to the terms you had approved, but that now the Herat Government would not listen to such terms from him, and wanted money from him, so that he had no longer any hope of persuading them to come to terms. Did I, on the part of the British Government, wish him to leave Herat without concluding any arrangement? If so, he wished a paper from me to that
effect, and then would march hence, leaving without an arrangement; or did I think the British Government would approve of his endeavouring by force, short of taking the city, to persuade them to come to terms? I replied, that His Majesty continuing to allow his troops to continue the firing, after his consent to the wishes of the British Government, was already a breach of friendship; and the British Government would certainly look upon the demonstration of further force here, as a new perseverance in the course so unhappily followed hitherto by His Majesty; also that his attempt at force, while the Afghans knew our army was backing them, was useless, and that it was His Majesty’s interest, instead of going away without terms, to employ me to conclude on the terms rejected by the Herat Government, while merely proposed by Persia. That he had only to seal the terms, send me for the seals of the Herat Government, and then your seal was ready on the part of the British Government. He received my answer last night, and is to give his answer to me to-day. There is no doubt that the Heratees stand firm. To-day is the last day of the Shah’s promise to write to you details of carrying into effect his answer, and I intend to-day to request the promised detail from Meerza Ali, and to leave camp for Subzar in three days, if not favoured with some satisfactory answer. The Russian Ambassador now says that he only came to Herat to arrange the return of the regiment of Russian deserters to Russia; the Emperor having given them four months’ time, after the elapse of which he would not pardon them, and would withdraw Count Simonich from this Court. The four months are nearly up. The 2nd of the month (Jemaudy-Assauny) is currently reported as the day the Shah leaves this. To-day is the 28th of Jemaudy-ul-Aval. Yesterday an elephant was presented by Shahhaus Khan in due form to the Shah, “as a (peeshkush) present from Kohundil Khan, Sardar of Kandahar, to the Shah-in-Shah!”

P.S. Sunday evening.

I reminded Meerza Ali to-day, that to-day is the third day on which I was to receive the Shah’s fulfilment of His Majesty’s commands, and it is promised me to-night. He told me the Shah said yesterday he would positively move hence on the 8th of Jemaudy-Assauny.

(Inclosure 2.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

Royal Camp before Herat, Monday, Aug. 20, 1838.

The Shah is continuing his preparations for marching hence. The two large guns remaining unburst, out of six that from first to last were cast, have been brought from the trenches, and are being broken up for convenience of carriage; 400 mules have been hired at three and a-half tomauns a-month, and in the bazaar the people are busy making up their loads, as next Sunday is talk of for their de-
parture. They say the artillery are to leave first with their stores, and the chief part of the guns; except, however, the mention made by His Majesty of the 8th Jamaudy-Assauny (29th August), reported in my despatch of the 19th instant, no other authentic report has reached me as to the day of march. The Shah’s orders have been issued to-day, that all the baggage and other animals at pasture should be brought into camp.

The Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote me the note, of which I inclose a copy and a translation, this morning. On receiving it, I requested him to say if it was by the Shah’s wish the note was addressed to me, and learning that such was the case, I furnished him with an answer, of which the inclosure (No. 2) is a copy and translation.

The Deputy-Minister told me that the Shah had decided to leave this without coming to any arrangement with the Affghans of Herat, (sans aucune convention.) He said the Shah intends to talk to you about an arrangement when he sees you at Tehran. In reply I said, I would in the meantime here use my best efforts on your behalf to prevent the Affghans from pursuing and harassing the army on its return, as well as to prevent them from making retaliatory incursions into Khurasan. His Majesty yesterday gave his orders about the letter detailing the carrying into effect the Shah’s consent to the demands of the British Government, but that letter has not yet reached me.

I acquainted the Deputy-Minister to-day, with my intention to proceed to Subzar, or some place on the Hazarajat road towards Cabool, in order that I might thence despatch my news to the Governor-General of India; and I said that if the Shah went hence soon, I should probably accompany the royal camp two or three stages; and I acquainted him that I had been furnished with a passport by you, enabling me to go towards India, and that after I had carried your instructions into effect, I was to return to Tehran.

(Sub-inclusion 1.)—Translation of a Note from the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs to Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart.—(Received August 20, 1838.)

A.C.

You sent an Indian newspaper translated to Meerza Baba (Hakeem Bashee), Chief Physician; I also saw it. You had written in it that British troops are coming against Persia; we are more astonished at this than are the people of India, if they are coming, because we desired to punish the irregularities of the Affghans. We have acted agreeably to three Treaties with you, in all of which it is settled that you are to have nothing to do with the Affghans. We came against Herat to recover our prisoners and our pillaged property; now you are not content at this, and act contrary to the Treaty; we will return: but there is
great room for astonishment, because it is extraordinary that Sovereigns should act contrary to Treaties.

29 Jemaudy-al-Aeil, 1254.
August 20, 1838.

(Sub-inclosure 2.)—Translation of a Note from Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A.C.
August 20, 1838.

The Indian newspaper should not be cause of astonishment, for State Ministers do not tell the reason of the movements of the army to the newspapers; and the editors write the news for themselves. The British Ministers have informed the Shah of the reason; and now, thank God, nothing remains but for me to be able to communicate speedily to the Governor-General of India, the news of the commands of the Shah being carried into execution, &c.

(Inclosure 3.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. McNeill.
(Extract.)
Wednesday Evening, August 22, 1838.

The delay that has occurred on the part of the Shah, in carrying into effect his promises, has caused me great regret, as I am aware how extremely anxious you are to be furnished with the details of the fulfilment of these promises. I was relieved this evening by the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs calling to express his apology for the delay, which he says has been occasioned by additions made by the Shah to the letter. His Majesty dictated the substance of the letter on the 19th. On the 21st it was taken to him for approval, and he made additions which are written fair, and he is to see and approve the fair copy to-morrow. In the meantime, the preparations for marching hence have been carried on. Nearly all the baggage and other animals are come to camp from pasture; and the Hajee talks of going by detachments.

(Inclosure 4.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. McNeill.
(Extract.)
Camp, before Herat, Thursday, Aug. 23, 1838.

His Majesty sent for me at half-past eight this morning; and after some expressions of kindness, inquired if I had sent off his answer to you. I replied that seven days ago I had sent off the letter, which informed you of the spirit of His Majesty’s intentions; but that the detail of carrying them into effect had not yet reached me. His Majesty reprimanded the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, for not having yet sent the detail to me, and expressed his wish that I should send it off to you without delay.

(Inclosure 5.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. McNeill.
(Extract.)
Royal Camp, near Herat, Sunday, Aug. 26, 1838.

I have the honor to forward inclosed, a letter to your address.
from Meerza Ali, the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was delivered to me last night; and I have taken a copy of it for India. A courier will be furnished to me to bear this to Meshed, where, should the arrangement proposed by you have been carried into effect, a Gholam will be waiting for it. I have desired the postmaster at Meshed, to forward this packet by a man of his own, in case the Gholam you proposed sending, or Ameer Beg, should not be at Meshed. The courier will probably leave this to-morrow morning. A Russian courier left this to-day, by whom, through Meerza Ali and Meerza Massood, I sent a short note to you.

With reference to the inclosed letter, it will be satisfactory to you to learn, that the Persian Government is actually carrying into execution its promises. The Shah has sent Ferashes to bring Hajee Khan to camp from his quarters behind the trenches; and the preparations for marching hence are continued. A guard of 2,000 men and two guns has been thrown out to protect the camp against any attack from Subzar, with orders to send in bullocks from the villages to drag the guns, and a man has been sent to turn back some ammunition that was on the road to camp. They are repairing the gun-carriages, and shoeing the artillery horses; and one great cause of delay is the unserviceable state of the ordnance branch.

(Inclosure 6.) — Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. McNeill.—
(Received by Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart in the Persian Camp, August 25, 1838.)

I am commanded by His Majesty to give the following answer to the message which Colonel Stoddart delivered by the directions of your Excellency to His Majesty. Colonel Stoddart represented, that your Excellency was instructed by the English Government to communicate to His Majesty, that the British Government considered, that in advancing to Afghanistan, Persia had hostile intentions towards England, and had formed projects of possessing herself of Hindostan; that the friendship which had for so many years subsisted between both nations must, in consequence, be necessarily dissolved; and that it became incumbent on the British Government to take such measures as it considered expedient for the protection of its dominions. Colonel Stoddart also represented, that your Excellency expressed a hope, that His Majesty having formed an equitable adjustment with the people of Herat, would withdraw his army from that territory (the Afghan), into the Persian dominions, and obviate the consequences of the hostility which a perseverance in such intentions was likely to produce. Colonel Stoddart further represented, that five ships of war had arrived in the Persian Gulf, with troops which had disembarked at the island of Karrak; and that the future movements of these troops depended
on the arrangements which the Persian Government might adopt in consequence of this announcement; and on its compliance with the demand of the British Government for satisfaction with reference to the affair of the courier. This is however a separate matter, and has no connection with the subject of Herat.

His Majesty, without entering into any argument or discussion, commands me to state, that with reference to the attack on Afghanistan, there are three Articles in the Treaties between the two Governments (England and Persia,) which declare distinctly the course that is to be pursued by England, should war ensue between Persia and Afghanistan. Thus, in the 6th Article of the Treaty, concluded during the Mission of Sir Gore Ouseley; "If war should ensue between the Persian and Afghan Governments, the English Government shall take no part in it, nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace.” Again in the 7th Article of the Treaty concluded by Sir Harford Jones; “If war should ensue between the Persian and Afghan Governments, the English Government shall take no part in it, nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace.” Again, in the 9th Article of the Treaty concluded by Mr. Ellis; “If war should ensue between the Persian and Afghan Governments, the English shall take no part in it, nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace.”

As the British Government appears to consider it has right on its side, in spite of the foregoing declarations, I am commanded by His Majesty to intimate to your Excellency, that previously to the arrival in camp of Colonel Stoddart, Prince Kamran had submissively solicited His Majesty to permit the Persian Ministers to renew the conferences and negotiations; but that after the arrival of Colonel Stoddart, and that the people in the fortress became acquainted with these affairs and circumstances, they would by no means consent to an arrangement, nor would they even consent to the arrangement which your Excellency had discussed with them; and they refused to make restitution for our losses, and to restore our captive subjects and tribes. Besides this they made inadmissible demands; notwithstanding this, His Majesty, considering the friendship between England and Persia, does not regard it expedient, that their ancient alliance should be dissolved on account of demands which are contrary to Treaty on the part of the British Government, and that these affairs should be the cause of disagreement and contention. His Majesty will, therefore, cause his army to retire from these territories (Herat): but viewing the devotion of your Excellency to Persia, how can you give your consent, that the Persian Government should expend so much money and trouble unprofitably, that the army should return
without compensation for losses for the captives and for the tribes, and that the friendship which subsists between both Governments should be the means of inflicting disgrace on Persia?

With regard to satisfaction on account of your Excellency's courier, His Majesty will perform the arrangement which he verbally explained to your Excellency when you were in his presence.

As His Majesty has acceded to the wishes of your Excellency, His Majesty is in hopes that you will return and ornament the Court with your presence, in order that the friendship between both Governments, which has always been a source of satisfaction to the mind of His Majesty, may again be renewed, and placed as before on a footing of intimacy.

Written on the 24th of Jemaudy-ul-Avl (apparently a mistake) or the 4th September, 1838.

Translated by
(Signed) JUSTIN SHIEL.

(Inclusion 7.)—Translation of a Letter from His Majesty Mahomed Shah to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

Let His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, Envoy Extraordinary from the exalted British Government, be honored by our uninterrupted royal favour, and know, that the representation, emblematic of sincerity of His Excellency, which was despatched by Colonel Stoddart to our presence, has reached our royal Court, which is as exalted as the heavens, and has been fully comprehended from the beginning to the end by our kingly mind resplendent as the sun. With regard to certain points on which His Excellency had expressed his wishes to the Persian Government, we have commanded Meerza Ali, the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to write a full and complete answer to His Excellency, conformably to our royal instructions, and to convey to him perfect information of the real intentions of our auspicious mind.

His Excellency is at all times to consider our royal favour towards himself as unbounded, and is to represent his wishes at the foot of our kingly throne with the assurance of their favourable reception.

This order is imperative.

Written in the month Jemaudy, 1254.
Aug. 38.

Translated by
(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

(Inclusion 8.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir
Royal Camp, near Herat, August 27th, 1838.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that I have this day forwarded to you a despatch, dated yesterday, inclosing to you, further assurances from His Majesty the Shah, of his friendly intention of preserving a good understanding with the British Government, and requesting you to
return to the Court. I trust this letter will reach you without delay. Since the departure of the above courier at noon, I received a Firman, from the Shah, addressed to you, to the same purport, and I entrusted it to a courier of Karaman Meerza's to deliver to you. As I merely inclosed the Firman, I did not number the communication. The same courier bears this.

I have, &c.

(Signed) C. STODDART,
Lieutenant-Colonel.

John Mc Neill, Esq.

(Inclosure 9.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.
Camp, before Herat, August 27, 1838.

The Russian Minister Plenipotentiary has obtained an official promise from the Persian Government, to allow the Russian Government, to take back by force to Russia the Russian regiment. The Hajee, on the part of the Shah, has arranged to send the regiment to Tabreez. Russian officers are to come there and take away the regiment in a body. Samson, the (Sirtip) Colonel, may return with his present rank to Russia, or remain unemployed here, but he must choose his residence far from the frontier. The Persian document obtained by the Russian Representative, was shown to Samson two days after the grand assault. Further, Russian officers are to be sent to every district of Persia to which the Russian Government chooses to send them, to collect and take back to Russia all refugee subjects of that nation. The Russian Force in the Caspian has also seized a Persian vessel, proceeding to Tchereken or the Turcoman coast, on the plea that swivels (zambooruks) being on board, it was a breach of Treaty.

Independent of the common right of granting refuge enjoyed by all sovereign States, the Treaty between Russia and Persia especially stipulates it for both contracting parties. Many Poles (200) are in the regiment.

(Inclosure 10.)—Extract of a Note from Colonel Stoddart, dated Shah's camp before Herat, August 25.—(Received at Tabreez, September 20, 1838.)

This evening, at sun-set, the official letter reached me; it says, in the most unqualified terms, that the Shah will immediately return hence, and will carry into execution the Gholam reparation exactly as you had wished. I hear Hajee Khan has been dismissed from all rank, and sent for to-night to camp; preparations for going hence are continued. At the end of the letter, the Hajee requests you to return, in the handsomest terms. I have begged Meerza Ali to send you word of this by this courier, and will, myself, despatch a man when these promises are carried into actual execution.
(Inclosure 11.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc. Neill.
(Extract.)

Royal Camp, near Herat, August 29, 1838.

Yesterday I was to have been honored by an audience of the Shah, but the Prime Minister remained so late in the Royal presence, that my audience was put off till this morning, when I attended and submitted to His Majesty, that I had despatched the letter of the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Royal Firman to you, and that doubtless the wish for your return, which His Majesty had expressed, would be considered by you as a distinguished mark of His Majesty’s friendship to the British Government. I then expressed my hope that but a short time remained before His Majesty would march. The Shah said we are going immediately, and no delay will take place. I then submitted that on the day the Shah marched, I would, with the leave of His Majesty, quit the Royal Stirrup: I meant to proceed on the service I had been sent upon by you, and that I had first to send the news of the Shah’s march to the Governor-General of India; and that after three or four months, I hoped to be honored again by returning to His Majesty at Tehran. That I requested His Majesty to give me the requisite pass, that I might not be stopped by the guards of the royal camp.

The Shah in the kindest manner assented, and I then inquired His Majesty’s pleasure respecting the Afghan Sirdar, Sheer Mahommed Khan, whether he was to remain at the Royal Stirrup, or what His Majesty decided respecting him. The Shah replied, “Sheer Mahommed Khan is free, whatever he himself chooses to do will be right. Let him come with us, or remain here, or go where he likes, he has his own free choice.” Business having passed off thus satisfactorily, I ventured to petition the Shah to repeat an order he had given two years ago for the release of two women (Turcomans of Surruks) from Meshed, assuring him that the petition was from myself, unauthorised by you, and acknowledging that I had no right to make such a position. His Majesty gave the requisite order for the release of these prisoners in the strongest and, at the same time to myself, the most kind manner. I must on this point beg you to excuse this deviation from my instructions, and I have only this plea of palliation to advance; namely, that on the score of humanity I had in vain offered all that I could afford to sacrifice in cash to obtain the freedom of these women, and their return to their friends, and that those friends had had no means of making their petition to the Shah but through me.

After some conversation with which His Majesty honored me, in the course of which I said, I thought it probable that a Member of the Legation would be sent by you to the Royal presence, so as to meet the Shah on his return, I retired, and wrote a short note, acquainting the Afghan Sirdar, Sheer Mahommed Khan, with the Shah’s commands respecting him.
(Inclosure 12.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc. Neill.
(Extract.)
Royal Camp, before Herat, September 5, 1838.

I communicated to Sheer Mahommed Khan, on the 29th August, the Shah’s pleasure respecting him, as detailed in my despatch of that day. The Sirdar, in answer, requested me to decide what he was to do, which I declined doing, not feeling myself authorized to undertake such a responsibility. The Prime Minister has since told him the same as the Shah told me, and it seems that he will accompany the Shah to Ghorian and thence return to Herat.

Shumsadeen Khan, and the others, will accompany the Shah. They talk of giving the Government of Toorsheeh to Shumsadeen Khan; but it is improbable.

The Kandaharees themselves say they are to be sent back to Kandahar, and that the Russian Minister has obtained a promise of 12,000 tomauns from them, from the Shah, on condition that they continue to hold Furrah and Subzar. The money is not yet forthcoming.

The greatest exertions have been made by the Russian Minister, the Hajee, and the renegade Heratees, to delay the Shah’s departure; but the Shah has been firm, and has publicly, though not to me, fixed next Sunday, for the departure. 400 loads of stores were started off last night, which was announced to me by the Hajee, through the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order to assure me, that the camp would march in a few days. Were I to detail the measures taken to detain the Shah, it would be of little interest, and very tedious. I yesterday begged the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs “to furnish me with the requisite pass, that I might leave camp when I thought proper;” and at the same time told him, “I did not think I could delay my departure beyond next Sunday. If the Shah marched that day, I should forward the news; if not, I could only report that up to my departure from camp, namely, thirty days after my arrival, the execution of the promises of the Shah, in answer to the demands of the British Government, was still delayed.” Every person in camp, except those I have mentioned, is anxious to go; the forage in camp will only last five or six days more, and as messengers have been sent to turn back all Casifals, except the 25,000 tomauns, said to be near this, from Fars, no more flour or grain will arrive. The advanced guard, under Humza Meerza, leaves camp on Friday evening.

My pass has been forwarded to me, as promised, this evening: it is signed by the Hajee.

The Sahebzada and twenty-two prisoners came out of the city to camp yesterday; they were sent out by Mr. Pottinger’s suggestion: and Allahaud Khan, the Indian cavalry officer with Mr. Pottinger, came out with a letter from that gentleman to me. They returned to the city this evening.
Ferooz Meerza, Governor of Kirman, reported the arrival of the troops at Bushire, 7,000 men; nine ships of war.

(Inclosure 13.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc. Neill.

(Extract.)

Camp, before Herat, Saturday, Sept. 8, 1838.

As there remain several subjects on which I have received information, which it is desirable should reach you, I have reported them in separate paragraphs of this despatch.

On the 1st instant I requested the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs to acquaint you, through me, if any menaces were used by the Russian Minister, in order that the British Government might without delay be put in possession of the information. He said he would afterwards acquaint me, for you, with the exertions the Russian Minister had made; but that he had only used vague menaces. If he has not used menaces, I feel convinced that he has held a line of conduct and language which his Government would never sanction. The day of the storm also he went to a balakhancheh, near Mahommed Khan’s camp, to see the Persians storm the Boorj Abdul Mesr from the bastion which Monsieur Blaremborg, of his suite, an engineer, has constructed. The Persian Prime Minister objected altogether to the storm; and before it took place, exculpated himself from having any share in it. His objections were very sensible ones; in short, he thought it would fail, as it did. The Shah very reluctantly assented to this advice of the Russian Major-General. After many days of delay, His Majesty summoned the officers the day before the storm, and told them, “he believed the men would willingly go to the assault, but he thought the officers would turn back; and that any officer who should turn back before he was wounded, might consider himself dismissed the service, and should be disgraced publicly.” The Russian Minister had told him, that a sovereign’s servants were intended to sacrifice their lives in such services as assaults for his sake.

The Russian Minister soon after the storm, sent one of his suite to show to the Lieutenant-Colonel of Russian deserters an official paper, signed by M. Ivanovitsch, as his secretary, which stated that, “the Emperor of Russia and the Shah of Persia were brothers; that their States were one, not two; that as a brother, the Emperor had requested the Shah to send back to Russia all the refugees and deserters from that country that may be in Persia; and that the Persian Government had assented to this.” The messenger added, that henceforth they should consider themselves as Russian servants, not as Persian; and the attendants of the Russian Minister were sent about amongst the regiment to proclaim the same news. The Lieutenant-Colonel and men answered separately, that they would hear of no such an arrangement. The men said, “that if we are Russian servants, give us our pay and
bread immediately.” The Russian Minister’s people replied, “The Emperor counts your serving the Shah as you do, as the same thing as serving him. Russia and Persia are one State.” The Colonel was given his choice of returning with his rank, or of quitting the service, and living any where at a distance from the frontier. The Deputy-

Minister for Foreign Affairs acquainted me, on the 3d of September, that the Russian Minister demanded the deserters to be given up for friendship’s sake; and had added that he was not to remain a single hour at the Persian Court, if they were not given up before the expiration of four months, now nearly out. The men are of course unwilling to go; many of them are Poles. In this affair the Russian Legation now gives it out that the refugees in Azerbaijan are already sent back, and that the regiment is given up to Russia, and will be immediately sent back.

Monsieur Yenitsch left camp on the 4th instant to return to Russia.

A Russian Gholam has been sent to Kandahar, and others-
to the Hazarechs and Koorrookh. A Reshty told me that two Russian officers left Resht for Khiva a year ago, travelling as merchants and doctors. This Reshty had heard of their safe arrival among the Turcomans.

(Inclusion 14.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. McNell.

Royal Camp, before Herat, Sept. 8, 1838.

News has been forwarded by the Ausef, that Shiraz and Kermanshah are in the hands of the British troops, that Soleiman Meerza is advancing with a large force from Bagdad, to co-operate with them, and that a Prince has left Isphahan with 8,000 men to join them; Feridon Meerza having already done so.

M. Goutte on the 6th instant told the Sirdar that if Persia makes this matter up with England, Russia will attack her. The Sirdar quoted a Persian proverb as expressing the wish of the Persian Government, “both to have their enemy silent, and to avoid estranging their friend.” I replied that I would report this to you, and that you would gladly assist Persia in preventing their friend, the British Government, from being estranged from them.

The Sirdar expressed his anxiety to have the Kandaharees retire from Furrah soon; but as this matter, and what may be done about Ghorian will only be known after the Shah’s march, I will leave that for a future communication. The Shah intends to reach Meshed in 18 days, halting 3 at Ghorian, stop 10 at Meshed, and in 22 reach Tehran; making 60 days. If they arrive in 75 days at Tehran, they will have marched very well.
(Inclosure 15.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

Near Herat, 8 A.M. Sept. 9, 1838.

Sir,

I have the honor to report that the Persian army has marched from this, and that His Majesty the Shah is about to mount, and that to-night the Royal Station is at Sangbust. Fearing that I shall not have an opportunity of detailing more, I close this, and have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) C. STODDART, Lieut.-Colonel.

John Mc Neill, Esq. 26 minutes past 10 o'clock, A.M.

The Shah has mounted his horse "Ameerij," and is gone.

(Signed) C. STODDART.

No. 101.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir, Foreign Office, December 12, 1838.

I have to state to you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve of your sending Lieut.-Colonel Sheil to Tehran, and of your proceeding yourself slowly to that Capital, under the circumstances reported in your despatch, of the 6th of October.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 102.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Dec. 31, 1838.)

(Extract.) Ardebil, November 5, 1838.

I have the honor to report, for your Lordship's information, that I left Tabreez on the 16th ult., with the intention of proceeding to Resht in Ghilan, where I may expect to learn from Lieut.-Colonel Sheil, who must now have arrived at the Shah's court, the steps which His Persian Majesty may have taken towards making the reparation I have required for the ill-treatment of the messenger; when, if the intelligence I may receive should appear satisfactory, I shall proceed from Resht to Tehran by the way of Casveen.

Previous to my departure from Tabreez, I was informed by the Prince Governor of Azerbaijan, that Hajee Khan had been dismissed by the Shah, and that being apprehensive that his life was in danger, he had taken sanctuary in the Shrine of Imaum Reza at Meshed. The Prince also informed me that the Khan had been dismissed after a formal trial, on no less than seventeen charges sent in by the Shah himself, and that Hajee Khan's conduct towards the messenger of Her Majesty's mission had been the principal and most important of these charges. I therefore hope that Colonel Sheil will be able officially to inform me, immediately after his arrival in the Shah's camp, that there is no longer any impe-
diment to the return of the mission to Tehran, where the Shah is supposed to have arrived two days ago.

Firmans have been addressed by His Majesty to the Governors of the different provinces, stating that Herat was on the point of submitting; when the British Government made a request that His Majesty would not prosecute the siege, and that he would forgive the offences of Shah Kamran. That in consideration of the ancient friendship between the British and Persian Governments, he had complied with the request of Her Majesty’s Government, and had raised the siege and withdrawn his army.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of the letter which I addressed to the Shah, on the occasion of his return, and which Colonel Sheil will present to His Majesty.

I have also instructed Colonel Sheil to ascertain how far the Persian Government may now be prepared to conclude the Commercial Treaty upon the terms which were proposed by me at Herat; and if he finds it favourably disposed, to point out to the Shah how desirable it is to have every subject which may possibly give rise to unpleasant discussion, arranged before my arrival at the Court.

(Inclosure.—Mr. Mc Neil to the Shah of Persia.

May it please your Majesty, Camp, near Tabreez, Oct. 12, 1838.

With sentiments of the most lively satisfaction, I have received from Colonel Stoddart, and have communicated to Her Majesty’s Ministers and to the Governor-General of India, the intelligence that your Majesty, preferring the maintenance of the alliance with England to the prosecution of the enterprise on which your Majesty had for some time been engaged, had raised the siege of Herat, and had determined to return with the Persian army within your Majesty’s own territories.

By this determination, full of prudence and patriotism, your Majesty has promoted the true interests of Persia, and has frustrated the schemes of designing men who sought to derive advantage to themselves from the difficulties and dangers in which the Persian Government appeared to be involving itself, and from which it could have been rescued only by the foresight and wisdom displayed by your Majesty on this occasion.

Colonel Sheil, Her Majesty’s Secretary of Legation, will proceed immediately to your Majesty’s Court, and when he has the honor of being presented, he will convey to your Majesty my most respectful and warmest congratulations on your Majesty’s safe return, and my anxious desire to be enabled speedily to present myself to your Majesty, and to offer on the part of the Queen, my august Mistress, assurances of Her Majesty’s desire to renovate and to maintain with your Majesty the ancient relations of cordial friendship which have so long united the two
kingdoms, and which, I cannot doubt, it must equally be your Majesty’s wish and intention to cultivate and to improve.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

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No.103.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 26, 1839.)

MY LORD,

Roodbar, November 28, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose a translation of a letter which I addressed to His Persian Majesty’s Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the occasion of Colonel Sheil’s proceeding to the Shah’s Camp. This letter was delivered by Colonel Sheil on his arrival there.

In his answer acknowledging the receipt of this letter, the Deputy-Minister merely refers me to the communication of his father, Meerza Massood, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, for information on matters connected with public business. The letters I have received from Meerza Massood contain no allusion to this communication, which I had addressed to his son, because I did not know that His Excellency the Minister had proceeded from Tehran to join the Shah on his return from Herat.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

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(Inclosure.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs.

To the high in rank and exalted in condition, the companion of greatness and power, my friend of friends and attached intimate.

Your amity emblemmed letters have been received, and the particulars of each have been duly understood. Subsequent to the receipt of the letters of that attached friend, despatches also arrived from the distinguished Colonel Stoddart, conveying intelligence of the march of the Royal Camp from before Herat, and as this intelligence was calculated to increase and strengthen the amity of the two illustrious Governments of England and Persia, I was, in the highest degree, and beyond expression, pleased and delighted, and communicated the intelligence to my own Government as an evidence of the good feeling and friendship still existing between the two States. With regard to the invitation which was also conveyed to me to return to the Royal Capital, I myself ever have been, and still am, most desirous to come again to the Imperial Court, and receive the distinguished honor of presentation to His Majesty; but in consideration of my being as yet without intimation of the fulfilment of all the demands that have been made by me, I have thought it best to appoint the high in rank, and exalted in condition, the companion of greatness and power, Colonel Sheil, Secretary of Her Britannic Majesty’s Legation, and to depute him to the illustrious Court of Royalty; that in the first place, having proceeded to meet His Majesty the Shah,
he may pay him the respects of sincere attachment, and may offer the proper compliments and congratulations on the return of the victory-starred banner of royalty in happiness and safety to the Imperial Capital; and that, as occasion offers, he may also communicate with the Ministers of Government on the subject of the fulfilment of my several demands, whilst I myself propose to travel to the Capital by the route of Karadaugh and Ghilan, in the full expectation and conviction of receiving intelligence upon the road, that all my demands have been complied with.

I am particularly anxious and desirous (regarding it as expedient for the interests of the two Governments) that before I return to the Capital, all the matters still remaining unadjusted between England and Persia, may be arranged in a pleasant and proper manner, in order that, after my arrival, no discussion may arise which may be productive of bad feeling or irritation between us, but on the contrary, affairs having been placed on a satisfactory footing, I may be able with composure of mind and undisturbed confidence of heart, to devote all my time to the increase and strengthening of the friendship of the two illustrious Governments, and the promotion of the interests of Persia, and may employ all possible attention and assiduity to these ends.

At present I am awaiting intimation of the fulfilment of all my demands, which I trust may reach me upon the road, and enable me afterwards with perfect happiness and ease of mind to travel on to Tehran.

May your days be long and happy.

2nd of Shaban, A. H. 1254.
October 20, 1838. True Translation.

(Signed) H. RAWLINSON, Major.

No. 104.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 26, 1839.)

My LORD,

I have the honor to inclose a translation of a Firman addressed to the Prince-Governor of Tehran, which was read publicly in the mosques of the Capital.

Your Lordship will perceive, that the tone and tenor of this document are in many respects very different from what, on the authority of information received from Tabreez, I reported to your Lordship, in my despatch of the 5th of November, to have been the substance of the Firman read in the mosques of that city. I am unable to inform your Lordship whether the two Firmans were conceived in different terms, or whether the information I received from Tabreez was inaccurate; but I am inclined to adopt the latter opinion, because there is an anxious desire on the part of the more intelligent portion of the population of Persia to see matters amicably arranged between the British and Persian Governments, and therefore to conceal any act of their own Government.
which they may think calculated to cause the English any annoyance or irritation. I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclusion.)—Translation of a Royal Firman which was read in the Public Mosque at Tehran.

To the light of our eyes, our excellent, most noble, and well-beloved brother, Ferhad Meerza, being now held in our remembrance, it is hereby notified:

That, whereas the auspicious and victory-starred troops of royalty were put in motion for the purpose of reducing to order the cities of the East; after the capture of the fortress of Ghorian, and when the city of Herat was beleaguered by our triumphant forces, all the inhabitants of those frontier provinces, either led by the hope of our far-famed clemency, laid their heads on the threshold of obedience, or, driven by extreme fear and consternation, came forward to submit to the yoke of our authority.

The high in rank and chief of illustrious nobles, Dost Mahommed Khan, Governor of Cabool, having issued from the portal of obedience, laid the hand of supplication on the skirts of our royal generosity, and having altogether severed the bond of union which connected him with other States, tendered to us his submission and allegiance in perfect sincerity and integrity of purpose.

The high in rank, and selected of powerful nobles, Kohundil Khan, Ruler of Kandahar, being urged in the purity of his heart to become the devotee of our irresistible Government, despatched his two sons, the high in dignity and favoured of royalty, Mahommed Sudeek Khan, and Mahommed Omar Khan, to the imperial stirrup, and duly performed the offices of allegiance; and on our part the munificence of royalty having graciously shed upon his condition its benignant influence, in regard to his sincerity of purpose and integrity of mind, bestowed on him the supreme authority of the frontier provinces. Upon Mahommed Sudeek Khan, we conferred the exalted honor of the Government of Furrah and Subzar, and Mahommed Omar Khan attained the glorious distinction of attendance upon the imperial stirrup.

The illustrious Mizrab Khan, Governor of Meimuna, with Shah Wulee Khan, Chief of Andkoh, and Shir Khan, as far as their ability extended, displayed the noblest efforts in advancing the interests of our service, and succeeded in bending to our allegiance the inclinations of the tribes and clans and entire population of their respective districts, and the noble Húkoomut Khan, son of the Governor of Meimuna, was admitted to the honor of presentation, and became the special object of our royal munificence.

The illustrious nobles, Wudood Khan, Chieftain of the Feroozko-
hees, Yusoof Khan, Head of the Tribe of Jeimunee, Mahommed Ali Khan Jemshedeef, Shah Pusund Khan, Governor of Lash and Jowein, Yahia Khan of Khooorrookh, together with all the Oimahs, and the great lords of Herat, having placed the collar of submission upon the neck of servitude, observed a due performance of the obligations of allegiance.

The distinguished Chieftains also, Mahommed Reza Khan and Ali Khan of Soisttan, together with the leaders of the Belooch Tribes, were among the foremost in tendering to us their services and allegiance, and displayed in the most becoming manner the sincerity by which they were actuated.

Neither was the illustrious Shumsadeen Khan, who is still attached to our imperial stirrup, nor were the other Chieftains of the Asfghans, nor the great lords and dignitaries of the city of Herat on any occasion backward in risking their lives in our behalf. In supplying our victorious army with provisions, and in the performance of other notable services, they displayed the most extreme attachment, and the most admirable fidelity, and they were never neglectful for a single instant in the execution of their important duties.

There was not, in fact, a single individual who did not bow the head of servitude.

Sheer Mahommed Khan Hazareh, acted for a time with duplicity and fraud; but he was caught at last, in his own wiles, and was carried off by death at his appointed hour, and then the illustrious Kerimdad Khan, and all the leaders of the Hazareh Tribe, following the example of the other Oimahs, prepared to submit to our authority; and there was, thus, not left, out of all the inhabitants of those countries, whether high or low, whether peasantry or soldiers, one single man who dared to raise opposition to us, or who did not so tremble at our all-pervading wrath, as to fear to thrust his head out of the collar of submission.

In regard to the distribution of money and rewards, and the liberal display of kindness and generosity, we did not neglect a single individual who had served us. They were each and all rewarded by our royal munificence in an unbounded measure, and altogether beyond their expectations.

The Prince Kamran, also upon several occasions employed as mediators the priesthood of the city, and the Ambassadors of the Foreign Governments, and preferred his humble prayer, that, on condition of his paying us a sum of money (or pesakhush), delivering hostages, and acknowledging our authority, we would overlook his former insolence, and graciously bestow on him the country (of Herat); but his request did not prove agreeable to our inclinations.

At last, when the city of Herat existed but in name, and the reality of the Government of Kamran was reduced to four bare walls, the noble Ambassadors of the illustrious British Government, notwithstanding
that three separate Treaties of Peace between the two Governments of England and Persia, negotiated respectively by Sir Harford Jones, Sir Gore Ouseley, and Mr. Ellis, were still in force, disregarding the observance of the conditions of these Treaties, prepared to undertake hostilities, and, as a warlike demonstration, despatched a naval armament, with troops and forces, to the gulf of Persia.

The winter season was now approaching, and if we protracted to a longer period our stay at Herat, there appeared a possibility that our victorious army might suffer from a scarcity of provisions, and that the maintenance of our troops might not be unaccompanied with difficulty; the tranquillity of our provinces was also a matter of serious attention to our benevolent thoughts; and thus, in sole consideration of the interest of our faith and country, and from a due regard to the welfare of our troops and subjects, we set in motion our world-subduing army upon the 19th of Jumady-el-Akher, and prepared to return to our Capital, leaving in the Fort of Ghorian the illustrious chiefs, Mahomed Ali Khan Kujur, and Jaffier Kooli Khan Shadloo, with a large force of horse and foot, artillery, and ammunition, and a due supply of provisions.

During the protracted siege of Herat, a vast number of the troops and inhabitants had perished, as well from the fire of our cannon and musketry, as from constant hardship and starvation; the remainder of the people, amounting to about 50,000 families, with a very large proportion of the Afghan and Persian Chiefs, who had been treated with the most liberal kindness by the officers of our Government, and who, being compromised, could not therefore possibly hold any further intercourse with Yar Mahomed Khan, marched away with us with zealous eagerness to the regions of Khain and Khorassan; and there was no vestige of an inhabited spot left around Herat.

The affairs of our eastern frontier have been thus, by the grace of God, and the exalted fortune of the Shah, reduced to the most perfect and satisfactory settlement; and henceforward it will not be in the power of any one to raise opposition to our will.

The illustrious Sheer Mahomed Khan, brother of Yar Mahomed Khan, at the opening of the campaign, when Ghorian was taken and destroyed, being in danger of his life, attached himself to our royal service. We now conferred on him a dress of honor, and dismissed him, to serve as a lesson to the inhabitants of all those countries, to teach them to place their hope in us. The principles of our illustrious Government are based upon personal freedom. Whoever, therefore, may declare in our favour, and attach himself to our service, we leave him a free rein; but whoever may attempt to oppose us, we consign him to eternal perdition.

And whereas it was deemed expedient to communicate the intimation of the above intelligence to all the Governors of our various pro-
vinces, we have conferred upon that light of our eyes and most excellent brother the honor of being addressed in this Imperial Firman, and have duly acquainted him with the return of our victory-starred army. It will be his duty to communicate the same particulars to all people, and to all our provinces far and near, and to consider the same as imperative.

Given in the auspicious month of Rujub, 1254, October, 1838.

True Translation.

(Signed) H. RAWLINSON,

Major serving in Persia.

No. 105.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 26, 1839.)

MY LORD,

Roodbar, Nov. 28, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose a translation of a Firman, addressed to me by the Shah, in answer to the letter from me which Colonel Sheil delivered to His Majesty, and of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch of the 5th of November.

In this Firman there is an innovation which must have been intentional, and which could have been introduced with no friendly or proper feeling or intention. Colonel Sheil, whom I had designated in my letter as Secretary of Her Majesty’s Legation, is in the Firman designated first writer, the word which is employed in the Persian being such as is only applied to persons in the grade of clerks of an inferior class, and is accurately and literally translated by the English word writer.

It is my intention to inform the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs that this innovation is improper, and I shall require that the word should be erased from this Firman by His Excellency, and the word “Naib,” Deputy, which has hitherto been the uniform designation in Persian of the second person in the mission, and indeed of all Secretaries of Embassy or Legation, whatever may be the number, should be substituted.

This circumstance would hardly be worth mentioning were it not for the spirit it indicates.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclusion.)—Translation of a Firman addressed by His Majesty the Shah to Mr. Mc Neill.

A. C.

Let it be known to the Minister Plenipotentiary of the British Government, that the high in rank Colonel Sheil, Secretary (first writer) of the Legation, had the honor of being presented to us at Deh Nimuck, and delivered to us your letter, and we have understood its contents. Your Excellency wrote that we had preferred the preservation of the friendship with England to the capture of Herat, and that we had counteracted the counsels of designing persons. We offer our thanks to the
Lord of the Universe that he has preserved our pure nature and our brilliant existence from all violation of Treaties and Engagements, and from all breach of friendship and alliance, and that he has prevented us from accepting the counsels of the designing. We have not for an instant disregarded the preservation of the terms of the august Treaty, and we have not taken one step which is at variance with friendship. If, as your Excellency has represented, the British Government desires to renovate the intercourse of friendship and to confirm the alliance, doubtless the difference which has occurred will be adjusted by both parties, and the ancient friendship will be restored to its former condition.

Let your Excellency make known your requests, and consider them about to be accomplished.

Translated by

17th Shaban, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.
November 7, 1838.

No. 106.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 26, 1839.)
(Extract.)
Roodbar, November 28, 1838.

I am informed that the Persian Government has transmitted the sum of 10,000 tomans to the Chief of Kandahar; and if this information should be correct, the aid thus afforded him will probably enable Kohundil Khan to collect a considerable body of men. It would also seem to indicate that Persia was acting on the Treaty concluded with Kohundil Khan under the guarantee of Russia; and the activity in the Persian arsenal, and the language of the Prime Minister, who speaks of the probability of his requiring military stores for the use of other people, and of the Shah’s having to undertake a campaign in the spring, seem to imply a similar intention in respect to Kandahar.

No. 107.—Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Rec. Jan. 26, 1839.)
My Lord,
Roodbar, December 4, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose copies and translations of the correspondence which has passed between Lieutenant-Colonel Shell and me, and between that officer and the Persian Government, in respect to the demands which I considered it my duty to make previous to resuming my official duties at the Shah’s Court.

From this correspondence your Lordship will perceive that the Persian Government, has unequivocally refused to give me the apology which I required from His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee, for the share he had taken in the violence offered to the messenger, and that no reply has been given to my demand, that the Persian Government should state whether or not Khoorrookh, Subzar and Furrah, were held for the Shah of Persia. The Persian Government has also declined
to comply with my request, that I might be furnished with a copy of the communication which I was informed it had made to at least one Foreign Court, reflecting in an unfriendly manner on the conduct of the British Government, and the proceedings of its agents; but it does not expressly state that the communication referred to did not contain such reflections.

Under these circumstances, I have not thought myself at liberty to resume my official duties at the Court of the Shah, for I could not consider the letter of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, acknowledging that Hajee Khan had been deprived of his rank, partly because of the expectation to that effect expressed by the British Government, as adequate reparation and satisfaction; especially as the Persian Government continued to assert that Hajee Khan's guilt had not been proved, and as it had not included his offence against the British Government in the list of charges on which he was tried and dismissed.

It is unnecessary for me to enter more minutely into an examination of the inclosed correspondence, because I believe my letters to Colonel Sheil will sufficiently explain the grounds on which I have proceeded. It may perhaps be regretted that I permitted myself so readily to credit the positive assurances at Tabreez, that the dismissal of Hajee Khan had been effected in a manner which I could not but consider as satisfactory, and that I was thereby induced to leave Tabreez before I received certain intelligence that the statement was correct, and that the Shah had redeemed his promises; but, personally, I cannot regret the readiness, and even the desire, I have thus publicly evinced to bring these discussions to an amicable conclusion, and to make the interval between granting the reparation and satisfaction I required, and my return to the Court, as short as possible.

It is now my intention to return to Tabreez, from whence my heavy baggage, and the public property I carried thither, has not yet been removed, and on my arrival there to make such arrangements for the future movements of the mission as may appear to be desirable.

If I should see no good reason for taking a different course, it is my intention to remove the mission beyond the Persian Frontier, into Turkey, and to send the officers and non-commissioned officers of the British Detachment to Bagdad, there to await the orders of Government.

Though I have endeavoured to separate as much as possible the consideration of the particular question of reparation and satisfaction from all considerations arising out of the general views, proceedings, and intentions of the Persian Government, so far as they were known to me, in respect to its relations with Great Britain, your Lordship will perceive from the other portions of the public correspondence which I have now the honor to transmit, that I had no inducement to accept anything less than the reparation and satisfaction I had from the first de-
manded; and which the Shah, through his Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, had formally and unconditionally promised to grant.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclusion 1.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. Mc Neill. (Extract.)

Camp, near Kishlay, November 5, 1838.

I have the honor to inform your Excellency that Mr. Riach and myself joined the King's camp at Semnoon on the 2nd instant.

I regret to be obliged to inform you that the apprehensions which I expressed to your Excellency in my letter from Tehran, that the punishment which had been inflicted upon Hajee Khan was not in consequence of his ill-treatment of the English courier, have been confirmed in camp. My sources of information, which I consider good, have distinctly stated, that in the list of charges said to have been sent by the King to the court of Justice (Dewan Khané) against Hajee Khan, no allusion whatever was made to the complaints of the British Government against him.

The succeeding day I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and stated to him, that besides congratulating His Majesty on his safe return to his Capital, another object which you had in view in sending me to camp was with reference to Hajee Khan: I said that the dismissal of that officer had not been made to appear as a reparation to the British Government, or as a punishment for his offence against it, without which your Excellency could not consider that adequate satisfaction had been given by the Persian Government, and that therefore you trusted that a Firman would be issued containing a statement to this effect. I also expressed a hope that His Excellency would not allow a matter of so trifling a nature to the Persian Government to become the cause of any difficulty in fulfilling the promise which the Shah had made to Colonel Stoddart, of complying with the whole of the demands of the British Government. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied simply that he would represent the matter to the King and the Prime Minister. Although he had ample opportunity of doing so, he made no declaration that the dismissal of Hajee Khan had been in any shape connected with the indignity the English Government had suffered from him, nor did he express any sentiments evincing the gratification he would feel at the speedy re-establishment of cordiality between the two Governments.

I then waited on the Prime Minister, to whom I repeated the same statement I had already made to Meerza Massood. His Excellency said he would bring the subject to the notice of the King, and that I had better make a representation myself of the wishes of your Excellency to him in person, as the Shah had taken the management of Foreign Affairs, but being bound by the letter of the Shah to his son, the Prince, he would have a say in the matter.
Affairs into his own hands. In answer to an observation of mine, the Prime Minister said he hoped there would be no difficulty in settling the business, and with this exception he made no use of the complimentary language customary on such an occasion, nor did he express any desire that the ancient feelings of amity between the two Governments might be speedily restored. With regard to Hajee Khan, he merely said that he had committed many crimes, and had therefore been dismissed, but not a single expression escaped him denoting that his dismissal was in any way connected with his offence against the British Government.

Yesterday I had an audience with His Majesty.

After the audience, I accompanied Meerza Massood to his tent. His Excellency tried to persuade me that the Shah had not intended to give a refusal to your demand; and that His Majesty had only asserted that Hajee Khan having been in fact discharged from the service, you ought not to make any further demands on the Persian Government. His Excellency said he would write a letter which would be satisfactory to you, and before quitting him, I repeatedly urged him to put the letter in such terms as would enable you to return to Court; letting him thereby understand that your return depended on the nature of the letter you might receive. I consider this to be for the present a sufficient indication to the Persian Government of your intention not to remain in Persia, should satisfaction to the extent you demand not be granted; but I shall place this before the Persian Government in the plainest terms should it hereafter be requisite; a contingency which I am strongly apprehensive may become necessary.

(Inclosure 2.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. McNall.

(Extract.)

Camp, Elyvanah Kuf, November 6, 1838.

In continuance of my letter of yesterday's date, I have the honor to forward to your Excellency the accompanying letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to your address which I received last night; want of time has prevented me from accompanying it with a translation, which omission I beg you to excuse.

This morning I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs before mounting, and stated to him I felt a conviction that a letter of this description would not by any means be considered satisfactory by you; first, because it contained a positive denial by the Persian Government of Hajee Khan's offence, which was totally inadmissible, and next, because it did not specify that he had been punished as a reparation to the British Government for the indignity it had suffered from him by his ill-treatment of the English courier. I also took exception to the use of the word tevekkkoo, as meaning solicitation, which was not the nature of the claim made by the British Government; but, on His Excellency assuring me positively, that the word was used between equals, I con-
sidered it sufficient to say, that if another term could be substituted, it would be preferable. Meerza Massood replied that it was out of his power to make any alteration, as the letter had been written agreeably to the instructions of the King, by whom it had been perfectly approved and that to omit on their part a denial of Hajee Khan’s offence would be equivalent to a confession of his guilt, which was an admission the Persian Government could not make. I repeated the arguments I had already employed; I requested him to remember the difference of treatment in regard to Hajee Khan, and the Governor of Resht, who was so ignominiously punished at the requisition of the Russian Government. I begged him not to forget that the claims of your Excellency were to the Persian Government of small importance, while they were essentially necessary to the dignity of the English Government, and I pointed out to him that though the King had formally agreed to comply with the whole of the demands of the British Government, the letter which it was proposed to send to you, left the question of Hajee Khan in nearly the same state as when you quitted the Royal camp at Herat. The Minister for Foreign Affairs endeavoured to refute these arguments, but said that he would bring them to the notice of the King, though he had very slight expectations of being able to induce His Majesty to consent to any alteration of the letter.

Your Excellency will perceive, that in the letter addressed to you, the expression mazaab has been used; this word means degradation or reduction from a higher to an inferior rank, in which sense Meerza Massood said the phrase was used in the enclosure; the word ikraj or dismissal being intended to apply to the misconduct of Hajee Khan in certain matters relative to the army. I stated to His Excellency that dismissal was the punishment demanded by you throughout your correspondence, not reduction of rank; but he contended that this was the word employed by you in all your letters, and that the word signified reduction.

It appeared to me, seeing, as I conceived, the evident intention of making no further concession, that the time had arrived for announcing what I considered would be the ultimate course you would adopt. I, therefore, intimated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, though not officially as I apprized him, that I felt assured that if the letter were not altered, you would not continue in Persia; and I begged him in my private capacity to remember, that if this were allowed to happen, demands of a weightier nature might possibly be made to the Persian Government.

I stated to Meerza Massood that I had been directed by you to demand a Firman, or letter sealed by the Prime Minister, Hajee Meerza Aghassee, on the subject of Hajee Khan’s offence, yet as I perceived that the document sent to me had been sealed by His Excellency, I was disposed to anticipate that the British Minister would consider the
document, with the seal of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, satisfactory; since you, when you gave me instructions on this subject, were not aware that His Excellency would be in camp at the time of my arrival.

Before leaving Meerza Massood’s tent, I told him that I would transmit this letter to your Excellency, even if unaltered, but that this was not to be considered as an assent on my part to its contents.

(Sub-inclosure.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Meerza Massood, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

A.C.

The high in rank, Mr. Sheil and Mr. Riach, joined the Shah’s camp at Semnoon, and at Deh Nimuck had the honor of being presented to the Shah, and delivered your Excellency’s letter to His Majesty. A Firman has been addressed to your Excellency which shall be transmitted through them; and you will shortly be rejoiced and exalted by perusing it. In regard to the affair of the dismissal of Hajee Khan, which you had made the subject of a verbal message to be delivered by Mr. Sheil; although the Ministers of the Government, as will appear from the communications which have during some time taken place in respect to this matter, do not consider him as in any way in fault in this affair, yet as they had adopted the resolution to fulfil the expectations which the British Government has at this time expressed, so that no cause of complaint whatsoever may remain to that Government, therefore in consequence of the expectations of the exalted Government of England, and because of several offences which he had committed in the discharge of his military duties, they (the Persian Government) have degraded Hajee Khan from his rank, and dismissed him from the service.

At this time when your Excellency’s messenger was about to depart, I have, in obedience to His Majesty’s commands, answered your message. I expect you will address to me friendly letters, and acquaint me with the services and affairs to be performed and transacted.

Translated by

6th Shaban, 1254. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

November 6, 1838.

(Inclusion 3.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir,

Camp, Kebout Gomtuz, November 7, 1838.

With reference to my letter dated 6th instant, I received yesterday evening a message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Shah had refused to make any alteration in the inclosure to that despatch. I immediately called on Meerza Massood for the purpose of receiving this intimation officially. He apprized me that he had communicated
to the King the observations I had addressed to him yesterday morning, and had been directed by His Majesty to say, that no change could be made in the letter which had been addressed to you. In reply to this intimation, I announced to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I felt a conviction that you would not, under these circumstances, return to Court. To this intimation he made no reply.

This morning I proceeded to the tent of the Prime Minister, and recapitulated to him, what has passed between Meerza Massood and myself. After making his usual declarations of not being a member of the Government, and whatever observations he made were not to be considered official, His Excellency said that he had not seen the letter addressed to you, but that he would speak on the subject to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and see what could be done. He then entered into a long detail of all that had been said and done in this business, denied the guilt of Hajee Khan, and defended the proceedings of the Persian Government.

On this occasion he seemed earnestly to desire to have this affair settled, that is, settled by allowing it to drop altogether into forgetfulness on both sides, and said that the paper, as described by me, contained nothing to prevent you from coming to Tehran. He complained that the Persian Government was pressed too much by your Excellency in relation to this affair, and declared more than once, in a very emphatic manner: “Do not press us any more, or else we surely will connect ourselves most closely and intimately with another European Government;” to which observation I replied, that the English Government had not the least desire to press the subject further than was absolutely necessary, and although it sincerely desired to be on the most cordial terms with Persia, yet that the preservation of its own honor was of more value than the alliance of any nation whatever.

After a long and desultory conversation, His Excellency promised to see me again to-day and give an answer to my observations.

November 7, 6 P.M.

I sent a message a short time ago by a Gholam to the Prime Minister to know at what time it would be convenient to him to receive me, and give me an answer to the conversation I held with him in the morning. The same person brought an answer that I might call on him in the morning if I liked, but that he had consulted the King on the subject, and had seen Meerza Massood, and that His Majesty’s commands were that no change was to be made in the letter.

I propose waiting on the Prime Minister in the morning, and repeating to him what I had already told him, that under these circumstances you will not return to the Court.

I have, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq.  
(Signed)  JUSTIN SHEIL.
(Inclosure 4.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. McNeill.

(Extract.)

Tehran, November 8, 10, 1838.

In continuation of the concluding observations of my letter of yesterday, I have the honor to inform your Excellency, that I called on the Prime Minister this morning, and was told by him that His Majesty could not consent to any alteration of the letter which I forwarded from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to you, regarding the dismissal of Hajee Khan. His Excellency urged Mr. Riach and myself to use every effort to induce you to return to Court, and declared he would himself address you a letter entreat you to return to Tehran.

I told him I should be most happy to receive it, and that I would forward it immediately. This letter, which he promised to send me to-morrow, will, I am certain, not be of an apologetic character. His Excellency renewed his hints and warnings of an alliance between Persia and Russia. He then spoke of the siege of Herat, and extolled highly the abilities of Mr. Pottinger. "Oh," said His Excellency, "Pottinger is a clever fellow. I never saw such an engineer: he met me at every turn,—every thing I undertook he foiled me in. If I dug a trench here or there, he was certain to meet me with another trench in the right place. Ah, that Pottinger, he is a clever soldier, but be beat me only because I had no powder. If I had had 20,000 pounds of powder, I would have made a mine under a bastion, and blown Pottinger and the bastion to the skies." This was said with perfect good humour, and with every appearance of admiration for Mr. Pottinger.

The inclosures are a copy and translation of a letter which I addressed to Meerza Massood, acknowledging the receipt of the letter from him addressed to you, which I forwarded to your Excellency on the 6th instant.

10th November, 1838, 4 P.M.

I have been delayed despatching the packet by the non-arrival of the inclosed letter promised by the Hajee, which has only just reached me.

(Sub-inclosure.)—Translation of a Letter addressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to His Excellency Meerza Massood, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

A. C.

In reference to the message from His Excellency the British Minister, which I had the honor to deliver to the King on the day I was presented to His Majesty, I have received the answer which your Excellency addressed to the British Minister, and I have forwarded it to Mr. McNeill. It is to be distinctly understood by your Excellency, that the fact of my having transmitted that letter to its destination, is not to be considered as an assent by me, on the part of His Excellency Mr. McNeill, to its contents. I transmitted it, simply because it is an official letter from the Persian Government.
The day before yesterday I stated verbally to your Excellency, that it was impossible that the British Minister could be satisfied with the letter in question, from a variety of reasons, but especially from the two following: viz., first, because in the above letter, the Persian Government has given a denial of the offences of Hajee Khan; and, secondly, because in this document, there is no declaration that Hajee Khan was dismissed, as a reparation to the British Government in consequence of the insult committed by him against that Government, by ill-treating a courier belonging to it. This was the statement I made to your Excellency, and I intimated to you that without a change in your Excellency’s letter, I feel confident that the British Minister would not return to the capital; requesting you, at the same time, to lay these points before His Majesty the Shah, in order that if it was in conformity with His Majesty’s pleasure, such an alteration might be made in your Excellency’s letter, as would enable Mr. Mc Neill to return to Tehran. Your Excellency having yesterday informed me that the Persian Government did not consider it expedient to make any alteration in your Excellency’s letter, I think it proper to intimate to you, in writing, I feel convinced that the British Minister will not be satisfied with a letter of this description, and that he will not return to the capital, unless a change is made in that document.

Not having had a writer at my disposal in camp, I have taken this opportunity of addressing your Excellency.

Translated by

Teheran, 19th Shaban, 1254. (Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.
November 8, 1838.

(Sub-Inclusion 2.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee, Prime Minister of Persia, to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

To His Excellency the nobly descended, the dearest of friends, and the true emblem of attachment.

The high in rank, and exalted in dignity, Colonel Sheil, First Secretary of Legation, and Mr. Riach, reached the Imperial Camp at Semnoon, and at the stage of Deh Nimuck attained the honor of being admitted to the beneficent presence of Royalty.

Your friend, likewise, having obtained an interview with them, was delighted to hear of the prosperous and happy state of your Excellency’s health. I also learnt, that having resumed the footing of our ancient alliance, you had set out, to return to the glory-seated court of royalty by the route of Ghilan, and I offered up thanksgivings, that, by the grace of Almighty God, I was soon to experience the gratification of again meeting you; and that the past would then be explained upon both sides, and adjusted in the most satisfactory and indissoluble manner.
"Affection can only be rendered firm, after the bond has been once broken, as the branch must first shed its blossom, ere it can produce fruit."

Your Excellency's messenger being now about to start, I have written this sincerity-embled letter, to unfold the portals of amity and attachment. I have also to request that, until the time when I may regain the delight of your society, you will take every opportunity of acquainting me minutely with all particulars relating to your much esteemed self, and pray honor us with your presence with the utmost speed that you may find it possible to exert.

I await your coming with such "intense anxiety," that whatever "speed you use, I shall still think it late." May all your days be passed in happiness and prosperity.

True translation.

(Signed) H. RAWLINSON.

Dated the 21st of Shaban, A.H. 1254. Major serving in Persia.

November 8, 1838.

(Inclosure 5.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir,

Tehran, November 9, 1838.

I have the honor to report to your Excellency, that yesterday His Majesty the Shah entered the capital.

I have, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq.

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

(Inclosure 6.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir,

Tehran, November 12, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of a letter received from Meerza Massood, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in answer to a communication I addressed to him, and of which a copy was inclosed in my despatch of the 8th of November.

I have not thought it necessary to return an answer to the above letter. I have, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq.

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

(Sub-Inclosure.)—Translation of a Letter from Meerza Massood, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil, Secretary of Legation.

To the high in rank and companion of greatness, my esteemed friend and intimate.

I have received your letter, under date the 19th of Shaban, A.H. 1254, and have made myself acquainted with its contents. Its object is to announce to me that the communication which I addressed to His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary, on the subject of Hajee
Khan's dismissal, will not be considered by him satisfactory, for two reasons: first, that it contains no acknowledgment of Hajee Khan's culpability; and, secondly, that there is no positive declaration of his having been dismissed as an act of reparation to the illustrious Government of England, for the insult offered by him to that Government in the outrage committed upon one of its public messengers. In reply, I have to state, that His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary has demanded that the noble Government of Persia shall dismiss Hajee Khan at the desire of the illustrious Government of England; and that a written declaration to this effect shall be forwarded to His Excellency. The fulfilment of both these demands is formally contained in the communication addressed to His Excellency; and over and above, an announcement is also made, that although no fault has been proved to our satisfaction, against Hajee Khan, yet in sole consideration of the friendship of the illustrious Government of England, we have complied with the desire expressed by them. In fact, this circumstance must be received as an evidence of the extreme friendliness entertained by our illustrious and imperishable Government to your's, and if you would still discuss the question, why is not the criminality of Hajee Khan proved to our satisfaction? we can only reply, that you possess no proof or convincing evidence of it. Since the demand of His Excellency the Minister Plenipotentiary, repeatedly expressed in his letters, was restricted to the dismissal of Hajee Khan, and this demand has been complied with (a written declaration having been also addressed to him, that the dismissal has taken place, to gratify the wish of the illustrious Government of England), we feel assured that His Excellency will shortly resume the honor of being presented at our noble and illustrious Court of Royalty, and will then and there arrange any points of difference that may still remain unadjusted between the Governments. I have nothing further to trouble you with.

Translated by
(Signed) H. RAWLINSON, Major.

Dated 21 Shaban, A. H. 1254.
8th November, 1838.

(Inclosure 7)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil.

SIR,

I have had the honor to receive your despatches of the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th instant, announcing to me the communications you have had with the Persian Ministers, and with the Shah, regarding the dismissal or degradation of Hajee Khan, as an act of reparation for the violence used by that officer to the messenger of the British Mission.

I have also received the letter from the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, inclosed in your despatch of the 6th, which informs me that though the Persian Government does not consider Hajee Khan to
have been in any way in fault in this matter, still, in consequence of the expectations to that effect expressed by the British Government, and of offences committed in his military capacity, he had been degraded from his rank, and dismissed the service.

I regret to find that the course adopted by the Shah, in respect to this matter, has been such as to deprive the servants of the British Mission of the protection for the future, which the public and avowed punishment of Hajee Khan, for the violence he had used towards the British messenger was calculated to afford; and that far from seeking to obliterate the remembrance of a very grave offence against a friendly Power, by a frank and faithful performance of the promise which His Majesty had made, to comply with all the demands of the British Government, as conveyed in my communication delivered by Colonel Stoddart, the steps which have been taken by the Persian Government in this affair, appear not only to have been calculated to afford the British Government the smallest amount of reparation and satisfaction which could possibly be derived from the admission, now tardily made by the Persian Government in answer to a formal demand, that Hajee Khan was degraded in consideration of the wishes of the British Government; but it also appears to me, that the course which the Shah has been advised to adopt, has placed the Persian Government itself in a position which, by a faithful and candid observance of the promise of the Shah to comply with the demands of the British Government, it would have avoided.

By denying the notorious fact, that Hajee Khan was guilty of misconduct towards the messenger of the British Mission, while it asserts that he was punished because of expectations to that effect expressed by the British Government, the Persian Government is made to excuse itself of having unjustly punished one of its own officers for an offence of which it was convinced that that officer was altogether innocent; and, on the other hand, if Hajee Khan was justly punished for his offence against the British Government, on what grounds can the Persian Government deny his guilt?

It is not my intention at this moment to express any opinion as to whether or not the declaration contained in the letter of His Persian Majesty’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, will or will not be received as reparation and satisfaction for the share taken by Hajee Khan in the violence offered to the messenger; but the Persian Government, in publicly and avowedly dismissing that officer on other grounds, while it excluded the offences he had committed against the British Government from the numerous charges which were sent in against him, and by persisting in denying his guilt, has deprived the British Mission in Persia of that security for its servants, and especially for its messengers, which the public and avowed punishment of Hajee Khan, on the charge preferred against him by the British Government might have been
expected to afford. I therefore consider it necessary to demand, that a
 Firman according protection to the servants of the British Mission in
 Persia shall be issued, in the terms in which it has already been de-
 manded, before the Mission can return to the Capital; for without an
 assurance of this protection, and an acknowledged right to demand it,
 no Mission can conduct its official business with the confidence and the
 feeling of security which the laws of nations afford at other Courts,
 and which are indispensable to the independence of all foreign Missions.

In addition to the demand for the dismissal or degradation of Hajee
 Khan, I required as an indispensable act of reparation for the violence
 offered to the messenger, that His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee
 should make an adequate apology for having ordered the messenger to
 be placed in the guard at His Excellency's tent, an order which was
 given and executed in presence of Colonel Stoddart. In promising to
 comply with the demands of the British Government, as communicated
 in my message conveyed by Colonel Stoddart to the Shah, His Majesty
 undertook to see this demand complied with.

When I was in the Shah's camp, I required that His Excellency
 should call upon me for the purpose of making the apology I required;
 and had the proceedings of the Persian Government in respect to the
 affair of Hajee Khan been such as to inspire me with confidence in its
 feelings or intentions, I might still have felt disposed to defer, until my
 arrival at the Capital, the renewal of this demand for an apology from
 His Excellency; but, with reference to the course pursued by the Persian
 Government in the affair of Hajee Khan, and to the spirit it has mani-
 fested in the discussions you have had on the subject, I feel it to be my
 duty now to demand that a written apology should be addressed to me
 by His Excellency, expressing his regret for the indignity and violence
 to which the messenger of the mission was subjected by his orders.

I have, therefore, to request that you will formally demand from
 the Persian Government that a Firman promising protection to the servants
 of the Mission, and corresponding in its tenour and substance with that
 which I required in the list of demands presented to the Shah in his
 camp at Herat, of which a copy is inclosed for your information, should
 be issued and delivered to you, and that His Excellency Hajee Meerza
 Aghassee should address to me a letter of apology as above stated.

In making these demands you will consider yourself at liberty to
 state the reasons I have assigned for renewing them at this moment,
 and for making it a condition of my return to the Shah's Court that
 they should be complied with.

If any unnecessary delay should occur in putting you in possession
 of these documents, you will fix a reasonable time, which you will inti-
 mate to the Persian Government; at the expiration of which, if they
 should not be delivered to you, you will consider them as having been
 refused; and in that event, or in case the Persian Government should
expressly refuse to comply with these demands, you will set out from
Tehran without any unnecessary delay, and proceed with Mr. Riach to
join me on the road between Resht and Zunjan, taking the way of
Casveen and Menjjeel, at one of which places, or on the road between
them, you will find or meet a person whom I shall send to you.

I have, &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inlosure 8.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil.
Resht, November 16, 1838.

Sir,

In the communication which Colonel Stoddart conveyed from me to
the Shah, subsequent to my departure from His Majesty’s Camp, I
intimated that if the Shah should retain any portion of the Affghani
Territory, the British Government would consider such a proceeding as
a hostile demonstration against itself. I now learn that not only the
troops which occupied Ghorian, but also those which took possession of
Subzar and Furrah in the name of the Shah of Persia, continue to hold
these places in the name of His Majesty.

I have therefore to request that you will apply to the Persian Go-

dernment for information on this subject, and call upon it to state whether
or not the troops which have occupied Furrah and Subzar, as well
as those at Ghorian, hold these places for the Shah of Persia, or sub-
ject to His Majesty’s orders.

If it should appear that Furrah and Subzar are still held for His
Majesty, or by persons subject to His Majesty’s orders, you will call
upon the Persian Government to issue the necessary order for the
immediate evacuation of these places, and to furnish you with an
authentic copy of that order for the information of the British Govern-
ment.

You will at the same time intimate to His Persian Majesty’s Minis-
ters, that I feel it to be my duty to protest against the continued
occupation of Ghorian by the Persian troops, being regarded as consti-
tuting any right on the part of Persia to retain permanent possession of
that fortress or district.

I have, &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclosure 9.)—Mr. Mc Neill to Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil.
Resht, November 16, 1838.

Sir,

Subsequent to my departure from Tabreez, I received information
that the Persian Government had addressed to at least one foreign
Court, observations which reflected in an unfriendly and improper
manner on the proceedings of the British Government, as well as of its
representatives and agents here and elsewhere.

I have to instruct you to request the Persian Government to furnish
me with a copy of these communications, that I may be enabled to judge whether or not the sentiments that have thus been communicated to at least one foreign Court, and probably to more than one, are of such a nature as ought to deter me from renewing my official intercourse with the Persian Government.

I have, &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

(Inclosure 10.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.)

_**Tehran, November 30, 1838.**_

I have the honor to inclose for your Excellency’s information, copies of the correspondence which has passed between the Minister for Foreign Affairs and myself, in connection with your demand for a Firman insuring protection to the servants of Her Majesty’s Mission, and for an apology from the Prime Minister.

The objectionable style of Meerza Massood’s communication cannot fail to strike your Excellency, and I did not consider that it would be judicious to allow this document to pass without an intimation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the view you were likely to take of its contents.

I have refrained from entering into any argument with Meerza Massood on the absurdity of the demand for an apology from your Excellency, from a conviction that a correspondence would be attended with no other result than the protraction of my stay in this city, and from the certainty that I should be unable to produce any alteration in the sentiments of the Persian Government.

Mr. Riach and myself propose to leave Tehran on the second proximo.

(Sub-inclosure 1.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to His Excellency Meerza Massood, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

_**Tehran, Nov. 22, 1838; 3d Ramadán, 1254.**_

With reference to the letter regarding the dismissal of Hajee Khan, which was addressed in camp by your Excellency to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, I am instructed by Her Britannick Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary to intimate to your Excellency, that it is not his intention at this moment to express an opinion whether or not the declaration contained in your Excellency’s letter will be received as a reparation and satisfaction for the share taken by Hajee Khan in the violence offered to the English courier. The Persian Government by publicly and avowedly dismissing that officer on other grounds, while it excluded the offences he had committed against the British Government from the numerous charges which were sent in against him, and by persisting in denying his guilt, has deprived the British Mission in Persia of that
security for its servants, which the public and avowed punishment of Hajee Khan, on the charge preferred against him by the British Government might have been expected to afford.

I am, therefore, instructed by Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary to demand that a Firman, according protection to the servants of the British Mission in Persia, shall be issued in the terms contained in the memorandum which was presented to His Majesty the Shah, by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, in camp before Herat, namely "a Firman declaring that henceforward the servants of the Shah-in-Shah of Persia shall, on no account or pretext whatever, molest or interfere with the servants of the British Mission, whether these servants be natives of Persia, or natives of other countries; moreover, if any of the servants of the British Mission should be guilty of a crime, he is not to be treated with violence or interfered with, unless with the knowledge and concurrence of the British Minister." Without an assurance of this protection, and an acknowledged right of demanding it, no Mission can conduct its official business with the confidence and the feeling of security which the laws of nations afford at other Courts.

In addition to the demand for the dismissal of Hajee Khan, His Excellency required as an indispensable act of reparation for the violence offered to the British courier, that His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee should make an adequate apology for having ordered the British courier to be placed in confinement in the guard at His Excellency's tent, an order which was given and executed in the presence of Colonel Stoddart. In promising to comply with the demands of the British Government as communicated in His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill's message, conveyed by Colonel Stoddart to His Majesty the Shah, His Majesty undertook to see this demand complied with; therefore, with reference to the course pursued by the Persian Government in this affair, His Excellency the British Minister considers it necessary to demand that a written apology should now be addressed to him by His Excellency the Prime Minister, expressing his regret for the indignity and violence to which the courier of the Mission was subjected by his orders.

I am therefore instructed by Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary to demand, formally, from the Persian Government, that a Firman, corresponding in its terms with what I have already described, and giving protection to the servants of the British Mission, shall be issued and delivered to me; and that His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee should write a letter of apology to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill of the nature already stated, and this also be delivered to me.

I am further instructed to intimate to your Excellency that compliance
with these demands is the condition on which His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill will return to the Court of His Majesty the Shah.

It is also my duty to inform your Excellency, by direction of His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, that if the demands now made are not complied with, the British Government will no longer consider itself bound to adhere to these demands, and that it will feel itself at liberty to make such further demands as the circumstances may render necessary.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

His Excellency Meerza Massood.

(Sub-inclosure 2.)—Translation of a Letter from His Excellency Meerza Massood, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil.

A. C.

I have received three letters from you, dated 3d Ramadan (23d November); and I have thoroughly comprehended the demands of His Excellency the British Minister, contained in your communications.

With regard to the demands of His Excellency for a Firman, granting protection to the servants of the English mission, agreeably to the commands of His Majesty, a Firman has been issued to the following effect:—"That, if a crime should be committed by a servant of the English mission, whether he be a native of Persia or not a native of Persia, which shall be deserving of punishment, his crime shall be investigated and decided upon in the presence of one of the members of the English Mission, nor shall any measures be taken for the punishment of the guilty person unless one of the members of the English Mission be present."

With advertence to the demand which you have made for an apology from His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee, the glory of the faith, the point of adoration of mankind, may the great God protect him; the dignity of His Excellency is too exalted to admit of the imputation of a fault to him, and that imputation, too, being one of which there is no evidence or proof. His Excellency the Hajee, who desires the welfare of all mankind, wished when in the royal camp to deign to honor His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill with a visit, for the purpose of consoling him, and removing the vexation of grief from his mind. His Excellency the British Minister would not consent, and thereby acted contrary to the rules of respect: and agreeably to the rules of respect (of society) it is incumbent on His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to make an apology for this impropriety of conduct, not on His Excellency the Hajee, who at all times pays the utmost attention to the rules of courtesy, without omitting a single point. Besides this, His Excellency the Hajee, may God perpetuate eternally his existence, has no knowledge of this transaction, and
never knew the servant of the English Government, that he should be called on to make an apology.

With regard to retaining Ghorian and various districts of Herat, which the English Government considers as a hostile demonstration against itself; in the first place, we are ignorant by what evidence the British Government considers our interference in the affairs of Afghanistan as a mark of hostility against itself. Besides the auspicious Treaty, the observation of the stipulations of which is the foundation of the friendship of the two States, are there any other treaties or engagements between Persia and England, relative to which any neglect or non-observance has proceeded from us? or did the Plenipotentiaries of both States forget this point at the time of forming the Treaty, that they omitted any allusion to it? or, have new rules of friendship been instituted in this world, of which we are not acquainted? or, does the party which considers itself strongest, consider also that the observance or violation of treaties rests on its discretion? When His Excellency the British Minister shall have been honored by a return to His Majesty's Court, we shall understand the exact state of these affairs from his own lips. In the next place, Ghorian is not included in the places in dispute, for from the commencement of the Kujur dynasty, this force was in the possession of the Persian Government. Ishak Khan, chief of Kerraee, held this place in his possession, and appointed his son Mahommed Khan Kerraee to the government of it, by whom the fort, which is now in existence, was built. When Ishak Khan was killed, and disturbances arose in Toorbut and districts attached to it, the Afghans got possession of Ghorian by force of arms, and made an arrangement with the Governors of Khorassan that they should pay the revenue of Ghorian to the latter.

With regard to sending communications to other States; it is evident that other friendly Courts expected to be made acquainted with the details of the fortunate campaign of His Majesty, and we wrote to these friendly Courts, an exact account of the campaign, in fulfilment of their expectations: apparently there is no necessity to make a demand for this communication, for His Excellency the British Minister is perfectly acquainted from beginning to end with every circumstance, and we, may God protect us, have not written a word contrary to the fact.

Translated by

10 Ramadan, 1254. (Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

November 28, 1838.

(Sub-inclosure 3.)—Copy of a Letter from Lieut.-Colonel Sheil, Secretary of Legation, to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Sir, Tehran, Nov. 30, 1838; or 12 Ramadan, 1254.

I have had the honor to receive your Excellency's letter of No.
November 28th (10th Ramadan) in reply to my letter of November 23, announcing to me that a Firman had been issued with the object of securing protection to the servants of the British Mission. I request your Excellency to observe that the Firman in question, as described by you, does not correspond in its terms with that which was demanded by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill in camp at Herat, nor consequently with that which was demanded in my communication.

The Persian Government has met the claim of His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill for an apology from His Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee by a counter-claim for an apology from Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary. It is, therefore, needless for me to prosecute this discussion further.

I regret to be obliged to advert to the language which you have thought fit to employ on this occasion. The phrases "deigning to honor" His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill with a visit, with "the intention of offering him consolation under the vexation of his griefs," are unsuitable on a subject purely official, and I am at a loss to conceive what object the Persian Government expects to obtain by the employment of language so much at variance with the usual style of official intercourse; but I relinquish to His Excellency the British Minister the duty of commenting on this and other parts of your Excellency's letter.

It is my intention to quit Tehran on the 2nd proximo (16th Ramadan), accompanied by Mr. Riach: I therefore request your Excellency will be so good as to furnish me with a paper to enable me to obtain accommodation on the road to Tabrez by the route of Resht and Zunjan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

His Excellency Meerza Massood.

(Inclusion 11.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir,

Tehran, November 30, 1838.

I have the honor to inclose for your Excellency's information, copies of the letters which I addressed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, relative to the occupation by Persia of Ghorian, and the evacuation of Furrah, Subzar, and Khoorrookh. The inclosure No. 2, to my letter of the 30th of November, contains, among other matters, the reply of Meerza Massood to the first letter which I addressed to him on this subject.

I have, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq.

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

(Sub-inclosure 1.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to His Excellency Meerza Massood.

Sir,

Tehran, Nov. 22, 1838; 3 Ramadan, 1254.

In the communication which Colonel Stoddart conveyed to His Majesty the Shah from His Excellency the British Minister, subsequent to
his departure from the Royal Camp, His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill announced to His Majesty, that if His Majesty should retain any portion of the Afghan territory, the British Government would consider such a proceeding as a hostile proceeding against itself. Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary has now learnt that the troops which occupied Ghorian, and also those which took possession of Furrah, Subzar, and Khoorrookh in the name of the Shah of Persia, continue to hold those places in the name of His Persian Majesty.

Agreeably to the instructions I have received from Mr. Mc Neill, I have the honor to request that your Excellency will furnish me with information on this subject, and I request you to state whether or not the troops which have occupied Ghorian, Furrah, Subzar, and Khoorrookh, hold these places for the Shah of Persia, or are subject to His Majesty's orders.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

His Excellency Meerza Massood.

(Sub-inclosure 2.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil to His Excellency Meerza Massood.

Sir,

Tehran, Nov. 29, 1838. 11 Ramadan, 1254.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of the 10th Ramadan (28th November) in reply to the communication which I addressed to you regarding the continued occupation by the Persian Government of Ghorian, Furrah, Subzar, and Khoorrookh.

Your Excellency having given no reply to the information I sought, whether the above places were garrisoned by Persian troops, or were held by troops in the name of His Persian Majesty, I am obliged to conclude from your silence that the intelligence which had been received by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill on this subject is correct, and that the above places are held by troops in the name of His Majesty the Shah, and are under His Majesty's orders.

I am instructed by Her Britannic Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary to intimate to His Persian Majesty's Ministers, that he feels it to be his duty to protest against the continued occupation of Ghorian by Persian troops, being regarded as constituting any right on the part of Persia to retain permanent possession of that fortress or district.

With regard to Furrah, Subzar, and Khoorrookh, I am directed by His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill to call on the Persian Government to fulfil the engagement into which His Majesty the Shah entered at Herat, of complying with the whole of the demands of the British Government, and to issue the necessary orders for the immediate evacuation of these places, furnishing me at the same time with an au-
thentie copy of that order for the information of the British Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

His Excellency Meerza Massood.

No. 108.—Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir,

I have received and laid before the Queen, your despatches to the 4th of December, and I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve your conduct in the matters reported in those despatches, and also that of Colonel Sheil during his intercourse with the Persian Government, in pursuance of the instructions which he received from you.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 109.—Viscount Palmerston to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

My Lord,

I transmit to your Excellency herewith a draft of a note relating to events which have recently occurred in Persia and in Afghanistan, which your Excellency will address to Count Nesselrode.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

H. E. the Marquess of Clanricarde, K.P.

(Inclosure.)—Draft of Note to be presented by the Marquess of Clanricarde to Count Nesselrode.

The undersigned, &c., is instructed by his Government to state to His Excellency Count Nesselrode, &c., that events which have lately occurred in Persia and in Afghanistan, render it necessary for the British Government to request from that of Russia, explanations with respect to certain circumstances which are connected with those events, and which have an important bearing upon the relations between Russia and Great Britain.

It is unnecessary for the undersigned to remind Count Nesselrode that the British and Russian Governments have, for a long time past, and from similar motives, taken a deep interest in the affairs of Persia.

To Russia, Persia is an immediate neighbour; the frontiers of the two countries touch; and it is a legitimate object of solicitude to Russia that her neighbour should be friendly and tranquil; so that the Russian territory should be secure from attack, and the Russian population should be free from the uneasiness which civil commotions in an adjoining country have a tendency to create. Russia therefore must naturally desire that
the Persian nation should be prosperous and contented; and that the Persian Government should abstain from all external aggression; should direct its attention exclusively to internal improvement; and should occupy itself in the pursuits of peace.

Great Britain has regarded Persia as a barrier for the security of British India against attack from any European power. With this defensive view, Great Britain has contracted alliance with Persia; and the object of that alliance has been, that Persia should be friendly to Great Britain, independent of foreign control, and at peace with all her neighbours.

The interests therefore of Great Britain and Russia, with regard to Persia, are not merely compatible, but almost the same, and hence the two Governments have felt, that having common objects to attain in Persia, they would find it for their mutual advantage to consult together upon matters connected with Persian affairs, and to endeavour to pursue, with respect to those affairs, a common course.

The expediency of such concert between Great Britain and Russia upon Persian affairs, has frequently been urged by the Russian Government, and acknowledged by that of Great Britain.

Upon this principle it was, that after the death of Abbas Meerza, in 1832, the two Governments came to an understanding with respect to the part they should take in regard to the succession to the Persian throne, whenever the then reigning Shah should die; and that they agreed together to give their support to the present Shah, whom the then reigning Monarch named as his successor. It is well known to the Russian Government how instrumental British influence was, in carrying that decision of the late Shah promptly into effect; and in preventing Persia from becoming the theatre of a protracted and ruinous civil war.

The two Governments continued for some time afterwards to maintain the same similarity in their respective courses of policy towards Persia; and the influence of both, as exerted by their missions at Tehran, appeared to be directed towards the same end, namely, to secure to Persia internal tranquillity, and external peace.

But in 1836, the Shah announced an intention of undertaking an expedition to attack and conquer Herat; founding that intention upon some antiquated and obsolete claims of a former dynasty of Persia upon Afghanistan.

The British Minister at Tehran was instructed to dissuade the Shah from such an enterprise; urging reasons of indisputable force, and founded upon the interests of the Shah himself.

But the advice given by the Russian Ambassador was all of an opposite tendency. For while Mr. Mc Neill was appealing to the prudence and the reason of the Shah, Count Simonich was exciting the ambition, and inflaming the passions of that Sovereign; while the one was preach-
ing moderation and peace, the other was inciting to war and conquest; and while the one pointed out the difficulties and expense of the enterprise, the other inspired hopes of money and assistance.

This conduct on the part of Count Simonich, so much at variance with the professed policy of Russia, determined the British Government to seek explanations at St. Petersburgh. And accordingly in February, 1837, the Earl of Durham stated to Count Nesselrode what Count Simonich was doing; and inquired whether that Ambassador was acting in pursuance of instructions from his Government.

The answer of Count Nesselrode to this inquiry was plain, direct, and unequivocal. He stated indeed that he could not but entertain some doubt of the accuracy of the reports which had reached the British Government; but he declared that if Count Simonich had acted in the manner represented, he had done so in direct opposition to his instructions, which distinctly enjoined him to dissuade the Shah from making war against Herat, at any time, and under any circumstances. And the Earl of Durham having read to Count Nesselrode a dispatch which he had received from his Government, stating the reasons why the British Cabinet considered the undertaking of the Shah to be impolitic and unwise, Count Nesselrode said, that he entirely concurred in the opinions thus expressed by the British Government.

Shortly after this interview, the Earl of Durham had a conversation on the same subject with M. Rodoñfokinin, in the course of which, M. Rodoñfokinin offered to produce the original book, in which all the instructions given to Count Simonich were entered; and which he said, would prove to the Earl of Durham, how little Count Simonich had attended to his instructions if he had really acted in the manner stated by the Earl of Durham.

Such were the professions and declarations of the Russian Government at St. Petersburgh; but very different have been the proceedings of the Russian agents, in Persia.

Those reports from Mr. McNeill, of which the accuracy was doubted by Count Nesselrode, in February, 1837, have been fully confirmed by subsequent information. For not only did the Prime Minister of the Shah state that Count Simonich had urged His Persian Majesty to undertake an expedition to Herat, but Count Simonich himself admitted to Mr. McNeill that he had done so; though he added, that in so doing he had disobeyed his instructions, which directed him not to urge the Shah to prosecute the war against Herat.

It has been further stated to Her Majesty's Government that Count Simonich, during the last twelve months, has advanced to the Shah the sum of 50,000 tomanis to enable His Persian Majesty to prosecute with vigor the war against Herat; and that the Count has also announced to the Shah, that if His Persian Majesty should succeed in taking Herat, the Russian Government would release Persia from
the payment of the balance of its debt to Russia; and would consider this balance, thus given up, as a contribution on the part of the Russian Government towards the expenses of the Persian campaign against Herat.

The Shah, as is well known, persevered in his march to Herat, notwithstanding all the representations of the British Minister; and commenced his operations against the place in the month of November last. A member of the Russian mission in Persia was then appointed to accompany the Shah; and Her Majesty’s Government have been informed that this individual, who is reported to have habitually held language encouraging the Persian Government in its proceedings, addressed in the month of February last, a letter to the Chief Ruler of Kandahar, holding out to him an expectation of obtaining from Persia, through the intervention of Count Simonich, the cession of Herat; assuring that Chief of the friendship of the Count, and urging him to send his son to the camp of the Shah. In the month of March last, when the state of the relations between Great Britain and Persia, compelled the British Minister to proceed to the camp of the Shah before Herat, Count Simonich is understood to have urged the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to remonstrate with Mr. McNeill, in order to dissuade him from taking his intended journey. The ground upon which the Persian Minister rested his objections to that journey, being, that if the British Minister, who was known to disapprove the operations of the Shah, were to arrive at the camp, his presence there would serve to encourage and strengthen the Afghans, and would therefore be injurious to the designs of the Shah.

The British Minister, nevertheless proceeded on his journey; but he had not advanced far, when intelligence reached him that Count Simonich was following him to the royal camp.

One object which the British Minister proposed to accomplish by going to the Shah’s camp, was to bring about an accommodation between the Persians and the Afghans, upon terms equitable for both parties. And his first endeavours after his arrival were industriously applied to persuade the Shah to consent to such an arrangement as it was reasonable to expect that the Government of Herat might accept.

Mr. McNeill was at last authorized by the Shah to go into the town, and to negotiate with the Government of Herat,—the Persian Minister assuring him that he was at liberty to conclude the matter in any manner that he might think advisable, and that he had as full power to act for the Persian Government, as he had for his own. The Shah, in order to give time for this negotiation, suspended a general assault, for which every preparation had been made; and Mr. McNeill on entering the town, had the satisfaction to feel, that even should he not succeed in making peace between the contending parties, he had at least, by his unremitting exertions, prevented for the moment that effusion of blood, and that sacrifice of life, which were otherwise about to ensue.
The night which the Shah had destined for a bloody assault, was successfully spent by Mr. Mc Neill in pacific negotiation; and before the next day's sun had risen, he had obtained the assent of Kamran Shah, to terms which gave to the Shah of Persia every satisfaction and security which he had demanded, reserving only the independence of the Government of Herat.

The British Minister was returning in the morning to the camp of the Shah, believing that he was thus about to terminate the war in a manner satisfactory and honorable to both parties, when on his way back out of the town, he was informed that Count Simonich had, in the course of the night, arrived in the Persian camp. But the arrival of the Russian Ambassador was not the only event which had happened while Mr. Mc Neill was employed in this negotiation. For simultaneously with that arrival, a change had come over the mind of the Shah, who was no longer animated by the pacific spirit which he had manifested on the former evening; and notwithstanding the declaration of the Persian Minister that Mr. Mc Neill had full power to negotiate for the Persian Government, this Treaty was at once rejected by the Shah, because it did not contain a surrender of that independence which the Heretees had so long and so bravely been fighting to maintain. The hostilities which had been suspended at the entreaty of Mr. Mc Neill, were now re-commenced; and Count Simonich, assuming the very reverse of that which the British Minister had acted, appeared publicly as the military adviser of the Shah; employed a Staff Officer attached to the Russian Mission to direct the construction of batteries, and to prosecute the offensive operations; furnished a further sum of money for distribution to the Persian soldiers; and by his countenance, support, and advice, confirmed the Shah in his resolution to persevere in his hostilities.

But in about ten days after this time, the progress made by the Persians in the siege not corresponding with the expectations which they had been led to form, the Persian Minister sent to Mr. Mc Neill, requesting him again to take up the negotiation, and to arrange matters between Persia and Herat in any manner he might think proper. An interview took place thereupon between Mr. Mc Neill and the Persian Minister, at which the latter accepted, with some trifling modifications, the Treaty to which Mr. Mc Neill had obtained the consent of the Government of Herat during his visit to the town.

The British Minister now a second time flattered himself that he had succeeded in his endeavours to restore peace, and nothing remained to be done for the full accomplishment of that object but that he should carry back the Treaty into the town, and get it signed by the Shah of Herat; but again some unknown and secret cause interfered to disappoint his well-founded hopes. The Persian Government again suddenly changed its purpose, and after having agreed to accept the Treaty, refused, upon various pretences, to permit Mr. Mc Neill to carry it into
the town, in order to communicate to Kamrav Shah its acceptance by the Persian Government; and afterwards the Persian Minister declared his acceptance of the Treaty as no longer binding, because the Afghans still continued to carry on their defensive hostilities notwithstanding a Treaty, the acceptance of which by the Persian Government had been studiously concealed from their knowledge.

Her Majesty's Government have, moreover, been informed in a manner which seems to entitle the report to some credit, that Count Simonich announced to the Shah, that a Russian army was about to march on Khiva and Bokhara; and, it is said, that he also held out to the Shah the prospect, that an eventual adjustment of the frontiers between Persia and Russia, in the direction of Khiva and Bokhara, would be the consequence of a successful issue of the operations of the two Governments against Herat.

Later accounts which have reached Her Majesty's Government, represent Count Simonich as having counselled, planned, and personally superintended an assault which was made upon the town by the Shah's forces, on or about the 23rd of June, and which ended in the defeat of the Persians with considerable loss; and it is said, that among those who fell on the Persian side upon that occasion, there were officers belonging to the Russian service.

The Undersigned is further instructed to state, that the British Government possess a copy of a treaty which has been concluded between Persia and the Afghan Ruler of Kandahar, the execution of which has been guaranteed by Count Simonich, and the stipulations of which are injurious and offensive to Great Britain. The guarantee which Count Simonich has given to this Treaty, tends to afford Russia, if she adopts the guarantee, a pretence to compel the Shah of Persia, not only to make himself master of Herat, but to deliver over that city afterwards to the Rulers of Kandahar, to be held by them, together with their other possessions, in the capacity, which those Rulers engage by the Treaty to acknowledge, of tributaries to Persia.

The guarantee, moreover, contains a promise to compel Persia to defend the Rulers of Kandahar against attack from any quarter whatever. It is true, that in this stipulation no specific allusion is made to England; but the intention of the parties may be inferred from the original draft of this Treaty, of which, also, Her Majesty's Government have a copy, and which was less cautiously worded, and in which, specific allusion was made to England, as one of the Powers, against whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the Rulers of Kandahar.

The Undersigned is further instructed to state, that a Russian agent of the name of Vicovich, but sometimes calling himself Omar Beg, and said to be attached to the Staff of the General commanding at Orenberg, was the bearer of letters from the Emperor and Count Simonich to the Ruler of Cabool, copies of which are in the possession of the British
Government; and that Count Simonich observed the most perfect silence towards the British Minister at Tehran with respect to the mission of this agent; a reserve which might seem unnecessary, if this agent was merely to deliver the letters of which he was the bearer, and if his mission was to have no tendency prejudicial to British interests.

But the British Government have learned that Count Simonich announced to the Shah of Persia, that this Russian agent would counsel the Ruler of Cabool to seek assistance of the Persian Government, to support him in his hostilities with the Ruler of the Punjab; and the further reports which the British Government have received of the language held by this Russian agent at Kandahar and at Cabool, can lead to no other conclusion, than that he strenuously exerted himself to detach the Rulers of those Afghan States from all connection with England, and to induce them to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and ultimately upon Russia.

If the British Government could entertain a doubt of the correctness of the foregoing information, that doubt would, in a great measure, be removed by the unfriendly language with respect to the British Government, which Count Simonich held some time ago to the agent of Cabool at the Court of Persia, and of which the British Government possess proof, in the report made by that Agent to the Ruler of Cabool.

It appears, then, from the foregoing statement, that on the last occasion when a communication took place between the Governments of Great Britain and of Russia upon the affairs of Persia, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh unequivocally disavowed having advised the Shah to make war; and asserted, on the contrary, that its instructions to the Russian Ambassador at Tehran were, to dissuade that Sovereign from attacking Herat at any time, and under any circumstances; but that, nevertheless, the Russian Ambassador in Persia has, during the whole period which has elapsed since the above-mentioned communication, strenuously exerted himself to encourage the Shah in his aggressive undertaking; and has contributed his own assistance, and that of other officers under his orders, to promote the success of the enterprise; and it appears, moreover, that although Her Majesty's Government was led to think from what fell from Count Nesselrode in a conversation which he had on this subject with the Earl of Durham, on the 1st May, 1837, that Count Simonich "would not long remain in Persia," that Ambassador, nevertheless, has continued to remain in Persia, pursuing, with increased activity, and in the most open manner, the conduct of which his Government had expressed such decided disapprobation.

It further appears from the foregoing statements, that whereas Russia has of late years invariably professed a desire to concert with Great Britain the course of policy which the two Governments should
pursue with regard to Persia, so that the identity of their measures in that quarter, might be a manifest proof of their friendship and union; Russian agents in Persia and Afghanistan, have lately been engaged in measures studiously concealed from the British Government, and planned in a spirit unfriendly to Great Britain, and for objects hostile to her interests.

The British Government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue with respect to the matters in question, whatever course may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh most conducive to the interests of Russia; and Great Britain is too conscious of her own strength, and too sensible of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates. But the British Government considers itself entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia, towards Persia and towards Great Britain, are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and M. Rodosinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vicovitch? and the British Government thinks itself also justified in observing, that if from any cause whatever, the Russian Government has, subsequently to the months of February and May, 1837, altered the opinions which were then expressed to the Earl of Durham; and if that Government has in consequence thought fit to give to its Ambassador in Persia, instructions diametrically opposite to those which were then described by Count Nesselrode and M. Rodosinikin, and which M. Rodosinikin offered to exhibit to the Earl of Durham, then, and in such case, the system of unreserved reciprocal communication upon Persian affairs, which of late years has been established between the two Governments, gave to the British Cabinet a good right to expect, that so entire a change of policy on the part of Russia, together with the reasons on which it was founded, would have been made known to Her Majesty’s Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, instead of being left to be inferred from the acts of Russian Agents in Persia and Afghanistan.

The Undersigned in conclusion is instructed to say, that Her Majesty’s Government is persuaded that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh will see in this communication, a fresh proof of the anxious desire of the British Government to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations which so happily subsist between the two countries; and to which the British Government justly attaches so great a value: because, explanations sought for with frankness and in a friendly spirit, tend to remove misunderstandings, and to preserve harmony between nations.
No. 110.—Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—(St. Peters-
burgh, October 30, 1838.)—Communicated by Count Pozzo di Borgo,
November 11.

Monsieur le Comte,

St.-Pétersbourg, le 20 Octobre, 1838.

L'Empereur a voulu une attention sérieuse à la lecture des Dépêches
de Votre Excellence qui rendent compte de deux entretiens consécutifs,
dans lesquels, Lord Palmerston, en parlant de la situation actuelle des
affaires en Perse, a manifesté les appréhensions que l'expédition du Shah
contre Hérat a fait naître dans le Gouvernement de la Compagnie des
Indes.

A cette occasion, le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Bri-
tannique, dirigeant le Département des Affaires Etrangères, ne vous a
point dissimulé, M. le Comte, que l'opinion publique en Angleterre
attribue à l'influence de la Russie, une part décisive aux événements qui
se passent aujourd'hui en Perse, et prête à notre Cabinet des intentions
dangereuses pour la sécurité des Possessions Britanniques en Asie.

Cette considération est si grave, elle est faite pour influer d'une
maniè re si fâcheuse sur toutes nos relations avec la Grande Bretagne,
que nous n'hésitons pas un seul instant à aller au-devant du Cabinet
Anglais par une explication franche et spontanée, pour le rassurer com-
plètement sur les intentions et les vues de notre Gouvernement à l'égard
des affaires d'Asie.

La politique que l'Empereur y poursuit, M. l'Ambassadeur, est
guidée par les mêmes principes qui la dirigent en Europe. Loin de
toute idée d'envahissement, cette politique n'a pour but que le maintien
des droits de la Russie et le respect de ceux légitimement acquis à
toutes les autres Puissances.

La pensée de porter atteinte à la sûreté et au repos de l'état de
possession de la Grande Bretagne aux Indes, ne s'est donc jamais pré-
sentée, et ne se présentera jamais, à l'esprit de notre Auguste Maître.
Il ne veut que ce qui est juste, et ce qui est possible. Par ce double
motif, il n'admet point une combinaison quelconque dirigée contre la
Puissance Britannique aux Indes. Elle ne serait pas juste, parceque
rien ne l'aurait provoquée. Elle ne serait pas possible, à cause des
distances immenses qui nous séparent, des sacrifices qu'il faudrait faire,
des difficultés qu'il faudrait vaincre, et tout cela pour réaliser une con-
ception aventureuse qui ne saurait jamais s'accorder avec une politique
saine et raisonnable. Un seul regard jeté sur la carte, devrait suffire
pour dissiper à cet égard toute préoccupation, et pour convaincre chaque
homme impartial et éclairé, que nul dessein hostile envers l'Angleterre,
ne saurait diriger en Asie la marche politique de notre Cabinet.

Voilà, M. le Comte, ce que l'Empereur vient de déclarer lui-même
to Lord Clancaricade, dès le premier entretien que Sa Majesté a eu avec
lui, le jour de son audience de réception, qui a eu lieu le 16 de ce mois,
at Tsarskoyé-Selo.
Cet Ambassadeur ne manquera pas de rendre compte à son Gouvernement de tout ce que notre Auguste Maître a daigné lui dire. La confiance que nous aimons à accorder au Représentant de Sa Majesté Britannique, nous dispense d’ajouter un commentaire quelconque au récit qu’il va soumettre à son Cabinet. Nous nous bornons à nous y référer, dans l’entièr e persuasion qu’il aura rendu un juste hommage aux principes politiques que l’Empereur a daigné lui exposer de vive voix.

Si le Gouvernement Britannique accorde à ces principes la confiance qu’ils sont faits pour inspirer, il vous sera facile, M. l’Ambassadeur, d’éclaircir à ses yeux les doutes qu’il a conçus sur la conduite que nous avons tenue au milieu des derniers événements en Perse, et nommément à l’égard de l’expédition de Mahomméed Shah contre Hérat.

Afin de mettre Votre Excellence à même de rétablir ainsi dans leur exacte vérité, des faits qui paraissent avoir été étrangement dénaturés, je m’empresser, M. le Comte, de vous communiquer dans leur ensemble, les détails que renferme la présente dépêche, en vous autorisant à la placer sans la moindre réserve sous les yeux du Cabinet Anglais.

Il connaît, comme nous, l’origine de l’inimitié qui règne entre la Perse et Hérat, partie la plus occidentale de l’Afghanistan. Cette inimitié date de loin. Le Gouvernement Persan se croit en droit d’exiger un tribut de cette contrée, et de faire valoir sur elle une suprématie que, déjà sous le règne de Feth-Allah-Shah, Abbas Mirza et Mahomméed Mirza (le Souverain actuel) vinrent soutenir, les armes à la main, jusque sous les murs de Hérat. En dépit de ces droits sur lesquels la Cour de Téhéran se fonde, les Afsghans de Hérat se livrent à des incursions continues en Perse, réduisent en esclavage les habitants qu’ils enlèvent des provinces orientales de ce pays, et y entretiennent sans cesse des élements de trouble et de révolte.

Nul doute que la répression de ces brigandages ne fut hautement réclamée par l’intérêt bien entendu de la sûreté et du repos du Gouvernement Persan. Il était incontestablement en droit d’user pour sa propre défense des moyens qui appartiennent à toute Puissance indépendante, et de porter les armes contre des voisins qui l’inquiètent et l’insultent. En s’engageant dans un conflit avec une province qui touche à ses frontières, la Perse ne faisait donc absolument rien de ce qui fût contraire à ses droits ; elle ne donnait aucun motif de plainte fondée à une Puissance tierce, étrangère à ce litige entre deux pays limitrophes. Encore moins devait elle s’attarder à irriter et à blesser le Gouvernement Britannique, qui, par ses transactions avec la Cour de Téhéran, s’est expressément engagé à n’intervenir en faveur d’aucun parti, si la guerre venait à éclater entre les Persans et les Afsghans.

Toutes ces considérations réunies, mettent hors de doute que Mahomméed Shah, en se déterminant à faire la guerre contre Hérat, a été complètement dans la limite de ses droits, comme Souverain indépendant, et qu’il n’a manqué d’aucune manière aux obligations que la foi des Traités lui impose.
Cependant, si cette guerre, comme nous venons de le dire, nous a paru complètement justifiée en principe, et par les droits incontestables que possède le Gouvernement Persan, et par les griefs continuels que lui donnent les déprédations d'une peuplade sans frein, nous n'avons jamais hésité, d'autre côté, à considérer comme intempestive et comme dangereuse, toute expédition militaire que le Gouvernement Persan entreprendrait dans l'état de faiblesse et d'épuisement où il se trouve. Au lieu de le précipiter dans une entreprise qui, à nos yeux, ne présentait aucune chance de succès, nous avons fait tout ce qui était en notre pouvoir pour l'en détourner, et pour le décider à préférer un accommodement à l'amiable avec le Chef de Hérat, à un état d'hostilité indéfiniment prolongé.

C'est dans ce sens qu'ont été rédigées toutes les instructions dont le Cabinet Impérial a muni son Représentant à la Cour de Téhéran, dès l'instant où nous avons été avertis de la résolution qu'elle avait prise de tourner de nouveau les armes contre Hérat.

En 1836 comme en 1837, les conseils de notre Cabinet, dictés par un véritable esprit de conciliation et de sincère bienveillance, ont constamment eu pour objet de consolider le repos de la Perse et des provinces voisines, par un accommodement qui mit fin à leurs dissensions et empêchait Mahommed Shah de s'engager dans une lutte sans espoir.

Durant l'hiver de 1837, l'arrivée à Téhéran d'un Envoyé du Chef de Hérat, nous fit entrevoir la possibilité d'un arrangement pacifique entre les deux parties contediantes.

Le Comte Simonich reçut en conséquence l'ordre positif "d'employer tout son crédit auprès du Shah pour le disposer à un accommodement formel." Tels sont les propres termes dans lesquels est conçue la dépêche que, d'ordre de l'Empereur, j'adressai à ce Ministre sous la date du 4 Mai, 1837.

Si nos conseils sont malheureusement restés sans effet, nous n'en avons pas moins la conscience d'avoir employé tous nos soins pour prévenir le renouvellement d'une guerre dont nous avions prévu d'avance la regrettable issue.

Certes, ce n'est point sur le Cabinet de Russie que retombe le reproche d'avoir suggéré, ni encouragé cette fatale entreprise. S'il fallait donner à cet égard une preuve de la sincérité de nos intentions, de la constance de nos principes, il nous suffirait de citer ce seul fait, que l'Empereur a sommé le Gouvernement Persan de renvoyer le bataillon formé de déserteurs Russes, et cela dans un moment où nous n'ignorions pas que ce bataillon constituait la principale force des troupes réunies au camp devant Hérat.

C'est précisément dans le but d'insister sur cette demande que notre Ministre a sollicité et obtenu l'autorisation de se rendre auprès du Shah.

Arrivé au camp, le Comte Simonich, témoin de la détresse dans laquelle se trouvait l'armée Persane, n'a pas cru devoir refuser son
assistance au Shah, lorsque ce Souverain lui a adressé l’instante prière d’examiner les travaux du siège.

Assurément, nous ne nierons point la part que le Général Simonich a prise à ces travaux. Tout officier Anglais, placé sous des conditions semblables, en aurait sans contredit agi de même pour prêter à un Souverain ami l’assistance qu’il aurait réclamée dans une situation si critique.

Cependant, lors même que le Shah aurait réussi à sortir victorieusement de cette situation dangereuse, lors même que la ville d’Hérat aurait été forcée de lui ouvrir ses portes, l’intention de notre Cabinet n’aurait jamais été de donner de ce côté à la Puissance Persane une extension qui aurait pu devenir un sujet d’appréhension pour les contrées voisines.

Loindelà, notre Ministre, dans la supposition d’une issue favorable, avait cru devoir suggérer éventuellement à la Cour de Téhéran, le projet d’un arrangement pacifique au moyen duquel Hérat aurait été remis par la Perse à Kohundil Khan, Chef du Kandahar.

Déjà une négociation avait été entamée à cet effet entre ce dernier et Mahommed Shah sous les bons offices de notre Ministre.

Cet arrangement, s’il avait effectivement eu lieu, aurait eu expressément pour base l’indépendance de l’Afghanistan, en imposant au Shah “l’obligation formelle de n’attenter d’aucune manière à l’intégrité du pays dont les Serdars se trouvent actuellement en possession, ni à la tranquillité des Tribus dont ils sont les chefs.”

Une pareille transaction, pacifique et inoffensive, aurait servi, selon toute apparence, à raffermir la paix intérieure de l’Afghanistan, à faire cesser les dissensions qui n’ont que trop souvent agité ce pays ; enfin à y faire reconnaître un état de prospérité et de calme qui aurait rendu cette contrée accessible au commerce et à l’industrie de toutes les nations intéressées à l’exploitation des ressources de l’Asie Centrale.

Selon l’intime conviction de notre Cabinet, les ressources de cette contrée sont assez vastes pour être librement ouvertes à l’activité commerciale de tous les pays, qui, sans vouloir s’exclure les uns les autres, doivent rivaliser entre eux par une franche et honorable concurrence.

Pour notre part, M. l’Ambassadeur, nous considérons cette concurrence comme toute pacifique et industrielle, mais nullement comme politique ni comme hostile.

Fort de notre loyauté et de notre conscience, nous n’aurons jamais rien à cacher ni à dissimuler de ce que nous avons mérité ou entrepris.

Nous sommes donc les premiers à convenir franchement envers l’Angleterre, qu’un employé Russe s’est rendu dernièrement à Caboul dans un but d’exploration commerciale.

Le fait de l’apparition de cet agent dont Lord Palmerston vous a parlé, M. le Comte, se trouve ainsi complètement exact. Mais l’origine et la tendance de son envoi semblent avoir été représentées au Ministère Anglais avec des commentaires dont il nous importe de démontrer l’exagération et la fausseté.
Pour cela il nous suffira de dire que l’envoi de M. Witkewitsch [Vicovich] à Caboul, a été motivé tout simplement par la mission d’un agent que Dost Mahomed Khan nous a envoyé en 1837, à St. Pétersbourg, dans l’intention de former avec la Russie des relations de commerce. Afin de reconnaître les avantages et le degré de sûreté qu’une parcelle entreprise pourrait offrir à nos commerçants dans une contrée jusqu’ici inconnue à la Russie, notre Gouvernement a résolu, avant tout, d’y envoyer un Employé chargé de lettres en réponse à celles que Dost Mahomed Khan avait été le premier à nous adresser.

Tel est l’exposé clair et simple des circonstances qui ont amené l’apparition momentanée d’un voyageur Russe à Caboul. Elle n’a eu pour but ni Traité de Commerce, ni combinaison politique quelconque, dont une Puissance tierce ait lieu de se plaindre et de prendre ombrage. Elle n’a produit, et elle ne devait produire qu’un seul résultat; celui de mieux nous faire connaître une contrée séparée de nos frontières par de grandes distances qui obligent notre Gouvernement à redoubler de précautions, afin que l’activité de notre commerce ne risque point de s’y engager dans des entreprises ruineuses, sans avoir été éclairée d’avance sur les chances qu’elle peut courir.

En rétablissant ainsi les faits dans leur entière vérité, notre Cabinet peut offrir à celui de Londres, l’assurance positive que dans l’envoi de M. Witkewitsch [Vicovich] à Caboul, et dans les instructions dont il a été muni, il n’y a pas eu la moindre pensée hostile envers le Gouvernement Anglais, ni la moindre idée de nuire au repos des possessions Britanniques aux Indes.

S’il est une Puissance qui aurait quelque appréhension à nourrir, ou quelque plainte à former, ce serait la Russie, qui n’ignore point l’activité infatigable déployée par les voyageurs Anglais pour répandre l’inquiétude au milieu des peuplades de l’Asie Centrale, et pour porter l’agitation jusqu’au sein des contrées qui touchent à nos frontières.

Tandis que pour notre part nous ne demandons autre chose que d’être admis à participer par une franche concurrence aux avantages de commerce de l’Asie, l’industrie Anglaise, exclusive et jalouse, voudrait nous priver totalement des bénéfices qu’elle prétend recueillir sans partage; et faire disparaître s’il se pouvait, les produits de nos fabriques de tous les marchés du centre de l’Asie; témoins les réflexions de Burnes, et la tendance des voyageurs Anglais qui ont suivi ses traces sur la route de Bokhara, et jusqu’aux portes d’Orenbourg.

Si nous citons ces faits, si nous signalons l’inquiète activité de quelques individus sans mission et sans aven, nous ne voulons certainement pas rejeter le blâme qu’ils méritent sur le Gouvernement auquel ils appartiennent. Au contraire, nous croyons le Cabinet Britannique entièrement étranger à la tendance que nous venons d’indiquer. Mais de même que nous plaçons une juste confiance dans la loyauté des inten-
tions du Gouvernement Anglais, de même aussi nous avons le droit d'attendre qu'il n'éleve pas de doute sur notre.

La Grande Bretagne, comme la Russie, doit avoir à cœur le même intérêt, celui de maintenir la Paix au centre de l'Asie, et d'éviter qu'il ne survienne dans cette vaste partie du globe, une conflagration générale. Or, pour empêcher ce grand malheur, il faut conserver soigneusement le repos des pays intermédiaires qui séparent les possessions de la Russie de celles de la Grande Bretagne. Consolider la tranquillité de ces contrées, ne point les exciter les unes contre les autres en nourrissant leurs haines mutuelles, se borner à rivaliser d'industrie, mais non pas s'engager dans une lutte d'influence politique; enfin, plus que tout le reste, respecter l'indépendance des pays intermédiaires qui nous séparent; tel est, à notre avis, le système que les 2 Cabinets ont un commun intérêt à suivre invariablement, afin d'empêcher la possibilité d'un conflit entre 2 grandes Puissances qui, pour rester amies, ont besoin de ne pas se toucher et de ne pas se heurter au centre de l'Asie.

Ces réflexions, M. le Comte, que l'Empereur vous charge de communiquer au Ministère Anglais avec la plus entière franchise, serviront, j'espère, à le rassurer avant tout sur les intentions de notre Cabinet, et à replacer dans son vrai jour la politique conservatrice et désintéressée de notre Auguste Maître.

Après vous être acquitté de ce premier devoir, veuillez, M. l'Ambassadeur, aborder nettement les questions qui se rattachent plus spécialement à la situation actuelle de la Perse, et sur lesquelles se fixent en ce moment les regards attentifs de l'Empereur. Votre Excellence voudra bien rappeler d'abord à Lord Palmerston, que de toutes les Affaires politiques que nous avons eu à traiter avec l'Angleterre, celle de la Perse est précisément celle où nous avons toujours été assez heureux pour établir un parfait accord entre notre Cabinet et celui de Londres, et cela par la simple raison que nos intérêts bien entendus sont les mêmes à l'égard de la Perse, vù que nous déploreions autant que l'Angleterre, de voir ce pays redevenir le théâtre d'une commotion politique à laquelle nous ne saurions rester étrangers. Pénétré de cette conviction, notre Cabinet a été le premier, avant l'avènement du Shah actuel, à aller au-devant du Gouvernement Anglais pour aviser aux moyens d'établir entre la Russie et la Grande Bretagne une parfaite entente au sujet des affaires de la Perse, afin de préserver ce pays des malheurs d'une succession contestée et d'une guerre civile.

Le résultat de cette ouverture a répondu alors complètement à notre attente. Les 2 Cabinets, vous le savez, M. le Comte, ont agi dès-lors dans un esprit de conciliation et de bonne intelligence qui a pleinement assuré le succès de toutes leurs démarches. Des instructions rédigées d'un commun accord, ont été envoyées à leurs Représentants à Téhéran; Mahommed Mirza, secondé par les deux Cours, est monté sur le Trône,
et la paix intérieure de la Perse, malgré les éléments de trouble qui semblaient la compromettre alors, n'a pas été exposée un seul instant à la moindre altération, grâce à l'unanimité qui régnait entre la Russie et la Grande Bretagne.

Il ne sera pas sans utilité, M. le Comte, de replacer aujourd'hui sous les yeux de Lord Palmerston, la dépêche qu'il a adressée à cette époque au Ministre d'Angleterre à St. Pétersbourg, et ce dernier a été chargé alors de nous communiquer.

Votre Excellence la trouvera ci-jointe en copie. Ce document à la main, vous voudrez bien, M. l'Ambassadeur, témoigner à Lord Palmerston, que les mêmes sentiments qui nous ont guidés en 1834, et qui nous ont portés alors à désirer une entente amicale avec l'Angleterre, sur les affaires de la Perse, sont encore aujourd'hui le motif de la présente démarche, et nous inspireront la pleine confiance de voir celle-ci amener des résultats tout aussi satisfaisants que celle qui l'a précédée.

Votre Excellence exprimera ensuite sans réserve, le regret que nous éprouvons de voir momentanément troublés les rapports de bonne intelligence entre la Cour de Londres et celle de Téhéran, ainsi que notre sincère désir de les voir promptement rétablis sur leur ancien pied.

Veuillez ajouter, M. le Comte, qu'il est loin des intentions de notre Cabinet de vouloir s'ériger en juge des griefs directs que la Grande Bretagne peut avoir à faire valoir contre le Gouvernement Persan. Ces griefs, ainsi que nous ne l'ignorons pas, se rapportent toutefois à des objets d'une importance secondaire. Il nous semblerait donc permis de croire que le Gouvernement Persan s'entendrait facilement avec le Ministère Anglais sur les moyens d'aplanir ces difficultés d'une manière équitable.

Mais il est une circonstance d'une nature plus grave, et une considération d'un ordre plus élevé, qui nous déterminent à nous ouvrir sans détour envers le Cabinet Britannique, et à lui communiquer amicalement, le jugement que nous portons sur la situation actuelle des affaires en Perse.

Cette situation se complique et s'aggrave à nos yeux par l'attitude menaçante que l'Angleterre a prise en dernier lieu envers la Cour de Téhéran.

En effet, la démonstration navale à laquelle le Gouvernement Britannique s'est porté dans le golfe Persique, l'occupation de l'île de Karrak, et les bruits repandus sur la ré-apparition prochaine de Zelly Sultan et des Princes Persans qui se seraient placés sous la protection Anglaise, sont autant de circonstances qui doivent nécessairement inspirer à Mahomed Shah des appréhensions sérieuses.

Dans cet état de choses, ce Souverain a cru devoir recourir à l'amitié de l'Empereur pour réclamer ses bons offices auprès de l'Angleterre, afin d'en venir à une entente à l'amiable, et de faire disparaître les motifs de crainte que l'attitude récemment adoptée par le Gouvernement Britannique, a dû donner à la Cour de Téhéran.
L'Empereur, déferant au désir du Shah, n'hésite point aujourd'hui d'en appeler aux sentiments d'équité du Cabinet Anglais pour l'engager à faire cesser un état de choses qui, s'il venait à se prolonger encore, finirait par compromettre gravement le repos de la Perse, et deviendrait ainsi pour la Russie elle-même un sujet d'inquiétude qui la forcerait de prendre à son tour des mesures de sûreté et de prévoyance.

Afin de prévenir à temps toute complication ultérieure dont la Perse aurait infailliblement à regretter les conséquences fâcheuses, le moyen le plus sûr serait, à notre avis, de voir les légations de Russie et de la Grande Bretagne se replacer sur la même ligne, et marcher de front pour raffermir l'autorité du Souverain que les deux Cours ont contribué d'un commun accord à élever sur le Trône.

Ainsi pour ne point agir aujourd'hui dans un but contraire à celui qu'elle a voulu atteindre en 1834, pour ne pas exciter les troubles qu'elle a voulu empêcher alors, l'Angleterre, selon notre intime conviction, devrait ne pas tarder à rétablir ses relations avec la Cour de Téhéran sur leur ancien pied, rappeler son escadre du golfe Persique, et évacuer l'île de Karrak que ses troupes y ont momentanément occupée.

En replaçant de cette manière les choses dans leur ordre habituel, l'Angleterre nous trouvera prêts à la seconder dans la tâche de maintenir désormais le Gouvernement Persan dans les limites que son propre intérêt lui conseille de ne pas dépasser, et de renoncer à l'avenir à toute expédition pareille à celle qu'il vient d'être forcé d'abandonner.

C'est dans ce sens que notre Légation à Téhéran recevra l'ordre d'agir dorénavant de concert avec celle d'Angleterre, dès que nous aurons acquis la certitude que la démarche dont Votre Excellence est chargée de s'acquitter actuellement, aura atteint son but, et que le Cabinet de Londres aura consenti à mettre fin à son attitude hostile envers la Perse.

La nôtre, M. le Comte, se réglera nécessairement d'après les déterminations définitives que le Gouvernement Britannique croira devoir adopter. Assurément il dépendra de lui seul de rétablir entre les légations de Russie et de la Grande Bretagne à Téhéran, cet heureux accord de vues et d'action que nous avions eu si vivement à cœur de former en 1834, et qui avait été accompagné alors de conséquences si utiles pour l'affermissement de la tranquillité intérieure de la Monarchie Persane.

Si le Ministère Anglais, ainsi que nous le désirons sincèrement, se décide à rentrer dans cette voie, il pourra être pleinement assuré qu'il trouvera à cet effet dans le Représentant de l'Empereur à Téhéran, la coopération la plus active et la plus loyale. Le Colonel Duhamel, que notre Auguste Maître a daigné appeler à succéder au Comte Simonich, est suffisamment connu par la modération de son caractère, pour que sa nomination seule soit l'indice le plus sûr de la ligne de conduite qu'il est chargé de suivre, de même que ses antécédents honorables sont la meil-
leure garantie de la fidélité avec laquelle il saura remplir les intentions de notre Gouvernement par rapport aux affaires de la Perse.

Destiné depuis six mois à remplacer le Comte Simonich, le Colonel Duhamel, dont le départ avait éprouvé des retards inévitables, doit être, à l'heure qu'il est, à la veille d'arriver à son poste. Sa présence ne saurait manquer d'agir utilement sur les conseils du Shah, pourvu que le Gouvernement Anglais veuille bien à son tour combiner ses efforts avec les nôtres, afin de rendre à la Perse ce repos qui est pour elle une première condition d'existence en même temps qu'il est un gage de paix pour les deux Grandes Puissances appelées à influer mutuellement sur les destinées de l'Asie Centrale.

Votre Excellence est invitée, d'ordre de l'Empereur, à faire valoir ces réflexions auprès de Lord Palmerston, en lui remettant copie de la présente dépêche. Nous aimons à espérer que les sentiments qui l'ont dictée seront appréciés par le Cabinet Britannique, et qu'il veudra bien faire à cette communication un accueil conforme aux intentions sincèrement bienveillantes de notre Auguste Maître.

Recevez, etc.

S. E. Le Comte Pozzo di Borgo. (Signé) NEsselrode. (Translation.)

M. le Comte,

The Emperor has read with serious attention, your Excellency's despatches giving an account of two consecutive interviews in which Lord Palmerston, speaking of the present situation of affairs in Persia, explained the apprehensions which the expedition of the Shah against Herat, has given rise to on the part of the Government of the East India Company.

On this occasion, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not conceal from you, M le Comte, that public opinion in England, ascribes to Russian influence a decisive part in the events now passing in Persia, and attributes to our Cabinet, intentions dangerous to the security of the British possessions in Asia.

This consideration is so serious, it is calculated to have so pernicious an influence on all our relations with Great Britain, that we do not hesitate a single instant to meet the English Cabinet with a frank and spontaneous explanation, in order completely to remove its apprehensions as to the intentions and views of our Government with regard to the Affairs of Asia.

The policy M. l' Ambassadeur, which the Emperor pursues in that quarter, is guided by the same principles which direct it in Europe. Far from any idea of encroachment, that policy has only for its object, the maintenance of the rights of Russia, and respect for those legitimately acquired by all other Powers.

The idea of assailing the security and the tranquillity of the state of possession of Great Britain in India, has consequently never presented it-
self and will never present itself to the mind of our August Master. He desires only what is just, and what is possible. For this two-fold reason, he cannot entertain any combination whatever directed against the British power in India. It would not be just, because nothing would have given cause for it. It would not be possible, by reason of the immense distance which separates us, the sacrifices which must be made, the difficulties which must be overcome, and all this, to realize an adventurous scheme which could never be in accordance with sound and reasonable policy. A single glance at the map ought to be sufficient to dissipate, in this respect, all prejudice, and to convince every impartial and enlightened man, that no hostile design against England can direct the policy of our Cabinet in Asia.

This, M. le Comte, is what the Emperor has himself just declared to Lord Clancarcarde, at the very first interview which His Majesty had with him, on the day of his audience of reception, which took place at Tsarkoyé-Selo on the 25th of this month.

That Ambassador will not fail to report to his Government all that our August Master was pleased to say to him. The confidence which we place in the Representative of Her Britannic Majesty, renders it unnecessary for us to add any comment whatever to the report which he will lay before his Cabinet. We confine ourselves to referring to that report, in the full persuasion that he will have paid a just tribute to the political principles which the Emperor was pleased verbally to explain to him.

If the British Government places in those principles, the confidence which they are calculated to inspire, it will be easy for you, M. l'Am- bassadeur, to clear up the doubts which it has conceived as to the conduct which we have adopted in the midst of the recent events in Persia, and specifically with regard to the expedition of Mahommed Shah against Herat.

In order to enable your Excellency thus to place in their exact truth, facts which appear to have been strangely distorted, I lose no time, M. le Comte, in communicating to you the whole of the details contained in the present despatch, authorizing you to place it without the least reserve before the English Cabinet.

That Cabinet knows, as well as we do, the origin of the enmity which subsists between Persia and Herat, the most western part of Afghanistan. That enmity is of ancient date. The Persian Government thinks itself entitled to exact a tribute from that country, and to claim to exercise over it a supremacy, which, even under the reign of Futteh Ali Shah, Abbas Meerza, and Mahommed Meerza (the present sovereign) appeared in arms to sustain under the very walls of Herat. In despite of these rights, on which the Court of Tehran relies, the Afghans of Herat make continual incursions into Persia, reduce to slavery the inhabitants whom they carry off from the eastern provinces
of that country, and keep up therein incessantly the elements of disturbance and revolt.

No doubt the repression of these robberies was loudly called for by the well understood interest of the security and tranquillity of the Persian Government. That Government had an unquestionable right to employ for its own defence the means which belong to every independent Power, and to direct its arms against neighbours who disturb and insult it. In engaging in a conflict with a province touching her frontier, Persia did then absolutely nothing contrary to her rights: she afforded no cause of well-founded complaint to a third Power, which was a stranger to this dispute between two conterminous countries. Still less could she expect to irritate and to offend the British Government, which, by its engagements with the Court of Tehran, has expressly bound itself not to interfere in favour of either party, if war should break out between the Persians and the Afghans.

All these considerations put together, establish beyond a doubt, that Mahommed Shah, in determining to make war against Herat, was completely within the limits of his rights as an independent sovereign, and that he has in no respect failed in the obligations imposed upon him by the faith of Treaties.

Nevertheless, if this war, as we have just said, has appeared to us to be completely justified in principle, both by the indisputable rights possessed by the Persian Government, and by the continual grievances occasioned to it by the depredations of lawless tribes, we have, on the other hand, never hesitated to consider as unseasonable and hazardous, any military expedition which the Persian Government might undertake in the state of weakness and exhaustion in which it is placed. Instead of urging it on in an enterprise, which, in our view, offered no chance of success, we have done all that was in our power to divert it therefrom, and to induce it to prefer an amicable arrangement with the Chief of Herat, to a state of hostility indefinitely prolonged.

It is in this sense that have been framed all the instructions with which the Imperial Cabinet has furnished its Representative at the Court of Tehran, from the time that we were apprised of the resolution which it had taken to direct its arms anew against Herat.

In 1836, as in 1837, the counsels of our Cabinet, dictated by a true spirit of conciliation, and of sincere goodwill, have constantly had for their object the consolidation of the tranquillity of Persia, and of the neighbouring provinces, by an arrangement which should put an end to their dissensions, and should prevent Mahommed Shah from engaging in a hopeless contest.

During the winter of 1837, the arrival at Tehran of an Envoy from the Chief of Herat, gave us a prospect of the possibility of a pacific arrangement between the two contending parties.

Count Simonich received in consequence a positive order "to
employ all his credit with the Shah to dispose him to a formal accommodation." Such are the very terms in which is conceived the despatch, which, by the Emperor's command, I addressed to that Minister on the 4th of May, 1837.

If our counsels have unfortunately remained without effect, we are not the less conscious of having employed all our care to prevent the renewal of a war, of which we had foreseen beforehand the lamentable issue.

Assuredly it is not upon the Cabinet of Russia that can fall the reproach of having suggested or encouraged that fatal enterprise. If it were requisite to give, in this respect, a proof of the sincerity of our intentions, of the steadiness of our principles, it would be sufficient to quote the single fact, that the Emperor has called upon the Persian Government to send back the battalion formed of Russian deserters, and that too at a moment when we were not ignorant that that battalion constituted the principal force of the troops assembled in the camp before Herat.

It is precisely with the object of insisting upon that demand, that our Minister applied for and obtained an authority to join the Shah.

On his arrival in camp, Count Simonich, witnessing the distress in which the Persian Army was, did not think that he ought to refuse his assistance to the Shah, when that Sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of the siege.

Assuredly, we will not deny the part which General Simonich took in those works. Any English officer, placed in similar circumstances, would unquestionably have acted in the same manner in order to render to a friendly Sovereign the assistance which he might have applied for in so critical a situation.

Nevertheless, even if the Shah had succeeded in coming victoriously out of that dangerous situation, even if the city of Herat had been forced to open its gates to him, the intention of our Cabinet would never have been to give, in that quarter, to the Persian Power, an extension which might have become a subject of apprehension to the neighbouring countries.

Far from that, our Minister, in the supposition of a favourable issue, had deemed it his duty to suggest eventually to the Court of Tehran, the plan of a pacific arrangement, by means of which Herat would have been given over by Persia to Kohundil Khan, Chief of Kandahar.

Already a negotiation had been entered into for that purpose between the latter and Mahommed Shah, under the good offices of our Minister.

That arrangement, if it had actually taken place, would have had expressly for its basis the independence of Affghanistan, by imposing upon the Shah, "the formal obligation in no way to assail the integrity
of the country of which the Sirdars are actually in possession, nor the tranquillity of the tribes of which they are the Chiefs."

Such an arrangement, pacific and inoffensive, would have served, according to all appearance, to strengthen the internal peace of Afghanistan, to put a stop to the dissensions which have too often agitated that country, finally, to cause to revive therein, a state of prosperity and tranquillity which would have rendered that country accessible to be commerce and to the industry of all the Nations which are interested in turning to account the resources of Central Asia.

According to the intimate conviction of our Cabinet, the resources of that country are sufficiently extensive to be freely opened to the commercial activity of all countries, which, without desiring to exclude each other, ought to contend among each other by a frank and honourable competition.

For our part, M. l’Ambassadeur, we consider this competition as entirely pacific and commercial, but by no means as political or as hostile.

Strong in our rectitude and in our conscience, we shall never have any thing to conceal or to dissemble which we have designed or undertaken.

We are then the first frankly to admit to England, that a Russian agent lately proceeded to Cabool for the purpose of commercial inquiry.

The fact of the appearance of this agent, of whom Lord Palmerston has spoken to you, M. le Comte, is thus completely correct. But the origin and tendency of his mission seem to have been represented to the English Government with comments of which we are desirous to demonstrate the exaggeration and the falsehood.

For that purpose it will be enough for us to say, that the mission of M. Witkewitsch [Vicovich] to Cabool, was simply occasioned by the mission of an agent, whom Dost Mahommed Khan sent to us in 1837, to St. Petersburgh, with the intention of forming commercial relations with Russia. In order to ascertain the advantages and the degree of security which such an enterprise might offer to our merchants, in a country hitherto unknown to Russia, our Government determined in the first instance, to send thither an agent charged with letters, in reply to those which Dost Mahommed Khan had been the first to address to us.

Such is the clear and simple statement of the circumstances which have led to the momentary appearance of a Russian traveller at Cabool. It had for its object neither a Treaty of Commerce, nor any political combination whatever, which a third Power could have reason to complain of, or take umbrage at. It has produced, and was intended to produce, but one result; that of making us acquainted with a country
separated from our frontier by great distances; which oblige our Government to increase its precautions, in order that the activity of our commerce should not run the risk of engaging there in ruinous enterprises, without having been enlightened beforehand as to the chances to which it might be exposed.

In thus replacing the facts in their full truth, our Cabinet can offer to that of London the positive assurance that, in the mission of M. Witkewitsch [Vicovich] to Cabool, and in the instructions with which he was furnished, there has not existed the smallest design hostile to the English Government, nor the smallest idea of injuring the tranquillity of the British possessions in India.

If there is one Power which might have any apprehension to entertain, or any complaint to prefer, it would be Russia, who is not ignorant of the indefatigable activity displayed by English travellers to spread disquiet among the people of Central Asia, and to carry agitation even into the heart of the countries bordering on our frontier.

Whilst on our part we ask nothing but to be admitted to partake in fair competition, the commercial advantages of Asia, English industry, exclusive and jealous, would deprive us entirely of the benefits which it pretends to reap alone; and would cause, if it could, the produce of our manufactories to disappear from all the markets of Central Asia; witness the remarks of Burnes, and the tendency of English travellers who have followed his steps on the road to Bokhara, and to the very gates of Orenberg.

If we adduce these facts, if we point out the restless activity of certain unaccredited and unrecognised individuals, it is certainly not our wish to impute to the Government to which they belong, the blame of which they are deserving. On the contrary, we consider the British Cabinet to be altogether a stranger to the tendency which we have just alluded to. But in like manner as we place a just reliance on the rectitude of the intentions of the English Government, so also are we entitled to expect that it will not raise a doubt as to our own.

Great Britain, like Russia, must have at heart the same interest, that of maintaining peace in the centre of Asia, and of avoiding the occurrence of a general conflagration in that vast portion of the globe. But, to prevent that great calamity, it is necessary carefully to maintain the tranquillity of the intermediate countries which separate the possessions of Russia from those of Great Britain. To consolidate the tranquility of those countries, not to excite them against each other by nourishing their mutual animosities, to be contented with competing in industry, but not to engage in a struggle for political influence; finally, beyond every thing else, to respect the independence of the intermediate countries which separate us, such is, in our opinion, the system which the two Cabinets have a common interest invariably to
pursue, in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between two Great Powers, which, that they may remain friends, require not to touch each other, and not to come into collision with each other in the centre of Asia.

These remarks, M. le Comte, which the Emperor commands you to communicate with the most perfect frankness to the English Ministry, will serve, I hope, to satisfy it, above all, as to the intentions of our Cabinet, and to place in its true light, the conservative and disinterested policy of our August Master.

After having acquitted yourself of this first duty, have the goodness, M. l'Ambassadeur, distinctly to enter upon the questions more immediately connected with the present situation of Persia, and upon which, the attention of the Emperor is at present fixed. Your Excellency will have the goodness, in the first place, to remind Lord Palmerston, that of all the political matters which we have had to treat with England, that relating to Persia is precisely the one on which we have always been sufficiently fortunate to establish a perfect agreement between our Cabinet and that of London; and this for the simple reason that our well-understood interests are the same with regard to Persia, seeing that we should deplore as much as England to see that country again become the scene of a political disturbance to which we could not remain strangers. Impressed with this conviction, our Cabinet was the first, before the accession of the present Shah, to propose to the English Government to consider of the means of establishing between Russia and Great Britain, a perfect understanding on the subject of the affairs of Persia, in order to preserve that country from the calamities of a disputed succession, and of a civil war.

The result of this overture completely answered our expectation at that time. The two Cabinets, you are aware, M. le Comte, acted from that time in a spirit of conciliation and of good understanding, which has fully insured the success of all their measures. Instructions drawn up by common consent, were sent to their Representatives at Tehran; Mahommed Meerza, supported by the two Courts, ascended the throne; and the internal peace of Persia, notwithstanding the elements of trouble which at that time appeared to place it in jeopardy, has not for an instant been exposed to the slightest disturbance, thanks to the unanimity which subsisted between Russia and Great Britain.

It will not be without advantage, M. le Comte, to place again before Lord Palmerston at the present time, the despatch, which at that period he addressed to the Minister of England at St. Petersburg, and which the latter was then directed to communicate to us.

Your Excellency will find a copy of it annexed. With this document in your hand, you will have the goodness, M. l'Ambassadeur, to make known to Lord Palmerston that the same sentiments which
guided us in 1834, and which led us at the time to desire a friendly understanding with England upon the Affairs of Persia, are now also the motive of the present step, and inspire us with the full confidence of seeing it lead to results fully as satisfactory as that which preceded it.

Your Excellency will then without reserve express the regret which we feel at seeing the relations of good understanding between the Court of London and that of Tehran, disturbed for the time, as well as our sincere desire to see them speedily re-established on their ancient footing.

Have the goodness, M. le Comte, to add that it is far from the intention of our Cabinet, to constitute itself a judge of the positive grievances which Great Britain may have to allege against the Persian Government. Those grievances, however, as we are not ignorant, relate to objects of a secondary importance. It would, therefore, seem to us allowable to believe that the Persian Government might easily come to an understanding with the English Ministry as to the means of removing those difficulties in an equitable manner.

But there is a circumstance of a more serious nature, and a consideration of a higher order, which make us determine to open ourselves without reserve towards the British Cabinet, and to communicate to it, in a friendly manner, the opinion which we entertain upon the actual state of affairs in Persia.

That state of affairs is complicated and becomes more serious in our view by reason of the menacing attitude recently assumed by England towards the Court of Tehran.

In fact, the naval demonstration to which the British Government has had recourse in the Persian Gulf, the occupation of the Island of Karrak, and the reports spread abroad as to the approaching reappearance of the Zil-Sultaun and of the Persian Princes, who are said to have placed themselves under English protection, are so many circumstances which must necessarily inspire Mahommed Shah with the most serious apprehensions.

In this state of things, that Sovereign has thought it necessary to have recourse to the friendship of the Emperor, to request his good offices with England, in order to arrive at an amicable understanding, and to remove the grounds of alarm which the attitude recently assumed by the British Government, has necessarily occasioned to the Court of Tehran.

The Emperor, yielding to the wish of the Shah, does not hesitate at the present time to appeal to the sentiments of equity entertained by the British Cabinet with the view of inducing it to put a stop to a state of things which, if it should still be prolonged, would end by seriously endangering the tranquillity of Persia, and would thus become, to Russia herself, a matter of uneasiness, which would compel her, in her turn, to take measures of security and of precaution.
In order to prevent, in time, any further complication, of which Persia would infallibly have to regret the lamentable consequences, the surest method would, in our opinion, be to see the Missions of Russia and of Great Britain replace themselves on the same line, and proceed together to strengthen the authority of a Sovereign whom the two Courts have, by common consent, contributed to raise to the throne.

Thus, in order not to act at present for a purpose contrary to that which she desired, in 1834, to attain, in order not to excite the disturbances which at that time she desired to prevent, England, according to our intimate conviction, ought not to delay to re-establish her relations with the Court of Tehran upon their ancient footing, to recall her squadron from the Persian gulf, and to evacuate the island of Karrak which her troops in that quarter have occupied for a time.

On her thus replacing matters in their ordinary position, England will find us ready to second her in the endeavour to maintain, hereafter, the Persian Government within the limits which its own interest recommends it not to transgress, and for the future to renounce every expedition like that which it has just been forced to abandon.

It is in this sense that our Mission at Tehran will be instructed to act henceforward, in concert with that of England, as soon as we shall have acquired the certainty that the step which Your Excellency is directed now to take, has attained its end, and that the Cabinet of London has consented to desist from its hostile attitude towards Persia.

Our attitude, M. le Comte, will necessarily be regulated according to the definitive determination which the British Government shall think fit to adopt. Assuredly, it will rest with that Government alone to re-establish, between the Missions of Russia and of Great Britain at Tehran, that happy agreement of views and of actions which we had so much at heart to form in 1834, and which had at that time been attended with consequences so beneficial for the consolidation of the internal tranquillity of the Persian Monarchy.

If the British Ministry, as we sincerely desire, decide upon reverting to this course, it may have full assurance that it will find for this purpose, in the Representative of the Emperor at Tehran, the most active and honest co-operation. Colonel Duhamel, whom our August Master has been pleased to appoint to succeed to Count Simonich, is sufficiently known by the moderation of his character, that his appointment alone may be the surest indication of the line of conduct which he is directed to follow; as his former honorable conduct is likewise the best guarantee for the fidelity with which he will fulfil the intentions of our Government with regard to the affairs of Persia.

Destined for the last six months to replace Count Simonich, Colonel Duhamel, whose departure had been unavoidably delayed, must, at the present time, be on the point of arriving at his post. His presence cannot fail to have a beneficial influence on the counsels of the Shah,
provided that the English Government should, in its turn, be pleased to combine its efforts with ours, in order to restore to Persia that repose which is to her a primary condition of existence, at the same time that it is a pledge of peace for the two Great Powers who are called mutually to exercise an influence on the destinies of Central Asia.

Your Excellency is requested, by command of the Emperor, to urge these considerations upon Lord Palmerston, on delivering to him a copy of the present despatch. We would fain hope that the sentiments which have dictated it, will be appreciated by the British Cabinet, and that it will be pleased to receive this communication in a manner conformable to the sincerely friendly intentions of our August Master.

Receive, &c.

H. E. Count Pozzo di Borgo.  
(Signed)  
NESSELRODE.

(Inclusion.)—Viscount Palmerston to the Hon. John Duncan Bligh.  

SIR,

In acknowledging the receipt of your despatch of the 6th of August, I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of expressing to the Russian Government the satisfaction of His Majesty’s Government at the decision which has been taken by the Shah of Persia to nominate Mahommed Meerza as the successor to the throne, an event which it is to be hoped will avert the danger of civil war in Persia on the next demise of the Crown; and you will also say that His Majesty’s Government are gratified to find that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting with regard to the affairs of Persia in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia;

His Majesty’s Government will at all times find a real pleasure in co-operating with that of Russia for such purposes; and instructions have been sent to the British Resident at Tehran, to communicate confidentially with the Russian Representative in the furtherance of the common views of the two Governments.

I am, &c.

The Hon. John Duncan Bligh.  
(Signed)  
PALMERSTON.

No. 111.—Viscount Palmerston to the Count Pozzo di Borgo.

M. le Comte,  
Foreign Office, December 20, 1838.

I have not failed to communicate to Her Majesty’s Government the despatch upon Persian affairs addressed to your Excellency by Count Nesselrode on the 20th October, and of which your Excellency, by instructions from your Government, gave me a Copy on the 11th of last month.

I can assure your Excellency that Her Majesty’s Government have given to this important communication all the attention which it so justly demands; and I have great pleasure in being able to state to your Excellency that this communication has in its general result been highly satisfactory to Her Majesty’s Government.
The leading principle which invariably directs the conduct of the British Government in the management of its relations with Foreign Powers, is an anxious desire to preserve for the British Nation the blessings of peace. This desire must inspire Her Majesty's Government with an earnest wish to maintain with all States the most friendly relations. But as regards Russia, this wish is peculiarly strong. Because an alliance of long standing between Great Britain and Russia; commercial intercourse valuable to both Countries; and common interests of the highest order; must necessarily lead Her Majesty's Government to deprecate as a great misfortune, any event which might tend to interrupt the good understanding which so happily subsists between the Cabinets of Petersburgh and London.

But all nations have interests which cannot be abandoned; and which must be protected at whatever hazard or sacrifice. And when those interests appear threatened with danger, it is the duty of the Government of the Country concerned, to seek explanations from that quarter, from whence such danger appears likely to come.

The proceedings of Russian agents in Asia had for some considerable time been so much at variance with the professed policy of the Russian Government, and so inconsistent with the friendly relations subsisting between Great Britain and Russia, that the British Cabinet deemed it its duty to ascertain by frank explanations with that of St. Petersburgh, whether any change had taken place in the declared policy of the Imperial Government with regard to the affairs in question, or in its friendly disposition towards Great Britain.

The despatch from Count Nesselrode which your Excellency has communicated to me, contains upon these points assurances the most full and complete; and Her Majesty's Government accept as entirely satisfactory, the declarations of the Imperial Cabinet, that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India; that its own policy with respect to Persia remains unchanged, and is the same which in 1834 the two Powers agreed to adopt (and which, I must be allowed to remind your Excellency, the British Government and its agents in Persia, have from that time to this, undeviatingly pursued); and that in future the Russian agents in Persia will unite themselves with those of Great Britain in earnestly dissuading the Shah from engaging again in any expedition similar to that which he has lately undertaken against Herat.

If such shall continue to be the policy of Russia, and if her agents in the East shall faithfully obey their instructions, there seems every reason to hope that nothing can hereafter occur in those quarters, that can be calculated to disturb the good understanding between the two countries; and I beg to assure your Excellency that it is the most earnest wish of the British Government that this good understanding should be firmly and perpetually maintained.
The two Cabinets being thus entirely agreed as to the future, it appears to Her Majesty’s Government that no good could result from any controversial discussion as to the past: and therefore, although there are many passages in Count Nesselrode’s despatch, to which, under other circumstances, Her Majesty’s Government would have felt it their duty to reply, yet as matters stand, they prefer letting those passages go by, as belonging to discussions now happily closed; making however this reservation, that Her Majesty’s Government desire that their silence may not be understood as implying acquiescence in the reasonings, the views, or the statements of any passages in that despatch, to which I have not specifically adverted in this letter.

With respect to the unfortunate change which of late has taken place in the relations between Great Britain and Persia, that change has been deeply regretted by the British Government. But it has not been of their seeking; and has been forced upon them by the conduct of the Shah, and by those evil advisers by whom he has allowed himself to be influenced.

It rests therefore with the Shah, and not with the British Government, to determine when and how soon the relations between Great Britain and Persia shall be replaced upon their former footing of friendship; but Her Majesty’s Government are led to hope, from the last accounts which they have received from Persia, that such a satisfactory arrangement may by this time have already been effected.

I have, &c.

H. E. Count Pozzo di Borgo. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 112.—The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—
(Received November 19, 1838.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburgh, November 6, 1838.

I am assured that the Shah has retired from before Herat, and that Colonel Duhamel has proceeded to the Persian Court.

No. 113.—The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—
(Received December 5, 1838.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburgh, November 20, 1838.

Before I took leave of Count Nesselrode, I told him that I should present to him, in a day or two, a note on the affairs of Persia. His Excellency immediately said, that, upon that subject, he had just sent off a despatch to Count Pozzo di Borgo, which that Ambassador was directed to communicate to your Lordship, and which he would show me, if I desired it.

Since my interview with His Excellency, I have received a few lines from him, of which the inclosure is a copy, acknowledging the receipt of the note which I was instructed to present to him, and com-
municating to me a copy of the despatch which he has addressed to Count Pozzo di Borgo.

(Inclusion.)—Count Nesselrode to the Marquess of Clanricarde.

St.-Pétersbourg, 11 Novembre, 1838.

J'ai l’honneur, My Lord, de vous envoyer ci-joint, la dépêche que j’ai adressée au Comte Pozzo sur les affaires de la Perse, et qui sera croisée, au milieu de la Baltique, avec la communication que j’ai reçue hier de votre part sur le même sujet. Ces deux pièces prouvent que nos Gouvernements veulent la même chose. Il ne me paraît donc pas impossible de nous entendre. C’est dans cet espoir que je renouvelle à Votre Excellence mes plus sincères hommages.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, 11th November, 1838.

I have the honor, My Lord, to send to you herewith the despatch which I have addressed to Count Pozzo on the affairs of Persia, and which will have crossed, in the middle of the Baltic, the communication which I received yesterday from you on the same subject. These two documents prove that our Governments desire the same thing. It therefore does not appear to me impossible that we should come to an understanding with each other. It is with that hope that I renew to your Excellency, &c. &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 114.—The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—

(Received December 5, 1838.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, Nov. 20, 1838.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to talk of Persian affairs, and of the note which I had presented to him. He protested against the existence of the slightest intention on the part of Russia, hostile to our Asiatic dominions. He said that naturally they desired to possess influence in Persia and in Turkey; but that such influence was not for the purpose of injuring British possessions or British interests. Count Nesselrode acknowledged that Count Simonich had certainly acted in a manner of which we had a right to complain; and therefore that functionary had been recalled.

No. 115.—Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—Communicated by Count Pozzo di Borgo, February 25, 1839.

M. le Comte,

St.-Pétersbourg, le 29 Janvier, 1839.

J’ai eu l’honneur de placer sous les yeux de l’Empereur la communication que Lord Palmerston vous a adressée en date du 20 Décembre dernier, en réponse à celle dont votre Excellence s’était
acquittée auprès du Ministère Anglais, au sujet des affaires de la Perse.

Notre Auguste Maitre a vu avec satisfaction que nos ouvertures spontanées sur cette importante question, ont été accueillies par le Gou- vernement de Sa Majesté Britannique avec ce sentiment de confiance qu’un exposé aussi franc et positif des intentions pacifiques de l’Empereur était fait pour inspirer.

Notre Cabinet, tout autant que celui de Londres, a sincèrement à cœur d’éviter une controverse pénible entre les deux Gouvernements dont l’Alliance, ainsi que Lord Palmerston l’a dit avec tant de vérité, est si ancienne, et dont les intérêts sont si étroitement unis.

A l’exemple du Ministère Britannique, nous nous abstiendrons de faire un retour sur le passé ; et nous ne reléverons point les allégations contenues dans plus d’un passage de la note du 9 Novembre, que le Marquis de Clanricarde a été chargé de nous adresser, d’ordre de sa Cour, relativement aux derniers événements en Perse.

L’échange des communications qui a eu lieu dans l’intervalle, nous dispense de répondre aujourd’hui à celles des assertions de cette pièce auxquelles nous ne saurions souscrire.

D’accord avec le désir franchement énoncé dans la lettre de Lord Palmerston, nous considérons cette discussion comme fermée par les explications qui viennent d’être échangées à Londres.

Ces explications ont donné aux deux Cabinets, l’occasion de recevoir et d’offrir de part et d’autre, des assurances qui portent le caractère d’une juste réciprocité, et qui sont inséparables les unes des autres.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a reçu de notre part l’assurance formelle qu’il n’entre nullement dans les vues de notre Cabinet de vouloir diriger la moindre combinaison hostile contre le sécurité des possessions Anglaises aux Indes, et que, loin de là, notre politique à l’égard de la Perse, est demeurée invariablement telle qu’elle était en 1834, à l’époque où une entente parfaite s’est si heureusement établie à ce sujet entre la Russie et l’Angleterre.

En retour de cette déclaration claire et précise, nous croyons devoir compter, de notre côté, sur l’intention et sur le désir que le Cabinet Britannique a énoncé à son tour, à l’effet de replacer l’ordre des choses en Perse sur son ancien pied, en rétablissant avec elle ses relations d’amitié et de bonne intelligence.

Notre Cabinet en prenant acte de cette assurance, s’attend à recevoir la preuve de son entier accomplissement.

C’est cette attente que votre Excellence voudra bien exprimer itéra- tivement à Lord Palmerston, en lui remettant copie de la présente dé- pêche.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NEsselrode

S. E. M. le Comte Pozzo di Borgo.
(Translation.)

M. le Comte, St. Petersburgh, January 29, 1839.

I have had the honor to lay before the Emperor the communication which Lord Palmerston addressed to you on the 20th of December last, in reply to that which your Excellency made to the English Ministry on the subject of the Affairs of Persia.

Our august Master has seen with satisfaction that our spontaneous overtures on this important question, have been received by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty with those sentiments of confidence which so positive and frank an explanation of the pacific intentions of the Emperor was calculated to inspire.

Our Cabinet, quite as much as that of London, has sincerely at heart to avoid a painful controversy between the two Governments, whose Alliance, as Lord Palmerston has said with so much truth, is so ancient, and whose interests are so closely united.

Following the example of the British Ministry, we will abstain from reverting to what has passed, and we will not take up the allegations contained in more than one passage of the note of the 9th of November which the Marquess of Clanricarde was instructed by his Court to address to us, relative to the late events in Persia.

The communications which have in the interval been exchanged, relieve us from replying now to such of the assertions of that document to which we could not subscribe.

In conformity with the desire frankly expressed in Lord Palmerston’s letter, we consider this discussion as closed by the explanations which have just been exchanged in London.

Those explanations have afforded to the two Cabinets the opportunity of receiving and of offering, on either side, assurances which bear the character of just reciprocity, and which are inseparable from each other.

The Government of Her Britannic Majesty has received from us the formal assurance that it in no wise enters into the views of our Cabinet to desire to direct the slightest hostile combination against the security of the English possessions in India; and that, far from that, our policy, in respect to Persia, has invariably remained the same as it was in 1824, at the time when a perfect understanding was so happily established on this matter between Russia and England.

In return for this clear and precise declaration, we consider that, on our part, we may rely upon the intention and upon the desire which the British Cabinet has, on its part, expressed, to the effect of replacing the order of things in Persia on its ancient footing, by re-establishing its relations of friendship and good understanding with that country.
Our Cabinet, in taking note of that assurance, expects to receive the proof of its entire fulfilment.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to repeat the expression of this expectation to Lord Palmerston, on delivering to him a copy of the present despatch.

I have, &c.

H. E. Count Pozzo di Borgo. (Signed) Nesselrode.

No. 116.—Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo. 25th March, 1839.

M. le Comte, St.-Pétersbourg, 21st February, 1839.

Les dépêches de votre Excellence, du 17 et du 27 Janvier, nous annoncent que les affaires de la Perse feront probablement l'objet d'une discussion sérieuse au Parlement, et que le Ministère Anglais pourra se trouver dans le cas de donner de la publicité aux communications échangées à ce sujet entre notre Cabinet et celui de Londres.

L'Empereur me charge de vous exprimer en son nom qu'il ne trouve aucun inconvenient à cette publicité. La politique de notre Auguste Maître ne craint pas le grand jour. Au contraire, Sa Majesté sera satisfaite de voir que les explications qu'elle a spontanément offertes à l'Angleterre, soient généralement connues. Cette communication, en rétablissant les faits dans leur exacte vérité, éclairera l'opinion de tous les hommes de bonne foi, et dissipera les inquiétudes que la malveillance cherche à répandre sur les intentions de la Russie.

Dans cette conviction, l'Empereur vous autorise, Monsieur le Comte, à déclarer à Lord Palmerston, qu'il n'a pas la moindre objection contre la publication des dépêches que vous avez été chargé de remettre en copie au Ministère Anglais, relativement aux affaires de la Perse.

Conformément aux ordres de Sa Majesté, je vais résumer encore une fois, dans leur ensemble, les explications que nous avons données au Cabinet Britannique, et rendre ainsi les plus complètes possibles, les informations que votre Excellence lui a communiquées successivement.

Je commencerni, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, par vous retracer sommairement ce qui s'est passé à l'égard des affaires de la Perse.

C'est après le retour de l'Empereur de son dernier voyage en Allemagne, que l'attention de Sa Majesté a été appelée pour la première fois, sur les appréhensions sérieuses qu'inspirait au Ministère Anglais la part que notre gouvernement était censé avoir prise aux événements en Perse, nommément à l'expédition du Shah contre Hérat; entreprise que l'opinion publique en Angleterre tendait, de plus en plus, à considérer comme dirigée par notre influence, dans un but hostile envers la Grande Bretagne.

Dès que l'Empereur a été instruit de l'existence de ces appréhen-
sions, son premier soin a été de les calmer. Aussitôt il est allé fran-
chement au-devant du Ministère Anglais par un exposé complet de sa
politique à l'égard des affaires de l'Asie. Il a énoncé ses intentions,
ses principes à cet égard, dès le premier entretien qu'il a accordé au
Marquis de Clanricarde. De mon côté, je me suis acquitté auprès de
Votre Excellence, des ordres de notre Auguste Maître sur cette im-
portante question, par ma dépêche du 20 Octobre dernier.

Elle renferme l'assurance positive que jamais il n'est entré dans les
vues de l'Empereur de porter la moindre atteinte à la sécurité des pos-
sessions Britanniques aux Indes. Elle exprime au contraire notre désir
sincère de maintenir l'état des choses existant au centre de l'Asie, et de
rétablir promptement sur leur ancien pied, les relations d'amitié entre
l'Angleterre et la Perse. Elle annonce notre ferme intention de con-
nuire, comme nous l'avons fait en 1834, à agir d'un commun accord avec le
Gouvernement Britannique, pour assurer la tranquillité de ce pays,
consolider l'autorité du Shah, et le maintenir dans les limites de ses vrais
intérêts, en le détournant de toute nouvelle agression également
compromettante pour sa propre sécurité, comme pour celle des États
voisins. Finalement, elle exprime l'attente ou nous sommes de voir
l'Angleterre rentrer, à son tour, dans l'ordre habituel et régulier des
choses, rappeler son escadre, et abandonner l'île de Karrak, momentane-
ment occupée par les troupes qu'elle a envoyées dans le Golfe Persique.

Cette ouverture précédée celle que le Marquis de Clanricarde fut
chargé de nous faire sur la même question, et dont il s'acquitta par sa
Note du 9 Novembre. Les éclaircissements que le Gouvernement Bri-
tannique désirait obtenir, nous venions de les donner. Les doutes qu'il
avait paru concevoir, nous avions été les premiers à les dissiper. Les
explications rassurantes qu'il était en droit d'espérer de notre loyauté, il
n'avait pas eu besoin de les attendre. L'Empereur venait lui-même de
les offrir.

Voilà quelle a été notre conduite envers l'Angleterre.
Quant à la Perse, la marche que le Cabinet Impérial a suivie, a été
tout aussi franche, et tout aussi correcte. Dès que nous avons eu
connaissance des embarras dans lesquels le Shah s'était jeté, malgré
nos vœux, malgré nos conseils, le Général Duhamel, qui se rendait alors
à son poste, a reçu l'ordre d'adresser à ce Souverain les représentations
qui nous semblaient les mieux appropriées à sa position et à ses vrais
intérêts.

Nos conseils peuvent se résumer en deux mots : rétablir ses rela-
tions d'amitié avec l'Angleterre, abandonner l'expédition d'Hérât que
nous avions toujours désapprouvée comme inopportune et comme dan-
gereuse, enfin se replacer, sans le moindre retard, au centre de ses
États, pour y maintenir l'ordre et le repos. Tel est le sens des instruc-
tions dont le Général Duhamel se trouvait muni en se rendant à Té-
hérân.
Au moment où il y arriva, la force des choses avait déjà réalisé nos prévisions, justifié nos remontrances ; accompli notre attente.

Le siège de Herat était levé ; l'armée Persane dissoute ; le Shah rentré dans sa Capitale.

Il ne nous restait plus qu'à employer nos efforts à rétablir la bonne intelligence entre la Cour de Londres et celle de Téhéran. C'est à cette œuvre de conciliation que nous avons travaillé, et que nous continuerions à contribuer sans relâche. Certes, une politique exclusive, jalouse, et étroite, aurait pu nous conseiller de profiter de la circonstance présente, pour entretenir la querelle entre les deux Gouvernements, afin d'exploiter à l'avantage de notre prépondérance, la rupture de leurs relations. Loin de nous une pareille pensée, que réprouve la Politique conservatrice de l'Empereur. Au lieu d'élargir la brèche que les derniers événements ont faite dans les rapports mutuels des Cours de Londres et de Téhéran, notre Auguste Maître n'a eu d'autre soin, que de la fermer pour toujours ; au lieu de perpétuer leur méssisce, il a sincèrement à cœur de la terminer une heure plus tôt. C'est vers ce but que les Représentants de l'Empereur ont reçu l'ordre de diriger leurs soins à Londres comme à Téhéran.

Leurs efforts semblent déjà ne pas être restés sans résultat.

Les premières démarches dont le Général Duhamel s'est acquitté depuis son arrivée à sa destination, ont été accueillies avec dévouer. Le Shah a énoncé itérativement le désir de connaître le jugement que l'Empereur porte sur la situation actuelle des choses en Perse ; l'intention de se conformer à nos conseils ; enfin le vœu de voir nos bons offices activement employés à Londres pour apaiser les différends survenus entre les deux États. Telles sont les dispositions que notre Ministre a trouvées et qu'il cherche à entretenir à Téhéran.

De votre côté, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, vous avez recueilli des assurances satisfaisantes de la part du Ministre Anglais. Il a reçu notre communication du 20 Octobre, avec un juste sentiment de confiance. Appréciant les motifs qui l'ont dicté, il nous a témoigné à son tour, sa ferme intention de replacer les choses en Perse sur leur ancien pied, en rétablissant avec elle ses relations de paix et de bonne intelligence.

Par notre dépêche du 29 Janvier, vous avez été chargé, Monsieur le Comte, de faire connaître au Cabinet Britannique, qu'en prenant acte de cette promesse, nous nous attendions à recevoir la preuve de son entier accomplissement.

Depuis, j'ai eu l'occasion d'énoncer de vive voix cette attente à Mr. Mc Neill à son passage par Pétersbourg.

Il m'a assuré, que le rétablissement des relations diplomatiques entre les deux Cours ne souffrirait aucune difficulté, dès l'instant où le Shah consentirait à offrir au Gouvernement Anglais, la satisfaction qu'il avait demandée et qu'il était en droit d'attendre, pour l'insulte
faite à la Légation Anglaise, par l'arrestation de son courrier au camp devant Hérat.

Cette demande, Monsieur le Comte, nous a paru fondée en justice. Dès le principe, nous n'avions pas hésité à déclarer à notre Ministre en Perse, que les circonstances qui avaient accompagné l'arrestation du courrier Anglais, nous semblaient de nature à ne pouvoir pas être justifiées de la part du Ministère Persan, et à exiger une réparation équitable. Nous avions énoncé cette opinion même avant l'arrivée de Mr. Mc Neill à St.-Pétersbourg, en la fondant sur les renseignements seuls que la correspondance de notre Légation nous avait fournis.

Mais après les explications plus détaillées que le Ministre d'Angleterre m'a communiquées lui-même, et que je me suis fait un devoir de soumettre immédiatement à l'Empereur, Sa Majesté a daigné ordonner au Général Duhamel de conseiller formellement à la Cour de Téhéran de ne point différer la satisfaction que l'Angleterre est en droit de réclamer pour réparer un tort, qui retombe évidemment à la charge du Gouvernement Persan.

Tel est, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'exposé clair et net des instructions dont le Général Duhamel est muni quant aux affaires de la Perse.

Pour ce qui est de celles d'Afghanistan, ma dépêche du 20 Octobre, vous a déjà fourni quelques informations préalables, que je vais rendre aujourd'hui aussi complètes et aussi précises que possible, afin de ne rien laisser dans le doute ni dans le vague.

Je vous ai déjà fait connaître, Monsieur le Comte, que pendant la durée du siège de Hérat, une négociation avait été entamée entre le Shah et le Serdar de Kandahar, à l'effet de mettre ce dernier en possession de Hérat, lorsque cette ville aurait été prise par les Persans.

Je vous ai annoncé de plus, que cette négociation, à la demande du Shah, avait été appuyée des bons offices du Comte Simonich, alors Représentant à la Cour de Téhéran.

En effet, avec la coopération de ce Ministre, un Acte avait été rédigé et arrêté entre le Shah et Kohundil Khan dans le but de placer Hérat sous la dépendance de ce Chef, et d'assurer par là la tranquillité des frontières orientales de la Perse, en mettant un terme aux brigandages qui ne cessent de la troubler.

Croyant agir dans les intérêts du Shah, le Comte Simonich prit sur lui de prêter à cet Acte une garantie que le Gouvernement Persan et le Serdar de Kandahar réclamaient unanimement de lui, comme un gage de confiance qu'ils auraient à placer désormais dans leurs obligations mutuelles. Pleins de soupçons, les uns envers les autres, ils éprouvaient également le besoin d'en appeler à l'impartialité d'un tiers. Ce motif décida notre Ministre à ne point refuser sa garantie, qui lui était demandée par les deux parties, comme une condition indispensable de leurs engagements.
Le projet de Convention qui renfermait ces stipulations, nous parvint au mois d’Avril, 1838. Rien ne manifestait dans cet Acte une pensée agressive, ni hostile. Un système strictement défensif servait de base aux stipulations convenues de part et d’autre. Malgré cela, l’Empereur ne voulu point confirmer la garantie que notre Ministre avait prêtée à cet Acte. Bien que purement défensifs, les engagements qu’il consacrait étaient placés en dehors des limites que notre Auguste Maitre a posées à sa politique. En conséquence, Sa Majesté donna au Comte Simonich l’ordre de s’abstenir de se rendre garant d’une transaction, à laquelle notre Cabinet croyait devoir rester complètement étranger. Cet ordre fut expédié à notre Ministre en Perse, le 26 Avril, 1838, avant le départ de l’Empereur pour l’Allemagne.

Cependant, sans attendre les décisions de la Cour Impériale, le Comte Simonich avait apposé son nom à l’Acte qui venait dans l’intervalle d’être signé entre le Shah et Kohundil Khan.

Ce fait n’a pu apporter aucun changement aux déterminations une fois arrêtées par l’Empereur. Il avait désapprouvé la garantie, lorsqu’elle avait été conçue et projetée. Il a refusé de la ratifier, dès qu’elle a été donnée sans son autorisation.

Le Général Duhamel a reçu l’ordre de déclarer en conséquence au Shah, comme aux Afgans, que la transaction dont son prédécesseur s’est porté garant, n’a point obtenu la sanction de notre Auguste Maitre.

A cette déclaration, le Général Duhamel ajouta :

Que l’intention de l’Empereur a été et sera de n’entretenir avec l’Afganistan que des relations purement commerciales ;

Que ses volontés ont été mal rendues ou mal comprises, si l’on y a attaché une tendance politique quelconque ; enfin

Que la Russie ne veut avoir aucune part aux guerres civiles des Chefs Afgans, ni à leurs haines de famille, qui n’ont nul droit à notre intervention.

Tel est le langage que le Général Duhamel a l’ordre de tenir aux Serdars de Caboul et de Kandahar. A son arrivée à Téhéran, il a trouvé que son prédécesseur, ainsi que Lord Palmerston vous l’a dit, avait envoyé le Lieutenant Witkowitz [Vicovich] à Kandahar.

Aussitôt, le Général Duhamel, sans demander et sans attendre de nouvelles instructions, mais agissant strictement en conformité aux volontés arrêtées une fois pour toutes par l’Empereur, a rappelé le Lieutenant Witkowitz [Vicovich] de Kandahar.

Voilà, Monsieur l’Ambassadeur, quelle a été la conduite de notre Cabinet, dans l’affaire de l’Afganistan.

Nous laissons au Ministère Anglais le soin de juger, s’il peut encore s’élever le moindre doute sur la loyauté des intentions et des démarches de la Russie, dont nous venons de retracer ici l’ensemble. Résumons les faits tels qu’ils se sont passés.

En Angleterre, des inquiétudes se sont répandues sur nos prétendues
vues d’agression dirigées contre les Indes. L’Empereur a calmé ces appréhensions par le langage le plus positif, par les assurances les plus franches.

En Perse, une contestation sévère s’est engagée entre le Shah et l’Angleterre. Le Ministre Britannique a quitté Téhéran. Une rupture a eu lieu. Loin de la faire servir à l’avantage de notre influence exclusive, nous ne visons qu’à rétablir la bonne intelligence entre les deux Cours.

L’Angleterre demande une satisfaction à la Perse. Au lieu d’empêcher cet acte de réparation, nous sommes les premiers à conseiller au Shah d’y acquiescer, parceque nous trouvons que la justice est en cela du côté de l’Angleterre, le tort du côté de la Perse.


Tout observateur réfléchi qui jetera un coup-d’œil sur les faits que je viens de citer, sera forcé de convenir, Monsieur le Comte, que notre Cabinet a fait tout ce qui a dépendu de lui pour maintenir dans ses relations avec l’Asie Centrale cet état de paix qu’il est de l’intérêt mutuel de la Russie, comme de l’Angleterre, de préserver de toute atteinte.

Il appartient aujourd’hui au Gouvernement Britannique de concevoir de son côté à ce résultat si nécessaire et si désirable : nous ne pouvons que nous référer à ce sujet à nos communications précédentes, et rappeler encore une fois au Cabinet Anglais, les vœux que nous lui avons exprimés par notre dépêche du 20 Octobre dernier.

Rétablir promptement les relations d’amitié entre les Cours de Londres et de Téhéran ; faire cesser les mesures hostiles adoptées dans le Golfe Persique ; ne pas troubler le repos des peuples du centre de l’Asie, en nourrissant leurs haines ; se borner à rivaliser d’industrie dans ces vastes contrées, mais non pas s’y engager dans une lutte d’influence politique ; respecter l’indépendance des Pays intermédiaires qui nous séparent, tel est, nous le répétons encore une fois, le système que l’Angleterre et la Russie ont un commun intérêt à suivre invariablement, afin d’empêcher la possibilité d’un conflit entre ces deux grandes Puissances, qui, pour continuer à être amies, ont besoin de rester chacune dans ses limites, et de ne pas avancer l’une contre l’autre au centre de l’Asie.

Nous abandonnons au jugement éclairé du Cabinet Anglais de peser ces réflexions dans sa sagesse. Il est trop intéressé lui-même à la conservation de l’ordre des choses existant pour ne pas se persuader que le repos de l’Asie, pour être assuré d’une manière durable, ne peut l’être que par un mutuel accord de vues et de démarches pacifiques.
Il importe qu'il y ait à cet égard une complète réciprocité entre les deux Puissances qui influent en commun sur les destinées de cette vaste partie du globe. Nous soumettons ces considérations à l'esprit d'équité et de sagesse du Cabinet Anglais, en nous félicitant de lui offrir par les explications contenues dans la présente une nouvelle preuve de nos sentiments de conciliation et de franchise.

C'est dans cette intention que votre Excellence voudra bien remettre à Lord Palmerston copie de cette dépêche, qui sert de complément à nos communications précédentes du 20 Octobre, et du 29 Janvier.

Recevez, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

M. le Comte Pozzo di Borgo.  
(Signé)  
NESELRODE.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,  
St. Petersburgh; February 21, 1839.

Your Excellency's despatches of the 17th and 27th of January, inform us that the affairs of Persia will probably form the subject of a serious discussion in Parliament, and that the English Ministry will possibly find itself obliged to give publicity to the communications which have been exchanged on this subject between our Cabinet and that of London.

The Emperor directs me to state to you in his name, that he does not see any inconvenience in that publicity. The policy of our August Master does not fear the open day. On the contrary, His Majesty will be glad to see that the explanations which he has spontaneously offered to England should be generally known. Such communication, by replacing the facts in their exact truth, will enlighten the minds of all upright men, and will dispel the uneasiness which malevolence seeks to propagate as to the intentions of Russia.

With this persuasion, the Emperor authorizes you, M. le Comte, to declare to Lord Palmerston that he has not the slightest objection to the publication of the despatches relative to the affairs of Persia, of which you have been instructed to deliver copies to the English Ministry.

In conformity with the orders of His Majesty, I will once more recapitulate the whole of the explanations which we have given to the British Cabinet, and thus make as complete as possible the information which your Excellency has successively communicated to it.

I will begin, M. l'Ambassadeur, by summarily recounting what has passed with regard to the affairs of Persia.

It was after the return of the Emperor from his last journey to Germany, that the attention of His Majesty was for the first time called to the serious apprehensions which the English Ministry felt, at the part which our Government was supposed to have taken in the events in
Persia, specifically in the expedition of the Shah against Herat; an enterprise which public opinion in England was more and more inclined to consider as directed by our influence, with an object hostile to Great Britain.

So soon as the Emperor was apprised of the existence of those apprehensions, his first care was to tranquillize them. He immediately met the English Ministry frankly, by a complete explanation of his policy with regard to the affairs of Asia. He declared his intentions, his principles in that respect, at the very first interview which he granted to the Marquis of Clanricarde. On my part, I executed with respect to your Excellency the orders of our August Master on this important question, by my despatch of the 20th of last October.

That despatch contains a positive assurance that it never entered into the views of the Emperor to assail in the smallest degree the security of the British possessions in India. It expresses, on the contrary, our sincere desire to maintain the existing state of things in the centre of Asia, and speedily to re-establish on their ancient footing the relations of friendship between England and Persia. It declares our firm intention of continuing, as we did in 1834, to act in common concert with the British Government, in order to secure the tranquillity of that country, to consolidate the authority of the Shah, and to maintain him within the limits of his true interests, by dissuading him from any fresh aggression equally hazardous to his own security as to that of the neighbouring States. Lastly, it expresses our expectation of seeing England on her part revert to the ordinary and regular state of things, recall her squadron, and abandon the Island of Karrak, which has been temporarily occupied by the troops which she has sent to the Persian Gulf.

This overture preceded that which the Marquis of Clanricarde was instructed to make to us on the same question, and of which he acquitted himself by his note of the 9th of November. We had just given the explanations which the British Government was desirous of obtaining. We had been the first to dispel the doubts which it had appeared to entertain. It had not had occasion to wait for the satisfactory explanations which it had a right to expect from our sincerity. The Emperor had himself just offered them.

Such has been our conduct towards England.

With regard to Persia, the course which the Imperial Cabinet has pursued has been equally frank and equally correct. As soon as we were made acquainted with the embarrassments in which the Shah had involved himself, notwithstanding our wishes, notwithstanding our counsels, General Duhamel, who was then proceeding to his post, received orders to make to that Sovereign the representations which appeared to us most appropriate to his position, and to his true interests.

Our counsels may be briefly stated in two words:—To re-establish his relations of friendship with England; to abandon the expedition
against Herat, which we had always disapproved as unseasonable, and as dangerous; in short, to return without delay to the centre of his dominions, in order to maintain there order and tranquillity. Such is the sense of the instructions with which General Duhamel was furnished on going to Tehran.

At the moment of his arrival there, the force of events had already realized our anticipations, justified our remonstrances, accomplished our expectations.

The siege of Herat was raised, the Persian army was broken up, the Shah had returned to his Capital.

It only remained for us to employ our efforts to restore a good understanding between the Courts of London and Tehran. We have laboured in that work of conciliation, and we will continue to contribute towards it without remission. Assuredly an exclusive, jealous, and narrow policy might have counselled us to take advantage of the present circumstances, to keep alive the difference between the two Governments, in order to turn to account for the advantage of our own preponderance the rupture of their relations. Far be from us such a thought, which the conservative policy of the Emperor reprobates. Instead of widening the breach which the late events have produced in the mutual relations of the Courts of London and of Tehran, our August Master has had no other care than to close it for ever; instead of perpetuating their misunderstanding, he has sincerely at heart to end it at the earliest period. It is to the accomplishment of this object that the Representatives of the Emperor have received instructions to direct their attention at London as well as at Tehran.

Their efforts appear already not to have been without effect.

The first steps which General Duhamel has taken since his arrival at his post, have been received with deference. The Shah has repeatedly expressed his desire to be made acquainted with the opinion of the Emperor on the actual state of affairs in Persia; his intention to act in conformity with our advice; in fine, his wish to see our good offices actively employed at London, to smooth away the differences which have arisen between the two States. Such are the feelings which our Minister has found, and which he endeavours to keep up at Tehran.

On your side, M. l'Ambassadeur, you have obtained satisfactory assurances on the part of the English Ministry. It received our communication of the 20th of October with a just sentiment of confidence. Appreciating the motives which dictated that communication, it manifested to us in its turn its firm intention of replacing matters in Persia on their ancient footing, by re-establishing with that country its relations of peace and good understanding.

By my despatch of the 29th of January, you have been instructed, M. le Comte, to make known to the British Cabinet, that in taking
Note of that promise, we looked to receive proof of its entire fulfilment.

Subsequently, I have had the opportunity of expressing this expectation verbally to Mr. Mc Neill on his passage through St. Petersburg.

He has assured me that the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two Courts would not experience any difficulty, from the moment that the Shah should consent to offer to the English Government the satisfaction which it had demanded, and which it had a right to expect, for the insult offered to the English Mission, by the arrest of its messenger in the camp before Herat.

That demand, M. le Comte, has appeared to us to be founded in justice. From the beginning we had not hesitated to declare to our Minister in Persia, that the circumstances which had attended the arrest of the English Messenger, appeared to us to be of a nature not to be justified on the part of the Persian Ministry, and to demand an equitable reparation. We had expressed this opinion even before the arrival of Mr. Mc Neill at St. Petersburg, resting it solely on the information which the correspondence of our Mission had furnished us with.

But after the more detailed explanations which the Minister of England has himself communicated to me, and which I made it my duty immediately to lay before the Emperor, His Majesty has been pleased to order General Duhamel formally to advise the Court of Tehran not to delay the satisfaction which England is entitled to demand for the reparation of a wrong which is evidently imputable to the Persian Government.

Such, M. l’Ambassadeur, is the clear and plain statement of the instructions with which General Duhamel is furnished, with respect to the affairs of Persia.

With regard to those of Afghanistan, my despatch of the 20th of October has already furnished you some preliminary information, which I will now make as complete and as precise as possible, in order to leave nothing doubtful or vague.

I have already informed you, M. le Comte, that during the siege of Herat a negotiation had been commenced between the Shah and the Sirdar of Kandahar, with the view of placing the latter in possession of Herat, when that city should have been taken by the Persians.

I have moreover announced to you that this negotiation had, at the request of the Shah, been supported by the good offices of Count Simonich, at that time our Representative at the Court of Tehran.

In fact, with the co-operation of that Minister, an Act had been drawn up and agreed upon between the Shah and Kohundil Khan, with the view of placing Herat in dependence on that Chief, and of so-
curing thereby the tranquillity of the eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end to the acts of plunder by which they are incessantly disturbed.

Count Simonich considering that he was acting for the interests of the Shah, took upon himself to give to that Act a guarantee which the Persian Government and the Sirdar of Kandahar unanimously required of him, as a pledge of the reliance which they might thereafter have to repose in their mutual obligations. Full of suspicion, each of the other, they equally felt the necessity of appealing to the impartiality of a third party. This motive decided our Minister not to refuse his guarantee, which was demanded from him by both parties as an indispensable condition to their engagements.

The Draft of Convention containing those stipulations, reached us in the month of April, 1838. Nothing in that Act manifested an aggressive or hostile design. A strictly defensive system was the basis of the stipulations agreed upon on either side. Notwithstanding this, the Emperor would not confirm the guarantee which our Minister had given to that Act. The engagements recorded in it, although purely defensive, were placed beyond the limits which our August Master has laid down for his policy. Consequently, His Majesty ordered Count Simonich to abstain from making himself guarantee to a transaction to which our Cabinet thought it right to remain completely a stranger. That order was despatched to our Minister in Persia on the 26th of April, 1838, before the departure of the Emperor for Germany.

Meanwhile, Count Simonich, without waiting for the decision of the Imperial Court, had affixed his name to the Act, which in the interval had been signed between the Shah and Kohundil Khan.

That fact could not produce any change in the determination once taken by the Emperor. He had disapproved the guarantee, when it was conceived and planned. He refused to ratify it, when it was given without his sanction.

General Duhamel has in consequence received orders to declare to the Shah, as well as to the Afghans, that the compact which his predecessor had guaranteed, has not received the sanction of our August Master.

To this declaration General Duhamel added:

That the intention of the Emperor has been, and will continue to be, not to maintain with Afghanistan any other than purely commercial relations;

That his wishes have been ill-expressed or ill-understood, if any political tendency whatever has been attributed to them;

Finally, that Russia will not take any part in the civil wars of the Afghan Chiefs, nor in their family feuds, which have no claim to our intervention.

Such is the language which General Duhamel is ordered to hold to the Sirdars of Cabool and of Kandahar. On his arrival at Tehran, he
found that his predecessor, as Lord Palmerston has told you, had sent 
Lieutenant Witkewitsch (Vicovich) to Kandahar.

General Duhamel, forthwith, without applying for, and without 
waiting for fresh instructions, but acting strictly in conformity with the 
determinations taken once for all by the Emperor, recalled Lieutenant 
Witkewitsch (Vicovich) from Kandahar.

Such, M. l’Ambassadeur, has been the conduct of our Cabinet in 
the affair of Afghanistan.

We leave to the English Ministry the task of judging, if it can still 
raise the slightest doubt as to the sincerity of the intentions and of the 
measures of Russia, of which we have just related the whole course. 
Let us recapitulate the facts, such as they have taken place.

In England, uneasiness was excited as to our pretended views of 
aggression directed against India. The Emperor tranquillized those 
apprehensions by the most positive language, and by the most frank 
assurances.

In Persia, a serious controversy has arisen between the Shah and 
England. The British Minister has left Tehran. A rupture has 
taken place. Far from making that rupture serve for the advantage of 
our exclusive influence, we only aim at re-establishing a good under-
standing between the two Courts.

England demands satisfaction from Persia. Instead of preventing 
that act of reparation, we are the first to counsel the Shah to acquiesce 
in it, because we find that justice is in this matter on the side of 
England, wrong on the side of Persia.

In Afghanistan, a Convention is concluded under the guarantee of 
the Minister of Russia. The Emperor refuses to ratify it, because he 
cannot and will not have with the Afghans, any relations but those of 
commerce, and in no wise any political interests. A Russian agent 
appears at Kandahar with the appearance of a diplomatic mission. 
That agent is recalled.

Every considerate observer, who will cast his eye upon the facts 
which I have just recited, will be forced to admit, M. le Comte, that 
our Cabinet has done all that depended upon it to maintain in its rela-
tions with Central Asia that state of peace which it is the mutual 
interest of Russia as well as of England to preserve from all attack.

It rests now with the British Government to co-operate on its part 
towards this result, which is so necessary, and so desirable. We can 
on this matter only refer to our preceding communications, and once 
more recall to the English Cabinet the wishes which we have expressed 
to it in our despatch of the 20th of last October.

To re-establish promptly the relations of friendship between the 
Courts of London and of Tehran; to put an end to the hostile measures 
adopted in the Persian Gulf; to abstain from disturbing the tranquillity 
of the people of the centre of Asia by nourishing their animosities; to
be contented with competing in industry in those vast countries; but not to engage there in a struggle for political influence; to respect the independence of the intermediate countries which separate us; such is, we once again repeat it, the system which England and Russia have a common interest invariably to pursue, in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between these two Great Powers, which, that they may continue friends, require to remain each within its own limits, and not to advance against each other in the centre of Asia.

We leave it to the enlightened judgment of the English Cabinet to weigh these reflections in its wisdom. It is too much interested itself in the preservation of the existing order of things, not to be itself convinced that the tranquility of Asia can only be ensured in a durable manner by a mutual agreement of pacific views and measures. It is important that there should be in this respect a complete reciprocity, between the two Powers who exercise in common an influence over the destinies of that vast portion of the globe. We submit these considerations to the spirit of equity and of wisdom of the English Cabinet, congratulating ourselves that we offer to it in the explanations contained in the present despatch, a fresh proof of our sentiments of conciliation and of frankness.

It is with this purpose that your Excellency will have the goodness to deliver to Lord Palmerston a copy of this despatch, which serves as a complement to our preceding communications of the 20th of October, and of the 29th of January.

Receive, &c.

H. E. Count Pozzo di Borgo.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

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No. 117.—Viscount Palmerston to Count Pozzo di Borgo.

Monsieur le Comte,

I have the honor to acquaint your Excellency, that I have not failed to communicate to my colleagues the despatch from Count Nesselrode of the 31st March on the affairs of Persia, of which your Excellency delivered to me a copy on the 25th of last month; and I feel great pleasure in expressing to your Excellency the satisfaction which the renewed assurances contained in that despatch have afforded to Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government have also been much gratified by learning that one of the first acts of Colonel Duhamel, on entering upon his functions at Tehran, was to recall Captain Vicovich from Afghanistan.

With respect to the relations between Great Britain and Persia, I beg again to assure your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government are waiting with great anxiety for the moment when Great Britain may be enabled to re-establish those relations upon their former footing of
friendship; but it rests with the Shah, and not with Her Majesty’s Government, to take the steps which are necessary for bringing about that result.

I have, &c.

H. E. Count Pozzo di Borgo. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

APPENDIX.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Foreign Office, March 20, 1838.

Sir,

I enclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty’s Ambassadors at Paris and at Vienna, directing them to apprise Hoossein Khan, if he should arrive at either of those Capitals, that, under existing circumstances, he will not be received at this Court.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

(Incluision.)—Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville and Sir Frederick Lamb.

Mr. Lord,

Sir,

By intelligence recently received from Her Majesty’s Envoy at the Court of Persia, it appears that certain Persian authorities, acting there is too much reason to suppose, under the immediate orders of the Shah, intercepted one of the messengers of the British Mission on his return from Herat to Tehran; and having brought him back by force to the Royal Camp, took from him his despatches, and otherwise maltreated him. For so outrageous a violation of the law of nations, Her Majesty’s Minister in Persia has demanded redress; and it will depend upon the course which the Shah may take in this matter, whether Her Majesty’s Minister will remain in Persia or not.

Meanwhile, Her Majesty’s Government have been apprised that Hoossein Khan, who was some time ago appointed by the Court of Persia to proceed to England, as Ambassador from the Shah, to congratulate Her Majesty on her accession to the throne, has actually set out, and has probably, by this time, made considerable progress on his journey.

Her Majesty’s Government, fully concurring in the view taken by Mr. Mc Neill of the unjustifiable conduct of the Persian authorities, have entirely approved of the course which Mr. Mc Neill has adopted in this transaction; and under these circumstances it is obvious that the Queen cannot receive at Her Majesty’s Court any Ambassador from the Shah, neither can Her Majesty’s Secretary of State hold any communication with such Ambassador on any matter of business whatever, until information shall have been received that the Shah has made full reparation for the outrage committed upon the British Messenger.

I have therefore to instruct your Excellency to take measures for
obtaining early intelligence of the arrival of Hoossein Khan at Paris, and upon being informed of his arrival, you will immediately apprise him of the determination of Her Majesty's Government, not to receive him nor to hold any communication with him under existing circumstances: and you will point out to him the mortifying position in which he would be placed, if, instead of waiting where he is, to learn the result of this affair in Persia, he should persist, notwithstanding this intimation, in continuing his journey to England.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

H. E. The Earl Granville, G.C.B.
H. E. Sir Frederick Lamb, G.C.B.

No. 1.—INDIAN PAPERS.

TREATIES.

Treaty with Runjeet Sing and Shah Shoojah-oool-Moolk, concluded at Lahore, on the 26th June, 1838.

Whereas a Treaty was formerly concluded between Maharaja Runjeet Sing and Shah Shoojah-oool-Moolk, consisting of fourteen Articles, exclusive of the Preamble and the Conclusion: and whereas the execution of the provisions of the said Treaty was suspended for certain reasons: and whereas at this time, Mr. W. H. Macnaghten having been deputed by the Right Hon. George Lord Auckland, G.C.B., Governor-General of India, to the presence of Maharaja Runjeet Sing, and vested with full powers to form a Treaty in a manner consistent with the friendly engagements subsisting between the two States, the Treaty aforesaid is arrived and concluded, with certain modifications; and four new Articles have been added thereto, with the approbation and in concert with the British Government, the provisions whereof, as contained in the following eighteen Articles, will be duly and faithfully observed.

1. Shah Shoojah-oool-Moolkh disclaims all title on the part of himself, his heirs and successors, to all the territories lying on either bank of the river Indus, that may be possessed by the Maharaja; viz. Cashmere, including its limits E. W. N. S., together with the Fort of Attock Chuck Hezara Khebel Amb, with its dependencies, on the left bank of the aforesaid river, and on the right bank Peshawar, with the Enjupai territory, Kheleks Hisht Nazur Mechae Kohat Hingoo, and all the places dependent on Peshawar, as far as the Khyber Pass; Benno, the Vezini territory Dour Frank Gorang Kalabagh and Kushal Ghur, with their dependent districts, Dera Ismail Khan and its dependency, together with Dera Glazee Khan Kat Mithan, Osmar Kote, and
their dependent territory, Singhur Herea Dajeb Hujeepore Kajenpore, and the three Ketches, as well as Mankera, with its district, and the province of Moottan, situated on the left bank. These countries and places are considered to be the property, and to form the estate of the Maharaja; and the Shah neither has, nor will have, any concern with them; they belong to the Maharaja and his posterity, from generation to generation.

2. The people of the country on the other side of Klaybar will not be suffered to commit robberies, or aggressions, or any disturbances, on this side. If any defaulter of either State, who has embezzled the revenue, take refuge in the territory of the other, each party engages to surrender him; and no person shall obstruct the passage of the stream which issues out of the Klegber defile, and supplies the Fort of Gutyghur with water, according to ancient usage.

3. As agreeably to the Treaty established between the British Government and the Maharaja, no one can cross from the left to the right bank of the Sutledge, without a passport from the Maharaja; the same rule shall be observed regarding the passage of the Indus, whose waters join the Sutledge, and no one shall be allowed to cross the Indus without the Maharaja’s permission.

4. Regarding Shikapore and the territory of Sinde, lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will agree to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharaja through Captain Wade.

5. When the Shah shall have established his authority in Cabool and Cundahar, he will annually send the Maharaja the following articles; viz., 55 high-bred horses, of approved colour and pleasant paces, 11 Persian scimitars, 7 Persian poniards, 25 good mules, fruits of various kinds, both dry and fresh, and sirdas or musk melons, of a sweet and delicate flavour; (to be sent throughout the year), by the way of Cabool River, to Peshawar, grapes, pomegranates, apples, quinces, almonds, raisins, pistach or chionuts, an abundant supply of each; as well as pieces of satin of every colour; chogas of fur, kim khab, wrought with gold and silver, and Persian carpet, altogether to the number of 101 pieces. All these articles the Shah will continue to send every year to the Maharaja.

6. Each party shall address the other on terms of equality.

7. Merchants of Affghanistan who will be desirous of trading to Lahore, Amulsah, or any other parts of the Maharaja’s possessions, shall not be stopped or molested on their way; on the contrary, strict orders shall be issued, to facilitate their intercourse, and the Maharaja engages to observe the same line of conduct on his part with respect to Affghanistan.

8. The Maharaja will yearly send to the Shah the following
articles, in the way of friendship:—55 pieces of shawls, 25 pieces of muslin, 11 dopatahs, 5 pieces of kim kheb, 5 scarfs, 5 turbans, 55 loads of bureh rice (peculiar to Peshawar).

9. Any of the Maharaja's officers who may be deputed to Afghanistan to purchase horses, or on any other business, as well as those who may be sent by the Shah into the Punjab for the purpose of purchasing piece-goods, or shawls, &c., to the amount of 11,000 rupees, will be treated by both sides with due attention, and every facility will be afforded to them in the execution of their commissions.

10. Whenever the armies of the two States may happen to be assembled at the same place, on no account shall the slaughter of kine be permitted to take place.

11. In the event of the Shah taking an auxiliary force from the Maharaja, whatever booty may be acquired from the Barakzais in jewels, horses, arms, great and small, shall be equally divided between the two contracting parties. If the Shah should succeed in obtaining possession of the property, without the assistance of the Maharaja's troops, the Shah agrees to send a portion of it by his own agent to the Maharaja, in the way of friendship.

12. An exchange of missions charged with letters and presents shall constantly take place between the two parties.

13. Should the Maharaja require the aid of any of the Shah's troops, in furtherance of the objects contemplated by this Treaty, the Shah engages to send a force, commanded by one of his principal officers. In like manner the Maharaja will furnish the Shah, when required, with an auxiliary force, composed of Mahomedans, and commanded by one of his principal officers, as far as Cabool, in furtherance of the objects contemplated by this Treaty. When the Maharaja may go to Peshawar, the Shah will depute a Shahezada to visit him, on which occasion, the Maharaja will receive and dismiss him with the honor and consideration due to his rank and dignity.

14. The friends and enemies of each of the three high Powers, that is to say, the British and Seikhl Governments, and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, shall be the friends and enemies of all.

15. Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk engages, after the attainment of his object, to pay, without fail, to the Maharaja, the sum of two lacs of rupees, of the Nannuck, Shahee, or Caldar currency, calculating from the date on which the Sikh troops may be despatched for the purpose of reinstating His Majesty in Cabool, in consideration of the Maharaja stationing a force of not less than 5,000 men, cavalry and infantry, of the Mahomedan persuasion, within the limits of the Peshawa's territory for the support of the Shah, and to be sent to the aid of His Majesty whenever the British Government, in concert and counsel with the Maharaja, shall deem their aid necessary; and when any matter of great importance may arise to the westward, such measure will be
adopted with regard to it, as may seem expedient and proper at the
time to the British and Shikoh Governments. In the event of the
Maharaja requiring the aid of any of the Shah's troops, a deduction
will be made from the subsidy, proportioned to the period for which such aid
may be afforded; and the British Government holds itself responsible
for the punctual payment of the above sum annually to the Maharaja,
so long as the provisions of this Treaty are duly observed.

16. Shah Shooja-oool-Moolkh agrees to relinquish, for himself,
his heirs and successors, all claims of supremacy and arrears of tribute
over the country now held by the Ameers of Sinde, (which will con-
tinue to belong to the Ameers and their successors in perpetuity), on
condition of the payment to him by the Ameers, of such a sum as may
be determined, under the mediation of the British Government,
15,000,000 of rupees of such payment being made over by him to
Maharaja Runjeet Singh on these payments being completed. Article
4th of the Treaty of 12th March 1833 will be considered cancelled, and
the customary interchange of letters and suitable presents between the
Maharaja and the Ameers of Sinde shall be maintained as heretofore.

17. When Shah Shooja-oool-Moolkh shall have succeeded in establish-
ing his authority in Afghanistan, he shall not attack or molest his
nephew, the ruler of Herat, in the possession of the territories now
subject to his government.

18. Shah Shooja-oool-Moolkh binds himself, his heirs and succes-
sors, to refrain from entering into negotiations with any foreign State
without the knowledge and consent of the British and Shikoh Govern-
ments, and to oppose any power having the desire to invade the Shikoh
or British territories by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability.

The three Powers, parties to this Treaty, viz. the British Govern-
ment, Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and Shah Shooja-oool-Moolkh, cordially
agree to the foregoing Articles. There shall be no deviation from
them, and in that case, the present Treaty shall be considered binding
for ever; and this Treaty shall come into operation from and after the
date on which the seals and signatures of the three Contracting Parties
shall have been affixed.

Done at Lahore, this 26th day of June, in the year of Our Lord
1838, corresponding with the 15th of the month of Asahr 1893, era
of Bikarmajit.

(Signed)  AUCCLAND.
          RUNJEET SINGH.
          SHAH SHOOJA-OOL-MOOLKH.

*Treaty concluded between Maharajah Runjeet Singh and Shah
Shoojah-oool-Moolkh, dated 12th March, 1834.*

(Translation.)

PREAMBLE.—Relations of friendship having been firmly esta-
lished between Maharajah Runjeet Singh and Shah Shoojah-ul-Mulk, so that there neither is, nor ever shall be, any alienation or difference of interest existing between them, they agree to adopt the following Articles, in consideration of the terms of goodwill and friendship by which they are reciprocally actuated:—

1. Shah Shoojah-ul-Mulk disclaims all title on the part of himself, his heirs, successors, and all the Siddozais, to whatever territories lying on either bank of the river Indus that may be possessed by the Maharajah, viz. Basloure, including its limits E. W. N. and S., together with the fort Attock Chebh Hezara Khebel Aub, with its dependencies on the left bank of the aforesaid river, and on the right bank Peshawar, with the Gusefzek territory, Khetks, Hesba Nagoor Michnee Kohol, and all places dependent in Peshawar as far as the Khybeer Pass; Bennoo, the Vizerey territory Douer Taub Goraik Kalabah, and Kushhall Gheer, with their dependent districts, Derah Ismael Khan and its dependency, with Derah Ghazi Khan Kot Mithem, and their dependent territory, Surgheer Kerm Dagill Hajupoor Rajupoor, and the three Ketchrees, as well as Mintheah, with its district, and the province of Muttaee, situated on the left bank. These countries and places are considered to be the property, and to form the estate of the Maharajah; the Shah neither has, nor will have, any concern with them; they belong to the Maharajah and his posterity, from generation to generation.

2. The people of the country on the other side of the Khybur will not be suffered to commit robberies or aggressions, or any disturbances, on this side. If any defaulter of either State, who has embezzled the revenue, takes refuge in the territory of the other, each party engages to surrender him.

3. Agreeably to the Treaty established with the British Government and the Maharajah, no one can cross from the left to the right bank of the Sutledge, without a passport from the Maharajah; the same rule shall be observed regarding the passage of the Indus, whose waters join the Sutledge, and no one shall be allowed to cross the Indus without the Maharajah's permission.

4. Regarding Sheikapoor and the territory of Sinde, lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.

5. When the Shah shall have established his authority in Cabul and Candahar, he will annually send the Maharajah the following articles; viz. 55 high-bred horses, of approved colours and pleasant paces, 11 Persian scimitars, 7 Persian poniards, 25 good mules, fruits of various kinds, both dry and fresh, sirdars or musk melons of a sweet and delicate flavour (to be sent throughout the year), by way of Cabul
River to Peshawar; grapes, pomegranates, apples, quinces, almonds, raisins, pisters or chestnuts, an abundant supply of each; as well as pieces of satin of every colour, chогas of fur, khinkaks wrought with gold and silver, Persian carpets, altogether to the number of 101 pieces. All these articles the Shah will continue to send every year to the Maharajah.

6. Each party shall address the other on terms of equality.

7. Merchants of Afghanistan who will be desirous of trading to Lahore, Amritsar, or any other part of the Maharajah's possessions, shall not be stopped or molested on their way; on the contrary, strict orders shall be given to facilitate their intercourse; and the Maharajah engages to observe the same line of conduct on his part, in respect to traders who may wish to proceed to Afghanistan.

8. The Maharajah will yearly send to the Shah the following articles, in the way of friendship:—55 pieces of shawls, 25 pieces of muslin, 11 doopullahs, 5 pieces of kinkaub, 5 sirrums, 5 turbans, 55 loads of baret rice, peculiar to Peshawar.

9. Any of the Maharajah's officers who may be deputed to Afghanistan to purchase horses, or on any other business, as well as those who may be sent by the Shah into Punjab, for the purpose of purchasing piece-goods, or shawls, &c., to the amount of 11,000 rupees, will be treated by both sides with due attention, and every facility will be afforded to them in the execution of their commission.

10. Whenever the armies of the two States may happen to be assembled at the same place, on no account shall the slaughter of kine be permitted to take place.

11. In the event of the Shah taking an auxiliary force from the Maharajah, whatever booty may be acquired from the Barkzee, in jewels, horses, arms, great or small, shall equally be divided between the two Contracting Parties. If the Shah should succeed in obtaining possession of their property without the assistance of the Maharajah's troops, the Shah agrees to send a portion of it by his own agent to the Maharajah, in the way of friendship.

12. An exchange of missions charged with letters or presents, shall constantly take place between the two parties.

13. Should the Maharajah require the aid of any of the Shah's troops, the Shah engages to send a force commanded by one of his principal officers; in like manner the Maharajah will furnish the Shah, when required, with an auxiliary force, composed of Mahomedans, and commanded by one of his principal officers, as far as Cabul. When the Maharajah may go to Peshawar, the Shah will depute a Shahzadah to visit him; on which occasion, the Maharajah will receive and dismiss him with the honour and consideration due to his rank and dignity.

14. The friends and enemies of the one shall be the friends and enemies of the other.
15. Both parties cordially agree to the foregoing Articles; there shall be no deviation from them: the present Treaty shall be considered binding for ever.

Declaration on the part of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India.

Simla, October 1, 1838.

The Right Hon. the Governor-General of India having, with the concurrence of the Supreme Council, directed the assemblage of a British force for service across the Indus, his Lordship deems it proper to publish the following exposition of the reasons which have led to this important measure.

It is a matter of notoriety that the Treaties entered into by the British Government in the year 1832, with the Ameers of Sinde, the Nawab of Bhawalpore, and Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, had for their object, by opening the navigation of the Indus, to facilitate the extension of commerce, and to gain for the British nation in Central Asia that legitimate influence which an interchange of benefits would naturally produce.

With a view to invite the aid of the de facto rulers of Afghanistan to the measures necessary for giving full effect to those Treaties, Captain Burnes was deputed, towards the close of the year 1836, on a mission to Dost Mahomed Khan, the chief of Cabool. The original objects of that officer’s mission were purely of a commercial nature. Whilst Captain Burnes, however, was on his journey to Cabool, information was received by the Governor-General, that the troops of Dost Mahomed Khan, had made a sudden and unprovoked attack on those of our ancient ally Maha Raja Runjeet Singh. It was naturally to be apprehended that his Highness the Maha Raja would not be slow to avenge the aggression; and it was to be feared that, the flames of war being once kindled in the very regions into which we were endeavouring to extend our commerce, the peaceful and beneficial purposes of the British Government would be altogether frustrated. In order to avert a result so calamitous, the Governor-General resolved on authorizing Captain Burnes to intimate to Dost Mahomed Khan, that if he should evince a disposition to come to just and reasonable terms with the Maha Raja, his Lordship would exert his good offices with his Highness for the restoration of an amicable understanding between the two Powers. The Maha Raja, with the characteristic confidence which he has uniformly placed in the faith and friendship of the British nation, at once assented to the proposition of the Governor-General, to the effect that, in the meantime, hostilities on his part should be suspended.

It subsequently came to the knowledge of the Governor-General, that a Persian army was besieging Herat; that intrigues were actively prosecuted throughout Afghanistan, for the purpose of extending
Persian influence and authority to the banks of, and even beyond, the Indus; and that the Court of Persia had not only commenced a course of injury and insult to the officers of Her Majesty’s Mission in the Persian territory, but had afforded evidence of being engaged in designs wholly at variance with the principles and objects of its alliance with Great Britain.

After much time spent by Captain Burnes in fruitless negotiation at Cabool, it appeared that Dost Mahomed Khan, chiefly in consequence of his reliance upon Persian encouragement and assistance, persisted, as respected his misunderstanding with the Sikhs, in urging the most unreasonable pretensions, such as the Governor-General could not, consistently with justice and his regard for the friendship of Mahā Rāja Runjeet Singh, be the channel of submitting to the consideration of his Highness; that he avowed schemes of aggrandizement and ambition injurious to the security and peace of the frontiers of India; and that he openly threatened, in furtherance of those schemes, to call in every foreign aid which he could command. Ultimately he gave his undisguised support to the Persian designs in Afghanistan, of the unfriendly and injurious character of which, as concerned the British power in India, he was well apprized, and by his utter disregard of the views and interests of the British Government, compelled Captain Burnes to leave Cabool without having effected any of the objects of his mission.

It was now evident that no further interference could be exercised by the British Government to bring about a good understanding between the Sikh ruler and Dost Mahomed Khan, and the hostile policy of the latterchief showed too plainly that, so long as Cabool remained under his government, we could never hope that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be secured, or that the interests of our Indian empire would be preserved inviolate.

The Governor-General deems it in this place necessary to revert to the siege of Herat, and the conduct of the Persian nation. The siege of that city has now been carried on by the Persian army for many months. The attack upon it was a most unjustifiable and cruel aggression, perpetrated and continued, notwithstanding the solemn and repeated remonstrances of the British Envoy at the Court of Persia, and after every just and becoming offer of accommodation had been made and rejected. The besieged have behaved with a gallantry and fortitude worthy of the justice of their cause; and the Governor-General would yet indulge the hope that their heroism may enable them to maintain a successful defence, until succours shall reach them from British India. In the meantime, the ulterior designs of Persia, affecting the interests of the British Government, have been, by a succession of events, more and more openly manifested. The Governor-General has recently ascertained by an official despatch from Mr. Mc Neill, Her
Majesty's Envoy, that His Excellency has been compelled, by a refusal of his just demands, and by a systematic course of disrespect adopted towards him by the Persian Government, to quit the Court of the Shah, and to make a public declaration of the cessation of all intercourse between the two Governments. The necessity under which Great Britain is placed of regarding the present advance of the Persian arms into Afghanistan as an act of hostility towards herself, has also been officially communicated to the Shah, under the express order of Her Majesty's Government.

The chiefs of Candahar (brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabool) have avowed their adherence to the Persian policy, with the same full knowledge of its opposition to the rights and interests of the British nation in India, and have been openly assisting in the operations against Herat.

In the crisis of affairs consequent upon the retirement of our Envoy from Cabool, the Governor-General felt the importance of taking immediate measures for arresting the rapid progress of foreign intrigue and aggression towards our own territories.

His attention was naturally drawn at this conjuncture to the position and claims of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, a monarch, who, when in power, had cordially acceded to the measures of united resistance to external enmity, which were at that time judged necessary by the British Government, and who, on his empire being usurped by its present rulers, had found an honourable asylum in the British dominions.

It had been clearly ascertained, from the information furnished by the various officers who have visited Afghanistan, that the Barukzye chiefs, from their disunion and unpopularity, were ill-fitted, under any circumstances, to be useful allies to the British Government, and to aid us in our just and necessary measures of national defence. Yet so long as they refrained from proceedings injurious to our interests and security, the British Government acknowledged and respected their authority; but a different policy appeared to be now more than justified by the conduct of those chiefs, and to be indispensable to our own safety. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should have on our western frontier an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquillity, in the place of chiefs ranging themselves in subservience to a hostile power, and seeking to promote schemes of conquest and aggrandizement.

After serious and mature deliberation, the Governor-General was satisfied that a pressing necessity, as well as every consideration of policy and justice, warranted us in espousing the cause of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, whose popularity throughout Afghanistan had been proved to his Lordship by the strong and unanimous testimony of the best authorities. Having arrived at this determination, the Governor-
General was further of opinion that it was just and proper, no less from the position of Maha Raja Runjeet Singh, than from his undeviating friendship towards the British Government, that his Highness should have the offer of becoming a party to the contemplated operations.

Mr. Macnaghten was accordingly deputed in June last to the Court of His Highness, and the result of his mission has been the conclusion of a triplicate Treaty by the British Government, the Maha Raja, and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, whereby His Highness is guaranteed in his present possessions, and has bound himself to co-operate for the restoration of the Shah to the throne of his ancestors. The friends and enemies of any one of the contracting parties have been declared to be the friends and enemies of all.

Various points have been adjusted, which had been the subjects of discussion between the British Government and His Highness the Maha Rajah, the identity of whose interests with those of the Honorable Company has now been made apparent to all the surrounding States. A guaranteed independence will, upon favorable conditions, be tendered to the Ameers of Sinde, and the integrity of Herat, in the possession of its present ruler, will be fully respected; while by the measures completed, or in progress, it may reasonably be hoped that the general freedom and security of commerce will be promoted; that the name and just influence of the British Government will gain their proper footing among the nations of Central Asia; that tranquillity will be established upon the most important frontier of India; and that a lasting barrier will be raised against hostile intrigue and encroachment.

His Majesty Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk will enter Afghanistan surrounded by his own troops, and will be supported against foreign interference and factious opposition by a British army. The Governor-General confidently hopes that the Shah will be speedily replaced on his throne by his own subjects and adherents; and when once he shall be secured in power, and the independence and integrity of Afghanistan established, the British army will be withdrawn. The Governor-General has been led to these measures by the duty which is imposed upon him of providing for the security of the possessions of the British Crown; but he rejoices that, in the discharge of his duty, he will be enabled to assist in restoring the union and prosperity of the Afghan people. Throughout the approaching operations, British influence will be sedulously employed to further every measure of general benefit, to reconcile differences, to secure oblivion of injuries, and to put an end to the distractions by which, for so many years, the welfare and happiness of the Afghans have been impaired. Even to the chiefs, whose hostile proceedings have given just cause of offence to the British Government, it will seek to secure liberal and honorable treatment, on their tendering early submission, and ceasing from opposition to that course of
measures which may be judged the most suitable for the general advantage of their country.

By order of the Right Hon. Governor-General of India.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

Notification.

With reference to the preceding Declaration, the following appointments are made:—Mr. W. A. Macnaghten, Secretary to Government, will assume the functions of Envoy and Minister on the part of the Government of India at the court of Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk. Mr. Macnaghten will be assisted by the following officers:—Captain A. Burnes, of the Bombay establishment, who will be employed, under Mr. Macnaghten’s directions, as Envoy to the Chief of Kelat, or other States; Lieutenant F. D’Arcy Todd, Bengal Artillery, to be Political Assistant and Military Secretary to the Envoy and Minister; Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, Bombay Artillery; Lieutenant R. Leech, of the Bombay Engineers; Mr. P. B. Lord, of the Bombay Medical Establishment, to be Political Assistants to ditto, ditto; Lieutenant E. B. Conolly, 6th Bengal Cavalry, to command the escort of the Envoy and Minister, and to be Military Assistant to ditto, ditto; Mr. G. J. Berwick, of the Bengal Medical Establishment, to be Surgeon to ditto, ditto.

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.

Orders by the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India.
Secret Department.

Camp de Buddee, 8th November.

The Right Hon. the Governor-General of India is pleased to publish, for general information, the subjoined extract of a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart, dated Herat, the 10th September, 1838, and addressed to the Secretary to the Government of India.

"I have the honor, by direction of Her Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, and the Hon. East India Company’s Envoy at the Court of Persia, to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India in Council, that His Majesty the Shah of Persia yesterday raised the siege of this city, and with the whole of the royal camp, marched to Sangbust, about twelve miles, on his return to his own dominions. His Majesty proceeds without delay, by Torrub, Sheki Jaum, and Meshid, to Tehran.

"This is in fulfilment of His Majesty’s compliance with the demands of the British Government, which I had the honor of delivering on the
12th inst., and of the whole of which His Majesty announced his acceptance on the 14th of August.

"His Majesty Shah Kamran and his Vuzeer, Yar Mahomed Khan, and the whole city, feel sensible of the sincerity of the friendship of the British Government, and Mr. Pottinger and myself fully participate in their gratitude to Providence for the happy event I have now the honor to report."

In giving publicity to this important intelligence, the Governor-General deems it proper at the same time to notify, that while he regards the relinquishment by the Shah of Persia of his hostile designs upon Herat as a just cause of congratulation to the Government of British India, and its allies, he will continue to prosecute with vigour the measures which have been announced, with a view to the substitution of a friendly for a hostile Power in the eastern provinces of Afghanistan, and to the establishment of a permanent barrier against schemes of aggression upon our north-west frontier.

The Right Hon. the Governor-General is pleased to appoint Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, of the Bombay Artillery, to be political agent at Herat, subject to the orders of the Envoy and Minister at the Court of Shah Shoojah-oool-Moolk. This appointment is to have effect from the 9th of September last, the date on which the siege of Herat was raised by the Shah of Persia.

In conferring the above appointment upon Lieutenant Pottinger, the Governor-General is glad of the opportunity afforded him of bestowing the high applause which is due to the signal merits of that officer, who was present in Herat during the whole period of its protracted siege, and who, under circumstances of peculiar danger and difficulty, has, by his fortitude, ability, and judgment, honorably sustained the reputation and interests of his country.

By order of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India,

W. H. MACNAGHTEN,
Secretary to the Government of India,
with the Governor-General.
No. II.—INDIAN PAPERS.

TREATIES.

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No. 1.—Preliminary Treaty with Persia, concluded by Sir Harford Jones on the 12th of March, 1809.

In the Name of Him who is ever necessary, who is all-sufficient, who is everlasting, and who is the only Protector.

In these times distinguished by felicity, the excellent Ambassador, Sir Harford Jones, Baronet, Member of the Honorable Imperial Ottoman Order of the Crescent, has arrived at the Royal City of Tehran, in quality of Ambassador from His Majesty the King of England (Titles), bearing His Majesty's credential letter, and charged with full powers munited with the great seal of England, empowering him to strengthen the friendship and consolidate the strict union subsisting between the high States of England and Persia. His Majesty the King of Persia (Titles) therefore, by a special Firman delivered to the said Ambassador, has appointed the most excellent and noble Lords Meerza Mahommed Shefeech, qualified with the title of Moatum-ed-
Dowlah, his First Vizier, and Hajee Mahommed Hoossein Khan, qualified with the title of Ameen-ed-Dowlah, one of the Ministers of Record, to be his Plenipotentiaries to confer and discuss with the aforesaid Ambassador of His Britannic Majesty, all matters and affairs touching the formation and consolidation of friendship, alliance, and strict union between the two high States, and to arrange and finally conclude the same for the benefit and advantage of both Kingdoms. In consequence whereof, after divers meetings and discussions, the aforesaid Plenipotentiaries have resolved that the following Articles are for the benefit and advantage of both the high States, and are hereafter to be accordingly for ever observed.

Art. I.—That as some time will be required to arrange and form a Definitive Treaty of alliance and friendship between the two high States, and as the circumstances of the world make it necessary for something to be done without loss of time, it is agreed these Articles, which are to be regarded as preliminary, shall become a basis for establishing a sincere and everlasting Definitive Treaty of strict friendship and union; and it is agreed that the said Definitive Treaty, precisely expressing the wishes and obligations of each party, shall be signed and sealed by the said Plenipotentiaries, and afterwards become binding on both the high contracting parties.

II. It is agreed that the Preliminary Articles, formed with the hand of truth and sincerity, shall not be changed or altered, but there shall arise from them a daily increase of friendship, which shall last for ever between the two most serene Kings, their heirs, successors, their subjects, and their respective kingdoms, dominions, provinces, and countries.

III. His Majesty the King of Persia judges it necessary to declare that from the date of these Preliminary Articles, every Treaty or Agreement he may have made with any one of the Powers of Europe, becomes null and void, and that he will not permit any European force whatever to pass through Persia, either towards India, or towards the ports of that country.

IV. In case any European forces have invaded, or shall invade, the territories of His Majesty the King of Persia, His Britannic Majesty will afford to His Majesty the King of Persia, a force, or, in lieu of it, a subsidy with warlike ammunition, such as guns, muskets, &c., and officers, to the amount that may be to the advantage of both parties, for the expulsion of the force so invading; and the number of these forces, or the amount of the subsidy, ammunition, &c., shall be hereafter regulated in the Definitive Treaty. In case His Majesty the King of England should make peace with such European Power, His Britannic Majesty shall use his utmost endeavours to negotiate and procure a peace between His Persian Majesty and such Power. But if (which God forbid) His Britannic Majesty's efforts for this purpose should fail
of success, then the forces or subsidy, according to the amount mentioned in the Definitive Treaty, shall still continue in the service of the King of Persia as long as the said European forces shall remain in the territories of His Persian Majesty, or until peace is concluded between His Persian Majesty and the said European Power. And it is further agreed, that in case the dominions of His Britannic Majesty in India are attacked or invaded by the Afghans or any other Power, His Majesty the King of Persia shall afford a force for the protection of the said dominions, according to the stipulations contained in the definitive Treaty.

V. If a detachment of British troops has arrived from India in the Gulf of Persia, and by the consent of His Persian Majesty landed on the Island of Karrak, or at any of the Persian Ports, they shall not in any manner possess themselves of such places; and, from the date of these Preliminary Articles, the said detachment shall be at the disposal of His Majesty the King of Persia, except his Excellency the Governor-General of India judges such detachment necessary for the defence of India, in which case they shall be returned to India; and a subsidy, in lieu of the personal services of these troops, shall be paid to His Majesty the King of Persia, the amount of which shall be settled in the definitive Treaty.

VI. But if the said troops remain, by the desire of His Majesty the King of Persia, either at Karrak, or any other Port in the Gulf of Persia, they shall be treated by the Governor there in the most friendly manner, and orders shall be given to all the Governors of Farsistan, that whatever quantity of provisions, &c., may be necessary, shall, on being paid for, be furnished to the said troops at the fair prices of the day.

VII. In case war takes place between His Persian Majesty and the Afghans, His Majesty the King of Great Britain shall not take any part therein, unless it be at the desire of both parties, to afford his mediation for peace.

VIII. It is acknowledged the intent and meaning of these Preliminary Articles are defensive. And it is likewise agreed, that as long as these Preliminary Articles remain in force, His Majesty the King of Persia shall not enter into any engagements inimical to His Britannic Majesty, or pregnant with injury or disadvantage to the British territories in India.

This Treaty is concluded by both parties, in the hope of its being everlasting, and that it may be productive of the most beautiful fruits of friendship between the two most serene Kings.

In witness whereof we, the said Plenipotentiaries, have hereunto set our hands and seals in the Royal City of Tehran, this twelfth day of March, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred
and nine, answering to the twenty-fifth of Mohurrum el Haram, in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and twenty-four.

(L. S.) HARFORD JONES.
(L. S.) MAHOMMED SHEFFEHEH.
(L. S.) MAHOMMED HOOSSEIN.

No. 2.—Definitive Treaty with Persia, concluded at Tehran, by Messrs. Morier and Ellis, on the 25th November, 1814.

Praise be to God, the all-perfect and all-sufficient.

These happy leaves are a nosegay plucked from the thornless Garden of Concord, and tied by the hands of the Plenipotentiaries of the two great States in the form of a Definitive Treaty, in which the Articles of friendship and amity are blended.

Previously to this period, the high in station, Sir Harford Jones, Baronet, Envoy Extraordinary from the English Government, came to this Court, to form an amicable alliance, and in conjunction with the Plenipotentiaries of Persia, their Excellencies (Titles) Meerza Mahommed Shefiyeh and Hajee Mahommed Hoossein Khan, concluded a Preliminary Treaty, the particulars of which, were to be detailed and arranged in a Definitive Treaty; and the above-mentioned Treaty, according to its articles, was ratified by the British Government.

Afterwards, when His Excellency Sir Gore Ouseley, Ambassador Extraordinary from His Britannic Majesty, arrived at this exalted and illustrious Court, for the purpose of completing the relations of amity between the two States, and was invested with full powers by his own Government to arrange all the important affairs of friendship, the Ministers of this victorious State, with the advice and approbation of the above-mentioned Ambassador, concluded a Definitive Treaty, consisting of fixed articles and stipulations.

That Treaty having been submitted to the British Government, certain changes in its articles and provisions, consistent with friendship, appeared necessary, and Henry Ellis, Esquire, was accordingly despatched to this Court, in charge of a Letter explanatory of the above-mentioned alterations. Therefore, their Excellencies Meerza Mahommed Shefiyeh, Prime Minister, Meerza Bozoor, Caimacan (Titles), and Meerza Abdul Wahab, Principal Secretary of State, (Titles), were duly appointed, and invested with full powers to negotiate with the Plenipotentiaries of His Britannic Majesty, James Morier, Esquire, recently appointed Minister at this Court, and the above-mentioned Henry Ellis, Esquire. These Plenipotentiaries having consulted on the terms most advisable for this alliance, have comprised them in eleven Articles. What relates to commerce, trade, and other affairs, will be drawn up and concluded in a separate Commercial Treaty.

Art. I. The Persian Government judge it incumbent on them,
after the conclusion of this Definitive Treaty, to declare all alliances contracted with European nations in a state of hostility with Great Britain, null and void, and hold themselves bound not to allow any European Army, to enter the Persian territory, nor to proceed towards India, nor to any of the ports of that country; and also engage not to allow any individuals of such European nations, entertaining a design of invading India, or being at enmity with Great Britain, whatever, to enter Persia. Should any European Powers wish to invade India by the road of Kharazm, Tartaristan, Bokhara, Samarcand, or other routes, His Persian Majesty engages to induce the Kings and Governors of those countries to oppose such invasion, as much as is in his power, either by the fear of his arms, or by conciliatory measures.

II. It is agreed, that these Articles, formed with the hand of truth and sincerity, shall not be changed or altered; but, there shall arise from them, a daily increase of friendship, which shall last for ever between the two most serene Kings, their heirs, successors, their subjects and their respective kingdoms, dominions, provinces, and countries. And His Britannic Majesty further engages not to interfere in any dispute which may hereafter arise between the Princes, Noblemen, and great Chiefs of Persia; and if one of the contending parties should even offer a province of Persia, with view of obtaining assistance, the English Government shall not agree to such a proposal, nor by adopting it, possess themselves of such part of Persia.

III. The purpose of this Treaty is strictly defensive, and the object is that from their mutual assistance, both States should derive stability and strength; and this Treaty has only been concluded for the purpose of repelling the aggressions of enemies; and the purport of the word aggression in this Treaty is, an attack upon the territories of another State. The limits of the territory of the two States of Russia and Persia shall be determined according to the admission of Great Britain, Persia, and Russia.

IV. It having been agreed by an article in the Preliminary Treaty concluded between the High Contracting Parties, that in case of any European nation invading Persia, should the Persian Government require the assistance of the English, the Governor-General of India, on the part of Great Britain, shall comply with the wish of the Persian Government, by sending from India the force required, with officers, ammunition, and warlike stores, or, in lieu thereof, the English Government shall pay an annual subsidy, the amount of which shall be regulated in a Definitive Treaty to be concluded between the High Contracting Parties; it is hereby provided, that the amount of the said subsidy shall be two hundred thousand (200,000) tomauns annually. It is further agreed, that the said subsidy shall not be paid in case the war with such European nation shall have been produced by an aggression on the part of Persia; and since the payment of the above,
subsidy will be made solely for the purpose of raising and disciplining an army, it is agreed that the English Minister shall be satisfied of its being duly applied to the purpose for which it is assigned.

V. Should the Persian Government wish to introduce European discipline among their troops, they are at liberty to employ European officers for that purpose, provided the said officers do not belong to nations in a state of war or enmity with Great Britain.

VI. Should any European Power be engaged in war with Persia, when at peace with England, His Britannic Majesty engages to use his best endeavours to bring Persia and such European Power to a friendly understanding. If, however, His Majesty's cordial interference should fail of success, England shall still, if required, in conformity with the stipulations in the preceding Articles, send a force from India, or, in lieu thereof, pay an annual subsidy of two hundred thousand (200,000) tonauns, for the support of a Persian army, so long as a war in the supposed case shall continue, and until Persia shall make peace with such nation.

VII. Since it is the custom of Persia to pay the troops six months in advance, the English minister at that court shall do all in his power to pay the subsidy in as early instalments as may be convenient.

VIII. Should the Affghans be at war with the British nation, His Persian Majesty engages to send an army against them in such manner and of such force as may be concerted with the English Government. The expenses of such an army shall be defrayed by the British Government, in such manner as may be agreed upon at the period of its being required.

IX. If war should be declared between the Affghans and Persians, the English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties.

X. Should any Persian subject of distinction, showing signs of hostility and rebellion, take refuge in the British dominions, the English Government shall, on intimation from the Persian Government, turn him out of their country, or, if he refuse to leave it, shall seize and send him to Persia.

Previously to the arrival of such fugitive in the English territory, should the Governor of the district to which he may direct his flight, receive intelligence of the wishes of the Persian Government respecting him, he shall refuse him admission. After such prohibition, should such person persist in his resolution, the said Governor shall cause him to be seized and sent to Persia; it being understood that the aforesaid obligations are reciprocal between the Contracting Parties.

XI. Should His Persian Majesty require assistance from the English Government in the Persian Gulf, they shall, if convenient and practicable, assist him with ships of war and troops. The expenses of such expedition shall be accounted for and defrayed by the Persian Go-
vernment, and the above ships shall anchor in such ports as shall be pointed out by the Persian Government, and not enter other harbours without permission, except from absolute necessity.

The Articles are thus auspiciously concluded.

A Definitive Treaty between the two States having formerly been prepared, consisting of twelve Articles, and certain changes, not inconsistent with friendship, having appeared necessary, we, the Plenipotentiaries of the two States, comprising the said Treaty in eleven Articles, have hereunto set our hands and seals, in the Royal City of Tehran, this twenty-fifth day of November, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fourteen, corresponding with the twelfth Zelahajeh in the year of the Hegira one thousand two hundred and twenty-nine.

(L.S.) JAMES MORIER.
(L.S.) HENRY ELLIS.
(L.S.) MAHOMMED SHEFFEEH.
(L.S.) ABDUL WAHAB.
(L.S.) ISAH (MEERZA BOZOORK.)

No. 3.—Bonds given by Abbas Meerza, Prince Royal of Persia, and by the Shah, cancelling the Subsidy Articles of the Treaty of 25th November, 1814.

Bond granted by Abbas Meerza, Prince Royal of Persia, to Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald, British Envoy.

Be it known to Colonel Macdonald, British Envoy at our Court, that we, the Heir Apparent to the Persian Throne, in virtue of the full powers vested in us by the Shah, in all matters touching the Foreign relations of this Kingdom, do hereby pledge our solemn word and promise, that if the British Government will assist us with the sum of two hundred thousand tomauns, (200,000), towards the liquidation of the indemnity, due by us to Russia, we will expunge, and hereafter consider as annulled, the IIIrd and IVth Articles of the Definitive Treaty, between the two States, concluded by Mr. Ellis, and obtain the Royal sanction to the same.

This paper bears the Seal of His Royal Highness Abbas Meerza, and that of His Persian Majesty’s Minister the Kaim-Mukam.

Dated in the month of Shaban, or March, 1828.

Ruckum of His Royal Highness the Heir Apparent, in ratification of the Annulment of the IIIrd and IVth Articles of the Treaty with England.

Relative to the Articles III and IV of the propitious Treaty between England and Persia, which was concluded by Mr Ellis, in the month Zeekaud, A.H. 1229, agreeably to the engagements entered into with your Excellency, that, in consequence of the sum of
200,000 tomauns, the currency of the country, presented as an aid to Persia, in consideration of the losses she has sustained in the war with Russia, we, the Heir Apparent, vested with full powers in all matters connected with the politics of this nation, have agreed that the said two Articles shall be expunged, and have delivered a bond to your Excellency, which is now in your hands.

In the month of Zikeya, A.H. 1243, on our going to wait upon His Majesty at Tehran, in consistence with the note addressed to your Excellency by Meerza Abul Hassan Khan, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, we were appointed sole Agent in this matter by His Majesty, with unlimited authority; therefore, as the Government of England, through the medium of Colonel Macdonald, have afforded us the assistance of 200,000 tomauns, we, the Representative of His Majesty, have, on this day, the 14th of the month Suffer, and the 24th of the Christian month August, annulled the two obnoxious Articles of our propitious Treaty. The Envoy, considering this document as a Ratification on the subject of the two Articles, will know that it is liable to no further comment from the Ministers of His Majesty's Court.

Sealed by
Month of Suffer, A.H. 1244. H. R. H. ABBAS MEERZA.

Firmann from His Majesty the Shah to Colonel Macdonald, British A.C.

Envoy in Persia.

Let it be known to Colonel Macdonald, the English Envoy, exalted by our munificence, that, our noble son having represented to us his having recently come to an arrangement relative to the two Articles of the Treaty with England, we have ordered that what has been executed by our son, touching this transaction, in conformity with the Firmann of full powers granted to him by us, be confirmed by our Royal ratification and consent; and we duly appreciate the exertions of your Excellency during the last year, which have obtained you the goodwill of the Shah.

Regarding the crore of tomauns required for the redemption of Khoe, agreeably to what has been laid before us, H. R. H. Abbas Meerza has directed the payment of 400,000 tomauns by Mohammed Meerza; and we have besides instructed the remaining 100,000 tomauns to be delivered to Meerza Abul Hassan Khan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of being transmitted to you.

Your Excellency will therefore, conceiving this Firmann as your security, become responsible for the payment of the above sum, which will be afterwards paid to you by the Lord of exalted rank, Meerza Abul Hassan Khan. Also make known to us all your wishes.

Sealed by
HIS MAJESTY FUTTEH ALEE SHAH.
No. 4.—**Treaty with Runjeet Sing, the Rajah of Lahore**, dated 25th April, 1809.

Whereas certain differences which had arisen between the British Government and the Rajah of Lahore, have been happily and amicably adjusted, and both parties being anxious to maintain the relations of perfect amity and concord, the following Articles of Treaty, which shall be binding on the heirs and successors of the two Parties, have been concluded by Rajah Runjeet Sing on his own part, and by the agency of Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, Esquire, on the part of the British Government.

**ART. I.** Perpetual friendship shall subsist between the British Government and the State of Lahore. The latter shall be considered, with respect to the former, to be on the footing of the most favored Powers; and the British Government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Rajah to the northward of the river Sutledge.

II. The Rajah will never maintain, in the territory occupied by him and his dependents on the left bank of the river Sutledge, more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit, or suffer, any encroachment on the possessions or rights of the Chiefs in its vicinity.

III. In the event of a violation of any of the preceding Articles, or of a departure from the rules of friendship, on the part of either State, this Treaty shall be considered null and void.

IV. This Treaty, consisting of four Articles, having been settled and concluded at Umritisir, on the 25th day of April, 1809, Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe has delivered to the Rajah of Lahore a copy of the same in English and Persian, under his seal and signature; and the said Rajah has delivered another copy of the same under his seal and signature; and Mr. Charles Theophilus Metcalfe engages to procure, within the space of two months, a copy of the same, duly ratified by the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, on the receipt of which by the Rajah, the present Treaty shall be deemed complete and binding on both Parties, and the copy of it now delivered to the Rajah shall be restored.

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No. 5.—**Treaty with the King of Cabool**, dated 17th June, 1809.

Whereas in consequence of the confederacy with the State of Persia, projected by the French for the purpose of invading the dominions of His Majesty the King of the Dooraunees, and ultimately, those of the British Government in India, the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinston was despatched to the Court of His Majesty, in quality of Envoy Plenipotentiary, on the part of the Right Honorable Lord Minto, Governor-General, exercising the supreme authority over all affairs, civil, political, and military, in the British possessions in the
East Indies, for the purpose of concerting with His Majesty's Ministers the means of mutual defence against the expected invasion of the French and Persians; and whereas the said Ambassador having had the honor of being presented to His Majesty, and of explaining the friendly and beneficial object of his mission, His Majesty, sensible of the advantages of alliance and co-operation between the two States, for the purpose above described, directed his Ministers to confer with the Honorable Mountstuart Elphinstone, and, consulting the welfare of both States, to conclude a friendly alliance; and certain Articles of Treaty having accordingly been agreed to between His Majesty's Ministers and the British Ambassador, and confirmed by the Royal Signet, a copy of the Treaty so framed has been transmitted by the Ambassador for the ratification of the Governor-General, who, consenting to the stipulations therein contained without variation, a copy of these articles, as hereunder written, is now returned, duly ratified by the seal and signature of the Governor-General, and the signatures of the members of the British Government in India. And the obligations upon both Governments, both now and for ever, shall be exclusively regulated and determined by the tenor of those Articles which are as follow:

Art. I. As the French and Persians have entered into a confederacy against the State of Cabool, if they should wish to pass through the King's dominions, the servants of the heavenly throne shall prevent their passage, and exerting themselves to the extent of their power in making war on them and repelling them, shall not permit them to cross into British India.

II. If the French and Persians, in pursuance of their confederacy, should advance towards the King of Cabool's country in a hostile manner, the British State, endeavouring heartily to repel them, shall hold themselves liable to afford the expenses necessary for the aforesaid service, to the extent of their ability. While the confederacy between the French and Persians continues in force, these Articles shall be in force, and be acted on by both parties.

III. Friendship and union shall continue for ever between these two States. The veil of separation shall be lifted up from between them, and they shall in no manner interfere in each other's countries; and the King of Cabool shall permit no individual of the French to enter his territories.

The faithful servants of both States having agreed to this Treaty, the conditions of confirmation and ratification have been performed, and this document has been sealed and signed by the Right Honorable the Governor-General and the Honorable the Members of the Supreme British Government in India, this 17th day of June, 1809, answering to the 1224 of the Hegira.
No. 6.—**Treaty with the Ameers of Sinde, dated 22nd August, 1809.**

**Art. I.** There shall be eternal friendship between the British Government and that of Sinde, namely, Meer Gholam Alee, Meer Kurreem Alee, and Meer Moorad Alee.

II. Enmity shall never appear between the two States.

III. The mutual despatch of the Vakeels of both Governments, namely, the British Government and Sindian Government, shall always continue.

IV. The Government of Sinde will not allow the establishment of the tribe of the French in Sinde.

Written on the 10th of the month of Rujeeb-oool-Moorujub, in the year of the Hegira 1224, corresponding with the 22nd of August, 1809.

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No. 7.—**Treaty with the Ameers of Sinde, dated 9th November, 1820.**

**Treaty between the Honorable East India Company on the one hand, and the Ameers of Sinde on the other.**

The British Government and the Government of Sinde having in view to guard against the occurrence of frontier disputes, and to strengthen the friendship already subsisting between the two States, Meer Ismael Shah was invested with full power to treat with the Honorable the Governor of Bombay, and the following Articles were agreed on between the two parties.

**Art. I.** There shall be perpetual friendship between the British Government on the one hand, and Meer Kurreem Alee and Meer Moorad Alee, on the other.

II. Mutual intercourse, by means of Vakeels, shall always continue between the two Governments.

III. The Ameers of Sinde engage not to permit any European or American to settle in their dominions. If any of the subjects of either of the two States should establish their residence in the dominions of the other, and should conduct themselves in an orderly and peaceable manner in the territory to which they may emigrate, they will be allowed to remain in that situation; but if such fugitives shall be guilty of any disturbance or commotion, it will be incumbent on the local authority to take the offenders into custody, and punish or compel them to quit the country.

IV. The Ameers of Sinde engage to restrain the depredations of the Khoosas, and all other tribes and individuals within their limits, and to prevent the occurrence of any inroad into the British dominions.

*Bombay, 9th November, 1820.*

**Note.—**The foregoing Treaty was approved by the Supreme Government on the 10th February, 1821.
No. 8.—Treaty concluded between the Honorable East India Company and Meer Moorad Alee Khan, Ruler of Hyderabad in Sinde.

ART. I. That the friendship provided for in former Treaties between the British Government and that of Sinde, remain unimpaired and binding; and that this stipulation has received additional efficacy through the medium of Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger, Envoy, &c., so that the firm connection and close alliance now formed between the said States, shall descend to the children and successors of the house of the above-named Meer Moorad Alee Khan, principal after principal, from generation to generation.

II. That the two Contracting Powers bind themselves, never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other.

III. That the British Government has requested a passage for the merchants and traders of Hindoostan by the river and roads of Sinde, by which they may transport their goods and merchandise from one country to another; and the said Government of Hyderabad hereby acquiesces in the same request, on the three following conditions:—

1. That no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river or roads.

2. That no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river.

3. That no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Sinde, but shall come as occasion requires, and having stopped to transact their business, shall return to India.

IV. When merchants shall determine on visiting Sinde, they shall obtain a passport to do so from the British Government; and due intimation of the granting of such passport shall be made to the said Government of Hyderabad by the Resident in Cutch, or other officer of the said British Government.

V. That the Government of Hyderabad, having fixed certain proper and moderate duties to be levied on merchandize and goods proceeding by the aforesaid routes, shall adhere to that scale, and not arbitrarily and despotically either increase or lessen the same, so that the affairs of merchants and traders may be carried on without stop or interruption; and the custom-house officers, and farmers of revenue, of the Sinde Government are to be specially directed to see that they do not delay the said merchants on pretence of awaiting for fresh orders from the Government, or in the collection of the duties; and the said Government is to promulgate a tariff, or table of duties leviable on each kind of goods, as the case may be.

VI. That whatever portions of former treaties entered into between the two States which have not been altered and modified by the present one, remain firm and unaltered as well as those stipulations now concluded, and, by the blessing of God, no deviation from them shall ever happen.

VII. That the friendly intercourse between the two States shall
be kept up by the despatch of vakeels, whenever the transaction of business, or the increase of the relations of friendship, may render it desirable.

Written on the 18th Zeekaud 1247, Hegira, corresponding with the 20th of April, 1832.

No. 9.—Supplementary Treaty between the Honorable East India Company and the Government of Hyderabad in Sinde, which is to be considered as virtually annulled on the fulfilment of its stipulations.

Art. I. It is inserted in the 5th Article of the perpetual Treaty, that the Government of Hyderabad will furnish the British Government with a statement of duties, &c.; and after that the officers of the British Government who are versed in affairs of traffic, will examine the said statement, should the statement seem to them to be fair and equitable, and agreeable to custom, it will be brought into operation, and will be confirmed; but should it appear too high, His Highness Meer Moorad Alee Khan, on hearing from the British Government to this effect, through Colonel Pottinger, will reduce the said duties.

II. It is as clear as noonday that the punishment and suppression of the plunderers of Parkur, the Thale, &c., &c., is not to be effected by any one Government; and as this measure is incumbent on and becoming the States, as tending to secure the welfare and happiness of their respective subjects and countries, it is hereby stipulated, that on the commencement of the ensuing rainy season, and of which Meer Moorad Alee Khan shall give due notice, the British, Sinde, and Joudpore Governments shall direct their joint and simultaneous efforts to the above object.

III. The Governments of the Honorable East India Company and of Khyrpoor, namely, Meer Roostum, have provided, in a Treaty concluded between the States, that whatever may be settled regarding the opening of the Indus at Hyderabad, shall be binding on the said Contracting Powers: it is therefore necessary that copies of the Treaty should be sent by the British and Hyderabad Governments to Meer Kooostum Khan, for his satisfaction and guidance.

Written on the 20th of Zeekaud, 1247, Hegira, corresponding with the 22nd of April, 1832.
No. 10.—Treaty between the Honorable the East India Company and His Highness Maharajah Runjeet Sing, the Ruler of the Punjab, dated 26th December, 1832.

By the Grace of God, the relations of firm alliance and indissoluble ties of friendship existing between the Honorable the East India Company and His Highness the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, founded on the auspicious Treaty formerly concluded by Sir Charles Metcalfe, Bart., and since confirmed in the written pledge of sincere amity presented by the Right Honorable Lord William Bentinck, G.C.B. and G.C.H., Governor-General of British India, at the meeting at Rooper, are, like the sun, clear and manifest to the whole world, and will continue unimpaircd, and increasing in strength, from generation to generation. By virtue of these firmly established bonds of friendship, since the opening of the navigation of the rivers Indus proper (i.e. Indus below the confluence of the Penjmul) and Sutledge, a measure deemed expedient by both States, with a view to promote the general interests of commerce, has lately been effected through the agency of Captain Claud Wade, Political Agent at Loodiana, deputed by the Right Honorable the Governor-General for that purpose, the following articles, explanatory of the conditions by which the said navigation is to be regulated, as concerns the nomination of officers, the mode of collecting the duties, and the protection of the trade by that route, have been framed, in order that the officers of the two States employed in their execution, may act accordingly.

ART. I. The provisions of the existing Treaty relative to the right bank of the river Sutledge, and all its stipulations, together with the contents of the friendly pledge already mentioned, shall remain binding, and a strict regard to preserve the relations of friendship between the two States, be the ruling principle of action. In accordance with that Treaty, the Honorable Company has not, nor will have, any concern with the right bank of the river Sutledge.

II. The tariff which is to be established for the line of navigation in question, is intended to apply exclusively to the passage of merchandise by that route, and not to interfere with the transit duties levied on goods proceeding from one bank of the river to the other, nor with the places fixed for their collection: they are to remain as heretofore.

III. Merchants frequenting the said route, while within the limits of the Maharajah's government, are required to show a due re-
gard to his authority, as is done by merchants generally, and not to commit any acts offensive to the civil and religious institutions of the Sikhs.

IV. Any one purposing to go by the said route, will intimate his intention to the agent of either State, and apply for a passport agreeably to a form to be laid down; having obtained which, he may proceed on his journey. The merchants coming from Umritisir, and other parts on the right bank of the river Sutledge, are to intimate their intentions to the agent of the Maharajah at Hurreekee, or other appointed places, and obtain a passport through him; and merchants coming from Hindoostan, or other parts on the left bank of the river Sutledge, will intimate their intentions to the Honorable Company’s agent, and obtain a passport through him. As Foreigners, and Hindoostanes, and Sirdars of the protected Sikh States, and elsewhere, are not in the habit of crossing the Sutledge without a passport from the Maharajah’s officers, it is expected that such persons will hereafter also conform to the same rule, and not cross without the usual passports.

V. A tariff shall be established, exhibiting the rate of duties leviable on each description of merchandize, which, after having been approved by both Governments, is to be the standard by which the superintendents and collectors of customs are to be guided.

VI. Merchants are invited to adopt the new route with perfect confidence. No one shall be suffered to molest them, or unnecessarily to impede their progress, care being taken that they are only detained for the collection of the duties, in the manner stipulated, at the established stations.

VII. The officers to be entrusted with the examination of the goods, and collection of the duties, on the part of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, shall be stationed at Miththun-Kote and Hurreekee. At no other places but those two, shall boats in transit on the river, be liable to examination or stoppage.

VIII. When the persons in charge of boats stop of their own accord, to take in or give out cargo, the goods will be liable to the local transit duty of the Maharajah’s Government, previously to their being embarked, and subsequently to their being landed, as provided in Article II.

IX. The superintendent stationed at Miththun-Kote, having examined the cargo, will levy the established duty, and grant a passport, with a written account of the cargo and freight. On the arrival of the boat at Hurreekee, the superintendent at that station will compare the passport with the cargo, and whatever goods are found in excess will be liable to the payment of the established duty; while the rest, having already paid duty at Miththun-Kote, will pass on free.
X. The same rule will be observed in respect of merchandize conveyed from Hurreekee by the way of the rivers towards Sinde.

XI. Whatever may be fixed as the share of duties on the right bank of the river Sutledge, in right of the Maharajah's own dominions, and of those in allegiance to him, the Maharajah's officers will collect it at the places appointed.

XII. With regard to the security and safety of merchants who may adopt this route, the Maharajah's officers shall afford them every protection in their power; and merchants, on halting for the night on either bank of the Sutledge, are required, with reference to the Treaty of friendship which exists between the two States, to give notice, and to show their passports to the Thammadar, or officers in authority at the place, and request protection for themselves. If, notwithstanding this precaution, loss should at any time occur, a strict inquiry will be made, and reclamation sought from those who are blameable.

XIII. The Articles of the present Treaty for opening the navigation of the rivers above-mentioned, having, agreeably to subsisting relations, been approved by the Right Honorable the Governor-General, shall be carried into execution accordingly.

_Dated at Lahore, the 26th of December, 1832._

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No. 11.—_Treaty concluded between the Honorable the East India Company and Nawab Bahawul Khan, the Ruler of Bahawulpore, dated the 22nd of February, 1833._

By the blessing of God, the friendly connection between the Honorable the East India Company and the State of Bahawulpore, which commenced on the occasion of the Honorable Mr. Elphinstone's visit to Cabool, in 1808–9, has continued uninterruptedly to the present time; and now that Captain Claud Wade, Political Agent at Loodiana, has arrived at Bahawulpore, on the part of the Right Honorable Lord William Bentinck, G.C.B. and G.C.H., the Governor-General of British India, in order to improve these amicable relations, and concert the opening of the navigation of the rivers Indus and Sutledge, with a view to promote the general interests of commerce, which is pleasing to God, and the prosperity of the surrounding States, the following are the Articles of a Treaty which has been concluded, through the agency of that officer, between the Honorable the East India Company on the one part, and Nawab Rukun-ud-Dowlah Hafiz-al-Moolk Mutchuz-ud-Dowlah Mahommed Bahawul Khan Abbassee Nusset Jeng Bahadoor, the Chief of the Doodpootahs, on the other, for the purpose of confirming the friendship of the two States, the opening of the trade by the above-mentioned rivers, and regulating the manner in which the arrangements connected with it are to be carried into effect.
Art. I. There shall be eternal friendship and alliance between the Honorable the East India Company and Nawab Mahomed Bahawul Khan and his heirs and successors.

II. The Honorable the East India Company engage never to interfere with the hereditary or other possessions of the Bahawulpore Government.

III. As regards the internal administration of his Government, and the exercise of his sovereign rights over his subjects, the Nawab shall be entirely independent, as heretofore.

IV. The officer who may be appointed on the part of the British Government to reside in the Bahawulpore State, shall, in conformity with the preceding Article, abstain from all interference with the Nawab's Government, and respect the preservation of the friendly relations of the two Contracting Parties.

V. The Honorable the East India Company having requested the use of the rivers Indus and Sutledge, and the roads of Bahawulpore, for the merchants of Hindoostan, &c., the Government of Bahawulpore agrees to grant the same, through its own boundaries, if the persons aforesaid be provided with passports.

VI. The Government of Bahawulpore engages to fix, in concert with the British Government, certain proper and moderate duties to be levied on merchandise proceeding by the aforesaid route, and never to increase, or diminish, the same, except with the consent of both parties.

VII. It is further agreed that the Tariff, or table of duties, fixed as above, shall be published for general information, and the Custom-house officers and farmers of the revenues of the Bahawulpore Government will be especially directed not to detain the passing trade, after having collected the duties, on pretense of waiting for fresh orders from their Government, or any other pretext.

VIII. The Tariff which is to be established for the line of navigation in question, is intended to apply exclusively to the passage of merchandise by that route, and not to interfere with the transit duties levied on goods proceeding from one bank of the river to the other, or with the established Chokies inland. These will remain as heretofore.

IX. Merchants frequenting the said route, while within the limits of the Nawab's Government, are required to show a due regard to his authority, as is done by merchants generally, and not to commit any acts offensive to the civil and religious institutions of the country.

X. The proportion of duties to which the Nawab may be entitled, shall be collected by his officers at the appointed places.

XI. The officers who are to be intrusted with the examination of the goods and collection of duties, on the part of the Bahawulpore Government, shall be stationed opposite to Mitthun-Kote and Hurreekee. At
no other place but those two, shall boats in transit on the river be liable to examination or stoppage.

XII. When the persons in charge of the boats stop of their own accord to take in, or give out, cargo, the goods will be liable to the local transit duty of the Bahawulpore Government, previously to their being embarked, and subsequently to their being landed, as provided in Article VIII.

XIII. The superintendent stationed opposite to Mithun-Kote, having examined the cargo, will levy the established duty, and grant a passport with a written account of the cargo and freight. On the arrival of the boat at Hurreekee, the superintendent at that station will compare the passport with the cargo, and whatever goods are found in excess will be liable to the payment of the established duty, while the rest, having already paid duty at Mithun-Kote, will pass on free.

XIV. The same regulation shall be in force for merchandize coming from Hurreekee towards Sinde.

XV. With regard to the safety of merchants who may frequent this route, the Nawab's officers will afford them every protection in their power; and wherever merchants may happen to halt for the night, it will be incumbent on them to show their passport to the Thannadar, or other officers in authority at the place, and demand their protection.

XVI. The Articles of the present Treaty shall in all respects, whether relating to the internal Government of the Nawab's country, or to commerce, be mutually observed, and form an everlasting bond of friendship between the two States.

_Dated at Bahawulpore, 22nd February, 1833._

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No. 12.—Commercial Treaty between the Honorable the East India Company and the Government of Hyderabad in Sinde; published by Proclamation on the 23rd of December, 1834, by Order of the Governor-General of India in Council.

Whereas in the 1st Article of the Supplemental Treaty concluded between the Honorable East India Company and the Government of Hyderabad, on the 22nd day of April, 1832, corresponding with the 20th of Zeekand, 1247 Hegira, it was stipulated that the Government of Hyderabad was to furnish the British Government with a statement of duties, &c.; and “after that the officers of the British Government who are versed in affairs of traffic, shall have examined the said statement, should the statement seem to them to be fair and equitable, and agreeable to custom, it will be brought into operation, and will be confirmed; but should it appear too high, His Highness Meer Moorad Alee Khan, on hearing from the British Government to this effect through Colonel Pottinger, will reduce the said duties.” Now, accord-
ing to the terms of the above stipulation, the Contracting States, having made due inquiry, hereby enter into the following agreement:—

Art. I. In lieu of a duty on goods proceeding up or down the river Indus, in virtue of the 5th Article of the perpetual Treaty of Hyderabad, there shall be levied on the rivers between the sea and Rooper, a toll on each boat of nineteen Tatta rupees per Tatta khurrar; of which amount eight rupees shall be receivable by the Government of Hyderabad and Khyrpooor, and eleven rupees by the other States possessing dominions on the banks of the rivers, namely, His Highness Bahawul Khan, Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and the Honorable the East India Company.

II. To obviate any cause whatever of trouble or inconvenience to traders and merchants during their progress, and also to prevent disputes and doubts, and consequent altercation and delay, touching the size of boats, the toll is fixed on thirty Tatta khurrars. Be a boat large or small, she will pay toll according to this, and whether she measures five khurrars or one hundred khurrars, she will be reckoned as one of thirty.

III. The portion of the toll above described appertaining to Sinde, and amounting to 240 Tatta rupees on each boat, shall be levied at the bundar or port at the mouth of the river where the cargoes are transferred from the river to the sea boats, and vice versa, and divided as the governments of Hyderabad and Khyrpooor may think best.

IV. For the purpose of assisting in the realization of the toll due to Sinde, also in the speedy and satisfactory adjustment of disputes which may happen to occur amongst the merchants, boatmen, and others, on the questions of hire, &c., as well as with a view to the preservation and augmentation of the amicable relations which happily subsist between the States, it is settled that a British agent (who shall not be an European gentleman) under the authority of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pottinger, agent to the Governor-General of India for the affairs of Sinde, shall reside at the bundar or port at the mouth of the river where cargoes are transferred from one description of boat to another; and the British Government binds itself that the said agent shall neither engage in trade, nor interfere in any way with the fiscal, or any other, affairs of the Sinde Government. It is further settled, that when occasion connected with this Treaty may render it advisable, the Governor-General’s agent for the affairs of Sinde shall have the power of deputing one of his assistants to the above-described bundar or port, to settle any discussions that may have arisen; after doing which he is to return to Bhooj.

V. For the more perfect fulfilment of this Treaty is hereby distinctly stipulated, that should any portion, however small or great, or of whatever description, of the merchandise or goods on board any boat passing up or down the river, be landed for sale by a merchant or merchants, such portion of merchandise or goods, whatever may be its
quantity or quality, shall instantly become subject to the existing local
duties, as levied by the respective Governments within their own terri-
tories; the purpose of the toll agreed to by this Treaty being, not to
supersede or set aside the established dues of the different States, but to
repay the expense to which the Governments will necessarily be sub-
jected in affording the customary protection to the trade in transit on
the river. It will be perfectly understood from this 5th Article, that the
Governments have no claim to duties on merchandize merely passing up
or down the river; and that the toll is all that is to be demanded; but
should any portion, however small or large, of goods, be landed and
sold, then the usual duties will be levied.

No. 13.—Supplementary Treaty between the British Government
and Maharajah Ranjeet Singh, for establishing a Toll on the
Indus; published by the Governor-General of India in Council,
on the 24th of January, 1835.

In conformity with the subsisting relations of friendship, as estab-
lished and confirmed by former Treaties, between the Honorable the
East India Company and his Highness Maharajah Ranjeet Singh; and
whereas in the 5th Article of the Treaty concluded at Lahore on
the 26th day of December, 1832, it was stipulated that a moderate scale of
duties should be fixed by the two Governments in concert, to be levied
on all merchandize in transit up and down the rivers Indus and Sutledge,
the said Governments being now of opinion that, owing to the inex-
perience of the people of these countries in such matters, the mode of
levying duties then proposed (viz. on the value and quantity of goods)
could not fail to give rise to mutual misunderstandings and reclama-
tions, have, with a view to prevent these results, determined to substitute a toll
which shall be levied on all boats with whatever merchandize laden; the
following Articles have therefore been adopted as supplementary to the
former Treaty, and, in conformity with them, each Government engages
that the toll shall be levied, and its amount neither be increased, nor
diminished, except by mutual consent.

Art. I. A toll of 570 rupees shall be levied on all boats laden
with merchandize in transit on the rivers Indus and Sutledge, between
the sea and Rooper, without reference to their size, or to the weight
or value of their cargo; the above toll to be divided among the different
States in proportion to the extent of territory which they possess on the
banks of those rivers.

II. The portion of the above toll appertaining to the Lahore Chief
in right of his territory on both banks of those rivers, as determined in
the subjoined scale, shall be levied opposite to Mithun-Kote on boats
coming from the sea towards Rooper, and in the vicinity of Hurruekee
on boats going from Rooper towards the sea, and at no other place.
In right of territory on the left
bank of the rivers Indus and
Sutledge - - Rs. 155 4.

The Maharajah's share of rupees,
67. 15.*

N.B. A distribution of the shares due to the British-protected
Sikh States, and the feudatories of the Maharajah on the left
bank of the Sutledge, will be determined hereafter.

III. In order to facilitate the realization of the toll due to the dif-
f erent States, as well as for the speedy and satisfactory adjustment of
any disputes which may arise connected with the safety of the naviga-
tion and the welfare of the trade by the new route, a British officer will
reside opposite to Mitthun-Kote, and a native agent, on the part of the
British Government, opposite to Hurreekee. These officers will be
subject to the orders of the British agent at Loodiana; and the agents
who may be appointed to reside at those places on the part of the other
States concerned in the navigation, viz. Bahawulpore and Sinde, to-
gether with those of Lahore, will co-operate with them in the execution
of their duties.

IV. In order to guard against imposition on the part of merchants,
in making false complaints of being plundered of property which formed
no part of their cargoes, they are required when taking out their pass-
ports to produce an invoice of their cargo, which being duly authenti-
cated, a copy of it will be annexed to their passports; and wherever
their boats may be brought to for the night, they are required to give
immediate notice to the Thannadars, or officers of the place, and to
request protection for themselves, at the same time showing the pass-
ports they may have received at Mitthun-Kote, or Hurreekee, as the
case may be.

V. Such parts of the Vth, VIIth, IXth, and Xth Articles of
the Treaty of the 26th of December, 1832, as have reference to the
fixing a duty on the value and quantity of merchandize, and to the
mode of its collection, are hereby rescinded, and the foregoing Articles
substituted in their place, agreeably to which, and the conditions of the
preamble, the toll will be levied.

No. 14.—Articles of a Supplementary Treaty between the Honorable
East India Company and the Government of Bahawulpore; pub-
lished by the Governor-General of India in Council, on the 5th
February, 1835.

Whereas in the VIth Article of the Treaty concluded between
the Honorable the East India Company and the Bahawulpore Govern-
ment, dated the 22nd February, 1833, it was stipulated that a moderate
scale of duties should be fixed by the two Governments in concert, to
be levied on all merchandize in transit up and down the rivers Indus
and Sutledge, the said Governments being now of opinion that, owing to the inexperience of the people of these countries in such matters, the mode of levying duties then proposed (viz., on the value and quantity of goods), could not fail to give rise to mutual misunderstandings and reclaims, have, with a view to prevent these results, determined to substitute a toll, which shall be levied on all boats, with whatever merchandize laden. The following Articles have therefore been adopted as Supplementary to the former Treaty; and in conformity with them each Government engages that the toll shall be levied, and its amount neither be increased, nor diminished, except with the consent of both parties.

Art. I. A toll of 570 rupees shall be levied on all boats laden with merchandize in transit on the rivers Indus and Sutledge, between the sea and Rooper, without reference to their size, or to the weight or value of their cargo; the above toll to be divided among the different States in proportion to the extent of territory which they possess on the banks of these rivers.

II. The portion of the above toll appertaining to the Bahawulpore State, and amounting to rupees 106. 12. 2½, shall be levied opposite to Mitthun-Kote, on boats coming from the sea towards Rooper, and in the vicinity of Hurreekee on boats going from Rooper towards the sea, and at no other place.

III. In order to facilitate the realization of the toll due to the different States, as well as for the speedy and satisfactory adjustment of any disputes which may arise connected with the safety of the navigation and the welfare of the trade by the new route, a British officer will reside near Mitthun-Kote, and a native agent on the part of the British Government at Hurreekee. These officers will be subject to the orders of the British agent at Loodiana; and the agents who may be appointed to reside at those places on the part of the other States concerned in the navigation, will co-operate with them in the execution of their duties.

IV. The British Government binds itself that the British officer who may reside near Mitthun-Kote, shall not engage in trade, and (in conformity with the IVth Article of the former Treaty) that he shall not interfere in any way with the internal administration of the Bahawulpore Government.

V. In order to guard against imposition on the part of merchants, in making false complaints of being plundered of property which they never possessed, they are required when taking out their passports, to produce an invoice of their cargo, which being duly authenticated, a copy of it will be annexed to their passports.

VI. Such parts of the VIth, VIIth, XIth, XIIth, and XIVth Articles of the Treaty of the 22nd of February, 1833, as have reference to the fixing a duty on the value and quantity of mer-
chandize, and to the mode of its collection, are hereby rescinded, and
the foregoing Articles substituted in their place, agreeably to which,
and the conditions of the preamble, the toll shall be levied.

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No. 15.—Treaty between the Honorable East India Company and
the Ameers of Sinde, concluded by Colonel Henry Pottinger, Agent
to the Governor-General for Sinde, on the one part, and their High-
nesses Meer Noor Mahomed Khan and Meer Nusser Mahomed
Nusser Khan on the other.

ART. I. In consideration of the long friendship which has subsisted
between the British Government and the Ameers of Sinde, the Go-
vornor-General in Council engages to use his good offices to adjust the
present differences which are understood to subsist between the Ameers
of Sinde and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, so that peace and friendship
may be established between the two States.

II. In order to secure and improve the relations of amity and peace
which have so long subsisted between the Sinde State and the British
Government, it is agreed that an accredited British Minister shall
reside at the Court of Hyderabad, and that the Ameers of Sinde shall
also be at liberty to depute a Vakeel to reside at the Court of the
British Government; and that the British Minister shall be empow-
ered to change his ordinary place of residence as may from time to time
seem expedient, and be attended by such an escort as may be deemed
suitable by his Government.

Ratified by the Right Honorable the Governor-General, at Simla,
this 20th day of April, 1838.

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No. III.—INDIAN PAPERS.

Correspondence relative to the expedition of Shah Shooja-oool-
Moolk into Affghanistan in 1833—34, and the Treaty
between the Shah and Runjeet Sing, of March 12, 1833,
which formed the basis of the subsequent Treaty concluded
at Lahore, on the 26th of June, 1838.

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No. 1.—Captain C. M. Wade to H. T. Prinsep, Esq.
(Extract.)

November 21, 1831.

I beg leave to transmit herewith copies and translations of the papers which have passed between Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, relative to the negotiation reported in my letter of the 7th of September, to have been opened by the Shah with the Court of Lahore, for the restoration of the exiled monarch to the throne of Cabool.

(Inclusion 1.)—Translation of a Note presented to Maharajah Runjeet Sing by Kazee Mahomed Hossein, Agent of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk.

1. In the event of the Maharajah being well-disposed towards my master, the Shah has desired me to say that the Almighty has made His Highness one of the greatest persons of the age, bestowing everything on him that can tend to his exaltation, and that some action redounding
to his greatness is daily emanating from him, except one, that is, the conferring a throne, which still remains.

2. Let Cashmere, Peshawur, and other countries which are under the Maharajah's subjection, belong to him: if his Highness will confer the crown of the remaining countries on the Shah the Maharajah's name will become famous throughout the world.

3. The Shah also desired me to say, that whatever had happened to him he considered as proceeding from his fate, and not from his Highness.

4. Provided the Maharajah will give me dominion of the countries which are not subject to him, I will identify myself with his Highness. Of what consideration will then be presents such as the Maharajah may wish to have? Everything will be his. Friendship is the best of all gifts.

5. If his Highness will perform the friendly act required, and continue to treat me with liberality, my successors will recollect his deeds. Let the Maharajah, therefore, state his propositions, article by article.

(Inclusion 2.)—Propositions of Maharajah Runjext Sing, in reply to the Note presented by Kazee Mahomed Hossein.

1. That if proper, according to the Treaty of friendship established between the two Governments (British, and that of Lahore), let the Shah come with confidence to the Maharajah, at either Umritisir, or Lahore, and meet his Highness in the manner that they before met at Rawil-Pindee, Kooshub, and Lahore; that the Shah enter into a Treaty with the Maharajah, agreeably to his desire, ratifying it by his oath and seal, that no treachery be practised towards his Highness's troops; that when the Maharajah may move in the direction of Peshawur, the Shah shall come to meet him.

2. That the heir apparent of the Shah shall always attend his Highness with a force, having also his family along with him; that he shall be treated with distinction, and expected to accompany the Maharajah in all his journeys.

3. That the Shah shall disclaim, both for himself, his successors, and all the tribe of Suddozye, every right and title to the countries which have been acquired by his Highness, his dependents, and tributaries of every kind; for instance, to the city of Peshawur, with the territory and customs, Cohaut, Heshtrugho, Isefzie, Khyber, Cashmere, Mooltan, Menkera, Kolebagh, Bootchee, Serai, Tenouls, territories farmed by Bahawulpore, the two Ketchees north of the Sutledge, Tonk, Sengher, Gherang, Fort of Rolien, Gooldhurree, Akora, territory of Khitteck, the seat of Preadah Khan's family; Derhend, Terbelah, and Preadah Khan's places of abode.

4. That the Maharajah's passion for horses is well known, and the Shah shall send him 102 horses of the finest description, every year,
25 Persian mules, 11 Persian swords, and 200 maunds of fruit, consisting of grapes, &c., besides some Persian silk cloaks, &c., &c.; half the presents to be delivered at the Noo Roz, and half at the Dussera.

5. That the Shah shall at once give three lacs of rupees worth of jewels, such as those for which his Highness negotiated through Miair Lemedjoo, for the expenses of the army.

6. That whenever the Maharajah may be in want of troops, the Shah shall send his own army to him, with one of his sons.

7. That the friends and enemies of one shall be the friends and enemies of the other.

8. That when any of his Highness's people shall proceed to Cabool to purchase fruit or horses for the Maharajah, they shall be well treated, and allowed to pass through the country in safety.

9. That should any European gentleman be coming from Persia with his Highness's sanction, or be proceeding to Loodiana, they are, according to the Treaty subsisting between the British and Sikh Governments, to be allowed to pass without molestation, and to be treated with respect.

10. That the abomination (of killing kine) shall never exist in the territory of Cabool, or in its armies; nay, let a proclamation be issued that no one commit the act.

11. That the portals, made of sandal, which have been carried away to Ghiznec from the temple of Jugernaut, shall be delivered to the Maharajah when the Shah's government is well established.

12. That whatever property in money, jewels, or cannon, be taken from the Barukzyres in Cabool, Peshawur, and Jelalabad, shall be divided equally by his Highness and the Shah.

13. That if the Shah's officers infringe any of the above-mentioned Articles, the army of the Maharajah shall be at liberty to correct them.

14. That his Highness will send the Shah presents worthy of his acceptance, consisting of the productions of Cashmere and Mooltan.

15. That should the Barukzyres attend the Maharajah to Cabool, his Highness and the Shah shall agree to make a suitable provision for them.

(Inclousure 3.)—Note of Kazee Mahomed Hossein on the part of the Shah.

LALAH KISHEN CHEND, the Maharajah's agent, having been admitted to the Shah's presence, laid before him his Highness's propositions. The Shah inquired in the first instance after the Maharajah's health, and was highly gratified to hear of his welfare. He then informed himself of the propositions. Some of them are admissible, others admit of no answer. Those that are admissible, may, according to the rules which regulate the conduct of friends, be carried into effect with propriety when friendship is confirmed. Those that are inadmissible, it would be useless to record.
With regard to the meeting, there are certain points capable of adjustment in person, and certainly, in the course of an interview, every objection could be satisfactorily arranged, provided that both parties be actuated by friendly motives; but, taking a worldly view of the subject, the accession of a third party is necessary. It is desirable, therefore, to seek a mediator: should that object be attained, and a meeting follow, in which matters are properly adjusted, by the blessing of God, the thread of friendship shall not be broken while life lasts.

(Inclosure 4.)—Replies of Shah Shooja-ool-Molk to the Maharajah’s Propositions.

1. Regarding a meeting; I am living as a guest of the British Government, who treat me with great kindness, consideration, and friendship. It is necessary to act, therefore, in respect to the present Article, with their advice and consent.

Let the Maharajah ask the concurrence of the British Government: if it concur, the affair may be suitably brought about. Regarding the ratification of the Treaty on the Koran; the execution of that point is proper at the time of meeting. Regarding treachery towards his Highness’s troops; when once an engagement of friendship has been formed, and the Treaty ratified, such a circumstance shall never come to pass.

2. Regarding the attendance of the Shahzadah; although it be an affair not incompatible with friendship, yet, in the light of discerning men, it is improper, because the world will consider him in the situation of an hostage; and to connect the offspring of kings with hostages, is not worthy of them. If the Maharajah will take one of the lords of the court, it is well; what does it signify, where friendly relations prevail?

3. Regarding the relinquishment, on the part of myself, and all the tribe of Suddozyes, of all right and title to the countries conquered by his Highness; that point may be settled when a meeting takes place, and the boundaries of those countries are defined.

4. Regarding horses, &c.; I agree to the presentation of them yearly, according to the list given.

5. Regarding the assignment of three lacs of rupees worth of jewels for the expense of an auxiliary force; the property of one friend is that of the other. It is a matter of no importance, where a close alliance exists.

6. Regarding the despatch of an army, with one of my sons, to cooperate with the Maharajah when requisite; I am ready to fulfil that condition.

7. Regarding the identification of friends and enemies of one with those of the other; the observance of that rule is incumbent on both parties, and let it be so considered.

8. Regarding the treatment to be shown towards any of his High-
ness's people who may proceed to make purchases in Afghanistan; I agree to see that they are well treated.

9. Regarding the respect and attention to be observed towards European travellers; I also agree to that proposition.

10. Regarding a due observance of the Maharajah's dignity in my letters; I agree to that also.

11. Regarding an equal division of the spoils arising from combined expeditions against Shikarpore, &c.; the settlement of that point may be reserved to a personal interview, when it can be arranged.

12. Regarding a prohibition against the slaughter of kine; let his Highness consider that notwithstanding the territory in which I am residing, is that of the Sikhs, the British Government and the Maharajah being connected by the ties of amity, the practice in question is permitted in the British cantonment and camps. Is it just that it should be prohibited in Cabool and Peshawur, which are Mahomedan countries?

13. Regarding a division of the property that may be taken from the Barukzyes in equal shares; it is right and proper.

14. Regarding the correction, by the Maharajah's troops, of any acts that may be committed by the Shah's officers at variance with the stipulations of Treaty; such an occurrence is not likely to happen where there is sincere friendship. Should any one have, however, the temerity to do otherwise, he will be punished as he deserves.

15. Regarding the transmission, by his Highness, of presents, the produce of Cashmere and Mooltan; certainly an interchange of presents is becoming among friends.

16. Regarding a provision to the Barukzyes; let the determination of that subject be postponed to the meeting, when it can be discussed.

17. Regarding the demand of the portals of sandal at Ghiznee, a compliance with it is inadmissible in two ways; firstly, a real friend is he who is interested in the good name of his friend. The Maharajah being my friend, how can he find satisfaction in my eternal disgrace? To desire the disgrace of one's friend is not consistent with the dictates of wisdom. Secondly, there is a tradition among all classes of people, that the forefathers of the Sikhs have said that their nation shall, in the attempt to bring away the portals of sandal, advance to Ghiznee; but having arrived there, the foundation of their empire shall be overthrown. I am not desirous of that event: I wish for the permanence of his Highness's dominion.

No. 2.—H. T. Prinsep, Esq., to Captain Wade.

(Extract.)

Camp, Bahadargurh, Dec. 4, 1831.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 21st ultimo, transmitting copies and translations of papers which have passed between Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk and Maharajah Runjeet Sing;
and, in reply, to state, that the Governor-General approves your keeping him informed of the substance of those negotiations; but does not deem it necessary that you should in any way interfere with advice or otherwise with either party.

No. 3.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Simla, May 11, 1832.)

I have the honor to transmit a note, addressed by Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk to his agent, who attends me, together with a translation of its contents, stating that he has lately been endeavouring to raise a loan of two or three lacs of rupees, on the pledge of his jewels, &c., preparatory to engaging in another expedition to Afghanistan; but failing in his endeavours, he is forced to apply to the assistance of "friends," through whose mediation he hopes to obtain his object, as he is impatient to make the attempt. That the people, not only of Afghanistan, but Khorassan, and Toorkistan, are in his favour; and that reports have reached him of Abbas Meerza being intent on the extension of his dominion throughout Khorassan, and of the actual arrival of an envoy at Candahar on the part of the Persian prince.

The friends through whose means the Shah wishes to obtain a loan are the British. Whatever interest the British Government may be supposed to take in the subject, from the apparent tendency which the operations of Abbas Meerza have to the establishment of Persian influence in Khorassan, and the neighbouring countries, I have not led the ex-King's agent to expect that the Right Honorable the Governor-General will entertain the application, which his master has made. At the same time I deemed it necessary not to withhold from his Lordship the paper which he has presented.

(Inclusion.)—Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk to Kazee Moollah Mahomed Hossein, the Shah's Agent with Captain Wade.

(After Address.)

The circumstances that I am about to mention, are already well known to you, and you are aware that since I formed the design of an expedition to Afghanistan, notwithstanding every exertion on my part to raise the sum of two or three lacs of rupees, by pledging my jewels, &c., I have not been able to accomplish my object. I sent persons to the bankers at Umritisir, Delhi, and Hansi, to negotiate the business. Some of them appeared well-disposed, and were coming to Loodiana, when, owing to some unaccountable circumstance, they withdrew their consent, which has thrown me into a state of great grief and perplexity.

The conquest of my country is an affair of easy attainment. To make a movement, however, pecuniary means, both for present and future use, are absolutely necessary to pay and reward my followers, and those who may join me on the road, until I may be able to provide
for those expenses from another source, should I succeed in my project.
If I could realize two or three lacs of rupees here, the Ameers of
Sinde would come forward with three or four. With these six lacs, I
am confident I should be able to establish my authority in Affghanistan.
I can effect nothing among the people with whom I deal. If 1,000
rupees be required, these persons will ask a pledge in property of a lac of
rupees. Try, if it be possible, by the mediation of my friends, to find
a banker ready to make the loan. I am willing to pledge my jewels,
&c., which may, perhaps, be equal to two or three lacs of rupees in
value, and, the money being obtained, I will prosecute my journey.
By the blessing of God, my country will be that of my friends.
The people of Affghanistan are anxious for my arrival. Those of
Khorassan, who observe a deference for me even now, and respect the obliga-
tions which it imposes, would flock to my standard, and acknowledge
no other Chief.
Persia comprises four great divisions, namely, Khorassan, Irak,
Fars, and Azerbaijan. The bravest and most intrepid inhabitants of
these countries are those of Khorassan. These people have, it is well
known, several times besieged Futtah Alee Shah's son in Meshid, and
compelled him to fly from that city. No long time has elapsed since
Mahomed Khan, the son of Esa Khan Kohhee, took and plundered
Meshid, and spread terror into it. Saloo Khan Dooranee, of the tribe
of Ishakzye, who is one of the old dependents of the monarchy, joining
with Mahomed Khan, are always writing to me, and urging me to at-
tempt the recovery of my throne. The same is the case with the people of
Toorkistan, especially with those of Bokhara. A sister of
Hyder Shah was betrothed to me, and his successors do not despise my
authority. The people of Sinde, Beloochistan, and Seistan to the con-
fines of the ocean, are well inclined towards me. They wear the symbol
of submission, and their country is mine.
The family of the Barukzyes are not the people around whom the
Affghans will rally. Even now they consider the preservation of their
authority within the streets and bazaars of Cabool and Candahar, a
blessing. Should any enemy threaten them with invasion, they would
fly to Maharajah Runjeet Sing, in the hope of acquiring bare means of
subsistence from him. In fine, my impatience exceeds all bounds; and
if I can raise a loan of two or three lacs of rupees from any banker, I
entertain every expectation that, with the favour of God, my object will
be accomplished.

No. 4.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. to Captain Wade.

Sir,
Simla, May 16, 1832:
I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 11th
instant, forwarding translation of a note from Shah Shooja, the ex-King
of Cabool, to his agent, now at this place.
The information contained in your letter is very interesting; but at present it appears to the Right Honorable the Governor-General to be necessary only to take such measures as are required for procuring accurate information of the state of affairs in Afghanistan, and the neighbouring countries of Khorassan and Bokhara. For this purpose you are authorized to depute a qualified person to Candahar, on a salary of 150 rupees a month, whose business it will be to keep you informed of all transactions of any moment in that quarter, and, when necessary, you will report his communications to Government, in the same way as you now do in respect to the Punjaub, Bahawulpore, &c.

You will be very careful to impress upon the person deputed, as a rule never to be deviated from under any circumstances, that he must keep himself clear from all connection, either ostensible or real, with the different political parties which exist in the country, confining his attention strictly to communicating to you the news of passing events.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAUGHTEN.

P.S.—The map which accompanied your letter, is herewith returned.

No. 5.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

Loodiana, September 15, 1832.

I have the honor to inform you that some communications are passing between Shooja-ool-Moolk and the Ameers of Sinde.

2. In my last, when I was at Simla, the Shah first heard of the serious designs which Abbas Meerza appeared to have on Khorassan, and the mission of Hajee Hossein Alee to Candahar. He determined, therefore, to address letters, not only to the Sindian Chiefs, but also to his friends in Afghanistan, and his nephew, Shah Kamran, at Herat, declaring his intention of making another attempt for the recovery of his throne, and wishing to know to what extent he might rely on their support.

3. The answers of the Ameers of Sinde arrived here a few days ago. I have been favoured by Shah Shooja with a perusal of them. They are written in terms of great devotion to his interests, and Meer Moorad Alee Khan has gone the length of submitting, for the Shah’s approval, a draft of an engagement into which he wishes him to enter, and that on the execution of it, he is ready to assist him to the best of his ability. Its tenor is, that Shah Shooja shall relinquish all claim to the sovereignty of Sinde and Shikarpore, and confer it as a bequest on its present rulers, their heirs and successors, and that the Shah will not remain at Shikarpore (the intended rendezvous) more than ten days. He offers also to send a confidential person to attend Shah Shooja, when he shall have determined on leaving Loodiana. Meer Roostum Khan, and the members of his family, particularly Meer Moobaruk Khan, the brother of Meer Roostum Khan, wrote to the Shah also in the most friendly
manner, and stated that they are ready to abide by whatever terms Meer Moorad Alee may make with him, for the promotion of the object which he has in view.

4. I am not yet aware what reply will be sent. A cossid belonging to Moorad Alee has returned with the one who went from the Shah, who may probably be detained until Shah Shooja hears from Kamran, whose answer he expects in the course of the present month.

5. Notwithstanding these demonstrations, the Shah has not, in my opinion, come to the resolution of undertaking the expedition on which he appears to be bent. I have .

W. H. Macnaughten, Esq.

(Signed) C. M. WADE.

No. 6.—Paper presented by Kazoo Mahomed Hossein, Envoy from Shah Shooja, to the Right Honourable Lord William C.


My Lord, I have five requests to make to you.

My first is this:

As Abbas Meerza is come to Herat, if I can procure assistance from the British Government, I will proceed to that place, and the country from Khorassan to the Oosbecks, and to the boundary of the sea, will fall into my hands, and become friendly to the British.

2. When I first arrived at Loodiana, I had one son and two daughters, and my pension was fixed by the British Government at 4,000 rupees per mensem. My family has now increased to fifteen sons and fourteen daughters, all of whom are arrived at the age of maturity, and are obliged to keep separate establishments of their own; therefore my pension is barely sufficient to pay their expenses, and for my own expenses I am obliged to sell my jewels, &c. to purchase the necessaries of life. Now that I am going to try and regain my country, I hope that the British Government will still continue my pension to my family during my absence, as it is the only means of subsistence they have.

2. I am now about to proceed to my own country, and when I shall have taken possession of it, as there will be no treasury, which, of course, will be greatly required to pay the troops, and to defray other necessary expenses, I hope the British Government will send an agent to me, and will advance me money for the purpose, until order and regularity can be established, which will be in the course of three or four months after, and that then the agent of the British Government will receive back the money by the first revenue that can be procured. I hope also that three military men may be sent me from the three different branches of the army: artillery, cavalry and infantry; for the purpose of instructing my troops in military movements.

4. I brought from Shikapore one lac of rupees some years ago, out of which I lent 64,000 rupees to some Hindoo merchants of Loodiana. I have frequently asked them to repay me; but they always make eva-
sive answers, and I cannot procure it from them. I hope your Lordship will be pleased to order Captain Wade to confine them, and make them refund it to me. The lands I at present hold are taxed now much more than they were formerly; I hope therefore your Lordship will order it to be reduced, and not allow them to be taxed beyond what is laid down in the Regulations of the English Government.

5. My house at present is too small to contain my family. I hope your Lordship will order some gentleman to inspect it, and should he report it to be so, may I request that it may be enlarged so that my family may live with comfort in it.

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No. 7.—Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk to Lord W. Bentinck.

Some time ago I received news that Abbas Meerza was coming to Khorassan at the instigation of the Russian Government. I immediately sent messengers to Herat to ascertain if it was the case, and to bring me information accordingly.

As Prince Kamran of Herat is my great friend, and I look upon him as one of my sons, I made known to him my wishes. The first was this, that when Abbas Meerza should arrive at Khorassan, to do his utmost to repel him, and, as he may depend upon me for assistance, to keep himself prepared until the arrival of my army in his territory.

My Lord, I have heard a variety of reports from different quarters; all may not be true; but the report of Abbas Meerza coming to Khorassan, and his intention to take Herat, is certainly true.

It is apparent to your Lordship, that although Abbas Meerza may not succeed immediately, his power is so great that he will eventually. The power of the Prince of Herat is known to be small, and although he may endeavour to repel him by every means in his power, still without assistance he will not be able.

The people of the Dooraanee, Ghilzee, and other tribes, are in despair from the tyranny of the Barukzye. They are always praying that some one may come who will take the government under his control, and relieve them from the tyranny and oppression they are at present suffering under.

From fear of the Prince of Herat they do not combine with one another. They are constantly sending me letters stating, that if I do not come and take possession of the Government, the country will fall into the hands of the Oosbecks, or some other tribes; and I am always trying to comfort them by telling them I will come shortly.

Now Abbas Meerza is in Khorassan, and if I do not proceed there, he will take possession of their country, and the people despairing of my coming, will seek protection from him. The tribe of Barukzye are not powerful enough to fight against him, consequently, they will fly to Runjeet Sing, and will enter his service to gain a livelihood.
At present it is a favourable opportunity, and I hope my friends (the British Government) will give me assistance and aid, that I may be able to execute my design of proceeding to that country.

God willing, the people of the Dooraumee, Ghilzee, and other tribes, will be all prepared to assist me, and the whole country from Khorassan and Seistan to Toorkistan, will be in my possession, and will be friendly to the British Government. But in the commencement, the country, owing to its poverty, will yield nothing for some months, until order and tranquillity can be established. This gives me uneasiness, because if there is no money to give the troops, they will be mutinous and dissatisfied; and if taxes are levied out of season, it causes the ruin of the country. I hope my friends, the British Government, will take this into consideration.

Another request of mine is, that when I have obtained possession of the Government, I shall require an agent of the British Government to be always with me, and also an officer of artillery, and two other officers, one for my infantry, and the other for my cavalry. My reason for wishing this is, that the friends of the British Government and myself may be made more firm by it.

No. 8.—Shah Shoja-ool-Moolk to Lord W. C. Bentinck.

After Compliments.

As I understand your Lordship will shortly proceed from Simla to Calcutta, I have sent Mahomed Hossein, before you take your departure, to inquire after your Lordship’s health, and also to mention to you some requests, that I am desirous should be made known to you. May I request that you will give the Cazee answers to them, and whatever you think fit and proper shall be done.

No. 9.—Lord William Bentinck to Shah Shoja-ool-Moolk.

After Compliments. Simla, October 20, 1832.

I have had the honor to receive your Majesty’s two letters, together with a paper containing five requests, presented by your confidential servant, Kazee Mahomed Hossein.

I am much obliged to your Majesty for communicating to me the intelligence which has reached you, regarding the movements of the Prince Royal, Abbas Meerza. Authentic information, up to a very recent date, has not been received by me. The conflicting nature of the reports circulated by individuals, regarding the politics of Khorassan, as connected with the movement of the Persian army, must convince your Majesty that no reliance can be placed on the accuracy of rumours proceeding from sources such as those from which your information has apparently been derived.

Your first request assumes the accuracy of the rumour that has
reached you, for you state that as Abbas Meerza is come to Herat, if you can procure assistance from the British Government, you will proceed to that place, &c. My friend, in answer to this request, I deem it my duty to apprise you distinctly, that the British Government religiously abstains from intermeddling with the affairs of its neighbours, when this can be avoided. Your Majesty is, of course, master of your own actions, but to afford you assistance for the purpose which you have in contemplation, would not consist with that neutrality which on such occasions is the rule of guidance adopted by the British Government.

With reference to your second request, I may venture to assure your Majesty, that your royal family will not be abandoned to destitution under any circumstances. On this point you may make your mind perfectly easy, relying on the well known generosity of the British nation.

After what I have above stated, it is hardly necessary to mention that your Majesty’s third request for money and military officers, in aid of the undertaking you have in view, cannot be complied with.

In the 4th Article of your paper it is stated, that your Majesty sent 64,000 rupees to some Hindoo merchants of Loodiana, which they are unwilling to repay. I shall direct Captain Wade to inquire into the matter, and to aid, as far as practicable, in the realization of your Majesty’s just claims.

But with regard to the taxation of the lands, of which your Majesty complains, I shall order inquiries to be made, the result of which I hope may prove satisfactory to your mind.

On the 5th point, I must beg to refer your Majesty to Captain Wade, who will be happy to afford you any assistance you may require, in making additions to your present accommodations, though the funds will, of course, be supplied from the allowances already assigned by the British Government for the comfort of your Majesty, and the other members of your royal family.

No. 10.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to Captain Wade.

Simla, October 19, 1832.

SIR,

I am directed to transmit for your information and guidance, an English copy of a paper delivered by Kazee Mahomed Hossein, envoy on the part of Shah Shooja, and of his Lordship’s reply thereto.

2. You will observe that in case Shah Shooja sets out on his proposed expedition, it is intended that his pension should be continued to his family; and the points adverted to in his Lordship’s answer to the 4th and 5th requests, respecting the realization of the money, said to be due to the Shah from the bankers of Loodiana, and the taxation of certain lands occupied by the Shah, will receive proper attention from you.

I have, &c.

Captain Wade. (Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.
No. 11.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
Camp, Ramneggher, November 11, 1832

Sir,

SHAH SHOOJA-OOL MOOLK, having resolved on quitting his asylum at Loodiana, for the purpose of making another attempt to regain his throne, is desirous of receiving three months of his stipend in advance.

2. When the Shah formerly left Loodiana on an expedition of the same nature, a similar advance was made to him by my predecessor, Captain Murray, which leads him to hope that it will be granted on the present occasion.

3. It is the Shah's intention in the first instance to proceed towards Shikarpoo; on his arrival at which place, he expects to receive important aid, both pecuniary and otherwise, from the Ameer's, according to the assurances which he has received from them. His plan then is to make a descent on Candahar, where he relies on being joined by numerous partizans from the Dooranaee tribes settled near that city, and those who are affected to his interests in Peshawur and Cabool.

4. The Barukzyes of Candahar are the weakest, and least enterprising, members of their family in possession of power; and the Shah seems sanguine of success.

5. In the event of the Right Honorable the Governor-General having no objection to a compliance with the Shah's request for an advance of his stipend, I beg that his Lordship's sanction may be conveyed to the officer in charge of my office at Loodiana, whom I will advise of the present reference.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) C. M. WADE.

No. 12.—Major Faithful to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)
Loodiana, December 4, 1832.

Adverting to the near approach (the 20th instant) assigned by the ex-King, Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk for his movement from Loodiana, and the great uncertainty of my being early furnish'd with the Right Honorable the Governor-General's instructions in reply to Captain Wade's letter of the 11th ultimo, regarding an advance of stipend, I am induced to address you on the subject.

In 1818, when the Shah proceeded to the south-west, it would appear that an advance of 6,000 rupees only was made to Captain W. Murray, one month's stipend, and 2,000 rupees road expenses. I am urged by the Shah to admit an advance of six months' stipend, and since the family remaining at Loodiana is guaranteed the monthly stipend during the Shah's absence, no contingent loss could arise to the State by acceding to this request; but it might be objected that so large an advance (which would assuredly become public) might give to the trans-
action an appearance of connivance and support beyond what either
the policy or intentions of his Lordship would admit.

I shall delay the issue of an advance to the latest possible period, in
the hope of being favoured with instructions from you; and in the event
of the Shah's movement taking place before their receipt, I propose to
advance the sum of 16,000 rupees, or four months' stipend. In taking
this step in the absence of defined instructions, it will afford me great
satisfaction to learn that the measure meet the concurrence of the
Right Honorable the Governor-General.

No. 13.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to Major Faithful.

Sir,
Camp, Dubra, December 13, 1832.

In reply to your letter, dated the 4th instant, I am directed to in-
form you, that, in consideration of the precedent adverted to by you, the
Governor-General has been pleased to sanction your making an advance
to Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk of four months' pay, or 16,000 rupees.
I have, &c.

Major Faithful. (Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

No. 14.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to Captain C. M. Wade.

Sir,
Camp, Dubra, December 13, 1832.

With reference to your letter, dated the 11th ultimo, on the affairs
of the ex-King of Cabool, I am directed to transmit, for your infor-
mation, copy of a letter which has this day been addressed to Major Faith-
ful.
I have, &c.

Captain C. M. Wade. (Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

No. 15.—W. Fraser, Esq., to G. Swinton, Esq.

Sir,
Delhi Agency, February 1, 1833.

I have the honor to forward, for the information of Government,
the annexed copy of a letter just received from the acting political
agent at Loodiana.

G. Swinton, Esq. (Signed) W. FRASER.

No. 16.—Major Faithful to W. Fraser, Esq.

Sir,
Loodiana, January 29, 1833.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that the ex-King of Cabool,
Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, yesterday quitted his residence at this station
for an encampment about 1½ mile distant, where he proposes to remain
for some days; from thence the Shah has expressed his intention to
move to Kotilah, where he will remain until the arrangements for pro-
ceeding towards Cabool are matured. I shall address you again whenever the Shah proceeds from his present encampment towards Kotilah.

W. Fraser, Esq.

(Signed) R. C. FAITHFUL.

No. 17.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

On the Sutledge, Khrpoo, February 5, 1833.

From the annexed copy of a letter from the officiating political agent at Loodiana, dated the 29th ultimo, it would appear that Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk has left Loodiana, and encamped a short distance from it; and that from thence he will move to the Affghan town of Malier Kotilah, in the protected Sikh States, where he intends remaining until some arrangements connected with his projected expedition on Cabool are completed.

2. I have requested Major Faithful to intimate the ex-King’s movements to the political agent at Umbalah, as I am not aware whether the intention to make Malier Kotilah the rendezvous, is with the consent of the Chief of that place or otherwise, or how far Shah Shooja may have secured the goodwill of the protected States, for a passage through their territory. The plan connected with his route, is a point in which I wrote to my locum tenens, that we ought not, in my opinion, to take any interest, either pro or con.

3. The completion of the arrangements at Malier Kotilah, referred to by Major Faithful, depends, I hear, in a great measure on the arrival of Ibrahim Khan, the envoy from Shahzadah Kamran, whom the Shah has for some time past been expecting, but who, instead of coming direct to him, as his instructions expressed, proceeded to Bhooj. I learn from a copy of Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger’s letter to your address, of the 5th ultimo, which I have just received, that he was then about to leave that place for Loodiana; but the journey is long, and it may be a month before he reaches his destination. A letter was received by the ex-King from Ibrahim Khan, on his arrival at Shikarpore, in which he mentioned his intention of visiting Bhooj, on his way to Loodiana. The Shah was very much vexed at the circumstance, as it affected the progress of his movements, and asked me to write to Government, and have him ordered forthwith to Loodiana; in reply to which I observed, that I could not address Government on a subject in which I knew it would not interfere; and in reporting the communication which I myself received at the same time from the envoy, in my letter to you of the 11th of October last, I did not think it requisite to take any notice of the Shah’s application, which I now regret, as Ibrahim Khan seems to have been charged with no letters or communications for the resident at Bhooj, and has ultimately been obliged to come on to Loodiana. It now appears that the delay in his arrival has been a source of embarrassment to Shah Shooja, and that Colonel Pottinger has been led to view the envoy in a light which he would not have done,
had he been acquainted with the preceding circumstances of his deputation, and the correspondence which followed it. The man’s own motive in going to Bhooj, was I have no doubt, to levy a present of money from that residency. A reference to my letter dated the 7th of December, 1830, regarding Ibrahim Khan, and the reply which I received, will afford Government an explanation of the nature and occasion, both of his former and his present mission, and the course which I was directed to pursue towards him. In the event of the envoy coming to me, I beg to know what I am to do with him. On the former occasion I was desired to acknowledge the receipt of the letters of which he was the bearer, and to treat him with civility, which is all that I then did, or should now conceive to be necessary.

I have, &c.

W. H. Maenaghtien, Esq.  (Signed)  C. M. WADE.

A copy of this letter will be sent to Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger.

No. 18.—Major Faithful to Captain Wade.

Loodiana, January 29, 1833.

Sir,

I have the honor to acquaint you that the ex-King of Cabool, Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk, yesterday quittd his residence at this station for an encampment about one mile and a half distant, where he proposes to remain for some days; from thence the Shah has expressed his intention to move to Kotilah, where he will remain until the arrangements for proceeding towards Cabool are matured. I shall address you again whenever the Shah proceeds from his present encampment towards Kotilah.

I have, &c.

Captain Wade.  (Signed)  R. C. FAITHFUL.

No. 19.—Captain Wade to W. H. Maenaghtien, Esq.

Bahawulpore, February 9, 1833.

Sir,

I have the honor to annex a copy of a letter to my address from Major Faithful, officiating political agent at Loodiana, forwarding for my information a copy of a communication which has been made to him by Maharajah Runjeet Sing, relative to the departure of Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk for Cabool, and wishing to guard against his designs, should the Shah quit his asylum without giving his Highness some assurance of security.

In transmitting these documents I submit at the same time copies and translations of two references which I myself have received from the Maharajah to the same effect.

My replies to his Highness have been, that I had no authority to offer any opinion on the subject.

I have, &c.

W. H. Maenaghtien, Esq.  (Signed)  C. M. WADE.
No. 20.—Major Faithful to Captain Wade.

Ludhiana, February 6, 1833.

Sir,

Moonshee Mahtab Rao, the agent of Lalah Kishen Chend, sent to me this morning a perwannah, of which the inclosed is a copy. Considering the questions it proposes as purely political, I informed the moonshee that I was not competent to afford any reply, the political relations between the British and Lahore States remaining in your hand.

Captain Wade.

(Signed) R. C. FAITHFUL.

(Inclosure 1.)—Maharajah Runjeet Sing to Lala Sherem Pet.

After address.

Take a fit opportunity of informing the Major, that according to report, Shah Shooja’s departure is nigh. As the relations of friendship between the two States are of the most firm and lasting nature, and the habits and disposition of the Afghans notorious, should the Shah cross the river, without giving some pledge of security, what should be decided on the occasion? Communicate to me word for word the Major’s reply.

(Inclosure 2.)—Maharajah Runjeet Sing to Faquir Shah Deen.

After address.

According to information received in quick succession, Shah Shooja-col-Moolk intends leaving Ludhiana immediately; similar intelligence is brought by persons who arrived here one after another, and Mahomed Shereef Khan, father-in-law of the King, having come to my presence, and made some representations on the Shah’s part. Mian Semdjee went away with him, charged with communications on mine, and authority to purchase a large diamond at half its price, as had been stipulated.

By a report from Sherem Pet, son of Kishen Chend, the vakeel, I learn that the said diamond is about to be sent to Jeswunt Sing, of Nabah, for sale.

As the news of the Shah’s early departure is current, the people, who are jealous of the perpetual friendship existing between the two States, will invent strange stories. In consequence, you are required to ask my sincere friend Captain Wade, who supports and preserves the relations of uninterrupted amity existing between the two States, if, God forbid, the Shah should set out on his journey of his own accord, what ought to be done to give me assurance against his designs: and communicate to me what the Captain may say in reply.

(Inclosure 3.)—Maharajah Runjeet Sing to Faquir Shah Deen, Choonee Lal Jemadar, and Moonshee Ramjus, January 28, 1833.

After address.

It is necessary that you will avail yourselves of a suitable opportunity of seeing Captain Wade, and after dilating on the indissoluble
friendship existing between the two States, which, by the grace of God, is firmly consolidated, like the sun, that enlightens the whole world, is clear and manifest, inform Captain Wade, my sincere friend, that the news of Shah Shooja’s departure to a certain quarter is rife, and ask him that in the event of the Shah’s going without assurance being given of his designs, as it is an affair which concerns the left bank of the Sutledge, and the disposition and habits of the Afghans are well known to the Captain, what is the course which it is advisable to adopt agreeably to the friendship of the two States, for there is not time to submit letters to the address of the Right Honorable the Governor-General and Sir C. T. Metcalfe; it will take a long time to get a reply. Request Captain Wade, therefore, to favour me with an immediate answer; and give a particular report of what he says.

No. 21.—Major Faithful to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Extract.)
Loodiana, February 18, 1833.

In continuation of my report of the 29th ultimo, I have now the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that the ex-King of Cabool, Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk, yesterday broke up his camp at Sonait, near this cantonment; and proceeded to Aulungur Ree Ghung, on the route to Maliar Kotilah, where he will, I believe, arrive tomorrow. At Kotilah the Shah will remain until after the approaching festival of the Ramazan; but his Majesty’s movements have been so uncertain, that it would be imprudent to offer an opinion on the subject.

The negotiation conducted by Moolla Shukoor with the Chief of Nabah, Rajah Jeswunt Sing, for raising a lac and a half of rupees, has utterly failed, the chief declining to advance on the jewels to be placed in deposit, a larger sum than 1,08,000 rupees. A somewhat similar negotiation has been pending between the Shah and the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, who deputed a respectable merchant (Mean Sundoo) to the Shah’s camp; but nothing satisfactory having been arranged, Moolla Shukoor, who has just returned from Nabah, proceeds to Lahore to endeavour to accomplish his master’s object of raising funds. The Moolla is to rejoin the Shah at Ferozepore.

The political relations with the Lahore State remaining in the hands of Captain Wade, I doubt whether it falls within my province to notice, in a report to his Lordship in Council, that the negotiation attempted between Runjeet Sing and Shah Shooja, embraces stipulations regarding the territory conquered from the Cabool State by the Chief of Lahore, such as Cashmere, Mooltan, &c.; and a proposition that certain provinces hereafter recovered by the Shah himself, or by the Maharajah in his name, shall be equally shared.

It may be proper for me to state that both the Shah and the Maharajah have repeatedly attempted to interest me in their proceedings. I
have steadily declined any sort of cognizance in the private arrangements of the parties, or in the proceedings of the Shah, beyond such aid for his journey in carriage, &c., as my situation authorized. On any point proposed to me by the agent of the Lahore State, I have referred him to Captain Wade as the proper authority to apply to.

On receiving, through Moolah Shukoor, a written intimation that the Shah would move on the 17th instant in prosecution of his journey, I issued from the treasury 16,000 rupees, four months' advance of stipend, authorized in Mr. Secretary Maenaghten's letter of the 13th Dec. last.

No. 22.—William Fraser, Esq., to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Delhi Agency, February 21, 1833.

(Extract.)

A few days ago the agent of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, Gobind Jus, communicated to me by his master's desire, the substance of two letters addressed to himself on Shooja-ool-Moolk's movements. The first letter contained injunctions for an inquiry to be made of me, whether the ex-King was proceeding under the sanction of this Government to Vilayee, as Gobind Jus expressed it, or no. I told him that, as far as I knew, nothing in the way of sanction, or opposition, on the part of this Government had been done. I was then asked, whether the intention of Shooja-ool-Moolk led him. I understood this to be known to every one, as I told Gobind Jus, mentioning Shikarpore. On my stating this belief, he remarked, if Shah Shooja goes there, we shall send troops also. I inquired how far Dera Ghazee Khan, whereabouts the Sikh force is stationed, is situated from Shikarpore. Gobind Jus said, not many marches, through an easy and fertile country.

The second letter was then read to me. It contained a suggestion that this Government, and the Lahore Government, should have an understanding on Shooja-ool-Moolk's movements; that if he advanced, it should be with the consent of both; if he was prevented advancing, it should be with the consent of both. On this point, I told Gobind Jus I could not reply without the orders of Government, and desired him to send me a note on the subject: he, in return, stated he could not do so without his master's orders.

No. 23.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to W. Fraser, Esq.

Fort William, March 5, 1833.

(Extract.)

I am directed by the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 20th ultimo, reporting the substance of communications made to you by Gobind Jus, the agent of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, regarding the views and movements of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk.

You did perfectly right, I am desired to state, in acquainting the vakeel that the project of the Shah is regarded with indifference by the British Government; and you are authorized, on the part of the Governor-General in Council, to declare explicitly to that individual,
for the information of the Maharajah, that a strictly neutral part has been maintained with regard to the Shah and his proceedings; and that this Government, though it did not feel justified in prohibiting the movement of the Shah, has indirectly refused to afford him the assistance which he has repeatedly solicited in aid of his undertaking.

Consistently with this view of the question, the Governor-General in Council could not enter into any negotiation, either with the view of encouraging, or preventing, the designs of Shah Shoolla. You will explain to the Maharajah's vakeel that the British Government apprehends no injury, either to his own interests, or to those of his Highness, (which are considered as identical) from any movement which may be made by Shah Shoolla.

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No. 24.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. to Captain C. M. Wade

Sir,

Fort William, March 5, 1833.

I am directed by the Right Honorable the Governor-General to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 5th ultimo, with its inclosures, regarding the movements of Shoolla-ool-Moolk, and of Ibrahim Khan, the envoy of Shah Kamran.

2. You judged correctly, his Lordship in Council desires me to observe, in forming the opinion that we ought not to take any interest in the plans connected with the route of Shoolla-ool-Moolk, and should an impression exist in any quarter that the British Government feels otherwise than indifferent as to the movements of the Shah, you will do your utmost to remove it. As connected with this subject, I am desired to forward to you the accompanying copy of a letter from the agent to the Governor-General at Delhi, dated the 21st ultimo, and of the reply this day written by order of his Lordship.

3. In the reply to the question contained in the concluding paragraph of your letter, I am desired to acquaint you, that in the event of Ibrahim Khan's coming to you, it will be sufficient that you acknowledge the receipt of any letter of which he may be the bearer, and that you treat him with civility.

4. A copy of this letter and of the communications referred to in it, will be furnished to Major Faithful for his information.

I have, &c.

Captain Wade.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

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No. 25.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to Major Faithful

Sir,

Fort William, March 12, 1833.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 18th ultimo, reporting the further movements of Shah Shoolla-ool-Moolk.

2. In reply, I am desired to acquaint you that the Right Honorable the Governor-General entirely approves the course of proceeding you
have adopted on this occasion, as described in the fourth paragraph of your letter now acknowledged. I have, &c.

Major Faithful.  
(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

No. 26.—Maharajah Runjeet Sing to Sir C. Metcalfe, Vice-President in Council.—(Received March 13, 1833.)

After making observations on the friendly intercourse subsisting between the two States, &c. he proceeds to state as follows:

It is reported that Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk now intends to proceed to Candahar, and the proposals of certain persons of Willacet have become known. In such a case, satisfactory assurances with respect to the interests of this Government, are required by me. I hope, therefore, that as the Right Honorable the Governor-General has now arrived at the presidency, you will be pleased to consult his Lordship on the subject.

As the receipt of the intelligence of your welfare will be a source of great pleasure to me, you will, I trust, continue to gratify me with your favourable letters.

No. 27.—Lord William Bentinck to Maharajah Runjeet Sing.

My honored and valued friend,  
Fort William, April 30, 1833.

I have derived much pleasure from your Highness's letter, forwarded through Major Faithful, and I assure you that it always gives me real satisfaction to receive accounts of your health and welfare.

Your Highness states that Shah Shooja intends to make another attempt for the recovery of his throne. This is a matter with which the British Government has no concern, and it has therefore taken no pains to inquire into it. The Shah's success or otherwise depends upon the will of Providence, and the favourable disposition towards him or otherwise of the inhabitants of that quarter.

In conclusion, &c.  
(Signed) W. C. BENTINCK.

No. 28.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Loodiana, June 9, 1833.

Sir,

I have the honor to forward an extract of a letter from Lieutenant Mackeson, dated the 22nd ultimo.

By a subsequent despatch from that officer, I learn that Shah Shooja has been allowed by the Sindians to cross the Indus with his force, and establish himself at Shikarpore. The Ameers are supposed to have adopted this policy as the only means of preventing the Shah's threatened visit to Hyderabad, which would, they say, have obliged them to render him more assistance in troops and money than they felt inclined to do.

A few days ago the vakeel of Maharajah Runjeet Sing presented for my perusal, by his master's desire, a paper of intelligence which the Maharajah had lately received from his newswriter in Cabool, in which it was stated that the news of Shah Shooja's approach had raised the
people in that part of the country in his favour, and that several of the neighbouring Chiefs had already thrown off their allegiance to Dost Mahomed Khan.

This report is confirmed from other quarters.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.  
(Signed)  
C. M. WAD

No. 29.—Lieutenant Mackeson to Captain Wade.

(Extract.)

The Shah arrived at Bahawulpore sooner than could reasonably have been expected, and the Kyrpore deputation then waited on me to ask if I had any objection to their accompanying the Khan to see him. I, of course, had none. It was the Khan’s wish. He had expressed a desire that I too should be of the party; but the indisposition under which I was suffering, would have been sufficient excuse for my not complying, had I even thought my going at all necessary, which I did not. The Khan’s first plan was to have persuaded the Shah to come to Ahamedpore, but the Shah insisted on his waiting on him at Bahawulpore. Accordingly, he set out for that place, accompanied by 5,000 of his Daoodpoortras, his artillery, and sepoy regiments. He had felt some alarm at the Shah’s proceedings, who was busily employed in entertaining troops, and completing the equipment of his new levies. It was arranged that the Shah should pitch a separate tent for the interview, away from own his camp, and on the opposite side of the city. They were to meet with a few personal attendants only. This was the Khan’s desire, who did not like to trust himself too near the Shah’s army. I am informed that, notwithstanding the previous precautionary arrangements, the Khan’s escort, before he arrived at the Shah’s tent, in infringement of his promise, had swollen to the number of 200 armed attendants, that they pressed in close behind the Khan’s person, and resisted the slight opposition offered to their entrance by the Shah’s immediate attendants. The Shah, who was almost unattended, was seated on a charpae, in the interior of a bechoba, the centre purdah of which was raised, the two side purdahs being down. There was a street of Kamaouts. The Khan saluted at the prescribed distance, and on being invited into the tent by the Shah, excused himself from approaching nearer than his rank authorized. He was standing exposed to the sun, and it was remarked that he was very far from having his usual self-possession; he was evidently in alarm, and feared to trust himself inside the tent, thinking the purdahs might screen some one. Heretofore such absurd suspicions would be hardly credible when treachery was less common. He was at last prevailed on to approach within a short distance of the inner apartment, and conversed personally with the Shah. The Shah reminded him of the assistance he had received from his father, Sadig Mahomed Khan, and called on him to assist him with an army of Daooodpoortras, ten guns, 200 camels, and a few boats to take him to
Shikarpore. The Khan made no promises, but said that his Minister, whom he left with the Shah, would attend to his requisitions. He then took leave, and set out for Dilawar immediately after the interview, anxious to escape from the Shah's further importunities.

The Khypoor deputation had an interview with the Shah.

The Shah left Bahawulpore on the 4th. Bahawul Khan furnished the Shah with 50 camels, seized from the mercantile community at Bahawulpore; he made him a present of an old gun and 1,000 rupees. The Shah is highly indignant at this treatment.

No. 30.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Loodiana, July 23, 1833.

I have the honor to transmit extracts of letters from Lieutenant Mackeson, containing a confirmation of the report formerly sent by me of Shah Shooja having crossed the Indus, and been allowed to establish himself at Shikarpore; and the state of affairs in that quarter in consequence.

No. 31.—Lieutenant Mackeson to Captain Wade.

(Extract.)

Ahmedpoor, May 27, 1833.

The Shah is reported to have crossed the water, Shikarpore to be empty, the inhabitants fled, and the Shah in possession, with the consent of the Ameers. I am hourly expecting the return of my cossid from Shikarpore, who will, I hope, give me correct intelligence of the merchants.

No. 32.—Lieutenant Mackeson to Captain Wade.

(Extract.)

Ahmedpoor, May 30, 1833.

I have kept the hurkara a day beyond his time, in the hope of being able to give you intelligence from Shikarpore. I sent a cossid with a letter to the merchants on the 18th instant; he promised to be only 10 days on the journey; and, allowing two days for his detention at Shikarpore, he ought to have returned yesterday; the merchants have kept him longer than there was any necessity to answer my letter; but perhaps they delay writing till their own plans are decided. I am the more anxious to hear from them, as I understand from the Khan's officers, who accompanied Shah Shooja to the frontier, that the Shah has been allowed to cross the river with his army, and to establish himself at Shikarpore. The place has been deserted by all the more respectable inhabitants, all who had the wherewithal to move. The army of the Khyрpoorians is still stationed in the neighbourhood, on the road to Khorassan, the only one open to the Shah.

No. 33.—Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger, to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

Bhooj Residency, Camp at Kheroe, Dec. 26, 1833.

I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency
the Right Honorable Governor-General in council, that I have this day received a letter from the native agent in Sinde, under date the 18th instant, reporting that all amicable means having failed to induce the ex-King of Cabool to quit Shikarpore, and His Majesty having even threatened, in case he was not amply supplied with money, to plunder that city, and the neighbouring rich town of Larkau, the Hyderabad Government had determined to employ force against him, and that the army which had been ordered to assemble under the personal command of Meer Sobdar and Meer Nusseer Khan, is to break ground on the 26th of this month.

2. It further appears, from the native agent's letter, that Mehrab Khan, the Chief of Beloochistan (who resides during the winter in the low country of Cutch Gundava, at no great distance from Shikarpore), had espoused the cause of the King, and had summoned his troops to the royal camp.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) H. POTTINGER.

No. 34.—Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

Bhoor Residency, January 6, 1834.

I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, that authentic intelligence has this day reached me from the native agent in Sinde, of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk having taken possession of the city, and dependent districts, of Shikarpore, and of his having levied three lacs of rupees on the former, and seized all the crops of the latter.

2. The four Ameers left Hyderabad on the 27th of last month, with all the troops they could collect, after paying up all the long-standing arrears of the army, which is understood to have agreed to serve only one month.

3. Meer Alee Moorad, of Meerpoor, has promised to join his relations on their march; but from his known dissatisfaction, the Hyderabad Ameers are very anxious as to the course he will adopt.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) H. POTTINGER.

No. 35.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

Loodianna, February 1, 1834.

Inclosed I have the honor to transmit another report from Lieutenant Mackeson, dated 18th ultimo, of the action which took place between the troops of Shah Shooja and the Sindians, on the 9th ultimo.

The Ameers of Sinde could not have anticipated the present result when they permitted the Shah to enter their territory, and make Shikarpore a rendezvous for his designs on Candahar; but they have no one to blame but themselves, as it was on their invitation that Shah Shooja commenced his expedition, and, having invited and allowed him to remain in Shikarpore until he gained strength, their best policy
would have consisted in giving him the sum of money that he at first demanded, to enable him to move on Candahar, by which the Ameers would have got rid, at a moderate price, of a visitor, whose continued presence, and warlike preparations, could not but be pregnant with danger to them.

Dost Mahomed Khan, instead of proceeding to the relief of his brethren at Candahar, has marched in the opposite direction to Jelalabad, the possession of his nephew Mahomed Zamaun Khan. The Sirdars of Peshawur have proceeded to the aid of the Jelalabad Chief; and the contest between these rival members of the Barukzye family is probably already decided. In the event of a reverse of fortune befalling the Sirdar of Cabool, the probability is, that he will not be able to retain his authority in that city. His declaration of assisting the Candahar Chiefs, has terminated as was expected, and the snow has now effectually cut off his communication with that quarter.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.  
(Signed)  
C. M. WADE.

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No. 36.--Lieutenant F. Mackeson to Captain C. M. Wade.
January 18, 1834.

I have the honor to forward the translation of a letter from Bahawulpore, containing further particulars respecting the action fought between the Shah's forces and the Sindians.

The fort of Dunglur, alluded to in the latter part of the letter, is, I believe, erroneously mentioned as now belonging to the Jesulmer Rajah. It is garrisoned by the soldiers of the Ameers of Sinde.

Subzul Kot was taken from the Daoodpootras by the Talporees in the time of Sadig Mahomed Khan, the father of the present Bahawulpore Chief.

I have, &c.

Capt. C. M. Wade.  
(Signed)  
F. MACKESON.

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Translation of a Letter from Bahawulpore.

I have before sent you some account of the action which took place between the Shah's forces and the Sindians. I now send you what further particulars have reached me. The action between the two armies, was fought at a place seven coss beyond Rohree, and was very severe. In addition to Mustapha Shah, the son of Ghola Shah, Masta Khan, Muree, and a son of Futtah Mahomed Ghiree, whose deaths I before reported, the Sindians lost Ahmed Khan Lughuree Kheir Mahomed Thoree, and Ahmed Khan, the son of Nawab Walee Mahomed of Larkau, and 160 other Chiefs, who were the best and most trustworthy leaders of Meer Rostum and the Hyderabad Ameer. The loss of the Sindians in men amounted to 1,370 horse and foot soldiers. The loss of men on the Shah's side was also considerable. The army of the

2 A
Talpoorians fairly fled from the field of battle; three boats filled with them sunk in crossing the river; very few were allowed to escape; and the victory was complete on the Shah's side. He is now firmly established at Shikarpore, and has taken advantage of his victory to seize on the whole territory dependent on it; the fort of Larkau and Kee Kot Nallee Jugun have also been captured by his forces. In the action four guns were taken from the Sindians.

The Ameers of Hyderabad and Meer Roostum are said to have assembled all their forces, amounting to near a lac, to try the issue of another battle. They have written to Meer Alee Moorad, Meer Hara Walee, and Meer Mehrab Beloochee to assist them; but were answered by those Chiefs that they could not be guilty of disloyalty to their King, and that the Ameers must not expect aid from them.

There is a report that on hearing of the success and increased strength of the Shah, Nawab Bahawul Khan collected his Daoodpootras and other forces at Khunpore, on the western frontier, and sent them off with the utmost expedition to capture the fort of Dungur, which is situated in the district, about thirty coss from Subzul Kot. It was taken from the Jesulmer Rajah by the Daoodpootras, but afterwards taken from them by the Sindians, who sold it again to the Jesulmer Rajah. I have heard that it is the Khan's intention, after taking Dungur, to attempt the capture of Subzul Kot.

No. 37.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

I have the honor to inclose an extract of intelligence from Shikarpore.

2. The pride of the Ameers of Sinde has been humbled by their late defeat, and they have consented to grant pecuniary aid to Shah Shooja in preference to hazarding another battle.

3. It appears immediately after the last action which occurred, they sued for peace, to which the Shah has acceded, and, according to the accounts now received, he is on his way to Candahar.

4. The Sindians have agreed to pay a contribution of either five or seven lacs of rupees, it is not yet known which; to farm the Shikarpore territory for a settled annual sum from Shah Shooja; and to provide him with an auxiliary force; the Shah taking hostages from them for the entire execution of these Articles.

5. It was the opinion of those acquainted with the Sindian character, that they would not risk another battle, and it was not the interest of Shah Shooja to provoke one. His object is Candahar; and having now obtained means which are considered ample by his countrymen, for the prosecution of his designs against that place, and Cabool, there is every reason to anticipate his continued success.

6. On the side of Cabool, Dost Mahomed Khan has attacked and
dispossessed his nephew, the Chief of Jelalabad, of his territory. This attack has led to an open schism between that ruler and his brothers, heightened by the circumstance of one of their brethren having been killed in the contest. The Barakzyes have hitherto respected the possessions of each other, and though disputes have occasionally existed between them, they have never been guilty of spilling the blood of their own family, an event which is viewed by the Afghan as the certain source of a feud between Dost Mahomed Khan and his brothers, not to be expiated without the humiliation of the former.

Intelligence from Shikarpore, from February 1 to 9, 1834.

(Extrait.)

On receiving the intelligence of the defeat of their troops, the Ameers of Hyderabad became alarmed, and sent their vakeels to Shah Shooja to offer terms of peace. The Shah, in consequence, dispatched Mahomed Shereeff Khan, the Zebt Begee, with their vakeels, to the Sindian camp, in order to conclude a negotiation. On his approach to Larkau, the place where the Ameers are now assembled, he was greeted by a deputation composed of Walee Mahomed Legharee, and the son of Meer Mahomed Khan Thoor. The Ameers received him with great marks of respect. They pitched two tents for his reception, and sent him a zaseef of 200 rupees on the day of his arrival; in fact every attention was shown to him on their part. The Sindians of Hyderabad appointed Ahmed Khant, his son of Walee Mahomed Khan Legharee; and those of Khyrpoor, Futter Mahomed Khan Ghiree; for the purpose of negotiating a peace, on condition that Shah Shooja would proceed on his expedition to Khorassan. The Ameers are anxious to secure a lease of the Shikarpore territory from the Shah.

A cossid had been sent by Shah Shooja to ascertain the actual amount of the forces of the Ameers. He came back, and reported that they did not exceed 25,000 men, which information appeared to give the Shah great satisfaction.

The Sindians behave now in a very humble and respectful manner towards Shah Shooja, which he ascribes to their fears. Within the last five days, the Shah's troops have increased greatly by the junction of people of the Shikarpore territory, &c. On the 2nd of February, Shah Shooja left Shikarpore, and proceeded to Kot Hebab, a place about four coss to the south of that city, on the road to Larkau. The advance of the Shah struck terror into the Sindians; and they immediately came to terms. Bahadar Khan Khoker is the agent by whom the negotiation has been concluded. They have brought and paid to Shah Shooja one lac of rupees, to make his march back to Shikarpore; and what sum has been settled as the contribution of the Sindians to the Shah, is as yet uncertain; some say they have agreed to pay five
lacs of rupees; others that it amounts to seven lacs of rupees. Having ascertained the fact, I will hereafter let you know.

On the 9th of February, Shah Shooja ordered his tents to be pitched in the direction of Candahar; and it is said that he will proceed towards Khorassan to-morrow.

The Ameers of Hyderabad have farmed the district of Shikarpore from the Shah, for a settled annual contribution to be paid by them, and the place has been restored to their authority. Hostages have been taken by Shah Shooja for the entire execution of these articles; and it is stated they have likewise agreed to furnish him with an auxiliary force of 5,000 men.

No. 38.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghton, Esq.

(Extract.)
Loodiana, May 22, 1834.

I have the honor to transmit an abstract from the reports of our newswriter at Lahore, dated from the 9th to the 15th instant, relative to the occupation of Peshawur by the troops of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and the demonstrations of joy with which his Highness has received this intelligence, together with other circumstances, exhibiting his views and transactions in connection with that place.

Abstract of Intelligence from Lahore, dated from the 9th to the 15th of May, 1834.

On the 13th instant Sook-lal, the Jemadar of Hurkaras, appeared before the Maharajah, and after presenting him with a nuzzur of two rupees, delivered a letter from Kour Nao Nihal Sing, to the following effect: “I entered the city of Peshawur, accompanied by all the Sirdars, on the 6th of May. The next day I, together with Sirdar Hurree Sing, Ram-lal, and Mr. Court, &c., moved towards Sultan Mahomed Khan’s encampment, when an action ensued between us and the mulkyahs, or peasantry, in which 100 of them fell, and 25 were wounded, while the loss on our part was 25, both killed and wounded; and the mulkyahs, finding themselves unable to maintain the contest, fled towards the Khyber Pass.” Immediately on learning the contents of this letter, Runjeet Sing was highly delighted; he gave a pair of gold bangles, and a pair of shawls to Sook-lal; a present of the same kind was conferred on Mool Sing, the vakeel of Sirdar Hurree Sing, and 100 rupees in money; and a shawl given to Lalah-Chend, the vakeel of Kour Nao Nihal Sing, while a discharge of artillery was ordered in honor of the victory.

An order was sent to Hurree Sing, directing him to conciliate the principal inhabitants of the city, to attend to its welfare and population, and to act with extreme vigilance and circumspection in establishing his authority in the place, in requital of which service he would receive a valuable honorary investiture.
No. 39.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Ludhiana, May 23, 1834.

SIR,

ACCOMPANYING is a further report from the newswriter at Lahore, dated from the 15th to the 21st instant, from which it would appear that a battle had been fought between Shah Shooja and the Candahar Chiefs, previously to the capture of that place by the Shah in which the Barukzyes were defeated, with a loss of 700 men killed; that they took the road to Cabool, pursued by Shah Shooja, who had arrived within five stages of that city; and that Dost Mahomed Khan has destroyed himself by swallowing poison.

2. There seems no foundation but rumour for the reported death of Dost Mahomed. Many people are of opinion that, despairing of his means of opposition, he will endeavour to conciliate the Shah by tendering his submission, which is one of his motives for the hesitation that he has shown in not affording his Candahar brothers any overt assistance. Others say that, instead of expending the contributions which he lately levied from the people of Cabool, on the ostensible plea of making preparations to resist Shah Shooja, he is hoarding them in anticipation of flying into exile.

3. I account for the absence of any direct communications from the Shah, by recollecting that, in the case of his late hostilities in Sinde, though victorious in two actions over the people of that country, he studiously abstained from writing on the state of his affairs, either to myself or to any of his family, until he had brought them to a satisfactory issue.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.  
(Signed)  
C. M. WADE.

Abstract of Intelligence from Lahore, dated from the 15th to the 21st May, 1834.

On the 15th May, intelligence was received from Bahadar Sing, the Maharajah's newswriter at Dera Ismael Khan, stating that Shah Shooja, on entering the Candahar territory, was joined by an auxiliary force of 10,000 men, sent by Shahzadah Kamran to assist him, and that Kohen Dil Khan, Rehem Dil Khan, and Mehril Dil Khan, together with their followers, advanced from the city and came to action with Shah Shooja's army, 15 coss in advance of Candahar, when the Shah's good fortune triumphed over his enemies, and the Candaharees were totally defeated, with a loss of 700 lives, besides a considerable number wounded. The Sirdars fled towards Cabool, while the Shah, crowned with victory, entered the city of Candahar. Although no letter has been received from Cabool, either by the Maharajah, or any of the sahookars, yet it is everywhere rumoured that Shah Shooja, after establishing his authority at Candahar, had arrived within five marches of
Cabool, and that on his approach, Dost Mahomed put an end to his existence by poison.

**No. 40.—Colonel Pottinger to C. E. Trevelyan, Esq.**

(Extract.)  
**Bhooj Residency, Camp at Mandavee, June 5, 1834.**

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Honorable the Vice-President in Council, that I have received a letter from the native agent in Sinde, of which the following are extracts:

“The Chiefs of Candahar having collected a vast quantity of supplies, Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk sent his eldest son and Simundur Khan with 6,000 men to surprise it, in which they completely succeeded.

“In consequence of this surprise, the troops of the confederated chiefs had fallen back on Candahar, and it was said they intended to make a stand in defending that city.”

**No. 41.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.**

(Extract.)  
**Loodiana, June 7, 1834.**

I have the honor to transmit a translation of a despatch that has been received from Maharajah Runjeet Singh, by his agent here, conveying authentic intelligence from Candahar of that place being closely besieged by Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, and the retreat of Dost Mahomed Khan, and that of his Peshawur brothers, to Cabool, to determine on the measures that they ought to adopt to avert the evils of their present embarrassing situation.

*(Inclosure.—Maharajah Runjeet Singh to Lalah Kishen Chand.*

(Extract.)  
**June 5, 1834.**

Intelligence has arrived that Khemha Sing, one of the chief Hindoo merchants at Peshawur, has received letters from Cabool, stating that Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk has occupied the city of Candahar, and that the Barukzies were closely besieged in the citadel. A constant cannonade was kept up on either side. Wheat was selling at the Shah's camp at seven seers for a rupee. Dost Mahomed Khan had proceeded two coss in the direction of Candahar, at the head of about 30,000 troops, both horse and foot, intending to join his brethren at that place by hasty marches, for the purpose of opposing the Shah; but on being informed of the occupation of Peshawur by Kour Nao Nihal Singh, he abandoned his design, and returned to Cabool. Avail yourself of a suitable opportunity of conveying this intelligence, first to Captain Wade, and then, with his concurrence, through Moolla Shukoor to Her Majesty the Wezza Begum.

**No. 42.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.**

(Extract.)  
**Loodiana, June 8, 1834.**

Herewith I have the honor to despatch the copy of a report from
Lieutenant Mackeson, dated the 30th ultimo, bringing his information regarding Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk down to the 25th ultimo, which, though not so recent as that which I sent yesterday, I deem it right to transmit, in order that the reports received from one quarter may be compared and checked by those of another.

The account of the Barukzyes having made overtures to Shah Shooja requires confirmation, and is not likely to be true.

**No. 43.—Lieutenant Mackeson to Captain Wade.**

_Mithunkote, May 28, 1834._

My last authentic intelligence from the Shah's camp, was dated 19th April. The Shah was then at Shah Derra, five marches on this side of Candahar, with a small reserve, the main force of his army, under Shahzadah Timour, having gone on two marches in advance. I have the honor to forward the translation of a letter received from Dera Ghazee Khan, containing intelligence up to the 25th ultimo; but I cannot vouch for its authenticity, as it rests on the report of a cossid.

A rumour is gaining ground here of the Shah being in possession of Candahar, and of the Barukzye Sirdars having made overtures to him through the mother of Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan,—but this is mere rumour.

**No. 44.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.**

_Loodiana, June 15, 1834._

I have the honor to transmit an abstract of intelligence from Lahore, dated from the 30th ultimo to the 5th instant.

The Maharajah writes to his agent with me, that the letter of postulation addressed to him by Dost Mahomed Khan on the capture of Peshawur is couched in the most vaunting language; viz., that as soon as he and his brethren had disposed of Shah Shooja, they intended to attack the Sikhs, and drive them out of Peshawur,—a threat which his Highness views with contempt.

I find, by the Treaty concluded between the Shah and Runjeet Sing, that Peshawur is one of the places ceded by the former to the latter. The Maharajah has, therefore, possessed himself of it in virtue of his compact with Shooja.

**Abstract of Intelligence from Lahore, dated from the 30th May to the 5th June, 1834.**

_Maharajah Runjeet Sing_ received a letter from Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan on the 31st of May, stating, that, notwithstanding Sirdar Sultan Mahomed had this year given 10 Nuzzeraana horses more than usual, yet Kour Nao Nihal Sing had occupied Peshawur, which was not proper; and he hoped his Highness would adhere to
established engagements, and restore Sultan Mahomed Khan to his territory. The Maharajah, on hearing the contents of the letter, ordered 10 rupees to the bearer, and observed, he would consider what answer could be given.

On the 3rd of June, Abdul Ghear Khan, the son of Nawab Jubbbar Khan, visited the Maharajah, and made him a present of four Persian horses and two scimitars. His Highness gave him a seat on a "mondah," and inquired for some time about the affairs of Cabool, Candahar, and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk. He then desired the Nawab's son to write to Sultan Mahomed Khan, that if he would agree to serve the Maharajah with 5,000 sowars, he would receive a jagheer in the Jelalabad territory. Abdul Ghear Khan replied, that Sultan Mahomed Khan would never consent to such an offer.

A cossid arrived here on the 5th instant, in twelve days from Peshawur. He represented that the troops of the Maharajah were encamped near the Bala Hissar and other stations, within a circumference of five coss about Peshawur; that owing to a vast consumption, the wheat was selling there at 12 seers, and flour at eight or nine seers per rupee, and that in consequence the people were much dejected and distressed. Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan was halted in the hills of Mechnoo; while his brother, Peer Mahomed Khan, was in Cohaut, and Syed Mahomed Khan, another brother, in the fort of Hehtneggher. Haji Khan Kaker, a commander formerly in the service of Dost Mahomed Khan, and who, having deserted him, joined Sultan Mahomed Khan, was now encamped, with 1,000 or 2,000 men, in the hills of Khyber.

As it is reported that Shahzadah Timour, the son of Shah Shooja, is marching towards Cabool, the Dooranees and Gholamkhanels of that place, as well as the Chiefs of Mehmud and Nusefzye tribes, inhabiting the Peshawur territory, were proceeding to join him.

No. 45.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Loudiana, June 17, 1834.)

I have the honor to annex an abstract of intelligence from our newswriter in Cabool, dated from the 14th April to the 10th ultimo, containing news from Candahar, derived from the letters of the Barkzyes of that place to their brothers at Cabool.

2. The intelligence which I forwarded on the 7th instant, is of a later date, and may be relied on as correct.

3. I expect every moment to receive a report of a more decisive nature.

4. It is clear that the Candahar Rulers have not been able to keep the field against Shah Shooja, or they would not have retired within the fortifications of the city, there to sustain a siege.
5. An account, on the accuracy of which I can implicitly rely, mentions that the Barukzyes attempted to give battle to the Shah as he approached the precincts of Candahar, which was obstinately refused.

6. The simple Afghans, untutored in the modern art of war, considered this reluctance to close with them a proof of timidity and weakness, while those who can appreciate the subject, see in such a course that Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk has not been an inattentive observer of the system of strategy that prevails in our army, and that as far as his imperfect means will allow, he is applying it with perseverance in his present contest with his enemies.

7. Maharajah Runjeet Sing, in his letter to Weffa Begum, announcing the occupation of Peshawur, writes that he hopes soon to receive a letter of congratulation from her, on the Shah's capture of Candahar.

Abstract of Intelligence from Cabool, dated April 14 to May 10, 1834.

News from Candahar.

The regular report has not yet been received from Meerza Asker, the newswriter, stationed at Candahar; but on the 2nd of May a letter came from him, a copy of which I subjoin for your perusal.

On the 17th of April, Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk arrived at Kot (a fortress in the Shah's district, and on the day of the Eed, being the 20th of April, he intends to proceed to Pesheng. He sent a present, consisting of 60 cows and 200 rupees, to the syeds of that place, with a message that he would enter it on the day of the Eed. At the same time, he assured them that he would present them with a liberal donation annually, and begged their blessings.

The Sirdars of Candahar have, in consequence, left the city and marched to Futtehabad, attended with 3,000 sowars, 1,000 jazayerchees, and 2,000 infantry, besides 12 pieces of artillery and 40 shahceens.

To-morrow, being the 21st April, they intend to join Sadig Khan at Rebat. It is expected that the two parties will come to action after the Eed. Time will show to which God will give the victory. The Sirdars have now abandoned the design of sending their families to Cabool, and are engaged in preparing for a siege. All the gardens and buildings outside of the city have been levelled to the ground within gun-shot of the walls, and the poor classes of the people will, it is said, be turned out of the city. A large cannon has been removed from Gherisk, and planted upon the Shikarpore gateway.

On the 28th April a cossid arrived here from the Sirdars of Candahar, with letters from Dost Mahomed Khan, and Nawab Jubbar Khan. He is the same cossid whom I alluded to in my letter of the 21st of April, as having been sent as a spy by the Sirdars of Candahar to the camp of Shah Shooja. The letters were of the following purport:
Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk is not in great force, nevertheless we are apprehensive of the Doormans. Come as quickly as possible. If you only proceed as far as Mekher, it will be a relief.

The cossid represented that he had been living in the Shah’s camp until its arrival at Kot; that he had received an offer to enter his service, but refused.

On the 22nd April a cossid came to Cabool from Shikarpore, after a journey of twenty-eight days, from the date of the letters of which he was the bearer. The letters were to the effect, that the Sindians had made peace with the Shah for three and a half lacs of rupees, on condition of restoring to them Shikarpore, and other territories which he had occupied. On the conclusion of these terms the Shah had left Shikarpore, in which the Ameers had re-established their authority. The Sindians have further agreed that if Shah Shooja should possess himself of Candahar, which is the seat of government, they would pay him the tribute which they were formerly in the habit of paying, and restore to the Shah all the districts which before formed a part of the Doormans possessions. Of the whole stipulated sum the Sindians had only paid 1,71,000 rupees, and for the payment of the balance they sent their agent, Bahadar Khan Khoker, with orders to pay it to the Shah on the road.

On the 4th of May a cossid arrived here from Candahar. He represented to Dost Mahomed Khan that Shah Shooja had advanced as far as the village of Sokhteh, which is about two or three coss from Candahar in the direction of Shikarpore. The Sirdar observed that this man was a muleteer, and left Candahar before the other cossid; but I learn from Gholam Mahomed Khan, that he had come on the part of the Sirdars of Candahar and that Dost Mahomed Khan had concealed the truth. I doubt, however, the veracity of his remark; how could the Sirdar conceal the fact? The rumour here is, that the Shah had occupied Old Candahar.

On the 5th May Sher Mahomed Khan, a servant of Sirdar Kohan Dil Khan, came to Cabool with Futteh Alee Khan, who was sent by Dost Mahomed Khan, on the 10th of April, to the Sirdars of Candahar. They brought letters for the Sirdar, and Nawab Jubbar Khan. A copy of the letter to the address of the Nawab, I transmit for your information. It bore the seals and signature of all the three brothers of Candahar.

"After compliments.

"At the present time, being the 5th of April, we are encamped at Kirz, and have reason to thank God for his mercies. We hope that you are in the same state. Futteh Alee Khan lately arrived here with your letters; we have learned all their contents, as well as what the bearer mentioned verbally.

"The state of affairs in this quarter is as follows. Two days ago
the troops of Shah Shooja entered Pesheng. In the course of five or six days, it is probable that there will be an action between us. God is the giver of victories! We urge you to join us without delay, and tell Dost Mahomed Khan that instead of waiting to make preparations, he should proceed forthwith, in order that we may act in conjunction. If he delay his departure, which God forbid, it may be said that the harvest of all the family of Barukzyes will be scattered to the winds. Remember the proverb, 'Provide a remedy for an evil before it happens.' Take your course. By the grace of God we will exert ourselves on our part to the extent of our ability. For the rest what is written in the book of fate will come to pass.

"Other matters relating to the state of affairs here, you will learn from Futteh Alee Khan in person."

In their letter to Dost Mahomed Khan they write, "In whatever way you can, pray join us with the utmost expedition. If you cannot come immediately yourself, send one of your sons as soon as you possibly can." This letter was written in a very pressing manner.

Futteh Alee Khan mentioned that the Sindians had not yet paid the Shah more than 1,71,000 rupees of the stipulated sum; and that the Shah had in consequence confined Bahadar Khan, their agent, who was in attendance on the Shah, for compelling the payment of the rest of the money.

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No. 46.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Loodiana, June 17, 1834.

WHEN addressing you on the 17th December last, regarding the negotiations that had been passing between Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk and Runjeet Sing, I mentioned that I had been endeavouring to obtain a copy of the Treaty concluded between them without success, neither party appearing to be inclined to show it to me. On expressing a wish to see it, I was referred from the one to the other, without obtaining a sight of it from either. They did not then seem willing to admit me to their confidence, which is now explained by an article in the contract, on which I shall hereafter have occasion to comment.

If you will refer to my despatch of the 21st of November, 1831, to your predecessor in office, Mr. H. T. Prinsep, inclosing the translation of a note presented by Kazee Moolla Hossein, on the part of the Shah, to Runjeet Sing, inviting his Highness to state the conditions on which he was disposed to assist his master in recovering the kingdom of Cabool, and to the propositions with which Runjeet Sing met that overture on the part of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk; you will observe, that with one exception regarding Sinde, the Articles of the Treaty now
contracted, are nearly the same as those that were formerly proposed by the Maharajah.

The Treaty, though dated in March, (when I was in the vicinity of Mitthunkote), does not seem to have been exchanged until August last, at which period the Shah had established himself in some force at Shikarpore; a fact which hastened the ratification of it on Runjeet Sing’s part.

The negotiations between Shah Shooja-ool-Mookl were scarcely brought to a conclusion when intelligence arrived of the death of Meer Moorad Alee, the Hyderabed ruler, which diverted for a time the attention of the Ameers of Sinde from their discussions with the Shah, to a consideration of their own affairs. Domestic disensions existed in the family regarding the succession to the vacant seat of authority. Shah Shooja perceived that the period was propitious to him, and he has persevered in his demand of a contribution from them, and assumed an attitude of defiance, which ultimately led to a collision, in which the Sindians were severely defeated, and glad to make their peace with him, on terms that served at once to expose their weakness, and the strength that he had been acquiring while permitted to make a rendezvous of Shikarpore, preparatory to a descent on Cundahar.

The Articles of the Treaty now formed between Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, are 15 in number. That which was formerly proposed consisted of 17.

It is unnecessary that I should recapitulate each Article in its order of succession. I have stated that they differ in some respects from the propositions of the Maharajah in 1831, and it will be sufficient to notice these differences, and offer such remarks regarding the others as their importance may seem to deserve.

The following are the terms proposed, in the first instance, that have been entirely rejected, or modified in the present.

1st. That there should be an interview between the two parties, before the Shah set out on his expedition; and whenever the Maharajah might move in the direction of Peshawur, the Shah should meet him at that place.—Rejected.

2nd. That the Shah’s heir-apparent should always attend the Maharajah with a force, and accompanied by his family.—Rejected.

3rd. That the Shah should observe to send presents to the Maharajah at the Noo-Roz, and Dussera.—Agrees to send presents, but no particular days specified. The Maharajah receives the presents of the tributaries on the Noo-Roz, and Dussera. An acquiescence on the part of the Shah to their days of presentation, would have been equivalent to an open acknowledgment of allegiance to the Maharajah.

4th. That the Shah should give the Maharajah jewels to the amount of three lacs of rupees.—Rejected.

5th. That should the Maharajah be in want of an auxiliary force,
the Shah should send one of his sons.—Agrees to provide an auxiliary force when required: but does not bind himself to send any of his sons with it.

6th. That should any European gentleman be coming from Persia towards Hindoostan, he shall be allowed to pass, and be treated with respect, according to the subsisting Treaty of friendship between the British and Sikh Governments. Instead of this stipulation there is an Article, to the following effect:

“3. As agreeably to the Treaty established between the British Government and the Maharajah, no one can cross from the left to the right bank of the Sutledge, without a passport from the Maharajah, the same rule shall be observed regarding the passage of the Indus, whose waters join the Sutledge; and no one shall be allowed to cross the Indus, without the Maharajah’s permission.”

7th. That should the Contracting Parties engage conjointly in hostilities against Shikarpore the territories of the Sindians or others, the property captured shall be equally divided, as well as the revenues; and in the event of the Shah not sending any troops, prompt reclamation should be made. The substitution that has taken place in the foregoing Article forms the exception to which I have alluded. It is as follows:

“4. Regarding Shikarpore and the territory lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah through Captain Wade.”

I know not with what sentiments his Lordship may view the manner in which the name of the British Government has here been introduced, but as it has been done without any expressed sanction, and affects the interests of a third party, with which friendly relations exist, I have ventured to think that I should not err in pointing out to both parties, that it is not consistent with the law of nations, to use the name of a third party in such engagements, without previously consulting it; and his Excellency will perceive that in answering his Highness the Maharajah’s letter, as well as the one purposely addressed to Shah Shooja, I have drawn their particular attention to the impropriety of disregarding this rule on the present occasion.

I will now revert to the remaining propositions of the Maharajah that have been rejected or modified.

8. That the slaughter of kine should be prohibited in the Cabool territory by proclamation. The Shah agrees to issue such a prohibition only when the two armies may be serving together.

9. That the sandal portals of Ghiznee should be restored, when the Shah shall have well established his authority.—Rejected.

10. That any property taken from the Barukzyes in Cabool, Pesah-wur, and Jelalabad, should be equally divided.—Agrees to such a divi-
sion only in the event of an auxiliary force of the Maharajah being present at the capture, when the Shah will send him a portion of the captured property in the way of friendship.

In the revised Article there is no specification of the places at which the capture may be made; and even where they are enumerated, it cannot fail to be remarked that Runjeet Sing has abstained from making any allusion whatever to Candahar, and the countries beyond Cabool.

11. That should the Shah's officers infringe any Articles of the Treaty, the Maharajah's troops shall coerce them.—Rejected.

12. That should the Barukzyes attend the Maharajah to Cabool, the Shah and the Maharajah should agree to make a suitable provision for them.—Rejected.

By that Article of the Treaty that relates to Peshawur, it will be seen that Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk has really transferred the sovereignty of that territory to the Maharajah, and that his Highness has not taken it in opposition to the Shah, as those who are ignorant of the real merits of the transaction, infer; a motive for the capture of the place, which however unjust to its former possessors, accounts for the congratulatory tone of the letter which his Highness has written to the Waffa Begum. He concludes his letter to her by expressing a hope that he may soon receive intelligence of the Shah having taken Candghar.

The greatest benefit derived by Runjeet Sing from the present Treaty is in Shah Shooja having formally renounced, on the part of himself, his heirs, successors, and the whole race of Suddozyes, all right and title to such tracts of country, lying on both banks of the Indus, as have been wrested by the Sikhs from the Afghans, since the dissolution of the kingdom of Cabool.

I subjoin that Article which contains the Shah's renunciation of supremacy to those possessions; viz. Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk disclaims all title, on the part of himself, his heirs, successors, and all the Suddozyes, to whatever territories lying on either bank of the river Indus may be possessed by the Maharajah, viz.; Cashmere, including its limits E. W. N. and South, together with the fort of Attock, Chetich, Hazeeza Khebel, Aub, with its dependencies on the left bank of the river aforesaid; and on the right bank Peshawur, with the Eusezye territory, Kheteks, Hesht Nager, Meechnee, Cohaut, and all places dependent on Peshawur, as far as the Khyber Pass, Bennoo, the Vizeerey territory, Dour, Tonk, Gorauk, Kalabagh, and Khush Halgher, with their dependent districts, Dera Ismael Khan, Kote-Mitthun and their dependent territory. Sengher, Heren, Dajel Hajeepoor, Rajupoor, and the three Ketchees, as well as Menkerah, with its district, and the province of Mooltan, situated on the left bank. These countries and places are considered to be the property, and to form the estate, of the Maharajah. The Shah neither has nor will have any concern with them. They
belong to the Maharajah and his posterity from generation to generation.

Before the capture of Peshawur, his Highness had actually acquired and introduced his administration into the whole of the places enumerated as lying on the right bank of the Indus, with exception to the following, viz.: Bennoo, the Vizeerey territory, Dour Tonk, Kalabagh, Khush Halgher, Dera Ismael Khan, and Rajunpoor; and these are bound in tributary allegiance to him, excepting the Vizeerey country, to which his authority has never been extended, and which scarcely ever acknowledged more than a nominal dependence on the Affghan monarchy, even in its vigour. The inhabitants are a wild pastoral race of Affghans, and the territory strong, from its position within the ramifications of the Lahrun range. It is on the great commercial road that leads from Cabool to Derabend, and commands some other passes to that city from the banks of the Indus; but it is its contiguity to the possessions of the Maharajah that lie in the vale of that river, below Kalabagh, and its celebrity for a good breed of horses, that have induced him, I imagine, to stipulate for its annexation to his Government.

Dera Ismael Khan is held by Sher Mahomed Khan, the son of Hafiz Mahomed, the late Nawab of Menkera; on the seizure of whose country, in 1821, Runjeet Singh obliged him to retire to the right bank of the Indus and settled on him in jagheer, the district of Dera Ismael Khan, which had formerly been a part of his estate. He died in 1825. The late defeat of the Sikhs in the Bennoo territory, gave occasion to his Highness to design the confiscation of the only remaining portion of the once extensive possessions of the family, and to make Sher Mahomed Khan a stipendiary pensioner. As the Nawab had, however, really nothing to do with the cause of the failure, and both he and his father had served the Maharajah faithfully, from the time that they had come under his yoke, the Sirdars of the court exclaimed with one accord against the act; and his Highness, yielding to their advice, has left the son in the enjoyment of his jagheer. I was introduced to him by Runjeet Singh, at Noor Miani, in my last mission to the Punjab.

Tonk, Dour, Bennoo, Gorauk, Kalabagh, and Khush Halgher, were forced to submit to the authority of the ruler of Lahore, in 1825, and are possessed by petty Affghan Chiefs, who pay a tribute of 60,000 rupees to the Maharajah; but which is never exacted without the presence of a force. The whole of these districts had been the object of predatory extortions in preceding years, but they did not become decidedly tributary to Lahore before the period I have mentioned.

Rajunpoor belongs to Shah Nawaz Khan, the living representative of the Kahlora family, the former rulers of Sinde. It was conferred on his grandfather by Timou Shah, the King of Cabool, in 1786, when the Kahloras were expelled from the Sindian territory. The present possessor has been confirmed in his estate by Runjeet Singh, on a
trifling annual tribute of four or five horses. He is favoured by his Highness in consequence of his hereditary claim to the Government of Sinde. His connection with the Maharajah commenced in 1821. I saw Shah Nuwaz Khan in my visit to Dera Ghazee Khan last year.

The concession obtained by the ruler of Lahore, by the Article above quoted, secures to him, his heirs and successors, not only the entire sovereignty of the Punjaub, but also of the river Indus, and the territories that immediately bound it on either side, after its escape from Little Tibet, to the confuence of its tributaries at Mitthumkote.

Besides the foregoing Article, there is one by which Shah Shoojaool-Moolk has agreed to address Runjeet Sing on terms of equality. He thus recognizes that chieftain as a sovereign, of the same rank as himself, and abrogates every pretension to his dominions.

(Inclusion 1.) Maharajah Runjeet Sing to Captain Wade.

After compliments.

By the grace of God, at the present auspicious moment, I have been lighted by the arrival of the following happy tidings. The Barukzye Sirdars, destitute of foresight, having arrayed themselves at the dawn of day, with about 12,000 horse and foot, in hostility against my troops, Kour Nao Nikil Sing took a spear in his hand, and prepared to oppose them with great presence of mind, in concert with Sirdar Hurree Sing, Nelwah, and Mr. Court, when a discharge of artillery and musketry commenced. At length the Barukzyes, repining at their temerity, sought safety in flight, and being dispersed on all sides, Peshawur fell into the hands of the officers of my government, who extended their protection to the inhabitants of the place, and their property. In the evening there was an illumination in the city, which was hailed by the Hindoos and Mahomedans of the country as the harbinger of their deliverance from the hands of their tyrants.

Adverting to the everlasting relations of friendship that distinguish the union of the British and Sikh Governments, and which like the sun, are shining and resplendent, and also to the friendly light that sheds its brilliant influence on the hearts of the two parties, like the ruby of Behdekshan, so that those who, from their gloomy and perverse minds, and their want of penetration, could not view without jealousy the friendship subsisting between the two high States, have become ashamed of themselves. I offer you my congratulations on the victory gained by Kour Nao Nihal Sing, whose intrepidity and intelligence of character you predicted.

Now as the Treaty has been contracted between Shah Shoojaool-Moolk and myself, a copy of which I have sent to Lalal Kishen Chend, my agent at Loodiana, been duly adjusted, and I hope soon to receive the welcome news of the Shah's conquest of Candahar.
(Inclosure 2.)—*Treaty concluded between Maharajah Runjeet Sing and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, dated the 12th of March, 1833.

**Preamble.**

Relations of friendship having been firmly established between Maharajah Runjeet Sing and Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, so that there neither is, nor ever shall be, any alienation or difference of interest existing between them, they agree to adopt the following Articles in consideration of the terms of goodwill and friendship by which they are reciprocally actuated.

1. Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk disclaims all title on the part of himself, his heirs, successors, and all the Suddozees, to whatever territories lying on either bank of the river Indus may be possessed by the Maharajah; viz., Cashmere, including its limits E. W. N. and S., together with the fort of Attock, Chetch, Khebel, Aub, with its dependencies on the left bank of the aforesaid river; on the right bank, Peshawur, with the Eusefzye territory, Kheteks, Hesht Nagor, Mechnee, Cohaut, and all places dependent on Peshawur, as far as the Khyber Pass, Bennool the Vizeeree territory, Dour, Tonk, Gorauk, Kalabagh, and Kush Halgher, with their dependent districts, Dera Ismael Khan, and its dependency together with Dera Ghazee Khan, Kot Mithun, and their dependent territory, Songher, Heren, Dajel, Hajeepoor, Rajunpoor, and the three Ketches, as well as Menkerah, with its district, and the province of Mooltan, situated on the left bank. These countries and places are considered to be the property, and to form the estate of the Maharajah, the Shah neither has, nor will have, any concern with them; they belong to the Maharajah and his posterity from generation to generation.

2. The people of the country on the other side of Khyber, will not be suffered to commit robberies, or aggression, or any disturbances on this side. If any defaulter of either State, who has embezzled the revenue, take refuge in the territory of the other, each party engages to surrender him.

3. As agreeably to the Treaty established between the British Government and the Maharajah, no one can cross from the left to the right bank of the Sutledge, without a passport from the Maharajah, the same rule shall be observed regarding the passage of the Indus, whose waters join the Sutledge; and no one shall be allowed to cross the Indus without the Maharajah's permission.

4. Regarding Shikarpore, and the territory of Sinde, lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah will abide by whatever may be settled

* This Treaty, though given in the selection presented to the House on the 18th ultimo, is repeated in this place as being particularly referred to in the preceding letter of Captain Wade, and as having what appears to be the correct date of 1833 instead of 1834. The latter date was affixed to the copy received from India, from which the copy was last presented to Parliament; but the copy now presented, has the date of 1833.—India Board, March, 1839.
as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.

5. When the Shah shall have established his authority in Cabool and Candahar, he will annually send the Maharajah the following articles; 55 high-bred horses of approved colours and pleasant paces, 11 Persian scimitars, 7 Persian poignards, 25 good mules, fruits of various kinds, both dry and fresh; and sirdars or musk melons of a sweet and delicate flavour (to be sent throughout the year), by the way of Cabool River to Peshawur; grapes, pomegranates, apples, quinces, almonds, raisins, pistas or chronels, an abundant supply of each; as well as pieces of satin of every colour, chogas of fur, kimkhobs wrought with gold and silver, and Persian carpets, altogether to the number of 101 pieces; all these articles the Shah will continue to send every year to the Maharajah.

6. Each party shall address the other on terms of equality.

7. Merchants of Afghanistan who will be desirous of trading to Lahore, Umritsir, or any other part of the Maharajah's possessions, shall not be stopped or molested in their way; on the contrary, strict orders shall be issued to facilitate their intercourse; and the Maharajah engages to observe the same line of conduct on his part, in respect to traders who may wish to proceed to Afghanistan.

8. The Maharajah will yearly send to the Shah the following articles in the way of friendship; viz., 55 pieces of shawls, 25 pieces of muslin, 11 dooputts, five pieces of kimkhob, five scarfs, five turbans, 55 loads of Bareh rice (peculiar to Peshawur.)

9. Any of the Maharajah's officers who may be deputed to Afghanistan to purchase horses, or on any other business, as well as those who may be sent by the Shah into the Punjab for the purchasing piece-goods or shawls, &c., to the amount of 11,000 rupees, will be treated by both sides with due attention, and every facility will be afforded to them in the execution of their commission.

10. Whenever the armies of the two States may happen to be assembled at the same place, on no account shall the slaughter of kine be permitted to take place.

11. In the event of the Shah taking an auxiliary force from the Maharajah, whatever booty may be acquired from the Barukzyes in jewels, horses, arms, great or small, shall equally be divided between the two Contracting Parties. If the Shah should succeed in obtaining possession of their property without the assistance of the Maharajah's troops, the Shah agrees to send a portion of it by his own agent to the Maharajah in the way of friendship.

12. An exchange of missions charged with letters and presents, shall constantly take place between the two parties.

13. Should the Maharajah require the aid of any of the Shah's
troops, the Shah engages to send a force, commanded by one of his principal officers: in like manner the Maharajah will furnish the Shah when required, with an auxiliary force, composed of Mahomedans, and commanded by one of his principal officers as far as Cabool. When the Maharajah may go to Peshawur, the Shah will depute a Shahzadah to visit him, on which occasions the Maharajah will receive and dismiss him with the honor and consideration due to his rank and dignity.

14. The friends and enemies of the one shall be the friends and the enemies of the other.

15. Both parties cordially agree to the foregoing Articles: there shall be no deviation from them. The present Treaty shall be considered binding for ever.

(Inclosure 3.)—Captain Wade to Maharajah Runjeet Sing.

June 7, 1834.

After compliments.

I have had the honor of receiving your friendly letter, in which you inform me of the occupation of Peshawur by Kour Nao Nihal Sing, and have acquired a perfect knowledge of its contents. A copy of your Highness’s letter, accompanied by a translation, shall be submitted for the information of his Excellency the Right Honorable the Governor-General.

What you write regarding the everlasting relations of friendship that distinguish the union of the British and Sikh States, and that they vie with the sun in splendour and brilliancy, is very just and true; and please God, their connection will always continue to flourish and increase in proportion to the good wishes of the friends of both. The offer of congratulations on the event that you have announced, rests with his Excellency the Governor-General. I am merely a servant of Government, and do not feel myself at liberty to assume that office without his Lordship’s consent.

Your Highness observes, that now as the Treaty that has been concluded between Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk and yourself, and a copy of which has been sent to Lalah Kishen Chend, your agent at Loodiana, has been duly adjusted, Lalah Kishen Chend having submitted a copy of the Treaty in question to my perusal, every part of it has become known to me.

The 4th Article is, I perceive, as follows: “Regarding Shikarpore and the territory of Sinde, lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah agrees to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.” As it is not consistent with the laws of nations to introduce the name of a third party into such engagements, without previously consulting it, I regret that your Highness should not have duly adverted to the importance of observing this rule before you allowed the name of my
Government or myself to be inserted in the present Treaty; and a sense of duty impels me, therefore, to point out to you the irregularity of that act.

Consider me among your Highness’s sincere wishers, and continue to delight me by the receipt of your friendly letters, assuring me of your health and welfare.

(Inclosure 4.)—Captain Wade to Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk.

After Address. June 7, 1834.

It will be well impressed on your Majesty’s mind, that when I had the honor of seeing you at Mendot, I informed you that my Government could take no part in the negotiations that were passing between yourself and Maharajah Runjeet Sing.

I have lately perused a copy of the Treaty that has been concluded between your Majesty and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and have learned the whole of its contents.

It is mentioned in the 4th Article of it, “that regarding Shikarpore, and the territory of Sinde, lying on the right bank of the Indus, the Shah agrees to abide by whatever may be settled as right and proper, in conformity with the happy relations of friendship subsisting between the British Government and the Maharajah, through Captain Wade.” I regret that your Majesty should not have paid due consideration to my representation, and inserted the name of my Government and myself in the present Treaty. A sense of duty impels me, therefore, to point out to you the irregularity of this act.

Be pleased to honor me by the continued arrival of your Majesty’s kind and gracious letters.

No. 47.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. Loodiana, July 19, 1834.

(Extract.)

There is a report received, via Peshawur, of a general action having been fought between the Shah and the united army of the Barukzyes, which had terminated in Shah Shooja’s complete defeat, the dispersion of his army, and his subsequent flight towards Herat.

Abstract of Intelligence from Lahore, dated from the 27th June to the 3rd July, 1834.

On the 3rd instant the writer received a letter from Gholam Rassul Khan, at Mooltan, stating that on the 1st June there arrived a cossid from Cabool, after a journey of 14 days. He was the bearer of many letters directed to Assa Mil, as well as to the other sahookars, which represented that Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan had assembled all the merchants and great men, and informed them that Shah Shooja having occupied Candahar, and being about to proceed against Cabool, it was the Sirdar’s intention to send his family by the way of Bameean to Balkh and Bokhara, while he himself intended to oppose the Shah, or
tender his allegiance, or to follow his family. In fact, said he, I will execute one of these plans. You are at liberty to adopt whatever you think convenient for your own interests. The cossid further stated, that Dost Mahomed Khan had in consequence sent his family towards the hills of Bameean, and proceeded himself with about 10,000 men to Arghendeh, which is 25 coss to the south-west of Cabool, where there is one road which leads to Candahar, and another to the hill of Bameean. Dost Mahomed Khan had received a letter from Shah Shooja, offering to forgive past offences if he would appear before His Majesty. He answered, that his faults were too numerous to be forgiven, and that he felt ashamed to present himself. Some of the sowers belonging to Ameer Mahomed Khan, the brother of Dost Mahomed Khan, who came to the city of Cabool, represented that Shah Shooja was halted near Candahar, in the garden of Ahmed Shah, in which stands that monarch's mausoleum, while his troops were encamped round it, and that Shahzadah Jahangher, the son of Prince Kamran, had joined him, accompanied by a party of 1,000 sowers.

No. 48.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Loodiana, July 25, 1834.

(Extract.)

In my letter to your address of the 19th instant, I mentioned the prevalence of a report of Shah Shooja having been defeated in a general action with the Barukzyes. On the 21st instant, Maharajah Runjeet Sing's agent received a letter from his Highness, stating that Sirdar Huree Sing, his commander at Peshawur, had reported the same intelligence, but that he waited for a confirmation of it before he could credit its accuracy, as the Shah was known to be superior both in numbers and discipline to the Barukzyes; to have established his authority in the Candahar territory, (though he had not taken that city,) and to have been joined not only by all the Dooranine Chiefs, but also by the peasantry of the country; but it was not easy to believe the complete dispersion of his army at one blow, as was reported to be the case. Another report received from the Maharajah has, however, confirmed the truth of his previous information; and from the circumstantial manner in which the details of the battle are now given, I am inclined to think that there is no doubt of its authenticity. M. Ventura has also received an account of the action from M. Court, who is now at Peshawur. A translation of the one sent by Runjeet Sing is annexed. It appears that the Peshawur Sirdars, Sultan Mahomed Khan and Peer Mahomed Khan, had not formed a junction with their brethren on the present occasion, but were at Jalalabad. Both statements confirm the bravery and perseverance with which Shah Shooja sustained the combat. The few disciplined troops he had with him are said indeed to have vigorously repulsed the Barukzye troops, and the disastrous termination of the day to the Shah seems to have been owing to the rash confidence of his
troops in the superiority which they gained over the Barukzyes at the beginning of the action.

Letter from Peshawur, dated July 9, 1834.

A merchant's cossid, who has just arrived here in three days and a half from Cabool, relates that Azim, a Khedmutgar belonging to Dost Mahomed Khan, had reached that city in five days from Candahar, with a letter from the Sirdar, who writes, that notwithstanding the repeated messages of Shah Shooja, and the anxious desire expressed by him to come to terms of reconciliation, the Barukzyes would not consent; that at the time that the Shah had drawn out the whole of his army, and was proceeding to assault the city, Dost Mahomed Khan, who was halted at Kelah Azim Khan, distant about five coss from Candahar, on the Cabool road, marched and attacked him; and the Candaharees having at the same time sallied forth and joined Dost Mahomed's army, a severe action ensued, in which about 5,000 men were slain on both sides. Ahmed Khan, the son of Nawab Lamud Khan, killed, and Jeddao Khan, Nawab Mahomed Zeman Khan, and Nawab Jubbak Khan, Barukzyes, wounded. At length, after a hard struggle, Shah Shooja, not finding himself able to maintain his position, was totally defeated and obliged to fly. He has gone towards Herat, accompanied by 200 men. Mahomed Akber Khan, the son of Dost Mahomed Khan, was in pursuit of him with 2,000 sowars; 12 pieces of artillery, besides the Zembuor Khana, and every kind of property belonging to the Shah, fell into the hands of Dost Mahomed Khan; and four pieces of cannon have fallen to the lot of the Candaharees. The city of Cabool was illuminated on the occasion, and the cossid represents that just after he had quitted Jelalabad, he heard the discharge of the artillery at that place in honor of the victory.

No. 49.—Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Bhooj Residency, August 7, 1834.

An express reached me yesterday afternoon from the native agent in Sinde, with authentic intelligence of the total defeat of Shah Shoojaool-Moolk by the confederated Affghan Chiefs.

It appears that Dost Mahomed joined with reinforcements from Cabool on the 27th of June, and the King on this raised the siege of Candahar, and moved to the village of Abassabad in the plain, where the Sirdars attacked him on the 29th. The battle is stated to have been a drawn one that day, and was renewed on the morning of the 22nd, when about 7 A.M. Kohen Dil Khan charged the guns with his division of horse, and took the whole of them and the ammunition wagons, after killing Campbell Sahib, (who had remained at his post all night, notwithstanding he had before received two wounds from
matchlock balls,) two nephews of Simunder Khan, the King's Zebt Begee, and about eighty of the artillerymen.

It is supposed the King has taken the road to Herat. He had crossed the Urghundah river, and was several miles distant before he was missed. The Rohillas fought with great valour, and stood their ground even after the King's flight, till they were quite overwhelmed by numbers. The Affghans in the King's service all behaved disgracefully.

Bahadar Khan Khoker (the Sinde Nawab), Agha Neks, the King's chief eunuch, with one young prince, and about 4,000 people of all kinds, have arrived at Gundie in the Beloochee country. The latter and the Agha, it is said, all intend to return to Loodiana.

No. 50.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
Loodiana, August 13, 1834.

(Extract.)

ALTHOUGH many days elapsed after the receipt of the report forwarded to Runjeet Sing by the Barukzyes, of Shah Shooja having been defeated, without any confirmation of it being received from other quarters, the fact of his defeat is now fully confirmed, both by accounts from Shikarpore, and fugitives from his army who have reached Loodiana. The brunt of the action was confined to the two battalions of infantry commanded by Mr. Campbell, which the Shah had organized. Dost Mahomed Khan and his brethren bore ample testimony to the bravery of these troops in their letter to Nao Nihal Sing; and I hear that he immediately entertained Mr. Campbell and the survivors in his service. Mr. Campbell himself received three wounds in the action. The men composing these battalions were almost all Hindoostanies, and the firmness that they evinced, is said to have astonished an enemy who had never been accustomed to act against such troops, but not being supported by the Dooraneees they were obliged to yield. Shah Shooja is ascertained to have taken the road to Herat.

No. 51.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
Loodiana, August 17, 1834.

SIR,

I HAVE the honor to forward an abstract of intelligence from our newswriter at Lahore, dated from the 25th to the 31st ultimo. The letter addressed to Runjeet Sing by Dost Mahomed Khan is nearly to the same effect as the one written by the confederate Barukzye Chiefs to his grandson, a copy of which accompanied my despatch of the 27th ultimo. There is a report that Shah Shooja has surprised and taken the Barukzye frontier fortress of Gherisk, situated on the river Helmund, while Simunder Khan has rallied the fugitives of his army at Shal. It appears that the Shah contrived to carry off all his treasure, and four pieces of his horse artillery. Shahzadah Jahanheer, the eldest son of the Herat ruler, and who is charged with the Government
of Furrah, is said to be in rebellion against his father, and to be acting
in conjunction with Shah Shooja. The defeat of the Shah before
Candahar may, perhaps, be fatal to every hope of his restoration; but
the divided interests and independent rights hitherto possessed by the
Baruksye rulers in the government of the country, render the consoli-
dation of the kingdom of Cabool under Dost Mahomed Khan, a very
improbable event without foreign aid.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Signed)  C. M. WADE.

Abstract of Intelligence from Lahore, from July 25 to 31, 1834.

On the 25th of July, Moorad Alee Shah was desired to state whe-
ther he had received any recent news regarding M. Ventura; he said
that he had not. Misdardea Pundit and other astronomers of Lahore
were then admitted to the Durbar, when the Maharajah directed them to
consult the stars, and ascertain which of the belligerent parties in
Afghanistan was victorious. The astronomers were of different opi-
nions; some said that Shah Shooja had gained a victory, while others
represented that he had been defeated. The courtiers stated that the
common report in the city was that the Shah had defeated his enemies,
and occupied Candahar, while the Baruksyes were put to flight. His
Highness listened, but remained silent.

A letter was received from Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan on the
26th instant, announcing his victory over Shah Shooja, and stating
that as the Maharajah had deprived his brethren Sirdar Sultan Maho-
med Khan, Peer Mahomed Khan, and Seid Mahomed Khan, of the
territory of Peshawur, he hoped that his Highness would restore them
to their possessions, when they would continue to pay him the usual
tribute in horses, &c. On hearing the contents of the letter, Runjeet
Sing ordered a khelant of four pieces to the bearer, besides a present
of 25 rupees in money, and delivered a letter in reply, saying that he
was not disposed to interfere with the territory of the Peshawur Sirdars,
and would have been satisfied with taking the long-established tribute
which they paid in horses; but that Kour Nao Nihal Sing, the son of
Kour Kherek Sing, had occupied that territory of his own accord, they
should send therefore their agent to him through Kour Nao Nihal, and
that he (the Maharajah) after charging the agent with some communica-
tions, would dismiss him; that after the rainy season it was his
Highness's own intention to proceed in that direction. Sirdar Ram
was directed on the 27th instant to forward, through Lalah Kishen
Chend, the letter which the Maharajah had received from Dost Maho-
med Khan, to Captain Wade. He replied, very well. A letter to the
following effect was received from Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan:
"I lately addressed a letter to you, reporting the defeat of Shah
Shooja, which has ere now I hope met your perusal. At present I am
preparing to depute Yaqub Alee Khan to your Highness’s court, charged with a horse, &c. He will soon proceed on his mission; but I rely on being restored to my territory.” The Maharajah made the cossid a present of ten rupees, and dictated a letter to be delivered in reply, urging him to send the intended present without delay, when his Highness would take into consideration the grant of a jagheer to him. On the 29th instant a despatch was received from Bahadar Khan, Runjeet Sing’s newswriter, stationed at Dera Ismael Khan, in which he stated that the Nawab of that place had lately received news of Shah Shooja’s defeat, but not being satisfied of the truth of the report, he had despatched a pair of cossids to Candahar, in order to ascertain the exact state of affairs in that quarter.

No. 52.—Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Bhoor Residency, August 29, 1834.

With reference to my letter, No. 293, of the 7th instant, in which I announced the defeat of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, that I have received further details of the battle, through the native agent in Sinde (who obtained them from an eye-witness), which do not differ materially from those I formerly reported.

2. The King is stated during the first day to have driven the confederated Chiefs several times back under the walls of the city, and on the morning of the second day, Kohen Dil-Khan’s division of horse captured two guns (not the whole park), which Mr. Campbell retook, together with four guns of the enemy; but in this effort that gentleman was unfortunately wounded, and made prisoner; and the instant His Majesty learned this, he lost all hope, and made preparations for flight, on observing which the consternation became general, and the whole army dispersed.

3. The confederated Chiefs, in a letter to the Ameers of Sinde, rate the loss of the Royal troops at 4,000 men, and that of their side at 700 or 800 only. They have put Mr. Campbell under care of their best medical officer, and have taken all the Rohillahs who fought so bravely for the King, into their own service.

4. The Hakeem of Shikarpore reports, in a letter received by the Ameers this day (18th August), that the King, instead of going to Herat, had taken refuge with Saloo Khan, alias Pusund Khan, in the fort of Lashk; that he had about 1,000 men with him; and that he had written to Simunder Khan, who is at Shal, on the northern frontier of Beloochistan, with 4,000 men and some treasure, to join him without delay.

5. The same letter states that the whole of the confederated Chiefs were about to set off for Cabool, leaving Mehr Dil Khan in charge of
Candahar, in consequence of intelligence they had of the arrangements of the Sikhs for advancing to Cabool. Nao Nihal Sing has already gained over the important and refractory tribes of Shukurdurruh and Durrue Khyberee, and three forts are about to be built in the celebrated Pass bearing the latter name. He is also completely repairing the fortifications of the city of Peshawur, and mounting cannon on the works.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) HENRY POTTINGER.

No. 53.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Loodiana, September 7, 1834.

SIR,

I have the honor to forward the translation of a letter which I have just received from our newswriter at Lahore, dated the 3rd instant, announcing the receipt of intelligence, via Peshawur, of Shah Shooja being again in force, and of the Sirdars of Candahar having applied to Dost Mahomed Khan, who had returned to Cabool, for his assistance to oppose the Shah a second time.

2. Although this report requires confirmation, and it is not probable that Shah Shooja could have resumed the siege of Candahar so quickly after his late defeat, as is reported, people are not altogether inclined to discredit that part of the intelligence which relates to the Shah having arrived at Lash, nor of Simunder Khan having made a diversion in his favour, by the seizure of some strong place, if not of Kelat in the Beloochee country. Saloo Khan, the Governor of Lash, has always been considered a well-assured friend of Shah Shooja; and nothing is more likely than that the ex-King would throw himself, in the first instance, on his friendship and hospitality. The general opinion is, that the Shah will renew the contest, and Affghanistan continue, as it has hitherto been, a prey to the civil war of the Suddozyes and Barukzyes, neither party being supposed to possess the requisite power and resources of consolidating its authority.

3. Dost Mahomed Khan is stated to be actively engaged in preparing to advance on Peshawur to attack the Sikhs, who have at present an army of 20,000 men at that place, and have strongly fortified the Bala Hissar for its defence.

4. I have at length had a report from Meer Keramut Alee, dated the 7th ultimo, giving an account of the late occurrences at Candahar, and of the ratification of an offensive and defensive alliance between Shahzadah Kamran and Mahomed Meerza, the son of Abbas Meerza. The Persians had resigned their claim to Ghorian, and released Yar Mahomed Khan, who had arrived at Herat. An envoy from Mahomed Meerza had accompanied him. Keramut Alee endeavours to account for the long interruption which occurred in the receipt of his despatches by the troubled state of the country, and the consequent difficulty of
communication; which may be partly true as regards the road between Cabool and Candahar; but between the former places and Peshawur opportunities of communicating with me have happened, of which he might have availed himself. Extracts from his present report shall be submitted when I can find time to translate them.

5. In the Lahore intelligence, which I now send, his Excellency the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council will be sorry to learn that there are symptoms of the return of the illness with which Maharajah Runjeet Sing was affected last year.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.  
(Signed)  C. M. WADE.

Intelligence from Lahore, dated the 3rd of September, 1834.

Intelligence has been received here from Peshawur regarding Shah Shooja, the substance of which I transcribe for your information.

After his defeat the Shah went to the fort of Lash, which is situated between Seistan and Furrah about 10 marches distant from Candahar, and is in the possession of Saloo Khan, while Shahzadah Timour and Simunder Khan, with about 7,000 or 8,000 horse and foot, retired towards Shikarpore; on their way to which they occupied by stratagem, the fort of Kelat, possessed by Mehrab Khan Beloochee, and, having confined that Chief, took possession of the whole of his property, including his treasure and artillery. After the capture of that place, the Shahzadah, leaving a part of his troops in that country, for the purpose of keeping the people in order retrograded towards Candahar. Shah Shooja was also on his way to that city, with a force which he had collected. On receiving this information, the Sirdars of Candahar wrote to Dost Mahomed Khan, and requested his assistance again. He replied, that as the Sikhs had established themselves at Peshawur, and threatened Cabool, he feared that, if he proceeded to assist them, Cabool would also be taken out of his hand.

Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan is now at Cabool. Besides 12 pieces of cannon, horses, camels, &c., belonging to Shah Shooja, he has brought with him to Cabool Mr. Campbell, Janiruddin Khan, Risaldar, Fateh Khan, Jusim Khan and Halee Bekhsh, the officers who were lately in the regiment of lancers, as prisoners of war. He has engaged Mr. Campbell in his service, and given him charge of a battalion and six pieces of artillery. Janiruddin Khan and his companions have also been offered service, which they have refused. They intend to join the Shah.

Dost Mahomed Khan has lately sent Hajee Khan towards the hills to coerce and assemble the tribes in that quarter, while he himself is night and day employed in recruiting troops and in repairing his artillery, as well as in making other military preparations, with the in
tention of proceeding towards Jelalabad. Sirdar Sultan Mahomed Khan is at Cabool, and is treated with great consideration and kindness by Dost Mahomed Khan. Mahomed Hussan, son of the late Yar Mahomed Khan, of Peshawur, together with Moorad Alee Nazir, are now at Peshawur, with Kour Nao Nihal Sing, waiting the arrival of some horses from Cabool, when they will proceed to Lahore. Mansur Khan has applied to the Kour to rent the Haslit Nagar territory from him at 1,125,000 rupees; but nothing has hitherto been settled. Lalah Amant Rum has been appointed to the judicial administration of Peshawur.

An intermittent fever is raging violently at Peshawur. Nearly half of the Sikh army stationed there, are suffering from it.

According to long established usage, Runjeet Sing intended to proceed on the occasion of the festival of Amawas, which takes place in the month of Bhadoor, to the holy tank of Tuon Turan, about five coss from Umritisir; but during the last four or five days he has had a slight attack of diarrhoea, and he has also been visited with a return of the affection which he had last year, in consequence of which he has been obliged to relinquish his design of going to the above-mentioned bathing-place, and has celebrated the festival here.

No. 54.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Loodiana, September 25, 1834.

Dost Mahomed Khan is said to be making great exertions. He has raised the whole of the Mahomedan population of the neighbouring countries to join him, by preaching a holy war; and means to attack the Sikhs in three divisions; one to proceed by the way of Bergish to Cohaut, and take possession of that territory; another to enter into the valley of Peshawur by Bajoor; and the third, headed by Dost Mahomed Khan himself, to advance by the Khyber Pass, on the high road between Cabool and Peshawur. On Runjeet Sing's part great preparations are also making to give the Affghans a warm reception. His Highness has at present 25,000 men at and near Peshawur, and is assembling the whole of his remaining disposable troops with the intention of leading them himself to their support. Many well-informed persons are of opinion that the fate of Affghanistan depends on the issue of the approaching contest, which must either confirm or destroy the power of the Sikhs in that country. Runjeet Sing is determined not to let go his hold on Peshawur, while Dost Mahomed Khan and the other Affghan rulers are equally resolved to stake their political existence on the recapture of that place.

No. 55.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

Loodiana, December 29, 1834.

I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter from Lieutenant
Mackeson, dated 27th instant, reporting Shah Shooja’s arrival at Goondava, on his way to Shikarpore and Loodiana. It appears that the Shah, after collecting a force at Lash, proceeded to Furrah, where he expected to be joined by some troops from Shahzadah Kamran. Failing in that hope of support, he resolved to fly to Kelat, by the desert of Seistan, and is reported to have reached that place, with great difficulty, after enduring severe privations, and the loss of many of his followers from hunger and thirst.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnagthen, Esq.  
(Signed)  
C. M. WADE.

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No. 56.—Lieutenant Mackeson to Captain Wade.

SIR,  
Rana Wattoo, Bahawulpore Frontier, Dec. 27, 1834.

A letter which has just reached me from Ahmedpoor mentions, on good authority, the flight of Shah Shooja from Furrah to Kelat, accompanied by two other persons, and closely pursued by Sirdar Rehem Dil Khan, one of the Candahar Chiefs. The Shah arrived safely at Kelat, and the Barukzye Chief, Rehem Dil Khan, on reaching the place soon after, demanded the surrender of the Shah’s person from Meer Mehrab Khan, but this the Beloochee Chief refused. It was finally agreed between Sirdar Rehem Dil Khan and Meer Mehrab Khan that the latter should not harbour him, and the former should give up his pursuit of him. Under these conditions, the Shah was safely conducted by the Beloochee Chief as far as Gundave, on his way to Shikarpore, where he was daily expected to arrive. The same letter mentions that it is the Shah’s intention to cross over to the left bank of the Indus at Shikarpore, and to return without delay to Loodiana, but I should doubt his adopting such a measure, and question very much his being allowed to quit the Sinde territory unmolested.

I have, &c.

Captain Wade.  
(Signed)  
F. MACKESON.

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No. 57.—W. H. Wathen, Esq., to the Secretary to the Government of India.

SIR,  
Bombay Castle, January 8, 1835.

I am directed by the Right Honorable the Governor in Council to acquaint you, for the information of his Excellency the Governor-General of India in Council, that an envoy from Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan, the Chief of Cabool, has arrived at this presidency, and that he brings late intelligence respecting the movements of the unfortunate ex-King of Cabool, Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk. He states that the Shah, having effected his escape from Furrah, in the Afghan territories, fled, with a small body of horse, in the direction of Kelat, the capital of the Beloochee Chief, Mehrab Khan; that on hearing of the Shah’s flight,
Rehem Khan set out from Candahar with some choice cavalry, to intercept the ex-King on his march; that the Candahar troops, however, did not come up with Shah Shooja until close to Kelat, the Chief of which place interposed his forces between those of the Shah and the Candahar people; and on claiming the Shah as his guest, the Candahar Chief gave up all further hopes of taking the Shah prisoner, and returned to his own country.

The envoy further states, that the Shah is now residing with the Beloochee Chief, as his guest, at Keelanteey Nuseer; but had given out his intention of proceeding, without loss of time, to Bombay, where he gave out he would be received with the most liberal hospitality by the British Government.

As during the present monsoon, a vessel may arrive in a very short time from Sonmeaneee at Bombay, his Lordship in Council directs me to request that you will have the goodness to obtain, without loss of time, the instructions of his Excellency the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, as to how the ex-King should be received by this Government, in case of his coming here, and what extra expenditure, to be debited to the Supreme Government of India, this Government will be authorized to make, should such a circumstance take place, distinct from the sum allowed in your letter, under date the 15th of May, 1834. I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) W. H. WATHEN.

No. 58.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Extract.) Loodiana, January 27, 1835.

I have the honor to transmit the following items of intelligence just received here.

Dost Mahomed Khan has declared himself the reigning Chief of the Afghans under the title of Ameer Shah Ghazeel, and offered the vizierat to Nawab Jubbar Khan. Though the title which he has taken is intended to proclaim his supreme authority over the Afghans, Dost Mahomed affects to say that he has not assumed the regal title, but merely that of nobility. Notwithstanding his declarations to the contrary, in point of fact, he may now be considered to have asserted his right to the throne of Cabool, and is acknowledged by the people as their leader. I am not at present aware with what sentiments his brethren of Peshawur and Candahar have viewed his assertion of supremacy over them.

On the 1st of the month of Ramazan, corresponding with the 2nd instant, the new sovereign quitted Cabool with his forces to attack the Sikhs at Peshawur, and is stated to have arrived at Jelalabad. Some portion of his troops had been sent in advance, and came to an engagement with an advanced post of the Sikhs, who were defeated with a
loss of 500 men, and obliged to retire to Peshawur. Another account
is, that the assailants were a large body of peasantry, who made a night
attack on a party of Sikhs who were entrenched near the entrance of
the Khyber Valley, making preparations to possess themselves of the
passes which lead to Cabool. The result in either case is reported to
be the same. It is probable that a general engagement will soon follow.

Intelligence has arrived at Lahore, but I do not know from what
source, of the death of Futteh Alee Khan, the King of Persia, near
Isphahan, and that he had been succeeded in the kingdom by Hassan
Alee Meerza, the Prince-Governor of Shiraz.

No. 59.—Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
SIR, Bhooj Residency, Camp at Mandevee, January 31, 1835.

With reference to my letter No 4, of the 9th instant, from Bomb-
ay, I have the honor to report, for the information of his Excellency
the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, that
I last night received a letter from the native agent in Sinde, in which he
mentions that Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk was then (17th of this month)
at the town of Bhag, in Cutch Gundava; that the son and nephew of
Meer Roostum, Khan of Khypoor, had arrived at Hyderabad for the
express purpose of persuading Noor Mahomed Khan and his relatives
on no account or pretence whatever to allow the ex-King to enter Sinde;
that Noor Mahomed had promised that His Majesty should not be per-
mitted to halt above a day or two anywhere in the province; but had
said that if he asked for a free passage through the country, he must
not only be granted it, but treated with all the respect and hospitality
to which his station and misfortunes entitled him.

The native reports at this place are, that Shah Shooja intends to
embark at Curachee Bunder, in Sinde, for Bombay, but I do not think
they are to be relied on.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) HENRY POTTINGER.

No. 60.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to W. H. Wathen, Esq.
Fort William, February 5, 1835.

Sir,

In reply to your letter, dated the 8th ult., I am directed to inform
you, that, in the opinion of his Excellency the Right Honorable the
Governor-General of India in Council, in case of the ex-King of Cabool’s
arrival at Bombay, he should be treated with all the personal attention
which is due to an unfortunate Prince; but his visit ought not to be
distinguished by a salute, or by any other public marks of honor which
might lead to the supposition that his recent proceedings had received
the countenance and support of the British Government.
The donation of a seafet of 100 rupees a day, to the ex-King of Cabool, during his stay at Bombay, is sanctioned.

I have, &c.

W. H. Wathen, Esq. (Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

No. 61.—The Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

(Extract.) March 5, 1835.

As connected with the affairs of the north-western frontier of India, we beg leave to advert generally, in this place, to the movements and proceedings of the ex-King of Cabool, on the occasion of his renewed attempt to regain possession of his throne.

Under the circumstances stated by Captain Wade and Major Faithful, we sanctioned an advance to the Shah of four months’ stipend, or 16,000 rupees, on his quitting his asylum at Loodiana, to proceed on his projected expedition, which, it appears, he was encouraged to undertake by the Ameers of Sind.

With reference, however, to the substance of a communication made to the agent at Delhi by Govind Jus, the vakeel of Maharajah Runjeet Sing, regarding the views and movements of Shah Shojoa-cool-Moolk, we entirely approved the conduct of Mr. Fraser in acquainting the vakeel that the project of the Shah was regarded with indifference by the British Government; and we authorized him to declare explicitly to that individual, for the information of the Maharajah, that a strictly neutral part had been maintained with regard to the ex-King and his proceedings; and that this Government, though it did not feel justified in prohibiting the movement of Shah Shojoa, had invariably refused to afford him the assistance which he had repeatedly solicited, in aid of his undertaking.

From Loodiana, pursuing a south-westerly route, the Shah, agreeably to the invitation which he had received from the Ameers, proceeded to Shikarpore, in the Sindian territory, where he immediately engaged in extensive military preparations for the execution of his designs on Candahar.

A rupture, however, took place in the meantime between the Sindians and the Shah, in consequence of the refusal of the Ameers to comply with the application of the ex-King for a money contribution in aid of his projected expedition. In this conflict, which occurred in the vicinity of Shikarpore, the Sindians met with a signal defeat. This disastrous issue of the contest compelled the Ameers to make their peace with him on terms that seemed at once to expose their weakness, and to display the strength which the Shah had been acquiring, while permitted to make a rendezvous of Shikarpore, preparatory to a descent on Candahar.

After his victory over the Sindians, the ex-King, in prosecution of
his designs on Cabool, marched towards Candahar, and laid siege to that
city. As the army of the Shah was known to be superior, both in
numbers and discipline, to the Barukzye troops, the most confident ex-
et expectations were entertained of his success: but a general action, which
soon followed, ended in the total defeat of the unfortunate Prince, by
the confederated Afgan Chiefs. This reverse left him no alternative
but flight, and, pursuing the route of Beloochistan, he arrived at Kelat,
the capital of that country, with about 200 followers; and so closely
pressed by Rehem Dil Khan, of Candahar, with upwards of 2,000 men,
that the royal fugitive was forced to take refuge within the palace of
the Khan of Kelat.

The Beloochee Chief instantly accorded to the unhappy monarch the
protection and hospitality for which that nation is proverbial. After
some negotiation, Rehem Dil Khan was persuaded to return to Canda-
har; and the ex-King, with his small retinue, subsequently descended
into the plain of Cutch Gundava, and was, when the cossids quitted his
camp, halted at Dadur. Copies of the despatches, subsequently received,
containing further intelligence regarding the movements and proceedings
of Shah Shooja, are included in the packet.

The Government of Bombay having in the meantime, with reference
to the supposed intention of the ex-King to proceed to that Presidency,
requested the instructions of the Supreme Government as to the nature
of the reception to be given to the Shah, in the event of his visiting that
quarter, we replied that he should be treated in the case contemplated,
with all the personal attention which was due to an unfortunate Prince;
but that his visit ought not to be distinguished by any public mark of
honor, which might lead to the supposition that his recent proceedings
had received the countenance and support of the British Government.

The donation of a zeafet of 100 rupees a day to the ex-King of
Cabool, during his stay at Bombay, received our sanction.

As it was probable that Shah Shooja would take the route towards
Bhooj, we approved the instructions issued by the Bombay Government
to Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger, regarding the mode in which the ex-
King was to be received, in case of his passing through Cutch.
No. IV.—INDIAN PAPERS.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO AFFGHANISTAN.

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No. 1.—Lord Auckland, Governor-General of India, to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

(Extract.) Simla, May 22, 1838.

I have the honor to submit herewith copies of despatches from Captain Burnes, on political employ in Cabool, from which your Committee will perceive that the increase of Russian and Persian influence in Affghanistan, and the impression of the certain fall of Herat to the Persian army, have induced the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to avert and to insist upon pretensions for the cession to him, by Maharajah Runjeet Singh, of the Peshawur territory, and to take other steps which are tantamount to the rejection of the friendship and good offices of the British Government; and have in consequence led to the retirement of Captain Burnes from the territories of Cabool.

A minute recorded by me on the 12th instant, previously to the receipt of the latest despatches, a copy of which is herewith forwarded, will put your Committee in possession of my views upon the general aspect of our relations with the States on our north-western frontier; and I also append a note of instructions addressed to Mr. Macnaghten, Secretary in the Political Department, on the occasion of his being deputed on a mission to the Maharajah of Lahore.

It will be evident to your Committee, on perusal of the above documents, that the emergency of affairs may compel me to act without awaiting any intimation of your views upon the events which have recently occurred in Persia and Affghanistan. But it will still be most satisfactory to me to be placed, at the earliest possible period, in full possession of your general opinions and instructions.

In anticipation of the possibility of such a contingency, I have deemed it expedient to put matters in train by previous negotiation, in order to render whatever measures of direct interference I may be obliged to adopt as effective as possible.

Demi-official intelligence has been received of the arrival of Cap-
tain Burnes at Peshawur on the 7th or 8th instant; and there is every hope, that in the conference between Mr. Macnaghten and the Maharajah, at which Captain Burnes has been directed to attend, valuable assistance may be given by that officer, who is so intimately acquainted with the existing state of parties in Afghanistan.

P. S.—Subsequent to the preparation of the above despatch, I received communications from Captain Burnes.

I beg leave to draw the attention of your Committee to the unequivocal demonstrations therein noted, of the extent to which Russia is carrying her system of interference on the very threshold of the British Indian possessions.

I need not repeat my anxiety, even though the rapid march of events may oblige me to act without your instructions, to be favoured with a communication of your views upon the present crisis at the earliest possible opportunity.

(Inclosure 1.)—Minute by the Governor-General.

Simla, May 12, 1838.

In this important crisis of affairs in Afghanistan I would wish to place on record a brief retrospect of our past policy, and to resolve, with as much certainty as is at present possible, what measures it may be proper to adopt under different future contingencies. It is the more necessary to endeavour, at this time, to propose to ourselves some clear plans of future action, as a deputation is about to proceed to Maharajah Rumjeet Sing, headed by my principal secretary, Mr. Macnaghten; and as it will, no doubt, be sought by that Chief to elicit some unserved expression of our views, so it will be of the greatest advantage to avail ourselves of this occasion for the purpose both of confirming in his mind the conviction of the complete identity of interest between the two Governments, and of ascertaining his sentiments in return, and so guiding our proceedings as to secure to the utmost his cordial cooperation.

Of our past policy it may be sufficient to say, that the considerations which dictated it, were direct and obvious; and that it is yet very possible that, although the ambitious temper of the Chief of Cabool has disappointed the expectations under which our political intercourse with him was opened, effectual benefit may have been derived from it.

The distracted condition of Afghanistan, from the open and acrimonious contests between the Sikhs and the Chief of Cabool on the one side, and between the Rulers of Candahar and Herat on the other, and from the total absence of any feeling of harmony and mutual confidence among the different branches of the Barukzye family, had been the immediate cause of proffers of submission to Tehran, and of the invitation of Persian and Russian influence into the country. It was
our plain course to seek to remove this inducement to connections so prejudicial to us, by the exercise of our counter influence, in order to reconcile these differences, and to convince all parties of the common danger which would arise to them from Persian encroachment. It will be remembered at the same time, that in dealing with these difficulties we had also to deal with engagements of Treaty, binding us not to interfere in wars between Persians and Afghans, and with the position of Mr. Mc Neill, who, mainly guided by instructions from home, and acting as much in reference to European as to Indian politics, was endeavouring to sustain the tottering influence of his country with the court of Persia. Yet there was every reason to believe that opportunity would be afforded, notwithstanding these difficulties, for the beneficial operation of such a policy, and Mr. Mc Neill was far from anticipating that any effective advance could be made upon Herat by the Shah of Persia in the season then current. There was, indeed, at the time a reasonable probability that that advance might be altogether prevented, when the hope of assistance from the eastern portion of Afghanistan was taken away.

The rapid and successful advance of Persia in the investment of Herat, and the well-judged diversion by which the Shah has been able to cut off, apparently, every hope of succour to the place from any of the friendly tribes in Toorkistan, have, unfortunately, intervened to baffle all our calculations. These circumstances, the presence of a Russian agent at Cabool, and his own restless and unaccommodating spirit, have led Dost Mahomed Khan to reject the terms which we held out to him, of security in his actual possessions (which are all to which he has any fair claim, or that have ever been subject to his authority); and I have been, in consequence, compelled to relinquish the hope of coming to any good understanding with him, such as would warrant us in placing the least reliance on his adherence to our interests.

The failure, therefore, of our negotiations, in regard to their ultimate and main object of general union and pacification, must be admitted; yet I cannot doubt that our intervention has been most usefully instrumental, up to the date of the latest despatches, in preventing the impression even of goodwill at Cabool to the Persian enterprise, and in confirming the Chiefs of Candahar in their resolution to afford no support to it. Unhappily the absence of aid from these Chiefships to the Persian attack may be insufficient to save Herat; but that it has been, in itself, an advantage to Herat in the contest can scarcely be questioned. The assistance, in supplies alone, which might have been furnished from Candahar, would have been of the utmost value to the Persian army.

More direct aid to Herat has not been in our power; direct interference, even if the difficulties of time and distance could have been surmounted, would have been opposed to the positive engagement of
treaty. Arms in the hands of the present Afghani Chiefs of Cabool and Candahar would, could they have been given by us, more probably have been used against Sikhs than against Persians. Candahar would not move but in concert with Cabool. Cabool, we have found, would not move but on the condition of the cession of Peshawur; and armaments and subsidies to Dost Mahomed Khan and his brothers, would, especially while such pretensions were advanced as regards Peshawur, have been attended with the absolute certainty of wholly destroying the cordiality of our alliance with the most powerful and valuable of our friends, Maharajah Runjeet Sing, while they would have involved us in responsibilities that could in no degree be compensated by any aid from Chiefs so weak, and divided by so many jealousies and distractions.

Captain Burnes has now been desired to retire from Cabool as soon as there is reasonable certainty as to the fate of the expedition against Herat; because it is felt, that, under the best circumstances, any professions which Dost Mahomed Khan might make of submission to our wishes, would be only hollow and insincere: whatever may be the course of our future proceedings, it is clear that the presence of a British negotiator at Cabool excites this Chief to intrigue in support of extravagant pretensions; and our continued intercourse with him would lead to no real advantage, while it might, to a greater or less degree, compromise us with the court of Lahore.

To proceed now to the consideration of our future policy in the different results which may attend the attack upon Herat, I would first remark, that since the transmission of my despatch to the Secret Committee, in which I stated that it was not then my intention to oppose the hostile advance of Persia upon Candahar and Cabool, whether by arms or money, circumstances have occurred which may materially modify my views; for Russian agents have now put themselves prominently forward in aid of the designs of Persia, and we could scarcely, with prudence, allow this new and more formidable element of disorder and intrigue to be established, without opposition, on our frontiers. The extraordinary excitement which has been produced in the public mind, as well in the Punjaub as in Afghanistan, in consequence of the approach of the Persian power, is also a signal to us of the mischief which might arise, were that power to acquire a settled authority or influence over all the Afghani countries.

Herat may yet escape, and in that event it will behove the British Government seriously to consider whether means ought not to be taken to guard it against future similar attacks. It would be no violation of our Treaty with Persia to give strength to Herat as we have done to Persia; to advise her, by the presence of a resident agent; to discipline her troops; to fortify her defences, and to give her facilities
for procuring efficient supplies of artillery and military stores. Indeed Herat might well complain, that while we are bound to abstain from interference between them, we have yet supplied ample means of offence to Persia, but have left Herat in the day of need to her own resources; I need not, however, dwell further on this point at present. It would remain, in the case, to determine how to act towards the Chiefs of Cabool and Candahar. Herat having escaped, both might be expected to be profuse in their declarations of devotion to us. But Dost Mahomed Khan has shown himself to be so disaffected and ambitious, that with him, at least, we could form no satisfactory connection. Although he might not, under such circumstances, furnish us with grounds for measures of direct hostility against him, he must yet be regarded as a person of more than equivocal feelings, occupying a position in which it is of the first importance to the tranquillity of our territories that we should have assured friends.

Should Herat fall, and this, as it is I fear the most probable event, so must it principally engage our attention, we must prepare to see the rapid advance of Persian influence, if not of her arms and direct power towards India. In such a state of things it were much to be desired that we had some distinct instructions from the Home authorities for our guidance, as our measures may involve the national interests in reference both to Persia and Russia. But, on the other hand, time may be very precious to us, and that may be accomplished with facility at an early period, which may afterwards be attended with much difficulty when opportunity has been given for growth and consolidation of adverse influences. One thing is to my mind very certain, that we ought not to suffer Persian and Russian influence quietly to fix themselves along our entire western frontier, and that it is, in fairness, open to us to take the high ground with Persia of her whole demeanour having lately been estranged and unfriendly to the British nation; of her schemes in Afghanistan being in the universal belief combined with designs of aggression upon India; and of her advance, therefore, in the mere lust of conquest to a position which would enable her to take up a threatening attitude towards our Indian possessions, being a measure not merely of attack on the Afghan independence, with which we might be restricted by Treaty from interfering, but one injurious, in intention and in effect, to ourselves, which we are warranted in repelling by all means in our power. Other circumstances may occur to strengthen further this language of direct and open opposition to Persia, as for instance, if satisfaction be not afforded to our Government for the insults offered to Mr. McNeill's gholam; insults which the Persian Government has attempted to justify.
(Inclosure 2.)—H. W. Torrens, Esq., to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Extract.)

Simla, May 15, 1838.

In any discussion upon the present policy of the Indian Government, you may remark that the Governor-General has no appetite for wars and conquest; that the boundaries of the East Indian Empire have seemed to him to be amply extensive; and that he would rather conquer the jungle with the plough, plant villages where tigers have possession, and spread commerce and navigation upon waters which have hitherto been barren, than take one inch of territory from his neighbours, or sanction the march of armies for the acquisition of kingdoms: yet that he feels strong in military means, and that with an army of 100,000 men under European officers in Bengal, and with 100,000 more, whom he might call to his aid from Madras and Bombay, he can with ease repel every aggression, and punish every enemy; yet he looks on this army only as a security for peace, and as an instrument of preserving in their integrity the present territories and the dignity of the East India Company. In discussing the dangers to which the British Government may be exposed, you may remark that, for enemies from the westward, the Sikhs and the English are as one nation, and their armies, acting in the field together, would be invincible. To the north is Nepal, and it may be stated that the Governor-General is well aware of the dissensions which have prevailed in that kingdom, and of its present distracted state. He knows that every divided country is dangerous to its neighbours, and that designing men are active in endeavours to raise their consequence at home, by exciting disturbance abroad. Every movement of these men is known to, and watched by him; but the Governor-General expects that this fever of excitement will subside in Nepal, as it promises to subside in Ava. The mountains of Nepal may be difficult to climb, but they have been climbed by British troops; a contest on the plains would be fatal to the Goorkhas, and Nepal could ill afford to lose the many lacs which its possessions in the Terrace afford her. The state of Ava has been similar to that of Nepal; there has been internal commotion, which has had influence on external relations; with its steamers and men-of-war, and a few regiments from Madras, the British Government might overrun and conquer large tracts of unhealthy country; but it has been slow to take offence, and it yet looks with confidence to the adjustment of every difference. Of serious internal disturbance his Lordship can have no apprehension, for whilst every native Chieftain appreciates the good faith and the forbearance of the British Government towards those who are faithful to their engagements, they are conscious also of their weakness, and that treason would ensure their own ruin, as it would add to the power and resources of the paramount authority.

With regard to commercial matters, you may particularly express
the gratification with which the British Government receive information of the fostering protection which the Maharajah had extended to the commerce of the two States, in the sanction given by him to the transmission of boats and merchandize by the Indus to Bombay. It is well known with how much favor the British Government regards the interest of merchants, how it looks upon commerce as the legitimate source of wealth and of power, and as the best bond of concord amongst nations in the extension of its own wealth; by those means it foresees also the extension of the wealth and power of the Maharajah, and rejoices in the joint aggrandizement of the two nations.

No. 2.—Lord Auckland to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)

Simla, August 13, 1838.

I purposely delayed reporting to your Committee the progress of the interesting and important negotiations with the ex-King of Cabool, and the Maharajah Runjeet Singh, conducted by Mr. Macnaughten, the Secretary to Government, until enabled to submit their final result, together with the detail of proceedings.

Mr. Macnaughten, accompanied by Captain Wade, political agent at Loodiana, by the Honorable W. Osborn, my military Secretary, Dr. Drummond, and Lieutenant Mecgregor, one of my aides-de-camp, arrived at the town of Adenanuggur, situated about 70 miles to the N. E. of Lahore, on the 30th May, and found the Maharajah encamped there. The mission had been joined previously by Lieutenant Mackeson, agent with the Ruler of Lahore for the navigation of the Indus. Among the inclosures with this despatch, I have not deemed it necessary to forward the daily reports of the progress of the mission, but shall content myself with noting that it was everywhere received with marks of honor and attention.

I have already stated that there is every likelihood of remaining on amicable terms with Ava; and the State of Nepaul has recently, and voluntarily, disclaimed having the slightest intention of hostility towards our power. The details of transactions connected with these States will be separately reported to you. I mention them here, merely because I believe that the favourable result adverted to has been brought about, especially in the instance of Nepaul, mainly by the notoriety of our new Treaty with Runjeet Singh.

Of the justice of the course about to be pursued, there cannot exist a reasonable doubt. We owe it to our own safety to assist the lawful Sovereign of Afghanistan in the recovery of his throne. The welfare of our possessions in the East requires that we should, in the present crisis of affairs have a decidedly friendly Power on our frontiers; and that we should have an ally who is interested in resisting aggression, and establishing tranquillity, in place of a Chief seeking to identify
himself with those whose schemes of aggrandizement and conquest are not to be disguised.

The Barukzye Chiefs, from their disunion, weakness, and unpopularity, were ill-fitted under any circumstances to be useful allies, or to aid us in our just and necessary views of resisting encroachment from the westward. Yet, as long as they refrained from proceedings positively injurious to our interests, we withheld our aid from Shah Shooja in his attempts to recover his lost throne. But the grant of this aid has now become indispensable to our own safety, if we desire to avert Persian and Russian intrigue from the very confines of our territories. With those Powers the Cabool and Candahar Chief’s have openly allied themselves; and the declared object of Dost Mahomed Khan is to obtain foreign aid in the prosecution of hostilities against our old and faithful ally, Runjeet Sing, with a view to whose destruction he has avowedly been exciting the whole Mahomedan population of Central Asia to engage in a religious warfare. His determination to resist our efforts at mediating his disputes with the Maharajah, showed too plainly that so long as Cabool remained under his Government, we could never expect that the tranquillity of our neighbourhood would be preserved. We are warranted, therefore, by every consideration of prudence and justice, in espousing the cause of Shah Shooja-oool-Moolk.

Still it must be admitted, that in one respect the conduct of the Barukzye Chiefs is not without some colour of excuse; and though a spirit of ambition was unquestionably the governing motive of Dost Mahomed’s conduct, yet he and his Candahar brothers may not have been without apprehension of the displeasure of the Powers to the westward, in the event of their holding back from the Persian alliance. It is my intention, therefore, when our preparations are sufficiently matured, to tender to Dost Mahomed Khan an honorable asylum in the Company’s territories. That an individual of his character could ever be trusted by Shooja-oool-Moolk is not to be hoped for. With the Candahar brothers His Majesty may, perhaps, be left with propriety to make his own terms.

The operations which we are about to undertake, will doubtless be attended with much expense; but this consideration must, I feel assured, be held comparatively light, when contrasted with the magnitude of the object to be gained, which is no less than to raise up a barrier to all encroachments from the westward. We shall, at all events, by the means we are adopting, avert a danger immediately threatening us, at a period when a more than usual excitement prevails throughout our Indian territory; and we shall gain time (ample if judiciously employed) to strengthen our frontier, and render us independent of external aid in warding off such designs as those which have now been clearly developed.

I have acted, in a crisis which has suddenly arisen, and at a period when appearances in every quarter were the most threatening to the
tranquillity of the British Indian empire, in the manner which has
seemed to me essential to insure the safety, and to assert the power and
dignity, of our Government. I have, in adopting this step, been deeply
sensible of the responsibility which it places on me; but I have felt,
after the most anxious deliberation, that I could not otherwise rightly
acquit myself of my trust.

The encouragement afforded to dangerous intrigues by the division
of Afghanistan into weak and disunited Chiefships, has been promi-
nently developed by the experience of the past year. I have determined,
I may here likewise state, to give the direct and powerful assistance of
the British Government to the enterprise of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk, in
a degree which was not in the first instance contemplated by me, from
a conviction, confirmed in the most decided manner by every opinion of
authority on the subject, that the measure could not be trusted mainly
to the support of the Sikh Ruler and army, without imminent hazard of
failure, and of serious detriment to the reputation of the British
name among the Afghan people.

I need not enlarge on the additional proofs which have been fur-
nished, since the date of my former despatches, of the manifest designs
of the Russian officers to extend the interference and authority of their
country to the borders of India. The opposition of the Russian Am-
bassador before Herat, by which the efforts of Mr. McNeill to arrange
a peace upon just and reasonable terms, between the Shah and the
besieged, were wholly frustrated, when they seemed on the point of
being effectual; the aid given by the Russian Ambassador to the siege
by advance of money; and still more, the employment of an officer of
the mission to direct the works of siege, are facts which will have forcibly
arrested the attention of your Committee.

No. V.—INDIAN PAPERS.

CORRESPONDENCE RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN.

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No. 1.—Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to Lord Auckland.

After compliments. 

May 31, 1836.

As I have been long attached to the British Government by the ties of friendship and affection, the late intelligence of your Lordship’s arrival, enlightening with your presence the seat of Government, and diffusing over Hindoostan the brightness of your countenance, has afforded me extreme gratification; and the field of my hopes (which had before been
chilled by the cold blast of the times) has, by the happy tidings of your Lordship's arrival, become the envy of the garden of Paradise.

It may be known to your Lordship, that, relying on the principles of benevolence and philanthropy which distinguish the British Government, I look upon myself and country as bound to it; and the letters I have received from that quarter have all been replete with friendly sentiments and attention, and to the effect that, in the time of need, the obligations of friendship should be fulfilled. The late transactions in this quarter, the conduct of reckless and misguided Sikhs, and their breach of Treaty, are well known to your Lordship. Communicate to me whatever may now suggest itself to your wisdom, for the settlement of the affairs of this country, that it may serve as a rule for my guidance.

I hope your Lordship will consider me and my country as your own; and favour me often by the receipt of your friendly letters. Whatever directions your Lordship may be pleased to issue for the administration of this country, I will act accordingly.

No. 2.—Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. August 22, 1836.

I have had the pleasure to receive your friendly letter, which was transmitted to me through Captain Wade; and I am gratified at the opportunity which it affords me, so shortly after my assumption of the Indian Government, to convey to you the assurances of my unfeigned regard and esteem.

It is my wish that the Afghanis should be a flourishing and united nation; and that, being at peace with all their neighbours, they should enjoy, by means of a more extended commerce, all the benefits and comforts possessed by other nations, which, through such means, have attained a high and advanced state of prosperity and wealth.

My predecessor, aware that nothing was so well calculated to promote this object as the opening of the navigation of the Indus, spared himself no pains in procuring this channel for the flow of industry and enterprise; and it shall be my study to second his philanthropic purpose, and to complete the scheme which he so successfully commenced. I feel assured that you cannot but take a lively interest in the success of this undertaking, so especially conducive as it must be, to the prosperity of the people over whom you rule.

It is probable that I may, ere long, depute some gentleman to your Court, to discuss with you certain commercial topics, with a view to our mutual advantage.

I have learned with deep regret that dissensions exist between yourself and Maharajah Runjeet Sing. My friend, you are aware that it is not the practice of the British Government to interfere with the affairs of other independent States; and indeed it does not immediately occur
to me how the interference of my Government could be exercised for your benefit. I shall be happy, however, to learn from you by what means you think that I can be of any assistance; and, in the meantime, I have only to hope that you will be able to devise some mode of effecting a reconciliation with the Sikhs; it being not only for your own advantage, but for the advantage of all the countries in the vicinity, that two nations so situated should ever preserve unimpaired the relations of amity and concord.

Begging that you will accept my renewed assurance of friendship and regard,

I am, &c.

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

No. 3.—The Secretary to the Governor General of India in Council to Captain Alexander Burns.

Fort William, September 5, 1836.

I am directed to inform you, that the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council has been pleased to select you to conduct a commercial mission to the countries bordering on the Indus, with a view to complete the re-opening of the navigation of that river on the basis of the Treaties lately concluded with the Powers possessing territory on its banks.

You will first proceed to the Court of the Ameers of Sinde; to the Chief of whom, a letter of credentials is inclosed, with a copy for your information. While you remain within the limits of Sinde, you will act in communication with Colonel Pottinger, and in subordination to him; and that officer will accompany you to Hyderabad, should he consider that his doing so will further the success of the objects which the Supreme Government has in view.

The measures which require the earliest attention, are, the continuance of the surveys of the mouths of the river, and the laying down of the buoys, and the erection of rough land-marks as a guide to the navigation of that mouth which may be selected as offering the greatest facilities to trade in the present state of the river. It may possibly be necessary to have frequent, and even annual, surveys of the entrances of the river, and declarations at the principal ports of the Bombay Presidency, of the passage which may, in each season, be most conveniently adopted. Your first care, therefore, after your arrival at Hyderabad, will be to obtain permission for the adoption of these measures; and when this object has been attained, the Bombay Government should be immediately informed of it, through Colonel Pottinger, in order that no time may be lost in taking the necessary steps.

The next point will be, to secure the actual execution of the Treaty as regards the communication between the river and the sea. The Treaty provides, that a fixed toll shall be levied at the mouth of the river, in lieu of all demands, as long as merchandize does not quit the river line; and that a native agent shall be stationed at a convenient
place, on the part of the British Government, to see that no extra
exactions are made. The excessive duties now levied preclude all hope
of the revival of trade until these arrangements are carried into effect.

It appears to his Lordship in Council to be desirable, that you
should settle with Colonel Pottinger, before you leave Bhooj, at what
point the native agent may, for the present, be most conveniently
established; and you can then take him with you to Hyderabad; intro-
duce him to the Ameers; and, lastly, send him to his destination at the
mouth of the river, after procuring the necessary orders to the local
officers, prohibiting them from levying any other duties, except those
which are allowed by Treaty, either from river or sea vessels; and
directing them to communicate with the native agent on every con-
 troverted point. The completion of this arrangement should be im-
mediately intimated to the Bombay Government, in order that public
notice of it may be given at Bombay, and the other ports of the
Bombay Presidency. The place of residence of the native agent may
be subsequently changed, as experience may dictate.

You are aware that the navigation between the sea and Tatta has in
all ages been attended with great difficulties, and that, at times, the
obstructions have been so great as to have led to the partial or entire
abandonment of this portion of the water route. It will, therefore, be
necessary to be prepared for the possible case of the land route being,
to the above extent, alone available for the conveyance of merchandize;
and the present seems to be a favourable opportunity for obtaining the
removal of every unnecessary obstacle from it. You will accordingly
represent to the Ameers the present excessive amount of the transit
duties between the sea and Tatta, and those which, against the spirit of
the Treaty, are exactions on the water-carriage from Vikhur up the
Buggaur; and you will endeavour to obtain their reduction to such
moderate rates as will admit of the free passage of the trade. The
most equitable and convenient plan, perhaps, would be, that the same
toll should be levied, and at the same place, whether the goods are
conveyed by land, or water, during this part of their route; but it is
not intended that this arrangement should interfere with the established
duties on opium, which are understood to be very profitable. His Lord-
ship in Council believes that the Ameers will not be insensible, at the
present period, of the advantages of a close understanding with the
British Government; and they must be aware that, although a strict
observance of the existing Treaties is all that will be required of them,
yet a complete and cordial union between the two Governments can
only be the effect of a hearty concurrence in the object for which alone
these Treaties were entered into, which was the real and substantial
encouragement of commercial enterprise.

In order to give full effect to the plan for re-opening the naviga-
tion of the Indus, it is necessary that some places of entrepôt and
general resort, secure from all oppression and vexatious exactions, to
the establishment of which general publicity may be given, and in the
safety of which general confidence may be felt, should be fixed upon.
Perhaps Tatta, towards the mouth of the river, and Mitthin-Kote,
towards the junction of its upper streams, may be pointed out as most
convenient for this purpose; but on this point a determination can best
be formed by officers on the spot. You have also suggested as a
means conducive to success, not unlikely to have weight in these coun-
tries, that a proclamation of a fair, and of a meeting of merchants from
all countries, from Bombay to Bokhara, from Tabreez to Calcutta, at
an appointed time, at some place upon the banks of the Indus, might
be effectually attempted. His Lordship in Council is disposed to trust
more to time, to the continuance of peace, and to the gradual growth of
confidence, than to measures of the kind last mentioned; but, as a
secondary means of success, they ought not to be neglected.

It would be a great point gained, if the Ameers could be persuaded
to re-establish Tatta on its former footing of a commercial entrepôt;
and arguments will not be wanting to show how much their interests
and reputation would be benefited by such a measure. The proclama-
tion of an annual fair, at the proper season, at that place, with low
duties, and the presence of a British officer to settle disputes, might
also assist in attracting merchants from Bombay on one side, and the
different countries in the interior on the other; but in suggesting this,
or other similar measures, you will be guided by your own local know-
ledge, and by the advice of Colonel Pottinger, with whom it is expected
that you will freely communicate, before leaving Bhooj, on all the
different points on which you will have to negotiate.

The attention of Government has lately been called, by a report
from Mohun Lal, on the Muzaree tribe, who, as you are aware, occupy
a tract about 60 miles in length above Shikarpore, and whose lawless
habits are likely, if not effectually checked, to cause great annoyance
to the trade in that part of the route. The country of the Muzarees
is nominally dependent on Sinde, and was taken into the calculation of
their portion of the toll; but the tribe is said to set the authority of
the Ameers at defiance. It is, however, by the Ameers that we must
in the first instance require them to be restrained; and it is to be
hoped, that when the Sinde Government is known to be acting by our
desire, and in furtherance of an object to which we attach much im-
portance, its efforts to secure respect for the trade passing along the
river, may still prove successful. One object, therefore, of your visit
to Hyderabad must be, to induce the Ameers to adopt some effectual
measures to prevent the Muzarees from in any way molesting the
boats passing up or down the river. The Ameers themselves must
determine what those measures shall be; but you will be at liberty to
offer them any advice you think proper.
After leaving Hyderabad, you will proceed by the river to Khyrpoor; but, in the existing state of the political relations between the Chief of Khyrpoor and the Hyderabad Amerees, there does not appear to be any sufficient reason for entering into separate negotiations with him. You will, however, renew your friendly intercourse with him; explain to him the object of your mission; and engage his cooperation in any points in which it may be required.

From Khyrpoor you will proceed, as before, to Mitthun-Kote, where you will be met by Captain Wade, and Lieutenant Mackeson; and Maharajah Runjeet Sing will also be invited to have an agent present. You will then discuss, with the above-mentioned British officers, the question of the most convenient place for the establishment of a mart, or entrepôt, with reference to all the branches of trade proceeding down or across the Indus, and the means best suited for the establishment of an annual fair; and you will submit a joint report on these points to the Supreme Government. You will, however, particularly observe, that any negotiations which may be necessary with Maharajah Runjeet Sing, in furtherance of the plan, for the security of the merchants, for the imposition of moderate duties, perhaps for the residence of a British officer at the town selected for the entrepôt, will be conducted under the instructions which may be furnished to Captain Wade. You are not to consider yourself as vested with any authority as a political officer out of the limits of Sinde.

It will be necessary for you to keep Captain Wade, and Lieutenant Mackeson, well informed regarding your movements, in order that they may meet you at the proper time at Mitthun-Kote.

You are aware that the arrangements which have been settled by Treaty, for re-opening the navigation of the Indus, do not extend, as regards the main stream of that river, higher than Mitthun-Kote. Maharajah Runjeet Sing's permission will therefore be requested for your passage up the Indus to Attock; whence you will proceed to Peshawur and Cabool.

On proceeding to Peshawur and Cabool, you will make inquiry into the present state of the commerce of those countries; inform the merchants of that quarter, of the measures concerted, and officers employed, for the purpose of affording security on the Indus; encourage them, by all means in your power to conduct their trade by the new route; and invite them, when that plan shall be sufficiently matured, to resort to the contemplated entrepôt and fair. You will hereafter be furnished with a letter to Dost Mahomed Khan, stating generally the objects for which you are deputed, and soliciting for you friendly protection.

From Cabool you will proceed to Candahar, where you will make the same inquiries, and invite the same cooperation in the plans in progress for the revival of trade. A flourishing commerce is supposed
to have been formerly carried on between the Indus and Candahar, by several mountain routes, which are now shut; and it is requested that you will make inquiry regarding these routes, and the practicability of re-opening them, both while you are on your way up the Indus, and while you are on your road from Cabool and Candahar. The direct route from Candahar to the sea, by Kelat and Sonmeaneet, will also engage your attention.

You will return from Candahar to Hyderabad, by way of the Bolan Pass, and Shikargone.

Your salary has been fixed at 1,500 rupees per mensem; besides which, you are authorized to charge all the expenses which it may be necessary to incur on account of the mission. It will, perhaps, be desirable, that you should immediately procure from Bombay such articles as will be required to be given in presents to the different Chiefs on your route. They ought not to be of a costly nature; but should be chosen particularly with a view to exhibit the superiority of British manufactures.

It is requested that you will have a strict regard to economy in all your arrangements, which you will easily be able to do, as parade would be unsuitable to the character of a commercial mission.

In conclusion, I am directed to state, that his Lordship the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council confidently relies on your already well-known industry and intelligence.

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No. 4.—Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan.

Fort William, May 15, 1837.

After compliments.

In my letter to your address, dated the 22nd August, 1836, I intimated my intention of deputing an officer to confer with you as to the best means of promoting the interests of commerce, and facilitating the intercourse of traders between India and Afghanistan.

To your enlightened mind it cannot fail to be obvious, that commerce is the basis of all national prosperity, and that it is commerce alone which enables the people of one country to exchange its superfluous commodities for those of another, to accumulate wealth, and to enjoy all the comforts and blessings of civilized life.

The general diffusion of these blessings and comforts among neighbouring nations, is the grand object of the British Government. It seeks for itself no exclusive benefits; but it ardently desires to secure the establishment of peace and prosperity in all the countries of Asia.

With this view, the British Government prevailed upon the Powers occupying the banks of the river, to open the navigation of the Indus; and to this object, indeed, have all its efforts been invariably directed.

I now send Captain Burnes, who will deliver this letter, to confer with you as to the best means of facilitating commercial intercourse be-
tween Afghanistan and India. I have no doubt that he will meet with
a friendly reception at your court, and that his personal communications
with you will be attended with all the advantages which I anticipate.

In conclusion, &c.

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

No. 5.—Captain Burns to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Cabool, September 24, 1837.

SIR,

I do myself the honor to report, for the information of the Right
Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, that we reached
Cabool on the morning of the 20th inst., were conducted into the city
by Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, with great demonstration of respect
and joy, and, immediately on our arrival, presented to the Ameer,
whose reception was of the most gratifying nature. After the interview
we were conducted by the Ameer's son to a spacious garden in the Bala
Hissar, which had been prepared for us, and where we are now
residing.

On the following day I had the honor to deliver my letter of creden-
tials, which the Ameer received in a very flattering manner, with
many expressions of his high sense of the great honor which had been
conferred on him, in his at last having had the means of communica-
tion with an officer of the British Government, for which he felt deeply
grateful to the Governor-General.

Up to this time my communications with the Ameer have been con-
fined to matters of compliment and ceremony; but I shall take an early op-
portunity of reporting on what transpires at this court, merely observing
at present, from what I have seen and heard, that I have good reason
to believe Dost Mahomed Khan will set forth no extravagant preten-
sions, and act in such a manner as will enable the British Government
to show its interest in his behalf, and, at the same time, preserve for us
the valued friendship of the Sikh Chief.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ALEXANDER BURNES.

No. 6.—Captain Burns to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Cabool, October 4, 1837.

I have now the honor to report the result of my inquiries on the
subject of Persian influence in Cabool, and the exact power which the
Kuzzilbash, or Persian, party resident in this city, exercise over the
politics of Afghanistan. Since any ascendency on the part of Persia,
or her allies in this quarter, must either have its origin, or be chiefly
brought about by means of the Persian faction in the country, it be-
comes highly important to note the history of these tribes, their rise,
progress, and present condition.

In the beginning of the last century the feebleness of the Persian
monarchy excited the cupidity of the Afghans, who overran the fairer
portion of that kingdom, and possessed themselves of Ispahan. Their
successes called forth the energies of the Great Nadir, who not only
drove the Afghans from Persia, but annexed the whole of their own
territories to his empire, and turning their swords against India, with an
army of Persians and Afghans, sacked it precisely a hundred years ago.
During these wars, the conqueror deemed it politic to fix some native
tribes in the lands he had subdued; and to this policy we owe the
colony of Persians now settled in Cabool, which, when first located,
amounted to less than 2,000 families.
The people composing it consist of three divisions: 1st, the
Juwansheers; 2nd, the Ufshurs; and 3rd, the Moorad Khanees; the
whole being designated by the general name of Gholam Khane, or
Gholam-i-Shah, servants of the King. The Juwansheers are a clan of
Toorks from Sheeshu. There are various divisions included among
them, such as the Koort, the Shah Sumund, the Syah Munsoor, &c.,
and they form the principal portion of the Kuzzilbashes. They con-
sist of 2,500 families, and occupy a separate quarter of Cabool, called
the Chandool, which is surrounded by high walls; their Chief is Khan
Sheereen Khan. The Ufshurs are also Toorks, and of the tribe to
which Nadir himself belonged. There are 300 families of them, who
live in a strong fort about three miles from Cabool, under Gholam
Hoossein Khan. The last division, the Moorad Khane, is comprised
of all the Persians who have from time to time settled in the country;
1,500 families of them reside together, under Mehr Alee Khan,
and five other Chiefs. Besides these, there are 700 others in the
Fort of the Byats, a division of the tribe under Mahomed Khan. It
will be thus seen, that there are at this time 4,000 Kuzzilbash families
in Cabool, from which a force of from 4,000 to 5,000 men could be
levied, on an emergency, for the purposes of war. The number has
been generally considered greater than this detailed statement, but the
whole of the Sheeah population in and about Cabool is then included in
the calculation, and among these the Hazarehs would furnish twice as
many men as the Persians.
On Nadir Shah’s assassination, many of the Persians fled from
Cabool to their native country; but Ahmed Shah Doorameee, who suc-
ceeded to the authority of Nadir, conciliated a portion of them, whom
he retained in his pay, and found of eminent service throughout his
active reign, in which they became an organized body, acting under a
Khan, who was directly responsible to the Shah, while the Kuzzilbashes
themselves only acknowledged their own Chief. Matters seem to have
continued in this state for about 53 years, during which the Persians
acquired such power, that the Kings found it necessary to favour them
by large stipendiary allowances, granted in some instances even to
minors, and as the Suddozye monarchy declined, their support became
indispensable to the personal security of the King. In the reign of
Shah Zemaun, the Chief of the Juwansheers was put to death, and from that time a want of confidence in the Kings of Cabool on the part of the Kuzzilbashers is to be traced, till they almost cease to appear as a body in the affairs of the State. The superior intelligence possessed by all Persians, readily befits them for employment among the Afgans, and from war many became secretaries (Meerzas) and stewards (Nazirs) to the different Chiefs; others took to agriculture and merchandize; and some are at present shopkeepers in Cabool. It would at one time have been dangerous to entertain any Persian without their Khan's permission, but with the loss of military employment, or rather withdrawal from it, their pay ceased, and the growing wants of many drove them to the occupations which I have stated, though a portion of them have always continued in the service of the Ruler of Cabool, as is the case at the present time.

Since the whole of the Persians in Cabool are Sheehas, and the national persuasion of the Afgans is Soonnee, the position of the Kuzzilbashers was full of danger; it was at any time possible to turn political disputes into religious differences, and there are various instances in the history of the Cabool monarchy, in which these have threatened their very existence. Of late, these fears have not been diminished, and since the overthrow of the monarchy, the walls which surround the Juwansheer quarter of the city have been heightened and improved, and I observe alterations even since 1832. At one time they were not afraid to live outside the city, but common interest has now led the whole of the Persians to congregate together as the best means to ward off danger. They would have willingly left the city of Cabool, and fixed themselves at a distance, like the Ushurs, in a detached fort, but this they have found impossible, and their situation in the Chandool, or quarter of the Juwansheers, is now so completely commanded, that an infuriated population might readily overpower them. The Persians themselves are therefore intently bent on adding to their own strength by intrigues around them; and though their military influence has declined, their power in this way is more considerable than before, since every man of rank has Persians for his secretaries, and all the home and foreign correspondence is in their hands, by which their influence ramifies in every direction.

The Persians of Cabool attached themselves to the Vizier Futtee Khan, and fought against Persia in his Herat campaign. They have long sought for a master who would consolidate them as in former times, and they have at times entered into correspondence with Shah Shooja; but they have especially attached themselves to the Vizier's brother, the present Ruler of Cabool, and with the greater avidity, as his mother was of their tribe. Dost Mahomed Khan availed himself to the fullest extent of their support, and it was long considered by many that he was even favourable to Sheehah doctrines; but he has either had
the discrimination to see that these would be fatal to supremacy among his countrymen, or never, in fact, entertained them. This he proclaimed to the world, when, about four years ago, he took the title of Ameer, which has a religious signification; and from that time the Kuzzilbashies have ceased to centre their hopes in him. He himself has also withdrawn much of his confidence from the party, reduced the number of those in his pay to about 1,000 or 1,200 persons, and part of their salaries he has retrenched. The head men receive about 58,000 rupees per annum, and the total derivable from the State by the rest, may amount to less than a lac of rupees, each horseman receiving 84 rupees per annum. Even in public he does not conceal his contempt for their creed, and, what is perhaps more bitterly felt, his avowed opinions of their wanting courage in the field, as exhibited in his campaign with the ex-King at Candahar, and lately at Peshawur.

In the former instance he is stated to have placed Afghans on both flanks of the Kuzzilbashies, with secret instructions to fire on them if they fled. At Peshawur it is very certain that the party were backward in fighting; none of them were killed; and a piece of pleasantry is attributed to the Ameer, who said that he never remembered a Kuzzilbash to have fallen in his service. But Dost Mahomed Khan may have mistaken a want of inclination, originating from disappointed hopes, for a want of courage. Certain it is, that of late he has sought to raise a body of regular troops, disciplined by Europeans, but he has hitherto completely failed; and if he consulted his interests, he would seek no other support than that which he may command from the hill people about Cabool, and the native Afghans who do now serve, and would willingly, on good pay, devote themselves to him. It would also undoubtedly add to his strength if he drew at the same time the Kuzzilbashies nearer to him.

While Persian influence is thus declining, it appears a strange contradiction to record that Dost Mahomed Khan has sought for alliance with Persia, as the best means which occurred to him to support his power. He admitted into his councils a native Persian of some talent, the Naib Abdool Samut, who has since been disgraced, and flew to Persia; and the advice of this man, with that of Mahomed Khan, Byat, a Kuzzilbash raised by him, and much in his confidence, as well as that of several interested persons, induced the Ameer to seek for support from Persia, and with this has revived the hopes of the Kuzzilbash faction, though their support would probably be directed, under Persian influence, to a master who more appreciated them than Dost Mahomed Khan. The whole party see, however, in the alliance certain benefit to their own condition, and in consequence do what in them lies to promote the intercourse. It is thus that the Persian community in Cabool have viewed the arrival of an agent of the British Government in this quarter, with suspicion, if not open dissatisfaction.
The Shah of Persia has not been slow in responding to Dost Mahomed Khan's desire for an alliance; an Elchee has been sent with robes and presents in return, and is now at Candahar; but he has appeared at a time most unfavourable to his master, when the attention of the British Government is directed to Afghanistan, and which goes far to discredit him with all parties, and even to damp the hopes of the Kuzzilbashis. It is even doubtful if he will advance to Cabool; and it is certain, if he does so, that any offers which he may make will never be placed in the balance against those of the British Government. The King of Persia desires to add Herat to his dominions, and the Chiefs of Candahar and Cabool might certainly aid him in his designs, but the probabilities of a return for such good offices are more dubious.

No. 7.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Cabool, October 5, 1837.

On the afternoon of the 24th I was invited to the Bala Hissar, and being conducted into the interior of the harem, found the Ameer and his favourite son, Mahomed Akbar Khan, without any of the chiefs, secretaries, or attendants. The interview lasted till midnight, dinner being meanwhile served up; and I had an opportunity of conversing at length with Dost Mahomed Khan.

At the outset I proceeded to unfold to him, in great detail, the motives which led the British Government to direct its attention to the river Indus, and the countries bordering on it. I dwelt upon the prosperous trade which had once run in the direction of its course, and the many facilities which it had been found to present to the trader to transport his goods by it in preference to land routes; and, in addition to all, explained the Treaties which we had formed with the Rulers upon it; the light tolls leviable; the certain protection to property which they insured, superintended as was the navigation by British agents; and, finally, since the river Indus leads to the great commercial city of Cabool, and the marts beyond Hindoo Koosh, the British Government sought in an extension and encouragement of the trade, not any selfish object, but, on the contrary, saw an advancement of the ends of others as well of itself, and the strongest motives for stimulating the Ameer of Cabool, and all other Chiefs, to associate themselves with us in promoting this trade, since increased consumption would be productive of increased revenues, and the direct advantage was not only apparent, but immediate. Dost Mahomed Khan listened with great attention to what had been said; assured me that no one did, or could, enter more readily into the views which the British Government held than himself, for he had the fortunate experience to discover that, by protecting the merchant, the returns of his custom-house had gone on increasing, and were in a state of improvement at this hour; and the Government of India
might therefore rely with every confidence on his cordial co-operation in any measures which tended to promote the trade to Cabool and Toor- kistan; and that he would instruct all the merchants and Hindoos to communicate with me, and also make them acquainted with the enlight- ened protection they would experience in passing to India, and with the new routes, through which, by our fostering care, they might bring their goods to market.

"But," said the Ameer, "I am involved in difficulties which are very prejudicial to commerce; my hostilities with the Sikhs narrow my resources, compel me to take up money from merchants, and to even increase the duties to support the expenses of war. These are the shifts to which I am driven, for seeking to preserve my honor. While we were engaged in resisting Shooja-ool-Moolk at Candahar, the city of Peshawur was seized from our family, and I had the mortification to discover, among the papers of the ex-King, after his defeat, a Treaty that made Peshawur the reward of the Sikhs, and to hurl me and mine from authority. I was yet left; but when Runjict Sing’s officers planted a fort near the Khyber Pass, my existence was endangered; I resisted, and here also with success."

I was not unprepared for the irritation of the Ameer on the late events which have transpired in this quarter; and as the best means of allaying such feelings, I thought it advisable to give a ready ear to what was urged, since I might, by argument and advice do the Chief service, and combat some of the positions which he had taken up. I admitted, therefore, that it was undoubtedly true that war produced the evils of which he complained, and crippled his power; but I strongly urged him to reflect on the uselessness of seeking to contend with so potent a prince as Maharajah Runjict Sing. I stated the revenue of that Chief, the great abilities which he possessed, the riches at his command, the fine army which he could bring into the field, the hopelessness of warring with him, and the injuries which he inflicted on himself and his people, by allowing himself to be drawn into hostilities, and, though the fortune of war had, of late, granted success to his arms, and his formidable opponent Huree Sing was no more, I could assure him, as a well-wisher, that he was contending with a Power which he could not resist, and that it would be prudent to seek for such an adjustment of differences as would preserve his own reputation, and that of his countrymen.

The Ameer bore at once the most ready testimony to the power and abilities of Runjict Sing; and, after various questions as to my own impressions regarding the Punjaub as a State, said it was too true that he could not attack such an adversary. My sons and people may speak in exaggerated strains of our late success; but it is too evident, how- ever, that our power is not one-tenth of that of the Punjaub; and, instead of renewing such conflict, it would be a source of real gratification if the British Government would counsel me how to act: none of our other
neighbours can avail me; and, in return, I would pledge myself to forward its commercial, and its political, views.

I assured the Ameer that I heard these sentiments with extreme satisfaction, for it had gone abroad that his conclusions, from late events, were otherwise; and I had only, as a well-wisher, set before him the true power of Runjeet Sing; and, from his own observations, it appeared to me I could not have overrated it. I could, however, assure him, that the British Government warmly interested itself in the preservation of peace, and wished well to both parties; that in Maharajah Runjeet Sing it recognised, and that too publicly, an old and valued ally; and in the Ameer himself it saw a Ruler, who was anxious to promote the commercial prosperity of his country, and consequently of his neighbours; and that though I myself had not been deputed here to adjust political differences, it would indeed be gratifying if I could do anything towards an end so desirable as a peace, which would not only save the further loss of human life, but promote the good of all parties; but without an exact knowledge of the Ameer's sentiments on all points, my advice would not only be useless, but probably prejudicial.

Dost Mahommed Khan now entered upon the affairs of his own Government; ran over the history of the Dooramee kingdom, expatiating on its power, which extended from Meshid to Cashmere; and, pointing to the house in which he sat, said, that this is the whole share of that vast empire that has fallen to me, and I cannot therefore be indifferent to the honor of having communication with an agent of the British Government, nor to seeking, by every means I can, to interest it in my behalf. The Treaties which have been made with the Powers on the Indus, are the best proofs of your sincerity in the objects which have led the Government to depute you to Cabool, and to interfere in the affairs of Peshawur and Cabool.

I did not conceal from the Ameer that we had sought to preserve peace along the line of the Indus, and that we had used our influence to prevent its being disturbed, and had happily succeeded; but I could assure him that we had done it to promote commercial views, without receiving any consideration, and that the current rumours regarding the cession of Shikarpore to us, were incorrect, and likewise that we had come to a perfect understanding with Maharajah Runjeet Sing, and that the friendship of the British Government for that personage was greater than ever. I here drew a broad line of distinction between the affairs of Shikarpore and Peshawur; pointed out that the one was a possession of the Ameers of Sinde, while Peshawur was an undoubted conquest of the Sikhs, made by the sword, preserved by it; and to interfere with which, would be a violation of justice, and the integrity of Runjeet Sing's dominions. I continued, however, that there was a rumour very current in Peshawur, and which has also reached me, that the Maharajah intended to make some change in the management of
Peshawur, but that it sprung from himself, and not the British Government.

The Ameer said that he had also heard similar reports, and asked if I knew the arrangements, for Peshawur could be of no value to the Sikhs, and must indeed cause great expense. I stated my ignorance of the plans of Runjeet Sing; but it appeared a probable enough arrangement, since His Highness had granted large jagheers to Sultan Mahomed Khan and his brothers, that he contemplated the restoration of the whole country to that branch of his family, under certain restrictions. I said that I spoke without definite information, and not from any indifference on the part of the British Government, which would rejoice to see a change that terminated the present state of constant war in Peshawur; and I even believe that if Runjeet Sing sought of himself to change his policy in that quarter, the Government would be glad to use its good offices to both parties, if it saw any prospect of their being useful; but that it was now needless to say more without certain information, though the supposed intentions of the Maharajah ought to afford the Ameer subject for consideration, and might probably lead him to devise some satisfactory means of a reconciliation with the Sikhs. With these observations, our private conversation ended by Dost Mahomed Khan stating that he would take an early opportunity of again seeing me.

The Ameer on this invited in Meerza Samee Khan and Meerza Imaum Verdi, who are the principal secretaries of himself and his son, and, without entering into any minute particulars, sketched out what had passed between us, and called for dinner; during, and after which, he entered upon many subjects, and among others, on his connection with Persia.

He stated, with considerable candour, the whole circumstances regarding it; declared that he had sought with ardour the friendship of the British Government, from its being his neighbour, but he had sought in vain, and hearing of the power of Persia, and the designs towards Khorassan, he had addressed Mahomed Shah, and an Elchee was now at Candahar, bringing robes for him and his brother, with a valuable dagger, and a promise of assistance in a crore of rupees. Since the conversation was not of my asking, I did not hesitate to enter upon it, and asked, if he placed reliance on the aid of Persia, and on the large pecuniary assistance which had been promised; and he at once assured me that he did not.

On the 26th and 28th, the Ameer came over in person to visit us, accompanied by many of the persons about his court; and, without entering on the subjects above treated on, discoursed on many matters of general interest, recurring however, in both visits, to Persia, for which he now either possesses, or feigns to possess, no good feeling, speaking contemptuously of the late campaign in Khorassan. He also asked of me the relations between the British Government and Russia; the influence
of Russia over the dominions of Turkey; and spoke of the control which Russia exercised over the trade in Toorkistan.

I was again invited last night to the Bala Hissar, where I met the Nawab Jubhar Khan, and had further and long conversation with Dost Mahomed Khan. I soon found that he had something to communicate which interested him; and after stating, at some length, how anxiously he himself desired to see his differences with the Sikhs terminated, said, that if I advised it, he would send a son to Lahore, to ask Maharajah Runjeet Singh's forgiveness for what has passed; and, if he would consent to give up Peshawur to him, he would hold it tributary to Lahore; send the requisite presents of horses and rice; and in all things consider himself, in that part of his dominions, as holding under Lahore.

On hearing the conclusion which he had come to, I asked him if his countrymen might not consider he had gone too far in his conciliation of the Sikh chieftain; but he did not consider such an arrangement would be viewed in that light, particularly as the homage which he had agreed to render for Peshawur, did not affect his other dominions. I here stated that he had brothers in Peshawur whose condition he must compassionate; and if Peshawur were restored to them, his reputation would be widely spread in this country, since the world would give him credit for having had some share in the transaction. Dost Mahomed Khan declared that he would guarantee to Runjeet Singh, or to the British Government, the jagheers which his brothers now enjoyed; but that Peshawur might as well continue in the hands of the Sikhs as in those of Sultan Mahomed Khan, as it would never otherwise be believed that Maharajah Runjeet Singh had withdrawn from the countries westward of the Indus. The Maharajah's often expressed wish to have horses and tribute from him, would, he was sure, prove a great inducement to his Highness to hand over Peshawur to him, as he had never before paid him tribute, and Sultan Mahomed Khan had long been his servant.

I am not aware how far this offer proceeds from a hope of future aggrandizement, or an intention to injure the Peshawur branch of his family; but it is now sufficient to report the sum of his views and wishes. By some, these offers may be construed merely into a specious kind of moderation; by others, they may be hailed as sincere proofs of the Ameer's desire to terminate his differences with the Sikhs; but whether Runjeet Singh's policy suggests, or not, a compliance with them, they certainly show that Dost Mahomed Khan is not likely to enter upon any aggressive measures, notwithstanding the vaunts of his people regarding the late battle at Jumrood.

With reference to the Chief of Cabool individually, I see little change in him since my visit to this country in 1832; since then he has added Jelalabad to his country, and the most important change in his administration is the investiture of five of his sons in different governments, a policy which cannot be condemned, and, if he can
succeed in it, will certainly contribute to the stability of his government.

With some, and perhaps they are the majority of his subjects, his wars with the Sikhs have gained him applause; but with one party, and that by far the most worthy of conciliation, the wealthy and mercantile classes, his campaigns have been viewed in a different light, and given great dissatisfaction.

No. 8.—Public Letter from Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to the Candahar Chiefs.

A. C. Cabool, October 25, 1837.

I have lately sent you all the news of this quarter which you might have understood.

What your letters contained I comprehend perfectly; we have been always friends with each other, and the fruits of unanimity have and will always prove advantageous: you and all my other brothers at Candahar have always written to me that I was your superior, and asked my advice on every subject, and declared that you would never contradict me.

As Peshawur, which is our principal abode, fell into the hands of the Sikhs, on account of the foolishness of Sultan Mahomed Khan, and which has been a source of great trouble and vexation to us, so now Candahar, the place of our nativity is always threatened by Kamran. These difficulties obliged us all to have recourse to the English, Persian, and Tartar governments. It brought, at last, from the East, the English Elchee, and from the West the Elchees of Persia and Tartary. Before the latter embassies entered the country, I informed you that, as Alexander Burnes is coming here on the part of the British Government, it would be proper to send one of your brothers to Cabool, that we might consult on the matter, and settle things with him: you replied to me that you would send Mehr Dil Khan, along with the Persian Elchee, and do what I advised.

Meanwhile, some misunderstanding takes place between you and your brothers, which prevents the Elchee and Mehr Dil Khan coming here. Mr. Burnes arrives, and enters upon business. What he has seen and heard he has reported to his Government, and it will also reach the Sikhs. We have some hopes regarding Peshawur. It is well known to the world that the power of the Sikhs is nothing in comparison with that of the English; and if all our objects be obtained through that Power, so much the better. Mr. Burnes, after settling matters in this quarter, intends to proceed to Candahar, and thence, by the road of Shikarpore, to Sinde.

For these few days past no letter has come direct from you; but from the contents of letters for Mr. Burnes and others, I learn, that on the information of a Persian army coming to Herat, you are going to
send your son Mahomed Omar Khan along with the Persian Elchee, to the Shah.

This has astonished me very much, because you never did anything before without my advice; and what fruits do you hope to reap by sending your son to Persia? If the British would not be friendly, then you might make friendship with others; the former are near to us, and famous for preserving their word; the latter are nothing in power compared with them.

If you look upon me as greater than yourself, take my advice and do not send your son to Persia. In the event of your not attending to my advice, such circumstances will happen as will make you bite the finger with repentance.

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**No. 9.— Private Letter from Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to the Chief of Candahar, inclosed in the preceding.**

A. C. Cabool, October 25, 1837.

A few days ago Alexander Burnes received information that you are sending Mahomed Omar Khan to Persia,— he privately asked me in the following manner:—“Notwithstanding the friendly feeling which subsists between the English and Affghans, your brother it appears is going to send his son to Mahomed Shah: how will it do to keep foot in two boats? If they act by your advice it is far from wisdom. We (English) are looking for the prosperity of the household of the Affghans, and you in return are doing such things. If you say that your brothers at Candahar are taking this step without your advice, the world will never believe it, because it is well known to the Europeans that Shah Shooja had nearly taken the city of Candahar, when you, being of one blood, went with troops and drove Shah Shooja from Candahar. It is, however, possible, that these matters at Candahar are going on without your knowledge.”

Mr. Burnes said many things in this style, and really I had no answer to give him. Oh, my brother, if you will do these things without my concurrence, what will the people of the world say to it? We have an enemy.

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**No. 10.— Captain Burnes to Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan.**

A. C. Cabool, October 24, 1837.

I had the great pleasure to receive your friendly letter, the arrival of which delighted me very much. What you said, that “by God the feelings of friendship which I entertain must correspond with those in your breast, and will strengthen the bonds of amity; do not think otherwise;” greatly pleased me; and I have been looking forward to the time when I should see and know you, and hear all about this good disposition from your own mouth.
It is known to you that I came to this quarter with good intentions towards all parties, and particularly to converse with all the members of your family; and I have received a very friendly reception at Cabool.

At this time I hear from various quarters that you are sending your son to Iran. When I look to the contents of your letter and to this step, I do not understand matters, and believe that some person has been deceiving me. It is not possible to hold two water melons in one hand; unanimity in families is a great source of power, family differences are the certain cause of evil; and foreseeing as much as the feeble intellect of man can do into futurity, I see no good in the step you now contemplate; even I see that the fruit of the matter will be nothing but repentance and loss; and wishing you well, I have thought it proper to warn you.

Let me hear from you that I may know you continue as much my friend as I am yours.

No. 11.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Oudiana, October 28, 1837.

In forwarding the accompanying packet to your address from Captain Burnes, the duplicate of it to the Bombay Government having been left open for my perusal, I would beg to recall the attention of the Right Honorable the Governor-General to the tenor of the letter, from His Excellency the British Ambassador in Persia, to the Right Honorable Lord Viscount Palmerston, dated the 30th of June last, notifying the arrival at Tehran of Futteh Khan, the Envoy from Shah Kamran, to whom Captain Burnes’s letter refers.

In waiting on Mr. Mc Neill, the Envoy in question had, it appears, assured His Excellency that though “the Government of Herat was sincerely desirous to come to some arrangement with the Persian Government, which would put an end to hostilities between them, there was no intention on the part of the Herat Government to relinquish its independence; that Kamran would not agree to renounce the title of Shah, or to coin the money in the name of Mahomed Shah; and that even if Kamran had been disposed to accede to the terms, he did not dare to propose them to the Afghan nation.”

From the foregoing extract the deputation of Futteh Khan to Tehran would not seem to imply that “Shah Kamran had tendered his homage to the Shah of Persia,” but that he had been sent with a view to adjust, if possible, by amicable means the conflicting interests of the Governments of Herat and Persia; and our ambassador had offered his mediation to promote that object, “considering the preservation of the sovereignty of Herat from the Government of Persia as precisely the question in which the British Government was most interested.”

It may appear an act of supererogation in me, to add my testimony to that of Mr. Mc Neill, as to the basis on which the negotiation should
be conducted; but as his Lordship is aware of the extreme importance which I have always attached, to securing the independence of Herat, whilst it is a source of satisfaction to me, to find my view of the subject confirmed by an officer of the enlightened judgment and long approved experience of our present Ambassador in Persia, I cannot help agreeing in opinion with Mr. Mc Neill, that it ought to be the primary object of the British Government, to “maintain, at all hazards,” for reasons which I have often declared, the integrity of Herat, as the only safe and sure means of opposing the efforts of Persia, to annihilate the independence of Afghanistan.

The position in which our discussions with respect to Herat are now placed, is one, from which no consideration of submission to the views of Persia, should, I think, divert our attention. It may be presumed, that His Persian Majesty will not dare to act in opposition to our views and wishes, when openly avowed, and steadily maintained. Although the friendship of our Government, may be less directly felt by Persia, than her alliance with the Russian Government, it is still sufficiently valuable to deter her, I should imagine, from seeking a separation of interests between the two States; for supposing even that she were prepared to bid defiance to British counsels, the Shah cannot expect that we should remain spectators of the prosecution of designs, which threaten the peace and tranquillity of British India, and the prosperity of our commerce in Central Asia, without an attempt to counteract them; and as Persia can scarcely pretend to encounter the probable effects of our indignation, it would surely be difficult for her to carry out her schemes of conquest towards Afghanistan, without throwing herself on the support of Russia, which, not having the power of affording her effectual aid in money, would proffer it in men; and the result to Persia would be an inundation of Russian troops into the fairest provinces of that empire, which, though intended to advance, would eventually destroy, the independence of the Persian monarchy. When viewing, therefore, the real interests of their Government, such is the light in which I should infer that the advisers of the King, and certainly the majority of his people, would be inclined to regard the consequences of offending the British Government.

No. 12.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Cabool, October 31, 1837.

On the morning of the 22nd, I received, by a messenger from Candahar, a full account of the proceedings at that city. The Chief had finally resolved on despatching his second son, Mahomed Omar Khan, to Persia, along with the Elchee; had fixed upon the persons who were to compose his suite, about 150 in number, set aside 14,000 rupees for the expenses of the journey, and made provision for the presents, with which the party is to be charged, to the Shah, and the
Russian Ambassador. For His Majesty an elephant is to be sent, for his minister a pair of shawls, for the Russian Ambassador four shawls, for Abbas Khan Heratee two shawls; and Kumber Alee himself, is to be dismissed with every honor and respect. To conciliate still further His Persian Majesty, the name of the Sirdar's son is changed from Omar Khan to Mudeed Khan, the former designation being offensive to Mahomedans of the Sheeah persuasion.

These measures were adopted by the advice of Hajee Khan Koker; but though he has no doubt had some share in the transactions, there are proofs of a much earlier disposition, in the Candahar Sirdars, to cultivate a close alliance with Persia, of which the late deputation of Hajee Mobeen, is not the least.

The activity of the present proceedings of the Candahar Sirdars is said to arise, from anxiety to strengthen themselves with Persia, under a belief that their brother in Cabool, will receive, to their exclusion, the alliance of the British Government; for though these Chiefs would willingly co-operate with Dost Mahomed Khan, on any occasion where Barukzye supremacy was endangered, they see, in the advance of Persia eastward, immediate danger to themselves, and they rejoice in the opportunity, which they think they possess, in the presence of a Persian Elchee, to conciliate the Shah, in whose promises their reliance seems firm. Since their resolution has been taken, the Persian envoy, Kumber Alee Khan, has been introduced to many people in the city, and talked openly of the connection between Candahar and Persia, and the vast benefits which must flow from it, which include a promise of the cession of Herat, when their combined forces shall have subdued that city.

Since these reports have reached this place, from other correspondents than my own, there could be no doubt that the time had arrived, for using every exertion to put a stop to this intercourse. I therefore resolved to enter in the most unreserved manner, as to the views entertained by the Ameer of Cabool, regarding his brother's league with Persia. The Ameer himself, instead of receiving me at the Bala Hissar, came over in person to our residence, along with his brother the Nawab, on the morning of the 24th; and I now proceed to state the nature of our interview, which sets Dost Mahomed Khan's conduct in a light, that must prove, as I believe, very gratifying to Government.

After we had conversed on the reported approach of the Shah of Persia, of which the Ameer had also heard by letter from Candahar, on the preceding evening, stating that His Majesty had arrived at Sharood, I asked at once, if there was any truth in the rumours that had reached me, of his brother at Candahar, sending one of his sons to the Court of Persia. The Ameer at once replied, that the very letter he had just mentioned, and which he showed to me, confirmed the
report, but that he had not heard direct on the subject. I stated that I was anxious to inform him, I saw no possible good that could result to Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan in such a step, and that I felt myself bound to tell him so. When Shah Shoja-ool-Moolk invaded this kingdom, in 1833, I added, you and your brothers at Candahar, acted in concert with one another; and the British Government, in evincing its sympathy with the difficulties, under which your family now labours, is not likely to be urged on to use its good offices to allay differences in the East, when fresh causes to disturb the public tranquillity of these countries in the West, receive support at Candahar.

The Ameer declared to me, in the most explicit manner, that if it was a cause of regret on our part, it was doubly so on his own, for he had himself bitterly repented his ever having had any thing to do with Persia, and the more so, since he had received the Governor-General's notification of my deputation to this country; so much indeed had this been the case, that he had refrained from entering with me into particulars regarding Kumber Alee Khan's mission, and that, what was further, he had resisted all persuasion to send a letter of invitation to that person, when he reported his arrival at Candahar: for, though he could not refuse to receive him, after the letters which he had addressed to the Shah, he saw clearly that it could not meet our approbation, and that he was glad to say, the Elchee in question, would not advance beyond Candahar. This, he said, appeared to him the best way in which he could mark his desire to ally himself to the British Government; and he begged to assure me, that the whole of these transactions at Candahar, were passing without his concurrence, and much against his inclination.

I immediately replied, that it was very pleasing to hear such sentiments, for though I could not doubt, after the declarations which I had heard, since reaching Cabool, that these were his real feelings, yet it had been stated, that he had taken offence at the detention of the envoy at Candahar, and had sent a confidential agent there, which now appeared to be erroneous; I felt myself bound, however, I stated, to explain very clearly, that neither he nor his brother, were to found hopes of receiving aid from the British Government. The British Government, if they had not taken any active measures in these countries, had now evinced their sympathy, while a good understanding between the Chiefs of Affghanistan, must ultimately lead to the benefit of all parties, and to the growth of that friendly feeling, now first evinced, by the present mission to this country. I hoped, therefore, he would use his influence at Candahar, for I also felt myself bound, after a friendly communication which I had received from that quarter, to address a friendly letter of advice, to Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan.

The Ameer declared that he himself was much concerned at what had passed, and said that I should have asked him sooner to use his
influence, and he would have exerted himself long since. He saw clearly that the designs of Persia were sinister; and that Russia, through her, was preparing to try her fortune in these countries, as the British had tried it in India: for this, too, they had themselves to blame, as that court had found out, from the applications of Kamran, of himself unfortunately, and of his brothers at Candahar, that this country is without masters. But if the affairs of Peshawur are adjusted, His Persian Majesty will learn that the case is otherwise; and whether the British Government interested itself or not, he was resolved to do everything which he could, to show his respect for its wishes, and conciliate it; and if he could not succeed, he was equally determined to have nothing further to do with Persia. He would despatch a confidential courier to Candahar this evening, and remonstrate in the strongest language with his brothers; and further, if he could not change them in their purpose, he would, if I advised it, put a stop to these intrigues by threats, or by force of arms, for the Afghans had no sympathy with Persia; and if Herat fell into the hands of that kingdom, it was time to unite their strength, or to take measures which would place the resources of Cabool and Candahar in one hand. I declared at once that the British Government would not give its countenance to any such step as active operations against his brother, but that if he succeeded in preventing Kohen Dil Khan from acting as he intended, it could not fail to be received as a strong mark of his desire for our friendship, and, I would add, of great good sense.

No. 13.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Loodiana, November 20, 1837.

Captain Burnes having favored me with the perusal of a copy of his letter of the 14th ultimo to your address, I feel it my duty to state that the interesting report given by that officer of the condition of the Kuzzilbashies settled at Cabool, corresponds with the accounts which I have received of them, during the period of my intercourse with the people of Afghaistan; but some observations have occurred to me, in perusing Captain Burnes's statement, which it appears to me important to record.

In considering the position of the various Persian colonies, in and around the city of Cabool, it is evident, from the manner in which they have been allowed to fortify themselves from time to time, that their comparative strength in the calculation of the political parties existing in that country, is such as to give them an opposing, if not a predominant, influence in the direction of its affairs. While the monarchy lasted, the Kuzzilbashies shared largely in the wealth and favors of the Court, and, in contrasting their present situation with the prosperity and consideration that they enjoyed, when they formed the select personal guard of their Royal Masters, they are sometimes illable to conceal
their impatience of submission to the absolute control, or capricious conduct, of a Chief who owes his rise and power chiefly to the aid and support which he received from one of their eldest leaders, Mahomed Khan, Byat.

Alluding to that Chief, Captain Burnes observes, that he had been raised by Dost Mahomed Khan. It would, perhaps, be more correct to say that the Byat had raised the Ameer, than the Ameer the Byat. On the death of Azeem Khan, and the ephemeral accession of his son Abibulla Khan to his authority, a conspiracy was set on foot by Amirulla Lagan, the youngest son of the late Meer Waeez, to overpower the Sheeas, and take the lives of some of their Chiefs; Mahomed Khan Byat, was one of those who was devoted, by the leader of the Caboolees, as the party of Amirulla Khan and the Soonnees is called, to be the victim of the religious animosity of the two sects. Intelligence having been conveyed to him of the design, the Byat immediately escaped from Cabool, and proceeded towards Ghiznee, for the purpose of joining Dost Mahomed Khan and inviting him to head an attempt to overthrow his nephew, the result of which, was a protracted struggle, carried on within the precinct of the city of Cabool, between the two parties, on which occasion Sultan Mahomed Khan, of Peshawur, and the late Sheer Dil Khan, of Candahar, sided with Abibulla Khan. The vacillating system which Dost Mahomed Khan has pursued, has as might have been expected, compromised his reputation for good faith amongst these colonists; and knowing their power, they are not likely to desist from using every effort, on their part, that disappointed hope and a sense of insult can suggest, to oppose any schemes which the Ameer may form to consolidate his own rule, in which they may not be associated.

Had Dost Mahomed Khan felt himself powerful enough in the government of Cabool, and so independent of Kuzzibbash influence as to try the experiment, he might have adopted the severe but vigorous policy said to have been suggested to Shah Kamran by his Minister Yar Mahomed Khan, of expelling from Herat every Sheeoh of Persian extraction who resided in that city. The Shah had found that they were intriguing with Persia for his own destruction, and when threatened by an immediate invasion from that quarter, he had recourse to a policy which was not only justified by the urgency of the occasion, but had the merit of gratifying the religious prejudices of his nation, and of showing the Afghans the sacrifices which he was ready to make, rather than forfeit the honor of his country, by submitting tamely to the yoke of a government which was hateful to them. Kamran saw that there was a lurking danger in the presence of the Sheeabs more fatal to his political existence than the threats of his enemy.
No. 14.—Captain Wade to W. H. MacNaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)
Loodiana, November 29, 1837.

HAD not an alarm of the extent to which Dost Mahomed may carry
his own projects of ambition, gained strong possession of the minds of
the Candahar Chiefs, both from the intercourse of Captain Burnes
with their rival brother, and the late acts of the Ameer, in displacing
his relations from authority to exalt his son, thereby securing the admin-
istration of the country in his own family, it is probable that his
brothers of Candahar might have agreed to the deputation of Mehir
Dil Khan to Cabool, as originally intended, though it may be doubted
if his presence there would have been productive of any benefit to either
party, so long as the difference between Dost Mahomed Khan and his
other brothers at Peshawur, formed no object of the Ameer’s care, and
he cherished the design of aggrandizing himself in that territory, with-
out regard for the pre-existing rights and acknowledged interests of his
ejected brothers, in whose misfortunes the others feel a deep sympathy.
With what confidence could the Chiefs of Candahar rely for their own
independence on the professions of a party, which they found wished
to make his quarrel with the Sikhs a stepping-stone to the degradation
of a brother to whom one of them is devotedly attached, and on whose
welfare the Nawab Jubbar Khan also takes a great interest?

I may remark, that there was no concert or consultation between
the Rulers of Candahar and Cabool in their overtures to Persia. The
Chief of Candahar was the first to make them, while Cabool followed.

No. 15.—Captain Wade to W. H. MacNaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)
Loodiana, January 1, 1838.

CAPTAIN BURNES has left open for my perusal the copy of his report
to your address.

The information contained in his paper is on a subject of such im-
mediate interest to the British Government, as to suggest the importance
of an attentive consideration of its contents; but as I am obliged to
hasten its despatch, I have little leisure to accompany it with my own
observations in the course of transmission. Any remarks that I may
now offer will therefore be regarded as of a more cursory nature than I
could have wished to make, had I time to do so, on many of the points
noticed by Captain Burnes.

Cabool is a city of modern date, not only in its political, but com-
mercial, character. In both these respects it cannot claim equal eminence
either with Candahar or Herat, which have from a remote antiquity
been the seats of empire, and a commerce which has forced its way
through them in the midst of every change of dynasty, and the obstacles
arising to its growth from the anarchy and confusion of successive go-
vernments. Sometimes the merchant has been allowed to pursue his
traffic in peace, while at another he has been subject to the tyranny and
oppression of needy and rapacious Chiefs, who, to extricate themselves from their financial distresses, have considered the pillage of a caravan as a legitimate means of replenishing their treasury.

In the time of the Caliphat the flourishing commerce which existed between Bagdad and the central regions of Asia, was principally concentrated at Candahar and Herat, and it is only since the decline of the Dooraumee monarchy that Cabool can be said to have become a place of any note. Its secluded position, the excellence of its climate, and the tractable disposition of its original inhabitants, recommended its selection for the seat of his government to Timour Shah, to whose love of ease and luxury his countrymen have ascribed the gradual decay of that power which owed its origin to the genius and activity of his father, Ahmed Shah.

There is no portion of the remaining empire of the Afghans which has been less exempt from the factions of party, and the revolutions to which the government of the country has been exposed, than the city of Cabool. It has been the chief scene of the struggles which have been maintained for supremacy, not only between the Barukzyes and Suddozyes, but the pretenders to power among the different members of the Barukzye family among themselves; while Candahar and Herat have been comparatively free from these intestine broils. The brothers of Dost Mahomed Khan had succeeded in establishing their authority in Peshawur and Candahar, before the Ameer had established himself in Cabool. His tenure of power in that city has been very insecure. Popular commotions have occasionally broken out, which he has found it difficult to suppress; and even after his late success against the Sikhs, such was the feeling of parties towards him, that, had it not been for the arrival of the British mission, nothing could have saved him from the combination which his brothers had formed to overthrow his authority. His sense of danger from internal enemies has made him as anxious for the alliance of a foreign Power, as his fear of the Sikhs.

With regard to the account given of the Chiefship of Cabool, the means and character of Dost Mahomed, and his connection with his neighbours, I need at present merely observe, that too much weight appears to be laid on the professions of homage ascribed to be rendered to him from his Candahar brothers; at the same time that too favourable an account is given, not only of the popularity of his rule, but the efficiency of his army. My own sources of information, which have been repeatedly authenticated, both by natives and Europeans, who have visited Cabool, lead me to believe that the authority of the Ameer is by no means popular with his subjects, and many instances in confirmation of the fact might be adduced from the reports of Mr. Masson, even when that individual has been willing to render every justice to Dost Mahomed Khan's abilities. The greater part of his troops are disaffected and insubordinate, and, though well equipped with arms, are
generally very deficient in the qualities which constitute good soldiers. Their behaviour at Jumrood is admitted, by none more readily than the Ameer himself to have exhibited their discipline and their courage in a discreditable manner; and, in alluding to the action which occurred there, I may state, that too great an importance would now seem to have been attached to the partial success of the Afghans on that occasion. The impression which resulted from it was such as to convince the men of Dost Mahomed’s army, of their inability to contend with the Sikhs.

Captain Burnes has aptly observed, that the want of success which attended Shah Shooja’s late attempt to recover dominion was partly owing to his own irresolution of character; but in estimating his chances of success, the opinion which he has expressed is directly at variance with that of other persons, who have treated of the subject from personal intercourse and an intimate knowledge of the sentiments of the people. It is necessary that I should recur to the events which transpired at the time of the Shah’s last expedition. At the commencement of it, Dost Mahomed Khan tendered his submission to our Government; while Runjeet Sing, failing in his desire to engage the British Government openly in the design, concluded a separate Treaty with Shah Shooja, and gave him aid in support of his pretensions. A report of these transactions will be found minutely detailed in my letter, with inclosures, to your address, dated 17th June, 1834; but Government would not then adopt the views of either party.

In addition to the documents to which I have referred, I would also beg to draw the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, on the present important occasion, to the report submitted from Mr. Masson, in my letter of the 27th of November, 1834, on the political state and resources of Afghanistan, in which it will be seen that, though the Barakzyes claimed a victory, the dissatisfaction which existed among themselves, as well as their troops, had nearly changed the fate of the day without a contest. At a subsequent period, when describing the retreat of Dost Mahomed from his fruitless enterprise against the Sikhs in 1835, and the discontent which then prevailed at Cabool, Mr. Masson made the following remark:

“‘The failure of Shah Shooja is now most sincerely lamented. I myself rejoiced at it at the time; but the course of events seems to prove that his success would have been felicitous to the countries. The wishes of all classes turn to his restoration.’

In another place he observes: “In the recent efforts of Shah Shooja there is little doubt but that, had a single British officer accompanied him, not as an ally or coadjutor, but as a mere reporter of proceedings to his own Government, his simple appearance would have been sufficient to have procured the Shah’s re-establishment in power.”

To the observations of Mr. Masson I may add that of His Excellency
the British Envoy now in Persia. In his letter to your address of the 22nd January last, on the state of Afghanistan, he states: “Though the sovereignty of the Afghans has passed out of the hands of Ahmed Shah, the Dooranee tribe appears to maintain an undoubted ascendancy in the nation. The Barukzyes have usurped the greater portion of the power of the Suddozyes; but the latter family still maintains itself in Herat, and has a strong hold on the prejudices, if not on the affections, of a large portion of the Dooranees.”

These opinions, declared by parties viewing the subject both far and near, and well acquainted with its merits, will not be overlooked, if actual habitation with the Afghans in the one case, and the long experience of an able servant of the British Government in the affairs of their country in the other, can give weight to the testimony which they have delivered.

Mr. McNeill has also remarked, that the Barukzyes holding Cabool and Candahar in independence, would not appear to have conciliated the attachment of the Dooranees, who depend in a great measure for their power on influences foreign to their tribe. To force their rule therefore on the people would not only be a difficult operation in itself, but, if sought to be effected through the mediation of the British Government, would require a degree of support from us which we cannot, in my opinion, afford to give to the present possessors of power in Afghanistan, or rather to the Ruler of Cabool, without bringing new elements of discord into action, productive of more evil to the peace of the country than the preservation of the sovereignty of the Afghans in the Suddozye family, at the same time that we profess every desire to respect the independence of each in his present authority, and assist them by our influence and advice in consolidating their national strength and security from the ambitious views of Persia.

After the late encounter with the Sikhs, the disputes of parties at Cabool ran so high, that had the Shah appeared in the country, he might, I am informed, have become master of Cabool and Candahar in two months; and Dost Mahomed Khan is not to be trusted; an opinion, for which I have not only the authority of Mr. Masson, but of his countrymen, who know him best.

Mr. Masson says, “I must confess I am not very sanguine as to any very favourable result, from negotiations with the Barukzyes. They are indeed their own enemies; but their eternal and unholy dissensions and enmities, have brought them to be considered as pests to the country, and the likelihood is, that affairs will become worse, not better. The British Government could employ interference, without offending half-a-dozen individuals. Shah Shooja, under their auspices, would not even encounter opposition; and the Ameer and his friends, if he have any, must yield to his terms, or become fugitives. No slight advantage, were Shah Shooja at the head of government here, would
be, that, from his residence among Europeans, he would view their intercourse in these countries without jealousy, which cannot be expected from the present Rulers, but after a long period, and until better acquaintance may remove their distrust."

In a report which he also sent to me, dated the 9th of August, 1833, on the state of Afghanistan, and the necessity of its organization, in discussing the political views and character of Dost Mahomed, he wrote, "It is a part of Sirdar Dost Mahomed Khan's creed, that he ought never to go to war with the Persians; he is ambitious, and would serve himself."

Regarding the condition of his troops, and the want of confidence which exists between the Ameer and his subjects, even at the present time, I might, if necessary, quote the opinion of an intelligent Englishman, who lately proceeded to Cabool. In further exposition of the sentiments and opinions, which I have deemed it my duty to record, on the relative claims of the two tribes, which at present divide between them, in a great measure, the government of Afghanistan, it may be likewise mentioned that the Barukzyes, instead of being a tribe of 60,000 men, as computed by Captain Burnes, on his visit to that country, in 1832, do not exceed 6,000; that the rest of the Dooranucees would be indignant to see the power of the British Government exerted, to establish the supreme control of the Barukzyes over their nation; and that the act would in itself tend to injure the name of the British Government, among a people tenacious of independence, and yet alive to the preservation of hereditary honors and ancient institutions. I submit my opinions with every deference in the wisdom of his Lordship's decision; but it occurs to me, that less violence would be done to the prejudices of the people, and to the safety and well-being of our relations with other Powers, by facilitating the restoration of Shah Shooja, than by forcing the Afghans to submit to the sovereignty of the Ameer.

Were it practicable, it would not be safe, to place Herat in the possession of the Barukzyes. Their predilections for a Persian alliance, and their doubtful faith, would render their occupation of that place more dangerous to the interests of the British Government, than if it remain in the hands of the Suddozyes. Suppose, however, that Herat were to fall into the power of Persia; that Government, whatever may be its promises to the Barukzyee Chiefs, is too sensible of the importance of such an acquisition to the extension of her dominion in the eastern part of Afghanistan, to think of resigning it to the Barukzyes; or to desist from her attempts to conquer the place, were it in the possession of the Barukzyes.

It may be well to consider also, what interest Maharajah Runjeet Sing would feel, in the choice of a head for the general government of Afghanistan. No argument need be urged, to show that any effort on
the part of our Government, to subvert the existing division of power for the benefit of the present Ruler of Cabool, would be received with extreme impatience by the rest of his family, and be displeasing to the majority of the nation. The mutual jealousies and differences of the one, and the habits and prejudices of the other, would rise in indignation against such a design, and a host of enemies would be raised towards ourselves, among a people, who, since the time of our first connection with them, have been disposed to regard us with a friendly feeling. Considering the feelings of hostility with which the Maharajah views Dost Mahomed, and that he is now scarcely restrained from prosecuting the war against the Ameer, His Highness will not, in my opinion, be persuaded to abandon his hostile designs on Cabool, without desiring to obtain terms of submission from its Chief, to which the British Government would not wish to become a party. From these, and other motives, Runjeet Sing would be brought with difficulty, I think, to acknowledge the elevation of Dost Mahommed Khan to the sovereignty of the Afghans, while, should the consolidation of that people become a measure of indispensible necessity to the establishment of security on the frontier of the Indus, the election of Shah Shooja, would only be in fulfilment of the compact which was formerly made with him, and would exact no new concessions.

A co-operation in the same object is likely, it occurs to me, to be more acceptable to the Ameers of Sinde, than a forcible imposition of Barukzye rule on the fragments of the Afghan empire.

The deadly nature of the feud which exists between the Ruler of Herat and the Barukzye Chiefs, renders, I fear, the prospect of a reconciliation between them very hopeless, but its bitterness does not extend to Shah Shooja, who, although he has been at war with the Barukzyes, has never been guilty of those cruelties towards the leaders of the tribe, that have disgraced the other members of his family. At the same time, the matrimonial alliance which connects the ex-King with a sister of the Ameer, would certainly have its weight in any efforts that might be used to reconcile the Shah to the only one of the Barukzye leaders, who would be likely to evince a reluctance to acknowledge his claim to be sovereign of the Afghans. Shah Shooja's recognition could only, however, be justified or demanded of us, in the event of the prostration of Herat to the Persian Government. I am convinced that nothing but an intimation of our wishes, and an assurance of safety, which the Shah would readily give to the British Government, in any way that might be deemed expedient, would be requisite to unite the two parties in the common object of preserving the independence of their country from the dominion of Persia.
No. 16.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Cabool, January 26, 1838.

Regarding the overtures made by Dost Mahomed Khan, for adjusting his difference with the Sikhs, and the apprehension that the Maharajah would not be disposed to surrender Peshawur on those terms, but be more likely to restore it to Sultan Mahomed Khan, its former governor, I lost no time in making known these circumstances, and the policy which it would be advisable for the Ruler of Cabool to pursue.

After listening with considerable attention to what I impressed upon him, the Ameer proceeded to make his own comments on what was recommended. He said that he felt satisfied, that the British Government was actuated by the most pure and upright motives in making known its sympathy with the sufferings of the Affghan nation; and that, in seeking to apply some remedy to them, it only followed the generous course for which it was celebrated throughout Asia; that there were, however, obstacles and objections to what had been recommended, which it behoved him to unfold, before any adjustment of differences on such terms was carried into effect.

"In offering to render tribute, horses, and apology, to Runjeet Sing, and to hold Peshawur under him," continued he, "I was actuated by no motive of hostility to Sultan Mahomed Khan; he is my brother, and though we have differed, the rank is on his side, and not on mine. I stated that I would secure to him and his brothers, the jagheers they enjoy; and this, with what would have to be paid, would not have rendered it a very profitable appendage to my power; for these were precautionary measures to secure myself in Cabool, and prevent injury befalling me. Of Runjeet Sing's power to invade me in Cabool, I have little fear of his power to injure me. If he reinstates Sultan Mahomed Khan in the government of that city, I have great apprehension, for in it I see a Mahomedan Ruler instead of a Sikh; and had the Maharajah been more conversant with the politics of Affghanistan, and bent on my destruction, he might ere this have succeeded, had he not displaced Sultan Mahomed Khan from Peshawur, and supplied him with funds to corrupt those about me, who are inimical, and envy the rise to my present elevation.

"At the present time, many of the Chiefs who belonged to Peshawur, and their retainers, are subsisted by me. They fled from their country on its invasion by the enemies of our religion, and on my brother becoming a servant to them. It cannot be supposed that, with my limited revenues, I can either give to these persons what they are entitled to, or what they received in their own country; but at this moment I expend about 90,000 rupees annually, in giving them bread. When Peshawur is restored, these individuals will of course leave me, and along with them will proceed every one who may take offence at his
merits not being appreciated as he considers they deserve; and thus, instead of being freed from enemies, I shall be lowered among my countrymen far below my present situation; and, far from being free from danger, as at present, have that situation most certainly endangered. I think, therefore, that I see in the contemplated plans for altering the arrangement for governing Peshawur, a rectification of the errors of the Ruler of Lahore; and that his designs are sinister, and his object to draw the British Government unawares into them.

"In the friendly expression of the feeling entertained towards the Afghans by the British Government, I see clearly that it would not permit itself to be made a party to my destruction. If you are not disposed to strengthen my hands, and raise me above the rank which I at present enjoy, it cannot be your intention with offers of sympathy to bring about my ruin. On that point I am at ease; but in separating us all one from another; in seeking to keep the Chiefs from being dependent on one another; you are certainly neutralizing the power of the Afghan nation, and sowing the seeds of future dissension. Your object is to prevent harm; you will also prevent good. You will secure to yourselves the gratitude of Peshawur, of the Eusefzyes, the Kutucks, and the tribes near the Indus; but as for myself, you open a new door of intrigue against me; and as you saw injury likely to accrue from the Chief of Candahar entering on an alliance with Persia, I see injury to myself in Sultan Mahommed Khan, when restored to his chiefship of Peshawur, being in alliance with Lahore: and, above all, what security am I to have that the Chiefs of Peshawur and Candahar will not join to injure me, and be aided in their designs by Maharajah Runjeet Sing?"

To these arguments I opposed the views of the British Government, and said that it would ill tally with its wishes to find new causes of quarrel arise consequent on an adjustment of the differences between the Sikhs and Afghans; that as the Ameer had renounced his connection with Persia, we had in return hoped to do him a good office by entering into a negotiation with Runjeet Sing on the differences existing between them; but that if he was thoroughly sincere in his belief that the restoration of Peshawur to Sultan Mahommed Khan was positively injurious to him, it was proper to state most decidedly that we had no such design.

To this Dost Mahommed Khan replied, that there were no doubt many advantages in prospect, and that the arguments adduced had both foundation and solidity, but that the advantages were chiefly on the side of others; that he had been hitherto able to stand on the defensive against Runjeet Sing, and to do it with some effect; that that Ruler's withdrawal was more injurious to him on the terms proposed, than his continuance at Peshawur; that he himself now received a degree of respect which he could then no longer command, and that it was better to leave things
as they were, in the hopes of some future change, than to shackle him-
self by being party to an arrangement, which did him little good, and
seemed fraught with danger; and, in return for which, things might be
expected of him which he would not perform. Peshawur, said he, has
been conquered by the Sikhs; it belongs to them; they may give it to
whomsoever they please; if to Sultan Mahomed Khan, they place it in
the hands of one who is bent on injuring me; and I cannot therefore
acknowledge any degree of gratitude for your interference, or take upon
myself to render services in return.

The Nawab Jubbar Khan followed his brother, and said, it was un-
doubtedly true that the Ameer had not mistaken the evils which might
ensue to himself from the entire restoration of Peshawur to Sultan
Mahomed Khan: but that the Afghans could not afford to lose
the sympathy which had been exhibited by the British Government;
and an arrangement might be made on the basis of a Treaty which Run-
jeet Sing had once entered into with the Ameer and his deceased
brother Yar Mahomed Khan, which was, to divide Peshawur between
them, and receive equally at their hands a fixed tribute. Such an ar-
range ment might now be made, and the Ameer would be free from fear
of injury, and Runjeet Sing receive, from him and Sultan Mahomed
Khan conjointly, the amount on which he was disposed to surrender it.
The Ameer added, that such an arrangement would remove his fears;
and he should wish no other person placed there but the Nawab himself,
and one or two of his own agents under him.

To the proposition of the Nawab, and the observations of the
Ameer which followed upon it, I made no further remark than that the
plan would also be taken into consideration; but before proceeding
further, it was incumbent on me to ask one categorical question: Was
I to consider that he would rather have the Sikhs in Peshawur, in pre-
ference to Sultan Mahomed Khan's being restored to his government
in that city?

The Ameer replied, that this was certainly placing the matter in an
extreme light, and that he found a difficulty in answering the question:
he would candidly ask in return, if the mode of accomplishing an act
generally beneficial were proved to be detrimental to himself, who had
the most substantial share of power in the Afghans dominions at this
time, it could be said to be applying a remedy to the difficulties under
which the Afghans laboured; and if, in return for it, the British Go-

dernment would reckon on those acts which all Powers naturally look
to, in return for benefits conferred. I ask you not to aid me in achiev-
ing a supremacy throughout this country; but I do ask to be allowed to
stand in the position in which you have found me: if I can be pro-
tected from intrigues in Peshawur, I will then consider myself benefitted,
but without such a plan as that which the Nawab has stated, or some
such other, that places a Barukzye there, which the Governor-General
must devise, I foresee evils which cannot have entered into the minds of those who are my well-wishers.

I have thus placed before the Right Honorable the Governor-General the opinion and views entertained by the Ruler of Cabool, and the nature of the arguments which I have opposed to them.

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No. 17.—Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to Lord Auckland.

After compliments.

The respectable Captain A. Burnes, whom your Lordship had graciously appointed to strengthen the bonds of friendship, to improve the commerce, and the going and coming to this country, and to do good to Afghanistan, safely reached this, and delivered to me the kind letter of your Lordship. I was delighted to learn its contents, and highly gratified with the good and friendly expressions it contained.

The report of these happy tidings has been widely spread throughout this country, and made me highly rejoice.

Knowing that the conversation which I have held with Captain Burnes, will be as clearly and comprehensively reported as if I had myself conversed with your Lordship, I did not think it right to give your Lordship trouble by its repetition here.

I have now heard of the approach of your Lordship towards Moodiana, in this neighbourhood, and I have thought it therefore incumbent on me to send this friendly letter.

Nothing is hidden from your Lordship which is passing in this country. I therefore repose entire confidence in your Lordship. I am aware of the favourable disposition which your Lordship entertains towards supporting and strengthening my government.

I beg your Lordship, considering me attached to the British Government, will be pleased to bestow early attention on the affairs of this quarter, as, from delaying, difficulties arise, which may not hereafter be put in order with facility.

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No. 18.—Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan.

After compliments. Camp at Bareilly, January 20, 1838.

I have received with great satisfaction repeated accounts from Captain Burnes of the cordial and friendly reception which you have given to his mission, and of the disposition which you have evinced to meet the views of the British Government. This intelligence has been very acceptable to me, and has confirmed my desire to mark the friendly feelings with which I regard you and the other Chiefs of Afghanistan.

My friend, Captain Burnes, has explained to me the different propositions which you have made to him, and your desire to obtain possession, on certain conditions specified by you, of the territory of Pesahwar, now held by Maharajah Runjeet Sing.

In regard to your relations with the other Chiefs of Afghanistan, my
desire has always been, that each should respect the rights of the others, and that all should maintain peace.

It has been my great wish, as far as the means presented themselves to me, to induce all to live on terms of mutual friendship. By dissension and distrust, room is afforded to intriguing persons to excite one chief against another, and in the end forward their own purposes to the injury of all.

In regard to Peshawur, truth compels me to urge strongly on you to relinquish the idea of obtaining the government of that territory. From the generosity of his nature, and his regard for his old alliance with the British Government, Maharajah Runjeet Sing has acceded to my wish for the cessation of strife and the promotion of tranquillity, if you should behave in a less mistaken manner towards him. It becomes you to think earnestly on the mode in which you may effect a reconciliation with that powerful prince, to whom my nation is united by the direct bonds of friendship; and to abandon hopes which cannot be realized.

The interference in your behalf which my regard to yourself and for the Afghan people, had led me to exercise, has hitherto protected you from the continuance of a war which would have been ruinous to you; and if you can establish equitable terms of peace with the Maharajah, you will enjoy in a security which has long been unknown to you, ample means of dignity and honor, and the territory which is actually under your government. To lead you to hope for more than this, would be to deceive you; and even for this object, although my good offices would readily be employed for you, I would always be careful so to act as to consult the interests and honor, and obtain the concurrence of the Sikh sovereign, who is the firm and eminent ally of my country.

I need not state to you that the English nation is faithful to its engagements, and true to its word. It is on this account that I have written plainly to you, that you may understand correctly the assistance which you may expect from me. This assistance also cannot be granted, if you form any connection with other Powers, unsanctioned by this Government. If you wish for its countenance and friendship, you must repose confidence in its good offices alone.

Should you be dissatisfied with the aid I have mentioned from this Government, which is all that I think can in justice be granted; or should you seek connection with other Powers without my approbation; Captain Burnes, and the gentlemen accompanying him, will retire from Cabool, where his further stay cannot be advantageous, and I shall have to regret my inability to continue my influence in your favour with the Maharajah. I am persuaded that you will recognise the friendly feeling which has led me to state the truth to you, as you can guide your actions as you may consider most proper for yourself. I trust that the result of your negotiations on this important subject will be such as to promote your real advantage, to conduct to the prosperity and peace of
your own and of all neighbouring territories, which are objects very dear to me, and to preserve and increase the sentiments of regard which I have always entertained for you.

I am gratified by the great confidence which you place in Captain Burnes; he has your welfare at heart; he reports to me faithfully all your wishes; he is fully informed of my opinions; and will assure you of the kindness which I would always wish to show to you, and other Afghans, who are a brave people much respected by the English nation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

No. 19.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Cabool, February 23, 1838.

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, the result of my proceedings as far as they have gone, consequent on the arrival of your express of the 20th ultimo, which I yesterday acknowledged.

The mode in which the Amurath of Cabool received the views of Government concerning Peshawur, as reported in my letter of the 26th ultimo, rendered the arrival of his Lordship's instructions more than satisfactory, for the time had arrived for a very frank and clear explanation with the Chief of Cabool; and I lost no time in coming to an understanding with him.

It will be seen, regarding Captain Vickovitch, that the Amurath had professed his inability to wait longer than the vernal equinox, if an adjustment were not made regarding Peshawur. Had I followed my own inclination, I would not have sat down for a day under such a declaration, but I was ignorant of the light in which Government would view Captain Vickovitch's presence at Cabool, and affairs to the west were getting every day more complicated, the Persians having not only held their position before Herat, but overrun Meimuna, and the adjacent States, being now actually without any people between them and Cabool itself, excepting the Hazareh, who are all of the Sheeiah persuasion, and linked, by religion and alliance, to the Kuzzilbash faction in this city.

Any withholding of what were his Lordship's decided views regarding Cabool, would have been as unjust to the Amurath as to ourselves; and I had become meanwhile informed of the further communications of Captain Vickovitch, which went to inform the Amurath that the Emperor of Russia was superior in his dominions, and could act, of himself, with promptitude, and without being delayed by consulting others; while the British Government transacted its business by a council (punchayet), which gave rise to procrastination, and would show to him the advantage of allying himself to Russia, where no such inconveniences ex-
isted; and further, that the Emperor's goodwill towards him would never then let Persia encroach in this quarter. If these sentiments had any weight with Dost Mahomed Khan, it followed that our position here was of little value, and that every day's delay rendered it less so, setting aside the valid objection that the Ameer could never be permitted to play off Russia against us in any terms that he might make.

Under these circumstances, I resolved at once to deliver to him the Governor-General's letter, since it contained an explicit statement of our sentiments and intentions, which he had so much courted, and on the absence of which he founded his grounds for retaining Captain Vickovitch at Cabool. I sought an interview with the Ameer, and was immediately invited to the Bala Hissar yesterday, when the explanation took place.

I at once informed Dost Mahomed Khan that I had come to communicate with him on matters of grave importance. I briefly ran over the events which had brought me to Cabool, and the primary objects connected with it; how we sought to improve his and our own commerce by friendly intercourse; how an unfortunate conflict had meanwhile taken place between Maharajah Runjeet Sing and himself; how that Chief had been disposed to act in harmony with the British Government regarding a removal of future differences near Peshawur, though that was a question to be decided wholly by the Maharajah himself; how the Ameer had received the proposed alteration, and the offers he had in consequence made. During the deliberation which those matters required, continued I, the Persians have invaded Khorassan, invested Herat, and disturbed men's minds in these countries, of which the Kuzzilbashes in Cabool had availed themselves to give counsel that was certainly injurious to his interests, and which I inferred, as I had a right to do, from what had passed in answering the letters from Russia, had some influence over him, since he had spoken of the vernal equinox being the limit of his delay, after which he would transfer hopes to the messages which Captain Vickovitch had delivered to him.

With regard to what the Kuzzilbashes had urged upon him, I would remind him, that we were a nation freed from religious prejudices, and that we regarded Sheeahs and Soomnees alike; but that the Afghans were a people strongly imbued with the tenets peculiar to the latter: and that he should suspect those who had advised acts at variance with national feeling, and suspect them the more when I, who told him so, was a servant of a government on good terms with Persia, and which was disposed to be on an equally good footing with the Afghans. If it had been to him a source of regret that he must take measures after the equinox, it was doubly so to me; for we were disposed to intercede, in behalf of the Afghan nation, with their formidable opponent, the Ruler of Lahore, to prevent further strife; but that such good offices did not appear to be appreciated as they deserved,
From the affairs of Peshawur, continued I, you have gone suddenly to those of Herat, and what with Persian and Russian emissaries, it is pressed upon you to look to that quarter, and perform a service which would gain for you your objects in Peshawur. These, continued I, are opinions fraught with error and ruin. Could you leave Cabool to aid, or to resist, the Shah of Persia, with a Sikh force in Peshawur, amounting to 35,000 men? It is impossible; and the advantages of cultivating an alliance with the British were apparent from the very fact that this formidable Power on the eastern frontier, had ceased to molest him the moment its agent had entered Afghanistan. I had therefore now to tell him that delay till the vernal equinox was perfectly unnecessary; that he would find the views of the Governor-General in the letter which I here presented to him, and which, as his friend and well-wisher, I begged him to read and weigh with the attention they deserved.

Before the letter was opened, the Ameer assured me that he placed the alliance of the British Government in no sort of comparison with that of any other nation; but it was true there were those who advised him as I had stated. I said I could fairly acquit him of having expressed any such sentiments, and that I had, from the whole tenor of his conduct since my arrival, become convinced of his being well disposed to my Government; but that the limiting a time to its deliberations, if it passed unnoticed by me to him, six days ago, was by no means unobserved, and I did not think it indicative of a tone of thinking which was due to a friendly Power that could substantially serve him. He excused himself by saying that he was obliged to give some answer for the honor which had been conferred upon him; and the interest which had been exhibited by Russia deserved acknowledgment; and if he had spoken of “Noo-Roz” as the time proper for coming to an adjustment, it was that his suspense had led him to use such an expression, as his Chiefs and people were constantly taunting him.

The letter was now opened, and read over twice with great attention by Meerza Samee Khan, who, excepting Aga Hoossein, one of his counsellors, and another Meerza, were the only persons present. I explained the import of all those passages which he required. After a short reflection, and some expressions of disappointment, he stated that the Governor-General’s letter was full of meaning, and that his Lordship’s sympathy with the Afghan people was very gratifying; but that he had already expressed his views regarding Peshawur, and unless Government lent its good offices to him, supposing Runjeet Sing to restore it to Sultan Mahomed Khan, he would suffer materially by it, and through him, the people over whom Providence allowed him to rule; that I had made an observation to him regarding his inability to move from Cabool, while peace did not exist on his eastern frontier, which was truth, and which he admitted; but that there was no pressing
danger to him from that quarter, and he could stay at Cabool; that he feared the case of the Afghans was, like that of most unfortunate people, they had no friends; that he had placed his all in the hands of the British Government; and that, if it blamed him for having written to others, he begged to declare he never would have done so, if he had known an agent was to have been sent to Cabool; that though he was unable to do much for himself, he might assist others, and perform very substantial service in this quarter for the British Government; that he was now told he was indebted to Runjeet Sing for the dress which he wore, which he could not admit; and further, that he inferred from the letter that it was thought his duty to send presents to Maharajah Runjeet Sing, who had never subdued him, which he certainly did not understand; that it was, however, true that a goodwill had subsisted between the British and the Afghans from the days of Mr. Elphinstone downwards, and that our wisdom and word were a theme of praise, which led him to reflect seriously on what best suited his interests, before he made any answer to the Governor-General.

I replied, that it was a wise course which he meant to pursue, in weighing well before he acted; and I would advise him to choose good counsellors before he let slip the opportunity of having the friendly sympathy of the British Government evinced. It was true, I said, that it expected him to live, if not on cordial, most certainly, on apparently harmonious, terms with Runjeet Sing; but I did not infer that he was to send presents to Lahore; nor did I feel it my duty to counsel any such procedure; but, I added, that if the Ruler of Lahore ceases to molest you, peace will naturally follow, and all the happy consequences attendant upon it. That I would now leave him to discuss with his advisers what he should do.

I took the occasion to tell him, that I, as his well-wisher, would advise him to reflect deeply before he lost the goodwill of the British; and that his entering into any political intercourse with others, must be considered by us a direct breach of friendship. On this I withdrew.

In the afternoon, and again this morning, the Ameer sent Meerza Samee Khan, to assure me that no measure would be taken, of whatever description, without first consulting myself: and that all communications, in every direction, would be suspended, as the letter which I had delivered was full of importance, and the Ameer had therefore summoned the Nawab from his castle at Tutung (near Jelalabad) and would send off an express to Candahar, to take the counsel of his brothers on what so vitally concerned their common interest. The Meerza then asked, by the Ameer's advice, for my sentiments regarding the kind of letter which should be written to Candahar.
No. 20.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Extract.)
Cabool, March 5, 1838.

On the 23rd ultimo, I had the honor to report to you the result of my intercourse with the Ameer of Cabool, on the subject of the extent to which he was to reckon on the good offices of the British Government, in an adjustment of his differences with the Sikhs, and the returns which would be expected from him in consequence.

From various quarters I have meanwhile heard, that the Ruler of Cabool is but ill-disposed to meet Government in its wishes; and the advice given to him by one of the first individuals whose counsel he sought, was, that he should take the British Government at their word, and dismiss their agent, since there was nothing now to be expected from his presence in Cabool. From the receipt of the Governor-General's letter to the present time, nightly meetings have been held at the Bala Hissar; and the Ameer has, on more than one occasion, given vent to very strong expressions, both as to his future proceedings, and the disappointment at the slight degree of appreciation entertained by Government regarding him.

It seems very clear, although the final answer of Dost Mahomed Khan has not been received, that we have little hope of establishing a friendly connection with him on the terms wished for by Government; even if it could be brought about before a vast change of opinion takes place, the friendship would be delusive, and no degree of dependence could be placed on this Chief.

As M. Vickovitch still remains in Cabool (and his presence is the strongest test of the Ameer's disposition to make use of him against us), and as Dost Mahomed Khan does not appreciate our good offices in Peshawur, I shall deem it my duty to retire when I receive the Ameer's letter, unless some very decided change of tone takes place at Cabool.

No. 21.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Extract.)
Cabool, March 13, 1838.

On the morning of the 5th instant I had the honor to report to you the result of my communications with the Ameer of Cabool, and the very unfavourable aspect which affairs had assumed.

In the forenoon of the 5th I had a visit from the Nawab Jubbar Khan, who came over from the Durbar, by the Ameer's request, with a string of propositions which were to be agreed to by me, as the terms on which the Ameer consented to what was asked of him. These consisted of a promise to protect Cabool and Candahar from Persia; of the surrender of Peshawur by Runjeet Sing; of the interference of our Government to protect, at that city, those who might return to it from Cabool, supposing it to be restored to Sultan Mahomed Khan; with several other proposals.

I at once informed the Nawab that I would agree to none of the
terms proposed; that I was astonished to hear a race so illustrious as the Dooraunees, who had carried their sword to Isphahan and Delhi, imploring protection against Persia; that as for Peshawur, it belonged to our ancient ally, the Ruler of Lahore, and he alone could surrender it; and that, as for protecting those who returned from Cabool, supposing the Maharajah to make a settlement, it was an after concern, which it was now useless to discuss, as well as the other matters stated, since the Ameer seemed so little disposed to attend to the views of the British Government, and what was of more importance, his own interests.

The Nawab replied at great length, and said that we did not seem disposed to meet the Afghans half way; that it was true we entertained a mean opinion of the power of Persia, and, as he always believed Europeans, he concluded we were right; but that it was otherwise among the Afghans, and with the Ameer, and particularly in a city like this, where there were so many Kuzzilbashies, and when Herat was besieged. I abridged the interview by stating that, as I saw no hope of adjustment in the present tone held, I should request my dismissal, and proceed to Hindoostan, where they might solicit, but probably in vain, another listening to their grievances. The Nawab left me in sorrow.

Shortly after the Nawab's departure, I drew up and forwarded the following to the Ameer, by means of Meerza Samee Khan.

**Note.**

"*Cabool, March 5, 1838.*

"That in consequence of the many letters which the Ameer Sahib wrote to the British Government about the sufferings which he experienced at the hands of the Sikhs, the Government had heard his requests, sympathized with him, and were willing and ready to use its good offices with Maharajah Runjeet Sing that a remedy be applied to the sufferings complained of. The Ameer Sahib wrote to other governments on the subject of these sufferings, and all the letters had one and the same contents; but it now appeared that the remedy which Lord Auckland offered to apply, and which was all that was then asked, was not sufficient; other demands being made quite unconnected with the Sikhs. That Mr. Burnes has no power or authority to speak on other matters, as is well known from his Lordship's letter, and he would therefore be deceiving the Ameer by listening to them. Under these circumstances, as there is a Russian agent here, and he is detained by the Ameer's request, it is clearly evident that the Ameer does not approve of the offers of the British, but seeks the aid of others. Mr. Burnes feels it due to himself and his Government, to ask leave in consequence to return to Hindoostan. To remain longer here fetters the Ameer, and discredits the British Government in Cabool. Had Mr. Burnes power to do what the Ameer wishes, he would not ask his leave; but he has no power. It is, however, in the Ameer's option to make
known to the Governor-General, by a trusty messenger, whom he can send to Hindoostan, all his wishes.

(Signed) "ALEX. BURNES."

In the evening, the Ameer assembled all his counsellors, several of whom had in the interval arrived, and a stormy discussion ensued, which lasted till past midnight. He was, I hear, very eloquent on the disgrace which would accrue to him in the Mahomedan world after his crusades against the Sikhs, and his raising the countries around. It was at last agreed to summon me next day; but the discussion was again resumed on the morning of the 6th, and lasted till near noon.

About mid-day, the Meerza, accompanied by Imaum Verdi, who had been called from Jalalabad, waited upon me: they brought the proposals of the Nawab, somewhat modified, with many expressions of regret on the part of the Ameer and themselves, that I seemed so resolute in rejecting all that had been urged. The Meerza Imaum Verdi claimed Peshawur as the Ameer's, but for which he was willing to pay tribute. I replied, that it never had been the Ameer's. Meerza Samee Khan then brought forward the clause of protection from Persia; and I produced letters, which had arrived over night, to show the progress and the hopes of that Power in the siege of Herat; the effect was electric; and the Meerza said that we need not now discuss that point. The Meerza then invited me to the Bala Hissar in the afternoon, in the name of the Ameer; and, in promising to go, I told them that Dost Mahomed Khan could not change my resolutions, which were final, and that, if he agreed not to what had been stated, I would conclude with asking permission to leave Cabool tomorrow morning. Meerza Samee Khan declared that that never could, and never would, be permitted, for the hopes of this country rested on the British Government.

At the time appointed, I proceeded alone to the Bala Hissar, and met the Ameer, whom I found more gracious and more friendly even than usual. He was only attended by the two Meerezas above-named. I lost no time in entering upon business, and said that I was sorry to hear he had not taken the Governor-General's letter in the spirit it was written, and that he had deemed it harsh, when the very fact of his Lordship sending such a letter proved the interest taken in him, and that I had perused the document in English and Persian, without finding a single expression to offend him. It was true that it was a very explicit paper, but the Afghans were a nation famed for their straightforward proceedings, and it was most important to act towards him with a clear good faith, and let him know at once what might be expected of the British Government.

These observations drew him forth, and he took up the whole question argumentatively, in which manner I was glad to meet him. He said that my explanation of his Lordship's letter was very true, and
perhaps satisfactory; but that he had ever avowed himself as an anxious suitor for the friendship of the British nation; that its fame and its generosity surpassed all others; but he now inferred from the Governor-General's letter, and from what I had told him, that it was thought that he was prepared to go counter to its wishes, and to make it his enemy, which had never even entered into his contemplation; that he appealed to all his past conduct if he had shown any such symptoms; that he was a rude Afgahan, not accustomed to the polish of courts, and had been unable to do the honor to a representative from the British, which so exalted a nation was so well entitled to; but as far as his ability went he had gone; and his efforts, however incommensurate with his wishes, should acquit him. That as for the Sikhs, he might or might not be able to resist them; but he could not stand for a month against the British; and the thought of its displeasure even filled him with terror.

It appeared to him that both the Government and myself had taken an erroneous view of his correspondence with Persia, Russia, and the neighbouring nations; that I in particular had, in the note which I forwarded to him, made it appear that to one and all his addresses had been of the same import, and that the good offices which the British were now disposed to use in his behalf, were the result that he desired; but it was otherwise. Runjeet Sing had in his wars slain, and disgraced thousands of the Afgahns; and he sought for money from others, for assistance from us, and, from all, means of injuring so bitter an enemy. He knew that the Maharajah was our friend, and that we would not attack him; but we had it in our power to rescue Peshawur, as we had rescued Shikarpore, not by arms, but by a single hint to the Ruler of Lahore; that, on the contrary, we had avowed our being more than ever friendly to him; had preferred him to the Afgahns, who were willing to do us service. What, however, was more remarkable than all, we had coupled with the offers of sympathy in his difficulties, numerous pledges and promises that benefitted ourselves, when it would have been more magnanimous to act without any individual benefit accruing to us. That he had hoped to raise the power of Toorkistan, and others, not including Persia and Russia, to aid him in his war; but though we had not avowed such proceedings being disagreeable to us, it was clear from the turn which things had taken, that they would be so, and it was folly in him to persist in a course that excited our anger.

I replied to these observations, that his good feeling towards our nation was known; that his cordial, kind, and friendly treatment of the mission that had been sent to him, was duly appreciated by Government; and besides this public acknowledgment, it would remain engraven in my own memory while I lived. That what he objected to in the inference drawn from his Lordship's letter, was, as it appeared to me, himself being the judge, an untenable opinion. With Runjeet Sing as
our friend, were we to aid him in his wars? We had gone to the very limit of propriety in offering to give our good offices for peace; and we did so because it was earnestly to be desired for both parties. Are we, however, said I, to allow you to sit in Cabool, address Russia and Persia, bring agents from those countries, and publicly avow that you wish to disturb the peace of a friend on our frontiers? * Thanks be to Providence, and the valour of our army, we have no fear of foreign enemies; but when the house of a neighbour is fired, it is but good neighbourhood to put it out, and it is better to come to an understanding before the accident happens; that we regarded but little the dread of such an accident; but he knew that my presence here had reference to commercial matters, and that we saw, in a discontinuance of these differences, the benefit of all; that I could not possibly have misunderstood his addresses to foreign Powers, regarding Maharajah Runjeet Sing; and that though I now admitted he wrote to one for money, and to another for aid, still his ends were alike. I begged, moreover, explicitly to tell him, that I had not come to Cabool as a petitioner, but because he had solicited it; that I was not here to humble our Government before him or his countrymen, but to tell him that if he did not wish our good offices on the terms proposed, he should dismiss me.

He professed himself shocked at this last proposition, and that inevitable disgrace would flow from it. You have been welcomed by every Mahommedan State since you left Bombay, from a belief that you were the bringer of good news to an unhappy race of men, whose internal discord has made them the prey of a nation of another faith. I dare not, if I wished it, set myself up against the Afghan people; the belief has gone abroad that your presence is connected with their advantage, and though I admit that I profit by it, still the objects of my heart are not fully accomplished. There are Afghans in Tak fighting in thousands at this hour against the Sikhs; they have aided me, and they looked to me, but their sufferings will have no abatement; but I throw myself upon the generosity of the Governor-General of India, and I rely on the sympathy which his Lordship has expressed.

I congratulated the Ameer on his having seen his own interest better than to permit of friendship being interrupted between him and a nation so well-disposed towards him; but that it was now my duty to tell him clearly what we expected of him, and what we could do in return. You must never receive agents from other Powers, or have ought to do with them, without our sanction; you must dismiss Captain Vickovich with courtesy; you must surrender all claim to Peshawur on your own account, as that Chiefship belongs to Maharajah Runjeet Sing; you must live on friendly terms with that Potentate; you must also respect the independence of Candahar, and of Peshawur; and co-operate in arrangements to unite your family. In return for this I promise to recommend to the Government that it use its good offices with its ancient ally,
Maharajah Runjeet Sing, to remove present and future causes of
difference between the Sikhs and Afghans at Peshawur; but as that
Chiefship belongs to the Maharajah, he may confer it on Sultan Mahomed
Khan, or any other Afghan whom he chooses, on his own terms
and tribute; it being understood that such arrangement is to preserve
the credit and honor of all parties.

"To this I assent," said the Ameer; "but as these arrangements
are not set forth in full in his Lordship's letter, it would be desirable
for you to reduce the matter to writing, as far as your knowledge of the
Governor-General's views will permit you, that I may fairly see what is
expected, and what is to be done in return. The differences of the
Afghans and Sikhs can never be said to be adjusted so long as the
Maharajah keeps his troops and officers at Peshawur; and, consequently,
though I place every faith in the friendly intervention of the British,
and know that the Maharajah must be left to himself, I am bound to
state that fresh causes for disturbance must arise if His Highness does
not place my brother, or an Afghan, in Peshawur, and leave him to
govern it, subject to his (the Maharajah's) orders, but without the pre-
sence of Sikh troops." I replied, that since the Ameer agreed himself to
peace, it was better to leave these things to be settled hereafter, since
the less that was now said about them the better.

I then enjoined the Ameer to use his utmost efforts to effect an union
of the Burukzeye family. I told him that at Candahar the Sirdars were
ready, on certain conditions, to attach themselves to the British Govern-
ment whether he did or not; and that before I visited him, I felt it
my duty to send off an express to say that no such agreement ever
would be made, since our object was to unite, and not to sow dissensions
among his family. As an instance of our good feeling, I would impart
to him a plan of the Governor-General, which might or might not come
to maturity; but which showed how much his Lordship was interested
in the prosperity of all parties. It was, that if the English became the
mediators for peace at Herat between the Shah and Kamran, it would
be stipulated that the latter should in future cease to molest Candahar.
No such arrangement or stipulation may take place, said I; but the
intention must still remain as the proof of his Lordship's most friendly
consideration.

Dost Mahomed Khan assured me that he highly appreciated this
symptom of the Governor-General's friendship, and also thanked me
for having returned so prompt an answer to Candahar; inveighing at the
same time against his brothers for their instability. I said that this arose
from their weakness, which raised up alarm, but, if united, they would
add to their strength and his own.

When I left the Ameer, he got up, and in an under tone, so as not to
be heard by his servants, said, that he hoped the Government would bear
in mind his peculiar situation, and see that his respect and name were preserved; that its good offices should be peculiarly directed so as to preserve these, since a failure with us might entail upon him greater disgrace than ever; for his hopes rested in agitation, and having ceased to agitate, he thereby diminished his own strength, which, at an early interview after my arrival in Cabool, he had told me, he was well aware was not one-tenth of that possessed by the Lahore Chief. On this, the interview ended; and it will be seen that the subject of Persia was not even mentioned, insuperable as it appeared to be, and which, without a doubt, the intelligence from Herat prevented.

In the beginning of these proceedings it was the expressed wish of his Lordship, that the differences of the Sikhs and Afghans should be healed without an ostensible intervention on our part. I had little hope, from the excitation that reigns in this country, that this plan would be feasible. After nearly a six months' residence in this city, I am constrained to pronounce it perfectly hopeless. It is only out of regard to his Lordship, and our feelings generally, that the Afghans have been taught to name Maharajah Runjeet Sing with becoming respect; and it is to be remembered, that these people are elated at their partial success over Runjeet Sing's arms, though the Ameer himself knows that it was a sorry victory, and one without any beneficial consequences. It, however, unfortunately carried with it an impression that the attack might be successfully repeated, and the train of events which have followed would have led the Afghans, but for the presence of an agent of the British, to acts that must have altered the existing political condition of these countries.

The vast resources of Maharajah Runjeet Sing would have, as a matter of course, preserved to him his dominions; but the misrepresentations of the Persian Elchee, Kumber Alee Khan, would have drawn the Chief's of Candahar and Cabool to aid in the Persian siege of Herat; and the resources of that kingdom, and of Afghanistan, would have thus arrayed against one city. Had it fallen, promises, equally worthless, would have led the Afghans to trust to Persia for prosecuting their wars to the eastward, and with the Kuzzilbash influence in this city (not in the country), their introduction must have been ruinous to the integrity of Afghanistan. The promises of Captain Vickovitch I cannot at this time permit myself to believe made with the concurrence of the Emperor; but they remain uncontradicted, and must continue so for a time, so that they would have had at this crisis all the effect of truth, and led the Afghans headlong, as I consider, to ruin.

On the morning of the 10th, I received a deputation from the Ameer, consisting of the Nawab Hafizjee, the son of Meer Waceez (a man who cut a conspicuous figure in Afghani history), and the Naib or deputy of the Ameer, a Barukzye. The object of these personages
was to draw from me the written document above alluded to; and, besides giving reasons for its being withheld, I ran over with them the whole history of the Ameeer's applications to our Government.

I had proceeded thus far with this despatch, when notice of letters of a most embarrassing nature reached this place, from Candahar, in the course of the 12th instant. They convey the intimation of M. Goutte, the Russian agent with Mahomed Shah, having promised to get Count Simonich to ratify the Treaty of the Sirdars of Candahar with the Shah, and that a letter of a flattering nature had been addressed to these Chiefs by the Shah himself.

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No. 22.—Ameeer Dost Mahomed Khan to Lord Auckland. Cabool, March 21, 1838.

After compliments.

When I was anxious to hear of your welfare, and to receive the marks of your Lordship's favor, your highly esteemed letter reached me, and made me happy. Its contents, which I fully understood, conveyed the promise of your Lordship's favor in behalf of the Affghaan people, to some limited points; and also how far your Lordship will do them kindness on certain conditions; all this I have perfectly comprehended.

Consequent on my several applications and ardent hopes for a settlement of my affairs with the Sikh Government, your Lordship was kind enough to depute Captain Alexander Burnes to Cabool.

Meanwhile other circumstances happened; the King of Persia marched on Herat, which delayed the settlement of affairs on this side the Attock (Indus). As I rely on the British friendship, I gave no countenance to the Persian Government. What I wrote to prevent the Sirdars of Candahar from making any connection with Persia, is known to Captain Burnes.

After this had occurred, the Emperor of Russia has sent here his messenger, with His Majesty's royal letter to me, which I showed to Captain Burnes, along with my own letter to the Emperor, which I had addressed in the time of my distress.

I have not yet replied to the letter from Russia, as snow, and the disturbances of the road, prevented my dismissing the messenger; but as the winter is now over, and the roads are free from danger, I shall by all means dismiss him, that he may return to his country safely.

To make known objects in the hope of profit, to those personages who can do some good to the man in want, is consistent with propriety. Your Lordship is the source of generosity and favour; therefore I take the liberty to repeat my grievances, expecting that your Lordship will release the Affghans from distress, and enlarge their possessions.

If your Lordship settles the affairs of the Affghans, they and their posterity will be grateful; you will have a good name; and by their
connections with the British Government, they will perform most important and useful service, according to your satisfaction. The King of Persia is now besieging Herat; but if your Lordship would give us a little encouragement and assistance, His Majesty would never be able to attack the country of the Afghans.

The favors of your Lordship are beyond the description of my pen; but I am lost in speculation what has created this neglect of your Lordship in behalf of the Afghan people. A settlement of the affairs of the east of Afghanistan remains under a painful delay; disturbances are making havoc on the west; and the whole of this people are low-spirited; how then is it possible that this nation can be free from impending dangers? I have no kind of inclination to enter into an alliance with any other Power but the British.

If we resolve to check the progress of the enemy on the west, my want and need prevent me undertaking the expedition. If Herat falls into the hands of the Persians, it will cause serious loss and damage to the whole country of Afghanistan. When disappointments afflict the heart of mankind, they do many things that are wrong. I hope Herat will never be taken by the Kajars, which might compel the Afghans of that part to submit to that Power.

The Chiefs of Candahar, somewhat by fear, and somewhat by weakness, as well as by their hopelessness, are bringing death to themselves. If they become friends to the Persians, and I also be unable to protect them, this will produce much harm in Afghanistan.

I hope, and sincerely trust, that your Lordship will apply an immediate cure to my pains, for the Russians are publicly assisting the Persians, and have made a breach in the Treaty which has long subsisted between them and the British, by stepping into the country of Afghanistan.

If such things do take place, what then prevents your Lordship remedying our grievances and protecting us?

If your Lordship would give us a little encouragement and power, it would be impossible for Mahomed Shah to go back safely to Persia, or take with him the baggage and guns which he has now with him at Herat.

If your Lordship is pleased to bestow a little trouble to adjust affairs between this country and the Maharajah Runjeet Sing, who is the great and old ally of the British, how is it possible that we should make objection to it, or to suitable arrangements for peace?

As I rely on your Lordship’s favour, I have freely laid open my feelings in the hope of better fortune, since delays raise up fear of danger.

Captain Burnes will fully inform your Lordship respecting the rest of my affairs. Let me be honored by hearing from your Lordship.
No. 23.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
Cabool, March 24, 1838.

(Extract.)

In my letter of the 13th instant reporting the progress which had been made in communicating with the Ameer of Cabool, I was under the necessity of abruptly terminating the communication, on account of the arrival of letters from Candahar.

After the interview which I had with the deputation sent to me by the Ameer on the 10th, and which wished to draw from me a paper of pledge regarding the use of our good offices at Peshawur, I had no more intercourse on business, till the 16th instant, with the Ameer or his agents, and it was only from visitors that I learned that things were going wrong. These reports went to inform me that the Ameer had despatched a letter to Candahar, telling his brothers that his hopes on the British had left him; that much more attention had been shown to Captain Vickovitch than he had ever experienced; with several other pieces of information, conveying a similar import.

It was quite clear that no such conduct on the part of Dost Mahomed Khan, could for a moment be tolerated by our Government; but under the circumstances of the late accounts from Candahar, it was impossible to tell whether the alienation arose from my refusal of the papers of pledge; and any extreme proceedings on my part might have contributed to the fall of Herat, by throwing into the scale against it all the weight of this country. The intelligence, however, from that city, being prejudicial to prospects of success on the part of Persia, made me resolve to have an immediate explanation, or my dismissal.

To put it out of the Ameer's power to misconstrue the intentions of the Governor-General, I sent to him on the morning of the 18th the following Note, repeating my request for leave, if it was not his intention to do as therein stated.

NOTE.

"Cabool, March 18, 1838.

"Since it appears that the Ameer considers the letter of the Governor-General as conveying his Lordship's wish to terminate intercourse with the Afghans, Captain Burnes begs to remind the Ameer that that letter has no such meaning. The Ameer complained of what he suffers from the Sikhs. His Lordship has used his interposition to prevent a continuance of war with that nation, and is willing to continue his good offices, that a permanent peace be established. Should the Ameer be dissatisfied with these good offices, and seek connection with other Powers, then the Ameer is to consider the Governor-General's letter a final answer, and not till then; since our friendship is entirely dependent on the relinquishment of alliance with any Power to the west. This is well known, but I commit it to writing, that there may be no misapprehension or mistake.

(Signed) "A. BURNES."
The effect of this declaration now brought upon the Ameer the Soonees of this country, and I am given to understand that some influence from the harem was likewise exercised, for it appeared that the Persian party was the mainspring of this change of sentiment, and had redoubled their exertion when they found the Ameer disposed to hesitate; and the ability, tact, and education of the few individuals of this tribe, who regularly attend the Durbar, for a time outweighed the arguments of the more simple Afghans.

In the course of the day, and after much discussion, the Ameer sent his brother the Nawab along with Meerza Samee Khan, and another confidential servant, to tell me that he was sorry to have caused so much uneasiness to me; that the Government of this country being "Ooolosee" (that is, of the tribes) was difficult to manage; that he regretted the contents of his late letter to Candahar, for he wrote under disappointment; and that he now threw himself on the favour of the Governor-General, and desired the Nawab and the Meerza to pass to me a paper under their seal, pledging the dismissal of M. Vickovitch without further delay, and requesting to know from me the route by which he should return. I told the party that I was glad that the Ameer's sense had prevailed against the persuasion of interested individuals; but that he must understand it was he himself that was favored and not us. As for the dismissal of the Russian, it would be sufficient if it were done, but speedily done. The party left me saying that they would return next morning, and make some observations, not as conditions, but for the Governor-General's consideration.

On the 19th I received the promised visit from the Nawab and Meerza Samee Khan, who were joined by the Naib-i-Ameer. The purpose of their first communication was to point out to me the danger at Candahar, on account of the vicinity of the Persian army, and their refusal to become subservient to the Shah, after His Majesty's acceptance of their Treaty, and its being guaranteed by Russia. To this I replied, that if the Shah were not in a state of despair, I did not believe he would have written as he had done, to the Sirdars at Candahar, and, for my part, I did not believe the Russian agent with the Shah had the power to act as he had promised; and I put it to themselves if it were likely that Mahomed Shah would waste his blood and his treasure to capture Herat, that he might surrender it to them; and that the Candahar Sirdars ought to rely on our Government, if they expected to keep what they had; and that I would write to those personages by a horseman this day, to bid them look to Bahawulpore and Sinde as a proof of the English never forsaking those friends who placed reliance upon them. My advice, therefore, was, that the Ameer should second this counsel, and retract what he had, in an unguarded moment, written some days since. This was agreed upon.

The Naib-i-Ameer then recurred to the observations which I had
always made, in refusing a paper of pledge regarding the use of our
good offices at Peshawur, that that Chiefship did not belong to us, and
I could not, therefore, give such a document. To that point the Ameer
has yielded, hoping that some change for the better will be made; but
the British Government have no such argument to adduce regarding
what occurs between Persia and the Afghan States. The Affghans
had abandoned all connection with Persia for two reasons: that it was
conducive to their interests to have no intimacy with that Power, and
that such a proceeding was agreeable to us, whom it was their great
object to conciliate; but we had refused all pecuniary aid, and their
situation was endangered, and the more so, as Afghanistan was crippled
by the loss of Peshawur, while with the three Chiefships united, the
Affghans might repulse Persia. In addition to this, the Ameer had de-
sired him to point out to me the 6th Article of the Treaty made by
Kumber Alee Khan, and which the Russian Government had guaran-
teed, viz. the promise, that "in case any harm befals Candahar, the
Shah of Persia agreed to give them, in his own county, land equal to
the value of their loss."

To these close questions I answered, that the Affghans would never
have cause to regret their friendship with us; but that we must have
good proofs before we pledged anything; and that we are not asking
a departure from their own interests by telling them to adhere to us;
that there was certainly a difference between their case as connected
with Persia, from that with Runjeet Sing; but I hoped there would be
no occasion to provide against such a calamity as the loss of Candahar;
and, at all events, that there would be abundance of time to refer the
matter for the Governor-General's consideration, which I promised to do;
that, however, I mistrusted all the promises of M. Goutte regarding
the Treaty in question. And, finally, if differences were removed from
among the Affghan Chiefships, I, who had been in both that country
and in Persia, believed that the Shah could make no impression on
Afghanistan; and further, that the only way to interest the Governor-
General in their behalf, was to consign themselves, as the Ameer had
yesterday stated, to his Lordship; and I would promise them more cer-
tain good treatment than Persia would ever secure to them.

The result of the Persian interference in Afghan affairs, as will be
seen, has revived the question of protection from Persia (though in a
qualified manner), which I had believed to have been set at rest.

The state of the weather prevented my having direct communication
with the Ameer on the preceding points, till the 23rd, when he came
in person to visit me. I had not seen him since the 6th instant. On
this occasion I was very sorry to observe a tone which I had not before
seen exhibited. The Ameer may have authorized his advisers to speak
as they had done, and he may entertain the feelings which they ex-
pressed; but I am bound to judge of what he said himself, and this by
no means seems to me so satisfactory as I have reported, or had been
led to believe. He stated that he had been viewed by our Government
as no one; that his friendship was worth little; that he was told to con-
sider himself fortunate at our preventing the Sikhs coming to Cabool,
of which he himself had no fear; that he had applied to us for a cure
in affairs at Peshawur, but our remedy was beyond his comprehension;
and that though he felt honored and grateful for the Governor-General's
sending a mission to him, he had now lost every description of hope
from us; that he saw little or no probable benefit to the Afghans as a
people, and less to himself; that our Government seemed to doubt him
in his connection with other Powers, but he would now tell me that he
wished to cling to us, for Russia, with her vast army and empire, would,
from distance, do him no good, except through Persia, which was as
much her's as India was British; but that, as for trusting to Mahomed
Shah himself, he had no such folly, and he would resist his advance to
the last, he being the enemy of the Afghans. We might, therefore,
feel satisfied on these points, that he would seek no such alliance, but that
if he and his countrymen were to be subdued, it was much better to be
overthrown by Mahomed Shah, who was a kind of a Mahomedan, in-
stead of the Sikhs; that, however, he had little fear of either, for the
millions of money which the Dooranmees, in the zenith of their glory,
had amassed and brought to Cabool, had not been lost by attacks from
Persians or Sikhs, but from internal discord.

I reasoned much with the Ameer on these confessions, and said at
once that our Government had no desire to guide him, and, if he did not
approve of its offers, he need not accept them, and it was evident, that
so long as he held such language, and that too in public, no good un-
derstanding could be established. He at once replied: "I do not
see what you are aiming at. I am either kept in the dark, or misled.
Never was there such excitement in this land. The Persians are be-
fore Herat, openly aided by Russia; that Power has sent an agent here,
and your Government have deputed you. I wish no countenance but
that of the English, and you refuse all pledges and promises, and mean,
I presume, as you are people of your word, to do nothing for me. I
am bound in duty to say as I feel, or I would be deceiving myself and
you." I contented myself with answering this long string of griev-
ances, by saying that he could shape his own course as he thought best;
and I referred him to Sinde as an instance of the value of a British
connection.

In pledging himself to have nothing to do with the Powers to the
west, the Ameer has so far acted in coincidence with the views of Go-

ternment; but it will be seen that he is not so sensible as he was
expected to be of our good offices in Peshawur, and seems to doubt of
anything being done. He has been told, and now admits, that he can
exercise no kind of interference in an adjustment of affairs there; but it
is too evident that he will test the British by what is settled in that Chiefship. If the Maharajah restores it, in whole or in part, to Sultan Mahomed Khan, he still paying tribute to Lahore, it would silence complaints in Cabool, and be to the Afghans an earnest of our sympathy of the highest value; but if something decisive is not done in this quarter, no reliance, in my opinion, is to be placed on this Chief. Fear, it appears to me, of our displeasure, is the lever on which he is now moved; and it has not escaped him, that if Peshawur be restored, even partially, and Candahar clings to us, these Chiefships will become identified with the British, and thus the Ruler of Cabool will find himself awkwardly situated from the conduct of his own relatives. If, on the other hand, we succeed in uniting the whole of the Barukzye family, which I believe quite practicable, we shall raise up in this country, instead of weak and divided States accessible to every intrigue, alike injurious to themselves and us, a barrier which will prevent future causes of vexation, and advance commercial and political ends.

No. 24.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

_Cabool, April 25, 1838._

(Extract.)

On the 24th ultimo, I had the honor, to report for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, the mode in which my discussions with the Ameer of Cabool had terminated, and that, though hope then existed of some ultimate good understanding being established, it has day by day grown more faint; and I have now received my dismissal from Cabool, and am preparing without loss of time to quit this city, and retire upon Peshawur. The immediate cause of such a step being necessary is the arrival of Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan from Candahar, and the demands in consequence made by him, in which he has been joined by the Ameer, for a direct promise of protection from Persia, should Herat fall, of which there is no doubt now entertained by the authorities here. I shall report in detail the circumstances which have led to this untoward event at Cabool.

Shortly after Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan reached this, he waited upon me, and we conversed upon all which had passed; when I plainly told him that the manner in which the Ameer had met the views of the British Government was by no means likely to satisfy it, and instanced his declining to open any communication, direct or indirect, with Maharajah Runjeet Sing, as the clearest proof of his neglect of our advice, and his own interests. The Sirdar expressed great concern at what had passed, but immediately turned upon the affairs of Candahar, stating that he had full powers from his two brothers there to treat with me, and that he must have, as the price of adhering to us in the present critical state of affairs at Herat, a pledge of protection from Persia. I told him that he could have no stronger or better pledge from Government than the presence of Mr. Leech at such a juncture, for the British never de-
sented their friends: and who would presume to disturb them when an agent accredited by it was resident at Candahar?

This was far from satisfying the Sirdar, who declared that neither he nor his brothers could accept such general promises, and that they had a claim on the British, since, whatever might have been the behaviour of the Ameer at Cabool, the Candahar family had done nothing wrong, and adhered to our Government, which was bound in consequence to protect them. This interview took place on the 13th instant.

On the 15th I received another visit from Sirdar Mehril Dil Khan, who was accompanied by the Nawab Jubbar Khan, Meerza Samee Khan, and the Naibs of Candahar and Cabool. The deputation was a formal one from both branches of the family. The Sirdar now informed me that the Ameer had agreed to write to the Maharajah through the Governor-General; to dismiss Captain Vickovitch; to hold no further communication with other Powers; to write to the Shah of Persia that he had done with His Majesty for ever. The Sirdars of Candahar, on their part, agreed to address the Shah, recall Ullahdad the agent, who had accompanied Kumber Alee, and to place themselves, along with their brother the Ameer, entirely under the protection of the British Government; in return for which they claimed at its hands two things: first, a direct promise of its good offices to establish peace at Peshawur, and an amelioration in the condition of Sultan Mahomed Khan; and second, a promise, equally direct, to afford them protection from Persia, in whatever way the British judged it best for their interests, it being clearly understood that Candahar was not to be allowed to suffer injury.

In reply to these observations, I observed that it was very satisfactory to hear what had been stated regarding the intentions of the Ameer and the Chiefs of Candahar; but the deputation must not wonder at my being sceptical as to their sincerity, after my having received, so long since as the 23rd ultimo, a letter of promise, addressed to the Governor-General, to dismiss Captain Vickovitch, while that officer still continued in Cabool; that with respect to Peshawur, the whole matter rested on Maharajah Runjeet Sing, with whom we were willing to use our good offices, if they behaved in a suitable manner; and had nothing further to say, than to regret their fixed determination not to address that personage directly, which might protract to a remote period a settlement so much to be desired for the good of all parties. With reference to their desisting from all intercourse with other Powers, that followed as a mere matter of course, if they expected our friendship; but it was a very grave question for me to answer, that we should immediately secure Candahar from the attacks of Persia. Mr. Leech was there, by my orders, and with the sanction of the Governor-General; and what proof of our intention not to forsake them, more valuable than this, could they desire? But for my part, their apprehension seemed very premature, for Herat was not yet captured, and the brave defence it was making
should dispel their despondency: "Above all," said I, "your proceedings seem singularly inconsistent, when it was but three months ago that you informed me you did not fear Persia, but the Ruler of Herat."

To this the Sirdar replied, that I could not have considered that they had not only received an agent from the Emperor of Russia in Cabool, but a written promise, under the seal and signature of M. Goutte, the Russian agent with the Shah of Persia at Herat, which he had with him, granting all that they desired; and it was for me to consider how far, under such circumstances, they could receive my arguments in opposition to such direct and recorded pledges. I asked if they reposed confidence in these papers: "Most certainly," was the reply, "since they are from Europeans, whose word is inviolable." "But," continued I, "is not Russia to aid you through means of Persia; and how does the Shah act towards you? He addresses you as his vassals, and calls your country a part of his own. Are Lord Auckland's letters or views couched in such terms? Certainly not." "That may be all true enough," said the Sirdar, "but a powerful enemy threatens us; and if you will do no more than use general terms, and go no farther than keeping Mr. Leech at Candahar, we must take measures to secure ourselves in the manner best suited for our advantage." The interview lasted about four hours; and I need not repeat the many arguments adduced for their abstaining from an alliance with Persia, since there was nothing new in them, further than has been now given.

On the 17th instant, as I have already reported to Government, an agent reached this from Herat, bringing, as now appears, a communication from Vizier Yar Mahomed Khan, begging for assistance, and setting forth the difficulties which increased upon them, all of which went to still further excite the fears of the Ameer and his brothers for their own safety, since the fall of Herat was again placed before them, and with it, as they believed, a shaking of their own stability, with which they could only contend by throwing themselves upon Persia through Russia; or by drawing from me, as the agent of the British Government, a pledge that no harm would befal them.

On the 19th, I received a second deputation, consisting of the Nawab, Meerza Samee Khan, and Reshid Akhoond Zadee, the adviser of the Candahar Chiefs; but Mehr Di Khan was not of the party. The chief spokesman on this occasion was Reshid, and he set forth at great length the views of his master. "It appeared," said he, "that this is no longer an affair between one nation and another, but it is Russia and Persia against England and the Sikhs; for Captain Vickovitch has publicly declared to the Ameer that the interests of the Emperor and the Shah are identified; and though we would not trust the Shah himself, we may safely rely upon Russia." Meerza Samee Khan stated, that a termination one way or the other was now at hand; and as the Ameer and his brothers had no other wish but to adhere to the
British, I might easily keep them in our interests by giving the promise asked of me, though there was little hope of my doing so, when a single word from the Government might have long since settled Peshawur, and we refrained from saying it. Besides replies of a justificatory nature to these points, I told the party that they very unnecessarily obtruded upon us the power of Russia; that she was a very remote nation, to say nothing farther of the inutility of an alliance with her; and that as for the comparison between Persia and Runjeot Singh, I could assure them that the Maharajah's power was far superior to that of Mahomed Shah, and I spoke from personal observation. On my declining to give the promises asked of me regarding Candahar and Peshawur, the interview terminated.

On the following day, I had a private interview with—— who did not conceal from me that the Ameer had withdrawn his hopes from our Government; and though he did not tell me on whom he had centred them, it was not difficult to discover. He told me that Captain Vuckovitch had informed him of his Government and Persia being one; and that the Russian agent had been explaining to him in what manner Mahomed Shah had been raised to the throne of Persia. The English and Russian Governments had both given him their hand; but the object of Russia was to exalt his Majesty, and of England to lower him.

Any doubts as to the course which the Ameer and his advisers were to follow, were soon removed; for he opened at once an intercourse, in person, with Captain Vuckovitch, and besides having been long closeted with him, sent for him publicly on the 21st instant, when he was conducted through the streets of Cabool, and received a greater degree of respect than had been hitherto shown to him. The nature of the intercourse between him and the Ameer, has been reported to me on good authority, and is anything but complimentary to the British; but as it rests on report alone, I shall not here record it.

Seeing that the Ameer was now almost reckless, and, if respectable people are to be relied on, even encouraged to commit himself by some acts of indiscretion towards the mission, I resolved on the 22nd to address him a firm but temperate note, drawing to his mind all past events; not from any hope that advantage could be derived from it in my negotiations, but to place as distinctly as possible before him how much he might have himself to blame for anything that followed. This document is appended. (No. 1.) On the day after it had been transmitted, I received a reply, containing the notification of his having done with the British Government (No. 2.), in which as there were some circumstances requiring explanation, I again addressed him in writing (No. 3.), and applied for carriage to convey the mission to Peshawur. This I sent for delivery to himself; when he enlarged upon his ill fortune, and our want of appreciation either of himself or the dangers which
threatened him; adding, that he would most certainly attend to my requests for carriage, and see the party safely carried beyond his country, which would still be open to all people of the English nation who visited it.

On the 24th I had no communication with the officers of the Ameer, but in several notes regarding the arrangements for my departure, in all of which every and prompt attention was paid to my wishes, and proper persons nominated to accompany me to the frontier.

On the 25th I was visited by Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan, the Nawab, Meerza Samee Khan, and the Naib of the Ameer; but it appeared to be of entirely a complimentary nature, for though they set out with professing to do all the Government wished, there was no change in what has been previously stated. Mehr Dil Khan said, that the Ameer had understood it had been reported that Captain Vickovitch had written to Maharajah Runjeet Sing to desire him to quit Peshawur; and I said at once, that it was as public as report could make it; when the Sirdar said, that it had been talked of, but not settled. He then said, that the presence of an agent from Kamran, now with me, was not consistent with a due regard to our friendly professions towards them. To this I replied, that I had not sent for an agent from Herat; that it was well known to them, if the British had mediated for the safety of Herat, the price of that was to be the discontinuance of attack on Candahar, and what was still further, the Ameer in his note had included Herat as a part of Afghanistan to be protected; and there had been so little concealment in the object of the agent's mission, that I had given the letters of which he was the bearer, for the perusal of the Meerza of the Ameer. This was unanswerable.

In the afternoon I had my audience of leave with the Ameer, whom I found considerably excited. He ran over the contents of the note No. 2, and said very distinctly, that he had erred in applying to the British Government. I answered, that it was ready to do what he had asked of it; and he interrupted me by saying, that if the Governor-General believed it was a protection of Cabool he had sued for, it was a mistake. Seeing the tone of feeling exhibited, I thought it advisable to say no more on what had passed; and, preparatory to taking leave, thanked him for his attention and arrangements for my returning to Peshawur. He on this renewed the question of my departure; declared he was not to blame; that he had discarded Persia in the hope of pleasing us; and likewise slighted Russia, for instead of caressing Captain Vickovitch, as was due to a great Government like Russia, he had paid him no attention, and came always in person to visit me, while he had sent no one to him. He now appealed to me if he had not been indifferent to the Russian agent; and, knowing as I did what had passed within these few days, I looked surprised. He then observed that he did not allude to what had passed this day or two, as he had certainly seen
and consulted with, Captain Vickovitch, and meant to avail himself of his services, to rid Afghanistan of its present difficulties; but here again, continued he, I suffer from having called in your Government: Persia will perhaps refuse my offers, because I treated her agent slightingly, and Russia may tell me that I only cling to her when you have cast me off.

Seeing matters in this state, I said but little, and referred him to my written papers, when the Ameer launched forth in praise of the English nation, and the conduct of the mission, &c. &c., and begged I would stay as his guest for a few days. I replied that the servants of the public were not their own masters; and after what he had written and stated, it was my duty to quit his country without delay, as I would never feel satisfied in a land where the goodwill of my Government was not appreciated; that that goodwill was implored throughout Asia, but had lost its virtue in Cabool. I added, that this was the second instance of failure in this country, and that, where a man so celebrated as Mr. Elphinston had failed, it might have been presumptuous in me to have hoped for success. To this he replied, that Mr. Elphinston's failure arose with the inability of the Afghans, but my failure with the disinclination of the British; for what other meaning was attachable to words when Herat was about to fall, and Candahar threatened? After some further conversation I took my leave, with many apparently kind and gracious expressions on his part.

(Inclosure.)—Captain Burnes to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan.

Cabool, April 22, 1838.

Mr. Burnes begs to recall the Ameer's attention to two notes formerly delivered, advertsing to certain points connected with his presence at Cabool on the part of the British Government. As the arrival of Sirdar Mehir Dil Khan from Candahar has given rise to new subjects of discussion, Mr. Burnes deems it due to all parties, to the Ameer especially, once more to record the objects of his mission, in case they may have been (which is scarcely possible) misunderstood.

The Ameer need not be reminded, that in consequence of a letter addressed by himself to Lord Auckland, setting forth his differences with the Sikhs, expressing his desire to form a friendship with the British Government, that a mission was deputed to Cabool; why? because his Lordship considered he could do good to all parties.

The Ameer need not be further reminded, that in the letter alluded to, no mention was made of Persian affairs; therefore, the mission was sent to Cabool without instructions respecting such matters. When the Persians came to Herat, Mr. Burnes did not, however, leave Cabool, but remained with the Ameer, to show how much the British Government was his well-wisher; for whatever may be necessary to be said on Persian affairs, will be said in Persia itself.
The objects of this mission have reference to other matters; to the differences between yourself and the Sikhs, to their adjustment to the honor and satisfaction of all parties, and that a union between yourself and all your brothers may strengthen you as a State, that, under the strong arm of British friendship and connection, you may in future be able to repel all invaders and enemies, for the powerful enemies which now threaten the country of the Afghans, would have then retired. These were the views of the British Government towards the Afghan nation and its rulers; they were full of friendship and disinterestedness; the friendship, when concluded, was not likely to be diminished, but it would have gone on increasing day by day. It was impossible to know the fruits of friendship before the tree was planted; but Captain Burnes begs again to declare that the intention of the British Government was to have planted that tree, and watched its growth.

Captain Burnes cannot express his anxiety too strongly, that the Ameer will review all the circumstances. The propositions of the British Government were made in the full confidence that they were those best suited to the state of circumstances, and which, if agreed to, were the most likely to place the Afghan nation in a state of security from all enemies. Hitherto the Ameer has not even acceded to the preliminaries for arranging these things, and brings forward matters quite foreign to the objects of the mission, viz., protection against Persia, from which there is no fear, when the differences among the Afghan Chiefs cease. The justice of Lord Auckland’s proposition was obvious; for if the Ameer seeks certain good offices from two Governments, one of them only can give, and from one Government only can the Ameer receive such good offices. If the Ameer receive the good offices of any Power to the West, he need not complain of being refused those of the British Government in his difficulties hereafter.

In conclusion, Captain Burnes must express to the Ameer, that as he was rejoiced at being deputed with such propositions to the Ameer, so will he feel sincere sorrow at carrying back to the Governor-General the Ameer’s non-acquiescence in them; and as his well-wisher, he hopes that he never will see cause to repent that he did not listen to them. The Ameer will observe that he has the perfect exercise of his discretion, and that if he considers the Governor-General’s views at variance with his interests, he is the best judge. It only seems due to the Ameer, and to Mr. Burnes himself, to repeat all these circumstances, that there may be no mistake hereafter, and that the Ameer may reflect well before he abandons the friendship of the British Government, who wish him, and all the Afghan people, to be prosperous and happy. After all the conversation which has passed, and the letter which the Ameer sent to the Governor-General, he would not now give the Ameer this trouble; but the conversation with Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan and other persons, makes Mr. Burnes very anxious that all doubt of the
obtains and intentions of his Government should be removed; and he again states them in writing. The Ameer knows best what suits his own interests, and he knows also individually how much Mr. Burnes wishes him well.

(Signed) A. BURNES.

(Inlosure 2.)—Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to Captain Burnes.
A.C.
April 23, 1838.

I have perused your note, and understood its contents, though I have successively explained and placed all my objects in your mind, I repeat them again here to you.

After the arrival of Abbas Meerza in Meshid, and his subjection of Kokan and Shirukhs, as well as when Keramat Alee was appointed as a newswriter, on the part of the British Government, at Cabool, I commenced a correspondence with your Government, and every one expected great advantages from the English.

When the Sikhs took possession of Peshawur, either with or without the permission of Maharajah Runjekt Sing, I explained all the circumstances minutely to the Governor-General of India, as well as to Captain Wade; and my object was merely the restoration of Peshawur.

The correspondence which took place respecting Peshawur, between myself and Maharajah Runjekt Sing, I sent all to your Government, through Mr. Masson. When the British authorities got a knowledge of my wishes, they kindly deputed you to this quarter.

After the conflict of the late Sirdar Huree Sing, with my son Sirdar Mahomed Akbar Khan, a correspondence passed between the latter and the Sikh authorities, copy of which I sent to you, through Mr. Masson; and in every place I have mentioned the restoration of Peshawur.

On your arrival, and the inquiry which you made into my wishes, I told you the same as I had written from the beginning. Hopes arose of the restoration of Peshawur. You made report upon my views to Government; and what has taken place from that day to this, is well known to you.

In the former days of distress, when I heard nothing from the British Government to cure my pains, I was obliged to solicit pecuniary aid of the Russian, Persian, and Toorkistan Governments, and from every direction I received satisfactory promises; but your presence, and the friendly opinion which I entertained of the British Government, made me abandon the friendship of all others, which is no secret from you; at length, I saw no signs of your sympathizing with me.

All the British officers used to say and write, that they are the well-wishers of Afghanistan; and my ideas were that you would protect Afghanistan, which includes Herat, Candahar, Cabool, and Peshawur. When Mahomed Shah entered the country of Herat, you sent Mr. Leech to the Sirdars of Candahar, saying that you will assist them with money and troops. We then saw good by connecting ourselves with the English, and thus made no firm friendship with others.
On the arrival of your letter, the Sirdars of Candahar abandoned the design of sending their son to Mahomed Shah, and valued it as a good proof of your sympathy to Afghanistan; but to this day neither Peshawur is restored, nor have we been released from the impending dangers of the Shah of Persia.

As you say that you are deputed to settle the affairs of Peshawur, and have nothing to do with other business, then on what account have you sent Mr. Leech to Candahar? Before and after the arrival of my brother, Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan, I always mentioned to you about the restoration of Peshawur, and protection of Candahar against Persia. I have never spoken of anything else foreign to sympathy with Afghanistan. From the beginning to the end, the contents of the letters of your Government gave me great hopes, and I expected the restoration of Peshawur, and the protection of Afghanistan. To show this to the people, I publicly solicited the above favour, that every one should learn that you have sincere sympathy with us.

Mankind have no patience without obtaining their objects, and as my hopes on your Government are gone, I will be forced to have recourse to other Governments. It will be for the protection of Afghanistan, to save our honor, and, God forbid, not from any ill design towards the British.

You write that a connection with the western Governments may create disturbances here, and the result of which will be repentance. If the return of my good hopes is this, and such be the law of the great, then all this nation must rely upon God, in whose hands are the good and ill of this world. The Afghans have done nothing wrong, that other Governments should blame them; nor have they received any injury from the English.

In making friendship with any Government, my object will be to save and enlarge Afghanistan; and during these last seven months I have told you every thing worthy of note, and you know the good and bad. Now I have consigned myself to God, and in this no Government can blame me. All the Afghans will be grateful to the Government which obliges them.

There is no more to say which is not said. If you like to speak in person, or examine all the correspondence that passed between us, there will be no objection.

I am very much obliged to you for the trouble you took to come so far. I expected very much from your Government, and hoped for the protection and enlargement of Afghanistan; now I am disappointed, which I attribute, not to the ill favour of the English, but my own bad fortune.

Creatures must rely on the Creator.
(Inclosure 3.)—Captain Burns to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan.
Cabool, April 23, 1838.

I have received your note in reply to mine, and perfectly understand its contents; it is useless, therefore, to repeat them. Two points of explanation are now only necessary, as relates to Peshawur and Candahar.

First, as to Peshawur: You are well aware that my design was to ascertain your wishes and dispositions, that the British Government might use its good offices when you became its friend, to make a peace between you and Maharajah Ranjeet Singh, which should preserve the honor of both parties. This was the hope that I gave you. As this sympathy is not all which you wish, it need not be further dwelt upon.

Second, as regards Candahar: Truly I came here under a hope of terminating your differences with the Sikhs, the result of which would bring many other advantages to all Afghans, and also to your brothers at Candahar, because the Chiefship of Candahar has strength from your strength. Seeing, therefore, that there was great hope of terminating all future differences between you and the Sikhs, it was incumbent on me to ask your co-operation to prevent the Chiefs of Candahar going to Mahomed Shah; and you were pleased to write a letter of advice to them. I did the same; but a cold reply was returned, saying, that Mahomed Omar Khan had gone to Gherisk; that the Treaty made with Persia would do no harm to you, or the British. At length, after some time, it was known here that this son had not gone to Persia, and the Chiefs of Candahar changed their mind, and expressed a wish to join you, the head of their family; which was most advisable. On this, I sent Mr. Leech to Candahar (first asking your leave) that I might give them confidence; and I made, in truth, the offers of money to which you allude.

Before Mr. Leech, or my letters, got to Candahar, the Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan wrote to you that "the respectable Kohen Dil Khan wishes Mr. Burns to come himself, or send any of the officers with him, to Candahar, that we may learn each other's objects; and it will be no harm if you endeavour to induce Mr. Burns to do so." These were the reasons of sending Mr. Leech to Candahar.

When my letter, making the offers which I did, reached Candahar, the Sirdars, instead of accepting them, sent in reply, that "our object in sending Mahomed Omar Khan to Persia, was to keep off Mahomed Shah, and to ruin Kamran, and to make ourselves the masters of Herat; and it was not from fear that his Majesty would invade Candahar. We have now postponed the departure of Mahomed Omar Khan, hoping that evil may befall Kamran." What is the meaning of this, I ask? let the Ameer be judge. It is a refusal of the money, and a declaration that the Chiefs of Candahar do not fear Persia, but Kamran. Now it is reversed.
In truth, the British Government wishes to protect Afghanistan, and prevent any injury befalling it; but it is proper to make peace near at hand, before doing so at a distance; and such are the sentiments of the Governor-General. Till Peshawur affairs are settled, it is needless to talk of Candahar, further than that an officer of the British Government is now there, to show to all the world that the Afghans and English are one; and the Ameer well knows that two neighbouring States, the Sikhs and Sindians, had their differences lately settled by the presence of an officer of the British.

It now appears that the Ameer is not satisfied with the good offices tendered by the British Government, and does not rely on it. It is the duty of all the creatures of God to rely on God, as the Ameer justly says; but as the note of the Ameer is a clear dismissal of the mission sent to him, I shall be ready to have my audience of leave whenever the Ameer may fix a time; and I beg that the Ameer will now do me the favour to give orders for carriage being provided for my baggage as far as Peshawur. I will also send orders to Lieutenant Leech to leave Candahar without delay.

(Signed) A. BURNES.

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No. 25.—Lord Auckland to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan. Simla, April 27, 1838.

After compliments,

I have received your letter, and fully comprehend its contents.

It has been a source of much regret to me to find that your views of what is most for your advantage, have led you to decline the good offices which I have tendered, for the purpose of effecting a reconciliation between you and Maharajah Runjeet Sing, on the only terms on which I could, consistently with what has appeared to me just, engage to exercise my mediation for the settlement of the unhappy differences existing between you.

With the explanation, however, of your sentiments which you have now afforded to me, my further interposition in this affair could not lead to beneficial results; and as, in so unsettled a condition of things, the continuance of Captain Burnes, and of the officers under his orders, in Afghanistan, would not be conducive to the good ends which I had hoped to accomplish by their deputation, I have now issued orders to them to return to India; and they will accordingly set out, on receiving from you their dismissal, for which their immediate application will be made to you.

I have to express to you my acknowledgments for your attention and kindness to these officers while residing in your dominions.

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

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No. 26.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaughten, Esq. (Extract.) Jelalabad, April 30, 1838.

On the night of the 25th of April, I had the honor to report, for
the information of the Right Hon. the Governor-General, that I had had my audience of leave with the Ameer of Cabool; and I quitted the city on the following day (the 26th), being escorted about two miles from its gates by three of the Ameer’s sons, and also accompanied to the first halting-place, Bootkhak, by Meerza Samee Khan. It is now my purpose to lay before his Lordship such additional particulars as illustrate the opinions of Dost Mahomed Khan, and the views which, it seems, he has in contemplation, and which, since we can no longer act with him, will, as it appears to me, require counteraction.

I inquired into the truth of the reports in circulation regarding the Ameer having actually gone over to Persia, and sought the security of Russia. The reply was, that they were too true. I asked what had really occurred, and learned that some of the Ameer’s family, or that of his brothers at Candahar, were to be sent with letters to the Shah; that Captain Vickovitch had promised to get the guarantee of Russia to all their arrangements; that when Herat fell, either to send part of the Persian force, through the Hazarehjat to Cabool, or furnish the Ameer with money to expel the Sikhs from Peshawur, which, he had said, was the more easily to be exacted from the Shah, who was a large debtor to Russia.

I said that there appeared so much folly in all that was proposed, that I could not credit such to be the fact, particularly when I considered the religious disinclination of the Afghans towards Persia. The reply was, that all the Soonees of Cabool were horror-struck at the design, and that there will be more opposition than the Ameer anticipated; but such plans were certainly in contemplation, whatever they might come to.

It will be remembered that the Ameer, in my last interview with him, offered no palliation of the intercourse which he had had within the few last days with Captain Vickovitch; and though he did not, of course, state the nature of it, I have had intelligence of it, that leaves little or no doubt on the subject.

Captain Vickovitch has already asked leave to set out forthwith for Herat. Such a circumstance might excite a suspicion in the mind of the Ameer and his advisers, that, after his succeeding in disturbing his friendship with the British, he had probably gained his objects, and that his wish to withdraw was founded thereupon; but this thought does not appear to have occurred; and most certainly, whatever are the plans of Persia and Russia, it will now be no fault of the Chief of Cabool if they come not to maturity. He still gives out that he would not trust Persia alone, but seconded by M. Goutte and Captain Vickovitch, he considers the Russian guarantee will gain for him all his ends, and, besides being able successfully to contend with the Sikhs, as certain of ministering to his ambition, and fixing his supremacy.
On the morning of the 27th, before I set out from the first halting-place, I was visited by Meerza Samee Khan, who came to take his leave, and present me with two horses from the Ameer. He pretended to be distressed at all that had occurred; said that Sirdar Mehril Dil Khan had brought it about; but he did not conceal that he thought neither the Ameer, nor the Candahar family, had been appreciated, since it was not actually a sum of money they wished, but a promise of protection from the west, for withstanding the offers of those who had power to injure them. He consequently defended the conduct of the Ameer. He asked me, when I avoided all particulars by making general remarks, if there was any chance of matters being yet adjusted with our Government: and I replied, that I now saw no prospect whatever, though I only spoke from myself. He then asked if I would reply to any letters he or the Ameer might hereafter send to me; and I said that such would depend upon circumstances. I desired him to convey my personal thanks to Dost Mahomed Khan for his personal civilities to my companions and myself; and when I said nothing more, he asked if I had no other message to convey to the Ameer; I said, none, save that I feared he would soon find out, he was trusting to those who could not befriend him.

Two days' march from Cabool, I received the inclosed letter to the address of the Governor-General from the Ameer. The Ameer informed me on leaving him, that he would write to his Lordship, and simply notify that he had dismissed me; but Sirdar Mehril Dil Khan, finding that the Soonee party laid all the blame upon him, and that the whole mercantile community were roused at my departure, which they as publicly expressed to myself as to Dost Mahomed Khan, prevailed upon the Ameer's allowing him to set forth at length, the affairs of Candahar, in his own justification; and the singular sentiments are exhibited, of claiming fulfilment of the Treaty said to have been entered into by Mr. Elphinstone, with the former dynasty of Suddozye kings. The interpretation of a sympathy with the Afghans, on the part of the British Government, also receives the widest interpretation; and it is in this manner that Dost Mahomed, in the document appended to my letter of the 25th instant, infers the views of Government, when he directly says, that "from the beginning to the end, the contents of the letters of your Government gave me great hopes, and I expected the restoration of Peshawur, and the protection of Afghanistan." Of course such matters were never promised him; nor have I the first letter of the present Governor-General to the Ameer to refer to, on which they are founded, no doubt erroneously; but our policy in Persia has raised up among Afghans, and all Asiatics, the hope of most substantial assistance, whenever sympathy is spoken of.

It is, however, useless to dwell further on what were either the hopes or expectations of the Ameer and his family. No arguments,
drawn from my presence, or that of Mr. Leech, at Candahar, being
proofs of our sympathy, would satisfy them; nor would they view the
cessation of hostilities at Peshawur, the clear result of such presence, in
that light; but demanded of me a clear, explicit pledge of protection
from Persia, or money to raise troops to protect themselves, which I
could not grant. Mehril Dil Khan is, without doubt, a man of talent,
and was readily perceivable in his intercourse with me; but I had a
message conveyed to me from Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan, the Chief of
Candahar, that he would rather come himself to Cabool, if any Treaty
were to be entered upon. Mehril Dil Khan, therefore, in so strongly
urging the Candahar question, quite overlooked that of Peshawur; and
the peace at the latter city seems to have rendered the Ameer less
solicitous about Sikh affairs, and hence the untimely termination of
these negotiations. An Afghān cannot be disposed to understand the
moral influence of British power, and arguments unsupported by acts,
have no weight in Cabool; and it is to be remembered that the
menacing attitude of Persia, sharpens the apprehensions of the Afghān
Chiefs. The Ameer too, I hear, always states in his own version of
the proceedings, that he refused to send for the Persian Elchee to
Cabool, threatened to break with Candahar, if the Chiefs there sent
their son to Persia, and finally, exposed the whole of Captain Vicko-
vitch’s intrigue, all of which was known to the Governor-General when he
wrote the letter delivered to him on the 22nd of February, but for which
he received no acknowledgment, and for which I would not even promise
him protection from the Shah, whom he had done so much to offend.

As I am despatching this communication from Jelalabad, half way
to Peshawur, I have received good information that the Ameer has
been constantly with Captain Vickovitch since I left; and that officer
has earnestly solicited permission to proceed to Herat, by the direction
of Hazarehjat, and offered the solemn pledges to do all which the
Ameer wishes, under a month. He has also bound himself to address
Maharajah Runjeet Sing, about retiring from Peshawur; and when
Dost Mahomed Khan asked if he had authority to do so, he replied
that he had a letter from the Emperor to that Potentate, which would
soon set matters right. That all this has been promised, and the con-
versation now reported has taken place, I do not doubt; but it remains
to be seen what will be the performance; but I can rely on my inform-
ant, and his intelligence is in corroboratation of former reports.

No. 27.—Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan to Lord Auckland.—
(Received at Jugdlyluck, 28th April, 1838, by Captain Burnes.)
Afer compliments.

All the conversation which has passed between Captain Burnes
and myself, from the day of his arrival, is well known to your Lordship,
and, consequently, it is needless to repeat it.
In the month of Zekkuld, I sent to your Lordship a letter on the affairs of this place: it is now the month of Safar, or nearly three months, that your Lordship has not favored me with its answer. I also wrote a second time, respecting the determination of the King of Persia, and the expectations of this friendly nation, (Affghans) for the protection and enlargement of their possessions, which it had hoped from the British Government for a long time.

It was my first desire that there should be peace between the Affghans and Sikhs, and that the country of Peshawur, which is the native place of this nation, should be restored through the good offices of the English. When the Shah of Persia came to take Herat, which along with the country of Candahar, is the abode of the Affghans, I asked Captain Burnes to point out the remedy against the Persians, since the English are noted for sympathising with the Affghans. In reply, he promised us pecuniary aid for troops, and also wrote to the Sirdars of Candahar about it, and sent Mr. Leeuch to assure them; all of which, I know, has been reported to your Lordship.

After passing some period, Captain Burnes, whether by your Lordship's order, or for some other reason, wrote to the Sirdars of Candahar, and refused to assist them. It is now, eight months since Captain Burnes came into this country, and about five months have elapsed since the Persians have besieged Herat; the expectations of the country of Peshawur being restored, or Candahar protected against the Persians, which were entertained for a long time, are gone now from the hearts of the Affghans. All of the people of this nation which were residing in the country of Herat, have been obliged to desert from their native abodes, and settle themselves in the districts of Candahar, for fear of the Persians.

Mehir Dil Khan came to Cabool to consult on the proceedings of this quarter, and asked Captain Burnes to apply a remedy, and release Candahar from the danger of the Persians. Until this considerable nation of the Affghans do receive evident and clear signs of sympathy from the British, they cannot be supposed to have confidence in it.

If there should be peace on the East, and Peshawur restored through the good offices of the English, the Sirdars of Peshawur, Cabool, and Candahar might advance to Herat. To save their own honor, they (the Affghans) would behave in such a brave way, that no danger could have accrued from the Persians. If the restoration of Peshawur required a longer time, it was no harm in saying so; but it was necessary that Captain Burnes should give pecuniary assistance, that we might be able to protect Herat, and, if unsuccessful, certainly to save Candahar from the Persians. Captain Burnes gave us no assurance on the above-mentioned subjects; perhaps he has no power to do so.

Since Captain Burnes' arrival, we have done everything according
to his advice. The Sirdars of Candahar, prevented their son going to the Shah by his letters, and none of us have hitherto contracted friendship with any other Power. It is well known to your Lordship that the Afghans expected very much from the English, from the day Mr. Elphinstone came to Afghanistan, for that gentleman made a Treaty with the Afghans of the following nature:

1st. That the Afghans should not allow the united Powers (French and Persians) to pass through Afghanistan, for an invasion of the British possessions in India; but must oppose those Powers on the part of the English.

2nd. That when the French and Persians come to subdue Afghanistan, the British will give them pecuniary assistance.

The time has now arrived that the Afghans should be done by, according to the second article of the above Treaty; but alas! the whole of this nation is disappointed in what they were so long expecting. The British Government has given to us aid of no kind, notwithstanding our abstaining from friendship with other Powers. I have really done so, and intended to do so; but your agent Captain Burnes, not having the power, neither gave us happy news of the restoration of Peshawur, nor of protection from the Persians.

Since Captain Burnes discovered that the Afghans were quite disappointed, and he has no powers from your Lordship to satisfy this nation, he is now returning to India with my permission.

When Captain Burnes reaches India, he will minutely speak to your Lordship, on all the circumstances of this place. There are many individuals who have enjoyed the favor of the British; but our disappointment is to be attributed to our misfortune, and not to the want of the British Government.

What is worthy of the good name of the British Government, it, I hope, will come to pass in future.

2 Safar, A.H. 1254, Friday.

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No. 1.—Captain Burns to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.) Camp near Jelalabad, September 9, 1837.

I now proceed to lay before the Right Honorable the Governor-General in Council, a report on the recent intercourse of Candahar with Russia and Persia, founded on documents and information which I consider authentic.

Immediately on the receipt of the despatches from our ambassador in Persia, at Dera Ghazee Khan, in June last, I dispatched a messenger to Candahar, to inquire into the state of affairs there.

That I might neutralize, as far as was then in my power, the results which might flow from the arrival of a Persian Elchee at that city, I addressed the Chief of Candahar (Kohen Dil Khan) and his two brothers, and made known to them the views contemplated by his Lordship in Council, by my deputation West of the Indus. I availed myself of this opportunity to seek an account of the state of affairs in that country, and my messengers returned yesterday.

The principal Chief of Candahar was absent when the courier arrived, but his brothers, Rehem Dil and Mehril Dil Khans, have forwarded to me letters expressive of their highest satisfaction at the prospect of meeting an agent of the British Government, and the reply of their elder brother is promised immediately on his return to the city. How far these professions of satisfaction tally with what is hereafter given, his Lordship in Council, will be best able to judge.

My private correspondents narrate, in circumstantial detail, the whole affair of the Persian Elchee’s arrival, reception, and treatment, as well as the fullest particulars regarding the change of presents and letters between the Chief of Candahar and the Russian Ambassador at Tehran.

The foundation of the intercourse between Candahar and Russia, is to be traced to Abbas Khan, the son of the Shatir Bashee of Shah Kamran, who fled from Herat to Tehran about two years ago, and became at that capital the guest of the Russian Ambassador.
Abbas Khan, possessing some influence with the Chiefs of Candahar, sent a secret message to them by his servant Meer Mahomed, suggesting that it would be greatly to their advantage if they addressed the Russian minister at Tehran; and they accordingly charged Tej Mahomed Khan, an Envoy, whom they had deputed to the Shah of Persia, with a letter to the Russian Ambassador, the contents of which were as follows:

“That the Sirdars of Candahar were sincerely anxious to enter into a friendly connection with Russia, as family differences had long existed among them, and in consequence of these, that Runjeet Sing, the Sikh Chieftain of Lahore, had seized much of their country; that money alone was wanted to expel him; for troops they had in abundance, but not the means to pay them; and that they hoped for such assistance from Russia.”

This letter was delivered into the hands of the Russian Minister at Tehran, to whom Tej Mahomed Khan was introduced by Abbas Khan, and at the same time he delivered a fur cloak, (posteen) ornamented with gold, from the Chief of Candahar. The Russian Minister expressed great satisfaction at the receipt of this letter; and directed a likeness of Tej Mahomed Khan to be taken, which he said he would forward to St. Petersburg.

Some time after the arrival of this Envoy, the Shah deputed Kumber Alec Khan as his Elchee to Candahar and Cabool, the copy of whose instructions and credentials are already before Government. Along with him the Candahar Envoy started, and the Russian Minister gave him a letter to the Chief, expressing his great satisfaction at the friendly sentiments he had communicated, and dismissed him with a message suggesting that Kohen Dil Khan should send his son to Tehran, and that an Elchee of Russia would return the compliment in the following year, when any money that could be spared, would be dispatched to satisfy the wants of the Candahar Chief. By this opportunity, presents were sent by the Russian Minister to the Candahar Chiefs.

In company of Tej Mahomed Khan came Meer Mahomed, the servant of Abbas Khan; and on reaching Candahar all the Sirdars treated him with the highest distinction, and personally visited him, which is quite unusual. It is stated publicly that he is an agent of Russia.

Before the circumstances transpired, and the Persian Elchee reached Candahar, the Ameer of Cabool addressed his brothers of Candahar, apprising them of the contents of the letter which he had received from the Governor-General regarding my mission to Cabool, and suggested the propriety of deputing one of their number to Cabool, to be present at any conference that might take place; and his reason for doing so was, that he wished to act fairly by them. It was resolved, therefore, to send Mehr Dil Khan to Cabool; but immediately that Tej Mahomed
arrived from Tehran with the Persian Elchee, all arrangements have been suspended, and the journey to Cabool is now postponed sine die.

Various surmises have occurred to the Chiefs of Candahar regarding the objects of the British Government, and the invitation of their brother of Cabool. The subject has been one of common conversation, and it appears that the Candahar family, who are not cordial with Cabool, considered that any conference there could only have reference to Peshawur, a restoration of which might not benefit themselves. They also considered that they might make themselves useful to the British Government independent of Cabool, if their intrigues to the west fail; but be their reasons what they may, they wish to be dealt with separately; but what is more important than this determination, is the depuration of another Envoy on their part to Tehran, by name, Hajee Mobeen, who has just set out, and that too in pursuance, as it is believed, of advice of the Russian Ambassador, for it has been given out that a son of Kohen Dil Khan will follow, and that the Candahar Sirdars will attack Herat.

This Envoy is the bearer of a letter to the Shah from the Candahar Chiefs, the substance of which is said to be as follows:

That the British Government has deputed one of its officers to Cabool; but that they, the Chiefs of Candahar, command the road to and from Herat, and not the Chief of Cabool, who is engaged in the affairs of Peshawur, and has it not in his power to serve the Shah; that they are prepared to move to Herat, whenever the Persian army is ready; and also to send a son of the Sirdar to Tehran, and keep aloof from all friendship with the English nation.

Along with this communication the Persian Elchee has written to His Majesty the Shah, stating, that it is Candahar alone which can serve him, and seeing such to be the case, he has met their wishes, and staid at Candahar.

As reported in my letter of the 1st ultimo, Kumber Alee Khan, the Persian Envoy, has reached Candahar.

He was received with great pomp and distinction, and conducted into the city by the Chiefs in person; since they have continued to entertain him, but he has made no progress on his way to Cabool; seldom leaves his house, and seems likely to continue at Candahar.

No. 2.—Captain Alexander Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Extract.) Cabool, November 15, 1837.

I do myself the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, the copy of a letter received some time since by the Ameer of Cabool from his Excellency Count Simonich, the Russian Ambassador at Tehran; likewise one from the Ameer's Agent forwarding the same. I append translations of these documents.
His Lordship in Council is already aware, by the despatches of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Persia, that a communication was also addressed by the Russian Ambassador to the Chief of Candahar. A double opportunity is now offered of judging of the designs and intentions of Russia in this quarter.

If anything were wanting to bear out the correctness of Mr. McNeeil's views as expressed in his despatch of the 30th June last, to Her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs, regarding the encouragement given to Persia by Russia to extend her influence to the countries eastward, these papers now forwarded, carry the clearest proof of it, for the Russian Ambassador himself commences the correspondence with the Chief of Cabool, and tells him, that if the Shah of Persia will not assist him that his Court is ready to do so.

(Inclusion 1.)—The Russian Ambassador, at Tehran, to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool.

A. C.

In these happy days, the respectable Hajee Ibrahim Khan, one of your people, arrived at the door of His Majesty the Shah. He has now got leave to return to you, and I embrace the opportunity to write to you, being induced to do so by the praises which I am always hearing of you, and the friendly conversation which has passed between your man and myself. Through him, therefore, I send this friendly letter, and hope that you in future will keep up a correspondence with me.

Considering me your friend, I trust that you will strengthen the bonds of friendship by writing to me, and freely commanding my services, as I shall always be happy to do anything for you.

Look upon me as your servant, and let me hear from you.

(Sealed) GRAF IWAN SIMONICH.

Minister Plenipotentiary of the Russian Government.

(Inclusion 2.)—Letter to Ameer of Cabool, forwarding the proceedings from Hajee Ibrahim, his Agent at Tehran.

A. C.

I reached the camp of the Shah in the month of Jumad-ooi-wai. When His Majesty learned the contents of your letter he was nappy and kind to me; at that time the Shah was at Chushima Ali, seven marches from Tehran, near Dam Ghan; he stated that on arriving at Khalpush he would discharge me with some messages to you. On his reaching Khalpush, he went to punish the Toorkomans, and I accompanied His Majesty as desired. When we returned to Sharood the winter set in, and the Shah, by the advice of his counsellors, left his artillery there, abandoned the intention of going to Herat this year, and returned

2 H 2
to Tehran. He ordered his nobles to get ready by Noo-Roz, for an
expedition to Herat.

The Shah directed me to inform you that he will shortly send an
Elchee, who, after meeting you, will proceed to Runjeet Sing to explain
to him, on the part of the Shah, that if he (Runjeet) will not restore all
the Affghan countries to you, the Ameer, he must be prepared to re-
cieve the Persian army. When the Shah takes Herat he has promised
to send you money and any troops you want.

The Russian Ambassador, who is always with the Shah, has sent
you a letter, which I inclose. The substance of his verbal messages to
you is, that if the Shah does every thing you want, so much the better;
and if not, the Russian Government will furnish you (the Ameers) with
every thing wanting.

The object of the Russian Elchee, by this message, is to have a road
to the English (India), and for this they are very anxious. He is
waiting for your answer, and I am sure he will serve you. The letter
you sent through Aga Mahomed Kashee, pleased the Shah very much,
and he (Mahomed Hoossein) will soon return to you.

The Ausaf-ud-Dowlah, the Ruler of Khorassan, has written to the
Shah that he saw Yar Mahomed Khan on this side of Furrah; he says
that he has not power to oppose the Shah, but he will not serve him
until the Shah gives him money to take Candahar and Cabool.

I send you the letter (Firmaum) of the Shah, which will, I trust,
meet approbation.

No. 3.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Extract.)

Cabool, November 19, 1837.

Without waiting for the reply of my communication to the Chief
of Candahar, I consider it advisable to dispatch by this opportunity, the
annexed document which purports to be the heads of a Treaty between
the Shah of Persia and the Sirdars of Candahar. I have seen the
original paper which arrived here a few days ago, so that there is no
doubt of its authenticity.

On the afternoon of the 15th instant, I was specially invited by the
Ameer to the Bala Hisar, and had an opportunity of conversing with
Dost Mahomed Khan on matters of some moment, as well as the sub-
ject of this paper. He proceeded to inform me that its contents had
given him great dissatisfaction, and that probably a corresponding feel-
ing would arise in the mind of the British Government on account of it;
that it was very evident there was some crisis at hand in the affairs to
the West; and that Herat certainly, and Candahar probably, would fall
into the hands of Persia, if some arrangement was not speedily entered
into to check her approach: as it was very clear from every account,
that Persia could not of herself act in this manner, she must be assisted
by Russia.
I observed that among other very dubious portions of the Treaty, was a promise that the British Ambassador in Persia would see its terms fulfilled. On this point I found myself at liberty to state most unhesitatingly, that no such promise would be fulfilled, and that an unjustifyable use had been made of the name of the British Government in that document, since it was contrary to its policy to hew down Herat for the benefit of Candahar. I could not also help observing that the whole of the stipulations seemed in favour of Candahar, and I questioned very much the authority on which the Persian Elchee had made them.

Note from Moolla Abdool Reshid, the Chief Manager of Kohen Dil Khan of Candahar, to the address of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabool.

The Treaty which the Sirdars have made with Kumber Alee Khan, is as follows: when Taj Mahomed Khan was at Tehran the Shah spoke to him about Herat, and promised if any of the brothers sent one of their sons to him, and he was assured of their fidelity, he would give them Herat, and never intrude upon the country of the Afghans. The Persian troops will be considered as under the Sirdars. We are never to make friendship with Kamran. The expedition for the taking of Herat must be undertaken according to the wishes of the Sirdars. Whatever number of forces, either small or large, are required for assistance, the Shah is to furnish them, and they are to be under us. On the arrival of Mahomed Omar Khan, at Tehran, with Kumber Alee Khan, the Treaty made here must be shown by the Shah to the Ambassadors of Russia and England. They, with the two Viziers of the Shah, are to witness it, and be responsible for the oath; also for the manner in which the Shah receives Mahomed Omar Khan. The Shah will then send us money for the expenses of 12,000 cavalry, and twenty-four guns. When every thing for the troops is completed, we are to march and encamp at Furash-road. On our arrival there, one of the two Viziers of the Shah must come to us with Kumber Alee Khan, and bring money for the troops. The Vizier is also to convince us of the preservation of the articles of the Treaty on the part of the Shah. After this, Sirdar Mehrir Dil Khan is to accompany the Vizier to the Shah at Meshid, and whatever number of troops he may want, he is to take from the Shah, and then march against Herat, the expenses of the army being paid by the Shah. By the grace of God, when Herat is conquered, we are to be left masters of it. After taking the city, the Shah requires from us in return, that whenever he may have any civil war in Persia, we must assist him. Such are the articles of the Treaty, which after it bears the seals of the Shah’s two Viziers, and the Russian and English Ambassadors, must be returned to us. Mahomed is
going for this purpose; but we do not know what are the wishes of God, and what will happen.

No. 4.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, a very extraordinary piece of intelligence of the arrival in this city yesterday of an agent direct from Russia.

On the 11th instant, I received a notification of his approach from my correspondent at Candahar, in the terms reported in the annexed letter, No. 1; and on the 13th instant, the Ameer received the information conveyed in the enclosure, No. 2. A circumstance of so unusual a nature prevented my sending off an express to you till I could be better informed.

(Inclusion 1.)—Abstract of Intelligence received from Candahar on the 11th December, 1837.

Yesterday I went to see the Sirdar agreeably to his desire, and met a horseman of Gherisk, with a Persian escort. They brought information that another Persian Elchee was coming, and delivered a letter to Moolla Nusoo. He told me that was not a Persian embassy, but an Elchee from the Russian Government, or from the Russian Ambassador of Tehran. The letter was from Hajee Mobeen, and he has not come himself. The Russian Elchee is named Marana; he may be Armenian, but not a Persian. The Sirdars sent two horsemen to receive him on the road, and bring him into the city with consideration.

When I am perfectly acquainted with the affairs of the Russian Elchee, or three days after, I will write to you minutely.

Sirdar Rehem Dil Khan has become friendly with his brother, and lives in one place.

(Inclusion 2.)—Moolla Reshid, the Counsellor of Kohen Dil Khan of Candahar, to Ameer Mahomed Khan, Agent or Naib of Dost Mahomed Khan of Cabool.—(Received on the 13th day of December, 1837.)

(Extract.)

We have heard nothing new of the Persian siege of Herat since the first of Ramazan (14 days ago) except that which I wrote to you before.

The fresh intelligence I wrote to you, that at the noon on the 28th of Shaban (17 days ago) Tuesday, an Elchee arrived here from Russia. Leaving the rarities of that country in Tehran, he came to the camp of Mahomed Shah Kajar; and after seeing His Majesty, he passed through Birjird Jawer, Lash, and Seistan, on way to Ahmed Shahee (Candahar).
He is a man of Moscow, and stands high in the favour of the Emperor. The Russian Ambassador at Tehran has sent a list of the presents, with his letter to the Sirdars, which this Elchee left in his charge, on account of the disorders of the road between Tehran and Candahar. As he looks a confidential person, I think he will do everything for the Sirdars. We have heard nothing of the results of the arrangements which Mr. Burnes is making at Cabool.

As Mahomed Shah intends to take Herat, so he has left the English and Russian Ambassadors at Tehran. Meerza Massood, the Minister of his Majesty, is also with them. The assistants of both the ambassadors are in the camp of Mahomed Shah.

Mahomed Omar Khan, and the Persian Elchee, are still at Gherisk.

(Inclosure 3.)—Moolla Reshid, the Counsellor of Kohen Dil Khan Sirdar, to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan.—(Received at Cabool on the 19th December, 1837.)

(Extract.)

An ambassador on the part of Russia came to Tehran, and has been appointed to wait on the Sirdars at Candahar, and thence to proceed to the presence of the Ameer. He paid his respects to Mahomed Shah at Nishapoor, and passing through Kayanat Lash and Jawer, Seistan, and Gourdansal, arrived at Ahmed Shahee (Candahar). He is the bearer of letters from the Russian Ambassador at Tehran.

The Russian Ambassador recommends this man to be a most trusty individual, and to possess full authority to make any negotiation. Captain Burnes will undoubtedly comprehend the real motives of this Elchee.

The conduct and appearance of this man, Elchee, seems to infer that he possesses no less dignity and honor than Captain Burnes; and whatever arrangements he may make, will be agreeable to the Russian Ambassador. You have now both the English and Russian Ambassadors at your Court. Please to settle matters with any of them who you think may do some good office hereafter.

By the conversation of this man, Elchee, it appears that Mahomed Shah is neither assisted nor induced by the Russians, and is come of himself to try his fortunes. You should receive him with consideration, as he is a man of consequence. He has got four horsemen with himself, and will remain but a few days in Cabool. Sher Mahomed has been sent by the Sirdars to conduct him to you. The Russians and the Persians are separately anxious to promote their respective designs in that quarter.

P. S. When this Russian Elchee reaches Cabool, show him respect, and it will rouse the mind of Alexander Burnes. His appearance will
also induce him (Mr. Burnes) to be sharp, and to put off delay in promoting objects.

No. 5.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.  
Cabool, December 22, 1837.

(Extract.)

With reference to my letter of the 20th instant, I have now the honor to inform you, for the information of the Rt. Honorable the Governor-General of India in Council, that the individual who has arrived here from St. Petersburg, is a veritable Agent of Russia; and brings letters from the Shah of Persia and Count Simonich. He is designated as Captain Vickovitch.

I have the honor to inclose the following copies of documents in explanation of the appearance of this person, with translations:

A letter from Dost Mahomed Khan to the Emperor of Russia.
A Ruckum from the Shah of Persia to Dost Mahomed Khan.
A letter from Count Simonich to the same.

I have addressed a confidential letter to His Lordship the Governor-General of India, regarding these documents, and the Russian Agent who has brought them.

(Inclosure 1.)—Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool, to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia, transmitted, via Bokhara, by Meerza Hoosain Hoosein Cabooliee, about the beginning of 1836.

A. C.

There have been great differences and quarrels between myself and the Royal house of the Suddozyes. The English Government is inclined to support Shooja-ool-Moolk. The whole of India is governed by them, and they are on friendly terms with Runjeet Sing, the Lord of the Punjaub, which lies in their neighbourhood. The British Government exhibit no favourable opinions towards me.

I (literally the creature of God,) with all my power, have been always fighting with the Sikhs. Your Imperial Government has made friendship with the Persians; and if your Majesty will graciously be pleased to arrange matters in the Afghin country, and assist this nation (which amounts to 20 laces of families) you will place me under obligations.

I hope your Imperial Majesty will do me the favor by allowing me to be received like the Persians, under the protection of the Government of Russia, under your Royal protection. Can perform along with my Afghans various praiseworthy services.

It would be highly proper, whatever your Imperial Majesty may be pleased to do.
(Inclosure 2.)—Mahomed Shah’s Ruckum to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool.—(Received on the 20th December, 1837.)

A. C.

AGREEABLY to my affection and kindly feelings towards you, I wish to bestow great favours on you, and anxiously wait to hear from you.

In these days the respectable Captain Vickovitch having been appointed, by my esteemed brother the Emperor of Russia, to attend your Court, paid his respects on his way, stating he had been honored by his Imperial Majesty to deliver some messages to you: on this I felt it incumbent on me, to remember you by the dispatch of this Ruckum, to convince you that your wellwishers are deeply engraved in my mind.

Considering the favors of my Majesty attached to you, let me hear occasionally from you; and by rendering good services you will obtain the protection of this Royal house.

(Inclosure 3.)—Count Simonich, the Russian Ambassador at Tehran, to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool.—(Received on the 20th December, 1837.)

(Extract.)

The respectable P. Vickovitch will wait upon you with this letter. Your agent Hajee Hoosain Alee has been attacked by a severe illness, and therefore he stopped at Moscow: when the intelligence of his bad health was conveyed to the Emperor, a good physician was ordered to attend, and cure him as soon as possible. On his recovering I will not fail to facilitate him in his long journey back to Cabool.

Knowing your anxiety to hear from this quarter I have hastened to dispatch the bearer to you. He was ordered to accompany your agent to Cabool. I hope on his arrival at your Court that you will treat him with consideration, and trust him with your secrets. I beg you will look upon him like myself, and take his words as if they were from me. In case of his detention at Cabool you will allow him often to be in your presence; and let my Master know, through me, about your wishes, that anxiety may be removed.

Though the great distance has been preventing the continuance of my correspondence with you, I am always very happy to respect and serve your friends to show my friendly opinions towards you.

The cause of our often hearing from each other merely depends upon our friendship and acquaintance.

I have some Russian rarities to forward to you; as the bearer (P. Vickovitch) is lightly equipped, it was beyond his power to take them along with him; but I will take the first opportunity to convey them safely to you, and now have the pleasure to send you the undermentioned list of them:
Gilt and silvered cloth  -  1  Do. white, with gold flower  -  1
Cloth, with do. flowered  -  1  Alachah, with gold flower  -  1
Do. with gilt do.  -  1  Do. yellow and silver do.  -  1
Do. with green gilt flowers  -  1  Do. red with green  -  -  1
Zari Abi, with gilt do.  -  1  Do. light blue  -  -  1
Do. firmaz of gold  -  1  Do. with red flower  -  -  1
Do. do. of silver  -  1  Do. green  -  -  -  1
Parcha huxir, red and white  -  1  Do. banassh  -  -  -  1
Do. painted  -  -  -  -  -  1  Do. red and light blue  -  -  1

No. 6.—Captain Burnes to Lord Auckland.

(Extract.)

Cabool, December 23, 1837.

In the despatches, which I forward by this opportunity to Mr. Macnaghten, your Lordship will find a report of the extraordinary circumstances of an agent having arrived at this capital direct from St. Petersburg, with a letter from the Shah of Persia and Count Simonich, the Russian Ambassador at Tehran.

Before I enter upon the messages delivered by the agent to the Ameer, it is proper to state the information which has reached me regarding what has passed at Candahar. In my official communication of the 9th of September last, your Lordship will remember that I reported the departure of one Hajee Mobeen on a mission to Persia, and, as it was believed, in pursuance of the advice of the Russian Ambassador. That individual accompanied Mahomed Shah to Khorassan, and was requested by His Majesty to await the arrival of Captain Vickovitch, and proceed with him to Candahar. The connection between Russia and Persia in this part of the transaction, leaves little doubt of the whole being a concerted plan between these Powers. The statement made by the emissary to the Sirdars of Candahar, was to the effect that Russia had full influence in Persia; and that they should assist the Shah, and draw on him for money, and if their drafts were not paid, that the Russian Government would be responsible for their discharge; but that they should follow the wishes of Mahomed Shah if they sought the Emperor’s good offices, and on no account ally themselves with the English nation. This declaration, if true, is certainly most explicit; but though it has been communicated to me by a man whose other reports entirely tally with all that is passing in Candahar, and who is the individual that made known to me five months ago the then inexplicable nature of Hajee Mobeen’s mission, I should not wish your Lordship to give to it that confidence which I seek to place on the report of events that have transpired in Cabool.

On the evening of the 20th instant, the Ameer received the Russian messenger. On the agent’s producing Mahomed Shah’s ruckum, the Ameer felt a degree of irritation which he could hardly control;
and said, in Afghanee, "that it was an insult to him, and a proof of Mahomed Shah's being guided by advisers; for his Master, the Emperor, wrote him a letter, and the subservient Shah of Persia arrogated to himself the right of sending him a ruckum, or order, with his seal in the face of the document." The agent was then dismissed, and invited to the Bala Hissar on the following day.

The communications which passed on this second occasion, have been also made known to me, and are of a startling nature. M. Vickovitch informed Dost Mahomed Khan, that the Russian Government had desired him to state his sincere sympathy with the difficulties under which he laboured; and that it would afford it great pleasure to assist him in repelling the attacks of Runject Sing on his dominions; that it was ready to furnish him with a sum of money for the purpose, and to continue the supply annually, expecting in return the Ameer's good offices. That it was in its power to forward the pecuniary assistance as far as Bokhara, with which State it had friendly and commercial relations; but that the Ameer must arrange for its being forwarded on to Cabool. The agent stated that this was the principal object of his mission; but that there were other matters which he would state by and by; that he hoped the Ameer would give him a speedy answer to dispatch to St. Petersburg, and that with reference to himself, he would go, if dismissed, along with it, though he gave the Ameer to understand (and under which impression he still continues), that it is his wish to remain, at least for a time, in Cabool. The report of this interview has been communicated to me from two sources, and they both agree in the substance of what passed.

Having thus laid before your Lordship these strong demonstrations on the part of Russia to interest herself in the affairs of this country, it will not, I feel satisfied, be presumptuous to state my most deliberate conviction, that much more vigorous proceedings, than the Government might wish or contemplate, are necessary to counteract Russian or Persian intrigue in this quarter, than have been hitherto exhibited.

By one class of politicians, every thing regarding the designs of Russia in this quarter, has been treated with disbelief. By another, the little which has transpired, has excited immediate, and, in consequence, what may be termed groundless, alarm. For the last six or seven years, I have had my attention directed to these countries, and I profess myself to be one of those who do believe that Russia entertains the design of extending her influence to the eastward, and between her dominions and India. With her commercial operations, she has invariably spread the report that her designs were ulterior; and the language of her agents has lately been, that as the affairs of Turkey and Persia are adjusted, she sought an extension of her influence in Toorkistan and Cabool. Such reports would deserve little credence if unsupported by facts, but assisted by them, they gather high importance,
and exhibit views which, but for the greatest vigilance, might have eluded notice for years to come.

There being, therefore, facts before us in the transactions passing at Cabool, it seems impossible, with any regard to our safety, to look on longer in silence. If Russia does not entertain inimical feelings directly to the British in India, she avows that she wishes for the good offices of the Chiefs on our frontier, and promises them her own in return; so that it is useless to conceal from ourselves, that evils must flow from such connections. It is indeed casting before us a challenge. It is a true maxim that prevention is better than cure, and we now have both in our hands. We might certainly wish to delay awhile longer before acting; but it is now in our power, by the extended and immediate exercise of our already established influence, to counteract every design injurious to us.

I trust that the free expression of my sentiments will not prove displeasing to your Lordship; I am emboldened by the confidence which has placed me here to speak according to my conviction.

No. 7.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to Captain Burnes.

(Extract.)

January 20, 1838.

His Lordship attaches little immediate importance to this mission of the Russian agent, although he will bring all the circumstances connected with it to the notice of the Home Authorities, as it undoubtedly marks a desire, which has long been known to exist on the part of the Russian Government, to push at least the influence of their name to our Indian frontier; and the proceedings, especially of the Russian envoy at Tehran, in regard to it, are open to much observation.

His Lordship is much gratified at the deference to our views shown by Dost Mahomed Khan, in requesting your advice as to the reception of this agent; and he entirely approves your having sanctioned his being admitted to the presence of the Ameer, and treated with becoming civility. If he be not already gone from Cabool, you will suggest to the Ameer that he be dismissed with courtesy, with a letter of compliments and thanks to the Emperor of Russia, for his proffered kindness to Cabool traders. His mission should be assumed to have been as represented entirely for commercial objects; and no notice need be taken of the messages with which he may profess to have been charged.

This course will be recommended by you, in the event of the Ameer being firmly disposed to abide by our good offices. If he should, on the other hand, seek to retain the agent, and to enter into any description of political intercourse with him, you will give him distinctly to understand, that your mission will retire; that our good offices with the Sikhs will wholly cease; and that, indeed, the act will be considered a direct breach of friendship with the British Government. It has been
before, at different times stated to you, that the continuance of our
good offices must be entirely dependent on the relinquishment by the
Ameer of alliances with any Power to the westward.

No. 8.—Lieutenant Mackeson, British Agent, Camp Shekhwan, to
Captain C. M. Wade, Political Agent at Loodiana.

(Extract.)

"The Russian Envoy at Cabool gave out that he intended to visit
Lahore, to have some friendly conversation with Maharajah Runjeet
Sing, and to send an account of his Highness's military power and
resources to the Emperor of Russia."

No. 9.—Lieutenant Mackeson to Captain Wade.

(Camp Khanpur, February 12, 1838.

His Highness next adverted to a letter he had received from
Peshawur, mentioning that the Russian Envoy intended to come on to
Lahore.

No. 10.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Caboil, January 29, 1838.

I do myself the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right
Honorable the Governor-General, the accompanying letter, dated the
18th instant, from Lieutenant Leech at Candahar, reporting his pro-
ceedings at that city.

With reference to the letter now forwarded, his Lordship will see a
further confirmation of the views put forth regarding the commercial
advantages contemplated by Russia in establishing her influence over
Herat and Candahar. That the correspondence with the Russian Ambas-
sador entirely related to commerce I have lately discovered the best grounds
for disbelieving, for it seems that the Sirdars of Candahar sent blank
letters by their agent, with their seals affixed, to Tehran, and requested
Abbas Khan to have them filled up in a manner that would do them
most service with Russia; and certainly, if a Russian resident being
located at Candahar is the result of these communications, the widest
latitude has been taken in filling them up.

The report which Mr. Leech gives of the communications made by
Captain Vickovitch, on his passing through Candahar, is important, as
we know now what has passed there as well as in Cabool. It has
occurred to me, that whatever be the ulterior views of Russia in these
countries, the immediate design of sending this Russian agent to Afgha-
nistan was to prevent our thwarting the present Persian expedition on
Herat, by leading the Afghans in a body to render assistance. It is
known to Russia that there is a British mission in this country; and if
it had acted thus, as they supposed, the attack on Herat would have
been hopeless. The reports of having strengthened the detachments
east of the Caspian, and of Persia being protected by Russia in the
Shah's absence, have been widely spread by M. Vickovitch, and countenance the opinion above given.

(Inclosure.—Lieutenant Leech to Captain Burnes.)

(Extract.)

Candahar, January 18, 1838.

I have the honor to report my arrival at this city, which I entered on the 15th. I was received with every distinction by the Sirdars, who granted me an immediate interview, and apportioned a part of the premises of Sirdar Mehir Dil Khan for my residence. This Sirdar said it was well known that Persia had marched against Herat, contrary to the advice of the British Ambassador at Tehran; that it was well known that Persia had not the power to act by herself, and that the Shah had been put forward by the Russians.

Regarding the Russian officer now in Cabool, with a letter from the Emperor, Mehir Dil Khan informed me the following were his messages from the Emperor, That if they would make friends with Amer Dost Mahomed, the Russians would assist them with money to make war on the Sikhs, and regain Mooltan and Derajat; and that they would also aid them in regaining Sinde; that Mahomed Shah owed them 1½ crores of rupees, and they would give an order on him, the money to be divided between the Ameer and them equally, as also the countries thus gained; that the Russians could not furnish men, but would furnish arms; that they in turn expected the Sirdars to become subservient (farman bardar), and to receive a Russian Resident; that they were to make war when desired, and make peace. This officer told them, that the English had preceded the Russians in civilization for some generations; but that now the latter had arisen from their sleep, and were seeking for foreign possessions and alliances; and that the English were not a military nation, but merely the merchants of Europe. Sirdar Mehir Dil Khan also informed me that several merchants had seen that officer in Bokhran, but were ignorant of the object of his visiting that city.

With regard to the active part that Russia is taking in the movements of Persia, the Sirdar assured me that he had good authority to state that Russia had taken measures to keep the kingdom of Mahomed Shah tranquil in his absence, by letters where they were feared, and by troops where they were not.

No. 11.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Cabool, February 18, 1838.

I have not addressed you since the 22nd ult. regarding the Russian Agent at this city, not that I have been inattentive or indifferent to his proceedings here, for I find that there is no doubt of Captain Vickovitch's real character, and that all the early surmises regarding him have been thus confirmed.
The interval, has not, however, passed without the most strenuous exertions on the part of M. V Vickovitch to draw from the Ameer of Cabool some answer to the credentials and letters which he had brought. He urged, that if a decided answer were called for by him, it might be held unreasonable; but that he had now been here for a period of nearly two months, and that it was due to those from whom he came, to acknowledge the receipt of the letters which he had delivered. Dost Mahommed Khan sent for M. Vickovitch on the 16th instant, when he repeated his reasons for wishing replies, and which the Ameer agreed to give.

The mode of forwarding them naturally formed the first subject of conversation after the Ameer's consent to reply, and he pointed out the route of Bokhara as the speediest and best line of communication, but to this M. Vickovitch objected, saying that they could be much more rapidly transmitted through M. Goutte, in the Persian Camp at Herat, who, besides being his countryman and personal friend, was an accredited Agent of the Russian Government. To this the Ameer saw no objections, but he decided not to address the Shah of Persia.

The Ameer next inquired of M. Vickovitch if he had received any intelligence from the Russian gentleman at Herat, which he had not. He then stated his own views regarding Herat, that it must certainly submit in the end to Persia, for Kamran had no such promised assistance, to oppose the Shah, as would avail him. M. Vickovitch replied that the Persian army was not a very efficient body, but that it had an excellent park of artillery, and that the fall of Herat was very probable; and that the Government of Russia had further added to that security by throwing troops east of the Caspian sea, to keep the Toorkomans in check. The Ameer replied that, with such protection, even the Shah of Persia could not have succeeded but for the supineness of himself and his brothers at Candahar, for they had it in their power to succour Herat. The interview then terminated.

I further learn that M. Vickovitch has been discoursing at length on the policy of Persia, himself, and of the British Government in that country. He stated that the English, by disciplining the troops of Persia, had hoped to injure Russia; but the very opposite consequence had resulted; that Persia had attacked Russia, and been defeated, which had enabled her to possess herself of some of her best and frontier provinces, and to establish a complete influence over the kingdom. That Russia had no desire, however, to make any further conquests in Persia, or to allow the Shah to extend his power beyond Herat, for she wished to keep Persia in check, and not that she should become too powerful. He further told the Meerza to inform the Ameer on these points; and that he and his brothers might feel assured that this Persian expedition against Herat would stop there, and not prosecute its march further to the east.
I took the opportunity to request that he would inform the Ameer that, if M. Vickovitch spoke on the authority of the Russian Government, it had certainly misunderstood our proceedings in Persia; that we had never sought to injure Russia through Persia, or ought but to make Persia strong in herself; for which purpose we had from time to time given her munitions of war and officers; but we had never countenanced her invading Russia or Afghanistan; and he saw, in our present disapproval of the siege of Herat, a proof of the correctness of these facts.

(Inclosure.)—Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, Chief of Cabool, to His Excellency Count Simonich, the Russian Ambassador at the Court of Persia.

(Extract.)

Your friendly letter was delivered to me by the respectable Captain Vickovitch, and I was delighted to read this your second epistle.

If I were to thank for such kindness, it would be as impossible as to confine the river in a small vessel, or to weigh its water with stones.

I fully understand the messages which you had sent to me through Captain Vickovitch, and confidently expect that your Imperial Government will support and defend my honor, and by doing so, it will be easy to win the heart of friends.

I thank you for the offer you made to arrange my affairs, and further for your informing me that you do not merely tell me so, but that you will fulfill your promise. I expect much more from your friendly Government, and my hopes have been increased. Though the distance between us is great, it does not prevent our approach in heart. My mind is put in peace by your friendly messages, and I hope it will continue so.

Before the arrival of the agent of your Government (Captain Vickovitch), the English Government had deputed Captain Alexander Burnes, who is now with me at Cabool. That officer is sowing the seeds of friendship between Runjeet Sing and myself. Nothing is yet settled, but let us wait the result.

On the winter ceasing, and the roads opening, I will dispatch Captain Vickovitch by any road that he prefers. At present, on account of the snow, I have postponed his departure.

I hope you may continue to enjoy happy days.

No. 12.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

I had become meanwhile informed of the further communications of Captain Vickovitch, which went to inform the Ameer, that the Emperor of Russia was superior in his dominions, and could act of him-
self with promptitude, and without being delayed by consulting others, while the British Government transacted its business by a Council (punchayet) which gave rise to procrastination, and would show to him the advantages of allying himself to Russia, where no such inconveniences existed; and further, that the Emperor’s goodwill towards him would never then let Persia encroach in this quarter.

No. 13.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. Cabool, March 4, 1838.
(Extract.)
I have the honour to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, that I have more grounds for believing that Captain Vickovitch, the Russian Agent of Cabool, is charged with letters from his Government to Maharajah Runjeet Sing. I observed that Colonel Stoddart mentions this as a surmise to Mr. Mc Neill; and a few days ago, Mr. A. Ward wrote to me from Peshawur, to know if the “on dit” of M. Vickovitch’s going to the Punjaub were true.

I have made every inquiry on this subject, and in the course of yesterday, Mr. Masson was informed that the Russian agent had letters for the Maharajah, and that the purport of them was to the effect, that if his Highness did not withdraw from Peshawur, the Russian Government would compel him.

No. 14.—Captain Wade to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. March 21, 1838.
(Extract.)
I have the honor to transmit an open letter to your address from Captain Burnes, dated the 4th instant, repeating, from Cabool, the report which had formerly reached Peshawur, that the mission of Captain Vickovitch would extend to Lahore.

No. 15.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. Cabool, March 17, 1838.
(Extract.)
I have the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, four letters, with the Treaty (Nos. 1 to 5) to which they relate, that have just reached me from Lieutenant Leech, at Candahar.

These documents contain the avowal of M. Goutte, the Russian Agent with the Shah of Persia, at Herat, that the Russian Ambassador becomes the guarantee in the arrangements made between Persia and Candahar. The Treaty to which Russia thus makes herself a party, being annexed, speaks for itself.

Whatever be the interpretation put upon the Treaty between Persia and the British Government, and which prevents our succouring Herat, it has appeared to me, that no clause in that document can authorize
Persia to set on one Afghan Chief against another, much less permit Persia to use Russian agency to effect it.

The individual who went to the Shah's camp, along with Kumber Alee Khan, reports to the Sirdars of Candahar, as I learn from Mr. Leech, that the Persian Vizier has threatened him, that, if his masters do not become subservient to the Shah, they will soon be treated as Herat has been.

Supposing the Government of Russia disavows the act of their accredited agent, M. Goutte, the evil is done by the transmission of his letter, which passes for truth. At present, I only transmit the documents, as sufficient time has not elapsed to judge of their effects here or at Candahar. As far as I yet gather, that has been most prejudicial to us.

(Inclosure 1.)—Mahomed Shah to Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan.

A. C.

Alladad Khan has arrived in my camp and made known your requests, and the favor of the King towards you has increased. Whoever shall in confidence come to me, shall meet with nothing but kindness, and shall gain his ends, and if you are still firm and true to your word, you may consider the favor of the King firm on you too. Always write the state of your wishes and hopes to me, and consider that you will gain all your ends.

(Inclosure 2.)—M. Goutte to Kohen Dil Khan.

A. C.

Alladad Khan and Meer Mahomed Khan have delivered your letter to me, and I was much delighted at its contents. You wrote to tell me you had determined on becoming subservient to Mahomed Shah, and had sought his protection. You may depend upon my fulfilling the engagements I have entered into with you, and consider it to be advantageous to yourself to perform any service for my Government. I cannot express in writing my friendship for you and care for your welfare. Regarding your making Russia the guarantee in this connection, your wishes will be met by the Russian Ambassador, to whom I have forwarded your letter, and with it I have written my own opinions on the subject. I have cultivated your friendship at the suggestion of Hajee Aghasse. It is better to dispatch Omar Khan without apprehension, and I will write to the Persian Government to remove all apprehensions at your sending your son. He will be treated with great distinction by the Shah and his nobles. When you have dispatched your son, the Treaty, drawn up by Kumber Alee, will be entered into by the means of Hajee Aghasse, and I, as your friend, tell you to be under no apprehension at sending your son; after he arrives, everything
you wish will be done through Hajee Aghassee; send your son quickly, and trust him to God. When I receive an answer from the Russian Minister (Simonich) I will forward it.

(A enclosure 3.)—Letter from Major-General Borowski.

A. C.

Abdul Wahal Beg and Alladad Khan have arrived with Kumber Alee Khan, and have extolled to me your acts and nature. Consider the subjects on which Captain Vickovitch conversed with you, connected with your welfare; besides these I have other subjects to speak on. You have done well in seeking the protection of Persia; this Alladad informed me you had done, and I am much pleased with your messages. Alladad Khan has requested me to write to you, he has himself witnessed my influence here, and has been himself favourably received by the Shah, and asked to know in what favor the Sirdars of Candahar were with him (the Shah). Nothing but good will result from this your connection with the Shah; so much good, indeed, that I cannot put it to paper. Be convinced that your serving the Shah will turn out every way to your advantage. The Shah treats every one according to his deserts, and your deserts are above all others. By all means send Mahomed Omar Khan speedily; he will be treated with nothing but kindness, and on this subject the Assistant to the Russian Minister, M. Goutte, has written, as also has Hajee Aghassee who has written to confirm what Kumber Alee had done (at Candahar.) By the fortune of the Shah, Meimuna, the Hazarehs, and Char Adeemak (Annak) have been subdued as completely as could have been wished; and as the Ausif of Meshid has written, no doubt the son of Mizrab Khan Walee, and the brother of Sher Mahomed Khan, and Gurdzanum Khan and others will come over to the Shah (as hostages.) Persia is not what it was; I wish your connection with Persia were speedily accomplished. Mahomed Shah has hitherto avoided taking Herat out of kindness to its Mahomedans; but, by the blessing of God, and the fortune of the King, Herat will be taken, everything will be for the best. It will be all the better, the speedier you dispatch Sirdar Mahomed Omar Khan.

(A enclosure 4.)—The Vizier Hajee Aghassee to the Sirdars of Candahar.

A. C.

Alladad Khan and Kumber Alee Khan have arrived, and presented your petition, and I have learnt everything you write to the Shah, and I cannot express how much the favor of the King is upon you, and I am much pleased with your friendly messages. You ought to send Omar Khan, and by this the favor of the King will be greater even than you expect, and I also think you should send Ma-
homed Omar Khan quickly that your ends may be gained. On his arrival, everything Kumber Alee wrote, will be performed; and, thank God, to this day I have never spoken false. If you keep your word, and still seek the protection of the King, and only perform his engagements after this, and you will see how the King will favor you, and please God it be better if nothing should interrupt our friendship. If you do not make friends after all, I shall be disgraced for having proposed this friendship to the King; but I ought not to suppose such a thing. It is well known we are friends, continue to write to me.

(Inclosure 5.)—Draft of Treaty made by Kumber Alee Khan, the Persian Elchee, with the Chiefs of Candahar.

The Treaty which I, Kumber Alee (literally, creature of God) have made with the respectable Sirdars Kohen Dil, Rehem Dil, and Mehr Dil Khan, on the part of His Majesty Mahomed Shah, is as follows:

In case the Sirdars should send one of their sons to His Majesty, I promise to the Sirdars the following return—

1. That the country of Herat, whether it be taken by the power of the servants of the Persian Government, or that of the Sirdars, must be left to the latter. The Shah should not expect anything from them in return but service, and likewise make no interference of any kind with their country or tribe in Afghanistan.

2. His Majesty is not to form a connection with the Afghans of any description, great or small, and also not to employ them in case of any business with the Afghans. His Majesty is to have recourse to the Sirdars.

3. His Majesty is never to make friendship with Shahzadah Kamran, and Yar Mahomed Khan.

4. On the arrival of the son of Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan, His Majesty is to order the army at Meshid to march towards Herat; if Kamran and Yar Mahomed Khan resolve to take Candahar, the Shah should prevent them by coming to Candahar, and if they do not agree to this, then the Shah should come to Herat.

5. The Shah is also to give the Sirdars the expense of 12,000 cavalry and infantry, 12 guns, and the extra expenditure of the troops in the capture of Herat; if the battle lasts long, the Shah must furnish the expenses of the army.

6. In case any harm befalls the country of the Sirdars, the Shah agrees to give them, in his own country, land equal to the value of their loss.

7. The Treaty, which I have now made with the Sirdars, is to be approved of by His Majesty, and bear the signature of Hajee Meerza Aghassee, Meerza Massood (the Minister for Foreign Affairs), and also
of the Ambassadors of Russia and England, to ensure confidence to
the Sirdars.

8. When all these promises are fulfilled, the Sirdars are to leave
Candahar for Herat, at the head of 12,000 cavalry and infantry, and
12 guns. When they reach Furrah, they should send Sirdar Mehir
Dil Khan, with 1,000 horsemen to the Shah, who may give him fur-
ther troops and money, according to his wants. When Mehir Dil
Khan comes to Herat, and is dismissed by the Shah, the other Sirdars
are to join him at the same time; the Persian army must be guided by
the Sirdars, and obey them. If it please God, by the fortune of the
Shah, the wisdom of the Sirdars, and the assistance of the Candahar
and Persian army, the city of Herat will soon be reduced to homage.

9. When the above conditions are fulfilled, the Shah agrees not to
keep the son of Kohen Dil Khan with himself; it must be left to him
(the son) to stay or depart. If the latter, the Shah must dismiss him
and his companions with honor, and conduct him safe to the Candahar
boundary.

(Sealed) KUMBER ALEE KHAN.

No. 16.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Cabool, March 21, 1838.

(Extract.)

It is satisfactory to report that Mr. Leech informs me the Chiefs
of Candahar have sent as an answer to Herat, to their late Eelchee
Kumber Alee Khan, that the period which he had requested them to
wait, had elapsed two months ago; and that their reply to all the re-
quests made by the Russian and Persian Governments, therefore, was,
that they must consult with their brothers in Cabool.

(Inclusion.)—Sirdars of Candahar, Kohen Dil Khan, Rehem Dil
Khan and Mehir Dil Khan, to Captain Burnes.—(Received at
Cabool, March 21, 1838.)

Your friendly letter reached us, and we fully understand its con-
tents.

As the respectable Ameer has desired one of us to wait upon him,
we have resolved that Mehir Dil Khan should shortly proceed to
Cabool. If it pleases God, he will have also the pleasure of seeing you
there.

No. 17.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to Captain Burnes.
(April 27, 1838.

In regard to the recent open interference of the Russian Function-
ary in the camp of the Shah of Persia, in the intrigues of that Power
with the Chiefs of Candahar, I am directed to refer you to the observa-
tions in the accompanying copy of the despatch of this date, to the
Hon. the Secret Committee. It is satisfactory to his Lordship, that those intrigues have not, at least, been immediately successful.

No. 18.—The Governor-General to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

(Extract.) April 27, 1838.

Referring especially to the circumstances represented to your Honorable Committee, in my despatch of 8th February last, I have again to submit to your notice a demonstration still more disguised on the part of the Russian Agents, of their desire to connect themselves with the Persian schemes of encroachment in Afghanistan, and by that means to extend their own influence and intrigues to the very frontiers of our Indian Empire.

In my former despatch I stated that I could not look to any stability of Persian domination in the Afghan countries. But there is a course open to the agents of Russia, in the attempts made by them to extend the power and influence of their country, which they seem ready to pursue, and to prefer to the support of the direct dominion of Persia over Afghanistan. It may be collected from their language and proceedings, that they would on one side appear to be aiding Persia, in the establishment of a general supremacy over the Afghan Chiefships; and on the other, as protecting those Chiefships from any serious aggression and injury. Professions and promises to this effect may at least assist the immediate views of Persia; but they may also have the ultimate effect, in the actual distracted condition of Afghanistan, of giving to Russia an arbitration over the fortunes of all who exercise authority in that region.

It will be observed, that an accredited and high officer of the Russian mission in Persia, has publicly written to the Chiefs of Candahar, urging them to submission to Persia, and promising his best efforts to obtain the guarantee of his Court to the transfer to those Chiefs of the city and territory of Herat, on their being conquered by the Persian forces.

I need not say, that we would seem to have the clearest right and interest to remonstrate against such proceedings; for Russia can have no legitimate ground for extending her political connections to Afghanistan, while we are necessarily interested in the peace and independence of that country, by proximity and position.

I do not now dwell upon minor circumstances; the acceptance by Russia of Persian recommendations for her agent, Captain Vickovitch, to the Chiefs of Candahar and Cabool; or the language reported by Captain Burnes to have been held by that officer at the latter place. The more open and formal proceeding on the part of the Russian Functionary in the Shah's camp, in addressing such a communication to the Chiefs of Candahar, appears to be that to which attention should most distinctly be pointed.
A copy of this despatch will be forwarded to Mr. Mc Neill, at Tehran, that he may be apprised of my sentiments, and be prepared to take such notice of the proceeding alluded to, as may seem to him proper and consistent with his instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

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No. 19.—Dr. Lord to Captain Burnes.

(Extract.)

April 11, 1838.

I have reason to believe that a Russian Emissary is at present in Balkh, having returned after an unsuccessful attempt to pass by way of Kokan and Yarkund to Cashmere. He is said to employ himself much in writing and making maps.

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No. 20.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

April 30, 1838.

It will be some satisfaction to the Governor-General to learn, that however unfortunate has been the termination of our present intercourse at Cabool, the Government will be thereby possessed of most potent arguments for remonstrance with Persia, at the line of conduct which she has pursued towards a friendly ally like Britain, in the counteraction of her plans, to see peace established in Central Asia. With reference to Russia, her proceedings are open to so much remark, after Count Nesselrode's disavowals, that, I presume she must either disavow Captain Vickovitch and M. Goutte, as her emissaries, or be made responsible for their proceedings. I have only again to repeat my most deliberate conviction, founded on much reflection regarding the passing events in Central Asia, that consequences of the most serious nature, must, in the end, flow from them, unless the British Government applies a prompt, active, and decided counteraction. I do not offer these as opinions founded on the periodical publications of all Europe; (though the coincidence of sentiment in all parties does not want its weight;) but as formed on the scene of their intrigues, and it is my duty, as a public servant, earnestly to state them to my superiors.

As I am dispatching this communication from Jelalabad, half-way to Peshawur, I have received good information that the Ameer has been constantly with Captain Vickovitch since I left, and that officer has earnestly solicited permission to proceed to Herat, by the direct road of Hazarehjat, and offered the solemn pledges to do all which the Ameer wishes, under a month. He has also bound himself to address Maharajah Runjeet Sing, about retiring from Peshawur, and when Dost Mahomed Khan asked if he had authority to do so, he replied that he had a letter to that Potentate, which would soon set matters right.
No. 21.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Peshawur, May 9, 1838.

SIR,

I have the honor to transmit for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, the translation of a letter which I have just received from Cabool, explaining further the plans of the Chiefs of Cabool and Candahar, consequent on their new alliance with Persia and Russia.

(Inclosure.)—Letter from Cabool to Captain Burnes.—(Received at Peshawur, May 8, 1838.)

A. C.

The day after you left Cabool, the Ameer had a private meeting with Sirdar Mehril Dil Khan, Reshid Akhoondzada, and Meerza Samee Khan. They have settled that Mahomed Azeem Khan (the Ameer's son), and Meerza Samee Khan, should leave Cabool, and having joined Mahomed Omar Khan, and Moolla Reshid, at Candahar, proceed to Herat, and wait upon Mahomed Shah on the part of the Cabool and Candahar Chiefs.

Sirdar Mehril Dil Khan has addressed a letter to Mahomed Shah, which, after being sealed by his brothers at Candahar, will be sent by express. The contents of the letter are as follow:

"On the arrival of Kumber Alee Khan, your Majesty's agent at Candahar, it was resolved that Mahomed Omar Khan should wait upon the Shah on the part of the Candahar Chiefs. Meanwhile, Captain Burnes reached Cabool, as an agent of the British Government, on which our elder brother Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan sent a letter preventing us sending Mahomed Omar Khan to His Majesty on the following grounds: the British Government and Runjeet Sing are very near the Affghans, and Mahomed Shah is at a distance of three months' journey, and that the Ameer feared these two Powers may be offended and endeavour to ruin him, which his Majesty could not prevent. Regarding the superiority of our brother (the Ameer), and seeing the good of the Governments, we recalled Mahomed Omar Khan from Gherisk, on account of the confusion. When we received authentic information of His Majesty's arrival at Herat, I left Candahar, and came to Cabool, and brought about the dismissal of Captain Burnes, and induced the Ameer to send his Minister, Meerza Samee Khan, to His Majesty; and from Candahar, Mahomed Omar Khan and Moolla Reshid will wait upon His Majesty."

It is expected that the above-mentioned individuals will leave this on the 6th of May.

The contents of the Ameer's letter to Mahomed Shah, are as follow:

"When Kumber Alee Khan reached Candahar, Captain Burnes also came to Cabool, on the part of the English Government. He pre-
vented my entering into an alliance with your Majesty. As the Shah was at a distance, I kept Captain Burnes in evasive discourse, and on having the sure information of your Majesty's arrival at Herat, I dismissed him instantly. I have now appointed my son Mahomed Azeem Khan, and my Minister, Meerza Samee Khan, to wait upon your Majesty. I will obey the orders (aman) of His Majesty in future."

The Chupper has been dispatched with the above letter to Herat.

Yesterday, Meerza Samee told the Ameer that he must get another person to go to Mahomed Shah, in lieu of him, as he does not want to go himself. On asking the reason of the Meerza's refusal, he stated to the Ameer that he was a Kuzzilbash, and in case Mahomed Shah does not agree to the proposals of the Ameer, he would imprison his son and himself (Meerza), and advance on Candahar, which will excite the suspicion of the Afghans, and they will ruin him; and further, that it would be better if the Ameer sent along with him either his agent (Naib-i-Ameer), Ameer Akhoondzada, or Abdoolla Khan to Mahomed Shah.

This proposal of the Meerza to the Ameer originates in his sagacity, for he has settled everything with Captain Vickovitch, who has promised that, on reaching the camp of Mahomed Shah, he will send to the Ameer the sum of forty lacs of rupees. The above officer is boasting very much what he will do to protect and exalt the Ameer, but it is needless to mention these affairs minutely.

No. 22.—H. Torrens, Esq., Deputy Secretary with the Governor-General, to Captain Burnes.

(Extract.) Simla, May 22, 1838.

The details given by you as to the intrigues of the Russian Agent at Cabool, will be communicated to the Home Government, as well as to Her Majesty's Agent at Tehran.

No. 23.—Captain Burnes to the Secretary to the Government of India.

(Extract.) Peshawur, May 17, 1838.

It will again be seen that affairs at Cabool undergo further change, and that Russia, despairing of Cabool, has now stepped forward to detach Candahar of itself; and the promises held out by her, have led to a difference between the Ameer and Mehir Dil Khan.

(Inclosure.)—Letter to the Address of Captain Burnes.—(Received at Peshawur, May 16, 1838.)

(Extract.)

After your departure from this place, the Ameer sends for Captain Vickovitch daily to his Court, and makes arrangements with him which are not as yet written.
On Tuesday evening a man by the name of Bahar, in the service of Kohen Dil Khan, came to Cabool with letters from the Russian Agent with Mahomed Shah to Captain Vickovitch. Alladad, who had accompanied Kumber Alee Khan, has also returned to Candahar, with other letters from Mahomed Shah, and the Russian Agent, to the address of the Candahar Chiefs.

The Russian Ambassador at Tehran has written to Mahomed Shah to take Herat by all means if he can, as he will never be able to conquer Toorkistan without reducing Herat to subjection. His Excellency has instructed the Shah to satisfy the Chiefs of Candahar and the Ameer of Cabool at any rate, and give whatever they want, since they have written to him (the Ambassador) through Captain Vickovitch, and accepted the friendship of Russia.

No. 24.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Peshawur, May 25, 1838.

Sir,

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Hon. the Governor-General of India, the following authentic intelligence from Cabool: the Ameer has dismissed Captain Vickovitch with all honor and respect; and that officer has proceeded to Candahar, along with Sirdar Mehr Di Khan, accompanied on the part of Dost Mahomed Khan by Huboo Khan, a Barukzye enjoying the Ameer's confidence. After the Ameer had made every preparation for sending his son and Meerva Samee Khan to wait on Mahomed Shah at his camp before Herat, the plan was suspended, pro tempore, by the arrangement above given. The Candahar family will wait on the Shah without delay, and be introduced through Captain Vickovitch, and it is understood at Cabool, that the Ameer will send his own subsequent messengers direct to Herat by the Hazareh road.

(Signed) A. BURNES.

No. 25.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Peshawur, May 27, 1838.

With reference to the last paragraph of my letter of the 21st ultimo, reporting the presence of a Russian traveller at Balkh, I do myself the honor to annex an extract from Mr. Lord's Journal, regarding him, which may prove interesting.

(Inclosure.)—Extract from Mr. Lord's Journal regarding a Russian Jew traveller at Balkh.

Oorn, April, 1838.

have just returned from Balkh. They report that they met there a man who represented himself as a Jew, but allowed
he was from Russia; he has for two years been on his travels, has visited Bokhara, Samarcand, Kokan, but was induced to give up the project he had formed of penetrating by way of Yarkand, &c., to Cashmere, by learning that it would be impossible to get beyond the Chinese posts without leaving his papers behind; he is said to write much and to draw maps, but this he himself denied; he spoke Persian, but not fluently; he first inquired whether our men could speak English; then Russian, then Toorkee, then Persian, and, last of all, spoke a few words of Hindoostanee, which he said was all he knew of that language; he was not staying with the Jews, but living by himself in a hired house in the Bazaar: he was well dressed; he declined eating, saying this was his fast, that it would be over in ten or twelve days, and that then he would come to us, as he wished to accompany us to Cabool, and get by that road to Cashmere; this account would either suit his being a Jew or a Christian as Easter (Passover) is on the 15th of this month: he gave his name first as Murat, but on observing that that is not a Jewish name, he said his name was Murdehas (Mordecai.) He is described as having a fair complexion, a scanty beard of light brown, his head not shaved in any part, but he wore a turban; he had arrived from Bokhara only five days; he denied the report that any Russian troops had come to join the Kuzzilbash.

No. 26.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Lahore, July 8, 1838.

I enclose copy of a letter, that was sent by Captain Vickovitch to M. Goutte.

(Inclosure.)—Intelligence received by Captain Burnes from Candahar, on the 7th of July, 1838, at Lahore.

When the Sirdars of Candahar were disappointed, and sure that the British Government would do nothing for them, they sent the Treaty that had been drawn between them and Kumber Alee Khan to the Russian Ambassador. The contents of the Treaty are well known to you by my late communication.

After perusing the Treaty, the Russian Envoy took it to Mahomed Shah, who agreed to every article of it. The Envoy made himself guarantee for the fulfilment of its articles, and then sent it back to the Sirdars, along with his own letter, the contents of which are as follow:

"Mahomed Shah has promised to give you the possession of Herat, and I sincerely tell you that you will also get Ghorian, on my account, from the Shah. It is, therefore, advisable that you send your son Mahomed Omar Khan to Herat, where you must also afterwards come.

"When Mahomed Omar Khan arrives here I will ask the Shah to
quit Herat, and send your son along with His Majesty to Tehran, I (the Russian Envoy) will remain here with 12,000 troops; and when you join, we will take Herat, which will be afterwards delivered to you."

On the arrival of this letter, the Sirdars had no bounds to their joy, and sent it to Cabool. The report was, that it did not please the Ameer at all.

Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan has returned to Candahar. The Russian agent (Vickovitch) who accompanied him from Cabool to this place, was received here with honor, since the Russian Envoy at Herat had written strongly to the Sirdars, that they must treat Omar Khan, or Vickovitch, with all sorts of consideration; and believe his tongue, oath, and words, as if they were from him (Russian Envoy).

The Sirdars have sent Mahomed Omar with 250 horsemen to Herat, to wait for Mahomed Shah, and have sent an elephant for His Majesty, and some shawls for the Russian Envoy.

The Sirdars have sent 114 letters, &c., ordering the heads of Seistan, Furrah, Subzawar, and other Afghans, to join their son Mahomed Sadig Khan at Furrah. They have also informed them that the Russian Envoy has made them the "Miri Affghan," and has promised to give them possession of Herat, when, if any of them will not obey, our (Sirdars) orders, he will be banished from the country for ever.

No. 27.—Letter referred to in the Letter from Captain Burnes, of July 8, 1838, to the Russian Ambassador Extraordinary (or fully empowered) at the Court of Persia.

His Lordship Major-General and Cavalier Count Simonitch (or Simonich).

Report from Lieutenant Vickovitch of the first Ormehing Cossack Regiment.

Having departed from Candahar 2nd (or may be the 27th) November, of the past year, 1837, I arrived at Cabool on the 8th of December. The reception of Dost Mahomed Khan, and his condescension towards me, was sufficiently marked—polite as kind.

I was lodged in the house of the First Minister, Meerza Adoo Selm (probably Abdool or Abdalla) Khan, and after three days' (waiting) I demanded an audience, when I delivered the imperial credentials (literally the most high letter) and the letter of your Lordship; and to that I added verbally, that the object of my coming was to evince to him, and the Rulers of Candahar, the very gracious wishes (or inclinations) of the Emperor; and to declare that His Majesty the Emperor was pleased to return a gracious reply to the letter of Dost Mahomed Khan, and vouchsafed to him protection and friendly alliance; that the Rulers of Afghanistan, having made up or reconciled their differences among themselves (this passage is rather guessed at,
being unintelligible) should acknowledge, or place themselves under the dominion of Persia, with whom Russia is connected by truly friendly relations.

The Ameer (Prince) in showing his satisfaction at the imperial letter (credentials) gave me to understand, that a friendly Treaty (on the part) of the Affghans with the Persians could not be (subsist), because an English Envoy, Captain Burns, now here, has concluded (or was concluding) a mutual Treaty. That Dost Mahomed Khan having collected as large an Affghan army as possible (should go or was to go) to the assistance of Kamran, against the Persians besieging Herat; and by that Treaty the English bound themselves to give, (to supply) the Affghans 20,000 muskets. (I cannot exactly make out the word thousand; but suppose it.) (Some words here about the Russian Alliance not legible.) And to make over to the possession of the Affghans, Pesha-wur, and the other conquests of Runjeet, on the right bank of the Indus; and that the Treaty was dispatched to Calcutta, for the information of the Governor-General of India, Lord Auckland. Thus terminated my first interview with the Ameer Dost Mahomed; but his Vizier Meerza Abdool (Hossein) Khan almost daily comes to me, and makes various inquiries regarding the power of Russia, and the other European Governments. In the meantime, Captain Burns departed (went) for Candahar, accompanied by the Lieutenant of Artillery, Leech, in order to (induce) the Candahar Rulers (to enter into) a Treaty, and (to withdraw themselves) from friendly relations with the Shah. The English have established between Cabool and Candahar, a kind of (letter post); and they have written (or it has been written), that the Persians are defeated, have retreated to Meshid, and have suffered extremely from hunger (want of provisions). All this has occasioned Dost Mahomed Khan to conduct himself very coldly towards me; and then, as he daily (converses) with Burns, from my arrival here to the 20th of February, I have hardly (or two or) three times been in his presence. Having discovered (or learnt) from Meerza Abdool Khan, that he (I do not make out whether Abdool Khan is here meant or Dost Mahomed) had a secret distrust of (or dislike to) English influence (or connection,) I endeavoured, as much as possible, to strengthen it, and succeeded in shaking his previous (or at a former time) confidence in and friendship towards them.

In the meantime, on the 21st February was received from Lord Auckland, a reply distinctly (decidedly) to cancel (refuse) all that Burns had negotiated (or agreed upon); but in his letter (not clearly made out) he does not advise (dissuades) the Rulers of Affghanistan to enter upon any alliance with Persia or other Powers, that the Affghans were in a great measure indebted for their independence to the support of the English, who restrained Runjeet Sing from conquest. The true
cause (reason for) such proceeding of Lord Auckland, as Burnes declares, is the following:—Runjeet having received from the Company a proposal to give up to the Affghans Peshawur, and other conquests, that he would willingly comply with the wishes of the Company upon receiving intimation to that effect. (some reference here to the territories between the Indus and Cashmere, and securing the succession to his heirs, but I cannot make connected sense of it.) On receiving such proposition from Runjeet, Lord Auckland replied, that in consequence of (or on the occasion) the approach of the Persian Shah to Herat, he decidedly (objects) and advises Runjeet to retain Peshawur, and oppose himself to the movements of the Shah, who, as reported, is resolved to extend his march (or conquests) to the borders of India. Dost Mahomed Khan, abandoning his hopes of assistance, (not clearly made out) on the part of the English, has sent to Candahar (the purport) of the letter received from Lord Auckland, and requested for consultation and co-operation one of the Sirdars of that place. Burnes, on his part, has written to Lieutenant Leech (being) at Candahar, that he should by all means endeavour to dissuade the Sirdars from going to Cabool, and with Dost Mahomed Khan. But the ill-conducted intrigues of Leech have been disclosed and roused the Sirdar Kohen Khan, and led the Affghans to adopt the contrary course—to join—Dost Mahomed Khan, and break of all connection with them (the English), and place themselves under the sway of Persia, with the guarantee of Russia; that the Shah should apply (100 m) muskets for the equipment of the Cabool and Candahar army, and that after the taking of Herat, the Shah himself with his troops should advance into Afghanistan, for the recovery of the provinces conquered by Runjeet. In demonstration of the sincerity of this proposal, the Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and the Sirdar Kohen Khan, as one of their proceedings. Meerza Abdool Khan, who not only possesses the entire confidence of Dost Mahomed Khan, but influences all affairs in Afghanistan particularly, and the Sirdar Mehr Khan. They request me to set out (in the course of the month) to forward (or obtain) from your Lordship, the guarantee that the Persians shall fulfil the conditions upon which the Affghans agree to submit themselves to the sway of Persia; and for that purpose, I intend leaving Cabool, on the 26th or 27th of April. Captain Burnes has frequently demanded of Dost Mahomed Khan, that I should be immediately dismissed, and that the Rulers of Afghanistan should engage not to enter into any negotiations (or relations), with Persia, and Russia; but seeing that now affairs have taken entirely another turn, he does not wait for the arrival of his companions, who last autumn went into Toorkistan, and having instructed Lieutenant Leech to proceed from Candahar to Shikarpore and Hyderabad, (where he probably) suspects that the Ruler of Sinde may enter into the confederation forming between Persia and
Affghanistan, he left Cabool on the 19th (or may be 17th) instant, (April;) and went through Peshawur to Lahore. I have the honor to present, for the favorable consideration of your Lordship, a brief description of Affghanistan. I venture to infer (conclude) that with some pains and discretion the Russian Government (administration,) — here, — as well as in commercial, as political relations. The geographical position of Affghanistan makes it the only — through which a conqueror can — from Candahar to the very shores of the ocean; — barren deserts, which can never be passable by any kind of military force (or detachments), on the north, and north-west, the road (way) from Toorkistan is bounded (closed) by the strong pass of Hindoo Koosh, which has only two roads hardly passable for the space of four (I cannot make out whether the next word is months, or some term implying distance, I think the former,) (several words here not legible)—for military stores, or supplies of an army. The people of Affghanistan are warlike, and if the mutual animosities existing between the several authorities, (ruling Powers,) were reconciled, they could oppose the united forces of all India. Being a place where it is difficult (as it is in all such places) to display (or enforce) the maritime power of Russia; it nevertheless participates (lends its aid) in the reliance and influence which your Lordship has ably succeeded in diffusing throughout Persia. In these countries, your — which extends as far as the exploits of the Persian armies, accompanies the name of your Lordship, and no one of the inhabitants of Cabool and Candahar doubts that the Shah, when leaving Tehran, gave over to your Lordship the reins of Government; — for my part, I do not doubt, that by the aid of this, something permanent may be done; (established here;) the English have appreciated the full importance of this country, in a political point of view, (bearing), and they have spared neither trouble nor expense to gain a footing; (instal themselves), in Affghanistan, and, without doubt, is known to your Lordship. Their successes in respect to the defence of Herat. This mission of Captain Burnes, as it appears (to have been) costs him (or them) as far as I can ascertain, 300 rupees, he (or they) during eight years' residence here (or possibly it may be "when here eight years ago,";) made purchases to the extent of 150 rupees. From the year 1832, there has been here an established English agent receiving a salary of one thousand rupees. He left Cabool together with Burnes. On my arrival at Tehran, I shall have the honor more particularly to lay before your Lordship the affairs of Affghanistan. At present I venture to most humbly beg that the desired (by the Affghans) guarantee should be acknowledged. Your verbal condescension in the camp of the Shah.

(Signed)  VICKOVITCH, Lieutenant.
No. 28.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Maenaghten, Esq.

Simla, August 18, 1838.

I do myself the honour to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, intelligence from the west which appears to be of importance, since it conveys details of a repulse which the Persians have met at Herat.

I have, &c.

W. H. Maenaghten, Esq.  
(Signed)  
ALEX. BURNES.

(Inclosure.)  

(Extract.)  
July 19, 1838.

You must also know that the days in which you saw Dost Mahomed Khan are departed. He is no longer popular. His joining the Russians has utterly ruined him in the eyes of all Mahomedans.

News has reached Cabool that Lord Auckland has entered into a Treaty with Runjeet Sing to restore Shooja-ool-Molk, and that, as soon as the rains are over, one army is to march to Shikarpoore and Candahar with the Shah, and another to Peshawur with the Shah’s son. This has quickened Dost Mahomed Khan’s plans; he has set about repairing the Bala Hissar of Cabool, and the Port of Ghiznee; he has also increased his taxes in the Kohistan; and, as you know, this only increases his difficulties. He now sends messenger after messenger to the Russian Ambassador and the Shah, urging them to settle affairs at Herat, and come on to Cabool, when the country will be theirs.

No. 29.—J. P. Willoughby, Esq., Secretary to the Government of Bombay, to the Secretary with the Governor-General of India.

Bombay Castle, August 6, 1838.

I am directed by the Honorable the Governor in Council, to transmit to you for submission to the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, a copy of a letter from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 19th ultimo, regarding two Russian agents named Dieskau and Frees, said to have been deputed to India with a view to obtain certain information as to the country and its inhabitants.

(Inclosure.)—Captain Hennell, Resident in the Persian Gulf, to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

(Extract.)

About four years ago, I had the honor to communicate some circumstances of a suspicious nature, connected with an individual, calling himself Count Dieskau, a native of Hamburgh, then on the point of embarking for Bombay from this port.

From private information received this day which I have permission to lay before Government, it appears that the person above referred to,
after traversing a great part of India, and passing himself off as an English Ambassador at Cabool and Herat two years ago, proceeded to Tiflis, and there entered into the Russian service; it goes on to say, that he has lately received letters informing him that the soi-disant Count Dieskau, accompanied by a Mr. Frees (the son of a German Professor) left on a mission to India, in October or November last, employed and paid by Russia. Their instructions were to visit Bokhara, Cabool, Lahore and Calcutta; for which purpose they had been furnished with letters of introduction from the Russian Government to a Turkoman Chief, on the eastern shore of the Caspian, to the Rulers of the two former places (Cabool and Bokhara,) to Monsieur Allard, and an American at the capital of Runjeet Sing. They were directed to examine, with the greatest care and accuracy, all the passes of the Hindoo Koosh; to inform themselves most minutely regarding the Chiefs, the inhabitants, their feelings, views and sentiments; while the resources of the countries they passed through, were to occupy a prominent part in their inquiries, to enable them to acquire a perfect acquaintance with the territories of the Sikhs, and the leading men of that nation; they were instructed, as a temporary arrangement, to enter into the service of Runjeet Sing, and having accomplished the varied and important objects committed to their charge, to proceed to Calcutta, and from thence to return to Russia in order to lay all the information thus acquired before the Government of that country.

No. 30.—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

I have the hour to transmit further intelligence from Candahar, which has just reached me. Some of it has been already reported; but I believe the succinct detail in which it is given, will prove interesting to the Right Honorable the Governor-General.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) A. BURNES.

(Inclusion.)—Intelligence received from Candahar to the Address of Captain Burnes, dated early in July.

I have sent four cossids to you, which I hope have safely reached by this time.

The cossid whose letters were taken at Cabool, and waited upon you, by my request, at Peshawur, is come back to me with a few lines from you, and a note, the contents of which I perfectly understand. I fear nobody but God, be at ease on my part.

The report has reached here, that Mr. Macnaghten and you are with the Maharajah, at Kussoolnuggur.
You take no notice of the fire which has been kindled in Khorassan and Afghanistan. You will see how far it extends in the course of six months.

Mahomed Shah has written a letter to the Sirdars at Candahar. The contents of the letter were much; but I tell you the result of it.

"Since the arrival of Mahomed Omar Khan, His Majesty has become sure of the attachment of the Sirdars at Candahar, to Persia, and that they should be at ease on account of their son, Mahomed Omar Khan; after taking Herat, His Majesty will send Vickovitch (Omar Khan) the man of the Russian Ambassador, to them, and Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, with the amount of nine lacs rupees, and then they must hold themselves ready to receive the orders of the Shah."

This letter was sealed by the Shah; his Minister, Meerza Haje Aghasse; and the Russian Ambassador.

Mahomed Omar Khan was received by 10,000 Persian cavalry, and presented with four guns and five pairs of dresses of honor. The Shah has given him a place near his own tent, and his agent, Alladad Khan, lives with the Russian Ambassador. Mahomed Omar Khan gets 200 ducats every day for his expenses; and the Shah has told him that he will do much more for the Sirdars than he has promised in his letters.

This intelligence was sent by Mahomed Omar Khan to his father, Kohen Dil Khan, through Khodadad Khan Chapper, courier, who arrived here in eleven days from Herat.

Two days after the arrival of Mahomed Omar Khan, the Persians made an assault on Herat, and lost 400 people, besides 200 or 300 wounded. Borowski and Samson have been dreadfully wounded, and the former nearly killed. The head of one of the Russian officers was cut off and taken into the city by the Affghans. Yar Mahomed Khan lost 300 men on the field, and 100 Affghans were wounded. After this engagement, both parties returned to their own quarters.

The arrival of Mahomed Omar Khan at the Persian camp, has deeply disheartened the Affghans at Herat. Many of them have turned against each other, and if the Sirdars at Candahar write to Mahomed Omar Khan, he would easily take Herat, for the Affghans would likely surrender it to him.

Mahomed Sadig Khan, the eldest son of Kohen Dil Khan, has possessed Furrah, and is repairing it.

Notwithstanding the Sirdars have made friendship with Persia and the Russian Ambassador; in heart, they are anxious to do so with the English, and appear to wait for British assistance.

In my former letter I informed you, that the British Ambassador has got leave from the Shah of Persia, and now I have heard, that his Excellency has gone to India.
No. 31.—The Government of Bombay to the Secret Committee.
(Extract.) December 1, 1838.

We have the honor to forward, for the information of your Honorable Committee, copy of a letter dated the 9th, and received on the 30th ultimo, from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Alexander Burnes, the Envoy to Kelat, transmitting for our information copy of a letter he had addressed to the Government of India, containing some intelligence from Candahar, connected with the intrigues of Russia in that quarter.

(Inclosure 1.)—Captain Burnes to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

Sir, Shikarpore, November 9, 1838.

I have the honor to transmit, for the information of the Honorable the Governor, in Council, a copy of my letter of this day's date to the Government of India, containing some singular intelligence from Candahar.

I have, &c.

J. P. Willoughby, Esq. (Signed) A. BURNS.

(Inclosure 2.)—Captain Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir, Shikarpore, November 9, 1838.

I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, some very singular items of intelligence which have just reached me from Candahar. It will be seen that my correspondent there has been sent to meet me here, and some of his statements are of a most extraordinary nature.

It at first occurred to me that the despatch of this person might be a ruse of the Candahar Chief to get rid of one who overlooked their nation; but I imagine rather that they are involved in much perplexity.

The presence of a Russian Agent at Candahar tallies but ill with the Shah's acceding to all our requests, as reported by Colonel Stoddart, or we are now to make a distinction between Russian and Persian intrigues, and conclude at once that the former wish to approach India without Persia as a cloak.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) A. BURNS.

(Inclosure 3.)—Intelligence received from Candahar, addressed to Captain Burnes at Shikarpore, 9th November, 1838.

On the 18th of October I wrote to Mr. Leech about Captain Vickovitch, the Agent of the Russian Ambassador, on which you are also informed.

On the 26th of the above month, Captain Vickovitch reached Candahar, having left Mahomed Shah at Kasan on the other side of
Ghordan, Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan wanted to send his son Mahomed
Omar Khan, and 300 horsemen for his reception, but Captain Vickovitch,
prevented the Sirdar doing so. He entered the city alone, and put up
in the house of Meerza Zaha.

Captain Vickovitch told the Sirdars that he was the bearer of
60,000 ducats. Out of the above sum he has a bill for 40,000 ducats
on the treasury of Kirman, and that money will be paid in three months
hence to Dost Mahomed Khan; 10,000 ducats he has in cash for the
Sirdars, who will get 10,000 more from Kain, where they go with their
army to Herat.

After a long discussion on both sides, the Sirdars took the 10,000
ducats from Captain Vickovitch and divided them. Kohen Dil Khan
has pitched one coss from the city on his way to Herat, and troops are
daily assembling to join him.

The Sirdars asked Captain Vickovitch whether Mahomed Shah was
the friend of the English, or of Russia; he answered, of the latter. On
this the Sirdars observed, if the Russians are the friends of the Persians,
why could not Mahomed Shah take Herat during the siege of ten
months, and why did he at last leave it in possession of the English?

Captain Vickovitch replied, that he had also told the Russian Amb-
assador that it was the opinion of the people that Mahomed Shah had
a friendship with the English. When the Ambassador heard this he
waited upon Mahomed Shah, and said that the retirement of His Ma-
jesty from Herat will bring the English, and it will be reduced to their
subjection. The Shah explained to the Ambassador that it was impos-
sible to take Herat even if it were besieged for one year more, because
all his Persian nobles are not willing to conquer it.

The Russian Ambassador then asked the Shah his opinion of tak-
ing measures about Herat: he told him to send money to the Afghan
Chiefs. The Shah said, when the Afghans come against Herat, I will
also order my forces in Khorassan to join them in attacking that city.
On this the Ambassador told the Shah if the city of Herat was not
even taken by the combined arms of the Afghans and Khorassans,
what then was the mode to reduce it? the Shah pointed out to the Amb-
assador, that it was not according to Treaty, that Russian forces
should pass through Persia, but now His Majesty would bring no ob-
struction if that Government should send their army through it to reduce
any country they liked. This permission from the Shah was received
by the Ambassador with great thanks and pleasure. The Ambassador
has gone with the Shah.

The Sirdars told Captain Vickovitch that they were now quite sat-
isfied about Herat; but they feared for Candahar, which may be taken by
the English. He answered then that it was not the law among
Europeans that one nation should dare to conquer a foreign land in the
presence of an officer from another, and therefore his (Vickovitch's)
presence will prevent the English coming. These words have made the Sirdars totally fearless of any ill luck.

The Ameers of Sinde have written to the Sirdars that the English and Shah Shooja are advancing to take Afghanistan, which has perplexed Kohan Dil Khan very much.

The Ameers of Sinde have written to the Sirdars that Shah Shooja is coming to take his ancestors' country, and we (the Ameers) are not pleased with him. On this the Sirdars, and also Captain Vickovitch, wrote separate letters to the Ameers of Sinde, saying that they should remain quiet for three months, and the Ameers will soon see them on the Indus with their army.

No. 32.—J. P. Willoughby, Esq., to the Secretary of the Court of Directors.

(Extract.)

Bombay Castle, December 4, 1838.

With reference to the letter, No. 45, addressed by this Government to the Honorable the Secret Committee on the 1st instant, transmitting copy of one from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burns, the Envoy to Kela, with inclosure, containing important intelligence from Candahar, I am desired by the Honorable the Governor, in Council, to forward to you for the purpose of delivery to the Honorable the Secret Committee, the accompanying copy of a further despatch on the subject from Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burns, dated the 14th ultimo, this moment received.

No. 33.—Lieut.-Colonel Sir A. Burns to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

Shikarpore, November 14, 1838.

I have the honor to forward, for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council, some further information regarding the new Russian intrigue at Candahar, contained in my letter of yesterday to the Government of India.

I append likewise a letter on the same subject, received since it was written, by Major Leech.

(Inclosure 1.)—Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Burns to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Shikarpore, November 13, 1838.

In continuation of my letter of the 9th instant, reporting on the proceedings of the Candahar Chiefs and Captain Vickovitch, I now append another letter from Candahar, to the address of Major Leech.

The proceedings of Captain Vickovitch at Candahar are matters of notoriety here, and may have a prejudicial effect at Hyderabad. I also find that the Russians have sent presents to Alee Khan, the Beloochee Chief of Sistan. I keep Colonel Pottinger informed on these matters and indeed on all that is going on.
(Inclosure 2.)—Letter addressed to Major R. Leech.

(Extract.)
Candahar, October 25, 1838.

I yesterday asked Kohen Dil Khan what he meant by proceeding towards Herat, in the present crisis of affairs, and what was to be done with the English? He said, that if the English were encamped on the plains of Candahar, he could not help going as far as Furrah. He said his only plan was to remain at Furrah, as the Persians and Russians had told him; and if Candahar in the interim should be taken or besieged, the Russians would have the blame; that the Russians would give money and troops to them, that they might come back and fight at Candahar; and that if they did not find the English there, they might employ the resources put at their disposal to subdue Herat.

Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan has left Candahar, having distributed ducats to his army; he expected to arrive at Furrah on the 9th November.

Captain Vickovitch has brought 1,000 kharwars of grain for the Sirdar, that was in the Fort of Shumsoodeen Khan.

(Inclosure 3.)—Letter to Major R. Leech.

(Extract.)
Candahar, October 25, 1838.

Alladad Khan and Captain Vickovitch arrived at Candahar on the 17th October, bringing with them 10,000 ducats, which Kohen Dil Khan immediately applied for. The Russian answered, that it rested with Alladad Khan, to give the money as soon as the Sirdars should start.

On the 21st of October, the Sirdars pitched their pesh kheena (advanced tents), and received the 10,000 ducats. Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan took for his share 2,7000 ducats; Sirdar Rehem Dil and Mehir Dil Khans took the same; Meer Affzul Khan received 950 ducats; and Mahomed Sadig Khan the same sum.

On the 22nd of October, four messengers arrived from Ameer Dost Mahomed, saying that Captain Burnes and Mr. Wood had arrived at Peshawur with thirty regiments: that the Sikhs had retired from Peshawur, and urging the Sirdars not to quit Candahar.

Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan showed the letter to Captain Vickovitch, who said that they were at liberty to act as they pleased. The Sirdars said they would start in four days.

No. 34.—The Bombay Government to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.)
December 26, 1838.

In continuation of the despatch from Sir A. Burnes, the Envoy to Kelat, dated the 14th ultimo, regarding the intrigues of Russia in Candahar, which was forwarded to your Honorable Committee through the Secretary at the East India House, we have the honor to transmit two other communications from that officer, dated 22nd and 27th of the same month, containing further intelligence on the subject.
We beg to state, for your Honorable Committee's information, that we have caused copies of Sir A. Burnes's despatches on the above subject to be forwarded to Her Majesty's Envoy at the Court of Persia.

We have also the honor to forward, for the information of your Honorable Committee, copies of two further despatches from Sir A. Burnes, dated 29th ultimo, and 3rd and 5th instant, reporting further intelligence.

(Inclosure 1.)—Lieut.-Col. Sir A. Burnes to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.
Shikarpore, November 22, 1838.

I have the honor to transmit a copy of my letter, of this day's date, to the Government of India, for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have, &c. (Signed) A. BURNES.

(Inclosure 2.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
Shikarpore, November 22, 1838.

(Extract.)

In continuation of Captain Vickovitch's proceedings at Candahar, I have the honor to report, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General, that that officer is giving great encouragement to the Chiefs; he has urged them to put their ditch and walls in repair, and to collect supplies of grain, which my informants tell me are being done.

This agent does not wish to figure as a Russian, but as a Persian: he gives out that his proceedings are guided by Mahomed Shah's orders, whose ally and friend is his master the Emperor.

The last advices here state, that the Vizier of Herat, the brave Yar Mahomed Khan, has invested Furrah, where a son of the Candahar Sirdars now is; so that these Chiefs may be shaping their proceedings to counteract danger that impends from Herat, as well as from us.

(Inclosure 3.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.
Shikarpore, November 27, 1838.

I have the honor to transmit the copy of a paper of intelligence from Kelat, for the information of the Honorable the Governor in Council.

I have, &c. (Signed) A. BURNES.

Sub-inclosure.—Heads of Intelligence received from Kelat under date 16th November, and received on the 27th November, 1838, at Shikarpore.

The son of Shah Kamran who ruled in Furrah, and had taken shel-
ter in the hills of Ghoorband, has come back to Furrarah, and at the head of numerous Affghans, to fight with Mahomed Sadig Khan.

Sirdar Mehr Dil Khan has pitched at Vasheen; Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan (in company with Captain Vickovitch) at Kishk Rekhed; and Sirdar Rehem Dil Khan, near the Hanz Madad, twelve coss distance from the city. All the troops are preparing to follow and join them.

Aga Seid Mahomed, Agent of Dost Mahomed Khan, who had proceeded through the Hazareh with presents to the Persian Court, has been carried away by the Shah; and His Majesty has promised to send him back with money to Cabool.

Abdul Oaheb Khan, the servant of the Russian Ambassador, who passed through Candahar on his way to Cabool, in charge of the dress of honor for Dost Mahomed Khan, has been told that he will not be permitted to leave Cabool till the Ameer's Agent, Aga Mahomed, is restored by the Shah. This has been reported by Vahab Khan himself to the Sirdars of Candahar, who told him in reply, that it was his own fault for proceeding to Cabool against their advice.

(Inclosure 4.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes to J. P. Wil- loughby, Esq.

(Extract.)

Shikarpore, November 29, 1838.

I have the honor to transmit a copy of my despatch, of this day's date, to the Secretary to the Government of India.

(Inclosure 5.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes to W. H. Mac- naghten, Esq.

(Extract.)

Shikarpore, November 29, 1838.

I have, since my arrival here, reported in various communications the proceedings of the Russian agent at Candahar, though I have failed to hitherto satisfy myself on the precise objects of Captain Vickovitch's mission. Our intelligence from Candahar has been all along accurate; and you will see that the letters sent from Candahar to Hyderabad under Captain Vickovitch's instigation, (if not by himself), have at last come to light, as stated in the sixth paragraph of Colonel Pottinger's letter of the 23rd instant, now forwarded. It now turns out that the Chiefs of Candahar have offered a portion of their Russian bribe to the Chief of Kelat; and such is the unhappy fatality hanging over these disunited Chiefs, that such an offer carries with it weight, and leads Mehrab Khan to think he can play it off against the British in tendering his services. I have laid open to him the penalty he will incur, the line of duty he ought to follow, and the deceitful nature of the promises of the Candahar Chiefs, whom he should fear, though bringing presents.
No. 35.—The Bombay Government to the Secret Committee.
(Extract.)
Bombay Castle, January 18, 1839.

On the 15th of December, 1838, in his letter to the Secretary with the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes forwarded a paper of intelligence from Candahar, which had reached him at Shikarpore on the previous evening, which throws considerable light on the intrigues of Russia in that quarter, and in which Captain Vickovitch is represented to have taken a prominent part.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes has received authentic confirmation of the above intelligence from some respectable Afghans, who arrived at Shikarpore, on their route to join the Shah; and these persons state it to be the intention of the Chiefs of Candahar to hold out against us at Furrah, and abandon Candahar.

In his letter dated the 21st ultimo, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes forwards translated extracts from a communication to his address dated the 9th November, 1838, containing further particulars of the proceedings of Russia and her agents in Central Asia.

With his letter dated the 22nd ultimo, Lieutenant-Colonel Burnes forwards a paper of authentic intelligence of the proceedings of the Russians in Afghanistan.

No. 36.—Sir A. Burnes to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
(Extract.)
Shikarpore, December 15, 1838.

I have the honor to transmit a paper of intelligence from Candahar, which reached me last night.

The proceedings of Captain Vickovitch develop themselves.

(Inclosure.)—To Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes.—(Received at Shikarpore, December 14, 1838.)

Captain Vickovitch has given 10,000 ducats to the Sirdars of Candahar, and promised them 10,000 more when they arrive at Furrah, and the same number again on reaching one march on this side of Herat, and 20,000 ducats on besieging that city. The Sirdars have consequently left Candahar, and arrived at Furrah. Mehr Dil Khan has been sent back to Candahar; for he was afraid of the Ghilzees making an insurrection, because the heads of that tribe, Abdurrahman Khan, and Sultan Mahomed Khan, the sons of Shahabooddeen Khan, and Gool Mahomed Khan, the son of Khanan, had received letters from Shah Shooja; and because in the city there were Hajee Khan, Soohbat Khan, and Mama, in whom the Sirdars had but little confidence.

Vizier Yar Mahomed Khan is involved in a very distressed condition. He wrote to Kohen Dil Khan, stating that the Kajars had just raised the siege, and that he (Kohen Dil) should not come to invade
Herat; but if he did, he should bring Dost Mahomed Khan along with him, and please God they would not be able to conquer it for four months, after which it has got a master who will present himself soon.

No. 37.—Sir A. Burnes to H. Torrens, Esq., the Deputy Secretary with the Governor-General.

Shikarpore, December 21, 1838.

Sir,

I annex some extracts of a letter just received, containing particulars of the proceedings of Russia and her agents in Central Asia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. BURNES.

(Inclusion.)—To Sir A. Burnes. November 9, 1838.

We received your letter, and were much pleased on learning its contents.

The Russian Agent, who lately came to Dost Mahomed Khan, presented six hundred yards of long cloth and a few pieces of broad cloth. He has put up at Meerza Samee Khan’s, and is in a distressed state, not knowing what course he should pursue. There is no account of Agha Seid Mahomed, who had been deputed by Dost Mahomed to Persia.


Sir,

I do myself the honor to transmit, for the information of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India, a paper of authentic intelligence of the proceedings of the Russians in Afghanistan.

(Inclusion.)—Letter to Lieutenant-Colonel Sir A. Burnes and Major Leech. (Received at Shikarpore, December 22, 1838.)

December 11, 1838.

On the 11th of December, Sirdar Mehir Dil Khan invited Captain Vickovitch to a party at his house, where there were present Moolla Nusso Nazur Mahomed Khan and Hajee Hoosein Alee Khan, the Persian Ambassador. The Sirdar told Captain Vickovitch, that he (the Captain) had told them (the Sirdars) that on that side of the Indus was the British Government, and on this side that of Mahomed Shah, who owes allegiance to Russia; that since they had also submitted themselves to Russian allegiance, it behoved him to assist them against the English, who are now going to invade Afghanistan. Captain Vickovitch answered, that they were not in the allegiance of Russia, because though he had given them 10,000 ducats to set out for Herat, they had not yet travelled twenty-five cosses during fifty days, and that when they arrived at Herat he could then assist them against any
enemy. He also added, that he was deputed to Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, and that the Ameer had sent his letter to Russia, by his man Hubboo Khan, declaring himself a servant of the Russian Government, and given an unsealed copy of it to himself; that the man had come as far as Candahar, and then disappeared; that he sent the copy of the letter to his Government, and received a letter for the Ameer to this effect, that he (the Ameer) was not a servant but a friend, that if he wanted the Russian friendship, he should write so, and it would send to him four lacs of dacats and four officers skilled in artillery and infantry exercise; and that he was waiting for an answer to that letter from the Ameer, after the receipt of which, he would return to Russia.

He also stated that the Russian Government had more reliance on Dost Mahomed Khan's intellect and power than on the Chiefs of Candahar, because he, notwithstanding his poverty, and being without means, is fighting against the Sikhs who are provided with every thing; and the Sirdars of Candahar were so senseless as to believe that Mahomed Shah, after conquering Herat, would give it over to them, which was absurd.

Sirdar Kohen Dil Khan and Sirdar Mehir Afzul Khan each sent three horses, together with Captain Vickovitch's letter, to Meer Nusser Khan, at Hyderabad, by Mahomed Ibrahim.

Sirdar Mehir Dil Khan returned to Candahar on the 1st of December: on the next day Captain Vickovitch waited upon Mehir Dil Khan, and asked him to go to Kohen Dil Khan, and manage the expense of the troops, because the 10,000 duets which he had given to them are all spent. The Sirdar stated that 1,000 kharwars of wheat belonging to Shumsoodeen Khan, a servant of Mahomed Shah, where deposited in forts, which Captain Vickovitch should get for the army, either by purchase or gratis. This request Captain Vickovitch refused, stating that this was not the time for him to proceed to the camp, because Messrs. Burnes, Leech, and Wood, were in the neighbourhood of Shikarpore, clearing the jungles, making roads, and purchasing grain and supplies for the army. Colonel Pottinger was at Hyderabad, and the Governor-General of India, at Loodiana; that these officers must have some determined objects; if he leaves, it might occasion some trouble; but if he remains at Candahar, some remedy might be found.

The Sirdars then asked for letters of recommendation to the Russian Ambassador, Mahomed Shah, and Shumsoodeen, to supply the army with grain and money. Forage and other supplies were very scarce at Herat.

On the 4th of December, a messenger arrived with Kohen Dil Khan's letter to Mehir Dil Khan. This Sirdar took the letters to Captain Vickovitch, and read them to him.
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No. 1.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to John McNeill, Esq.

(Extract.)

Simla, May 1, 1838.

I am directed by the Governor-General of India to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 7th ultimo, with the copies of despatches to the address of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, which accompanied it, and for which his Lordship desires me to tender to you his best thanks.

His Lordship gathers from these documents, that the state of our relations with Persia is at the present moment exceedingly critical. It has occurred to the Governor-General, that it might prove of very essential aid to your negotiations, were as many cruisers as can be spared for the service, together with a regiment of native infantry, dispatched to the Persian Gulf, to hold themselves in readiness for any service on which your Excellency might deem it expedient, under the orders of Her Majesty's Government, or the general authority which you may possess from it, to employ them, with a view to the maintenance of our interests in Persia. A recommendation to this effect will accordingly be made immediately to the Governor in Council of Bombay, who will further be requested to dispatch the Hugh Lindsay to the Gulf, with a view of conveying rapid intelligence to India of the state of affairs in Persia, in the present highly critical emergency.

His Lordship understands from a demi-official communication with which your Excellency has favored him, that it is your intention to proceed to Herat, with a view of prevailing on His Majesty the Shah to raise the siege of that city. Your Excellency is fully aware of the great importance attached by the British Government in India to the preservation of the integrity of that place, and his Lordship would be glad of any efforts you can make to save it, which may not be inconsistent with the instructions under which you are acting from Her Majesty's Government.

No. 2.—W. H. Macnaghten, Esq., to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

Simla, May 1, 1838.

Sir,

I am desired by the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 16th ultimo, transmitting a packet from the Envoy Extraordinary in Persia, to my address, containing copies of despatches to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, in reply, to forward to you the accompanying copy of a letter this day written to Mr. McNeill.

It is requested that the Right Honorable the Governor in Council will comply with the suggestions contained in the second paragraph of that letter, at the earliest practicable period, if the troops and cruisers can be conveniently spared; and that the Hugh Lindsay may be forthwith dispatched with the accompanying despatch to Mr. McNeill, with instructions to the Resident at Bushire to forward it to his Excellency either at Herat, or Tehran, or wherever he may happen to be.
The Hugh Lindsay should be considered at the disposal of Mr. McNeill, or failing instructions from his Excellency, of the Resident at Bushire, until the present crisis is passed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MACNAGHTEN.

No. 3.—The Governor-General of India to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

(Extract.) Simla, May 1, 1838.

You will observe that, with reference to the very critical state of our relations with Persia, I have taken upon myself to request the Bombay Government to dispatch the Hugh Lindsay to the Gulf, with a regiment, and such cruisers as can be spared, having reason to believe that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Envoy, the presence of this force will tend materially to the success of his negotiation.

No. 4.—Proceedings held at an Extraordinary Council of the Bombay Government, on the 19th May, 1838.

Read and recorded a letter from Mr. Secretary Macnaghten, dated the 1st instant, with its inclosure of the same date, being copy of a letter from Mr. Secretary Macnaghten to his Excellency John McNeill, Esq., Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Persia.

The Board having taken the above into consideration, and having consulted Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Malcolm, Superintendent of the Indian Navy, Major Neill Campbell, Acting Quartermaster-General of the Army, Captain Turner, Mint Engineer, and Captain Lowe, Commanding the Honorable Company's Steamer Berenice, as to the best and easiest mode of equipping and transporting a small force to the Persian Gulf, it is unanimously resolved as follows:

That, in consideration of the probable importance of the despatches received yesterday by express from the Governor-General at Simla, it is not expedient that the departure of the Berenice with the overland mail, on the 21st instant, should be interfered with.

That with reference to that part of the Governor-General's instructions directing that the Hugh Lindsay Steamer be sent to the Persian Gulf, his Lordship be informed that both Rear-Admiral Sir Charles Malcolm and Captain Lowe being of opinion that at this late season of the year it is more than doubtful whether this vessel could reach Muscat, and that on failure thereof she would have no alternative but to return to Bombay, it is impossible that this part of the instructions can be carried into effect.

That it appearing that the Honorable Company's Steamer Semiramis can be got ready for sea in ten days from this date, and that as this vessel has been directed to proceed to Calcutta to try an experi-
ment, which ought to yield to the necessity of complying with the Governor-General's orders in an emergency of the present description, she be dispatched to the Persian Gulf, with as many troops on board as she can conveniently accommodate.

That as it distinctly appears, from the statements of Sir Charles Malcolm, that the Tigris can carry no troops, and the Coote a very few, while the Semiramis cannot well carry above 300, Sir Charles Malcolm be directed to endeavour to engage a vessel of 400 or 500 tons for the conveyance of troops to the Persian Gulf.

That he be directed to prepare the Company's sloop of war Coote for service in the Persian Gulf with all practical dispatch.

That the Company's brig of war Tigris, now ready for sea, be ordered to proceed to the Persian Gulf as soon as despatches can be prepared for the Envoy in Persia, and the Resident at Bushire, informing those officers of the measures about to be adopted by this Government to give effect to the instructions of the Governor-General.

That by the above vessel orders be issued to the Resident at Bushire, to concentrate the whole of the squadron in the Persian Gulf at Bushire, or at the Isle of Karrak.

That, provided tonnage can be obtained, a force consisting of 500 rank and file of native infantry, and two six-pounders, completely equipped for service, be dispatched with as little delay as possible to Bushire.

That the native infantry be composed of detachments from the 15th 23rd and 24th regiments, and the marine battalion, now forming part of the garrison of Bombay, in order to admit of those castes being selected which are likely to suffer least from a sea voyage.

That it being highly desirable that an officer of judgment and experience should be selected to command on this service, the President purposes that Lieutenant-Colonel Shirriff be specially selected to command the expedition, and be directed to place himself under the political control of the Resident in the Persian Gulf.

That the commissariat department be directed to provision the troops for a period of six weeks; that all indents connected with the expedition, be passed as on an emergent service, and that all expenses incurred be debited to the Government of India.

That Captain Hennell be directed to make the best arrangements in his power for landing the troops, he being informed that the island of Karrak appears to this Government to be the most convenient spot for this purpose; and that he also be informed that the troops are placed under his political control, subject to the instructions of the Envoy in Persia.

That a copy of Mr. Secretary Macnaghten's letter of the 1st instant, and of its inclosure, be transmitted to Captain Hennell in explanation of his Lordship's views in ordering this demonstration.
That the Resident be directed to apprise the Envoy in Persia of the arrival of these troops, and of their being placed entirely at his Excellency's disposal.

That the Resident be directed to apprise the Persian authorities at Bushire that the troops are sent on a special service to the Gulf, and that the British Government hope that they will make no objection to their being landed at Karrak, and that they will afford every aid in effecting that object; Captain Hennel being informed that it is left to his discretion to land them on that island, even in opposition to the wishes of those authorities, provided he deems this necessary and expedient, and that it can be done without compromising the safety of the troops.

That the despatches recently received from the Governor-General to the Envoy in Persia, be forwarded by the Semiramis, together with duplicates of the despatches of this Government, to be sent by the Tigris.

That a copy of Mr. Secretary Macnaghten's letter, and inclosure, of the 1st instant, and a copy of these Resolutions, be forwarded to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, by the steamer Berenice.

That a copy of these Resolutions be immediately transmitted to the Governor-General, and to the Government of India, with an intimation that, being unable to carry into effect literally the instructions of the Supreme Government, we have felt it our duty to comply, in the best manner our means will permit, with those instructions, in a case in which the interests of the British empire may be materially, and perhaps vitally, involved.

No. 5.—The Governor in Council at Bombay to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs,

Bombay Castle, May 21, 1838.

We have the honor to transmit to your Committee, by the steamer Berenice, which leaves this day with the overland mail for Suez, copy of a despatch from the Secretary to the Governor-General of India, dated the 1st instant, relative to the present unsettled state of affairs in Persia.

In reference to the second paragraph of Mr. Secretary Macnaghten's letter above adverted to, we beg to forward to your Committee a copy of the resolutions of this Government for carrying into effect the wishes of his Lordship, and to express our hope that the measures which we have deemed it our duty to adopt, will meet the approval of your Committee.

We have, &c.

(Signed) R. GRANT.
J. FARISH.
GEO. W. ANDERSON.
No. 6.—Captain Hennell to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

(Extract.)

Bushire, June 18, 1838.

This morning, by the Semiramis steamer, I had the honor to receive the important letter addressed to Her Majesty’s Minister at the Court of Persia, and now beg to acquaint you that it has been dispatched to Tehran, under charge of my jellowdar, and a cossid mounted from my stable, under instructions to use every exertion for its speedy and safe conveyance to its destination.

No. 7.—L. R. Reid, Esq., to Captain Hennell.

Bombay Castle, July 3, 1838.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 18th ultimo, No. 37, and to acquaint you that the Governor in Council approves of your having forwarded the despatch to the Envoy in Persia, in the manner therein indicated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) L. R. REID.

No. 8.—Commodore Brucks to J. C. Melville, Esq.

(Extract.)

Steamer Semiramis, Karrak Island, June 19, 1838.

Agreeable to my instructions, I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, that the Semiramis anchored at this island at 1.30 P.M. this day, having sailed from Bombay on the 4th June at 4 P.M.; arrived at Muscat at 7 P.M. of the 11th; sailed from thence at 10 P.M. of the 13th; anchored off Bushire at midnight of the 17th, and sailed from thence this morning.

We had 387 troops and followers, besides two guns, carriages and ammunition embarked. On the passage across, except the two last days, we had a moderate monsoon; on those days we had a strong wind from south-west, with an increasing head sea. Considering the great top weight (for all were on deck), we made good way, averaging 128 miles per diem. We should have done much better, but had only two firemen who had ever seen a coal fire; the consequence was, we never could get the steam kept up; two inches, instead of three and a half being the highest it ever rose on the gauge.

The troops, I am happy to say, are now being landed, with the consent of the authorities of the place.

No. 9.—Captain Hennell to the Secretary to the Government of Bombay.

(Extract.)

H. C. Steamer Semiramis, off Karrak, June 20, 1838.

I embarked early yesterday morning on board the Semiramis, and
accompanied by the Hugh Lindsay steamer, reached the island of Karrak about 1 o'clock P.M.

Finding no notice taken of the gun which had been fired for a boat, I sent my Arabic Meerza, Hajee Ahmed, on shore, with a message to Skeik Nasir, requesting he would pay me a visit on board, as I wished to communicate with him upon matters of consequence. The Meerza did not return until the afternoon, when I learnt from him that Skeik Nasir with six boats had that morning gone over to Bushire Roads, for the purpose of having an interview with me upon the subject of his own affairs. He added that Skeik Abdoolah (the uncle of Skeik Nasir), and the only authority here, was too much alarmed to come off, and that he was very anxious that I should wait the return of his nephew. To do this, however, appeared to me only a waste of valuable time; and it was therefore arranged that the troops should forthwith commence their landing in the boats of the steamers; while I, accompanied by my Meerza, proceeded on a native bugalah to the fort. I was met on the beach by Skeik Abdoolah, who appeared much relieved on seeing me. I told him, in a few words, that the British Government had sent up a body of troops upon a special service, and that the island of Karrak, on account of the salubrity of its climate, had been chosen for their place of residence. The Skeik replied that the island, its inhabitants, and everything it contained, were entirely at our disposal. I then intimated that it was desirable the vessels should be unladen as quickly as possible, as one was to return immediately to Bombay; and begged he would give orders for the native boats to go off, and assist in the disembarkation, upon the usual hire; with which request he immediately complied. The assistance given by the steamers' boats and the Karrak bugalahs was so effective, that before dark all the troops, excepting a guard and working party on board each vessel, were landed.

The whole of this day has been employed in landing the guns and stores. The tents sent from Bombay on board the steamers, being too few in number to cover the troops and officers, without their being much crowded, I placed the whole of those belonging to the Residency at the disposal of Lieut.-Colonel Shirriff, so that, with this addition, the whole detachment will be comfortably lodged until the Tamerlane transport brings up the remainder of the tents.

The island of Karrak abounds with wells, and springs of excellent water; but the limited population can furnish but small supplies for the troops. As far, however, as my inquiries go, there will be no great difficulty experienced in procuring these from the neighbouring ports of Gonaya, Bunder Reight, and Bushire.

The presence of the schooner Emily, at the present juncture, would have been attended with great advantages, as she would have been very useful in carrying supplies, and keeping up the communication between
the troops on the island, and the Residency at Bushire. I propose, however, to supply her place, as far as possible, by hiring a suitable vessel, if I can meet with one upon reasonable terms, to be employed as a tender.

No. 10.—L. R. Reid, Esq., to Captain Hennell.

Bombay Castle, July 3, 1838.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 20th ultimo, announcing the arrival of the detachment from Bombay, and its disembarkation on the island of Karrak, and to inform you that the Governor in Council approves of all your proceedings as therein reported.

I have, &c.

(Signed) L. R. REID.

No. 11.—L. R. Reid, Esq., to the Secretary with the Governor-General of India.

Bombay Castle, July 3, 1838.

Sir,

I am directed by the Governor in Council to transmit to you, for the purpose of being submitted to the Governor-General of India, the inclosed copy of a letter from the Officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 20th ultimo, announcing the arrival of the detachment from Bombay, and its disembarkation on the island of Karrak, and of my reply thereto of this date.

I have, &c.

(Signed) L. R. REID.

No. 12.—Captain Hennell to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

(Extract.)

June 22, 1838.

I have the honor to report my return yesterday to Bushire from Karrak, on board the steamer Semiramis, in company with the Hugh Lindsay.

I now do myself the honor to inclose, for the information of the Governor in Council, a copy of a note addressed by me to Meerza Abbas, the Governor of Bushire, immediately subsequent to my return, upon the subject of the location of the troops in the island, together with a copy of his reply to the same.

No. 13.—Captain Hennell to Meerza Abbas.

Bushire, June 21, 1838.

Having been much engaged on the arrival of the Government vessels with packets from Bombay, I had not leisure to wait upon you to explain the reason of my sudden departure from Bushire; but I take the earliest opportunity after my return, to acquaint you, that the
British Government having sent a body of troops to the Persian Gulf, upon a special service, I have been instructed to intimate the same to you, and to acquaint you that, on account of the superiority of Karrak over Bassadore, and every other island, in point of climate, the troops have been landed there. At the same time I have been directed to express the hopes entertained by the British Government that you will show them all kindness, and afford them every aid during their stay, particularly in allowing boats to carry out supplies of whatever may be required.

(Signed) S. HENNELL.

No. 14.—Meerza Abbas to Captain Hennell.
Persian Gulf, June 21, 1838.

I have had the honor of receiving your note brought by Meerza Juwad, and have understood what was written and spoken. What you state in apology, that in carrying into effect the orders of your Government you have not had leisure to visit me, and that for the forwarding the service of the Sirkar you had been directed to proceed to Karrak on account of the superiority of its climate, this is very good. It is necessary for a subject to perform whatever orders he may receive from his superior.

It is also incumbent upon me to represent to my own Government these new arrangements which have been made and executed by you, and to act according to whatever directions may be sent, as on certain points I do not possess authority to act, and therefore it becomes necessary to apply for instructions, and to be guided by them. Touching transport of supplies to the vessels, as no misunderstanding or separation has taken place between the two States, very good; there is no objection; let them be forwarded.

No. 15.—L. R. Reid, Esq., to Captain Hennell.
Bombay, July 3, 1838.

Sir,

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 22nd ultimo, reporting your return to Bushire from Karrak, and submitting the copy of a note addressed by you to Meerza Abbas, the Governor of Bushire, on the subject of the location of the troops at Karrak, together with copy of the Meerza’s reply; and to acquaint you that the Governor in Council approves of the tenor of your communication to Meerza Abbas.

I have, &c.

(Signed) L. R. REID.

No. 16.—L. R. Reid, Esq., to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
Bombay, July 3, 1838.

Sir,

I am directed by the Governor in Council, to transmit to you, for
the purpose of being submitted to the Governor-General of India, the enclosed copy of a despatch from the Officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 22nd ultimo, reporting the correspondence which he had with Meerza Abbas, the Governor of Bushire, on the subject of the location of the British troops at Karrak, and of my reply thereto of this date.

I have, &c.

W. H. Macnaghten, Esq. (Signed) L. R. Reid.

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No. 17.—The Governor in Council at Bombay to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs, Bombay Castle, July 11, 1838.

With reference to our letter dated the 21st May last, relative to the unsettled state of affairs in Persia, we have the honor to transmit to your Committee copies of despatches from the Officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf, regarding the location of the detachment under Colonel Shirriff in the island of Karrak, and the communications held by Captain Hennell with the Governor of Bushire on the subject.

The measures adopted by Captain Hennell, and his communication to the Governor of Bushire, relative to the occupation of Karrak, are, in our opinion, very judicious, and have met with our entire approbation.

Copies of the above despatches have been forwarded to the Governor-General of India, for his Lordship's information.

The despatches received by the Semiramis from the Persian Gulf, not showing any necessity for the Atalanta's proceeding to that quarter at present, as announced in the Government Gazette of the 28th ultimo, we have determined to await the receipt of further intelligence from the Resident before deciding on the dispatch of that steamer to Bushire.

We have, &c.

(Signed) J. Farish.

G. W. Anderson.

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No. 18.—Captain Hennell to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

(Extract.) Bushire, June 25, 1838.

I would respectfully suggest the extreme expediency, under the present very unsettled and critical posture of affairs, that the field force should be forthwith reinforced by four, or at least two, companies of Europeans, together with an additional detail of guns, artillermen, ammunition, and military stores.

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No. 19.—Captain Hennell to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

(Extract.) July 1, 1838.

I have the honor to report, for the information of the Governor in Council, the arrival at this port of the brig of war, Tigris, on the 26th; and on the 29th ultimo, that of the sloop of war, Elphinstone,
and transport, Tamerlane; which latter vessel proceeded directly over to Karrak, for the purpose of landing the troops, stores, and coals, upon that island.

On the 28th ultimo the replies from the Shiraz Government, to their communications reporting the arrival of the field force, and its location upon the island of Karrak, were received by the authorities of this place. From private information I have reason to believe, that the Prince of Fars does not contemplate any immediate movements of a hostile character; but that it is his intention to await the receipt of instructions from the Shah.

No. 20.—Captain Hennell to Lieutenant-Colonel Shirriff:
(Extract.)
(No date.)

I have the honor to acquaint you that the steamer, Hugh Lindsay, now proceeds over to Karrak, for the purpose of receiving on board a supply of coals from the Tamerlane transport, which passed this port yesterday afternoon.

As far as I can learn, no movements of a hostile character, consequent upon our occupation of the island of Karrak, are at present contemplated by the Government of Shiraz; and as the authorities here continue to exhibit the same friendly conduct as before, the service of the detachment under the command of Lieutenant Jackson, now on board the Hugh Lindsay, may be dispensed with for the present; particularly as the crews and marines of the two vessels of war, Elphinstone and Tigris, now in these roads, are available in case of necessity.

No. 21.—Captain Hennell to Lieutenant-Colonel Shirriff:

Sir,

It being advisable that the marines* of the steamer, Hugh Lindsay should remain attached to the escort of the Bushire Residency for the present, may I request the favour of your allowing that vessel to be furnished with a detail of the marine battalion from the field force under your command, to act in the place of the party which has been landed here.

I have, &c,

Lieutenant-Colonel Shirriff: (Signed) S. HENNELL.

No. 22.—The Governor in Council at Bombay to the Secret Committee.

Bombay Castle, July 14, 1838.

We have the honor to transmit to your Committee copies of despatches this day received from the Officiating Resident in the Persian Gulf, conveying the latest intelligence of affairs in that quarter.

We have, &c.
(Signed) J. FARISH.

G. W. ANDERSON.

* Viz. 1 havildar, 6 privates.
No. 23.—Captain Hennell to J. P. Willoughby, Esq.

(Extract.) 

Bushiire, August 7, 1838.

Up to the present date, with the exception of the impediments thrown in the way of the transmission of supplies to the troops at Karrak, and a few other petty annoyances, no exhibition of hostility has been made by the Governor of Bushire, or the authorities of Fars.

No. 24.—Captain Hennell to the Secret Committee.

(Extract.) 

Bushiire, August 11, 1838.

I have the honor to acquaint you, that this evening I received instructions from the Governor in Council of Bombay, by the Atalanta steamer, to apprise your Committee of the latest intelligence which might be in my possession regarding the state of affairs in Persia, and more especially at Herat.

As it is necessary that the Atalanta should be immediately dispatched to Bussorah, in order to afford her packets the slightest chance of reaching Beirut in sufficient time for the steamer which leaves that port on the 1st September, I have thought that the instructions of the Government would be carried into effect by the transmission to your Committee of copies of my last despatches to Bombay.

No. 25.—J. P. Willoughby, Esq., to Captain Hennell.

(Extract.) 

Bombay Castle, September 13, 1838.

With reference to my letter dated the 10th instant, I am directed by the Governor in Council to inform you, that it has been deemed advisable to increase the detail of artillery to be sent to Karrak, from 12 to 24 men, and to send two light six-pounders with this detachment.

I am at the same time desired to inform you that the reinforcement of troops now sent to Karrak, is chiefly intended, by having a force there of a character that will be respected, to prevent any attempt to attack it, or if, notwithstanding your representations and remonstrances, should you have the opportunity to offer them, such attempt should be made, Lieutenant-Colonel Shirreff may be enabled, with the troops under his command, and the vessels of war at the station, to maintain possession of the island.

No. 26.—J. P. Willoughby, Esq., to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.

Sir,

Bombay Castle, September 13, 1838.

With reference to my letter dated the 10th instant, I am directed by the Governor in Council to transmit to you, for submission to the Governor-General of India, an extract from the proceedings of this Government regarding an increase to the detail of artillery proceeding
to Karrak, and the instructions this day issued to the Resident at Bushire, explaining to him the object of the measure.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. P. WILLOUGHBY.

No. 27.—J. P. Willoughby, Esq., to W. H. Macnaghten, Esq.
Bombay Castle, September 27, 1838.

(Extract.)

I am directed by the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 3rd instant, relative to the sending to the Island of Karrak a reinforcement of troops, of the nature indicated by Colonel Shirriff; and, in reply, to refer you to my communications dated the 5th inst. and the 30th ult. from which the Governor-General of India will have learnt that this Government has anticipated his Lordship’s instructions.

No. 28.—Captain Hennell to the Secret Committee.
Bushire, October 26, 1838.

(Extract.)

I have now the honor to report, that from the date of my last communication until the present time, affairs in this quarter have remained perfectly tranquil, and everything has gone on in its usual routine, excepting that the exportation to Karrak of rice and wheat from this port is strictly prohibited.

The intercourse between Meerza Abbas, the Governor of Bushire, and the British Residency, continues of a polite and even friendly character. The subject of the field detachment at Karrak is never alluded to, either by the Shiraz Government, or the local authorities. To the present date no symptom of hostility has been exhibited, nor has any attempt been made to garrison the town.

The climate of the Island of Karrak has been found exceedingly salubrious by the troops located there; although exposed to the powerful heat of a Gulf summer, under canvas, they have never had more than from three to five individuals sick in the hospital, while in a space of upwards of four months not a single casualty has occurred.

No. 29.—Captain Hennell to the Secret Committee.
Bushire, October 27, 1838.

(Extract.)

I have the honor to report, for the information of your Committee, that since closing my letter in this department of yesterday’s date, I have received a communication from Lieutenant-Colonel Shirriff, the commanding officer of the force at Karrak, acquainting me with the arrival there of the merchant ship Ernaad, having on board 300 European troops, and 24 artillerymen, as a reinforcement to the field detachment located upon that island.
No. 30.—Captain Hennell to J. P. Willoughby, Esq
(Extract.)

Bushire, October 29, 1838.

The Government will have been made aware from my former communications, that Sheikh Nasir, the late Governor of Bushire, on taking flight (under the impression that Meerza Abbas, the present ruler, had been dispatched for the purpose of seizing, and sending him a prisoner to Shiraz), took refuge on that island, which has always been looked upon as the stronghold of the family.

At the period when the field detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Shirriff arrived in the Gulf, that island was in the possession of Sheikh Nasir; and with reference to the peculiar circumstances under which the force was sent up, I judged it expedient to land the troops rather as friends than as enemies, consequently, I have not hitherto interfered with the local government of the place, either by taking possession of the defences of the town and small star fort, (now occupied by the Sheikh and his few followers), or assuming any authority over the native inhabitants.

No. 31.—J. P. Willoughby, Esq., to Captain Hennell.
(Extract.)

Bombay Castle, December 5, 1838.

I am directed by the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 29th of October last, and to acquaint you that the information therein contained, regarding the island of Karrak, now occupied by the British troops, is satisfactory.

With reference to your letter, I am desired to inform you, that the necessary orders will be issued from the military department for sending the requisite supply of provisions for the troops at Karrak.

No. 32.—The Governor in Council at Bombay to the Secret Committee.

Honorable Sirs,

Bombay Castle, December 5, 1838.

We have the honor to forward, for the information of your Committee, the accompanying copy of a report from the Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated the 29th of October last, regarding the island of Karrak, now occupied by the British troops, which in our opinion, is very satisfactory.

Copy of the reply which we caused to be returned to the Resident, is herewith inclosed and we hope that our instructions to that officer, will meet your Committee’s approbation.

We have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES FARISH.
G. W. ANDERSON.
J. A. DUNLOP.
The Court of Directors of the East India Company to the Governor-General of India in Council.

September 20, 1837.

We now reply to the following letters and paragraphs, either addressed to ourselves or to the Secret Committee, and by them communicated to us:

Secret Letter from the Governor-General, dated 2nd July, 1832; paras. 1 to 190.

Secret Letter, dated 28th December (No. 27) 1832.

Secret Letter, dated 27th September, 1833 (Secretary).

Secret Letter, dated 5th March (No. 2) 1835; entire.

Secret Letter, dated 5th March (No. 3) 1835; entire.


Political Letter, dated 28th September (No. 33) 1835; paras. 182, 183, 185, 186, 188, 365, 367, and 411 to 414.

Political Letter, dated 15th February (No. 5) 1836; paras. 42 to 52, 54 to 58, 80, 81, and 247, 248.

Political Letter, dated 9th May (No. 10) 1836; paras. 65 to 70, 72, 74, 77, 78 and 82 to 93.

Political Letter, dated 25th July (No. 20) 1836; paras. 89, 104, 120, 123, 125 to 146.

Agra Secretary’s Narrative for April, 1835; para. 51.

Agra Secretary’s Narrative for July, 1835; paras. 135 to 138.

Political Letter from Bombay, dated 10th November (No. 44) 1835; paras. 3 to 11.

Political Letter from Bombay, dated 31st December (No. 62) 1835; paras. 73 to 87.

Public Letter from Bombay, dated 17th March (No. 9) 1836; para. 6.

2. These communications relate to the protracted negotiations with Runject Sing, the Nawab of Bahawulpore, and the Ameers of Sinde, for opening the navigation of the Indus; the successful issue of those negotiations; the commercial treaties concluded with those Powers; the subsequent proceedings of your Government, and its local agents, connected with the objects of those treaties; and the political state of the various countries bordering on the north-west frontier of India.

3. The papers which are before us relating to these various topics, are extremely voluminous; but the observations which they suggest do not require many words.

4. With respect to the negotiations carried on, and the treaties concluded, with the various States on the Indus, by which the important object of opening the navigation of that great channel for commercial communication has been attained, we have only to express our great satisfaction at this result, and the strong sense which we entertain of the merits of those whose exertions have contributed to its attainment. To
Captain Wade, to Lieutenant Mackeson, and especially to Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger, who had by far the greatest difficulties to encounter, high praise is due. The union of patience, temper, and firmness, by which Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger was enabled to triumph over the prejudices and jealousies of a government less favourable to commerce and civilization, and less desirous of our friendship, than perhaps any other in India, deserve the warmest commendation; and your Government has, in all its proceedings connected with the subject, evinced great judgment and discretion.

5. The moderate amount of the duties which have been fixed on the trade of the Indus, the security against disputes and delays afforded by levying those duties, not by a tariff, but in the form of a toll of so much on every boat, of whatever burthen, and whatever the nature of its cargo, and the limitation of the places where the toll is levied to three, viz. Hurreekee, Mitthum-Kote, and the mouth of the Indus, at each of which a British agent is stationed (though hitherto, except at Mitthum-Kote, not a European), are circumstances highly favourable to the success of the object which the treaties have in view; and we have little doubt that the jealousy of our designs entertained by the Ameers of Sinde will gradually abate, and that the two points which they have not yet conceded will speedily be gained, viz. permission for a survey of the Indus, and the residence of a British European officer in their territory.

6. With reference to the former of these objects, we regret that the Bombay Government should, without consulting with you, have opened a separate communication with the rulers of Sinde on the subject. The general relations with that State having been expressly reserved in your hands, the Bombay Government should not have considered itself warranted in any interference with those relations. It ought to have no concern with Sinde, except the protection of the Cutch and Guzerat frontier, and of the commerce of the Bombay Presidency, and the States connected therewith, against plunder, or other injury proceeding from that country.

7. With respect to the States west of the Indus, you have uniformly observed the proper course, which is, to have no political connection with any State or party in those regions, to take no part in their quarrels; but to maintain, so far as possible, a friendly connection with all of them, and to obtain, and transmit to us, the most correct information which can be procured, concerning all transactions of importance in that part of Asia.

8. We approve of the hospitable reception which you have given to Abdool Ghias Khan, son of the Nawab Jubbar Khan, and nephew of Ameer Dost Mahomed Khan, of Cabool, whom his father and uncle have sent to Loodeiana for education; and we approve of your having, on the return of Shah Shooja-ool-Moolk from his unsuccessful attempt
to recover his kingdom, continued to afford to him, his former asylum and stipend.

9. Since the above paragraphs were written, we have received the advices noted in the margin, from which we learn that the deputation of Captain Burns to Hyderabad (already notified to us in your previous communications) has been completely successful; that the Ameers have consented to a survey of the Indus, and to the abolition of the barbarous practice of plundering stranded vessels; and have expressed their willingness to permit the residence of a British officer in Sinde, if you would undertake to protect that country against foreign invaders. We approve of your having declined to enter into the proposed engagement; but we observe with great satisfaction, the tone of friendship and confidence which appears to be now established between the rulers of Sinde and your Government.

10. We consider Captain Burns entitled to great credit for the judgment and ability with which he performed the duties of his mission and we approve of your having raised his salary to 1,500 rupees per mensem while so engaged.

11. We regret the uncourteous conduct of Noor Mahomed Khan towards Dr. Heddle, the medical officer deputy by the Bombay Government: but we ascribe it to the fact that another medical gentleman had already been deputy by Lieutenant-Colonel Pottinger, who, as agent in Sinde, was not under the orders of the Bombay Government, and whom the Ameers considered as more especially the representative of the British Power. It is extremely desirable that our communications, with such a state as Sinde, should take place as rarely as possible through functionaries independent of one another, and especially through functionaries under the orders of two different governments.

12. It is, however, of so much importance to maintain the respect of the Sindian authorities for the Bombay Government, as well as for your own, that we should have approved of your taking some notice to the Ameers of their want of courtesy towards Dr. Heddle.
