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EXPEDITION

AGAINST THE

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ISAZAI CLANS

ON THE

HAZARA BORDER

BY A FORCE UNDER THE COMMAND OF

MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. S. A. LOCKHART, K.C.B., C.S.I.,

IN

1892.

COMPILED IN THE INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

BY

CAPTAIN A. H. MASON, D.S.O.,

LATE DEPUTY ASSISTANT QUARTER MASTER GENERAL FOR INTELLIGENCE, ISAZAI FIELD FORCE, 1892.



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
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
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India. Quartermaster-General's Dept. Intelligence Branch

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
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PREFACE.

THE following account of the operations against the Isazai clans on the Hazara border in 1892 is compiled from official sources. The present report contains the history of our dealings with these clans from the termination of the Hazara Expedition of 1891, the account of which has already been written in the Intelligence Branch.

INTELLIGENCE BRANCH,	}	A. H. M.
QUARTER MASTER GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT;		
<i>Simla, 1st April 1894.</i>		G. H. M.-M.



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EXPEDITION

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MAJOR-GENERAL SIR W. S. A. LOCKHART,
K.C.B., C.S.I.,

IN

1892.

At the end of the Hazara expedition of 1891 against the Hasanzai and Akazai
Events on the Hazara border subsequent to the expedition of 1891. clans of the Black Mountain, the *jirgas* of these tribes attended at Seri in May 1891 at the headquarters of Major-General Elles. They were followed by the *jirga* of the Mada Khel, whom it was necessary to include in the settlement, because they, with the Hasanzai and Akazai, make up the Isazai tribe, of which Hashim Ali Khan of Seri was regarded as the nominal head.

The chief conditions which these three clans then bound themselves to observe were :—

- (1) The perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan, Sikandar Khan his brother, Shekh Ata Muhammad his uncle, and Turabaz Khan, son of Shekh Ata Muhammad. If they or any of them came into their power, the clans undertook to arrest and make them or him over to the British Government.
- (2) Protection and preservation of roads made in their territory.
- (3) Obligation to accompany and escort officials marching on the border, and, on due notice being given, to escort and protect servants of Government travelling in their country.
- (4) Prohibition of any future settlement of the Hindustani fanatics within their limits.
- (5) Responsibility for offences by their clansmen in British territory; protection of British subjects in their country; and an undertaking to refer to the Deputy Commissioner all claims against British subjects, and not to seize such persons or their property in satisfaction of such claims in foreign territory.

The Hazara Field Force was broken up in June 1891, but a brigade was left at Seri in the Hasanzai country and at Nimal on the crest of the Black Mountain until November in order to maintain quiet and ensure the banishment of Hashim Ali Khan. Meanwhile the three clans had formally elected as their chief Ibrahim Khan, the rival and cousin of Hashim Ali Khan.

With a view to increase our control over the clans on this border, to assist in the maintenance of peace, and to secure the continued expulsion of Hashim Ali Khan, the levy of a small force of 200 Border Police, to be recruited from the independent clans and posted at suitable places on the frontier, was sanctioned.

The Swatis of Nandihar, Tikari, Deshi, and the Pariari Saiads accepted service in this force freely enough. The Hasanzai and Akazai at first refused the offer of allowances and of service, but finally agreed in order to shorten the occupation of their hills by our troops. In April 1892 there were 43 Hasanzais and 28 Akazais in the force; but these clans had not so far shown themselves eager or ready to enlist.

Hashim Ali Khan, the refugee chief of the Hasanzais, subsequent to the expedition of 1891, lived for the most part among the Makki Khel, a Chagarzai section on the confines of Buner. He, however, made incessant appeals to the clans around to aid him in an attack on Seri. The Nasrat Khel and Basi Khel sections of the Chagarzai, who are nearest to us, steadily refused to join, but he still had many friends among his own people.

After the withdrawal of the troops in November 1891, a petty raid was made by some personal retainers and old servants of Hashim Ali, who carried off a few head of cattle from a solitary cowshed high up the Black Mountain, just within the confines of Agror.

At the end of March 1892 Hashim Ali visited Baio, and later on his supporters and sympathisers among the trans-Indus Hasanzais and Mada Khels agreed to his family settling at Baio and Doba. (Baio is a Hasanzai and Doba a Mada Khel village). On the 8th April he brought his family to Baio, escorted by a following of Makki Khel and Sundar Khel sections of the trans-Indus Chagarzai, who live on the slopes of the Duma range, and here his supporters built him a house.

Return of Hashim Ali Khan to Isazai territory in contravention of agreement entered into with the clans at Seri in 1891.

An accident, which had no connection with Hashim Ali Khan, served to increase the excitement and add to his following. Shortly before this a quarrel occurred between two factions in Palosi, and the party which gained the ascendancy expelled the other from the mosque. Ibrahim Khan in the meanwhile had gone down to the river to hold a *jirga* of the cis-Indus sections to take steps against Hashim Ali's intended return. The defeated party in Palosi, finding him in the neighbourhood with a gathering, invited him over to turn the tables on their enemies. They in their turn sent for Hashim Ali Khan, who came down to Nawekili; but neither he nor Ibrahim Khan were strong enough to cross and try conclusions with the other. While the situation lasted, the excitement naturally increased. Hashim Ali Khan's allies brought a few flags, and some *mullas* began to collect; but in the end both sides were induced to retire simultaneously.

In allowing Hashim Ali to return to Baio, the Hasanzais and Mada Khels were guilty of a breach of the agreement to which they had subscribed at Seri in 1891.

The most active partisans of Hashim Ali Khan appear to have been the Kotwal Hasanzai of Nawekili, the Lukman Khel of Palosi, and the Mada Khel

of Manja Kot ; but there can be no question that the other sections concurred, and that the whole of the sections tacitly consented and were culpably negligent.

In consequence of their failure to keep their engagements, the Hasanzais and Akazais were warned that, if they were unable or unwilling to keep Hashim Ali out, we must occupy their territory. At the same time the Mada Khels were threatened with punishment if they did not withdraw all countenance and support from Hashim Ali Khan ; and the Nawab of Amb was warned that he would be held responsible if trouble arose which exertions on his part might prevent.

These orders to the clans were notified to them in writing, and were repeated to the *jirgas* of the cis-Indus Hasanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel when they came into Oghi on the 22nd and 23rd April.

In the opinion of the Deputy Commissioner, the Mada Khels were equally, if not more, guilty than the Hasanzais in allowing Hashim Ali to return, as the latter would never have committed themselves had they not known the Mada Khels were with them. Hashim Ali Khan spent several days among the Mada Khels at Karor, at Manja Kot, Sonia, and other villages, and was attended by many of their principal *maliks*.

To give substance to the threats made to the clans, a wing of the 2-5th Gurkhas was moved to Oghi on the 15th April, and on the 29th of the same month this wing was reinforced by the remaining wing of that regiment, together with the 1-5th Gurkhas and No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.

As a result of the visit of the *jirgas* to Oghi above referred to, the tribes entered into a sworn compact among themselves to expel Hashim Ali Khan ; but this led to no result, and he continued to reside in Baio with his family, while his relatives were granted an asylum in Doba, which is near Baio.

On the 6th June sanction was given by the Government of India to the blockade of the Mada Khel, the establishment of a police post at Darband, and to the Nawab of Amb being informed that, unless his influence with the Black Mountain tribes was exercised on the side of law and order, the question of his removal, temporarily or permanently, would have to be considered. In the meantime endeavours were to be made to bring about the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan, and with this object in view, if he or any one else on his behalf asked for terms, authority was given to offer a suitable allowance for his maintenance and that of his family in British territory.

On the 11th June, the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, reported that Hashim Ali, his brother, cousin, and whole family had cleared out of Baio, the three first named having gone to the Makki Khel Chagarzais, while their women and families had obtained an asylum among the Sundar Khels. News was, however, received shortly afterwards that Hashim Ali Khan had returned to Baio.

On the 4th August the Government of India addressed the Punjab Government regarding the future action to be taken with regard to affairs on the Black Mountain. The following is an extract from this letter :—

“ I am to observe that as the time is approaching when any expedition to be sent into the Isazai country this autumn will have to start, the Government of India think that if the local authorities should be unsuccessful in procuring Hashim Ali Khan's surrender before

the end of August, a special officer might with advantage be sent to carry on the negotiations. It seems just possible that the deputation of such an officer, particularly if it were known that he was armed with special instructions from the Government of India, and that his arrival was likely to be followed in the course of a few days by that of a British force, might tend to bring about a successful issue."

In reply, the Punjab Government suggested that, if the Government of India decided to adopt this course, it would be advisable that the special officer should be appointed at once without waiting till the end of August.

The Government of India, having concurred in this view, informed the Punjab Government on the 13th August that His Excellency the Viceroy had been pleased to select for this duty Major-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I., commanding the Punjab Frontier Force.

The following instructions were given to General Lockhart for his guidance in the conduct of these negotiations :—

- Major-General Sir William Lockhart appointed to try and secure the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan.
- (a) The three Isazai clans—Hasanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel—are bound by the engagements they entered into last year to perpetually exclude and banish Hashim Ali and his family from their country, and to surrender them to the British Government should they come into the power of the said clans. Hashim Ali is now at Baio within Isazai territory, and he has been in other Isazai villages. The clans have therefore broken their engagements. You are authorised to inform them that unless Hashim Ali is surrendered to the British authorities within one month from the receipt of the notice which you should give them, they will be punished. You should, however, if possible, arrange to reassure Ibrahim Khan and the friendly section of the tribe as to your intentions towards them.
- (b) As regards Hashim Ali personally, the question is separate. You may promise him a suitable allowance for the maintenance of himself and his family in British territory, and you should consult the Punjab Government as to the amount of the allowance.* If a question is raised as to how long Hashim Ali is likely to be detained in British territory, you should reply that the length of his detention is a matter absolutely in the discretion of the British Government, but that it will depend on the way he behaves himself, and on the state of the border during the next few years. You are also authorised to give a liberal reward, the amount of which is left to your discretion, to any one who succeeds in inducing Hashim Ali to surrender, or who brings him alive within British jurisdiction.
- (c) In all negotiations you should deal as a rule with the tribal *jirga*, but Hashim Ali must be distinctly informed through the *jirga*, or otherwise at your discretion, of the terms upon which his surrender will be accepted by the Government of India. Some evidence pointing to the possibility that Hashim Ali may be less unwilling to surrender to the military than to the civil authorities has been laid before the Government of India. As to this you will no doubt

* This was subsequently fixed at Rs. 300 a month.

take care to avoid any action calculated to suggest to Hashim Ali the idea that he will obtain more just treatment or more favourable terms from the military than from the civil authorities. The Governor-General in Council is of opinion that if Hashim Ali should evince a disposition to surrender at one place in preference to another, or to one official in preference to another, be they soldiers or civilians, no obstacle should be thrown in his way.

- (d) Your position in regard to correspondence with the Government of India will be the same as if you were in command of a force in the field; but you will understand that the object of the Government of India in deputing you to this duty is to exhaust every means at their disposal of effecting a peaceful solution before sanctioning further punitive measures.

On the receipt of these instructions, General Lockhart at once proceeded to

Subadar-Major Wali Khan, 2nd Punjab Infantry, despatched to Baio.

Oghi. For the duty of carrying communications to Hashim Ali Khan at Baio, General Lockhart selected an old and tried Pathan native officer, Subadar-Major Wali Khan, of the 2nd Punjab Infantry. He left Haripur on the 23rd August, and reached Baio in forty-eight hours. During the next three days, *viz.*, the 26th, 27th, and 28th, the Subadar-Major had several interviews with Hashim Ali Khan and his principal advisers, and also met a full *jirga* of the tribe. General Lockhart subsequently received ample testimony from the people themselves as to the fearless and earnest manner in which he had explained the situation to all concerned, and had exhorted them to submit to the conditions offered.

On the 29th August, Subadar-Major Wali Khan returned to Oghi with replies from Hashim Ali Khan and from the representatives of the Isazai clans. The former declined the terms in an offensive tone, while the latter professed their willingness to accept them, but declared their inability to do so on the ground that they could not coerce their own chief. The Subadar-Major attributed the attitude of Hashim Ali Khan to a *mulla* by name Saiad Imran, and by race a Dalazak. He also attributed Hashim Ali Khan's insolent letter to the same person, by whom, indeed, it was written.

On the same day (29th August) two Akazai headmen arrived in General Lockhart's camp, and reported that certain British subjects in the Agror valley, whose names they gave, were exerting themselves to frustrate the negotiations.

On the 30th August, Sir William Lockhart despatched the following telegram to the Foreign Department:—"Wali Khan returned last night from Baio. Hashim Ali Khan declines terms, and told him he preferred going to Kabul. The Isazai would willingly comply with my demand, but are helpless from their position as neighbours of Buner. Every endeavour has been made to bring about a peaceful arrangement, and every influence possible brought to bear on Hashim, but all has been frustrated by his advisers, among whom Wali Khan strongly suspects agents from Amb. I much regret this failure, and now advise that Baio be destroyed as soon as troops can safely move to Darband.* Four thousand men with either eighteen or twenty-four

Terms declined by Hashim Ali Khan.

Destruction of Baio recommended by General Lockhart.

* Some cases of cholera had recently been reported from Darband.

guns would be ample. The more men from Buner and elsewhere assemble to oppose us the better, and the greater the example.

* * * * *

Operations would be very short, and but little carriage would be required beyond Darband, except for ammunition and water."

On the 2nd September, Hashim Ali Khan sent for his father-in-law, Zaman Khan of Bagrian, a village in Agror, and begged him to go to him at once and advise him what to do. On the 4th September the Hasanzai sent messengers to ask to be allowed to send in a *jirga*. General Lockhart replied that he would be glad to receive such a deputation, but that he could hold out no hope of any alteration in the terms that had been made known to them. On the 6th September a submissive letter was received from Hashim Ali Khan, and in reply he was informed that he already knew the terms, and that there was nothing to add to them. On the 7th September, Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy, commanding the 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkhas, an officer with whom the tribes had become acquainted, and in whom they reposed confidence, received two letters, one from Hashim Ali Khan himself, and the other from the Isazai representatives. The first letter stated that mischievous persons in British territory were striving to prevent tribal *jirgas* from visiting General Lockhart, and the other letter told the same story, and added that the obstructionists were people of Tikari and Tanawal (Amb) as well as people of Agror. The bearer of these letters declared that Hashim Ali Khan was afraid to give himself up, because emissaries from various quarters had frightened him into the belief that, if he surrendered himself, the British Government would assuredly break faith with him and hang him, their plausible proclamations notwithstanding.

On the 9th September, General Lockhart again sent Subadar-Major Wali Khan with a letter to Baio reminding Hashim Ali Khan and the Isazai that half of their days of grace had expired. The Subadar-Major's account of this journey is given in Appendix I. On the 15th he returned bringing with him large deputations from the Mada Khel and Hasanzai clans. These deputations were received by General Lockhart on the 16th. They said that they were most anxious to bring about the surrender of their chief, but that all their endeavours were thwarted by certain individuals. Among the Hasanzai representatives was one Jahandad, headman of Shingri, who was known to be intriguing to prevent Hashim Ali Khan submitting. General Lockhart taxed him with this before the assemblage, and promised him that, in the event of the negotiations failing, he should be dealt with in the first place.

On the 21st September, some Hasanzai headmen arrived in camp, and begged for an extension of the day of grace on the plea that Hashim Ali Khan had not had sufficient time to arrange his family affairs before giving himself up. They were told that this was impossible. Before departing these headmen assured General Lockhart that if he would send Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy to Pabal Gali on the crest of the Black Mountain on the 25th, they would bring Hashim Ali Khan to meet him. Colonel Molloy having offered his services for this duty, General Lockhart agreed to their request.

On the 22nd a deputation from the Mada Khel clan appeared and asked for a two days' further extension for Hashim Ali Khan, which was refused. On the

23rd the Nawab of Amb begged for an interview, which General Lockhart declined, but sent a message to the effect that he might visit him at Darband when he assumed command of the field force.

On the 25th September, Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy met Hashim Ali Khan at the place agreed on, and did all he could to induce him to accept the terms of Government, pointing out the advantages to himself of surrendering, and assuring him that he incurred no danger by so doing. Hashim Ali Khan endeavoured to temporise, but wore throughout the interview an expression of utter apathy, referring each point to the men about him, and answering only through a spokesman. Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy impressed upon all present that, unless his overtures were accepted, the result must be ruinous to the tribe generally. Finding persuasion and threats alike unavailing, Colonel Molloy returned to camp.

Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy meets Hashim Ali Khan at Pabal Gali on 25th September.

Altogether the meeting lasted three hours. Colonel Molloy reported that the followers of Hashim Ali Khan seemed distressed at his refusal to surrender and at the prospect of punishment. One of the conditions of the interview was that each party should only take ten men. Hashim Ali broke this agreement by bringing at least 300 men, and a larger number in his immediate rear.

All efforts having failed, General Lockhart ordered to inflict punishment on the clans who had broken their engagements.

On the 27th September, Sir William Lockhart received the following telegram from the Secretary to Government in the Foreign Department:—

"Your attempt to secure the surrender of Hashim Ali Khan having proved unsuccessful, you will now proceed to inflict upon the tribesmen, who bound themselves by engagements entered into last year to exclude Hashim Ali Khan and his family from their country, and who broke these engagements by harbouring him in their villages, the punishment which they were told would be inflicted upon them in the event of Hashim Ali refusing to surrender himself to the British authorities.

"The punishment thus inflicted should be carefully confined to the villages of those tribesmen who are known beyond all doubt to have harboured Hashim Ali during the last few months.

"You should make it known that you have no quarrel with any other sections of the tribesmen, and that you will avoid molesting them except in the event of their interfering with your operations.

"Should you be attacked by other bodies of tribesmen, it will be necessary for you to disperse them, and they will be themselves responsible for any loss which they may sustain; but the Government of India has no quarrel with the Buners or other adjacent tribes, and has no wish to be drawn into such a quarrel.

"Your operations should be completed with as much rapidity as is consistent with the objects above described, and the punishment of the offending tribes should be sufficient to deter them from a further breach of their engagements to us."

In the meantime the following scheme had been drawn up at Army Headquarters for the proposed operations in the trans-Indus Isazai territory:—

Scheme for the proposed expedition.

1. *Formation.*—The force, which will be styled the "Isazai Field Force," will consist of the following troops:—

Cavalry	2 squadrons, native.
Royal Artillery	4 mountain batteries (3 British and 1 native).
Sappers and Miners	2 companies.
Infantry	{	2 battalions, British.
			5	" native.

2. *Concentration.*—Concentration to take place by the 1st October at Darband.

3. *General object.*—To punish certain villages of the trans-Indus Isazai clans who have harboured Hashim Ali Khan of Seri in contravention of their agreement entered into at Seri in May 1891.

4. *Details of commands, staff, &c.*

5. *Clothing.*—Summer scale for all troops and followers.

6. *Ammunition*—

Ammunition per man	{ 70 rounds in pouch.
		...	{ 30 „ on mules with corps.
		...	{ 100 „ at base.
		...	—
Total	200 „ in regimental charge.
		...	—

Artillery reserve ammunition in full.

7. *Kits, &c.*—As far as Darband, these will be on the scale laid down in the "Field Service Equipment Tables." Beyond Darband this scale may be reduced at the discretion of the General Officer Commanding as he may consider necessary.

8. *Engineer and Ordnance stores.*—The Director-General of Ordnance will authorize the issue of any engineer or ordnance stores from the Rawal Pindi Arsenal on the requisition of the General Officer Commanding the force.

9. *Supplies.*—Five days' supplies and two days' grain will accompany the force beyond Darband. Including the above, thirty days' supplies will be collected at Darband for the troops concentrating there, and these will be in position by the 1st October. All ration supplies to be free issues at and beyond Darband.

10. *Transport.*—Corps will rendezvous on the field service scale. Only the regulation number of followers will be permitted. Obligatory mule and normal camel transport will be provided. The General Officer Commanding will arrange with the Punjab Government for the collection locally of such boats as may be required.

11. *Medical.*—Corps will be supplied with full marching scale of establishment and equipment; also ambulance transport and camp equipment.

Field hospitals will not be provided.

12. *Veterinary.*—A field veterinary hospital fully equipped will accompany the force.

13. *Communications.*—A telegraph line will be erected from Haripur to Darband, and heliographic communication will be arranged for by the General Officer Commanding from regimental equipment, supplemented, if necessary, by the ordnance department.

14. *Post Office.*—Temporary field post offices will be established at Haripur and Darband under arrangements made by the Director-General of the Post Office of India.

15. *Maps.*—Maps will be issued to all officers with the force.

This scheme was approved by the Government of India, and the following Government General Order sanctioning the despatch of the force and giving details of its composition. General Order by the Governor-General in Council (No. 932, dated Simla, the 30th September 1892) was published:—

“The Governor-General in Council has been pleased to sanction the despatch of a force, as detailed below, for operations in the trans-Indus Isazai country. The force will be designated the “Isazai Field Force,” and will concentrate at Darband by the 1st October:—

1st Brigade of Infantry.

1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment.
25th Bengal Infantry.
4th Sikh Infantry.

2nd Brigade of Infantry.

1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps.
1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.

Divisional Troops.

11th Bengal Lancers (two squadrons).
Nos. 4 and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners.
30th Bengal Infantry.
No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery,
No. 8 " " " "
No. 9 " " " "
No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery.

2. The following officers are detailed for the staff of the force, and their appointments will have effect from the dates on which they respectively enter upon the duties thereof:—

To command the force	Major-General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I.
Aide-de-Camp	Lieutenant R. H. M. Currie, 2nd Sikh Infantry.
Orderly Officer	Lieutenant G. P. Brasier-Creagh, 9th Bengal Lancers.
Assistant Adjutant General	Brevet-Major A. R. Martin, 1st Batta- lion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General	Captain R. F. Gartside-Tipping, 1st Bengal Cavalry.
Deputy Assistant Quarter Master Gen- eral for Intelligence.	...	}	Captain A. H. Mason, D.S.O., Royal Engineers.
Commanding Royal Artillery	Lieutenant-Colonel J. Keith, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.
Adjutant of Royal Artillery	Captain G. C. Dowell, Royal Artillery.
Commanding Engineer	Major M. C. Barton, Royal Engineers.
Superintendent of Army Signalling	Captain A. E. Jones, 23rd Bengal Infan- try.
Assistant Superintendent of Army Sig- nalling.	Lieutenant R. A. Browne, 2nd Battalion, Border Regiment.

Principal Medical Officer	Surgeon-Colonel R. Harvey, M.D., D.S.O., Indian Medical Service.
Chief Commissariat Officer	Captain H. M. P. Hawkes, Staff Corps.
Divisional Transport Officer	...	Captain W. H. Allen, Staff Corps.
Survey Officer	Captain R. A. Wahab, Royal Engineers.
Veterinary Officer	Veterinary-Captain J. Cooper, Army Veterinary Department.

1st Brigade of Infantry.

To command	Brigadier-General G. T. Pretyman, Royal Artillery.
Brigade-Major	Captain B. Duff, 9th Bengal Infantry.
Orderly Officer	...	Captain V. J. Garland, Leinster Regi- ment.

2nd Brigade of Infantry.

To command	Colonel A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., Staff Corps (with the tempo- rary rank of Brigadier-General).
Brigade-Major	Captain W. G. Hamilton, East Lanca- shire Regiment.
Orderly Officer	Captain R. G. Egerton, Corps of Guides (The Queen's Own).

3. All subsidiary orders regarding the equipment, transport, provisioning, etc., of the force will be issued under the instructions of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief."

The General Officer Commanding the field force was invested with complete political authority. Mr. R. Udny, the Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, accompanied the force as Chief Political Officer.

In view of the possibility of the negotiations being unsuccessful, arrangements had been made for bringing up boats and bridging materials from Attock, and the pontoon section of the Bengal Sappers and Miners was ordered to that place from Roorkee. The boats started from Attock on the 12th September under the personal directions of Major Barton, the Commanding Royal Engineer, and after a difficult passage reached Darband on the 23rd September without the loss of a single boat.

On the 20th September, the Director General of Telegraphs reported that a field telegraph line, 28 miles in length, had been constructed from Haripur to Darband, and a field telegraph office had been opened at the latter place on the 19th.

Commissariat and other stores had also been ordered to be collected at Darband, and the first detachment arrived there on the 23rd September.

On the 28th September, Major-General Lockhart moved his head-quarters from Oghi to Darband. On the previous evening he had sent orders to Brigadier-General Pretyman to move from Darband with a small force that night and to surround the Hasanzai village of Shingri, eight miles north of Darband, in order to secure the headman Jahandad, who, as mentioned above

The village of Shingri surprised on the 28th September and the headman seized.

(see page 6), had been warned by General Lockhart of the punishment he might expect. Brigadier-General Pretzman marched from Darband at 12-30 A.M. with the troops as per margin, and succeeded in surprising the village at daybreak and seizing Jahandad without meeting with any opposition. The prisoner was sent under escort to Rawal Pindi, there to wait the orders of Government.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery
(two guns).
1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment.
No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers
and Miners.
4th Sikh Infantry.

On the 1st October, the concentration of the field force was completed the arrival at Darband of the 1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifles, and the 2-5th Gurkha Rifles. On the morning of this date the disposition of the force was as follows:—Nos. 4 and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners, and a wing of the 4th Sikh Infantry at Shingri to protect and assist in getting the boats up the Indus; one company of the 30th Bengal Infantry at Oghi, and another company under orders for the same place. The remainder of the force was in camp at Darband. For the detailed disposition of the force on the morning of this date, see Appendix II.

On the 1st Major-General Lockhart proceeded to the village of Chamb on the heights above the left bank of the Indus in Amb territory, whence a good view of Baio and the approaches to it were obtained.

During the day the head-quarters and a wing of both the 4th Sikh Infantry and 30th Bengal Infantry marched from Darband to Towara. The two companies of Sappers and Miners and the other wing of the 4th Sikh Infantry moved up with the boats from Shingri to Towara, and in the evening the boats arrived off that place.

A party of signallers during the day were sent to Pailam, and communication was opened between Towara and Darband.

On the night of the 30th September and on the 1st October five cases of cholera occurred in camp at Darband among the troops. Two of these terminated fatally in a few hours. Owing to the presence of cholera, strict orders had previously been issued regarding the sanitation of camps and bivouacs (*vide* Appendix III).

The following orders were issued on the 1st October for the advance of the force to Towara:—The 1st Brigade to march on the following day from Darband to Towara. No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, was attached to this brigade. The 2nd Brigade, to which was attached No. 9 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, as well as the divisional troops remaining at Darband, to march to Towara on the 3rd October, leaving behind for the protection of the camp two companies of the 30th Bengal Infantry and 50 men of the 11th Bengal Lancers. For the troops proceeding to Towara the following scale was ordered:—Officers' tents and baggage at the discretion of General Officers Commanding; tents for men at full field service scale; baggage for men, half kits; ammunition, 30 rounds per man in pouch, 20 in first reserve, and 20 in second reserve, both reserves being carried on mules. Five days' rations for men and two days' grain for animals were ordered to be taken. The above scale only to apply as far as Towara. A field post office was ordered to accompany the troops, and an extension of the telegraph line from Darband to Bela, about 6 miles, was also ordered.

Orders issued for the advance.

In accordance with the above orders, the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Pretyman marched on the morning of the 2nd October to Towara. On this date six more cases of cholera were reported in the camp at Darband.

On the 3rd October, the head-quarters with the divisional troops and also the 2nd Brigade under Brigadier-General Hammond moved from Darband to Towara. By noon on this date the bridge-of-boats across the Indus at the site of the Marer ferry was completed.

Bridge-of-boats completed opposite Marer on the 3rd October.

A reconnaissance party consisting of the 25th Bengal Infantry, and accompanied by the Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, crossed the river for the purpose of reconnoitring the roads and paths leading towards Baio. The party proceeded *viâ* Garhi to Palosi, and then ascended to Diliasa *viâ* Ariana. From here a small party pushed on as far as Wale. The road or rather path from Palosi was found to be very bad and narrow. No enemy was seen, and all the villages were found deserted. The party returned to camp *viâ* Doshkand and Nadrai quite exhausted from the great heat and the want of water. It was reported that it would take two days to make the road up to Wale *viâ* Palosi practicable for laden mules. In consequence of this report, Lieutenant Coldstream, R.E., who was in charge of the Haripur-Darband road, was ordered to proceed at once to Towara, bringing with him all available coolies to assist the two companies of Sappers and Miners in making roads. The 1st Brigade was ordered to move from Towara to Palosi (about 4 miles), and to furnish covering parties for the Sappers and Miners working on the road towards Baio.

Reconnaissance *viâ* Palosi to Wale on the 3rd October.

Two more cases of cholera were reported, and two deaths occurred among those previously attacked.

On the 4th October the 1st Brigade and the two companies of Sappers and Miners moved to Palosi, and the latter were employed during the day in improving the track between Palosi and Diliasa.


The Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, with an escort of two companies of the 1-5th Gurkhas, reconnoitred *viâ* Karor to Manja Kot. Karor was found deserted. On approaching Manja Kot, the inhabitants were seen leaving the village, but some of them returned on being called back. The party returned by different paths to that followed in the morning. The best of these was found to be *viâ* Doshkand and Karor to Manja Kot. This was practicable for infantry, but without the expenditure of some labour would have been impassable for laden mules. Water was found at Karor and Manja Kot, but in no great quantity, though sufficient for a brigade without animals. No opposition was met with.

Reconnaissance to Karor and Manja Kot on the 4th October.

The telegraph line was completed from Darband to Towara on this day, and an office was opened at the latter place.

Two deaths were reported from cholera at Darband (both in British corps), and five fresh cases occurred at Towara.

The following orders were issued on the evening of the 4th October:—The 2nd Brigade to march on the 5th to Manja Kot, taking one day's cooked rations, 50 rounds of ammunition, and full complement of *dandis* and great-coats. The tents



REFERENCE.

Routes followed by 1st and 2nd Brigades
 Ianni Field Force in the advance to Baio
 on the 6th October 1932.

VIEW OF BAIO, LOOKING WEST FROM KNOLL NEAR DILIASIA.

Copied from a sketch by Captain F. C. GAZEN,
Northumberland Fusiliers

of this brigade to be left standing at Towara. The head-quarters and the whole of the artillery and the Maxim gun* to move to Palosi on the same date.

2nd Brigade concentrated at Manja Kot and 1st Brigade and divisional troops at Wale on the evening of the 5th October.

On the 5th the above movements were carried out, the 2nd Brigade arriving at Manja Kot at 11-30 A.M., having started at 6 A.M.

Lieutenant Coldstream with 100 coolies arrived at Palosi on the morning of the 5th, and proceeded to Diliasa for work on the road beyond there towards Wale under the orders of the Commanding Royal Engineer.

Two deaths and six fresh cases of cholera were reported.

The road from Palosi to Wale was reported to be fit for mules at 3-30 P.M. on this date. The following orders were accordingly issued for the advance on Baio during the night of the 5th and for the attack on the morning of the 6th. The 1st Brigade and the divisional troops to advance from Palosi to Wale in three parties, starting respectively at 4, 6, and 8 P.M. The men to carry 50 rounds of ammunition, great-coats, and one day's cooked rations. Batteries to take two mules per gun with ammunition, and to take grain for one day on the ordnance mules. Regiments and batteries to take *pakhals*, *dandis*, and stretchers only. The divisional head-quarters to accompany the third party. Camps to be left standing under a guard at Palosi. One day's rations to be left ready in camp to be sent up, if required, to the troops; also a blanket and waterproof sheet per man. This movement was duly carried out, and by 10-30 P.M. the troops were assembled at Wale.

At daybreak on the 6th October the divisional artillery moved into position on the ridge in front of Wale within range of Baio, and the advance of the two brigades—the 1st from Wale and the 2nd from Manja Kot—was then carried out (see accompanying sketch). The crest was reached almost at the same time on the right and left by the advanced parties of each brigade at 7-30 A.M. No opposition was offered to the advance, and on approaching Baio the place was found to be deserted. The towers and defences were destroyed, the former being blown up. As there was no resistance, only a small portion of the force was taken to Baio itself, the remainder of both columns being halted below the crest.

The advance was carried out in a steady manner by both brigades. The paths were very difficult, especially for the 2nd Brigade, owing to the steepness of the ascent. From Palosi to Baio *via* Wale the distance was about five miles, and during the day some mules of the Sappers and Miners were able to reach Baio by the road which had been made by the sappers.

Before the demolition of the Baio defences was carried out, the troops which had not reached the crest were ordered to retire—those of the 1st Brigade and the divisional troops to Palosi, and those of the 2nd Brigade to Manja Kot. On the demolitions being completed, the whole of the troops were withdrawn. The 2nd Brigade before retiring destroyed the village of Doba. This brigade was ordered to march back to Towara on the following day (the 7th) after carrying out certain demolitions in the villages of Manja Kot and Karor in accordance with the suggestions of the Chief Political Officer.

* This gun had been sent up from Bombay in charge of a small party of the Yorkshire Light Infantry, and had arrived at Darband on the 3rd October.

During the 5th and 6th there were five deaths from cholera in the force and eight fresh cases.

On the 6th the General Officer Commanding despatched a telegram to Army Head-Quarters, which, after reporting the destruction of Baio, continued :—
 “The objects of the expedition have now been accomplished—that is to say, the sections of the Isazai which have harboured Hashim Ali Khan have been as severely punished as their own absence from their villages admitted of. It would have, of course, been more satisfactory had they offered resistance and suffered loss. Unless Government has any further work in this region for the Isazai Field Force, I recommend that the latter be broken up as soon as possible, and regiments and batteries sent to the destination which the Quarter Master General may prescribe. The whole force is slightly tainted with cholera, which was, I believe, picked up at Darband, and I will arrange to halt troops either on the river, or further side of that place, when I break up the force, according to the destination of the several units.”

It had been suggested by Mr. Udny, in order to enforce the joint responsibility of all three sections of the Isazai tribe who had entered into the engagement for the perpetual banishment of Hashim Ali Khan or to surrender him if he returned to Isazai limits, that some punishment should be inflicted on the Akazai tribe. The Government of India, however, were averse to extending the scope of the operations, and, as the Akazai had not harboured Hashim Ali Khan, it was considered undesirable to delay the breaking up of the force by destroying Bimbal and Bilianai as proposed by Mr. Udny. These villages had, moreover, been punished by the force under Major-General Elles during the 1891 expedition.

On the 7th October, the 2nd Brigade marched from Manja Kot to Towara, having carried out the demolitions ordered. The 1st Brigade remained halted at Palosi.

On this date four deaths from cholera were reported and five fresh cases.

On the 8th October, the 2nd Brigade moved from Towara to fresh ground, situated about two miles north of Darband. The 1st Brigade remained halted.

On the recommendation of the Chief Political Officer the defences of the villages of Garhi and Nawekili were destroyed by the two companies of Sappers and Miners, aided by two companies of the 25th Bengal Infantry.

There were four deaths and two fresh cases of cholera.

Orders were received on this date from the Quarter Master General in India for the force to be broken up.

On the 9th October, the Major-General Commanding with head-quarter staff, the four batteries of artillery, one company of the 4th Sikhs, and two squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers moved from Palosi to Darband.

There was only one death reported from cholera on this date.

On the 10th, the 1st Brigade under Brigadier-General Pretyman marched from Palosi to Darband. The two companies of Sappers marched from Palosi to Towara after having completed the demolition of the defences of the former place. The dismantling of the bridge-of-boats at Marer was commenced, and the field telegraph office at

Force broken up on the 10th October.

Towara was closed. On this date the following Field Force Order was published :—
 “Under the orders of Government, the Isazai Field Force ceases to exist from this day. The Major-General Commanding thanks all ranks for their work during the operations, which he regrets were not of a more stirring nature. He wishes every one of his comrades in the field force better luck next time.” The return of the troops to India commenced on this date.

Two deaths from cholera were reported.

On the 11th the whole of the troops had returned to Darband, and the boats passed that place *en route* for Attock. One death and two fresh cases of cholera were reported.

On the 12th Major-General Sir William Lockhart and staff left Darband, and by the 13th October the breaking up of the force was completed.

The General Officer Commanding, in submitting his report to the Adjutant General in India on the operations of the Isazai Field Force (see Appendix IV), specially brought to notice the services of—

Notice of officers.

Major M. C. Barton, Commanding Royal Engineer; Surgeon-Colonel R. Harvey, D.S.O., Principal Medical Officer; Captain A. H. Mason, D.S.O., Deputy Assistant Quarter Master General for Intelligence, and Subadar-Major Wali Khan, 2nd Punjab Infantry.

The Secretary to the Government of India in the Military Department, in acknowledging the receipt of this report from the Adjutant General in India, stated that “the Governor-General in Council concurs with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in thinking that great credit is due to Sir William Lockhart for his excellent conduct of the operations of the force. I am also to convey an expression of the appreciation of the Governor-General in Council of the good service rendered by the officers who have been brought to notice in the report, and of the soldierly spirit displayed by all ranks.”

Government letter expressing approval of the conduct of the operations.

In his report to the Foreign Department, Sir William Lockhart acknowledged the valuable services of :—

Mr. R. Udny, C.S., Commissioner and Superintendent, Peshawar Division, “a most able coadjutor and adviser.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy, 2-5th Gurkha Rifles, who “performed a dangerous duty with much resolution and ability when he met Hashim Ali Khan and his armed supporters at Pabal Gali on the 25th September;” and he again mentioned Subadar-Major Wali Khan, 2nd Punjab Infantry, who “displayed great courage and devotion in his two journeys to Baio, and did all that man could do to accomplish the wishes of Government.”

Reports on the Engineering and Signalling operations will be found in Appendices V and VI respectively. Extracts from the reports on the working of the Medical and of the Commissariat and Transport Departments (Appendices VII and VIII) and a report on the Survey operations (Appendix IX) are also given, as well as reports on the working of the Field Veterinary Hospital (Appendix X) and reports on the Telegraph and Postal operations (Appendices XI and XII).

With regard to the results of the expedition, Hashim Ali Khan, who fled to Buner before the troops advanced, has not since ventured back to Isazai limits; and his overtures to obtain assistance from Bunerwals, Chagarzai, and his own clansmen to restore him to Baio have so far not met with success.

Results of the expedition.

Full deputations of the Hasanzai, Akazai, and Mada Khel clans, including all Hashim Ali's supporters of any note, save one absent from illness, waited upon the Deputy Commissioner at Oghi at the end of March 1893. They appeared to have accepted the lesson of the Isazai expedition, and to be unwilling to give any encouragement to Hashim Ali which might render them liable to punishment again.

Since then up to the present time (April 1894) affairs have remained quiet among the Isazai clans on both sides of the river. Hashim Ali Khan has been working to remake a faction that will connive at his return to tribal territory trans-Indus in the hope that he may be in a better position to oppose his rival Ibrahim Khan and to get back to Seri, but he has met with little success.

He, however, succeeded in getting his partisans to carry off for him some of the produce of the lands of Baio. Formerly Baio was part of the lot of the Khan Khel who gave it in exchange for Ashkot near Seri. Having lost his lands about Seri, Hashim Ali Khan found it convenient to demand the restoration of the Baio lands; but his demand now appears less likely than ever to meet with favour.

A natural preference for independence, though coupled with poverty, and the knowledge that submission will destroy any remaining shred of reputation and break up his party for good, deter him from the thought of surrender to Government; and he yet clings to the hope that Ibrahim Khan may be removed and the way smoothed for his own return to Seri. As this hope fades, as he finds his means of living growing scantier, and the hospitality of surrounding clans becoming cooler, he may hereafter be more willing to prefer detention in India on an allowance which to him would be affluence rather than independence in beggary beyond the limits of Isazai territory.

APPENDIX I.

Statement of Subadar-Major Wali Khan, 2nd Punjab Infantry, deputed to visit Hashim Ali Khan at Baio on the 9th September 1892.

I reached Tilli on the 9th instant, and found the people perturbed about the concentration of our troops at Amb and a report that an advance was to be made at once; the object of this rumour, spread by Amb and Ibrahim Khan of Seri, being to prevent a *jirga* which the Hasanzais were arranging to collect on that day from assembling. Ibrahim Khan gave out that if the cis-Indus tribes desired protection from the troops, they should come to him; otherwise they would not be spared, his object in this announcement being also to spread alarm and prevent the *jirga* collecting. I explained to all the men present that all these rumours were utterly false; that only two companies of Sikhs were at Darband; and they were there only to protect Government stores. I assured everybody that no advance of troops was contemplated at present. At Kunarai I found the whole place in a state of trepidation from these same false rumours. At Kanar I heard that some Hasanzais had gone to Darband, and had there been told by emissaries or other *employés* of the Nawab of Amb that, if they desired to save their lives, they had better escape at once. Some of these men were advised to hide themselves in shelter offered by the Nawab's agents for their protection, the object of all this being simply to create a panic among the tribe and prevent the assemblage of a *jirga*.

On my reaching the ferry across the Indus at Ghazikot, I met Shaffi, and had a few words with him. I tried by flattery and soft speeches to worm some secrets out of him, begging him particularly to show me some of the letters he had received from Subadar Farid Khan of the Border Police, but he put me off with excuses, saying he would perhaps show them to me on my return from Baio. I explained before we parted that it would be of great advantage to him to put his services at the disposal of the General, who was now carrying on important negotiations with direct authority from the Viceroy. On the other hand, I said if he refused help and these negotiations failed, he would incur the displeasure of Government. I then moved off to the ferry and he accompanied me. At the ferry I noticed he spoke to the boatmen in whispers. The raft appeared to me to be in bad order, and ill-found with ropes and spars, etc. I told the boatmen it was a poor sort of a vessel for crossing such a rapid river. In reply they said: "Yes, it is; the best plan will be for you to send over the two *Saiads* who are with you first, and then you follow with your orderly." This I point-blank refused to do, the *Saiads* backing me up. As a matter of fact, 12 or 15 men could have crossed at once. When we were afloat the boatmen made for a rapid, and the *Saiads* in trepidation shouted out, "They mean to drown us." Thereupon I ordered my orderly to draw his pistol, and, turning to the boatmen, said: "If you attempt any foul play, I swear I will shoot one of you, and my orderly shall do for the other." The *Saiads* also menaced the boatmen with threats, for they too were apprehensive that mischief was meant. Thereupon they brought the raft back to the bank, saying they could not cross; but I said that was nonsense, for, as they had brought the raft back quite easily, they could just as easily have taken it across. Again they attempted a crossing, taking us to the same dangerous rapid, and again I threatened in my sternest manner to shoot both the boatmen, saying, "You may drown us; but I swear I'll shoot you both first." Thereupon they again brought the raft back, declaring it was beyond their power to cross. A third time they attempted the passage, taking the raft as before in the direction of the rapid. I plainly told them they would gain nothing by trying to play a foul trick like this on us. On this occasion they thought better of it, and, turning the raft's head, took us across without the least trouble. Just across the river I sat for a while under the shade of some trees, and then came across Mulla Muhammad Hasan of Nawekili. He informed me that one of the Border Police had recently brought a letter from Subadar Farid Khan for Shaffi Sahibzada, and had also taken the reply to the Subadar. Though I cannot speak with absolute certainty, I feel sure that this letter was written with malicious purpose—that is, to place obstacles in the way of the assemblage of the *jirga*. Another Hasanzai, Ahmad Khan, told me that a Border Policeman named Tor Lal, of Palosi, had also taken a letter from Subadar Farid Khan to Mulla Shaffi at Garhi. I was told by

Malik Ahmad Gul that Ibrahim Khan of Seri had sent word there on the 10th by the same policeman, Tor Lal, that the British force was on the point of invading the country, and that, if anybody wanted to save his life, his only chance was to take refuge at once with him (Ibrahim Khan) at Seri. At Palosi I found everybody in a state of great excitement about rumours spread by Amb's employes regarding the immediate advance of the *Sarkar's* army, and advising everybody to clear out of the place and take refuge where they best could. I contradicted the rumours, asking why they were so readily believed when there was no foundation for them. In reply they said: "Why should we not believe what is so plainly told us by people who ought to know as well as you what is happening?" I again reassured them that no move of troops was contemplated yet awhile, and told them to spread this news everywhere. I left Palosi at night and reached Baio before daylight. On my arrival being announced, Sikandar Khan, Turabaz, Hazrat Khan of Buner, and Jalal of Baio, with others, came out of the village and had a talk with me. I spoke then of all the wild rumours in the air about the immediate advance of troops, etc., and Sikandar Khan said: "Yes; we hear things here too. There is a spy of Amb's" (indicating the man to me at the same time by a gesture) "named Dad Sher of Jabba, and he has been spreading all kinds of tales about the place. One thing he declares is that the talk of peace is all a ruse. You had better hold your tongue in his presence." Presently Hashim Ali Khan appeared, and he, Sikandar Khan, Turabaz, Hazrat Khan, and I had a talk apart. I began by telling Hashim Ali that I had come for the second time on an express visit to him from the General, and I strongly advised him to come back with me to see the General, assuring him that he had nothing to fear if he did so. I did everything I could to reassure him, explaining that he had everything to gain by surrendering his person, for he might be sure he would be well and considerately treated if he did so, whereas he had everything to lose by remaining as an exile from his country without any means either to support himself or his family. Further, by persisting to hold aloof, he would bring ruin not only on himself, but on his whole tribe. At the time he gave me no reply, but retired to his quarters. Shortly afterwards he sent Saïad

* A Dalazak, educated in a Government school. His father was a servant of the Nawab of Amb.

Imran,* his confidential secretary, to me. He began by saying that Hashim Ali had sent him to tell me that he thought it would be better for him not to come in to the

General. Therefore I replied that I had nothing to say to him on the subject; what I had to say must be said to Hashim Ali himself and no one else. The *mulla* then went off, and I was left alone until the afternoon, when Sikandar Khan came. I accosted him at once by expressing surprise at his listening to the advice of such a rascal as this *mulla*, for his reputation is well known. He acquiesced in this, even going so far as to acknowledge him to be a tool of the Nawab of Amb. Later on Hashim Ali, Turabaz, Sikandar Khan, and Hazrat Khan again had a talk with me. Hashim Ali said: "I have no wish to misbehave or get into more trouble with the British Government. I have no property left, and am indeed no better than a beggar. I will send a *jirga* to the General, who shall solemnly promise on my part that the peace shall not be disturbed in any way either by me or by any of my people; but I think it best not to go myself, for no one of my family has ever yet done such a thing." I said: "Very well, as you like; but if you don't go your tribe will be ruined. Not only this, but an army will follow you wherever you go, and it will end in your bringing desolation and ruin on all your protectors, be they whom they may." After further talk in this vein, seeing my words did not produce the desired effect, I said that I did not believe the excuse he gave me was a valid one, and that the true reason why he refused to come in was nothing but fear. More than this, pointing to the *mulla*, who was standing by, I said: "I believe it is that scoundrel who has put this terror in your mind. The

† Wali Khan had heard from many different quarters that this *mulla* was in the pay of the Nawab of Amb. He much regrets his hasty speech, because he thinks he might have induced him to accompany the *jirga* to Oghi had he not spoken out, when perhaps I might have taxed him with his intriguing before the deputies.

W. S. A. L.

man is not your friend; he is your worst enemy."† Sikandar Khan thereupon said: "It is quite true the man is a scoundrel and in league with Shaffi of Ghazikot." It was now night, and no more was said. Next morning we met again, and the same talk was continued, and I again begged Hashim Ali to tell me the true reason for his not coming, for I said I did not think the reasons he gave me yesterday were the real ones. After awhile he confessed that it was

true, and that he was afraid. For, he said, "I hear not from one man, but from everybody who comes here from Agror or Tanawal, that if I deliver myself up I shall be hanged to a certainty." I again endeavoured to re-assure him, and to explain that he had nothing whatsoever to fear from a visit to the General. I had heard that he had received some letters from the Nawab of Amb, and I questioned him about them. (I had heard this from Jalal and all the villagers around). He called up his secretary, Mulla Imran, and asked for them; but the *mulla* declared they had been sent away to Shaffi, which was no doubt a lie. Although Hashim Ali did not tell me the exact purport of the letters, he said enough to imply that they were written with no other motive than to dissuade him from listening to anything said to him by the military authorities. Zaman Khan, his father-in-law, who was with him, also confirmed this from his own knowledge. I endeavoured to get possession of these letters, but failed to do so. Hazrat Khan of Buner afterwards did his best to persuade Hashim Ali to return to Oghi with me. The morning after this we all went down to Doshkand, where the whole Isazai *jirga* was assembled. There Hashim Ali was entreated by the whole *jirga* to give himself up. "You are our Khan," they said, "and it is your duty to save us from ruin; for ruined we shall be if you do not surrender." But it had no effect on Hashim Ali, who remained obdurate and refused to accede to their request. Two Hasanzais, Hashim Khan and Bahadur, told me they were dissuaded from joining the *jirga* by Abbas, a brother-in-law of Ibrahim Khan of Seri, who told them that if Hashim Ali went to Oghi he would be insulted, treated with ignominy and shot, and that the *jirga* would also be insulted or ill-treated. As I passed through Kewal on my return to Oghi, I was told by one Mir Ghulam* that the Subadar of the Border Police had set spies on me from the moment I first put foot in the country. One Abdur Rahman (one of the Border Police) had visited Ibrahim Khan at Seri to see if some plot could not be arranged for injuring me at one of the ferries over the Indus. I then told him what had happened at Ghazikot ferry, and he said it was no doubt an attempt to prevent my crossing.

* This man has since visited me. He is in great fear lest his visit should become known to the Border Police.

W. S. A. L.

APPENDIX II.

Return of strength, Isazai Field Force, 1st October 1892.

Stations.	Corps.	BRITISH TROOPS.		NATIVE TROOPS.		Horses, exclusive of officers' chargers.	Mules.	Equipment.	Guns.	REMARKS.
		Officers.	Non-commissioned officers and men.	Officers.	* Native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.					
DARBAND.	Staff, etc. ...	30	
	No. 3 Mountain Battery, R. A. ...	4	91	6	297	25" R. M. L.	6	
	No. 8 " " " ...	4	101	6	305	Do.	6	
	No. 9 " " " ...	4	97	6	311	Do.	6	
	No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery	4	246	5	287	Do.	6	
	1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment ...	21	832	110	
	1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps ...	24	674	121	
	11th Bengal Lancers	4	272	272	50	
	25th Bengal Infantry	8	734	...	80	
	30th " " "	9	611	...	83	
	1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles	7	464	...	83	
	2nd Battalion " " "	9	518	...	204	
Transport not with Corps	1,479		
SHINGRI.	11th Bengal Lancers	10	
	No. 4 Company, Bengal Sappers & Miners	4*	146	...	80	* Includes one attached.
	No. 6 Company " " "	4*	127	...	99	
	Pontoon Section " " "	3	73	
	4th Sikh Infantry	9	763	...	127	
OCHI	30th Bengal Infantry	90	
	Total ...	87	1,795	61	4,054	295	3,716	...	24	

At

APPENDIX III.

Extract from Isazai Field Force Orders by Major-General Sir W. S. A. Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I., regarding Sanitary arrangements of camps and bivouacs.

FIELD FORCE ORDER.

No. 2, dated 26th September 1892.

"The following Isazai Field Force Standing Order is published for the guidance of all, and is to be strictly adhered to:—

"Brigadier-Generals commanding columns and heads of departments will be good enough to see that this order is thoroughly explained by officers commanding corps and departments respectively to every officer, non-commissioned officer and man under their command.

"The strict attention of Brigadier-Generals commanding columns is directed to the sanitary arrangements of camps and bivouacs. In camp a latrine ground is to be provided for all troops and followers, and severe notice is to be taken of any infringement of the rules. The greatest care must be taken to keep the supply of drinking water unpolluted, and sentries are to be posted with this object.

"Brigadier-Generals will arrange for police and for duties in camp.

"Medical officers of the day will report verbally to the brigade-majors of the columns as to the sanitary state of the camps.

"During the advance, when there will be no regular camps, a latrine ground will be told off, also night latrines within the line of sentries. Men must be prohibited from proceeding for purposes of nature beyond the outlying picquets.

"In standing camps, latrine grounds are to be distinguished by a flag."

APPENDIX IV.

Despatch of Major-General Sir William Lockhart, K.C.B., C.S.I. (No. 730-B., dated 5th November 1892), to the Adjutant-General in India on the operations of the Isazai Field Force, 1892.

I have the honor to submit the following report on the operations of the late Isazai Field Force:—

I.—All negotiations having failed, as a last resource I accepted the offer of Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy, 2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkhas, to meet Hashim Ali Khan, and to endeavour personally to persuade him to surrender, and thus to save his tribe from the punishment which their breach of faith had earned. That breach of faith consisted in their having allowed the said Hashim Ali Khan to return to Baio and to other villages of the tribe in disregard of the solemn pledge their representatives had given to Major-General Elles in May 1891 to perpetually banish him from Isazai limits.

Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy met Hashim Ali Khan on the 25th of September at Pabal Gali on the Black Mountain with an escort of only ten men of his battalion, which was the condition on which a meeting was agreed to by the tribe. He reminded Hashim Ali Khan and the numerous tribesmen assembled that the thirty days' grace granted for the surrender to take place in had expired, and that if this, the last chance, were rejected, speedy punishment must inevitably follow.

As I reported to the Foreign Secretary at the time, Lieutenant-Colonel Molloy's appeal met with no response from Hashim Ali Khan. The Isazai, as a body, entreated the latter to give himself up; but he obdurately refused to do so, and his position as head of their Khan Khel, or chief section, gave him immunity from anything like compulsion on their part.

II.—In view of the possibility of negotiations coming to nothing, the collection of stores at Darband had already been ordered, and the first detachment had arrived there on September 23rd. The concentration of troops was completed on October 1st, when the field force stood as follows:—

1st Brigade.—(Brigadier-General G. T. Pretyman, commanding):—

1st Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment.

4th Sikh Infantry.

25th Punjab Infantry.

2nd Brigade.—(Brigadier-General A. G. Hammond, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, commanding):—

1st Battalion, King's Royal Rifle Corps.

1st Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.

2nd Battalion, 5th Gurkha Rifles.

Divisional Troops.

No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery.

No. 8 ditto ditto.

No. 9 ditto ditto.

No. 1 (Kohat) Mountain Battery, Punjab Frontier Force.

Two squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers.

Nos. 4 and 6 Companies, Bengal Sappers and Miners.

30th Punjab Infantry.

The strength of the entire force was 6,250 of all ranks and 24 guns.

III.—On September 28th I moved my head-quarters from Oghi to Darband. On the previous evening I had sent orders to Brigadier-General Pretyman to go out with a small force that night, and to surround the Hasanzai village of Shingri, six miles north of Darband, in order to secure the headman Jahandad. The latter had to my knowledge done all in his power to dissuade Hashim Ali Khan from giving himself up, and I had warned him at Oghi on the 16th of the month that, in the event of the surrender not taking place, I should call him to account.

Brigadier-General Pretyman succeeded in surprising the village at day-break and in seizing Jahandad, who was promptly sent under escort to Rawal Pindi, there to await the orders of Government.

IV.—The next few days were spent in reconnoitring and road-making. On October 3rd a bridge-of-boats was thrown across the Indus at Marer.

On the 4th, the 1st Brigade crossed the river and encamped at Palosi.

V.—On October the 5th the ascent towards Baio was begun by both brigades and all the artillery. The 1st Brigade and the batteries moved up in detachments from Palosi. The march began at 4-30 P.M. The troops were assembled at Wale at 10-30 P.M., and were there bivouacked for the night.

The 2nd Brigade crossed the bridge at day-break, and marched by way of Karor to Manja Kot, which was reached at 11-30 A.M. Wale, Karor, and Manja Kot were all found to be deserted. On the 6th, in accordance with orders communicated to the two commanders, both brigades, the artillery following the 1st Brigade, advanced at dawn on Baio, which they reached simultaneously at 7-30 A.M. The place had been abandoned, and nothing remained to be done beyond destroying the defences and making the most of the opportunity to fill in blanks on the map, and to correct the position of villages on the Buner plain.

The return march began at 1 P.M., the 1st Brigade and artillery going to Palosi, the 2nd Brigade to Manja Kot, by the routes followed in the advance.

During the advance, the bridge and the advanced commissariat depôt at Marer were held by the detachment of the 11th Bengal Lancers and a wing of the 30th Punjab Infantry under Colonel H. W. Webster, 30th Punjab infantry.

VI.—The attached sketch map* shows the position of Baio and the lines of advance taken by the two columns.

VII.—The field force having accomplished all that there was for it to do was now withdrawn to the left bank of the Indus without delay. The bridge-of-boats at Marer was dismantled on October 10th. The return march of the troops commenced on that day, and the Isazai Field Force was finally broken up on the 13th of the month.

VIII.—From a political point of view, as well as from a military one, it is to be regretted that the offending tribe did not make a stand at Baio and receive a salutary lesson.

IX.—The conduct of the troops was excellent. I regret that they suffered so severely as they did from sickness. The burden of exposure and fatigue fell on the Sappers and Miners. To the detachment of that corps under Major M. C. Barton, E.R., is chiefly due the credit for the rapidity with which I was able to bring operations to a close. Major Barton and his detachment had first of all to haul bridging material from Attock to Marer, a most arduous task, which was accomplished in a surprisingly short time. Officers and men, regardless of the fever by which nearly the whole party was speedily attacked, worked daily from dawn to dark in the water and under a powerful sun, hauling against the strong current of the Indus. Equally well done

* This sketch map is not reproduced, but the position of Baio and the lines of advance are shown on the map in the pocket of this report.

was the road-making undertaken by the Sappers and Miners, and especially the improvement of the actual approach to Baio from Palosi. The latter was simply a rough, rocky path, unfit in many places for mule traffic, yet in a few hours, thanks to Major Barton's skill and extraordinary energy, it was made practicable for mountain artillery.

- X.—It will be my duty to submit a separate report on the different departments represented in the field force. I may, however, be permitted to remark here that the working of each was all that I could have wished for. Work was very heavy, especially as regards my own district staff (whose regular routine duty was never interrupted), and the Medical Department, which had to struggle against severe sickness (including an epidemic of cholera), with what proved to be an inadequate staff of officers. For the second time, in little more than a year, I have the honor to bring to notice the services of Surgeon-Colonel R. Harvey, D.S.O., Principal Medical Officer, whose talent and readiness of resource tided the field force over a critical period. I trust that the devotion of the officers under him, which he freely acknowledges in his report, may be recognised by higher authority.
- XI.—The troops were supplied with excellent rations throughout the operations, and the transport arrangements were satisfactory.
- XII.—The Intelligence Branch was well represented by Captain A. H. Mason, D.S.O., R.E., who, as on former occasions, distinguished himself by the thoroughness of his reconnaissances and the reliability of his reports.
- XIII.—I will acknowledge the valuable assistance I received from Mr. R. Udney, Commissioner and Superintendent of the Peshawar Division, in my report to the Foreign Department.
- XIV.—In conclusion, there is a native officer, Subadar-Major Wali Khan, 2nd Punjab Infantry, whose services I desire to give special prominence to. This fine old soldier delivered the original proclamation of Government to the Isazai at Baio, and also my final reminder to the tribe when their day of grace was drawing to a close. Considering the faithless character of the people, this duty was a dangerous one, and when their deputations visited me at Oghi, I received ample testimony as to the fearless manner in which the Subadar-Major had spoken out at Baio, and had endeavoured to prove to them their folly in refusing the terms of Government.

APPENDIX V.

*Report on the Engineering operations, Isazai Field Force, 1892, by Major M. C. Barton,
Commanding Royal Engineer.*

DIARY OF OPERATIONS.

3rd September 1892.—On the 3rd September 1892 I received telegraphic orders to proceed to Attock for the purpose of collecting boats and materials for a bridge required at a point on the Indus above Darband, probably Marer. I was authorized to take with me any men of the pontoon section, Bengal Sappers and Miners, whom I might consider necessary. As Major Buston's experience in 1891 proved the great value of disciplined labour on an occasion of this sort, and as in 1891 23 days were occupied in getting the boats from Attock to Darband, while I, to carry out the work entrusted to me, had only 27 days before the 1st October (the date fixed for the concentration of the force at Darband) in which to collect the boats at Attock, provide material, etc., I thought it best to ask for the whole section, and thus ensure having with me a nucleus of labour which I knew I could rely upon.

4th and 5th September.—I accordingly wired for permission to take the whole section, and having selected and sorted out all stores which it was necessary to take from Roorkee (these not being available at Attock), I left Roorkee on the morning of the 4th September, arriving at Attock on the afternoon of the 5th. On arriving at Attock I at once sent for Amir Ali, the headman of the Mullahi-Tolah boatmen. He informed me that most, if not all, of the material which had been left in the Khairabad godown in May 1891 on the breaking up of the bridge made at Kotkai during the operations of 1891 in the Black Mountain had been taken by the Public Works Department to replace stores lost by the carrying away of the bridge-of-boats at Nowshera in August 1892. This increased my difficulties enormously, as I had counted upon using these; and I had now to improvise a superstructure which I had believed I should find ready at Khairabad.

6th September.—This morning I interviewed the Tehsildar of Nowshera, who promised me that there should be no difficulty about boats, but that it would be necessary to pay a rather high rate of hire, as the boatmen were not very keen on the job. I arranged with him to have 20 boats ready by the 10th, also 200 coolies to be paid at 8 annas a day, for which they promised to go right through with the boats up to the place where the bridge was to be made. My remaining difficulty was now the superstructure, and I resolved to go to Peshawar and personally see the Executive Engineer, Public Works Department. I visited the Military Works Department godown at Attock bridge, and ascertained that they could supply me with a sufficient quantity of railway irons to act as road bearers if required.

On reaching Peshawar, I ascertained from Mr. Barrett, the Executive Engineer, that there were 30 trussed beams in the Nowshera bridge with a corresponding amount of chesses, etc., but that much inconvenience would be caused to the public service by the dismantling of that bridge at present. I accordingly decided to use railway irons and to purchase locally such other materials as would be necessary.

7th September.—By the afternoon of this day I had completed the arrangements for material and returned to Khairabad and Attock.

8th September.—Moved over from Attock to Khairabad. Captain Cairnes and Lieutenant Mallaby joined me this afternoon: the former is to command the 4th Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners; the latter to join the 6th Company as additional company officer for field service.

Saw the Tehsildar of Nowshera again, who reports that some boats have already arrived, and that others from Jehangira, Akora, and Hastnagar will be in to-morrow. Major Buston in March 1891 measured the river at Marer to be 165 yards. Allowing for a

slightly greater width due to the time of year, and making allowance for the increased number of boats required owing to the substitution of 22 feet rails for 30 feet trussed beams as road bearers, I calculate that 16 boats at least will be required in bridge. I decided therefore to take 20, thus allowing a slight margin for possible losses, or for a flying bridge should one be required. The Tehsildars, to whom my thanks are due for his prompt and courteous assistance in this matter, had promised me this number of boats by the 10th, and he punctually kept his promise.

9th September.—The pontoon section under Lieutenant Bland, Royal Engineers, arrived at Khairabad this morning, bringing with them the stores which I had selected. I inspected the boats which were now all collected, rejecting two which were old and rotten, and ordering two others in their place.

10th September.—All the boats are now ready, and we are waiting for the superstructure ordered from Peshawar. Boats loaded up as far as possible and towing-ropes distributed. Each boat should have two pieces, *viz.*, 60 fathoms 3" manilla, and 60 fathoms 2" manilla. I arranged for each boat of the 16 intended for the bridge to carry its own superstructure and that for its adjacent bay, *i.e.*, 6 rails, 4 cross pieces 14' x 8" x 8", 2 gunwale pieces 14' x 8" x 8", 34 chesses, and some small stores; also the kits of crew and of coolies told off to it. The remaining stores were carried in the 4 spare boats.

In his report on the bridging operations, Hazara Field Force, 1891, Major Buston, R.E., gave the following strength of boatmen and coolies as necessary for each boat:—

Boatmen	8
Coolies	16

As I found that I could get plenty of boatmen at Rs. 16 per mensem, while coolies would not come under 8 annas a day, I decided to take as many boatmen as I could get, and to reduce the number of coolies. I got about 11 boatmen per boat, and on starting found that I had only 12 coolies per boat, though I had ordered more.

A Government row-boat (8-oared cutter) was received from Nowshera to-day. This will be useful for exploring the various channels off the river.

11th September.—Everything being now ready except the materials ordered from Peshawar, I moved all the boats up towards Kond, about 1½ miles.

12th September.—The materials from Peshawar came in by the early train; loaded them up and got the boats started by 10 A.M.; moved on and crossed the Kabul river just as it runs into the Indus. After this there is a slight rapid, then very fair towing-water for 4 or 5 miles, after which come several small rapids, but none of them serious, and at 5 P.M. we halted somewhere near the village of Attadeyr, having made about 6 or 8 miles. The heat is very great, and there is no shade anywhere.

13th September.—Started 7 A.M. The coolies and boatmen prefer to eat before starting, and will then work on till evening. After half a mile of fairly easy water, came to a troublesome rapid up which the boats had to be dragged in succession by a wire cable, the cable being brought back each time in the cutter. * * * This rapid delayed us till nearly 3 P.M. We then had fairly good water for a couple of miles or so, when we came to another rapid, not so difficult as the last one, but tedious, each boat having to be passed up separately by 50 or 60 men. The boats were all in by 6 P.M. A very hot day, and all hands up to their waists in water for the greater part of it. We are now somewhere near Nabbi.

14th September.—Started at 7-30. After half a mile of easy going have to leave the main right bank, where there is insufficient water, and try a side channel with a very rapid stream, and in places with only just enough water to get the boats up. All boats up by 1 P.M.; then there is a stretch of good water with one or two crossings to get back to the main bank, but none of these difficult. Halted at 5 P.M., as boatmen are doubtful as to the proper channel; went on in the cutter, and explored one which I think will do. Heat very great. Captain Cairnes and Sergeant-Major Crofton both sick. Camp to-night is still close to Nabbi. I fancy we have made only about 3 miles to-day after a very hard day's work.

15th September.—First boat off at 7 A. M. Got up the channel explored last night with little difficulty, and, getting good water after it, made a good run past Hund, and halted for the night between Minara and Tarobi. We must have made good over 10 miles to-day.

16th September.—Started 7 A. M. Current rapid, but there is plenty of water and a good tow path. By 11 A. M. about 4 or 5 miles made. The channel here dividing into several narrow ones, I halted the boats and went on in the cutter to look for the right one. I first went up under the left bank, past the village of Ponthia, but found there was not enough water, tried back and up a central channel, but here the rush of water was so great that I despaired of getting the boats up. So far we have stuck to the right bank of the river entirely, only leaving it temporarily to avoid a rapid or shallow, and returning to the main bank as soon as possible. Finding further advance impossible on this side, I decided to cross the main river and try under the left bank. The boats struck what I had taken to be the other bank some 3 miles below the village of Ghazi, but I found that we were on an island instead of the main bank, and that a difficult crossing had to be made over the head of a side channel, the water in which was rapid and too deep to allow of men fording it. We took the first boat's cable over in the cutter, but owing to having only about 20 men to hold her, she nearly went down the rapid: the second and remaining boats were passed over by making fast the cable of each to the boat in front.

The head of the side channel being of a width which lent itself to this arrangement, the boats were all over by dusk. The river ahead looks very bad, but there is no time to go and examine it. We are now about two miles below Ghazi, and on the left main bank.

17th September.—Went on with Amir Ali to examine the river. There is a shallow rapid channel under the left bank which the boatmen say is not practicable, but the alternative of going out to the middle of the river again is, judging from yesterday's experiences, not a hopeful one, so I determined to try this side, and sent back for one boat and all the sappers. Got the boat up as far as she would go, and then set all the men to work to clear away the boulders in the channel. This was very hard work, but the sappers stuck to it splendidly, and cleared a channel just wide enough for a boat to pass, and the first boat was through by 11 o'clock. We should not have been able to do this without disciplined labour under competent supervision; the boatmen pronounced the place impassable. Reached Ghazi about noon, and then had fairly good going up to a place where there are a lot of water-mills. Here we had to make a considerable detour to get enough water, and regained the main right bank between Mehra and Garhi Sobra about 5 P. M., and halted there for the night. A hard day's work and not much progress made.

18th September.—The river is now much narrower, and flows only in two or three channels. The boats were all started by 8 A. M., and at 11 A. M. had reached Dall Matt. There being some trees here, I decided to halt for the rest of the day, as we had had 6 days of exceedingly hard work under a September sun and the men had earned a rest.

19th September.—Left Dall Matt at 7-30; found good water up to Torbela, which was reached at 1 P. M. Sent off telegrams and letters. Started again at 2 P. M., and halted for the night on an island about 3 miles above Torbela.

20th September.—Started at 7-30. There is a place just at Burj-Khanpur, which with a little less water would have necessitated crossing to the other bank, but we just managed to squeeze the boats through. Halted for the night between Mandi and Ashera. The river here I estimate to be not more than 300 yards wide, and it flows entirely in one channel.

21st September.—Immediately after starting, cross to right bank, and continue on it up to the Ashera rapid. This is not dangerous, but it took 5 hours getting all the boats up it. After passing Ashera, cross again to left bank, where there is fairly good water up to the Amb rapid. Halt for the night just below, and opposite to the Nawab's palace. A smart thunderstorm, with a good deal of rain, at 5 P. M.

22nd September.—Decided to try the rapid by the left bank, though the right one, but for one bad place, looks easier: the boats have to be passed up with very long ropes, as there is no place for the men to stand. It is a question of strong ropes and plenty of men. All boats up by 5 P.M., only one boat damaged, and she was beached before she went down, so nothing was lost. We have made about one mile of advance to-day after a long and hard day's work. The river has risen a little from last night's storm.

23rd September.—Reached Darband (camp) at 11 A.M., *i.e.*, 12 days after leaving Attock, which was much better than I had hoped for. No boats lost, and the damaged ones have all been properly repaired. I should not have made nearly such good time if I had not had the whole of the pontoon section with its sapper artificers with me. In work of this sort the advantage of having men disciplined to work together is very great, as is also that of having plenty of carpenters and smiths of good physique and able to stand long hours of work as the sapper artificers are.

The 4th Company Bengal Sappers under Lieutenant Stockley and the 6th Company under Lieutenant Perceval marched in to-day from Bandi, where they have been improving the camping-ground and roads.

24th September.—Captain Cairnes with half the 4th Company reconnoitred towards Bela. He reports the road made in 1891 to be in very good order, and to require little repairs.

25th September.—4th and 6th Companies employed on the Bela road. Arranged to move them to Bela to-morrow, and to send the boats there also.

26th September.—Orders to move to Bela cancelled. Companies returned after working on roads; boats had not started.

27th September.—Work on roads near Darband. 4th Company with column acting against Shingri.

28th September.—Received orders to move forward. 4th and 6th Companies to march to Bela. Lieutenant Bland, R.E., commanding pontoon section, sent back to Rawal Pindi sick. Lieutenant Mallaby, R.E. (attached 6th Company), to command the section in his absence.

29th September.—Boats left Darband at 8 A. M. Arrived within one mile of Bela at dusk. There are one or two troublesome places, but generally the going is fairly good. 4th and 6th Companies to Bela, and worked onwards towards Shingri and Towara.

30th September.—The boats reached Bela 10 A. M. The rapid here is a heavy one, with a great rush of water; but with two good cables, and with the assistance of parties from the 4th and 6th Companies, I got all but three over by dusk. Heavy rain and wind then coming on, I had to leave these below the rapid.

1st October.—Got the three remaining boats up early, and started all off at 8 A.M. There are two or three troublesome places between Bela and Marer, but the first boat got into Marer by 4 P. M. and the last by 7 P. M., the whole of the boats thus reaching their destination safely.

Captain Aylmer, V.C., R.E., joined to-day.

4th and 6th Companies marched to Towara.

I selected site for the bridge; it is the same as that mentioned in Major Buston's report for which he had insufficient boats. The approaches on either side are good, the water is almost still, and the width, about 180 yards, is within my powers.

2nd October.—Began work on the bridge and approaches with all men available from the two companies and A Company Pontoon Section. By 4 P. M. eleven boats or 360 feet of bridge had been completed; heavy rain and wind then coming on, I knocked off for the day.

All coolies were to-day paid off and sent back.

3rd October.—At day-break I ferried over a reconnoitring party of about 600 men; then began work again on the bridge, which was practically finished by 11 A. M., and at 12 noon I reported its completion to the General Officer Commanding.

The construction of the bridge itself was very simple. The country boats are well adapted for the purpose; they run about 40' to 45' long, and from 13' to 14' wide; they are decked for about 10 feet at bow and stern. In the present case the road bearers rested on the gunwales, which is not theoretically a sound plan; but I had so much buoyancy and strength to spare that it was quite unnecessary to fix central saddle beams. It was also advantageous to utilize the great width of the boats which average 13' 6". Gunwale pieces 7" x 7" and of suitable length were spiked to the gunwales of the boats. On these cross-pieces 14' x 7" x 7" were placed, being let into the gunwale pieces 2", so that when the rails were in position the tops of the gunwale pieces and of the rails would be level. Four rails were used for each bay, the cross-pieces supporting the chesses over the boats. The rails were prevented from slipping by being spiked through the outside fish-plate bolt hole at each end to the corresponding cross-piece; a clear span of 20' between the boats was thus obtained, and I think that for a bridge of this kind rails are preferable to the trussed beams used last year. These give a bigger span no doubt, but they are very heavy, and are not suitable to the lighter country boats.

Owing to the slack water, very few anchors were necessary, and these were laid by the boatmen with trangar nets filled with stone.

The total length of the bridge was 538 feet, there being 16 boats in it as I had calculated, so that I had 4 boats to spare in case of emergency.

Received orders to move to Palosi with a view to improving the road to Baio, which is reported by Captain Mason to be extremely bad.

4th October.—To Palosi at 6 A. M. with the two Sapper companies, the pontoon section under Lieutenant Mallaby being left at Marer to look after the bridge. On arrival at Palosi, left a small party from each company to pitch camp, and proceeded with remainder to work on the Baio road. There is very little trace of the "good road for laden mules" made in April 1891. Up to Ariana the road lies up a watercourse, then falls a little, and taking a bend to right rises pretty sharply to Diliasa. The men of both companies worked with a will, and by 4 P. M. the road up to Diliasa and a little beyond it was quite passable. Returned to Palosi and got leave to bivouac at Diliasa to-morrow night, as the long march takes it out of the men, who are none too fit.

5th October.—Started early, taking up men's blankets, etc., which were left at Diliasa. Worked on through Wale and up to within $\frac{3}{4}$ mile of Baio. The road was very bad in places, and the great heat of the sun, combined with the scarcity of water, made the work very hard; but the sappers worked splendidly.

Lieutenant Coldstream, who had hitherto been improving the road between Haripur and Darband, came up to-day with his coolies and worked on the section between Palosi and Ariana, which, though passable, still left much to be desired as a mule road.

The 1st Brigade passed through Diliasa in the evening. The sappers are to follow at 3 A. M., so as to be ready to move towards Baio at daybreak.

6th October.—4th and 6th Companies marched to Wale at 3 A. M., and moved out after the advanced guard. Work on the road had to be commenced from the point where we left off last night, as the few laden mules with the column could hardly get along. Two or three hours sufficed to make the road. Baio was found to be evacuated. Two towers 45' high by 30' diameter were successfully blown up, and the defences were completely destroyed: guncotton was used in one and gunpowder in the other. The towers were solid up to 15 feet from the ground, and the charges were placed by digging down into the solid part about 6 feet and tamping well with stones and earth.

The whole force returned to Palosi in the evening.

The sappers have had 4 or 5 days of continuous and very heavy work. The last three days water has been very scarce, and they scarcely had enough to cook with on the evening of the 5th.

7th October.—Halt at Palosi.

8th October.—Defences of Nawekili and Garhi destroyed.

9th October.—I went to Marer. The two companies of sappers to move to Towara to-morrow after destroying the defences of Palosi. Orders to dismantle bridge as soon as 1st Brigade had crossed.

10th October.—1st Brigade rear-guard crossed 9 A. M. Bridge dismantled in heavy rain, which stopped about 11 A. M. Dismantling completed by 1 P. M. At by 1-30 the first boat had started. Darband was reached at 5 P. M. after a little delay at the Bela rapid.

11th October.—Left Darband 6-45, and arrived near Hund at 5 P. M. One boat struck near Ghazi, filled, and became a total wreck.

12th October.—Were much delayed to-day by a high wind, which blew the boats on to the shore and prevented progress. By evening had got 6 or 7 of the boats down the rapid above Attock. Another boat was sunk to-day.

13th October.—Got the remaining boats down the rapid and into Khairabad by 11 A. M., unloaded, and returned stores.

14th October.—Paid off boatmen and boats.

It will be seen from the above diary of operations that, apart from the bridge and work in bringing up the boats from Attock, no engineering works of any special interest were carried out. The road from Palosi to Baio was completed in very creditable time, considering the heat and scarcity of water, and my thanks are due to the officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the 4th and 6th Companies, Bengal Sappers, for their cordial co-operation and the cheerful manner in which the work was carried on under somewhat arduous circumstances. I was fortunate in having the assistance of Captain Aylmer, V.C., who rode down from Gilgit in a very short time on hearing that his company had been ordered on service. His previous knowledge of the country and his skill in rough engineering made his services especially valuable.

As regards the very hard work of bringing the boats from Attock to Marer, I wish to bring to notice the good work done by the officers, British non-commissioned officers, and men of the Bengal Sappers who were associated with me in this duty. It was owing to their zeal and energy during a period of exceedingly hot weather that I was enabled to convey so many boats safely to Marer in so short a time. Captain Cairnes, R.E., was of great assistance to me in organising the coolie gangs, and Company Sergeant-Major Crofton again showed himself to be a thoroughly practical and energetic non-commissioned officer, his previous experience of this river making his services especially valuable.

The boatmen of Attock, Jehangira, and other villages on the Kabul river worked well. The headmen, Malik Rozi of Jehangira and Amir Ali of Mullahi-Tolah Attock, are fine specimens of their class. The former, now a very old man, suffered a good deal from fever, but refused to return to his home, and stayed with me to the end. If some substantial reward could be bestowed on these two men, it would, I think, tend to encourage in their profession a class of men whose hardihood and skill in watermanship might prove at some future time of great service to the State.

APPENDIX VI.

Report on the Signalling operations, Isazai Field Force, 1892, by Captain A. E. Jones, Superintendent of Army Signalling, dated 10th October 1892.

I have the honor to submit herewith a report on the signalling operations which have taken place during the Isazai expedition.

2. Before the assembly of the troops at Darband, no opportunity offered of collecting the signallers belonging to the force for preliminary practice, and this was found to be a great drawback. I would strongly recommend that in future operations all signallers of regiments composing the field force should be collected together at some central station for instruction and practice at least a week before the force assembles. The Superintendent of Army Signalling of the field force in question would then be able to pick out the best men for important stations instead of having to take them haphazard, as occurred in this case.

3. The total number of signallers available on leaving Darband was thirty-eight (38) British and forty-seven (47) native. In the former were included six men of the 2nd Seaforth Highlanders for whom I had specially applied, and these men were posted at Pailam, one of my most important stations. They worked hard and well throughout. The men of the Bedfordshire Regiment were nearly all good and well trained. Sergeant Mulholland, Royal Scots Fusiliers, who was in charge of the head-quarter signalling party, rendered me invaluable assistance, as also did Sergeant Browning, King's Royal Rifles, in charge of the terminal station at Darband, and subsequently at Towara, when the telegraph line was prolonged to that place.

4. Of the total number of native signallers, a large proportion were found to be quite inefficient. The 4th Sikh Infantry produced three good men, as also did the 25th Punjab Infantry and the 2-5th Gurkha Rifles. From my experience on this occasion, I am of opinion that native soldiers as a rule are insufficiently educated, and that a better knowledge of English is required by them before they can ever become really efficient as signallers. They, however, even now render valuable assistance to British signallers; and although I found it impracticable to entrust natives with stations by themselves, I nevertheless consider that a very efficient signalling unit can be formed by combining British and native soldiers together.

5. I would venture to suggest that in future expeditions one officer as Assistant Superintendent of Signalling should invariably be appointed to each brigade, as also at least six selected men per brigade and twelve men per division, in addition to the regimental signallers. This number would give four complete units for important stations, and would prevent men being overworked, as has frequently happened during the late operations. General Elles' prediction—in his remarks on Captain Hamilton's report on the signalling operations of the Hazara Field Force of 1891—regarding the inconvenience which might probably arise from an insufficient staff of British signallers and from the want of efficient men among the native troops was fully realised by me on this occasion.

6. The regimental signalling equipment was found to be on the whole in very fair condition and nearly all complete, with some few minor deficiencies. Two units of signalling equipment were indented for and received by me from Rawal Pindi arsenal, and found in good condition; but I consider that perfection is yet far from being arrived at in the lamps used for signalling purposes. The idea of the lamps, Begbie's BB pattern, is good enough; but the manufacture at present is not good, and lamps of much stouter make are wanted. The lamps are of an unnecessarily large size, rendering them clumsy and inconvenient to carry about by hand up and down a hill side. If the size were reduced, the lamps could be made of stouter material without increasing the weight. The burners generally were of the most flimsy construction, and the chimneys supplied were made of thin glass, and consequently large numbers were broken. When signalling from Pailam to

Kotkai, and *vice versa*, light had to be directed upwards and downwards at an angle of nearly 30° ; the oil reservoir, chimney, and burner were consequently tilted backwards or forwards to the same extent; and as the flame continued perpendicular, a large number of chimneys were broken, one lamp exploded, and one lamp was rendered useless by the soldering of the burner melting. Surely some method might be devised by which the reservoir, chimney, and burner could be kept in a horizontal and perpendicular position respectively, while the rays of light could be directed upwards or downwards as desired. Owing to this defect in construction, hand lamps with candles had to be used in signalling between the two stations above noted.

7. I consider it would be very desirable if arsenals maintained units of signalling equipment complete in every respect. At present to complete one unit of signalling equipment, four different departments have to be indented on, *vis.*, Ordnance Department for the actual articles required for signalling purposes, the Mathematical Instrument Department for watches and magnetic compasses, the Stationery Department for pen-knives and envelopes, and the Commissariat Department for cooking utensils, oil and wick for lamps, etc. Rawal Pindi arsenal at present maintains eight sets of signalling equipment. I would strongly recommend that these sets be completed to units in their entirety, and thus a large amount of official correspondence and delay in the receipt of articles indented for would be avoided, especially if it be taken into consideration that these units can only be demanded on the eve of field operations commencing when but a short period of time is available to allow for the receipt of the articles required.

8. Work generally was carried out fairly well, and but few complaints were received of messages going astray, or being delivered in an unintelligible condition. The "Manual" of 1891 was adhered to throughout, as the men generally were found unacquainted with the differences introduced in the new "Manual" of 1892. No great difficulty was experienced in working with the field telegraph, which was constructed in the first instance to Darband and afterwards prolonged to Towara, and I consider it would be very advisable if the message forms used in visual signalling and in telegraphy could be assimilated; but I believe this has been already done more or less in the new regulations. It would also be a good arrangement if the words "to be initialled and returned to bearer" were printed on all official envelopes containing messages to be delivered, as it was found that messages sometimes went astray through native orderlies delivering them to the wrong person or to servants; and I think it would also be another improvement if signalling Form 119-A. was printed on thin paper, similar to that used in the Telegraph Department, as it was found that unless a very hard pencil was used messages could not be copied distinctly through the carbon paper, and had frequently to be copied over again, an unnecessary waste both of time and labour.

9. The attached map shows the various signalling stations occupied either permanently during the expedition or temporarily for a short period.


10. My assistant, Lieutenant Browne, Border Regiment, has shown himself an active and energetic officer, and has rendered me every assistance; and I would also beg to express my best thanks to Captain Hamilton, Inspector of Army Signalling, for the advice and assistance given me by him on my appointment as Superintendent of Army Signalling, Isazai Field Force.

11. I attach herewith a copy of the "orders for signallers" and a list of "call signals" issued to each and every signalling party in the Isazai Field Force. I think if orders on somewhat similar lines were drawn up and attached as an appendix to the new "Manual of Army Signalling" for 1892, it would be a great boon, as signallers would then become thoroughly acquainted with their orders before proceeding on field service.

Rules to be observed by the signallers employed with the Isazai Field Force.


(1) Every signal party is to be, if possible, of full strength. At permanent stations arrangements must be made, when practicable, for reliefs.

(2) Signal parties will be told off from regiments as required by signalling officers.



MAP ILLUSTRATING
SIGNALLING OPERATIONS
OF THE
ISAZAI FIELD FORCE,
1892.

Scale 2 Inches = 1 Mile.



REFERENCES.

- Signalling Lines of communication
- Signalling Stations o

(3) At permanent stations the headings of messages will be filled in in full; at shifting stations the prefix, code, and office of origin may be omitted. When the message has to be transmitted by telegraph, these particulars must be entered.

(4) Code time in every case is to be translated into ordinary figures at the stations of delivery, the 24 hours system of recording the time being adopted.

(5) When a message cannot be forwarded on the day it is handed in, the date of handing in is to be entered and signalled after the code time.

(6) The following procedure will be adopted when working in connection with the field telegraph :—

(a) On receiving over a message from a telegraph station to be forwarded, the headings of the message will be filled in on a visual signalling message form from the particulars in the preamble of telegraph messages. The message will then be signalled in the way laid down in the "Manual."

(b) The visual signalling form will be attached to the telegraph form, and filed with it after the message is sent.

(c) All messages, whether "sent," "received," or "transit," must be numbered consecutively.

(d) When a visual signalling station and a telegraph office are located together, the former will work as a terminal station, messages being taken in duplicate, the copy passed on to the telegraph office, and the original filed.

(e) A receipt bearing the number of the message should be obtained from the telegraph office.

(f) All "ordinary" state messages will be classed "M." The prefix "B" will be considered the equivalent of the telegraph "Urgent." The prefix "N. P." will be used for press messages.

(7) The signal "ooo" (.....) will denote "clear line." A station on receiving this signal will immediately cease all other work and take the message, calling up the next station, with clear line signal, if the message is for transmission.

(8) The signal "clear line" will be acknowledged by the same signal and followed by the letter "G" when the station is ready to receive the message.

(9) As this signal will rarely be used, and only when messages of great importance are to be sent, the utmost care must be exercised to ensure rapid and accurate transmission.

(10) "State" messages have priority over "press" messages. No private messages will be received for transmission.

(11) Four files will be kept at each station, one for "received" and one for "transit" messages, one for "sent" messages, and one for messages "handed in." These last must be filed in the order they are to be signalled.

(12) Messages about which any enquiry has to be made should be referred to by their code time, sender, and date.

(13) When a receipt is required from a signal station for a message tendered for transmission, the receipt must be prepared by the sender of the message, and will be signed by the non-commissioned officer or signaller in charge.

(14) The greatest care should be taken to preserve the signalling equipment in as serviceable a condition as possible. Heliographs and lamps must be kept clean. Shaky and dirty instruments add greatly to the difficulties attendant on signalling in the field.

(15) Non-commissioned officers in charge of stations must keep daily records of the number of hours' work of each signaller to enable the monthly statement of working pay to be filled in correctly.

(16) Non-commissioned officers in charge of stations will be held responsible for the safe custody of all messages.

APPENDIX VII.

Extracts from report on the working of the Medical Department, Isasai Field Force, 1892, by Surgeon-Colonel R. Harvey, M.D., D.S.O., I.M.S., Principal Medical Officer, dated the 6th November 1892.

4. * * * *

No field nor general hospitals were provided, but corps were ordered to take their full marching scale—much more than their field service scale—of establishment, equipment, carriage, and camp equipage. Ambulance transport was sanctioned for three *per cent.* of the strength of the troops instead of for 5 *per cent.* as laid down in paragraph 15, clause 47, "India Army Circulars" of 1887; but no mention was made of followers, of whom there were nearly 3,000. The Principal Medical Officer was directed to improvise a base hospital at Darband by collecting from regiments and batteries their marching equipment, and taking from batteries of artillery the medical officers, medical subordinates, field panniers, etc., needed for its requirements. No arrangements were made for sending sick or wounded to the rear, as it was considered that they could be picked up and taken away by their own regiments on return to Darband. No mention was made of bearer companies.

5. By this scheme the modern field hospital system, which, when properly worked, has always answered admirably, was entirely set aside; and the regimental system, which has invariably broken down under stress and strain, reverted to. No strain was expected at Simla, and it was thought it would suffice. On receipt of these orders, I proceeded to work out a plan by which, while dispensing with field hospitals and so securing the desired economy, the medical arrangements might yet be brought into field service lines, and made to conform to the principles laid down in the Medical Field Service Code. To this end I asked for some extra medicines, appliances, comforts, servants, etc., for the base hospital, a few extra medical officers, surgical havresacks, or to establish bearer companies, and an apothecary with a tent, field medical companion, and comfort case at Barakot, Haripur, and Hasan Abdal to enable me to pass sick to the rear. This latter proposal was considered premature and was not sanctioned, but on 13th September some additional servants, storekeepers, ward servants, etc., and certain field hospital boxes were ordered up * * * for use in the base hospital. The latter, however, never arrived.

6. As soon as it was known that negotiations had failed, that the expedition must proceed, and that opposition was possible, * * * two sections of a British and one Native field hospital were ordered up, with one or two medical officers respectively, instead of the two and four they should have had. Arrangements were also made to convey sick to the rear, and carriage was allowed for sick followers calculated at one *per cent.* of the established strength. The field hospitals reached Hasan Abdal about midnight on the 2nd October, marched 50 miles under a broiling sun and over (for 30 miles) very bad roads in two days, and reached Darband on the 4th, two sections going on ten miles more the same day, and opening at Towara on the morning of the 5th.

* * * *

10. The amount of sickness officially recorded is shown in the accompanying table, but

	Strength.	Admissions.	Deaths.
British officers ...	154	7	...
" soldiers ...	1,813	197	9
Native " ...	4,424	504	12
Followers ...	2,999	137	9
	9,390	845	30

a very large number of slight cases were treated in the lines, and were not admitted to hospital at all.

The following were the chief causes of admission.

11. No less than 532 cases are returned as ague. The excessive rains of 1892 had caused a large amount of malarial fever all over

the Punjab before the troops started, and the men were therefore more obnoxious to its attacks than in ordinary years. The conditions under which they were serving were also favorable to its development, hot days succeeded by cold nights, occasional heavy rain, storms, and very hard work. Surgeon-Captain Henvey illustrates this well in the case of the 2-5th Gurkhas, and his remarks are more or less applicable to all other corps:—

“Notwithstanding several medical inspections and a careful weeding out of all men who were considered unlikely to be able to go through the fatigues of a campaign, the men fell out in considerable numbers on every march. The combined influence of a hot sun, previous malaria, and the exertion of marching with heavy loads produced a very large amount of fever of the intermittent type, and it is no exaggeration to say that during the short time the campaign lasted between 40 and 50 *per cent.* of the strength of the battalion suffered at one time or another from fever.” A mean of 45 *per cent.* would give about 230 sick, yet this regiment sent only 69 to hospital, as “numbers of men managed to continue to perform their duties with the help of medicines and a little encouragement.” Most of the fever cases were slight, and yielded readily to quinine and a few days rest.

12. Thirty cases, all among British troops, are ascribed to the effects of sun, 25 of these being returned as simple continued fever and five as sunstroke. The majority of the former were really slight cases of sunstroke, and all recovered under copious douching with cold water, followed by quinine.

13. Cholera had been very widely prevalent all over the Hazara district in June, July, and August, especially at and in the neighbourhood of Haripur; but no cases had been reported for some weeks before the troops began to concentrate, and it was hoped the force might escape. On the 29th, however, a sapper who had come from the Galis *via* Oghi was attacked; on the 30th a man of the Bedfordshire company which had formed the escort of No. 8 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery; on the 31st another man of the same company, a follower of the Kohat Mountain Battery, and a medical warrant officer were seized. All these had come *via* Oghi; and though after this cases appeared in corps which had come from Haripur, 47 out of the 55 cases registered had travelled by the Oghi route.

The disease continued throughout the expedition, cases occurring in every corps (except No. 8 Mountain Battery, R. A.) and at every halting place; but, with the exception of the Bedfordshire Regiment, which lost 5 men, no corps was severely stricken.

14. All such precautions as were possible were taken to prevent its spread; but the paucity of our resources made effective isolation impossible till after the arrival of the field hospitals, when detached cholera hospitals were established at Towara and Darband. The type of the disease was not very severe except among the Europeans, who had eight deaths out of 10 cases, 24 deaths occurring among the 55 cases. Several additional cases and deaths have, however, occurred since the conclusion of the operations among troops and followers marching back to their stations.

* * * * *

16. Dysentery and diarrhœa gave 141 admissions with three deaths; but most of the cases were slight, and were probably chiefly due to chills at night or to men going out in the morning improperly clothed. Some were caused by eating pumpkins and other raw vegetables in contravention of orders.

17. Local injuries gave 26 admissions; venereal diseases 5; the remaining cases are distributed under many heads, and call for no special notice.



APPENDIX VIII.

Extracts from report on the working of the Commissariat and Transport Departments, Isazai Field Force, 1892, by Captain H. M. P. Hawkes, Staff Corps, Chief Commissariat Officer, dated the 2nd February 1893.

* * * * *

13. *Supplies and general arrangements.*—To carry out the orders of the Government of India that 30 days' supplies for the whole force should be collected at Darband and be in position there by the 1st October 1892, the divisional commissariat godown was established at Darband on the 10th September, and 30 days' supplies with substitutes and extras were in position there within the time ordered.

14. Fodder, fuel, potatoes, onions, *gur*, salt, turmeric, and chillis were obtained locally or from the adjacent districts. Beef and mutton for British troops and goats for Native troops were supplied under a contract arranged and concluded by the Chief Commissariat Officer, Rawal Pindi. The remainder of the supplies were drawn from the mobilisation reserve maintained at Peshawar, Rawal Pindi, and Mian Mir, and sent to Darband under your orders.

* * * * *

18. No complaints of any sort were received regarding the quality of the rations issued to the force. Throughout the expedition fresh meat, bread, and potatoes were regularly issued, except on the few occasions when circumstances necessitated the use of tinned meat and biscuits; and once when the force was breaking up, with the sanction of general officers commanding brigades, one quarter of the bread ration was issued in biscuits in order to reduce the stock of the latter. Fuel and fodder at and near Darband were plentiful. When I first arrived at Darband I found that but little progress had been made in the collection of these local supplies owing to the disinclination shown by the representatives of the Nawab of Amb to render any assistance in this respect. I personally interviewed the Nawab's two *wasirs*, who, however, made little effort to help me until I had telegraphed to the Deputy Commissioner of the Hazara district asking him to put pressure on them, and informing him that the required supplies could easily be obtained if the Nawab's officials would give their assistance. After this firewood and grass were brought in more freely; but I noticed all through that directly either myself or the divisional commissariat officer* in any way relaxed the strictest watch over the daily receipts, they fell off at once, thus showing that the assistance of the Nawab's officials was not willingly given.

Beyond Darband the standing crops of *bajra* and Indian-corn more than met all requirements; and as they all belonged to Hasanzai villages which had been deserted, no payment was made for what we took.

Fuel was obtained by dismantling the deserted villages of Shingri, Towara, Palosi, and Manja Kot.

* * * * *

20. On the 1st October, when the boats, with escort, reached Towara, I despatched to that place a convoy of three days' supplies for the force, and formed an advanced commissariat depôt at the bridge-head under Lieutenant Litchfield. After the brigades advanced beyond Towara, they drew their requirements from this depôt, which was in turn replenished from the base godown at Darband as found necessary. This depôt remained at Towara until the troops had all passed through on the return march and the bridge had been dismantled, and was then withdrawn to Darband on the 10th October.

21. When the force advanced from Darband, five days' rations and two days' grain were taken in regimental charge, and two issues of "substitutes" and three issues of "extras" with brigade commissariat godowns, this reserve being always maintained.

* The officer in charge of the divisional commissariat godown is apparently meant.

22. The force returned to Darband on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of October and broke up by the 14th *idem*, on which date 14,000 maunds of stores and equipment remained at Darband to be lifted back to India. With the carriage at my disposal there and by collecting empty carriage at Abbottabad and Haripur from corps proceeding to or passing through those stations and returning it sharp to Darband, the base godown there was closed on the 23rd October, the stores being sent to Haripur for onward despatch to Rawal Pindi and Hasan Abdal.

* * * * *

33. *Transport*.—Corps reached Darband equipped with normal camels and obligatory mules, and on arrival there returned the camels to the divisional transport lines and took over mules for carriage of five days' supplies for men and two days' grain for animals. Subsequently it was decided to take tents as far as possible beyond the base, and camels were issued and accompanied the force to Palosi.

34. *Hired transport*.—The camels supplied by Lala Lurinda Mal, Rai Bahadur, were only of fair quality, many of them being under-sized and weak, and females with young ones at heel. The expedition lasted so short a time that they were never really put on their trial; but I doubt whether they would have been equal to continuous hard work. Lurinda Mal, however, gave me every satisfaction in keeping his animals complete and up to the mark, and through his efforts the work proceeded satisfactorily. The hired mules only reached Darband when the force was being broken up, and they immediately returned with corps marching to India.

35. For the conveyance of stores from Hasan Abdal and Haripur to Darband, local carriage was obtained through Rai Bahadur Lurinda Mal, and the following rates were paid for the different stages:—

		Rs. A. P.
From Haripur to Darband 0 6 0 per maund.
" " to Barakot 0 2 0 "
" Barakot to Darband 0 4 6 "
" Haripur to Hasan Abdal 0 5 0 "

36. Sixty army transport carts and 130 bullocks were placed at Haripur for work between there and Hasan Abdal and Barakot, and were found most useful.

37. *Government transport*.—All worked exceedingly well. The mules arrived in good order and condition, which they maintained throughout. The Divisional Transport Officer, who inspected the transport of each corps on its arrival at Darband, reports that, with few exceptions, all the mules were in good order, fit for work, and had not suffered from galls, etc., due to bad loading.

* * * * *

Return of transport with the Isazai Field Force, 1892.

Government mules	3,442
Army transport bullocks	156
Hired mules	99
Hired camels	2,000

APPENDIX IX.

Report on the Survey operations, Isazai Field Force, 1892, by Captain R. A. Wahab, R.E., Survey Officer, dated 11th October 1892.

I have the honor to report as follows on the work done by the survey party attached to the force.

The party, consisting of one British officer, two native surveyors, and fifteen *khalasis*, joined at Darband on the 28th September. One surveyor, Dafadar Lal Singh, 19th Bengal Lancers, remained at Darband to revise the survey of the ground between Darband camp and that surveyed on the 2-inch scale during the last expedition, and I myself with the remainder of the party accompanied the force throughout its advance.

Owing to the short time the troops remained across the border, there was little opportunity for extending the survey. Some valuable information was, however, gained during the few hours available at Baio, where we were able to sketch in approximately on the $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch scale a considerable extent of country in the Chamla and Buner valleys covering an area of 250 square miles; and at the same time to survey on the 2-inch scale the ground in the neighbourhood of Baio, and to fix the positions of several of the Hasanzai and Chagarzai villages on the western side of the Baio-Duma range.

This survey shows that the Hasanzai territory south-west of the Baio hill extends further than was supposed; the whole spur on which Punar and Nask lie down to Wano on the left bank of the Barandu river being Hasanzai. The *nala* running due west from Baio past the village of Maliar appears to be the boundary between Hasanzai and Chagarzai lands, the latter extending up to the high spur from Duma, which bounds the view to the north-west; beyond that Buner territory commences; but, as far as could be ascertained, no Buner village lies within 2 miles in a direct line from Baio.

The general character of the country between Baio and Buner is similar to that of the hills along the Indus valley. High spurs from the Duma range descend steeply to the Barandu, the hill sides generally bare and stony, but with villages and terraced fields on the gentler slopes and occasional patches of pine forest.

The Buner and Chamla valleys, as far as could be seen, are open, fertile plains with numerous large villages and orchards, their elevation rising from about 2,000 feet above sea level at the junction of the two valleys near Chirorai to some 3,000 at the head of the Chamla valley, and 4,000 or 5,000 feet at the head of Buner. The former valley is about 18 miles in length; the latter about 30. The hills enclosing both valleys are well wooded.

Both the native surveyors worked hard and well. Asghar Ali is a quick and accurate topographer, who has done excellent work throughout his service in the department. Dafadar Lal Singh, 19th Bengal Lancers, is one of the class of soldier surveyors trained in the Survey Department who have proved so useful as auxiliaries to the civil staff of the department on military expeditions. He is a hard-working and efficient surveyor and an excellent non-commissioned officer.

APPENDIX X.

*Report on the working of the Field Veterinary Hospital, Isazai Field Force, 1892, by
Veterinary-Captain J. Cooper, A.V.D., dated 19th October 1892.*

I have the honor to forward herewith a short report on the working of the field veterinary hospital with the expedition for the information of the General Officer Commanding Isazai Field Force.

2. In accordance with instructions contained in the Principal Veterinary Officer in India's No. 2021 of 9th September 1892 to the General Officer Commanding Rawal Pindi District, No. 1 Field Veterinary Hospital marched from Rawal Pindi with two squadrons, 11th Bengal Lancers, on 21st September last, and reached Darband on 28th of that month.

3. On its arrival at Darband notice was published in divisional orders that commanding officers of corps and departments might send into hospital for treatment all serious cases, and that accommodation was also available there for the hired transport sick animals.

4. The site selected for the base veterinary hospital at Darband was on very high well-drained ground, and from a sanitary point of view it was well adapted for the collection together of a number of sick animals. A good deal of labour would have been required to clear away the stones; but it was useless to take exception to the stony nature of the soil, as this condition obtained over nearly the whole of the Darband camp.

5. On the 29th September the General Officer Commanding Isazai Field Force kindly consented to my suggestion to divide the field veterinary hospital into two units: to leave "B" section at the base at Darband under Veterinary-Lieutenant Haslam, and to take "A" section, under my charge, with the divisional troops to Towara. This arrangement was carried out, and, in the event of operations having extended over a longer period, it would have been found to work excellently, although it might have been necessary at a later date to transfer the "A" section to Palosi.

6. On a forward movement of the brigades from Darband, it was decided to remove section "B" of the veterinary hospital from the site originally selected, and to locate it in the transport sick-lines; and, in order to get the sole use of these lines, the whole of the transport sick animals, including the slight cases, were admitted into the field hospital. This change of ground was necessary to lessen the number of guards for the different base depôts at Darband.

7. With the exception of a sporadic case of adenitis (strangles) in a transport mule attached to the 11th Bengal Lancers, there has been an entire absence of disease of a contagious or infectious nature.

8. Although from the confined condition of the camping grounds it was found necessary to picket animals in very close proximity to each other, no ill-effects have followed and very little sickness has occurred. One interesting case of poisoning from the ingestion of the juice of a poisonous plant was brought to notice. The pony, an officer's charger, presented a pitiable appearance when first admitted, the head being swollen to an extent as to almost close the eyelids. He, however, recovered very quickly under treatment, and was convalescent in two days from the date of attack.

9. Although there were upwards of 3,000 baggage animals engaged in the expedition, the admissions for "saddle-gall" were only sixty-seven, and in this number were included many cases that were mere abrasions of the integument. This is highly satisfactory, and shows that very great care must have been exercised in fitting the transport pack-saddles. The more serious cases under this heading were generally caused by the pressure of the front of the panel on the superior extremity of the scapula (blade-bone). This particular form of galling occurs in very short-backed mules on account of the panel being too long for the animal's back. Several of these cases occurred

in No. 3 Mountain Battery, Royal Artillery, from the use of the long pack-saddle for extra ammunition. In this connexion the rough and hilly condition of the ground travelled over must be taken into account, and presumably the pack-saddle has yet to be invented that will render its wearer absolutely safe against "sore-back."

10. The good quality of the grain supplied by the Commissariat Department was particularly noticeable. Indeed, I did not observe a single instance in which inferior grain was issued. It is, however, to be regretted that bran was not obtainable. Bran should always be provided for field veterinary hospitals, as it enters very largely into the diet of animals suffering from febrile diseases or abdominal affections, and, in the absence of either linseed or bread, it has hardly a substitute as a poulticing agent.

11. I would very strongly recommend that each field veterinary hospital be equipped at the station of mobilisation with full establishment for division into its two sections. It will be generally found necessary to make this subdivision; and the usefulness of the hospital is very much diminished if this is found impracticable on account of the difficulty of providing the increased establishment at the time it is required; and this is very likely to be the case, for the different corps and departments take little surplus establishment.

12. Under no conditions should a field veterinary hospital leave the station of mobilisation without its full complement of public followers. Very great inconvenience is occasioned to all concerned if a portion of the establishment of public followers be supplied at the mobilising station and the deficit furnished at the base of concentration of troops.

13. The detail of establishment of a field veterinary hospital in Table 1, Section XV, "Field Service Equipment Tables," requires to be augmented by the addition of a clerk; and, in the event of sub-division of a hospital into two sections in the field, one should be detailed for each section. I think this suggestion should receive the fullest consideration, as it is a matter of considerable moment. The clerical work is heavy, and to the strictly necessary compilation of statistics, returns, etc., has to be added the rationing of sick animals for a large number of corps and departments, for each of which separate indents are required. The services of a veterinary officer should be entirely utilised for the prevention of disease as far as possible, and in the treatment of sick and lame animals; and, if a very considerable portion of his time be employed in office work, his professional duties will suffer to an extent in consequence.

14. The present is the first occasion on which a field veterinary hospital has been equipped for active service; and, although no great stress was thrown on it during this expedition, there can be little doubt that the very best results may be expected from the organization of the Veterinary Department into field hospitals during active service. It would appear to be the only means by which the handful of veterinary officers in India can be made at all adequate to the strain that would fall on them during a campaign.

15. It will be noticed that I have left almost untouched questions of detail relating to the establishment of a field veterinary hospital, the construction of the field chests, arrangement of medicines, etc. In this direction certain modifications will be found necessary; but such matters can be best dealt with departmentally, and with this view I am submitting an additional report to the Principal Veterinary Officer in India.

16. In conclusion, I have to acknowledge the help, always cheerfully given, that I have received from Veterinary-Lieutenant Haslam, A. V. D. In addition to his other duties, a very large portion of the office work has devolved on this officer. The clerk was on the sick-list during nearly the whole of the expedition, and both *salutris* falling sick at one time, the field veterinary hospital was left with very scanty subordinate assistance for the professional work.

APPENDIX XI.

*Report on the Telegraph operations, Isazai Field Force, 1892, by Lieutenant A. T. Moore
R. E., Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs, dated 24th October, 1892.*

Preliminaries.

At first it was understood that no field telegraphs at all would be required with the expedition. On 7th September, however, orders were received to open an office at Darband as soon as possible. As only the one line Haripur-Darband was required, I was deputed to take charge of the work in addition to my own duties as Assistant Superintendent of the Rawal Pindi Sub-division.

Construction of lines.

I.—Orders being received for opening the Darband office late on the 7th September, a large proportion of the line stores were got off the same evening, and the remainder on the following day; and these arrived at Haripur on the 10th and 11th respectively. Work was commenced properly on the 12th, and the line was completed into Darband camp on the morning of the 19th.

The carriage and distribution of stores had been entrusted to a contractor employed on previous occasions. He failed absolutely at Barakot, where cart transport at that date ceased. Stores were distributed by hand for the greater part of two days, and the workmen mostly spent those nights where they ceased work, as there were no means of shifting camp. Meanwhile such *ekkas*, donkeys, etc., as could be caught on the road or in the neighbouring small villages were entertained, and the remainder of the construction carried out with them. Had the contractor carried out his work properly, the Darband office would in all probability have been opened on the evening of the 17th.

II.—On the afternoon of the 1st October orders were given to carry on the line as far as possible towards Towara. The only establishment at my command to carry out this work were one permanent and one temporary lineman and twelve trained coolies, who had been kept at Darband in case of accidents to the Haripur line. There was one more permanent line-man at Haripur; but the remainder of the original working party had been returned to other construction works in the sub-division, and were too far off to arrive in time. Coolies were obtained from the Nawab of Amb's *wasir* and transport from the Commissariat Department. Work was commenced on the morning of the 2nd, and an office opened at Towara on the evening of the 4th, the line being taken as straight as possible even through Bela pass.

Opening of offices.

Oghi office was raised to 1st class, and strengthened on the 1st September.

Haripur was converted from a postal combined into a field telegraph office on the 15th. Abbottabad was converted from a postal combined into a departmental office on the 18th. Darband field telegraph office was opened on 19th.

Towara field telegraph office was opened on the 4th October.

Working arrangements.

At first Haripur office was so fitted up that it could work with Rawal Pindi, Darband, and Oghi separately, or work with any one of them while the other two worked with each other. When, however, the head-quarters staff arrived at Darband, it was found that there was so much traffic from Darband for Rawal Pindi and further offices that it suffered delay; consequently Haripur office was cut out, and Darband joined direct with Rawal Pindi, the remaining offices working with Rawal Pindi on another wire. This arrangement answered well, and for a great portion of the time Darband worked direct with Lahore; so that Simla messages were only transmitted once,

Closing of offices.

Towara was closed on the 10th October.

Darband closed on the 18th.

Abbottabad was converted on the 15th.

Haripur was reconverted on the 19th.

Oghi was reduced to 3rd class on the 1st, but worked 2nd temporarily during passage of troops on return march.

Dismantlement of lines.

I.—The dismantlement of the Towara line was commenced immediately the office was closed on the 10th, and completed on the 12th.

II.—The dismantlement of the Haripur line was commenced on the 24th.

Statistics.

I.—I am pleased to state that there were no interruptions on the field lines. One case of malicious damage occurred near Darband on the 19th September, but was seen and righted.

II.—Up to the 11th instant no complaints had been received by me regarding the treatment of traffic or the conduct of any of my subordinates.

III.—Work was very heavy in Towara office during the whole time it was open; and there was a very large amount of work also in the Darband office between the 25th September and 12th October.

The total amount of traffic dealt with in the Towara office* consisted of 258 sent and 242 received messages, and in the Darband office† of 933 and 760 messages respectively. The total

* 4th to 10th October.

† 1st to 16th October.

number of messages dealt with in the Rawal Pindi office during September reached the somewhat large total of 31,000, this increase being considerably due to the Isazai expedition.

Recommendations.

In case any reference should be made to the head-quarter officials of the department concerning the above work, I beg that the undermentioned names may be brought forward on account of good work done:—

- (1) Sergeant A. W. Smith, Unattached List, for his work as telegraph-master in charge of Darband field office.
- (2) Sergeant J. Thomson, R. E., Sub-Inspector Sherfath Ali, Lineman Shahsowar (and the last named specially), for their work on the construction of lines.

Remarks.

I have only one point to remark on regarding the methods of the department, and that is in connection with transport. It seems advisable that from the point where actual field lines begin, transport for the carriage of stores on construction should be supplied as a matter of course by the Commissariat Department. Beyond that point transport is invariably scarce, all that is available in the country being entertained at an early stage by departments who have earlier warning of impending operations. Having the stores carried by contract is more expensive, as the contractor also meets with the difficulty of scarcity and must charge accordingly; also it is liable to failure, as in the instance above detailed; and under other circumstances a similar failure might become somewhat of a disaster. The extra transport required by the telegraphs would be a small quota compared with the total on the expedition; given previous warning of the amount of lines required, the telegraph officer could at once state exactly how much transport would be required and for what period; and on completion of the lines, the transport could be returned for other duties until again required for dismantlement.

APPENDIX XII.

Extracts from report on Postal operations, Isazai Field Force, 1892, by Mr. C. G. Dease, Superintendent, Post Office, dated 15th October 1892.

I beg to give below a report on the working of the Postal department during the Isazai Field Force operations.

In April last the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, warned me of the advance of troops to Oghi, and asked me to make suitable postal arrangements for them.

I obtained sanction to double my runners' line and to raise the strength of my post office at Oghi to enable me to have two men available to open small offices should the troops go beyond Oghi and separate into two bodies, as appeared probable through the presence of cholera in the district.

The troops did go beyond Oghi, but did not separate, so they were given a small office, and one man left in Oghi in reserve.

Early in September (date not remembered) news reached me through unofficial sources of an intended advance on Darband, and that the Commissariat and Transport Departments under the protection of some companies of the 4th Sikhs were to be there on the 8th September. I at once ordered my spare man in Oghi to be in Darband on this date to open a small office for their convenience. Meanwhile I entered into correspondence with my department for sanction of arrangements suitable for a field force, but obtained orders for the establishing of only two field post offices—one in Haripur, and the other in Darband.

* * * * *

The establishment granted me began arriving in time for me to lay out men to help Haripur, Abbottabad, Mansera, and Oghi temporarily while troops were in transit to Darband, and to gradually call them into their permanent posts in Haripur and Darband, and out of them to pick sufficient men for a small office for the head-quarters camp. By 1st October Haripur and Darband were in full working order, and the head-quarters camp office ready to advance immediately on being called on to do so.

Till the troops left Oghi, Abbottabad especially, and Haripur to a small extent, were both sorting offices for the force, and made up mails, according to instructions, in separate bags for each regiment, staff, and departments, and sent them for delivery to the offices where they happened to be.


When the troops passed Oghi, Haripur became the only sorting office through which the mails of the entire force passed.


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The movable or head-quarters camp post office went out with the head-quarters to Towara on the 3rd October. On the 4th October it shifted a little further with the same camp, and on the 5th October arrived in Palosi.


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[G. C. F.]





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