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PERSIA AND AFFGHANISTAN.

ANALYTICAL NARRATIVE

OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO THE

CORRESPONDENCE

ON THE AFFAIRS OF

PERSIA AND AFFGHANISTAN.

FOLLOWED BY EXTRACTS

FROM THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS.

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ANALYTICAL NARRATIVE,

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A MOST interesting correspondence has lately been published, under the authority of Government, entitled, "Correspondence relating to the affairs of Persia and Affghanistan." It consists of 117 official letters, diplomatic notes, and reports; besides the documents corroborating the important facts connected with the subject. Embracing a period of about four years and three-quarters, it begins with a despatch, dated St. Petersburgh, 15th Jan. 1834, addressed to Lord Palmerston, announcing the probable settlement of the succession to the throne of Persia, and closes with a circular from the Foreign Office, dated March 20th, 1839, assigning the motive which has induced our Government to withhold for the present, all diplomatic intercourse with that country. As these papers have an immediate reference to the safety of our Empire in India, and to the stability of our commercial intercourse throughout the East, from the shores of the Hellespont to the banks of the Ganges; they will no doubt excite fully as much as they are fit to attract, the attention of politicians, and the interest and curiosity of our enlightened mercantile community, who have lately shown incipient signs of jealousy towards the encroaching policy and crafty ambition of Russia. The evidence with which these documents abound of a deep-rooted hatred of our pros-

perity cherished by that power, and of a settled and well digested plan of progressive hostility, not the less dangerous from disguise, or the less effectual from the cautious and wary steps with which it is generally prosecuted—is so circumstantial and so palpable, that any endeavours on our part to set that evidence in a stronger or a clearer light, would probably weaken instead of confirming the effect, which the perusal of the correspondence itself cannot fail to produce even on the minds of those, who might feel the most anxious desire to put a favourable construction on the acts of the Russian Government.

The conclusion forced upon the mind, by a thorough knowledge of the facts, is the necessity, sooner or later inevitable, of devising some effectual and permanent check on the restless ambition of a power, which seems to threaten the peace and the civilisation of mankind. To familiarize the great mass of the people with a subject of such vital importance, and to enable every man to judge for himself, without inflicting upon him the obligation of reading a ponderous volume, to which from want of leisure or inclination he might feel averse, we have made a selection from the documents, and confining ourselves only to essential and leading facts, we venture to lay them before the public in a shape, which however inconvenient in some respects, possesses the advantage of inviting attention on the score of brevity.

A short narrative of the events themselves, has

also been thought advisable, as it may be of considerable assistance to the general reader, to possess some previous knowledge of the entire subject calculated to excite his curiosity and attract his attention: with this view we think it advisable to preface the analysis of the documents, and the arrangement of facts and dates, with a short account of the ambitious schemes of Russia in the East, as they constitute in reality the principal topic of the whole diplomatic discussion.

The subversion of the British Empire in India, seems to have been seriously urged upon the Russian government, in the origin, by the First Consul of the French republic. At that period the Emperor Paul I., had become an enthusiastic admirer of Napoleon; and never pronounced his name without previously uncovering his head. A short time before, Paul had been the bitterest enemy of that great man, and could scarce avoid, when reluctantly obliged to allude to his person, betraying signs of abhorrence and contortions of countenance calculated to terrify his courtiers. Napoleon, aware of the peculiar malady of the Czar, endeavoured to soothe and propitiate his mind, by some extraordinary acts of generosity and forbearance, which produced the desired effect, and led to the closest intimacy.

Russian emissaries and French officers were despatched in every direction in the East, to prepare the nations of Asia, and represent to their governments the advantages they might derive from the subversion and plunder of the British Empire in

India. Surveys were made, maps were drawn, and numberless reports and projects were presented both to the French and Russian governments, on the practicability of marching an army from the shores of the Caspian, and the foot of Mount Caucasus to the banks of the Indus, and those of the Ganges; particular towns were fixed upon as depots for provisions and ammunition, and the importance of particular situations and defiles were pointed out, and expatiated upon by the able engineers who had been intrusted with this important mission.

The tragical fate of Paul, and the change of measures and of policy which immediately followed the accession to the throne of the Emperor Alexander, prevented the execution of a project which we have reason to believe had been seriously contemplated; and the invasion of British India gradually dwindled, in the estimation of the Russian government itself, into a wild imaginary scheme, worthy of the crazy intellect of the Sovereign who had the folly to adopt the suggestions, which, from different motives and with different views, had been instilled into his mind by a man of commanding genius. After the peace of Tilsit, however, and when the bonds of amity appeared to be cordially cemented between the Emperor of the French, and the Czar of Russia, the invasion of British India became again a frequent topic of friendly discussion between the two Cabinets; and new emissaries in the disguise of travellers were sent into the East, with instructions to facilitate the future attempt and to acquire fuller

and more circumstantial information: numerous official reports were the result of this step, and no doubt the archives of the War Office in Paris, possess at this moment as rich a collection of memoirs upon this interesting subject as the Cabinet of St. Peterburgh.

But the war which subsequently broke out between France and Russia, and the disastrous result of a campaign, where the elements triumphed over human skill, again altered the entire aspect of European politics, and united in the closest alliance Great Britain and Russia, equally threatened by the still formidable power of France; nor has the project of invading India been again seriously entertained by the Cabinet of St. Peterburgh, until after the French revolution of July 1830, to which the Emperor Nicholas seems to have vowed everlasting hatred from the very origin, a hatred which has been confirmed by the subsequent revolution of Poland, ascribed by him to the influence of a bad example alone, since in his own estimation his *mild and paternal government afforded no ground of complaint.*

Disappointed in his expectation that England would be gradually persuaded to co-operate with him in his intended crusade against the liberties of France, the Emperor of Russia, impelled by that vehemence of temper, which he seems to have inherited from his father, began at first with slight manifestations of rising discontent towards this country, which has grown up at last into a confirmed

hatred of British power, fully as strong as against France, if not indeed stronger, in as much as he looks upon our government to have been the designing authors of national apostacy from the supposed political creed of the Tory party. The first public indications of this spirit appeared in the Gazette of Moscow, an official or at least a semi-official paper. It is well known that nothing of any description, be it on politics, or on gardening, is ever published in Russia, without the previous approval of a censor appointed and paid by the state; nor would any private individual dare either to praise or to blame the conduct of any authority foreign or domestic, unless he had previously made up his mind to inhabit Siberia; yet it is in Russia, and in the second capital of the Empire, that the following paragraph was inserted in a newspaper.

Extract from the Moscow Gazette.

December 27, 1832.—The Russian nation is indignant at the secret part which England, or rather her perfidious Ministry, have taken in the troubles of Poland, but we shall have our turn. We shall tear off her mask, and we shall teach the world *how a nation can really be reduced to slavery*. You will soon judge if Ponsonby has spoken truth, in repeating to whoever would listen to him:—"Russia is no longer any thing, and Poland will henceforth hinder her from interfering in the affairs of Europe. She is an Asiatic government," &c. &c. How! this indebted Albion, now imbued with the most perfidious principles, dares she rouse the bear (as they call us), which almost devoured Napoleon with the first army that ever was on her territory, and went even to Paris to avenge herself for this temerity. No! its turn must come, and soon we will only have to treat with this people at Calcutta; her

false policy has compromised her tranquillity. Let her go and ally herself with the negroes of Africa, to whom she wishes so much good, and for whom Europe is her dupe. We, barbarians and slaves, as her papers call us,—we will teach her a lesson; meantime let them go on, *it is just what we want.*

From that time, it became evident that British influence and British interests would be everywhere either openly attacked, or insidiously undermined by the intrigues of Russia, that the most culpable means would be resorted to, and that practices worthy of the irresponsibility and crafty contrivance of despotic power would be sometimes detected. Determined to proceed to the utmost limit of opposition which might be warranted by prudence, the Russian Cabinet, emboldened by our internal squabbles, and by the weakness of Government in the Upper House of Parliament, has even ventured to exceed those bounds; and has been unable to extricate itself from difficulties of its own creation, without a manifest loss of character and of political influence, which the exposure of its conduct, and the publication of its formal and humiliating retractation and disavowal, cannot fail to produce, not only in the estimation of Europe, but also where it is most needed, in the minds of those nations of Asia, who had hitherto looked upon Russian power to be almost irresistible.

Nothing short, however, of the unequivocal demonstrations on the Indus and in the Persian Gulf, would have been sufficient to repress a system of encroachment which made us liable to all the evils

of war, without affording us any of its chances. It became necessary to throw down the glove in token of challenge, and to wait with calmness and resolution for the moment when it might be taken up; or the meaning of so manly an act deprecated. This was done with remarkable ability and not with less effect in the vicarious person of the Shah of Persia. It spared in some measure the pride and dignity of the stronger power; at the same time that the real object could not be an instant mistaken.

The events and negociations which have led to the above result, sprung out of the succession to the throne of Persia, an object of considerable importance both to England and to Russia. The correspondence begins with an official communication to Lord Palmerston, that the Shah had the intention of declaring his grandson, Mahommed Meerza, eldest son of Abbas Meerza, the rightful heir of his crown, and Count Medem, in a diplomatic note (No. 8, dated the 22d of August of the same year), insists upon the advantages of an union between his Cabinet and ours, in reference to this matter.—Lord Palmerston gave a ready assent to this proposal, and cordially concurred in strengthening the claims of a Prince, who was evidently the creature of Russia. It would not perhaps have been wise or prudent to have acted otherwise, as Mahommed Meerza was in the direct line of succession, and already invested with extensive power: nor could there exist any objections to Mahommed's claims, which might not apply with equal force to any other

candidate supported by Russia, fairly entitled in this case to exercise a reasonable share of influence. Lord Palmerston therefore, who we suppose would gladly have remained neutral had not Russia already interfered, found it advisable, by giving his consent, to imply thereby its necessity and importance. As early, however, as the 25th of July, 1835 (No. 10 despatch), Lord Palmerston appears to have been alive to the intrigues of Russia in that quarter, and he accordingly directed Mr. Ellis "to dissuade Persia from war with Affghanistan." Whether Persia be successful or not, (says his Lordship,) her resources will be wasted in these wars, and her future means of defence must be diminished." But the advice and admonition of Mr. Ellis seems to have been disregarded, as we find that he (No. 11, Tehran, November 13th, 1835), informs his Lordship of the determination of the Shah to march against Herat and Kandahar, at the instigation of the Russian Colonel Borowski. A series of communications took place subsequent to this incident, between Mr. Ellis and the Foreign Office, which extend over a period of eight months, beginning with despatch No. 12, dated 24th Dec. 1835, and closing with No. 28, August 22, 1836. These documents are replete with proof that numerous Russian agents endeavoured with indefatigable industry to excite a feeling in favour of war among the Persian people, and that the Russian ambassador himself openly encouraged the ambitious propensity of the young Shah, urging him to accelerate his move-

ments lest he should afford time for the interposition of British influence in behalf of Herat and Kandahar.

Mr. Mc Neill had now succeeded Mr. Ellis as British Minister in Persia, and Lord Palmerston directed him (No. 29, June 2nd, 1836) in terms similar to those which a year before had been addressed to his predecessor, to endeavour by all means to dissuade the Shah from schemes of conquest and ambition, and to offer the mediation of England for the adjustment of conflicting claims and differences between the contending parties.

Mr. Mc Neill, on the 12th of September, 1836, (No. 31) informs the Foreign Office that no doubt any longer existed of the march of the Persians against Herat, at the instigation of the Russian ambassador, who had followed with his suite the movements of the monarch—that the army had been harassed in their progress by the wandering Turcoman tribes, who had captured the cattle and baggage of his Excellency Count Simonich, inflicting upon the entire camp the severest privations. Barley was sold for ten times its common value, wheat was not to be had, the troops dissatisfied from want of pay, plundering alike their friends and their enemies; yet in the midst of this universal distress, the Russian ambassador repeatedly urged upon the Shah the advantage of persevering in the campaign even through the winter.

Upon receiving the above intelligence, Lord Palmerston directed the Earl of Durham (No. 34, Jan.

16, 1837) to ask Count Nesselrode whether the extraordinary conduct held by Count Simonich in Persia was in accordance with the instructions he had received from his court.

Lord Durham, in his answer, (No. 35, Feb. 26, 1837) asserts most positively, in the name of Count Nesselrode, that Simonich had no instructions of the kind inferred by Mr. Mc Neill, and that the charges brought against the Russian minister arose no doubt in misapprehension. This assurance was still further confirmed by the next despatch of Lord Durham, (No. 36, Feb. 24, 1837) wherein his Lordship states the substance of a conversation he had had with Mr. Rodofinikin, Russian Under Secretary of State, who protested most solemnly against any supposition injurious to the sincerity of his Court, offering to exhibit to Lord Durham the original book, containing the instructions transmitted to Count Simonich—a most clumsy offer, worthy of a Greek born at Constantinople, and by no means calculated to produce in our minds at least a favourable impression. Among the well-known tricks resorted to by conscious story-tellers, we may reckon the spontaneous addition of the word of honour or of an oath, in proof of an assertion otherwise improbable.

In the mean time the Shah's army, still harassed by numerous detachments of Turcoman horsemen hanging on his flanks and in his rear, abandoned the siege of Herat, and returned to his capital, where we find Count Simonich again urging, on the

30th December, 1836, the expediency of resuming the expedition against Herat in the spring, and offering, by way of further encouragement, the assistance of his own military services. Agents from Cabool and from Kandahar, secretly instigated by Russian emissaries, made at this period their first first appearance at Tehran, and endeavoured to conciliate the favour of Count Simonich and of the Shah. They offered to co-operate with Persia against Herat, and sought protection against the Seiks. Kumber Ali Khan was sent by the Shah on an embassy to Dost Mahommed Khan, of Cabool, who was represented as having applied for the assistance of Russia and of Persia.

Taj Mahommed Khan, (despatch No. 40) agent from Kandahar, at Tehran, accompanied by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, visits the Russian ambassador, and receives from him a letter and presents for his master. He is forbid to visit Mr. Mc Neill, whose influence is now in a rapid state of decline; while Russian intrigue is every where active and triumphant among the numerous nations or tribes of central Asia, according to the several inclosures contained in this despatch.

On the 2nd of May, 1837, (No. 42) Mr. McNeill communicates to Lord Palmerston that he had renewed his offer of mediation between Persia and Affghanistan, and on the 1st of June, of the same year, (No. 43) he justified himself against Count Nesselrode, renewed his charges against Count Simonich, and supplied various further most

conclusive details in proof of the accuracy of his former statement, nor was it long before the progress of events removed whatever doubts might still attach to his unequivocal assertions; as on the 15th of July, 1837, Mr. Rodofinikin placed in the hands of Mr. Millbank a copy of a despatch, dated May 28, 1837, and addressed by Count Simonich to Count Nesselrode, conveying the intelligence of a renewal of the expedition against Herat. This was soon confirmed by Mr. Mc Neill himself (despatch No. 45, 3rd Jan. 1837) who at the same time informed Lord Palmerston that the preparations for war had been kept a profound secret entirely on his account. It appears further that Mr. Mc Neill called upon Count Simonich (No. 47, June 30, 1837) and the conversation which passed between them in the presence of Captain Sheil is a striking example of that solemn kind of mystification which the presumption of superior power ventures sometimes to put on the credulity of the weak, not in the hope that it will be believed, but merely to avoid the harshness of stating an unwelcome truth. Count Simonich acknowledges, in reference to the denial of Count Nesselrode, that in his official capacity he was bound, if not to dissuade, at least to abstain from encouraging the warlike mood of the Shah; but he at the same time states that his own individual opinion was quite at variance with his public duty. Having to choose between two opposite lines of conduct, and to make his election whether in this matter he should advocate the wishes and intentions of his master the Emperor,

or his own, he preferred the latter, probably in obedience to some secret feeling of democratic independence, which might give him the opportunity of vindicating his own superior wisdom at the expense of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an enquiry before the Russian senate or the Russian public, who are both extremely familiar with similar discussions. Mr. Mc Neill had already given so many proofs to Count Simonich himself of the vigilance and activity of his character, as to make it very unlikely that the crafty Russian believed he had made a dupe of our envoy. He was trying a clumsy experiment, involving captious distinctions and endless contradiction, not on the credulity, but on the patience and forbearance of our Government, which he rightly conjectured were not yet exhausted.

The despatches included between Nos. 48 and 55, inclusive, and their enclosures, chiefly relate to the negotiations about Herat, and are replete with evidence of Russian intrigue, and Russian preponderance. To a deep-rooted feeling of suspicion and distrust towards the Punic faith of the great Bear, natural to all Asiatic nations, the most ardent friendship seems to have been substituted, and it is not improbable that to some extent this cordiality was real. Religious bigotry animated the Persians against their enemies, and the Shah himself, elated with the prospect of success, could scarcely brook the presence of those who he had reason to suspect disapproved of his conduct. The Russian ambas-

sador had artfully flattered the prejudices and passions of both the Sovereign and his people, the British appealed to their sober reason alone. He could not expect to be listened to as long as the excitement lasted, or until his arguments had acquired greater weight from some energetic demonstration in their support. The necessity of this demonstration had become apparent long before it was forced upon the reluctant conviction of the Foreign Office. The moral influence of this country, derived from the principles of her Constitution, which most European nations respect and admire, in spite of the earnest wishes of their rulers, and forms no mean part of her strength; but in Asia that influence cannot be exercised in the same manner; as no contest in that region has yet begun between the people and the sovereign on the theory of government; and moral power is in Asia grounded almost exclusively in the belief of the existence of physical force. Every incroachment, therefore, on the part of Russia, if tamely submitted to, would be considered at Tehran, or at Herat, as an additional proof of Russian superiority, and a tacit acknowledgment of British inability to resist. Arguments deduced from the actual condition of Europe, in reference to the great principles which for the last fifty years have almost entirely engrossed the attention of the western world, might easily be found in support of British power, and in proof of Russian weakness; but, however familiar to the minds

of the more civilized portion of mankind, they would be scarcely understood or accurately estimated among the barbarous nations of the East. Mr. Mc Neill seems to have been early impressed with a notion that he laboured under some disadvantage of this kind, and that his only chance of recovering the ground England had lost, consisted in a display of material force. While patiently waiting for some visible sign of this description from home, he endeavoured with considerable skill to keep up the appearance at least of the consciousness of power. Thus, in reply to a note from Haggee Meerza Aghassee, Prime Minister of Persia, (No. 48, inclosure No. 5) he says, "with reference to the alarm of the British Government, I believe that the phrase "alarm of the British Government" has not been employed by me in my letter. Thank God, up to the present time, the British Government neither has nor ever has had any alarm of any government whatever." He complains of the removal of the British officers from the Persian army and camp, of the refusal to conclude the commercial treaty, and to suffer the appointment of consuls; and respectfully reminds the Shah that British influence had placed him on the throne.

The firmness and dignity of this language had, however, no effect; and the Shah, infatuated with ambition, and fully conversant with the details of the last disastrous war with Russia, of which his grandfather had to bear the consequences, unas-

sisted or abandoned by every other government, felt himself strengthened in the friendship of his powerful neighbour, and treated with contempt the distant and improbable danger of British invasion. He left his capital about the 28th July, 1837, and proceeded for the second time to his camp before Herat. Mr. Mc Neill refused to sanction by his presence a measure which he had done all in his power to prevent, and remained at Tehran, still trying to negotiate terms of peace between Persia and Herat. He directed one of the horsemen officially attached to his mission, to accompany as far as Meshed, the envoy of the Heratees, on his return home; and, suspecting foul play, he told the man to return immediately in case the envoy should be detained. No accident occurred during his journey, but on the return of Mr. Mc Neill's courier from Herat, in charge of official despatches, he was met, as it were accidentally, by the former Colonel, now Russian Major-General Borowski, (No. 56) and innocently questioned on his errand, which the poor man had no motive to conceal. Borowski soon disappeared, and shortly afterwards the British courier, surrounded by several Persian soldiers, was carried off a prisoner to the Persian camp, where he was stript and beaten, and threatened with the loss of life by some officers of high rank, who forcibly deprived him of the despatches addressed to our envoy.

This flagrant violation of the law of nations was

from the very outset treated by Mr. Mc Neill with becoming indignation, and without loss of time he ordered Colonel Sheil, secretary to the mission, and present in the camp, to make a formal application for redress; and to insist upon a full and complete reparation and apology (No. 56). But matters had now proceeded to so desperate an extremity, as scarce to admit a diplomatic remedy. The Shah, successful in the early part of the campaign, had already begun openly to speculate on the probable consequences of the fall of Herat, an event apparently imminent, and he declared his intention to prosecute his conquests against Meimuna and Balkh, to the banks of the Oxus (No. 54), a project in which he would be assisted by Russia. To facilitate his movements, Captain Vicovich, aide-de-camp to the Governor-General of Orembourg, had been previously sent to Cabool as the accredited agent of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, to intimate that a large Russian force would march to the assistance of Persia. The intrigues of this officer, and the moral influence of his presence in the neighbourhood of British India, became the subject of popular discussion throughout the East, and the Persians, elated with his promises, and the prosperous state of their affairs before Herat, publicly boasted in their caravanserails of the means that they possessed of compelling England to bow before them, by a march upon the Indus, preceded and followed by Russian troops. (No. 57.)

The better to promote the mission of Captain Vicovich, the Persian Government supplied him with letters of recommendation to the rulers and princes of Affghanistan, and Count Simonich promised to give up to Persia, on the conquest of Herat, the arrears of the contribution still due to Russia, since the war. He even lent money to the Shah, an act of friendship which the cabinet of St. Petersburgh had seldom if ever performed before. The avowed motive of this solicitude in behalf of the Shah, was stated by Count Simonich to be the hope that the conquest of Herat would create a deep impression, and promote insurrection among the Mahomedans of British India. (No. 60.)

Lord Palmerston, informed of the outrage perpetrated in the person of a British diplomatic courier, instructed Mr. Mc Neill (No. 65, 16th March, 1838) in firm, temperate, and dignified language, to apply for ample reparation. Unable to obtain it, Mr. Mc Neill, on the failure of repeated attempts, threatened to suspend his intercourse with Persia, and recalled from camp Colonel Sheil. He subsequently proceeded in person to Herat (No. 73, 8th March, 1835), unwilling, it would appear, to give up his mission, until he had fairly exhausted every possible means of conciliation. We cannot approve of this excessive solicitude in behalf of peace, either on his part, or that of the Foreign Office. It seems little adapted to answer its purpose anywhere; and unless we have grossly misconceived the charac-

teristic feature of the Persian mind, it is least likely to prove successful at Tehran, or indeed in any part of Asia, Russia included. Neither Pitt nor Fox would have submitted to the ordeal of patience which Mr. Mc Neill and Lord Palmerston had already gone through, and we are satisfied that Russian insolence and intrigue would never have been carried to such unmeasurable lengths with the Duke of Wellington. While we express this belief, let us not, however, hastily condemn the Melbourne Cabinet. Neither Pitt nor Fox had to govern the country in spite of one branch of the legislature, and with a nominal majority in the other. We cannot, besides, reasonably urge against Lord Palmerston, that his own personal influence on the military government of Russia, is not equal to that of the greatest General of our age. In the peculiarly delicate circumstances of his own situation, Lord Palmerston has perhaps upon the whole, acted with propriety, in delaying beyond ordinary bounds a final resort to coercive measures. The excess of his patience would have justified the war, contingent upon his demonstration, in the opinion both of Parliament and of the nation. The slightest appearance of precipitancy, represented as it would have been in the most disadvantageous light, might have been fatal to his reputation for ability and prudence.

Instructed by Lord Palmerston (No. 74) to repeat his offer of mediation, Mr. Mc Neill is at the same

time ordered, if unsuccessful, to threaten a suspension of diplomatic intercourse, and to inform the Governor-General of India of his failure. He is directed further (No. 80) to declare to the Shah, that as Persia is bound by treaty to afford protection to British India, his present flagrant violation of the spirit, perhaps of the very letter of his engagements, will reluctantly compel the British Government to adopt some energetic means of coercion.

Shortly after his arrival in the Persian camp, Mr. Mc Neill had resumed his negociations with Herat, and had every hope of bringing them to a conclusion, when Count Simonich unexpectedly arrived in the night, and everything relapsed into the greatest confusion. Captain Vicovich (No. 76) on his part had exerted himself with equal activity, and had proposed to unite Herat and Kandahar under one chief, under the protection of Persia, and the guarantee of Russia. A treaty had been already drawn up to that effect (No. 84), which gave Russia the right to interfere directly in the affairs of all those countries, compelling them at her bidding to oppose England in the field. The terms of this treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, when finally agreed upon, received the formal sanction of Count Simonich, who guaranteed their execution, and affixed his seal and signature to the compact in his official character of Russian Ambassador, yet not in the name and in behalf of his Sovereign,—a most cunning device, so artfully

contrived as to give it perhaps a chance of escaping detection even in Europe. The Asiatic ignorance of diplomatic forms and etiquette, enabled Simonich to play off this insidious trick upon Persia and Kandahar, with the certainty of success. A distinction so subtle that it escaped the perception of honest Mahomedans, had nevertheless great importance in the estimation of the wily Russian diplomatist, as it might afford his Government a specious ground to deny, in answer to Lord Palmerston, the existence of a treaty, of which the informality might be at a future period considered in the light of an inadvertent omission of no consequence whatsoever, or insisted upon as fatal to the stipulations of the treaty,—according to the instructions which the Russian Ambassador at Tehran might receive from his Court. (No. 91.)

During the negociation of these nefarious transactions, Count Simonich, with a view no doubt to keep up the excitement of feeling, and giddiness of ambition, which he had himself raised among the Persians and in the breast of the Shah, depicted in the glowing terms of oriental eloquence, the power of his Sovereign, and his ardent friendship for Persia. The two countries were in future to be looked upon as one: such at least, he could assure the Shah, was the sincere wish and intention of Russia, and as an earnest that these sentiments were responded to by his Highness the Cousin of the Moon, he urged upon his serious consideration whether it

might not be advisable to undertake another war, in addition to the one already in full operation, by an invasion of Sindè, an expedition which a Russian army might assist by the occupation of Kiva and Herat. Of the capture of the place known under this latter name, his Excellency entertained no shadow of doubt, since he was himself the chief engineer of the Shah, and had besides the assistance of numerous Russian officers.

But the Russians, whatever praise they may otherwise deserve for military prowess, have never yet displayed any remarkable degree of ability in the conduct of a siege: their inferiority in this important branch of the art of war, may be ascribed partly to the deficient knowledge of their officers in mathematical science, partly to their want of experience, and defective *materiel* and battering train. They seldom or ever had any siege to go through against a civilized power—and all their achievements in this line have been confined to Turkish or Persian fortifications, which they have never conquered except at an enormous expense of time, of labour and of blood, far exceeding the probable outlay, which most other nations would be liable to, under similar circumstances. In support of this opinion, which we know to be entertained by competent judges, we may instance the siege of Oczacoff by Potemkin, the storm of Ibraïl by Souvaroff; the surrender of Braïloff, Varna and Silistria, during the last war against Turkey.

The experience of Count Simonich before Herat

tends still further to confirm the truth of our observation. His plan of attack upon that town ended in a complete failure, and after six days incessant battering, his Excellency, his officers, and the Persian army were definitively repulsed with the loss of nearly two thousand men, amongst whom we may notice General Borowski, and several Persians of high rank (No. 91, 31st July 1838), killed in an attempt to ascend an impracticable breach.

Previous to this occurrence, Mr. Mc Neill, who was in the camp near Tehran, following the movements of the Shah, had an audience of his Majesty, and laid before him the grievances of England; urging the absolute necessity of explanation and redress. (No. 84, 17th May 1838). His demands, expressed in moderate and perspicuous language in a memorandum (inclosure to No. 84), consisted of five articles, of which the execution could scarcely be avoided without a flagrant sacrifice of the best interests and dignity of this country. He insisted on an amicable arrangement with Herat,—on the conclusion of a commercial treaty; stipulating in our behalf a participation in the privileges and immunities already enjoyed by other powers,—on the punishment of the governor of Bushire, who had insulted and threatened our resident and mission there with the fate of a former Russian ambassador, massacred with his suite at Tehran,—and on an apology and satisfaction for the violation of the law of nations, in the arrest and ill treatment of a British courier. (No. 84, 17th May 1838.)

Receiving no satisfactory answer to his reasonable demands, and beginning to lose all hope from further delay, Mr. Mc Neill adopted at last the resolution to withdraw and to suspend all official intercourse with Persia. His situation at court, had been for some time past peculiarly delicate and irksome, a growing coolness towards him had become so apparent, that it attracted the notice of his menials. No Persian subject was allowed to visit him, except the Minister for foreign affairs and his assistant, while Count Simonich affected to be on terms of the greatest intimacy with every officer high in rank or in the confidence of the Shah. Mr. Mc Neill, thus driven to extremity, notified officially his intention to retire, and applied for the observance of the usual ceremonies on similar occasions. Finding his departure deprecated, he again made another supererogatory effort towards an arrangement, and replied by a note, that unless within three days he received a satisfactory answer, he would be on his way to the frontier; but instead of admitting his claims, the Persian government controverted his statements, denied his rights, and leaving him no alternative, Mr. Mc Neill finally withdrew. (No. 85, June 25, 1838).

On the eve of his departure he addressed a letter to the Shah, wherein he recapitulated the grievances of England, intimating, in energetic terms, that the perseverance of Persia in a course so much at variance with ancient friendship and positive obligation, would force upon the British government

the necessity of using the ample means that this country possessed of obtaining by compulsion what she claimed as a right, which it was her anxious wish to see restored by an act of Persian justice. (Inclosure No. 1 to 85).

This threat, coming from a quarter where hitherto patience and forbearance had predominated over every other consideration, had however no effect. It wanted besides a certain degree of precision of means and limitation of time, which admitted of vague and distant interpretation, and it seems probable that the Shah viewed it in no serious light, as he prosecuted with greater vigour than ever his ambitious projects upon Herat and Affghanistan.

Mr. Mc Neill left the camp of the Shah on the 7th of June, 1838, and proceeded towards the frontiers of Turkey. As long as he had tamely submitted to the exactions and insults which Russia was heaping incessantly upon England by means of Persian infatuation, his influence had rapidly declined, until at the moment of his departure it had dwindled down to zero (inclosure in No. 95); but he had no sooner taken his first energetic step—he had no sooner withdrawn from Tehran, than the belief of his being in earnest began to take possession of the mind of the Shah, and to produce a salutary effect. Requested to delay his final departure over the frontiers, he received an assurance from the Persian Minister, that all his minor claims would be arranged to his satisfaction, and that some sort of un-

derstanding would be attempted with Herat. This condescending mood received no check from the intelligence which about that time had reached the Persian camp, that a British force had arrived in the Persian Gulf, and had taken possession of the island of Karak. Moderation and dismay had now replaced insolence and rashness; and the manifesto of Lord Auckland, supported by his demonstration on the Indus, fully developed the serious consequences likely to visit the intrigues of Russia, and the infatuation of the Shah. A feeling of consternation spread far and wide, and its contagious influence had even extended to Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich themselves. It was artfully dissembled, however, and the Shah was still urged to prosecute the siege of Herat, under a threat of being attacked by Russia, should he submit to the terms England had offered for his acceptance. But his Majesty having at last acquired the conviction that there still existed a power which was perhaps capable to resist, since it had the courage to bid defiance to Russia, no longer looked upon Count Simonich as the arbiter of his destiny; and he accordingly retired from Herat on the 9th of September, 1838; thus abandoning for the second time a scheme of ambition which had been so insidiously contrived, fostered, and abetted by the perfidy of a foreign adventurer (*vide* No. 90, 92, 94, 95, 98.)

Irritated in the pride of despotic power, and on the eve of success, by his recent disappointment,

the Shah, however, still refused to come to any specific terms of peace with Herat, or to give to Mr. Mc Neill the satisfaction which our envoy had determined to exact previous to his return to Tehran, and to the resumption of his official character; the secret influence of Simonich had not yet entirely ceased, and might still have been exerted to a considerable extent on a mind already exasperated by defeat and angry discussion. Rumours of a resumption of hostilities against Herat in the spring, had reached Mr. Mc Neill (No. 106, Nov. 28th, 1838), as well as details relating to the stipulations of the treaty concluded under the guarantee of Russia, between Persia and Kandahar. The satisfaction which had been promised with reference to the violation of the law of nations, at first represented as full and ample, turned out upon inquiry to have been partial and incomplete. The observance of some specific forms of redress of considerable importance in the East, required by Mr. Mc Neill, had been hitherto resisted. The snake of Russian influence, stunned by the first blow, had somewhat recovered, not its muscular power, but the full faculty of distilling its poison. Under these circumstances Mr. Mc Neill refused to return to Tehran, and is at this moment in England.

While the above transactions were in progress, Lord Palmerston had at last adopted the resolution of calling upon the Russian Cabinet for categorical explanation. He directed the Marquess of

Clanricarde, the Queen's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, to lay before Count Nesselrode the draft of a note, wherein his Lordship recapitulates the principal events of our narration, specifies our grievances, and concludes with the following passage, equally remarkable for dignity of tone, and for elegant simplicity of diction.

"The British Government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue, with regard to the matters in question, whatever course may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh most conducive to the interests of Russia;—and Great Britain is too conscious of her strength, and too conscious of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates. But the British Government considers itself entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia towards Persia, and towards Great Britain, are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and Mr. Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and Mr. Vicovich."—(No. 106, Oct. 28, 1838.)

The meaning of this language cannot be easily misunderstood; and scarcely admits of delay or evasion. Russia is here called upon either to alter her policy or to accept its consequences; and Count Nesselrode and his Government promptly

adopted the safer course, no doubt impressed with the belief that discretion is the better part of valour; we find accordingly, in the despatch addressed by the Russian Cabinet to Count Pozzo di Borgo (No. 110, Nov. 1st, 1838), a seemingly anticipated answer to Lord Palmerston's question, and a full retractation and disavowal of almost every act perpetrated by Count Simonich and Captain Vicovich. After a short rhetorical preface on the conservative policy of Russia, which is here appealed to, *apropos de bottes*, the Count protests in the most solemn and unequivocal terms against any intention of interfering in the slightest degree with the safety of the British Empire in India, or with any British rights, political or commercial, in reference to the East. The copy book containing the instructions addressed to Count Simonich, is not again offered for British inspection; but their pacific and conciliatory nature is expatiated upon, and their date assigned in proof of their existence. The treaty with Affghanistan, which the Emperor, from mere motives of courtesy towards England, had refused to ratify, had no hostile object to answer. It was entirely conservative; and while it stipulated the separate independence of Affghanistan, it bound the Shah, under severe penalties, to respect the political rights of his neighbours. As to the mission of Captain Vicovich, it had purely a commercial object, and was intended to secure in behalf of Russian industry, a participation in the advantages

which the jealous and exclusive spirit of British enterprize had hitherto monopolized in every part of Central Asia. The tone and temper of this remark, as well as the stress laid upon the injury intended against Russian manufactures by the publication of a certain book ascribed to Captain Burnes, are materially at variance with the courteous and almost obsequious terms of the more important part of the explanation. Count Nesselrode had much better make a formal complaint against the liberty of the press, than advert in an official note to its errors or abuse. Recrimination of this kind in answer to complaints against far more serious grievances, appears exceedingly trifling; and authorizes a fair presumption, that the party accused is much at a loss for some sort of excuse.

Another paragraph of Count Nesselrode's note is still more liable to censure, as it seems to imply the existence of some secret stipulations between the Czar and the Shah intended to operate at some future period against this country. Whence comes the solicitude of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh in behalf of the Shah in a misunderstanding between Herat, Persia, and England? and in virtue of what treaty is Russia called upon to take the measures of precaution alluded to in this note in consequence of the appearance of a British force in the Persian gulf? Is it supposed that England intends to conquer Persia, and march upon St. Petersburgh by the route of Herat? It is obvious that the

infatuated Sovereign of Persia has been, partly by threat and partly by persuasion, induced to apply to Russia for her good offices and advice in his quarrel with this country; and that his request has been graciously granted. As Lord Palmerston has not yet thought proper to reject the implied offer of Russian mediation, the expression of Count Nesselrode's wish that matters might be amicably arranged between the Indian Government and the Shah is perfectly natural and inoffensive: but when in a subsequent note (No. 115) the Count ventures to say, in reference to an assurance which Lord Palmerston had given of his sincere desire to re-establish our intercourse with Persia, that "the Russian Cabinet in taking note of that assurance, expects to receive the proof of its entire fulfilment," he makes use of expressions somewhat dry and didactic, and little calculated to accelerate, if not intended to retard, the professed object of the Russian Minister.

But, upon the whole, the three notes of Count Nesselrode (No. 110, 115, and 116) are far more satisfactory to this country, on account of their admissions and concessions, than objectionable in some other respects. Our readers will probably find it hard to believe after the official details contained in our narrative, that Count Simonich had none but the most pacific and conservative instructions; and that Captain Vicovich had been intrusted with a purely commercial mission. Be

this as it may, the assertion of Count Nesselrode that such were the facts should be held satisfactory, followed as it was by the admission that Count Simonich had given Great Britain a right to complain (20th Nov. 1838, No. 114), and coupled with the intimation that he had been recalled from Tehran, and replaced by General Duhamel. The same satisfaction has also been offered by Count Nesselrode with regard to Captain Vicovich; whose *commercial* mission in Affghanistan seems to have abruptly ceased by his peremptory recall.

The great importance, however, of Count Nesselrode's notes consists not so much in the intrinsic value of the concessions made to this country, which may after all turn out a mere delusive expedient to gain time, as in the moral effect likely to arise in Europe and in Asia, from the knowledge of the fact that England has ventured to defy the power of Russia, and that Russia has shrunk before the challenge. On this ground, policy requires that the Count's three notes should be translated into every Eastern language, and copiously distributed in those countries, where there must be numerous witnesses of the facts alleged by one party and controverted by the other.

The reputation of ability which the Russian cabinet has long enjoyed in Europe, scarcely admits the supposition, that when Count Nesselrode went so far in his disavowals and concessions, with the view to deprecate a contest with this country,

he remained blind to the serious injury which his retrograde policy could not fail to inflict upon the moral influence of his government throughout the world. Having encouraged Persia during four years to resist the just demands, and counteract the policy of England, and having no doubt promised every assistance in case of war, Russia abandons the Shah when he is at last seriously threatened with an invasion arising out of her intrigues; and instead of proceeding with an army to his rescue, the Czar finds it more prudent to advise his infatuated ally to grant that reparation to England which, had it not been for Russian interference, would not for one moment have been withheld.

Lord Palmerston, in answer to the official communication of Count Nesselrode's notes, expresses himself satisfied with their general import, and forbears to notice some minor points of dissent. He concludes with expressing a hope, that should Russian Ambassadors, and other officers, faithfully adhere in future to the letter of their instructions, there will be no reason to apprehend any interruption to the harmony which happily at present exists between the two Governments. But with reference to the resumption of our diplomatic intercourse with Persia, his Lordship observes, that, however desirable, the return of our mission to Tehran depends entirely upon the conduct of the Shah of Persia, and the nature of the apology and satisfaction we are likely to obtain—the expectations of

Russia upon this subject, and the pointed phrase of Count Nesselrode, seem not to have produced much effect upon his Lordship's nerves; or to have induced him in any way to alter his course, as may be seen in the Appendix containing his despatch to Mr. Mc Neill (20th March, 1838,) and his circular to Earl Granville and Sir Frederick Lamb, bearing the same date, (No. 111 and 117.)

Having now waded through the 206 folio pages of this intricate correspondence, we shall conclude our analysis of it with a few remarks on its general character, and on the future consequences likely to follow the events which it records.

Fully alive to our interests in the East, and suspicious from the origin of the designs of Russia, our Cabinet seems somewhat liable to the imputation of having exceeded the common bounds of patience and of forbearance, to a degree scarcely *compatible* with national dignity. An anxious desire to avoid collision—a nervous apprehension of war—are the leading features of almost every despatch from the Foreign Office. Praiseworthy in the beginning, this feeling predominates over so long a period of time, as to become irksome and disgusting to the reader,—fully conscious of the futility of perseverance in a course which had obviously failed in its object, and seemed calculated to promote the very measures it was meant to deprecate. Nevertheless it must be acknowledged, in justice to the Foreign Office, that when every art of conciliation

had been fairly exhausted, the energetic measures resorted to were skilfully contrived, and manfully put in practice; nor is Lord Palmerston open to the accusation of having proceeded from the extreme of indolent forbearance to the opposite extreme of insolent menace or a hasty resolution to resist. Consistent throughout in his desire to obtain his object by persuasion, he resorts to a demonstration of force with professed reluctance, yet with a determination to assume all the responsibility of his actions.

The conduct of Persia in these transactions is such as might be expected from the ignorance, the weakness, and the propensity to artifice and cunning common to all Asiatic nations. Instinctively distrustful of Russian friendship, yet feeling the fatal necessity of submitting to the guidance of their hateful neighbours, the poor Persians became reluctant instruments of a policy which they felt should not have been their own. Actuated by fears which had gradually increased by the forbearance of England, and stimulated also in some measure by an insidious appeal to their pride and ambition, they ventured to insult and to exasperate a nation hitherto considered their most staunch support, and they had no sooner committed themselves than the voice of conscience, the cooler reflections of experience, warned them of their danger, and induced them to retract their foolish arrogance; but on every such occasion a hand unseen invariably

interfered, and contributed to widen the breach and exasperate the wound; so that, by the growing uncertainty and contradiction of their conduct, they finally involved themselves in a labyrinth of difficulties, alike disagreeable and perplexing to every party implicated in this captious controversy.

The conduct of Russia is not entirely free from the same objections; and when carefully inquired into, is as liable to the reproach of intrigue, of cunning, of rashness, and of weakness as that of the Shah. A spirit of opposition to England is apparent from the very origin of the negociations, and so long as it was resisted by the more gentle means of remonstrance and expostulation, it continued to grow up, and to bid defiance to our policy; but no sooner had it exceeded the bounds of endurance, than it shrunk into the tame and almost abject submission, which we have already noticed as the characteristic features of Nesselrode's despatches, in spite of here and there a short sentence of sullen discontent, introduced apparently by a different hand.

They who are acquainted with the high notions which the Emperor of Russia entertains of his own power, and the public in general who have noticed the inflated tone of exaggeration, with which on every occasion that power is proclaimed to the world, may be somewhat astonished at the facility with which His Imperial Majesty has condescended to humble his pride before the firmness of attitude

for a wonder, in this one instance, assumed by the Whig Ministers of England; but their astonishment will cease, and the seeming anomaly of this notorious fact will be easily explained, by a short inquiry into the actual situation of both England and Russia, and their respective influence on the affairs of Europe.

Gigantic in size, but unwieldy and ill-proportioned in its bulk and frame, the Russian empire, unlikely to tempt the ambition or cupidity of any future conqueror, and protected by its dreary wastes and freezing latitudes against any renewal of an attempt, which Napoleon alone, in the pride and giddiness of the influence of his apparently irresistible genius, ventured to undertake—is secure from dissolution by the agency of any external cause. It contains, however, within itself the seeds of future revolution; and events of the most appalling nature may at no distant day plunge that vast region into an endless civil war. Twenty millions of male slaves, kept under the iron yoke of despotic government, and groaning under the still more intolerable tyranny of their immediate feudal superiors, have long since begun to feel the weight and degradation of their lot, and to give signs of impatience. We could fill an entire volume with interesting details on this momentous topic, but as it is here only incidentally connected with our inquiry, we shall abstain from further remark, reserving our disclosures for a future occasion. Our

present brief allusion to the subject is intended to confirm the truth of our assertion in reference to the internal weakness of Russia, and to account for her recent submission to British power in the East.

Independent of the above cause, the discontent of the general mass of the population, since the accession of the present Emperor to the throne, has been a growing evil, and the more dangerous as it is connected with superstition. Partaking in the feelings and prejudices of Asiatic nations, the Russians became early impressed with the belief that Nicholas was not born lucky; and every succeeding event of his reign seems calculated to confirm the truth of this discouraging impression.

But the event which has the most contributed to weaken his power, and to extinguish, in the estimation of Europe, the moral influence of his artful policy, is the insurrection of Poland; nor has he been able, even though he has succeeded in crushing the independence of that unfortunate country, to recover the ground which he seems to have irrecoverably lost. Poland lies prostrate at his feet, yet in her bleeding and humbled condition, she is still a subject of anxiety and dread; and instead of filling the ranks of his army with trusty thousands, Poland requires the presence of eighty thousand Russian bayonets to prevent her rising again.

His affairs in the East are in no better condition. In spite of his encroachments upon Persia and

upon Turkey—in spite of the refinements of his policy, and of the preponderance of his influence in the councils of his Asiatic neighbours, Russian power is hated in the East, and the apparent friendship which now subsists between the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh and the nations of Asia is in reality but an ill disguised enmity—a concentrated hatred, ready to break out on the first favourable opportunity.

All the above elements of weakness and strife would burst out into a blaze on a declaration of war between Russia and this country. Unlikely at present, that war appears to us sooner or later inevitable. The military foundation and superstructure of the Russian Empire are calculated to make war one of the essential conditions of its existence; and we find accordingly that aggrandizement or conquest has been the invariable policy of every Emperor since the time of Peter the Great. Bordering nominally upon the Pruth, and really upon the Danube on one side, on Mount Caucasus in appearance and upon the gates of Herat on the other, the magnitude of the Russian Empire is threatening alike to the independence of Europe and of Asia; and particularly dangerous to our commercial prosperity and the safety of our Colonial Empire; nor are we able to discover any other means of averting the evils likely to arise from the present posture of affairs, than the restoration of the ancient kingdom of Poland; a subject which we are satisfied will in

the natural course of events force itself upon the serious consideration of Europe at no very distant period.

Whether England, France, or Austria shall take the lead in a crusade against Russia, it is difficult to conjecture, as every one of these countries has separate motives to concur towards the accomplishment of the same object. England might be called upon to defend the integrity of her possessions in the East, Austria her own national independence, and France her liberty and the dynasty of her choice. The three united might perhaps combine their councils and their strength; but in the supposition that England may have to fight single-handed against Russia, and without assistance from any western power, let us briefly inquire into the probable chances of such a contest.

Whatever fears may have been expressed in Parliament respecting the safety of Brighton, Portsmouth and Sheerness, being placed in imminent peril by an hostile attempt on the part of the Russian Navy, no man in possession of his reason, and in the least acquainted with the comparative efficiency of our own fleet and that of the Czar, is at all likely to feel the least uneasiness upon this subject. It is as certain as any future human event may be considered in such a light, that whatever Russian men of war might be at sea in the declaration of war, would be dealt with as effectually, as the more formidable navies of other powers have been disposed

of in former times,* and the vast extent of the Russian Empire having but three outlets, namely the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the White Sea, would be debarred from all commercial intercourse with the rest of the world; without any extraordinary effort of power or skill on the part of our government. Petersburgh itself, it has been held by competent judges, would not be safe from an attack by sea, and the Russian shores of the Baltic would be perpetually harassed, and in some cases materially distressed by the enterprizing energy of our sailors:

* When a comparison is made between the navies of England and Russia, most men are guided in their estimate by the respective number of ships, their rates, complement of sailors, number of guns, and weight of metal. All these essential particulars are not however sufficient to decide the question of preponderance, which is chiefly dependant on the skill and experience of both officers and men. Admitting that the vulgar, yet indispensable virtue of courage be equal on both sides; we may, without incurring the risk of being taxed either with partiality or want of modesty, claim a superiority in every thing else. Seamanship, skill, ships, sails, yards, masts, rigging, guns, carriages, locks, powder, and even matches and flints; in all these, and various other details we have decided and important advantages which we could illustrate with anecdotes, were it worth while to do so. War in less civilized ages, has been practised with success by rude Barbarians, who had to contend against effeminate and ignorant enemies, but since it has grown up, or rather revived into a science, it has called to its assistance every invention and every art of civilisation, even those which appear on a superficial inquiry to be the least connected with the subject; such for instance as chemistry, commerce, banking, &c., not to mention every branch of mathematics, surgery, and medicine.

Sevastopol, Nicolaif, and Odessa—every arsenal and every port on the Black Sea would be at our mercy; and their destruction would hurl back a century into the past, the power which Russia has so rapidly acquired in the immediate neighbourhood of Turkey to the imminent peril of the Sultan. Independent of these serious evils which England might inflict upon Russia, the loss of revenue, amounting to about one-half the entire income of the Empire, which the interruption of trade would occasion, and the discontent likely to arise among the Russian nobility and merchants, whose produce and whose industry are now almost entirely dependant upon English custom, constitute a subject of most anxious uneasiness to the Russian government.

To counteract or to defeat the hostile efforts of this country, what are the resources of Russia?

A successful march upon Constantinople would, no doubt, be an event of the greatest importance; but is there any probability that such an attempt would be easily accomplished. Before the power of Russia had received a staggering blow by the insurrection of Poland, and when the ranks of her army were filled with able officers and brave soldiers from that country, Diebitch found by experience that two campaigns were necessary to reach Hadrianople, at the head of eighteen thousand effective bayonets. This number, small as it may appear, we have reason to believe correct, even though we are aware that the muster roll of the army exhibited

in the earlier part of the war, an effective strength of one hundred and twenty thousand men, continually recruited from a reserve of seventy or eighty thousand more, who were gradually absorbed by the army of active operation. It is not our intention to insinuate that the loss of life sustained by Russia in her last war with Turkey amounted to the difference between the two extreme, yet, we repeat, correct numbers we have just mentioned; but we believe we shall be held by Russian officers themselves, to restrict our conjectures within the bounds of moderation, when we assert that the last war of Russia against Turkey, cost the Czar from ninety to one hundred and ten thousand lives.*

* It might be said that, even according to this computation, Diebitch had still 100,000 men under his command; but several detached corps had reduced still further the efficiency of the army marching upon Constantinople. As the fortified camp and excellent position of Shumla could not be carried, its garrison was kept in check by a large body of troops. Rudchook, a strong fortress, with a numerous garrison, which the Russians did not venture to besiege, required also a corps of observation. Silistria required another, and several thousand men were necessary to keep possession of Varna, and some other places of less importance. When Diebitch ventured to turn the position of Shumla, and to march upon Hadrianople, across the lower ridge of the Balkan, leaving behind him the three important fortresses of Shumla, Rudchook, and Silistria, with their numerous garrisons, which the Russians had scarcely the means to blockade, he resorted, according to the opinion of competent judges, to a very rash measure, which would probably have led to the utter annihilation of his army, had he to contend against more disciplined and scientific enemies than the Turks. Russian superiority was not,

Comparatively few of that immense number of deaths are to be ascribed to the sword of the enemy —the far greater number perished from fatigue, the plague, and a variety of most malignant fevers, the frequent concomitants of war, and the natural offspring of the marshy banks of the Danube. All these evils were greatly aggravated by the incurable and intrepid ignorance and profligacy of the Russian medical and commissariat departments; whose officers, in several instances, incurring the risk of being tried and shot, supplied the troops with oak bark instead of quinine, and with damaged

however, so incontestable, as to relieve the mind of Diebitch from all anxiety and danger, and had the Sultan, on the arrival of the Russians at Hadrianople, met with greater enthusiasm among his subjects, when during three days he paraded in the streets of the capital the sacred banner of the prophet, Diebitch would have been in the most imminent peril. His retreat would have been impossible, except towards the sea; and the success of his march upon Constantinople, at the head of 18,000 men, might have been very doubtful, if the Turks, still sullen and dissatisfied with the destruction of the Janissaries, had felt any spark of that religious fanaticism against Russia, which had been in former times the chief source of their martial energy. We have reason to believe that the incontestable superiority of the Russian fleet was the chief inducement of the march upon Hadrianople, as it provided a retreat by sea, at Varna, the only practical movement in case of defeat or unexpected resistance. At no period during the whole war had the Russians been exposed to greater danger, than during the short interval which preceded the negotiations for peace. Constantinople, even though in sight, might have been further from their grasp than ever. It is not so easy a conquest as it is commonly imagined.

provisions instead of wholesome food. Not that the Government restricted the expense; the ruthless economy was the result of personal avarice.

But ill-provisioned and ill-supplied as the troops were during that campaign, it is matter of doubt whether they could have been supplied to anything like the extent of their wants, had Russia been unable to maintain an undisputed superiority at sea. Six or seven hundred large merchant ships, chiefly under the Austrian, the British, and the Sardinian flags, were freighted at a large expense, and incessantly employed during the whole war in carrying provisions, fodder for the cavalry, and munitions of war along the coast; nor is there any reason to doubt, that had it not been for the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino, the result of the campaign by land would have been disastrous to Russia, in the improbable supposition that it would in that case have been undertaken.

In the event of her being at war with England, Russia might, however, have the good luck to secure the doubtful neutrality of Turkey, and keeping an army of observation upon the Pruth, she might be at liberty to turn her arms against British India. Under this hypothesis, let us take a glance at the distribution of her forces. Admitting the efficient strength of her military power to be fully equal to the estimate contained in the statistical work of Mr. J. H. Schnitzler, published at St. Petersburgh in 1829, under the immediate patronage of the Go-

vernment, we shall reckon that strength at 650,300 men, namely, 29,200 guards, 304,800 regular infantry, 77,000 militia, 100,000 irregular, and 68,000 regular cavalry, 44,300 artillery, and 27,000 extra corps. We have reason to believe that, however near the truth the above statement may be, according to the muster roll of the army, considered as the sum total of a certain number of regiments of uniform proportion, the muster rolls of those regiments themselves are invariably below their full complement ; but we shall not enter into a controversial discussion upon this captious subject, and shall rest satisfied with the numbers stated, recording at the same time the fact, that with so large a standing army, Russia, in her last war with Turkey, and in the insurrection of Poland, had, in both instances, exerted and stretched to the utmost verge of capability, her military power, without being able to spare more than 150,000 men actually engaged in the field, and never more than 70,000 or 80,000 concentrated upon any given point or urgent occasion. The reason of her inability to exceed these limits is obvious, the guards and garrisons required by the immense extent of the empire, and by the military administration of every province, every town, and every village, absorb the far greater part of her standing army, and admit scarce any reduction. The garrison of St. Petersburgh alone is seldom below 30,000 men—

60,000 more are requisite in Mount Caucasus, 50,000 on the frontiers of European Turkey, and 80,000 at least in Poland, besides every coast and every frontier from Kamschatka to the shores of the Black Sea.

Under the above circumstances, it would require no trifling exertion to enable Russia to collect an army of 100,000 or 120,000 men in Georgia, with the intention of invading India. The possibility of her reaching the banks of the Indus, and of her pursuing her march to those of the Ganges, has been hitherto held in popular estimation as a visionary and impracticable scheme. The correspondence which we have reviewed is somewhat calculated to alarm, in this respect, the confidence of the public, as it appears by Mr. Mc Neill's despatches, that the difficulties which an army is likely to meet with in the length and dreary solitude of the march, are by no means so great as it is generally supposed. Mr. Mc Neill himself had once shared the common belief, but subsequent experience has convinced him of the fallacy of his opinion, as he found during the second siege of Herat, that the Persian army, 40,000 strong, had an abundant supply of forage and provisions. He lays, besides, great stress on the importance of maintaining the independence of Herat as a barrier against any attack upon India; and he supports his theory with so many able arguments, and interest-

ing details, that it would be difficult to controvert either his premises or his conclusions. Inclined to admit to a certain extent the danger which he reveals and submits to the serious attention of Government, we confess that we consider them as very remote, and as little likely, now that they are known, ever to become formidable. No doubt exists in the abstract, that an army of 60 or 70,000 Russians might penetrate as far as Hindostan, to the imminent peril of our Indian empire; but the accomplishment of such a daring scheme requires the previous concurrence of a great variety of fortunate circumstances rarely united. Of the 120,000 men likely under the most favourable supposition to be collected by Russia for this purpose, 30,000 men must remain in Georgia as a reserve, and 30,000 more would be necessary to occupy all the important passes and military positions of a journey of tremendous length; nor is it probable that more than half of the remainder would ever reach the banks of the Indus. The only possible case of serious danger would be in the supposition that Russia might be assisted by Persia, and by all the numerous and warlike tribes of Circassians, Curds, Affghans, and Turcomans, acting as auxiliaries and pioneers to the Russian army. But there is not at present the most distant prospect of this co-operation: every one of those tribes bears the most inveterate hatred against Russia, and were she assisted even by Persia, their hostility would not be

the less likely to occur. As active and as efficient as the Cossacks, the Curds and the Turcomans would perpetually harass with their excellent cavalry the march of the invaders; and to maintain, under such circumstances, a military line of communication of several thousand miles in extent, would be an utter impossibility. That line would be intercepted in twenty different points, and the entire army of the invaders would be cut off from all chance of retreat. It would be obliged to capitulate, or surrender at discretion.

We have hitherto supposed that Russia, in undertaking an expedition to the Indus, would be otherwise free from anxiety in any other quarter; but once fairly engaged in her Quixotic adventures, and in full march towards Hindostan, events might occur of so serious a character as to threaten the very foundation of her power. Sweden has yet to avenge a series of 130 years of overbearing insolence and accumulated spoliations; and Poland, scarcely kept under the yoke by the presence of 80,000 men and the consciousness that this number might be increased in case of need, would again rise in arms, even though uninvited and unassisted by any other power. The desire of recovering the common rights of freemen, which during the last insurrection had prevailed over the dictates of unmanly prudence, has suffered no abatement from disappointed hope, and the love of liberty has received an accession of strength from the cruel abuse

of the rights of victory. Poland will again rise whenever Russia may have any serious difficulties to contend with, and such is the state of exasperation of that unhappy country, that even at this moment, or indeed at any moment, England has it in her power to create a revolution in the very heart of the Russian empire.

Our Government has hitherto studiously abstained from the exertion of its moral influence on the minds of the Poles; and has wisely, in our opinion, refused to give the slightest encouragement to a cause, which is not yet sufficiently ripe in the north of Europe to warrant our being involved in the expense and hazard of a war of opinion. Nothing easier than the beginning of such a tremendous conflict, and nothing more difficult than to limit its extent and consequences within the bounds of justice and of moderation. In the metaphorical language used by Canning, the attributes of Æolus have been handed down to this country; and the trident of Neptune is as powerful to raise, as to prevent a storm, even though it might not limit its consequences or duration. Ever since the battle of Waterloo, the preservation of peace has been the anxious care of every Administration; and it has been attended with so many advantages to the civilisation of the world, that it cannot be too highly praised: yet on one occasion, at least, too great a sacrifice has been made by Lord Grey's cabinet in behalf of this policy. While we abstain from

blaming Lord Melbourne's conduct in withholding a premature encouragement to Poland, we cannot exonerate his predecessors, who were bound in honour and in justice to advocate the rights of a nation, placed by the Treaty of Vienna under our protection and the protection of all Europe. We are much inclined to doubt the solid foundation of peace preserved by unmanly submission to Russian usurpation, and we sincerely wish that the dangerous precedent of a virtual abrogation of the stipulations relating to Poland, may not at some future day give rise to greater encroachments, either on the part of Russia, or on the part of France. The people of the latter country are already too much inclined to seize upon what they have never ceased to consider as their natural boundaries, and the example set before them by the Emperor Nicholas is not calculated to cool their aspiring ambition.

To avoid this danger, and many others, the remedy which most readily suggests itself to the mind is the restoration of the kingdom of Poland. Sound policy and justice alike concur in the expediency and propriety of this measure; but to give it the fairest chance of success, the cause of Polish independence should not be identified with the triumph of any extreme and visionary theory of government. It should be promoted by an appeal to the palpable interests of Europe; not by the excitement created among the multitude. It should be represented, what it really is, as the cause of

humanity—of civil and religious liberty; not as the offspring of Republican, Radical, Whig, or Tory principles. Jarring and discordant as these principles may be, when compared to one another, there are certain axioms in politics, derived from the purest sources of morality, in which all Englishmen —all honest men, of whatever country, agree. Among these we may reckon national independence,—civil liberty, consistent with law and order, in contradistinction to anarchy, and in harmony with the manners and opinions of the age,—religious liberty, or the right not to scoff at revelation, but to understand and to interpret Scripture according to conscience, with humility and deference to the opinions of our forefathers: these are essential principles which no political sect can well dispense with; and we cannot be held up to reprobation as demagogues, for expressing a wish that they may receive a speedy application in Poland, and that the sacred cause of her national restoration may triumph with the concurrence of the wise and good of all nations and of all shades of opinion. We are aware that some honest friends of Polish emancipation have endeavoured, with greater zeal than sound discretion, to identify it with the success of exclusive theories of government—with Utopian projects of universal regeneration. But such narrow views, such visionary hopes have not been so generally entertained; as Russian policy, and sectarian prejudice, ever ready to take advantage of the slightest aberration of mind produced by excited feelings,

have artfully tried to foist upon the credulity of the better part of the public, too much inc'ined to believe in scandal, and too hasty in passing sentence of condemnation on the slightest appearance of intemperance of action or of thought. It may suit the Russian Cabinet to persuade a certain noble Marquess, conspicuous alike for soldier-like frankness and eccentricity of intellect, that the cause of Poland involves the triumph of anarchy, and the annihilation of aristocracy all over the world; but it is the bounden duty of every friend of Polish freedom to avoid giving the least colour of probability to this abominable calumny. Holding a strong opinion upon this subject, we cannot avoid the expression of our sentiments, even at a risk which we have every reason to deprecate—the risk of displeasing some worthy friends of Poland, and the still greater risk of being misinterpreted or misunderstood. We cannot help, however, recording our objection to any imprudent or hasty attempt in favour of a cause, which we consider safe as long as it proceeds by slow and measured steps, and with the assistance of sober reason. Let not a zealous desire of advocating the unalienable rights of mankind by intemperate appeals to the passions, indirectly afford encouragement to daring acts of despair. Conspiracies in behalf of freedom are the too common resource, as they are the last hope, of slavery; but as they are doomed to frequent failures, they oftener retard instead of

accelerating the final cause of emancipation. Cardinal de Retz asserts in his Memoirs, that a popular object may be known to thousands, and yet be a secret to an odious Government; and his observation is illustrated by the facts recorded in the History of the Conjuration of Venice by St. Real. It is only under similar circumstances that resistance should be attempted: the repulsive epithet of conspirator, implying culpable means and doubtful objects, is in such a case absorbed in the higher title of disinterested patriot; which precludes the possibility of suspicion, while it rejects the use of unmanly means. Neither the French Revolution of July, nor the Polish insurrection, had their origin in conspiracies, according to the strict definition of the word; but several subsequent partial and unsuccessful attempts, in Poland and in France, came fairly under this description. Morality has reproved them in France—prudence has condemned them in Poland; and it is their repetition in this latter country that we would fain discourage. The open and manly support which her sacred rights have met with in England has, in our opinion, promoted her cause far more than any secret resolves or dark intrigues which may have taken place on the Continent. Englishmen disdain to imitate the policy of the Russian Ambassador at Tehran, detected in a most cunning attempt to excite against this country the religious bigotry of the Mahomedans of India; and while we have

fearlessly espoused the cause of Poland, we carefully avoid the selfish and despicable expedient of annoying our secret enemies, by raising hopes and exciting insurrections, when we are not, as a nation, prepared to share the dangers to which we might entice our friends.

From the general tenour of our narrative of the facts elicited by the Persian correspondence, no doubt can possibly be entertained of the ambitious projects of Russia on the integrity of our empire. An invasion of India, however difficult, is by no means impossible, and the obstacles and dangers likely to obstruct and to retard the completion of the scheme of conquest, appear not to be insuperable, or even so formidable as it is commonly imagined. In the supposition indeed, at present improbable, that the Asiatic nations and tribes on the frontiers of Russia, might be induced to associate themselves with their powerful neighbour in a common war of plunder and ambition, most difficulties would be removed, and the safety of the British empire placed in imminent peril. It is, therefore, the bounden duty of our Government to cultivate by all the arts of peace, the friendship, and in case of attack to secure the assistance of most Asiatic governments of whatever kind, and to demonstrate to their rulers, a truth already known by instinct among the people—namely, that it is their interest to prefer the alliance of England, even at the risk of provoking the enmity of

Russia. The hostility of the Emperor Nicholas is far less likely to inflict upon them the evils which would inevitably attend on his protection.

In reference to this subject, we cannot avoid expressing our opinion on the impolicy of our conduct towards the brave and independent Circassians. On the breaking out of the last war between Russia and Turkey, the Czar was not in possession of one single spot along the extensive coast included between the entrance of the Cimmerean Bosphorus and Trebizond. The Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, on the eve of hostilities, spontaneously proclaimed to the world in a solemn manifesto, that the war had no other origin than a desire to vindicate the insulted dignity of the Empire, and that his Imperial Majesty distinctly renounced every intention of territorial aggrandizement, yet in spite of this declaration, the treaty of Hadrianople stipulated the cession on the part of Turkey, of the entire coast of Circassia, besides the Pashaliks of Karrs and Akalchek. The Sultan being at the mercy of his victorious enemy, readily undertook to perform an act not within his power; and his Ministers had not the courage to declare, that their master had never been *de facto* the Sovereign of Circassia, and less so *de jure* than the Pope is the feudal Lord of Naples, since the Circassians are not Mahomedans. In virtue of this absurd transaction, Russia ventures to claim as an integral part of her dominions, a vast region hitherto un-

trodden by her soldiers, except on the sea coast, on the extreme frontier, and under the immediate protection of cannon—all commercial intercourse with a country abounding in a variety of produce is forbidden, and a British vessel seized upon the untenable ground of the existence of a blockade, is subsequently confiscated for a supposed breach of Custom-house and quarantine regulations, having no other existence than some vague and obscure enactment, never carried, from want of power, into execution, and never formally promulgated. This flagrant violation of the law of nations has been too readily suffered by our Government; and is keenly felt as a national humiliation. As the capture of the Vixen was originally attempted to be justified by Russia on the plea that she had infringed on the blockade of the coast—the moment that plea was abandoned, the restoration of the vessel should have been peremptorily insisted upon. The law of nations is as jealous in this case, as the law of treason is with us, and it is as derogatory to national dignity that a ship seized for a supposed breach of its provisions should be subsequently condemned by municipal law; as it would be odious to carry into effect a verdict of theft in a trial for high treason.

How long the people of this country may be doomed to endure similar acts of aggression, it is not easy in the present aspect of parties to conjecture. A most effectual means of preventing their

repetition would be an acknowledgment on our part of the independent sovereignty *de facto* of Circassia. This would enable us to establish commercial relations with that country without deciding the question *de jure* now pending between Russia, Turkey, and Circassia. The high authority of Sir James Mackintosh, and the notorious precedent of the South American colonies of Spain, might be consistently adduced in support of this opinion.

Individuals, unfortunately too few, who may have watched with perseverance and attention, the insidious progress of Russian aggrandisement and power, will perhaps readily acknowledge that the gigantic growth of that empire is to be traced fully as much to stealthy negociation as to success in war. Innumerable instances in support of this truth might be mentioned, and among these the treaty of Unkiar-Eskelessi, which is now on the eve of expiration, we trust never to be renewed. Aware of the designs of the Russian Cabinet, and at present wide awake to the dangers of our own relations in the East, we hope that our Ministers will not again relapse into their wonted lethargy; and should they find it necessary to proceed to extremities, the nation we are satisfied will cheerfully respond to their call. To restrain the ambition of Russia within proper bounds, should be in future the leading feature of their foreign policy.

When Peter the Great ascended the throne of

Russia in 1696, little was known of that empire in Europe besides the name. His conquests upon Sweden, and upon the Turks, were the first acts which revealed to the world the existence and extent of his power. It however created no jealousy among the more civilized nations of Christendom, being looked upon as too remote in point of distance, to be comprised within the circle of Western politics. Communications in those days were difficult and dangerous; and information of every kind neither general nor easy of access. A journey overland to St. Petersburgh occupied almost as much time, as at present one to India. The population of Russia was extremely thin, and travellers had often to cross large tracts of desert, obliged to carry along with them provisions, and often water, for the entire journey; the only human beings who were occasionally to be met with in these solitudes were a few scattered freebooters, generally stragglers belonging to more formidable bands of Cossacks, at that time independent. This was particularly the case on the side of Turkey, towards Azoph and Taganrok, on the river Don, and towards Kioff, and the Dnieper. Little value therefore was attached, in the estimation of European statesmen, to conquests, which however extensive in point of territory, were destitute of wealth, and deficient in population. The facility with which Europe submitted to this first encroachment on the part of Russia, created a dangerous precedent which the

Empress Catherine II. turned to her own advantage. She extended the conquests of Peter the Great from the Dnieper to the Boog, and from the Boog to the Dniester on one side; and from Taganrok, on the river Don, to the shores of the Black Sea, on the other, incorporating thus the Crimea, the ancient kingdom of Mithridates, in her already gigantic empire. As in the times of Peter, the greatest obstacle which stood in the way of his ever conquering Constantinople, appeared to be the insuperable difficulties of marching an army through the immense extent of desert which separated the populous part of his empire from the Turkish capital, so after Catherine had extended her frontiers, the same reason continued to be urged as a motive of security. The aspect of the country had undergone no change—it still continued a dreary waste; destitute of every resource; without fuel, in many places without water; scarcely able to support a few miserable runaway slaves from the interior of Russia, whose presence was tolerated rather than authorised, and totally unable to supply an army with food, with shelter, or with any assistance whatever. But the soil was fine, the climate genial, and the situation advantageous; the permanent influence of these important circumstances it was even then conjectured, would sooner or later give rise to great improvements, and we find accordingly that after the lapse of forty or fifty years, the deserts conquered by Catherine, have gradually

risen into thriving and populous provinces of the empire, in spite of every obstacle which the despotism of the Government and the introduction of feudal vassalage are apt to create. The deserts which formerly protected Turkey, are now converted into advanced posts of attack. They contain a hardy population of three millions of inhabitants; and produce in the greatest profusion, all the necessaries of life. Corn of every description is cheaper there than anywhere else; black cattle and sheep abound; and horses might be found in sufficient numbers to mount the cavalry of the whole empire. Thus the means of aggression of Russia towards Turkey have rapidly increased since the reign of the Empress Catherine, owing to the very acquisitions which, at the time she added them to her empire, were held in so contemptible a light by the rest of Europe. This was proved beyond a doubt during the last war. The Russian army could never have proceeded to Hadrianople, if the chief depot of the supplies necessary for its maintenance, and the means of transport had, as in former times, been established at Moscow; but instead of having recourse to the distant capital, extensive magazines were collected in the towns founded on the extreme limits of the empire, and in the conquered territory;—among these we may enumerate Odessa, originally known, and still remembered as a dreary bay on the shores of the Black Sea, and now a wealthy commercial sea-port, contri-

buting to the extent of five hundred thousand pounds per annum, towards filling the treasury—Sevastapol in the Crimea, an important naval station, founded by Catherine ;—Nicholaïf, on the Boog, head quarters of the Admiralty, and a naval dockyard, created by Alexander;—Kerson, founded by Potemkin, a commercial town ;—Bender, the residence of Charles XII. of Sweden, now a Russian fortress ; and various other places, which it is unnecessary to enumerate. In all these towns the troops were refreshed on their march, the reserves of the army quartered, hospitals established, and stores and provisions collected. These as well as the immense number of carts and horses necessary for conveyance, were supplied chiefly by the three Governments of Podolia, Volhinia, and Kioff, formerly part of the kingdom of Poland. The whole was raised by military requisition, and although a heavy tax upon those provinces, it by no means exceeded or exhausted their abundant resources.

The manifest tendency of Russian encroachments in the East towards disturbing the balance of power established in Europe, began to attract the notice of Mr. Pitt, at the period of the siege of Oczachoff, by Prince Potemkin ; and that great statesman had seriously determined to check the triumphant progress of Russia, when he found himself counteracted by the violent opposition of his great rival in the Senate. The Whigs were at that time little inclined to afford the slightest assistance to Turkey. Some

of their greatest orators, dazzled by a wily affectation of liberal measures, which Catherine had the peculiar talent to display with much apparent sincerity, went even so far as to raise doubts whether upon the whole, the subversion of the Turkish empire by Russia, might not ultimately redound to the advantage of civilisation. Mr. Adair was despatched to St. Petersburgh, to represent, not his Sovereign, but Mr. Fox and his party. The Empress received him with great distinction, delighted to learn that the only nation she had any reason to fear, was so divided by domestic squabbles as to be incapable of offering any serious obstacles to her career of ambition.

The same extraordinary degree of supine indifference which prevailed in the Councils of France and England, in reference to Turkey, during the entire reign of that crafty princess, seems to have existed also in reference to the partition of Poland. Louis XV. of France, sunk in the lowest depth of sensual pleasures, scarcely bestowed a moment's attention on the greatest political event and most infamous transaction of his reign. He was taken by surprise, and his slothful mind, unequal to the emergency, and inclined to sacrifice every nobler feeling to his love of indolence, at once gave up all thought of resistance, which he took it for granted had become irretrievably hopeless. The only remark he had been heard to utter, was an expression of regret that Choiseul no longer presided over his

councils, as he would never have allowed matters to proceed to so desperate an extremity.

In England, the freedom of the press, and the still greater freedom of Parliamentary discussion, represented the partition of Poland in all the native deformity of so nefarious a transaction. In justice to the Whigs, it must be said, that they stood forward in this instance the gallant advocates of an oppressed nation, the able expounders of international law, the warm friends of liberty, and the indignant vindicators of British honour and British influence; but, unfortunately, their efforts were confined to mere oratorical display. Earnest and sincere in their sentiments, they wanted the power, and perhaps that degree of daring courage, necessary to success. Their lamentations and their threats gradually dwindled into empty declamation; nor have they at a much later period, and during the last Polish insurrection, made an attempt to redeem, by some vigorous effort in behalf of oppressed Poland, the moral obligation which they had contracted towards that unhappy country by the energy of their conduct and the eloquence of their language in 1791.

But as the life of nations is incomparably longer than that of individual man, it seldom happens that the guilt or imprudence of any public act escapes sooner or later its merited reward. It is perhaps in this sense that we are to understand the particular passage of Scripture, wherein it is said "In

those days they shall say no more, the fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge." (Jeremiah, cap. 31, v. 29). The perpetrators of the immoral act of dividing among themselves the bleeding remains of Poland, have not yet, it is true, received the full measure of retaliation which they so richly deserve; but they have not altogether escaped the consequences of their guilt, and the precedent which they have established has been amply made use of to their detriment by conquering and revolutionary France. Austria and Prussia have had each in her turn to submi tt o large territorial spoliations, which were justified by the very principles they had themselves at a former period inculcated and exemplified by their shameless practice. Russia has had her capital destroyed, and the very existence of her power threatened; and the last insurrection of Poland has cost her more blood and treasure—it has weakened her moral influence in the affairs of Europe, more than her conquest had ever augmented her power and her wealth.

It has been justly remarked by Earl Grey, in one of his later Parliamentary speeches, that the partition of Poland has been the origin of a most dangerous innovation in the international law of Europe, inasmuch as it has given a legal sanction to the acquisition by physical force in defiance of right, and in contempt of justice. It is difficult to conjecture how far the recent example of Poland ex-

ercised a baneful influence over the councils of republican France, or over the mind of the great man who subsequently became the military dictator of that country. Had no precedent existed, it may be matter of doubt whether even his aspiring ambition would have so readily incorporated with his empire nations and countries totally averse to a similar proceeding. The influence of his genius, the glorious events of his reign, the solid advantages attached to the qualification of Frenchmen, in which most conquered nations participated, have not been sufficiently strong to counteract the repulsive principles and prejudices to which they were opposed, or to overcome and obliterate the feelings of national independence, and the manners and habits of a different state of society. Hence Napoleon, who considered himself strengthened by the numerous battalions of Italians, Germans, and Dutchmen, with which he swelled the ranks of his army, found himself abandoned by them in his hour of need, not because he was their tyrant,—no conqueror in history deserves less to be branded with this name, but he had been their victor, and he was still their master. A feeling of humbled pride had never ceased to rankle in their breasts, and they eagerly seized upon the first favourable opportunity to vindicate their national independence.

With so illustrious an example before us of the retribution which seems to be the destined lot of an unscrupulous exercise of power, are we to despair

of the cause of Poland? Difficulties overcome by the mighty genius of Napoleon could not be eradicated by him, and ultimately revived to hasten his downfall. The same deep-rooted causes exist in Poland, nothing can annihilate them, and is the Emperor of Russia more likely to succeed where Napoleon has failed? It is not intended here to establish a parallel between the treatment which conquered nations have experienced at the hands of France and those of Russia. The comparison would be as much in favour of the French as the moral and political character of their Emperor is superior to that of the Autocrat. Dissimilar in every respect, none but an abject flatterer of the one, or a personal enemy of the other, could ever find between them the slightest point of resemblance.

But the greater the oppression, the more violent and insulting the treatment of unhappy Poland; the greater the danger, the more probable the chance of reaction in a moment of despair. They who have nothing to hope, have scarce anything to fear. To this feeling may be ascribed the late, for it will not be the last, insurrection of Poland. The generous and ardent spirit of youth begun, in a moment of holy enthusiasm, a most unequal contest, without consulting their elders, and almost against their will. In an ecstacy of admiration at the noble result of the struggle between tyranny and freedom, which had just been obtained in France, every suggestion of prudence was indignantly

spurned; nor could any patriotic Polander find within himself the prodigious degree of coolness and dissimulation necessary to condemn an attempt which every nobler feeling of his heart secretly admired. Let us hope that such fine sentiments will in future be kept within the controul of prudence, and that no fresh outbreak of popular indignation will again occur until a favourable opportunity, which cannot fail to present itself, has fairly arisen. The success of a generous effort on behalf of freedom, is oftener due to a lucky concurrence of apparently trifling incidents than to feats of valour or to adequate means. The gradual obliteration of the few vestiges of nationality, and civil liberty, stipulated by the treaty of Vienna, had so exasperated Poland, as to render a future revolution a matter of absolute necessity. Had it occurred at the time that Russia was fairly engaged in no ordinary difficulties by her war with Turkey, the triumph of the Polish cause would probably have been secured. Yet the encouragement which that incident afforded, was thought unworthy of reliance, and a fairer prospect afforded itself in the French Revolution of July. There is no doubt that the insurrection of Poland, sooner or later inevitable, was accelerated by an event of such immense importance. Warsaw responded to the invitation of Paris; and Poland has expatiated in her dearest blood the crimes imputed to France, and has warded off on the Vistula the storm which threatened the banks of the Seine.

A debt of gratitude has thus been contracted by Frenchmen, which may be some day redeemed. It can never be forgotten, undervalued or cancelled by hospitality to the victims of a common cause. The national voice cannot fail in this instance to prevail at a future day over the frigid policy of the government. French pride, humbled by submission to Russia, has yet been unable to digest the celebrated phrase imprudently used by Sebastiani, "l'ordre regne à Varsovie." Whenever the happy hour which will summon again to arms the sons of oppressed Poland shall have struck, let us hope that the call will be responded to with fully as much patriotism, as we have witnessed in former instances; yet with more method and greater discretion. A false start is to be deprecated as it might be the harbinger of another disappointment. In the race, however true it might be, in the words of the greatest poet of our age that,

> Freedom's battle once begun,
> Bequeathed by bleeding sire to son,
> Though often baft is always won,—

the less frequently it is "baft" the better; hence Poland should be as slow in her next attempt, as determined in drawing the sword to throw away the scabbard. Our ardent devotion to her noble cause, should it not give us the right to advise, will at least plead our apology, for our venturing to address a few friendly words of admonition to her noble sons in foreign lands:—feeling with exquisite sorrow the

misfortunes of their country; and somewhat inclined to repine against the apathy of governments, who have hitherto neglected their sacred rights, several of them put their entire trust in the future triumph of pure and unalloyed democracy, and unseasonably employ their time, and exhaust the energy of their vigorous minds in discussions on the nature of the constitution best suited to their native land, when it shall be rescued from slavery. Disclaiming any intention of implying censure, and holding that every freeman has the undoubted right to entertain and to proclaim in moderate language, his own honest opinions on politics and on every other subject, yet we may on the score of prudence, and impropriety of time and place, condemn as premature all similar disquisitions,—which under present circumstances, might divide not only the Poles themselves, but also the numerous friends of the cause of Poland. Whether the democratic, the aristocratic or the monarchical principle should prevail in the future form of government suited to emancipated Poland, is a question which foreigners are not called upon to decide, nor is it our intention to propound or to give any decided preference to any Utopian scheme of our own; to condemn America by a comparison with England, or ancient Athens by a parallel with ancient Rome. All that we assert is that the first, the paramount question in reference to Poland, is the vital and preliminary measure of shaking off a foreign yoke—the iron

yoke of Russian despotism, which has crushed her national independence. This is an object in which men of all parties may concur, not only in this country but also in several others. It may be viewed in the light of a purely diplomatic and military question. It may grow up to be identified with British, and by degrees with European policy. As this seems the only sound practical state of the matter, so it is also the only popular one; in the best acceptation of the word popularity, which we apprehend to mean the favour that accompanies the assent given by the reasoning faculty of mankind to some feasible project of improvement, and not the admiration produced by excitement on the promulgation of some visionary offspring of the brain.

Most fervently do we hope, that national independence will be in future the only object which will engage the attention of the Polish exiles; and that all minor political questions will be adjourned till that great end shall have been accomplished. It is not difficult to trace the origin of the metaphysical discussions on government, which have preceded and survived the fall of Warsaw to the French Revolution of July. Equally noble in their origin, the two events have however no common features of resemblance—in the one case an independent nation defeated a nefarious plot in behalf of despotism, contrived by the overweening folly of their own native king, and a few of his natural born subjects—in the other, the people rose against a foreign tyrant.

Particular forms of government, although warmly advocated by particular parties, had little connexion with the main object of the insurrection, which was at first confined entirely to national emancipation Temperately discussed in the outset, these captious disquisitions soon became violent, and overspread the land with perplexity and discord; chiefly because they were premature, and we regret to say that as they contributed to distract the public attention from the war, they had no trifling influence on the disasters in which it has closed.

There are only three ways of preventing the future emancipation of a conquered country, the first consists in the admittance of its inhabitants to the fullest participation in the rights, immunities, and privileges of the conquerors themselves; this has been the policy of the Romans. It has been also the successful policy of England with regard to Scotland, converted by the act of union into an integral part of the Empire. Even this, the safest and mildest method is slow and gradual in its operation, and cannot be considered as fully accomplished until the language and manners, customs and interests of the two nations have merged in common uniformity. The next is the precarious, and costly expedient of keeping up a large standing army ready to crush the first attempt, bearing the slightest appearance of an insurrection. Ireland has been misgoverned in this manner for several centuries; and has not even at this moment entirely

emerged from this humiliating condition. Independent of the uncertainty and ruinous expense of a system of military coercion, the conquest itself far from being an accession of national strength, is on the contrary a perpetual source of alarm and weakness, as in reality the most dangerous of all foes, a domestic enemy, must be provided against. The third way of governing a conquered country is that of Alaric and Tamerlane, names which will be handed down with execration to the latest posterity. It consists in the extermination of the vanquished. Some of the successors of Mahomet II. have at various periods tried this experiment upon the unfortunate Greeks. Ibrahim Pacha renewed the attempt under our own eyes, and failed. Greece has been restored to her nationality, chiefly by the efforts of France and England, who undertook the crusade under the influence of Canning's eloquence, more in obedience to a chivalrous feeling of gratitude to the memory of the noble ancestors of the degenerate Greeks, than in the pursuit of any plan of political advantage. The principle of extermination seems to have been adopted also by the Russian Government. It is not practised after the clumsy and impolitic manner of the Turks, by an indiscriminate use of the sabre. Public executions are not frequent in Poland; but thousands upon thousands, men, women, and children, are doomed to untimely death from disease, fatigue, exhaustion, thirst, and hun-

ger, in the deserts of Siberia; in the dreary wastes of Georgia; and among the inhospitable rocks of Mount Caucasus. It is thus intended to accomplish in Poland, what has already been performed in the Crimea. That beautiful peninsula, at the time it was conquered by Catherine, contained a much larger population of Tartars than at present of every race. Under its native sovereigns, the Crimea, now the Russian province of Tauris, held about three millions of inhabitants; at this moment it scarcely contains six hundred thousand, and of these not more than half are descendants of the original owners of the soil.

By means worthy of Alaric and Gengis Khan, the Russian Government seems to have determined on the slow, but certain and infallible destruction of the Polish race, excépting from this doom those who may by abjuration of their religion, and conversion to the Greek faith, tranquillize the jealousy of power. It is much to be feared that so atrocious a project, will gradually progress towards final consummation, unless the patience of Providence should be soon exhausted, and some political event should arise in Europe, calculated to change entirely the present gloomy prospects of unhappy Poland. It is worthy of remark, that ever since the partition of that devoted country, Europe has been in an unsettled unsatisfactory state. Schemes of spoliation, and wars of ambition and of conquest have succeeded each other in rapid succession. Law and justice and

equity, constantly appealed to, are daily violated with shameless effrontery, and the balance of power, so essential to peace and civilization, has been in perpetual oscillation between opposite extremes. It may not be therefore unreasonable to hope, that a solution may some day be found to some of the greater evils complained of, in the restoration of the ancient kingdom of Poland. Even the Duke of Wellington himself, who was the first to proclaim the policy of giving a great moral lesson to France, may at the proper moment, advocate the greater necessity of teaching the same lesson to Russia. The restoration of Poland may at a future period become identified with the safety of the British empire in the East; and with the general interests of the rest of Europe. We are aware that statesmen are little inclined, and have scarce leisure to discuss hypothetical cases, which may never happen; or to provide against remote and contingent dangers. In war, as well as in politics, the opportunity must occur, the *casus fœderis* must arise, to enable the general to show his coolness and judgment,—the diplomatist his skill. Europe is not destined, however, to realise, in our times at least, the amiable dream of the French philosopher, who seriously submitted to the consideration of Frederick II. of Prussia, commonly called the Great, an elaborate treatise on the expediency and the means of stipulating perpetual peace among mankind. Whenever the dreadful necessity of war may force itself upon

Europe, it may afford some consolation to the friends of Poland to know, that it will inevitably revive the question of her restoration.

No sooner had the liberties of Europe escaped the grasping hand of Napoleon, than a power rose upon the ruins of his empire far more threatening to the peace and civilization of mankind; and Russia has since his downfall exercised an overbearing influence on the affairs of the world. The vast extent of that country, her immense resources —her military constitution, and the warlike habits and education of her population, must have made a deep impression upon the mind of the illustrious exile at St. Helena; if it be as true as it seems probable, that he declared the nations of Europe would be in a few years converted either into Cossacks, or divided into republics: there may be no reason to apprehend any such dangers at present; but let a sovereign endowed with superior talents ascend the throne of Russia; and Europe will have to repent the facility with which she has during half a century submitted to the encroachments of that power; nor is the genius of Napoleon necessary to make the Emperor of Russia an object of uneasiness and dread to every other state: the abilities of Catherine II. would be quite sufficient. This danger is certain to occur, unless Europe should interpose, when it is yet time: there is every reason to believe that the Russian Cabinet has long since formed a settled plan of uniting, if not under one

sceptre, at least in one great confederacy of ambition and conquest, the entire Sclavonic race: and should this intrigue be ever successful, Russia will rule the world from the banks of the Ganges, to the shores of the Hellespont and of the Adriatic. England and Austria have both the most immediate and most evident motives to prevent the consummation of this gigantic project; and what their independence and safety requires, cannot be held in a different light either by France, or by any other country. Let the kingdom of Poland be raised as a barrier,—as an intermediate power between Vienna and St. Petersburgh, between Moscow and Constantinople, and let the existence of that kingdom deprive Russia for ever of every hope of conquest in Persia, in Turkey, and in India. It is only by means of the restoration of Poland that the peace and security of Europe will be placed on a solid foundation—any other measures will be mere palliative and temporary expedients; which might perhaps contribute to retard, but never to obviate, the ultimate necessity of applying the great, the only effectual remedy, which sound policy and justice imperiously require.

NOTE.

We had no sooner sent to the press the above analysis and remarks upon the correspondence relating to the affairs of Persia and Affghanistan, than we had unexpectedly put into our hands No. 5, 6, and 7, of the series; the first and second explanatory of the part which the Indian Government took in the negociation, the last referring to the occupation of the Island of Karrak, situate in the Persian Gulf, not far from Bushire, the spot where our resident and his suite were threatened with the fate of Mr. Gribareif, the Russian Minister, massacred with his servants at Tehran some years ago. It appears from the instructions (No. 3, Sept. 5, 1836) transmitted to Captain, now Sir Alexander Burnes, by the Secretary to the Governor-General of India, that the attention of Lord Auckland was directed, soon after his assumption of the government, to the navigation of the Indus, and that commercial treaties, advantageous to all parties, had been entered into with the several states bordering on that river. Whether these measures be the result of an enlightened design to promote the general interests of trade, and thereby the diffusion of knowledge and civilisation, or whether they originate in a plan to counteract, by the creation of the new and peaceful ties of commercial interests, the insidious intrigues of Russia and her infatuated ally the Shah of Persia, we have not the means to decide: probably both motives concurred to stimulate the activity and watchfulness of Lord Auckland, and the perusal of these dispatches affords satisfactory evidence that his exertions have been crowned with merited success.

In corroboration of Mr. Mc Neill's opinion on the possibility of supplying an army with provisions in its march towards British

India, and in support of our own belief that the difficulties which we consider at present insuperable, would be entirely removed in the event of a Russian force being assisted by the native population of Central Asia, we may refer to a despatch of Captain Burnes (No. 6, Oct. 4, 1837), giving an account of the present state of Cabool, and of its political and social intercourse with Persia. It appears that in the beginning of the last century, anarchy had so enfeebled the latter country as to have enabled the Affghans to overrun the fairer portion of it, and to make themselves masters of Ispahan; but on the accession of Nadir Shah to the throne, the invaders were expelled, and in their turn conquered by that powerful prince, who converted his old enemies into allies, and with their assistance carried his victorious arms into India, which he plundered precisely a hundred years ago. As the power of Nadir Shah, however great in his own times and country, had never equalled that of Russia, and as he had probably recourse to no very gentle means of conversion, the historical details adverted to by Captain Burnes should not be lost upon our Government. There is no doubt that at present all the nations and tribes bordering upon or holding intercourse of any kind with Russia, feel the utmost repugnance to an alliance with the Northern Bear. His brutal strength is an object of dread among them, and his capricious temper and Punic faith inspire universal distrust and detestation; but the same feelings which had existed against Nadir Shah soon gave way to stronger passions—to the love of a life of adventure and plunder, which they had no other means of pursuing except under his banner; and as their manners and customs are precisely what they were in Nadir's age, it would be folly to put our trust either in the moderation of Russia, or the antipathy which is at this moment the common feeling of Asiatics in reference to that country.

In his commercial negociations with Dost Mahommed Khan of Cabool (No. 7, Oct. 5, 1837), Captain Burnes found him apparently ready and even anxious to promote the success of his mission; yet in reality the Ameer had no other object than that of securing to himself whatever advantage he might get from whatever quarter. He was very inquisitive in reference to Russian influence in Turkey

and Persia, adverted to our relations with the Emperor Nicholas, and spoke of the control which heexercised over the trade of Toorkistan. At the same time he wrote a public letter (No. 8, Cabool, Oct. 25, 1837,) to the chiefs of Kandahar, and blamed their intention to send the son of one of them to the Shah, accompanied by the Persian ambassador (Elchee). He expatiated upon the advantages of British friendship, extolled the power of England, and expressed his displeasure that he had not been consulted on the propriety of the overtures made to Persia. This advice and reproof he repeated in a private letter (No. 9), and Captain Burnes (No. 10) addressed the chiefs of Kandahar in the same strain of disapprobation, in reference to the intended embassy to Persia.

It is doubtful whether Dost Mahommed Khan was sincere, or had any settled plan of conduct from the very beginning of these negociations. Be this as it may, his advice and the warning of Captain Burnes had no effect upon the chiefs of Kandahar, who had now fully determined upon sending an agent to Tehran, well supplied with presents, according to the universal custom of Eastern nations. The Russian ambassador was not forgotten in the distribution of these gifts of friendship, and four shawls of Cashemeer were destined for his share. Dost Mahommed Khan continued, however, to express his disapprobation, and to give proofs of his sagacity, in frequent declarations of his belief in the ambitious views of Russia; but while he spoke and ostensibly acted in this manner, he betrayed hostile intentions towards Peshawur, and Lord Auckland found it necessary to caution him against his committing himself with Rujeet Sing, as in that case Captain Burnes had instructions to withdraw from Cabool (No. 18, Jan. 20, 1838).

Captain Vicovich was by this time in full activity, and his intrigues had begun to operate effectually upon the wavering mind of Dost Mahommed, already inclined to views of ambition. Captain Burnes, in a letter addressed to Mr. MacNaughten, gives various interesting details on the movements of this Russian emissary, who had informed the Ameer "that the Emperor of Russia was superior in his dominions, and could act for himself with promptitude, and without being delayed by consulting others; while the British Go-

vernment transacted its business by a council (punchayet), which gave rise to procrastination, and would show to him the advantage of allying himself to Russia, where no such inconveniences existed; and further that the Emperor's good will towards him would never then let Persia encroach upon this quarter." (No. 19.) Seduced by such promises, the Ameer began to look upon himself as a man of great importance, whose alliance was worth bidding for, and the price he seemed inclined to put upon it may be estimated by the importance of Peshawur, to which he laid claim as to an undoubted right, usurped by our ally Rujeet Sing. Deeply involved in a double negociation with Captain Burnes, and Captain Vicovich, in reference to this important matter, and ready to embrace either side according to his interest; he endeavoured to avoid an open rupture with our government, and protracting the period of final decision, he betrayed a great anxiety to preserve the means of deprecating the consequences of his wavering policy towards Lord Auckland. He frequently assembled his council—threw upon others the blame of his actions,—repeatedly promised to dismiss Vicovich and cajoled Captain Burnes, declaring that his departure would be probably considered in the light of an imprudent act by the people, who were more friendly to British connexion, than inclined to trust in the promises of Russia. (No. 21.)

The Ameer's councils, however, were at this period subject to rapid and frequent fluctuations; corresponding with remarkable accuracy to the favourable or unfavourable prospects of the Shah of Persia in reference to the siege of Herat; nor had the influence of Russia ceased to sway the mind of the Ameer, impressed by our forbearance with an exaggerated opinion of the power of the Emperor, whom he declared to be as much the master of Persia, as Great Britain is of India (No. 23, March 24, 1838). He as well as his brothers of Kandahar, had now entirely concentrated their hopes upon Russian protection, and finding Captain Vicovich ready to accede to all their demands, they treated Captain Burnes with great coolness; insisting upon terms which this officer had probably no authority to promise;—reasonable enough in their demands, the

rulers of Cabool required an explicit assurance of protection against Russia and Persia in case of need, which it is to be regretted that Captain Burnes felt himself obliged to give in too general terms. We are rather inclined to believe that the Ameer would have preferred our alliance to any other, could he have depended upon vigorous assistance. On the other hand, we are not to forget that he invariably connected this claim with his pretensions on Peshawur, which Lord Auckland could not have countenanced or tolerated without giving serious uneasiness to Rujeet Sing. Captain Vicovich, unfettered by similar considerations, hesitated not to promise and to guarantee whatever the Ameer required; and he undertook accordingly to summon the Maharadja in the name of Russia, to surrender Peshawur, threatening to use coercive means in case of refusal. "It is an affair between Russia and Persia, said Meerza Samee Khan, the adviser of the Kandahar chiefs, against England and the Sikhs, for Captain Vicovich has publicly declared to the Ameer that the interests of the Emperor and the Shah are identified, and though we would not trust the Shah himself, we may safely rely upon Russia."

In conformity with the above declaration, the Ameer, and the chiefs of Kandahar concluded their arrangements with Captain Vicovich, and allowed Captain Burnes to withdraw, expressing regret at his departure: they appear in this matter to have preferred what they considered the sounder policy, yet with sincere reluctance, and even with sorrow. They felt inclined to yield to their natural bias towards an alliance with England, but finding themselves courted by a greater power, they placed their country under its protection from necessity, and not from choice. (No. 24, April 25, 1838, and No. 26, April 30, 1838).

Lord Auckland had long foreseen that matters were likely to proceed to this extremity; and when he received intelligence of the fact, he was fully prepared to meet every consequence. The despatches addressed by his Lordship to the Secret Committee, (No. 1, May 22, 1838, and No. 2, August 13, 1838), the minutes of Council (12th May, 1838), and the instructions to Mr. Mac Naughten (15th May, 1838), at Lahore, fully corroborate our as-

sertion, and are worthy of an attentive perusal, as they afford most abundant direct and indirect proofs, general and circumstantial evidence of the intrigues, aspiring views, and deep designs of Russia; at the same time that they justify the measures of repression resorted to by the Indian Government. Conscious of the importance of Herat to the safety of our Eastern Empire, Lord Auckland adopted the resolution to prevent its capture, or if too late, to enforce its restoration. Secure on the side of the Burmese, and without any apprehensions of internal commotion, he collected with the greatest promptitude an army of five-and-twenty thousand men, and soon conveyed them across the Indus. This military demonstration had its origin in the stipulations of a treaty of alliance concluded between the Indian Government, Rujeet Sing, the ruler of the Punjab, and Shah-Shooja-El-Moolooch, the dethroned Sovereign of Cabool. The hostile views of Dost Mahommed Khan on Peshawur, and his dalliance with Russia, made him obnoxious alike to Lord Auckland, and to the Maharadja, and as his title to the throne had no foundation in right, his expulsion was soon resolved upon, and has probably been already accomplished. Sound policy required that a friendly power should replace in Affghanistan, the doubtful neutrality and dangerous influence of the Ameer. We are nevertheless glad to find in these despatches that Lord Auckland had determined to grant him an honourable retreat in British India.

The publication of the voluminous Parliamentary documents which we have just reviewed, will tend materially to enlighten the public on the critical situation of affairs in the East; but replete as they are with information, they scarce enable the reader to form a correct opinion, how matters are likely to end. The Shah of Persia has not yet given us the satisfaction which we have a right to expect, and if the daily press is worthy of belief, he still continues to entertain hostile intentions against Herat. With the military movements on the Indus, we are to this day imperfectly acquainted, nor is it easy to foresee either their extent or duration. The apparent submission of Russia is the only satisfactory circumstance known at present in reference to these mat-

ters. It is, however, the most important incident of the entire negociation, as there is no doubt that Russia was the main spring of the intrigue; but should it ultimately turn out that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh has resorted to pacific assurances, with no other view than to gain time, the affairs of the East will be involved in greater danger and uncertainty than ever.

APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM THE OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE ON PERSIA AND AFFGHANISTAN.

No. 8.

Substance of a Despatch from Count Nesselrode to Count Medem, communicated by Count Medem, August 22, 1834.

[Translation.]

We expect to see the Representatives of Russia and England in Persia, authorised to act in concert in a spirit of peace and union, as the despatch from my office of the 30th of June has already expressed the desire should be the case. The importance of providing, with this view, the two Representatives with corresponding instructions, is no wise diminished by the mere fact of the nomination of the hereditary Prince. That event, however satisfactory it may be, is nevertheless not in itself sufficient to consolidate the tranquillity of Persia, and to remove from that country all the elements of internal discord and disturbance. We consequently continue to think that a conformity of language and conduct on the part of the Representatives of Russia and of Great Britain, would of all political combinations be the one which would most effectually contribute to maintain the tranquillity of Persia, and to prepare the country for a new reign, without exposing that Empire to the disorders inseparable from any contested succession.

No. 10.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Ellis.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, July* 25, 1835.

You will especially warn the Persian Government against allowing themselves to make war against the Affghans.

Whether Persia is successful or not, her resources will be wasted in these wars, and her future means of defence must be diminished.

No. 11.

Mr. Ellis to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 28, 1836.*)*

(Extract.) *Tehran, November* 13, 1835.

It is unsatisfactory to know, that the Shah has very extended schemes of conquest in the direction of Affghanistan, and, in common with all his subjects, conceives that the right of sovereignty over Herat and Kandahar is as complete now as in the reign of the Suffavean dynasty. This pretension is much sustained by the success of his father, Abbas Meerza, in the Khorassan campaign, and by the suggestions of Colonel Borowski.

No. 29.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, June* 2, 1836.

It will be your duty on all occasions to discourage any ambitious schemes of foreign conquest on the part of the Shah, and to impress upon his mind the advantage which must result to Persia, from the maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring States.

With respect to the relations between the Persian Government and Affghanistan, it will be necessary for you to keep in mind the Article of the Treaty of 1814, which bears upon that subject, so long as the relations between Great Britain and Persia are regulated by that Treaty; but as His Majesty's Government would see with regret any attack made by Persia upon Affghanistan, you are authorized to tender to the Shah the good offices of the British Mission for the adjustment of any points on which differences may arise between the two nations.

No. 31.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 11, 1836.)

(Extract.) *Toorkmantchai, September* 12, 1836.

There can be no doubt, I think, that the Shah has actually marched on Herat, and that he has been encouraged, if not instigated, to undertake this expedition by the Russian Minister at his Court.

No. 34.

Viscount Palmerston to the Earl of Durham.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January* 16, 1837.

I transmit to your Excellency herewith, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister in Persia, dated the 3rd November, containing intelligence from the Persian army at that time in the field under the immediate command of the Shah, and reporting that Count Simonich, the Russian Minister in Persia, had urged the Shah to undertake a winter campaign against Herat; and I have to instruct your Excellency to ask Count Nesselrode, whether Count Simonich is acting according to his instructions, in thus urging the Shah to pursue a line of conduct so diametrically opposed to His Persian Majesty's real interests.

If your Excellency should learn from Count Nesselrode that Count Simonich is acting in obedience to his instructions, your Excellency will represent to the Russian Government, that these military expeditions of the Shah are in the highest degree unwise and injurious; that they lead him to embroil himself with neighbouring tribes, with whom, on the contrary, his sincerest friends ought to persuade him to remain at peace; and that they cause him to waste in fruitless war those resources which would be so much more advantageously employed in the improvement of his own dominions, and in organizing his civil and military establishments.

It would, however, be so contrary to all the professed principles, and declared system of the Russian Government, to have instructed Count Simonich to urge the Shah in the manner in which he is reported to have done so, that it must be assumed that the Count has been acting without instructions; and if that be the case, His Majesty's Government cannot doubt that the Russian Cabinet will put a stop to a course of conduct, so much at variance with its own declared policy, and so adverse to the best interests of an ally, for whom the Russian Government professes friendship and goodwill.

I am, &c.

(Signed,) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency the Earl of Durham,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 35.

The Earl of Durham to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14, 1837.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 24, 1837.

In conformity with your Lordship's instructions, I spoke to Count Nesselrode on the subject of the conduct of the Russian Minister in Persia. His Excellency stated, that if Count Simonich had acted in the manner stated by Mr. Mc Neill, he had done that which was in direct opposition to his instructions. The Count had been distinctly ordered to dissuade the Shah from prosecuting the present war at any time and in any circumstances.

His Excellency said that he was convinced that our Minister had been misinformed, and that Count Simonich had never given any such advice to the Shah, as that which had been attributed to him.

Count Nesselrode further stated, that he entirely agreed with the English Government as to the folly and impolicy of the course pursued by the Persian Monarch.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. &c. I have, &c.

(Signed.) DURHAM.

No. 36.

The Earl of Durham to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14, 1837.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, February* 28, 1837.)

Since I wrote to you my despatch of the 24th instant, I have had an opportunity of talking with M. Rodofinikin, the head of the Eastern Department in Count Nesselrode's Office, on the subject of the conduct of Count Simonich in Persia.

In answer to my complaints, he said he would bring me the original book, in which were entered all the despatches and instructions to the Russian Ambassador, which would prove to me how little the Count had attended to them if he had acted in the manner stated by me.

I said that there could be no doubt of the fact; it had been mentioned so often and by so many persons, that it was, I feared, indisputable; and I

pointed out to him the inconvenience of the Russian Government being represented by a person, who either would not or could not act according to his instructions.

No. 40.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 28, 1837.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, February* 20, 1837.

I HAVE the honor to inclose, for your Lordship's information, translations of the written communications which have passed between the Persian Government and the Chiefs of Cabool and Kandahar.

I took occasion, in conversation with the Prime Minister, a few days ago, to ask him whether he was aware that Taj Mahommed Khan, the Agent from Kandahar, had been conducted to the Russian Minister's house by Meerza Massood, while, at the same time, he had been directed not to visit me: and that he had even been charged with a letter and presents from the Russian Minister to his Master.

Hajee Meerza Aghassee protested, that he had not before heard of any of these things.

I told his Excellency, that as the Ministers of this Government had thought it proper to pursue such a course, and to become the medium of putting Russia in direct communication with the Chief of Kandahar, it might become necessary for the British Government to take measures to counteract the consequences of such a proceeding.

No. 42.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27, 1837.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, May* 2, 1837.

IN my letter to the Prime Minister, I have offered the mediation of the British Government for the adjustment of the differences existing between Persia and the Affghans.

No. 47.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 30, 1837.)

(Extract.) *Camp, near Tehran, June* 30, 1837.

I HAVE the honor to inform your Lordship, that having waited upon the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary two days ago, his Excellency took that opportunity to enter into a conversation on the proposed expedition of the Shah against Herat, and to inform me that he had seen His Majesty the day before, and had endeavour to dissuade him from proceeding in person against Herat. His Excellency further stated to me, in presence of Captain Sheil, that though he had been instructed by his Government not to urge the Shah to undertake the expedition last year, he had himself been of opinion that it was advisable to do so. The Shah having just come to the throne, he had been of opinion, that any brilliant achievement, such as he might have effected last year had the army been properly conducted, would have tended

to consolidate the Shah's power: that this year, however, he was of a different opinion.

His Excellency thus acknowledged, in substance, the truth of the statement I had made to your Lordship on this subject; and even justified what he represented as a deviatoin from the instructions he had received from his Government; but he did not represent these instructions as directing him to dissuade the Shah from undertaking the enterprise, or prosecuting the war; according to his Excellency's account, he was only instructed not to urge the Shah.

No. 48.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 30, 1837.)

(Extract.) *Camp, near Tehran, June* 30, 1837.

After having communicated with Futteh Mahommed Khan, the Envoy from Herat, who called upon me here, I found that while the Vizier's letter to the Ausef was written in a strain of submission, Kamran Shah of Herat, in his letter to the Shah of Persia, had preserved the style and title of an independent Sovereign. Though he addressed the Shah with deference and respect, he did not address his Persian Majesty as his Sovereign, and his signet bore the inscription, which has been used for several generations by the royal family of the Affghans, describing him as "Shah dor Doraun." The Envoy also informed me that there was no intention on the part of the Herat Government to relinquish its independence, that Kamran would not agree to renounce the title of Shah, or to coin the money, or to have prayers read in the name of Mahommed Shah; and that even if Kamran had been disposed to accede to these terms, he did not dare to propose them to the Affghan nobles. At the same time he assured me that the Government of Herat was sincerely desirous to come to some arrangement with the Persian Government, which should put an end to hostilities between them; and that he was prepared to conclude such an arrangement, on the basis proposed by Yar Mahommed Khan, if the Persian Government would give him security that it would act in good faith; but that he found it difficult to place any reliance on the assurances of the Persian Government, for that an arrangement had already been concluded with the Ausef-ud-Dowleh, who produced firmans, stating that he was fully empowered on the part of the Shah; and that now he found the Shah and his Ministers unwilling to ratify the Treaty which the Ausef had negotiated. He expressed great confidence in the views and feelings of the British Government, evinced by the refusal of the British Officers to march against Herat last year; and concluded by stating that he was very desirous that I should take a part in the negotiation, as the only means he could devise of obtaining some security that the Persian Government would fulfil the conditions on which he was authorized to conclude the arrangement.

The pretensions of Persia to the sovereignty of Affghanistan appeared to me to be such, as we were neither called upon by a sense of justice, nor per-

mitted by a due regard to our own security, to sanction or allow. I thought I could show from our Treaty with Persia, that the Affghans were looked upon by the Persian Government itself, at the time when that Treaty was signed, as an independent nation; while the fact of our having concluded a Treaty of defensive alliance with their Sovereign, in 1809, precluded the possibility, so long as they preserved their actual independence, of our being called upon to acknowledge them to be subjects of Persia.

In my letter recommending the Persian Government to accept the terms offered by the Herat Envoy, I had stated my fears, that if these terms were rejected, and troops were sent against Herat, the British Government might suspect that Persia had in view, in prosecuting the war, other objects than those which she had avowed. His Excellency refers to the perfect union of the nations as an answer to this statement. In my reply, I have thought it necessary to point out to him that the course pursued by the Government of the present Shah, has not been that which was best calculated to secure to Persia the advantages of that perfect confidence in her views and intentions, which she expects the British Government to feel; and I have endeavoured to make. His Excellency perceives, that if Persia is deterred by fear of others from rendering justice or evincing her friendship to England, such a state of things must effectually destroy all confidence in her policy, especially as the increasing disorganization and weakness of the Government must tend to increase the evil.

I think it possible that this discussion may, for a time, produce some unpleasant feeling on the part of the Shah and his Minister towards myself; for every thing done by a public servant here is looked upon as emanating from his own feelings, and becomes personal; but after very anxious deliberation, and keeping in mind the instructions I had received from India, I came to the conclusion, that the announcement of the sentiments and opinions I have conveyed to this Government in these letters, was more important than my own personal position at this Court.

No. 54.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 30, 1837).

(Extract) *Tehran, October* 30, 1837.

On the other hand, His Majesty has intimated his intention, after taking Herat, to proceed against Meimuna and Balkh, and having subdued them, he proposes to attack Khiva, advancing along the banks of the Oxus to that Principality, where he expects to arrive in the course of next year, and where I am informed he expects the co-operation of a Russian force, from Orenberg, as well as the assistance of the British officers in the Persian service. Such, with the exception of the reference to the Russian force, is the language the Shah held to Major Rawlinson, who had been summoned to camp by the Shah, and who returned only a few days ago.

No. 56.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 6, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Soolimaniah, November* 25, 1837.

WHEN within about three stages of Meshed, after he had already passed the Persian army, then marching to Toorbut Sheikh Jaum, the caravan which Ali Mahommed Beg accompanied, was met by Mr. Borowski, who has been some time in the Persian service, and who was then on his way from Meshed to join the camp. Mr. Borowski having recognized the man, who was travelling openly, and without disguise or concealment, accompanied by two horses and a pony, besides the horse he rode, and, having learnt that he was returning from Herat, reported the circumstance on his arrival in camp. Horsemen were immediately despatched to bring the messenger to camp. He was forced to return with them; a part of his clothes were taken from him; the horses, which he was bringing for me from Herat, were seized; he was dragged to camp, and there placed in custody. He succeeded, however, in making his way to the tent of Colonel Stoddart, and was by that officer conducted to the Prime Minister; who, after he had been informed by Colonel Stoddart that the man was in the service of this mission, again placed him in custody, while Hajee Khan, an officer of the rank of Brigadier in the service of the Shah, not only used offensive language in addressing Colonel Stoddart in presence of the Prime Minister, but, after the messenger had been released by order of his Excellency, seized him again in the midst of the camp; stripped him to search for any letters he might have concealed about his person; took from him Lieutenant Pottinger's letter, which was sent to the Prime Minister; used to the messenger the most violent threats and the most disgusting and opprobrious language, and took from him a portion of his accoutrements.

No. 60.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 14, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, December* 16, 1837.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship, that by the latest intelligence I have received, Captain Vicovich had passed Khain, from whence he was escorted, by order of the Persian Government, to Jowein, on the road to Kandahar. I find that this person was furnished with letters of recommendation from the Persian Government to the several Chiefs in Affghanistan, with whom it is in correspondence, that he was supplied with funds by the Shah, and that he was treated with great distinction in the camp, where presents of some value were bestowed upon him.

It is reported and believed at Tehran, that the Russian Minister has announced the intention of his Government, if the Shah should succeed in taking Herat, to release Persia from the engagement to pay the balance of the debt due by her to Russia; and the reason assigned for this act of grace is, that the Emperor desires to contribute that amount towards defraying the expenses of the campaign.

No. 63.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received March* 14, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, December* 30, 1837.

I LEARN through native channels of information, which are not unworthy of credit, that a large body of horse, consisting of many thousands, had marched from Khiva two months ago to the aid of Kamran, and that, after long doubt and hesitation, the Government of Bokhara had at length decided on sending a considerable body of horse to Kamran's assistance. This force, the number of which was not stated, had, it was said, been paid and mustered at Bokhara, preparatory to its setting out for Herat, when the letters containing this information were written. The same informant states, that all the Principalities bordering on Persia to the eastward, having become alarmed for their own safety, had determined to send succours to Herat, believing that if that city fell they should have to defend themselves in their own territories. A general, indeed an universal, opinion prevails in all those countries, that Persia is pushed on and supported by Russia in her schemes of conquest; and, I must confess that the demonstrations of joy which Count Simonich manifested on the fall of Ghorian, were well calculated to confirm that impression, for they far exceeded the expressions of gratification which might have been expected, even from the Persian Government itself.

No. 65.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 16, 1838.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to the 2nd of January.

As the result of your application to the Shah for reparation for the insult offered to your messenger was not known to you at the time when you sent off these despatches, I am unable to send you by this messenger any precise instructions for your guidance, in the event of your demand not being immediately complied with; because the non-compliance of the Persian Government may be attended with so many different modifications of refusal, that it is unlikely that I should be able by anticipation to suit my instructions to the precise circumstances of the case. But I place such entire confidence in your judgment, discretion, and firmness, that I am satisfied that you will adopt provisionally, and until you can receive further instructions from me, that course which, under the circumstances of the case, will be most conducive to the interests of Great Britain, and most consistent with her honour and dignity. That, on the one hand, you will not precipitately, or unnecessarily, widen the breach: that, on the other hand, you will do nothing which may lead the Persian Government to think that you can recede from your demand, or that you are in any way doubtful that your Government will support that demand with firmness.

Therefore, in the event of the Shah not at once acceding to your demand, I leave it to you to determine, whether it is expedient either to renew the

demand, and continue your functions until a further answer is received; or at once to declare your functions at an end, and to break off your diplomatic relations with the Persian Court.

No. 70.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 14, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Tehran, February* 23, 1838.

On the other hand, the fact that the Shah has been able, for above two months, to feed forty thousand men in his camp before Herat, notwithstanding the efforts that were made by the Herat Government to carry off and destroy the supplies which the country afforded, is a proof that a hostile army might move through that country without suffering from want, and gives great additional importance, as it appears to me, to the position of Herat, and to the influence which the Power that holds it may exercise over the future security of India, with reference not only to its internal tranquillity, but to the possibility that such a position may be occupied by a hostile Power.

No. 74.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, May* 21, 1838.

I have received your despatches to the 8th of March, reporting the progress of events in Persia, and stating your intention of setting out to the camp of the Shah of Herat, in order to endeavour to prevail upon the Shah to abandon the attack upon that town and its territory; and I have to inform you that her Majesty's Government entirely approve the step which you were going to take.

If when you receive this despatch, you shall have succeeded in inducing the Shah to retire from Herat, either with or without an arrangement with the Ruler of Herat, you will have accomplished an object of great importance to British interests in the East: and you will then only have to express to the Shah the lively satisfaction which her Majesty's Government will derive from this proof of friendly deference on the part of the Shah to the wishes of the Government of Great Britain.

But it is possible that you may have failed in the object of your journey, and that when this despatch reaches you, the Shah may be still engaged in besieging Herat; or may have taken it, and not have advanced beyond it; or, having taken it, may have marched further into Affghanistan.

In either of these cases, you are instructed to proceed at once to the Shah; and to declare to him explicitly, that the British Government cannot view with indifference his project of conquering Affghanistan.

That the British Government must look upon this enterprize as undertaken in a spirit of hostility towards British India, and, as being wholly incompatible with the spirit and intention of the Alliance which has been established between Persia and Great Britain. That, consequently, if this

project be persevered in, the friendly relations which up to this time have so happily subsisted between Great Britain and Persia, must necessarily cease; and that Great Britain must take such steps as she may think best calculated to provide for the security of the possessions of the British Crown.

You will lose no time in informing the Governor-General of India of the result of the communications which you may hold with the Shah in consequence of this despatch.

You will explain to the Shah that this question about Affghanistan is independent of, and separate from, the question of satisfaction for the outrage committed upon your messenger, for which outrage her Majesty's Government demand and expect to receive full redress.

No. 76.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 18, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Camp, before Herat, April* 11, 1838.

In the meantime, Captain Vicovich continues to remain at Cabool, and I learn from Captain Burnes's communications, that the success of his negotiations there will in a great measure depend on the failure of the Shah's enterprise against Herat. At Kandahar, our position is even more precarious; and I have the honour to inclose a translation of a draft of a Treaty between the Shah and the Chief of Kandahar, which it is proposed to conclude by the mediation and under the guarantee of Russia, and which has for its object to unite Herat and Kandahar under a Chief, who shall be nominally subject to Persia, but actually under the protection of Russia. I am unable to inform your Lordship what progress has been made towards the conclusion of this Treaty, or what view the Shah may have taken of the position in respect to these countries, in which, by this arrangement, he would be placed; but the Treaty is said to have been signed by Kohundil Khan, and I am not without very serious apprehensions, that even before the fall of Herat, Kohundil Khan may be induced to co-operate with the Shah; while in the event of Herat's being reduced, I cannot doubt that the Chief of Kandahar will consider it to be for his advantage to connect himself with Persia and Russia rather than with England. I, therefore, continue to be of opinion that the fall of Herat would destroy our position in Affghanistan, and place all, or nearly all that country under the influence or authority of Russia and Persia. I need not repeat to your Lordship my opinion as to the effect which such a state of things would necessarily have on the internal tranquillity and security of British India; and I cannot conceive that any Treaty can bind us to permit the prosecution of schemes which threaten the stability of the British Empire in the East. The evidence of concert between Persia and Russia for purposes injurious to British interest is unequivocal, and the magnitude of the evil with which we are threatened is in my estimation immense, and such as no Power in alliance with Great Britain can have a right to aid in producing. Our connection with Persia has for its real and avowed original object to give additional

security to India, and it has been maintained for the purpose of protecting us against designs of the only Power that threatened to disturb us in that quarter; but if the proceedings of Persia, in concert with that very Power, are directed to the destruction of the security and tranquillity which it was the sole object of the alliance with Persia to maintain; and if they obviously tend to promote and facilitate the designs which the alliance was intended to counteract; I confess I cannot believe that we are still bound to act up to the letter of the Treaty, the spirit of which has been so flagrantly violated. I do not hesitate to repeat my conviction, that if our only object were to preserve as long as possible the alliance of Persia, that object could best be effected by preventing her from taking Herat.

No. 80.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir, *Foreign Office, July* 27, 1838.

I HAVE to instruct you to state to the Shah of Persia, that whereas the spirit and purport of the Treaty between Persia and Great Britain, is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British possessions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears on the contrary, that the Shah is occupied in subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British possessions; and that in these operations he has openly connected himself with an European Power, for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile, to British interests; that under these circumstances, and as he has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned Treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that Treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests, and the security of her dominions may suggest.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.
&c. &c. &c.

No. 84.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 11, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Camp, before Herat, May* 17, 1838.

THE question of most immediate urgency, however, appears to me to be the Treaty with Kandahar, by which Russia acquires a right to interfere directly in the affairs of that country, and to force Persia to defend it against us or any one else who may attack it. But Persia cannot defend it; and I am of opinion that the Indian Government must feel the necessity of putting an end to this Treaty on any terms.

Inclosure in No. 84.

(Translation.)

Memorandum of the Demands of the British Government presented to the Shah.

1st. THAT the Persian Government shall conclude an equitable arrangement with the Government of Herat, and shall cease to weaken and disturb these countries.

2d. That the Persian Government, according to the stipulations of the general Treaty, shall conclude a commercial Treaty with Great Britain, and that it shall place the commercial agents of Great Britain on the same footing with respect to privileges, &c. as the Consuls of other Powers.

3d. That the persons who seized and ill-treated Ali Mahommed Beg, a messenger of the British mission, shall be punished; and that a Firman shall be issued, such as may prevent the recurrence of so flagrant a violation of the laws and customs of nations.

4th. That the Persian Government shall publicly abandon the pretension it has advanced, to a right to seize and punish the Persian servants of the British mission, without reference to the British Minister.

5th. That the Governor of Bushire, who threatened the safety of the British resident there, shall be removed; that the other persons concerned in that transaction shall be punished; and that measures shall be taken to prevent the recurrence of such proceedings.

No. 87.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 24, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Meshed, June* 25, 1838.

I HAVE already informed your Lordship publicly, that the country between the frontiers of Persia and India is far more productive than I had imagined it to be; and I can assure your Lordship that *there is no impediment*, either from the physical features of the country, or from the deficiency of supplies, to the march of a large army from the frontiers of Georgia to Kandahar, or, as I believe, to the Indus. Count Simonich being lame from a wound, drove his carriage from Tehran to Herat, and could drive it to Kandahar; and the Shah's army has now for nearly seven months subsisted almost exclusively on the supplies of the country immediately around Herat and Ghorian, leaving the still more productive districts of Subzar and Furrah untouched. In short, I can state from personal observation, that there is absolutely no impediment to the march of an army to Herat; and that, from all the information I have received, the country between that city and Kandahar not only presents no difficulty, but affords remarkable facilities for the passage of armies. There is, therefore, my Lord, no security for India in the nature of the country through which an army would have to pass to invade it from this side. On the contrary, the whole line is peculiarly favourable for such an enterprise; and I am the more anxious to state this opinion clearly, because it is at variance with my previous belief, and

with statements which I may have previously hazarded, relying on more imperfect information.

No. 91.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 22, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Camp, near Tehran, July* 31, 1838.

I HAVE the honor to report for your Lordship's information, that on or about the 23d ult., the Shah's army, after six days' incessant battering, assaulted Herat, and was repulsed with considerable loss. The number of the killed and wounded of the Persian army is variously stated, but the best information I have been able to obtain, leads me to believe that it must have amounted to one thousand seven hundred or one thousand eight hundred men. The loss in Officers, and especially those of the higher ranks, has been very great in proportion to the whole number killed and wounded. Major-General Borowski, and Sirteps Wully Khan, and Nebbee Khan, have been killed. Sirteps Samson Khan, Hoossein Pasha Khan, and Jaffier Kooli Khan, have been wounded, and almost all the Field-officers of these brigades have been either killed or wounded.

The Persian troops are represented to have assaulted with gallantry, and to have planted their standards three several times in the breach, but they were unable to maintain their position. The Affghans attacked them sword in hand, with an energy and determination that is represented as having been irresistible, and drove them with great slaughter across the ditch. Of the killed and wounded in the Persian ranks, more than three-fourths are stated to have received sabre wounds.

Count Simonich would appear to have planned the attack, but I understand His Excellency complains that all his directions were not attended to, and that there was a want of combination in the movements of the Persian columns. In his letters to Tehran, however, he anticipated considerable advantage from having proved to the Affghans that the Persian troops can be brought to attempt an assault.

What may be the determination of the Shah as to his future proceedings, does not appear to be known here. I learn that the son of Kohundil Khan, of Kandahar, has actually arrived in the Shah's camp, accompanied by Captain Vicovich, who has returned from Cabool, having, it is said, concluded a Treaty with Dost Mahommed Khan. The hope of receiving the submission of all Affghanistan, will be a very strong inducement to the Shah to persevere in the enterprise in which he is engaged. At the same time it may be feared that the disappointment which the Herat Government must experience, on learning that Cabool and Kandahar are to all appearance combined with Persia and Russia against it, and that even an unsuccessful assault has not forced the Shah to raise the siege, may depress the spirit of the gallant defenders of Herat, and lead them to submit to Persia.

That submission would now certainly be followed, if it has not been preceded, by the submission of both Cabool and Kandahar.

On the other hand, the arrival of even the small force which has occupied

Karrak, has caused a great sensation all over Persia. The intelligence of that event must already have arrived in camp direct from Shiraz, and the loss sustained by the Persian army in the assault, especially the loss of its most efficient and bravest officers, may perhaps prepare the Shah to attend to what Colonel Stoddart is instructed to state to him; but I am not sanguine in hoping for this result; the failure of the Missions from the Indian Government to Cabool and Kandahar, and the success of the Russian negotiations with the Chiefs on our very frontier, must give the Shah a more exalted opinion than even he has hitherto entertained of the superior power of Russia as compared with that of England. He sees an unknown Captain of Cossacks, from the banks of the Volga or the Emba, ride up to Cabool without pomp or retinue, and he sees him apparently driving out of Affghanistan the Agent of the Governor-General of India, and that Agent, Captain Burnes, who enjoys a reputation as high and as extensive as any officer who could have been employed upon that duty.

It is now certain that Captain Burnes' departure from Cabool, or at least the determination of Dost Mahommed Khan, which led to his departure, was known in the Shah's camp long before I left it, though I did not then credit the reports to that effect which were brought by the emissaries from Kandahar; and I therefore cease to wonder at the course pursued by the Persian Government in regard to the demands I made upon it, and to the Treaty with Herat which it had accepted, and which on the arrival of intelligence from Kandahar it hastened to reject.

No. 92.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(*Received September* 22, 1838.)

My Lord, *Camp, near Tehran, August* 1, 1838.

I HAVE the honour to inclose for Your Lordship's information a translation of the Treaty which has been concluded and ratified between the Shah and the Sirdars of Kandahar, and which Count Simonich has guaranteed. It appears to me, however, to be somewhat remarkable, that Count Simonich does not guarantee this Treaty in the name of his Government, though he uses his official designation.

I would further beg leave to observe, that as the Shah engaged unconditionally to put the Sirdars in possession of Herat, (at least, I presume, the second Article must be so understood), and as Count Simonich has made himself responsible to the Sirdars for the fulfilment of the engagements contracted by the Shah, he has, in fact, as I understand the Treaty, engaged to see the Sirdars put in possession of Herat.

The indefinite nature of the engagements contracted by both parties, and the very vague manner in which the terms are expressed, even in the Persian language, must at all times afford sufficient ground for difference and dispute, and therefore for Russian interference.

Persia engages to defend Kandahar against any enemy that may attack it, and if the Shah should fail to do so, Count Simonich engages to compel

him to do so; at least this, I presume, is the meaning of the guarantee, if it means anything.

The common arrangement of the Commercial Stipulations of Persia and Russia with a Principality which is a dependency of Persia, according to the terms of the Treaty, is not the least remarkable feature of this very curious document. It is even doubtful from the construction of the sentence in Persian, whether the commercial agent is not to be the common agent of the two Powers.

Finally, the effect of the Treaty would be to raise up a powerful Principality in Affghanistan, which shall be nominally subject to Persia, but which must always look to Russia for protection; which hangs so loosely to Persia, that Russia could at any moment, when she might desire it, put an end to the connection, and turn against Persia the strength with which the Shah proposed to endow the Sirdars. On the other hand, Russia could probably at any time make the defence of Kandahar a pretext for engaging the Shah of Persia in a quarrel with those Chiefs whose territories border on Kandahar.

In short, if Herat should fall, and if the Treaty has really been guaranteed by Russia, and not by Count Simonich personally, Russia becomes by it indisputable mistress of the destinies, political and commercial, of all Central Asia; for Great Britain, having been forced back to the Indus, Khiva and Bokhara must submit if they are attacked; while Persia and Affghanistan will already be entirely at her disposal.

I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G. C. B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 94.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 22, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Camp, near Tehran, August* 3, 1838.)

It is reported here that Kohundil Khan, of Kandahar, with a considerable force has besieged Furrah, one of the dependencies of Herat; and some of the Kandaharees who have accompanied Omar Khan, the son of Kohundil Khan, to the Shah's camp, accompanied the storming party of Persians which led the assault against Herat. The arrival of Omar Khan is a consequence of the conclusion of the Treaty between the Shah and the Sirdars of Kandahar.

It has also been asserted in letters from the camp, that Dost Mahommed Khan, of Cabool, has agreed to send an auxiliary force to co-operate with the Persian army against Herat; but I hope and believe that this statement is at least premature. Yet I am not free from apprehension on this subject, for I learn that Captain Vicovich returned to the Shah's camp with Kohundil Khan's son, and the perfect success of his mission is publicly spoken of.

At this moment the united influence of Persia and Russia would appear to be established in all the Affghan dominions, with the single exception of Herat; and the existence of that influence in those countries, viewed in

conjunction with the course which these Powers have recently been pursuing, and the measures that have resulted from their joint diplomatic exertions, is so obviously incompatible with the tranquillity of India, and even with its security, that no measures can be more unequivocally measures of self-defence than those which the British Government is called upon to adopt, for the purpose of counteracting the evils with which India is threatened. Persia has no provocation to complain of. The course pursued by the British Government towards this Government has been one of uniform friendship and forbearance; and it appears to me, that it would be an inefficient as well as a *hazardous and costly line of policy* to adopt, were the British Government any longer to permit Persia, under the shelter of her treaty with England, to open the way to India for another and far more formidable Power.

While the Persian Government is prosecuting schemes of almost undisguised hostility against England, and disregards the law of nations and the usual courtesies in its proceedings towards me, it has been peculiarly gratifying to me to have received from all my friends, many of them men of the highest rank in the country, and many also connected with the present Government, while others belonged to the Court of the late Shah, the most unreserved assurances of their continued regard for and attachment to myself, and of their entire conviction, that no man in Persia could have laboured more anxiously than I have done to prevent a misunderstanding between the Governments.

Inclosure in No. 95.

Mr. Mc Neill to Lord Auckland.

(Extract.) *Meshed, June* 25, 1838.

On the 7th instant, the day on which I quitted the Shah's camp, I wrote to your Lordship announcing that in consequence of the Persian Government withholding redress for the violence offered to the Messenger, I had felt myself compelled to suspend my official intercourse with this Court, and to proceed to the frontiers of Turkey, there to await further instructions.

The hostility of the views of Turkey, or, at least, their hostile influence on our interests, can no longer be doubtful. She herself takes no pains to conceal this fact. At a moment when she has been warned of the danger of a rupture with England as a consequence of her proceedings in Affghanistan, she permits me to leave the Court rather than afford me the reparation and satisfaction I had demanded, and *which she could not have withheld from the Russian Minister in similar circumstances for one day.*

Persia has systematically pursued a course which has continually tended to depress the British Mission, and to destroy British influence, not only in the Court but in the country. From these petty acts of annoyance she has proceeded to an invasion of Affghanistan, in opposition to the views of England, and disregarding the formal intimation that such a course, if adopted, might diminish the cordiality between the States. Not content with this she seizes the first opportunity to offer a public insult to the British Mission

and Government by the treatment that was inflicted on the messenger, and *the threat which*, though subsequently retracted, *was certainly held out against my life.*

At Bushire, the Resident is threatened; and at Tabreez the gentlemen of the Mission and of the detachment residing there, as well as the merchants, can barely extort from the authorities enough of civility and respect to make it possible for them to remain. On my proceeding to camp, fresh evidences of alienation, of coldness, and disrespect were rendered more marked by the contrast which the conduct pursued towards me exhibited, as compared with the treatment experienced by the Russian Mission. Every argument, every remonstrance on the subject of Herat was disregarded, and not only disregarded, but followed by a distinct proposition to the Government of Herat to engage that they should hold no intercourse with the English, as an indispensable condition of the arrangement of the differences between the Governments: engagements are entered into with Kandahar, which are framed for the express purpose of placing that country and Herat under the influence, and even under the control of Russia, while at the same time, they make Persia responsible to Russia in a new capacity, and bind her to admit Russia's right to interfere in an authoritative manner in the affairs of what she calls her Affghan provinces; finally, she refuses reparation for the indignity offered to the British Government, and permits the British Mission to leave the Court, without evincing the slightest concern for the step I was forced to take.

No. 98.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 17, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Camp, near Tabreez, September* 11, 1838.

ALL my arrangements had been made for marching to-day towards the Turkish frontier, when yesterday afternoon a messenger arrived from Colonel Stoddart with letters informing me that the Shah had given a favourable answer to the message of which that officer was the bearer. His Majesty had given a verbal promise to comply with the demands of the British Government; and a letter from Meerza Ali, the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, conveys to me, on the part of his Majesty, an unconditional written promise to the same effect.

I learn from Tehran, that an intimation of these his Majesty's intentions, has been made to the official authorities there; and his Excellency the Ameer Nizam called upon me this morning to inform me, that he had been specially instructed by the Shah to induce me to suspend the prosecution of my journey, and not to leave the Persian territory.

I have determined to remain here for some days, expecting the arrival of a messenger with the intelligence that the Shah has concluded the proposed arrangement with Herat, and has withdrawn his army from the Herat territory. Should no such intelligence arrive within seven days, I shall proceed by easy marches towards the frontier.

Should I receive intelligence of the return of the Shah and his army, after having concluded an arrangement with Herat, and should I learn at the same time, that Hajee Khan has been dismissed, which your Lordship will perceive has also been promised, I propose immediately to return to Tehran.

Colonel Stoddart would appear to have carried into effect with great precision the written instructions I gave him.

I have only further to state, that the intelligence of the Shah's having agreed to the demands of the British Government of which our messenger was the bearer, appears to have produced the utmost gratification in every town and village through which the messenger passed.

Colonel Stoddart mentions that Dost Mahommed Khan of Cabool had intimated to the Shah, that hostile preparations against him were in progress both on the part of the English and the Seiks. If the information be correct, he will have an opportunity of testing the value of the alliances he has recently formed, as compared with that of a friendly connection with England.

Inclosure 1 in No. 98.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Royal Camp, before Herat, August* 12, 1838.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that I arrived yesterday, at 11 A.M., and proceeded direct to the Hajee's tent. Omar Khan, the son of the Kandahar Chief, Kohundil Khan, with eight Affghans, were there. The Minister himself was with the Shah, and on his return received me in a friendly manner, ordered a tent for me in my old quarters, near my stable, made me his guest, and fixed to-day for my reception by the Shah. He inquired what news there was, and I told him I should have been here two days before, had not Thamasp Meerza thought proper to send seven horsemen, with Mahommed Khan Jaleelawund, after me from Ghorian, who detained me by force, which indignity he excused by saying he considered it the interest of Persia to detain me, without having any orders to do so. This I should represent to you I said, as I was not at liberty to enter on any other subject than those with which I was specially charged.

To-day, at half-past 10 A.M., I received an official note from the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Meerza Ali, requesting me to accompany him, agreeably to the Shah's directions, to the royal presence. I accordingly went and was handsomely received. After delivering your letter I delivered the message in Persian. On my coming to a pause, in the part requesting him to turn from ill-disposed advisers and refer to his own wisdom for the interests of Persia, his Majesty said, "The fact is, if I don't leave Herat there will be war, is not that it?" I said, "It is war; all depends on your Majesty's answer. God preserve your Majesty," handing the original English written message. He said, "This was all I wished: I asked the Minister Plenipotentiary for it, and he would not give it, alleging that he was not authorized." I said, "He was not then, but now he is ordered to give it. No one could give such a message without especial authority from our

Sovereign." He declared again that such a paper was all he had wanted, and turned for assent to his Chamberlains. He complained the paper was in English, which he could not read, and three times requested me to give him what I had read from in Persian, or to translate it for him, which I declined, referring him to the original. I said that was according to our custom, and requested his Majesty would soon favour me with an answer, that I might forward it without delay. He said, "Immediately and without delay, they shall translate it for me. Meerza Baba and Meerza Sauleh shall translate it, and the answer shall be given immediately, it will not take long, to-day or to-morrow." His Majesty then read your letter, and I took my leave. The Shah's manner throughout was marked by more than his usual kindness, both towards myself and in inquiries after you. He was in a raised room, up six or seven steps, the room was small and full, and the Deputy-Minister did not take me into the room, but the Shah made me come up close to him, and as his Majesty spoke very kindly in welcoming me, I did not think it a fit occasion to stickle for ceremony; otherwise I would not have delivered the message without entering the room.

Inclosure 3 in No. 98.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Royal Camp, before Herat, August* 14, 1838.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Shah summoned me to an audience this morning, at which his Majesty formally gave an answer to the message I had the honour of delivering in writing on the 12th instant. His Majesty stated, "We consent to the whole of the demands of the British Government. We will not go to war. Were it not for the sake of their friendship, we should not return from before Herat. Had we known that our coming here might risk the loss of their friendship, we certainly would not have come at all."

I replied, that I thanked God, his Majesty thus regarded the true interests of Persia.

His Majesty then said, "The British will, I trust, arrange for us this matter of Herat." I replied, I was commanded, in case of his Majesty desiring British mediation between Persia and Herat, to acquaint him, that I was empowered to conclude, on your part, the original arrangements that had been made; and drawing the paper of terms out of my pocket, I said, "Here are those terms, by which the Envoy Extraordinary is still ready to stand." His Majesty read them, and said, those were his own terms, and added, "All we want is one thing, that they should not make incursions into Khorassan. There is a great Mollah come to camp from Herat, with whom we will arrange the matter." I replied, "It is most easy;" and assured him, that the British Government was most anxious to put an end to this slave-taking. He wished to retain the paper of terms, but I told him I had not another copy, and would give him a copy of it, which in the

afternoon I furnished to the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, for his Majesty.

On coming from the Shah's presence, I acquainted the Deputy-Minister, that as far as it went, the answer of the Shah was most satisfactory; but that we now looked to the fulfilment of his Majesty's words; and I hoped no delay would take place, as every hour was valuable, and I could not undertake to say the operations of our troops would be suspended by any thing less than the Shah's actually carrying into effect what he was called upon to do by the British Government. The Deputy-Minister saw this in the light I desired, and on my returning his call in the evening, said the Shah had given orders about returning hence; and that his Majesty would probably place the arrangement with Herat in my hands, and that respecting the reparation for the treatment of the Gholam, his Majesty was considering it, and would order it as soon as he had decided what to do with Hajee Khan. The Deputy-Minister assured me the whole would be carried into effect immediately.

Inclosure 4 in No. 98.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Royal Camp before Herat, August* 15, 1838.

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that finding the musketry fire continued about noon to-day, I waited on the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to express to him my dissatisfaction at the continuance of hostilities, after his Majesty had expressed his consent to the demands of the British Government; and I requested him to make known to his Majesty, how inconsistent this continuance of operations was with his consent to the demands of yesterday. All this, with the copy of the paper of terms, the Deputy-Minister laid before the Shah, who repeated his intention to carry into immediate effect what had been demanded of him. I had recommended the Deputy-Minister, on his own account, to ask his Majesty for a Firman directing the Azerbijan Government to treat you on your return to the Court with such honours as were suitable to the occasion, and I inclose you a copy and a translation of his answer. This recommendation I made to the Deputy-Minister to show the sincerity and frankness with which we desired the matter to be well concluded. I requested the Deputy-Minister to tell me frankly, as far as he felt at liberty to do so, the intentions of the Shah in carrying into execution what he had agreed to. He assured me his Majesty will deprive Hajee Khan of his rank (destituera le Sirtip Hajee Khan), and will through me conclude the matter with Herat on the terms you had empowered me to say you would stand by; and that the camp would move hence in two or three days.

To conclude, Yar Mahommed Khan and Herat are firm, and show no signs of surrendering. The Kandahar people in camp are disgusted at all around them, and are become very slack since the 9th instant, when news reached them from Dost Mahommed Khan of Cabool, that warlike ope-

rations on the part of the English and the Seiks against him were on foot. This camp is in a totally unserviceable state.

I inclose herewith, by the Deputy-Minister's request, his official letter to you; a copy of which I have taken with his knowledge for the Governor-General of India.

Inclosure 6 in No. 98.

Translation of a Letter in the hand-writing of Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the address of his Excellency, Mr. Mc Neill, dated Herat, 24th Jumadee-ool-Avul, 1254, or 15th August, 1838.

A. C.

LIEUT.-COL. STODDART having arrived in the royal camp, has had an audience of his Majesty the Shah, at which he stated the demands which your Excellency has made on the part of the British Government.

His Majesty fully comprehended these demands, and his Majesty (may his Government and Kingdom be lasting) on account of the union and friendship which exists between the two Governments, and also for the great esteem his Majesty entertains for your Excellency, has fully agreed to the dem ands and wishes of the British Government, and with his royal lips his Majesty gave the following orders to Colonel Stoddart:—"We accede to "th e demands of the British Government, and we shall return from this. "Our desire was that the Affghan tribes should be prevented from plun-"dering and ravaging our dominions. Please God, we shall make an ar-"rangement with the people of Herat and return speedily."

In conclusion, let it be known to your Excellency, that the wishes of the British Government are complied with, and that in the course of two or three days the particulars and manner of this compliance, in accordance with the commands which his Majesty will issue, shall be communicated to your Excellency.

For the information of your Excellency, and according to his Majesty's commands, this communication is made on the 24th Jumadee-ool-Avul, 1254, August 15, 1838.

Translated by

(Signed) J. P. RIACH,
Attached to the Mission.

Inclosure in No. 99.

Mr. Mc Neill to the Shah of Persia.

May it please your Majesty, *Camp, near Tabreez, September* 15, 1838.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Majesty that I have been instructed by the Ministers of the British Government to state to your Majesty, that whereas the spirit and purport of the treaty between Great Britain and Persia is, that Persia should be a defensive barrier for the British dominions in India, and that the Persian Government should co-operate with that of Great Britain in defending British India; it appears, on the contrary, that

your Majesty is occupied in subverting those intervening States between Persia and India, which might prove additional barriers of defence for the British possessions, and that in these operations your Majesty has openly connected yourself with an European Power for purposes avowedly unfriendly, if not absolutely hostile to British interests. That under these circumstances, and as your Majesty has thought fit to enter upon a course of proceeding wholly at variance with the spirit and intent of the above-mentioned treaty, Great Britain will feel herself at liberty to adopt, without reference to that treaty, such measures as a due regard for her own interests and for the security of her dominions may suggest.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

No. 100.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 10, 1838.)

(Extract.) *Camp, near Tabreez, October* 6, 1838.

It affords me the greatest pleasure to have to report to your Lordship that the Shah and the Persian army marched from before Herat on the 9th September, and that the Messenger whom Colonel Stoddart despatched with this intelligence, accompanied the Persian army to a place some miles on this side of Ghorian, and 50 miles from Herat, where he left it on the 12th ultimo.

The inclosed letters from Colonel Stoddart contain all the details of that officer's negotiations, and of the state of affairs, with which I am acquainted. From these communications it would appear that the Shah has concluded no treaty with Herat, but that the Heratees had not in any way molested the Persian army when it retired; and your Lordship will observe that the Russian Minister Plenipotentiary is represented to have made great exertions, and even to have used vague threats, to deter the Shah from complying with the demand of the British Government, that he should retire within his own dominions. It is also stated, that Count Simonich has sent messengers to the tribe of Hazareh, to Kandahar, and to Koorrookh, a fort about a day's journey from Herat, though for what purpose these messengers have been despatched does not appear. It is also asserted that a sum of twelve thousand tomauns was to be given to the Chiefs of Kandahar, and that the troops of that place were to continue to occupy Subzar and Furrah, dependencies of Herat; but it is probable that the movements of the troops from the side of India may induce or force the Kandaharees to evacuate these places.

It would appear that the Shah proposes to defer the conclusion of any definitive arrangement with Herat until his return to Tehran, where he intends, it is said, to communicate with me upon the subject; but I regret to find, though Colonel Stoddart in his letters of the 25th, 26th, and 27th of August, leads me to expect that the reparation for the violence offered to the messenger would be immediately granted, and even led me to infer that Hajee Khan had already been dismissed; that his more recent letters make

no mention of this circumstance; and the messenger informs me that when he parted from the camp, Hajee Khan was still in command of the Shekakee battalions; but he added, that it was understood to be the Shah's intention to dismiss that officer on his arrival at Tehran.

Had it not been for this impediment, it was my intention to have proceeded at once to Tehran, there to have awaited the Shah's arrival; but as this part of the demands which I made has not yet been complied with, it is my intention to send Colonel Sheil to the Shah, for the purpose of endeavouring to arrange this matter; and in the mean time I shall move slowly towards the Persian capital, hoping that the Shah, having fulfilled his promise respecting his return from Herat, will not permit the renewal of official and friendly intercourse between himself and the British Government to be interrupted, by delaying to make a concession so much inferior in importance to that which he has already made. I rely with perfect confidence on the judgment and address of Colonel Sheil to obtain from the Shah, if it be practicable to do so, without giving rise to further irritation, this act of redress, without which I do not think I can return advantageously to the Court; and at the same time I am exceedingly desirous that the minor questions which are still subjects of discussion, should be disposed of before I come again into personal communication with the Shah. If these questions should be satisfactorily adjusted, and a definitive arrangement should be concluded between the Shah and Herat, I trust that all collision of interest between Great Britain and Persia will have ceased, and that the time will have arrived to which I have long looked forward with anxious hope, when her Majesty's Government may safely strengthen Persia, and afford her the most efficient support, with the confidence that, in so doing, they will be promoting the interests of Great Britain, and providing for the security of India.

In concluding this despatch, I hope I may be permitted to solicit the favourable consideration of her Majesty's Government for Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart and Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger, who have both, during this protracted siege, been exposed to all the hardships and privations, the one, of the besiegers' camp, the other of the besieged city. Colonel Stoddart has brought to a successful conclusion his duties in camp, and Lieutenant Pottinger has thwarted all the military efforts of the Russian officers of superior rank, who for some months conducted the siege, and all the intrigues by which the Russian mission sought to sow dissension and excite alarm amongst the defenders of Herat.

Inclosure 5 in No. 100.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Royal Camp, near Herat, Sunday, August* 26, 1838.

I HAVE the honour to forward inclosed, a letter to your address from Meerza Ali, the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs, which was delivered to me last night; and I have taken a copy of it for India. A courier will be furnished to me to bear this to Meshed, where, should the arrangement pro-

posed by you have been carried into effect, a Gholam will be waiting for it. I have desired the postmaster at Meshed to forward this packet by a man of his own, in case the Gholam you proposed sending, or Ameer Beg, should not be at Meshed. The courier will probably leave this to-morrow morning. A Russian courier left this to-day, by whom, through Meerza Ali and Meerza Massood I sent a short note to you.

With reference to the inclosed letter, it will be satisfactory to you to learn, that the Persian Government is actually carrying into execution its promises. The Shah has sent Ferashes to bring Hajee Khan to camp from his quarters behind the trenches; and the preparations for marching hence are continued. A guard of 2,000 men and two guns has been thrown out to protect the camp against any attack from Subzar, with orders to send in bullocks from the villages to drag the guns; and a man has been sent to turn back some ammunition that was on the road to camp. They are repairing the gun carriages, and shoeing the artillery horses; and one great cause of delay is the unserviceable state of the ordnance branch.

Inclosure 6 in No. 100.

Translation of a Letter from Meerza Ali, Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to his Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.—(Received by Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart in the Persian Camp, August 25, 1838.)

I AM commanded by his Majesty to give the following answer to the message which Colonel Stoddart delivered by the directions of your Excellency to his Majesty. Colonel Stoddart represented, that your Excellency was instructed by the English Government to communicate to his Majesty, that the British Government considered, that in advancing to Affghanistan, Persia had hostile intentions towards England, and had formed projects of possessing herself of Hindostan; that the friendship which had for so many years subsisted between both nations must, in consequence, be necessarily dissolved; and that it became incumbent on the British Government to take such measures as it considered expedient for the protection of its dominions. Colonel Stoddart also represented, that your Excellency expressed a hope that his Majesty having formed an equitable adjustment with the people of Herat, would withdraw his army from that territory (the Affghan) into the Persian dominions, and obviate the consequences of the hostility which a perseverance in such intentions was likely to produce. Colonel Stoddart further represented, that five ships of war had arrived in the Persian Gulf, with troops which had disembarked at the island of Karrak; and that the future movements of these troops depended on the arrangements which the Persian Government might adopt in consequence of this announcement; and on its compliance with the demand of the British Government for satisfaction with reference to the affair of the courier. This is, however, a separate matter, and has no connection with the subject of Herat.

His Majesty, without entering into any argument or discussion, commands

me to state, that with reference to the attack on Affghanistan, there are three Articles in the Treaty between the two Governments (England and Persia), which declares distinctly the course that is to be pursued by England, should war ensue between Persia and Affghanistan. Thus, in the 6th Article of the Treaty, concluded during the Mission of Sir Gore Ouseley: "If war should ensue been the Persian and Affghan Governments, the English Government shall take no part in it, nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace." Again in the 7th Article of the Treaty concluded by Sir Harford Jones, "If war should ensue between the Persian and Affghan Governments, the English Government shall take no part in it, nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator, at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace." Again, in the 9th Article of the Treaty, concluded by Mr. Ellis, "If war should ensue between the Persian and Affghan Governments, the English shall take no part in it, nor shall it give assistance to either party, except as a mediator at the solicitation of both parties, for the purpose of producing peace." As the British Government appears to consider it has right on its side, in spite of the foregoing declarations, I am commanded by his Majesty to intimate to your Excellency, that previously to the arrival in camp of Colonel Stoddart, Prince Kamran had submissively solicited his Majesty to permit the Persian Ministers to renew the conferences and negotiations; but that after the arrival of Colonel Stoddart, and that the people in the fortress became acquainted with these affairs and circumstances, they would by no means consent to an arrangement, nor would they even consent to the arrangement which your Excellency had discussed with them; and they refused to make restitution for our losses, and to restore our captive subjects and tribes. Besides this they made inadmissible demands; notwithstanding this, his Majesty, considering the friendship between England and Persia, does not regard it expedient, that their ancient alliance should be dissolved on account of demands which are contrary to Treaty on the part of the British Government, and that these affairs should be the cause of disagreement and contention. His Majesty will, therefore, cause his army to retire from these territories (Herat): but viewing the devotion of your Excellency to Persia, how can you give your consent, that the Persian Government should expend so much money and trouble unprofitably, that the army should return without compensation for losses for the captives and for the tribes, and that the friendship which subsists between both Governments should be the means of inflicting disgrace on Persia?

With regard to satisfaction on account of your Excellency's courier, His Majesty will perform the arrangement which he verbally explained to your Excellency when you were in his presence.

As His Majesty has acceded to the wishes of your Excellency, His Majesty is in hopes that you will return and ornament the Court with your presence, in order that the friendship between both Governments, which has

always been a source of satisfaction to the mind of his Majesty, may again be renewed, and placed as before on a footing of intimacy.

Written on the 24th of Jemaudy-ul-avul (apparently a mistake) or the 4th September, 1838.

Translated by

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

Inclosure 7 in No. 100.

Translation of a Letter from his Majesty Mahommed Shah to His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill.

LET His Excellency Mr. Mc Neill, Envoy Extraordinary from the exalted British Government, be honoured by our uninterrupted royal favour, and know, that the representation, emblematic of sincerity of his Excellency, which was despatched by Colonel Stoddart to our presence, has reached our royal Court, which is as exalted as the heavens, and has been fully comprehended from the beginning to the end by our kingly mind resplendent as the sun. With regard to certain points on which his Excellency had expressed his wishes to the Persian Government, we have commanded Meerza Ali, the Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, to write a full and complete answer to His Excellency, conformably to our royal instructions, and to convey to him perfect information of the real intentions of our auspicious mind.

His Excellency is at all times to consider our royal favour towards himself as unbounded, and is to represent his wishes at the foot of our kingly throne with the assurance of their favourable reception.

This order is imperative.

Written in the month Jemaudy, 1254.

August, 1838. Translated by

(Signed) JUSTIN SHEIL.

Inclosure 9 in No. 100.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Camp before Herat, August* 27, 1838.

THE Russian Minister Plenipotentiary has obtained an official promise from the Persian Government, to allow the Russian Government to take back by force to Russia the Russian regiment. The Hajee, on the part of the Shah, has arranged to send the regiment to Tabreez. Russian officers are to come there and take away the regiment in a body. Samson, the (Sirtip) Colonel, may return with his present rank to Russia, or remain unemployed here, but he must choose his residence far from the frontier. The Persian document obtained by the Russian Representative, was shown to Samson two days after the grand assault. Further, Russian officers are to be sent to every district of Persia to which the Russian Government chooses to send them, to collect and take back to Russia all refugee subjects of that nation. The Russian force in the Caspian has also seized a

Persian vessel, proceeding to Tchereken or the Turcoman coast, on the plea that swivels (zambooruks) being on board, it was a breach of Treaty.

Independent of the common right of granting refuge enjoyed by all sovereign States, the Treaty between Russia and Persia especially stipulates it for both contracting parties. Many Poles (200) are in the regiment.

Inclosure 10 in No. 100.

Extract of a Note from Colonel Stoddart, dated Shah's camp before Herat, August 25.—(*Received at Tabreez, September* 20, 1838.)

THIS evening, at sun-set, the official letter reached me; it says, in the most unqualified terms, that the Shah will immediately return hence, and will carry into execution the Gholam reparation exactly as you had wished. I hear Hajee Khan has been dismissed from all rank, and sent for to-night to camp: preparations for going hence are continued. At the end of the letter, the Hajee requests you to return, in the handsomest terms. I have begged Meerza Ali to send you word of this by this courier, and will, myself, despatch a man when these promises are carried into actual execution.

Inclosure 13 in No. 100.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

Extract.) *Camp, before Herat, Saturday, September* 8, 1838.

As there remain several subjects on which I have received information, which it is desirable should reach you, I have reported them in separate paragraphs of this despatch.

On the 1st instant I requested the Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs to acquaint you, through me, if any menaces were used by the Russian Minister, in order that the British Government might without delay be put in possession of the information. He said he would afterwards acquaint me, for you, with the exertions the Russian Minister had made; but that he had only used vague menaces. If he has not used menaces, I feel convinced that he has held a line of conduct and language which his Government would never sanction. The day of the storm also he went to a balakhaneh, near Mahommed Khan's camp, to see the Persians storm the Boorj Abdul Mesr from the bastion which Monsieur Blaremberg, of his suite, an engineer, had constructed. The Persian Prime Minister objected altogether to the storm; and before it took place, exculpated himself from having any share in it. His objections were very sensible ones; in short, he thought it would fail, as it did. The Shah very reluctantly assented to this advice of the Russian Major-General. After many days of delay, His Majesty summoned the officers the day before the storm, and told them, "he believed the men would willingly go to the assault, but he thought the officers would turn back; and that any officer who should turn back before he was wounded, might consider himself dismissed the service, and should be disgraced publicly." The Russian Minister had told him, that a sovereign's servants were intended to sacrifice their lives in such services as assaults for his sake.

The Russian Minister, soon after the storm, sent one of his suite to show

to the Lieutenant-Colonel of Russian deserters an official paper, signed by Mr. Ivanovitsch, as his secretary, which stated that, "the Emperor of Russia and the Shah of Persia were brothers; that their States were one, not two; that as a brother, the Emperor had requested the Shah to send back to Russia all the refugees and deserters from that country that may be in Persia; and that the Persian Government had assented to this." The messenger added, that henceforth they should consider themselves as Russian servants, not as Persian; and the attendants of the Russian Minister were sent about amongst the Regiment to proclaim the same news. The Lieutenant-Colonel and men answered separately, that they would hear of no such an arrangement. The men said, "that if we are Russian servants, give us our pay and bread immediately." The Russian Minister's people replied, "The Emperor counts your serving the Shah as you do, as the same thing as serving him. Russia and Persia are one State." The Colonel was given his choice of returning with his rank, or of quitting the service, and living anywhere at a distance from the frontier. The Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs acquainted me on the 3rd of September, that the Russian Minister demanded the deserters to be given up for friendship's sake; and had added that he was not to remain a single hour at the Persian Court, if they were not given up before the expiration of four months, now nearly out. *The men are of course unwilling to go; many of them are Poles.* In this affair, the Russian Legation now gives it out, that the refugees in Azerbijan are already sent back, and that the regiment is given up to Russia, and will be immediately sent back.

Monsieur Yenitsch left camp on the 4th instant to return to Russia.

A Russian Gholam has been sent to Kandahar, and others to the Hazarehs and Koorrookh. A Reshty told me that two Russian officers left Resht for Khiva a year ago, travelling as merchants and doctors. This Reshty had heard of their safe arrival among the Turcomans.

Inclosure 14 in No. 100.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

(Extract.) *Royal Camp, before Herat, September* 8, 1838.

M. GOUTTE on the 6th instant told the Sirdar that if Persia makes this matter up with England, Russia will attack her. The Sirdar quoted a Persian proverb as expressing the wish of the Persian Government, "both to have their enemy silent, and to avoid estranging their friend." I replied that I would report this to you, and that you would gladly assist Persia in preventing their friend, the British Government, from being estranged from them.

Inclosure 15 in No. 100.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stoddart to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir, *Near Herat*, 8 A.M. *September* 9, 1838.

I HAVE the honor to report that the Persian army has marched from this, and that His Majesty the Shah is about to mount, and that to-night the

Royal Station is at Sangbust. Fearing that I shall not have an opportunity of detailing more, I close this, and have the honor to be, &c.

(Signed) C. STODDART, Lieutenant-Colonel.

John Mc Neill, Esq.

&c. &c. &c.

P.S. 26 minutes past 10 o'clock, A. M.

The Shah has mounted his horse, "Ameerij," and is gone.

(Signed) C. STODDART.

No. 107.

Mr. Mc Neill to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 26, 1839.)

My Lord, *Roodbar, December* 4, 1838.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies and translations of the correspodence which has passed between Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil and me, and between that officer and the Persian Government, in respect to the demands which I considered it my duty to make previous to resuming my official duties at the Shah's Court.

From this correspondence your Lordship will perceive that the Persian Government has unequivocally refused to give me the apology which I required from his Excellency Hajee Meerza Aghassee, for the share he had taken in the violence offered to the messenger, and that no reply has been given to my demand, that the Persian Government should state whether or not Khoorrookh, Subzar and Furrah, were held for the Shah of Persia. The Persian Government has also declined to comply with my request, that I might be furnished with a copy of the communication which I was informed it had made to at least one Foreign Court, reflecting in an unfriendly manner on the conduct of the British Government, and the proceedings of its agents; but it does not expressly state that the communication referred to did not contain such reflections.

Under these circumstances I have not thought myself at liberty to resume my official duties at the Court of the Shah, for I could not consider the letter of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, acknowledging that Hajee Khan had been deprived of his rank, partly because of the expectation to that effect expressed by the British Government, as adequate reparation and satisfaction; especially as the Persian Government continued to assert that Hajee Khan's guilt had not been proved, and as it had not included his offence against the British Government in the list of charges on which he was tried and dismissed.

It is unnecessary for me to enter more minutely into an examination of the inclosed correspondence, because I believe my letters to Colonel Sheil will sufficiently explain the grounds on which I have proceeded. It may perhaps be regretted that I permitted myself so readily to credit the positive assurances at Tabreez, that the dismission of Hajee Khan had been effected in a manner which I could not but consider as satisfactory, and that I was thereby induced to leave Tabreez before I received certain intelligence that the statement was correct, and that the Shah had redeemed his promises; but, personally, I cannot regret the readiness, and even the desire, I have

thus publicly evinced to bring these discussions to an amicable conclusion, and to make the interval between granting the reparation and satisfaction I required, and my return to the Court, as short as possible.

It is now my intention to return to Tabreez, from whence my heavy baggage, and the public property I carried thither, has not yet been removed, and on my arrival there to make such arrangements for the future movements of the mission as may appear to be desirable.

If I should see no good reason for taking a different course, it is my intention to remove the mission beyond the Persian Frontier, into Turkey, and to send the officers and non-commissioned officers of the British Detachment to Bagdad, there to await the orders of Government.

Though I have endeavoured to separate as much as possible the consideration of the particular question of reparation and satisfaction from all considerations arising out of the general views, proceedings, and intentions of the Persian Government, so far as they were known to me, in respect to its relations with Great Britain, your Lordship will perceive from the other portions of the public correspondence which I have now the honour to transmit, that I had no inducement to accept anything less than the reparation and satisfaction I had from the first demanded; and which the Shah, through his Deputy-Minister for Foreign Affairs, had formally and unconditionally promised to grant. I have, &c.

Viscount Palmerston, G.C.B. (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

&c. &c. &c.

Inclosure 8 in No. 107.

Mr. Mc Neill to Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil.

Sir, *Resht, November* 16, 1838.

In the communication which Colonel Stoddart conveyed from me to the Shah subsequent to my departure from His Majesty's Camp, I intimated that if the Shah should retain any portion of the Affghan Territory, the British Government would consider such a proceeding as a hostile demonstration against itself. I now learn that not only the troops which occupied Ghorian, but also those which took possession of Subzar and Furrah in the name of the Shah of Persia, continue to hold these places in the name of His Majesty.

I have therefore to request that you will apply to the Persian Government for information on this subject, and call upon it to state whether or not the troops which have occupied Furrah and Subzar, as well as those at Ghorian, hold these places for the Shah of Persia, or subject to His Majesty's orders.

If it should appear that Furrah and Subzar are still held for His Majesty, or by persons subject to His Majesty's orders, you will call upon the Persian Government to issue the necessary order for the immediate evacuation of these places, and to furnish you with an authentic copy of that order for the information of the British Government.

You will at the same time intimate to His Persian Majesty's Ministers,

that I feel it my duty to protest against the continued occupation of Ghorian by the Persian troops, being regarded as constituting any right on the part of Persia to retain permanent possession of that fortress or district.

I have, &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil, (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

&c. &c. &c.

Inclosure 9 in No. 107.

Mr. Mc Neill to Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil.

Sir, *Resht, November* 16, 1838.

SUBSEQUENT to my departure from Tabreez, I received information that the Persian Government had addressed to at least one foreign Court, observations which reflected in an unfriendly and improper manner on the proceedings of the British Government, as well as of its representatives and agents here and elsewhere.

I have to instruct you to request the Persian Government to furnish me with a copy of these communications, that I may be enabled to judge whether or no the sentiments that have thus been communicated to at least one foreign Court, and probably to more than one, are of such a nature as ought to deter me from renewing my official intercourse with the Persian Government.

I have, &c.

Lieutenant-Colonel Sheil, (Signed) JOHN Mc NEILL.

&c. &c. &c.

Inclosure in No. 109.

Draft of Note presented by the Marquess of Clanricarde to Count Nesselrode.

THE Undersigned, &c., is instructed by his Government to state to His Excellency Count Nesselrode, &c., that events which have lately occurred in Persia and in Affghanistan, render it necessary for the British Government to request from that of Russia, explanations with respect to certain circumstances which are connected with those events, and which have an important bearing upon the relations between Russia and Great Britain.

It is unnecessary for the Undersigned to remind Count Nesselrode that the British and Russian Governments have, for a long time past, and, from similar motives, taken a deep interest in the affairs of Persia.

To Russia, Persia is an immediate neighbour; the frontiers of the two countries touch; and it is a legitimate object of solicitude to Russia that her neighbour should be friendly and tranquil; so that the Russian territory should be secure from attack, and the Russian population should be free from the uneasiness which civil commotions in an adjoining country have a tendency to create. Russia therefore must naturally desire that the Persian nation should be prosperous and contented; and that the Persian Government should abstain from all external aggression; should direct its attention exclusively to internal improvement; and should occupy itself in the pursuits of peace.

Great Britain has regarded Persia as a barrier for the security of British

India against attack from any European Power. With this defensive view, Great Britain has contracted alliance with Persia; and the object of that alliance has been, that Persia should be friendly to Great Britain, independent of foreign control, and at peace with all her neighbours.

The interests therefore of Great Britain and Russia, with regard to Persia, are not merely compatible, but almost the same; and hence the two Governments have felt, that having common objects to attain in Persia, they would find it for their mutual advantage to consult together upon matters connected with Persian affairs, and to endeavour to pursue, with respect to those affairs, a common course.

The expediency of such concert between Great Britain and Russia upon Persian affairs, has frequently been urged by the Russian Government, and acknowledged by that of Great Britain.

Upon this principle it was, that after the death of Abbas Meerza, in 1833, the two Governments came to an understanding with respect to the part they should take in regard to the succession to the Persian throne, whenever the then reigning Shah should die; and that they agreed together to give their support to the present Shah, whom the then reigning Monarch named as his successor. It is well known to the Russian Government how instrumental British influence was, in carrying that decision of the late Shah promptly into effect; and in preventing Persia from becoming the theatre of a protracted and ruinous civil war.

The two Governments continued for some time afterwards to maintain the same similarity in their respective courses of policy towards Persia; and the influence of both, as exerted by their missions at Tehran, appeared to be directed towards the same end, namely, to secure to Persia internal tranquillity, and external peace.

But in 1836, the Shah announced an intrntion of undertaking an expedition to attack and conquer Herat; founding that intention upon some antiquated and obsolete claims of a former dynasty of Persia upon Affghanistan.

The British Minister at Tehran was instructed to dissuade the Shah from such an enterprise; urging reasons of indisputable force, and founded upon the interests of the Shah himself.

But the advice given by the Russian Ambassador was all of an opposite tendency. For while Mr. Mc Neill was appealing to the prudence and the reason of the Shah, Count Simonich was exciting the ambition, and inflaming the passions of that Sovereign; while the one was preaching moderation and peace, the other was inciting to war and conquest; and while the one pointed out the difficulties and expense of the enterprise, the other inspired hopes of money and assistance.

This conduct on the part of Count Simonich, so much at variance with the professed policy of Russia, determined the British Government to seek explanations at St. Petersburgh. And accordingly in February, 1837, the Earl of Durham stated to Count Nesselrode what Count Simonich was doing; and inquired whether that Ambassador was acting in pursuance of instructions from his Government.

The answer of Count Nesselrode to this inquiry was plain, direct, and unequivocal. He stated indeed that he could not but entertain some doubt of the accuracy of the reports which had reached the British Government; but he declared that if Count Simonich had acted in the manner represented, he had done so in direct opposition to his instructions, which strictly enjoined him to dissuade the Shah from making war against Herat, at any time, and under any circumstances. And the Earl of Durham having read to Count Nesselrode a despatch which he had received from his Government, stating the reasons why the British Cabinet considered the undertaking of the Shah to be impolitic and unwise, Count Nesselrode said, that he entirely concurred in the opinions thus expressed by the British Government.

Shortly after this interview, the Earl of Durham had a conversation on the same subject with M. Rodofinikin, in the course of which, M. Rodofinikin offered to produce the original book, in which all the instructions given to Count Simonich were entered; and which he said, would prove to the Earl of Durham, how little Count Simonich had attended to his instructions, if he had really acted in the manner stated by the Earl of Durham.

Such were the professions and declarations of the Russian Government at St. Petersburgh; *but very different have been the proceedings of the Russian agents in Persia.*

Those reports from Mr. Mc Neill, of which the accuracy was doubted by Count Nesselrode, in February, 1837, *have been fully confirmed* by subsequent information. For not only did the Prime Minister of the Shah state that Count Simonich had urged his Persian Majesty to undertake an expedition to Herat, but Simonich himself admitted to Mr. Mc Neill that he had done so; though he added, that in so doing he had disobeyed his instructions, which directed him not to urge the Shah to prosecute the war against Herat.

It has been further stated to her Majesty's Government that Count Simonich, during the last twelve months, has advanced to the Shah the sum of 50,000 Tomauns to enable his Persian Majesty to prosecute with vigour the war against Herat; and that the Count has also announced to the Shah, that if his Persian Majesty should succeed in taking Herat, the Russian Government would release Persia from the payment of the balance of its debt to Russia; and would consider this balance, thus given up, as a contribution on the part of the Russian Government towards the expenses of the Persian campaign against Herat.

The Shah, as is well known, persevered in his march to Herat, notwithstanding all the representations of the British Minister; and commenced his operations against the place in the month of November last. A member of the Russian mission in Persia was then appointed to accompany the Shah; and Her Majesty's Government have been informed that this individual, who is reported to have habitually held language encouraging the Persian Government in its proceedings, addressed in the month of February last, a letter to the Chief Ruler of Kandahar, holding out to him an expectation of obtaining from Persia, through the intervention of Count Simonich,

the cession of Herat; assuring that Chief of the friendship of the Count, and urging him to send his son to the camp of the Shah. In the month of March last, when the state of the relations between Great Britain and Persia compelled the British Minister to proceed to the camp of the Shah before Herat, Count Simonich is understood to have urged the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to remonstrate with Mr. Mc Neill, in order to dissuade him from taking his intended journey. The ground upon which the Persian Minister rested his objections to that journey, being, that if the British Minister, who was known to disapprove the operations of the Shah, were to arrive at the camp, his presence there would serve to encourage and strengthen the Affghans, and would therefore be injurious to the designs of the Shah.

The British Minister, nevertheless, proceeded on his journey; but he had not advanced far, when intelligence reached him that Count Simonich was following him to the royal camp.

One object which the British Minister proposed to accomplish by going to the Shah's camp, was to bring about an accommodation between the Persians and the Affghans, upon terms equitable for both parties. And his first endeavours after his arrival, were industriously applied to persuade the Shah to consent to such an arrangement as it was reasonable to expect that the Government of Herat might accept.

Mr. Mc Neill was at last authorized by the Shah to go into the town, and to negotiate with the Government of Herat,—the Persian Minister assuring him that he was at liberty to conclude the matter in any manner that he might think advisable, and that he had as full power to act for the Persian Government as he had for his own. The Shah, in order to give time for this negotiation, suspended a general assault, for which every preparation had been made; and Mr. McNeill on entering the town, had the satisfaction to feel, that even should he not succeed in making peace between the contending parties, he had at least, by his unremitting exertions, prevented for the moment that effusion of blood, and that sacrifice of life, which was otherwise about to ensue.

The night which the Shah had destined for a bloody assault, was successfully spent by Mr. Mc Neill in pacific negotiation; and before the next day's sun had risen, he had obtained the assent of Kamran Shah to terms which gave to the Shah of Persia every satisfaction and security which he had demanded, reserving only the independence of the Government of Herat.

The British Minister was returning in the morning to the camp of the Shah, believing that he was thus about to terminate the war in a manner satisfactory and honourable to both parties, when on his way back out of the town, he was informed that Count Simonich had, in the course of the night, arrived in the Persian camp. But the arrival of the Russian Ambassador was not the only event which had happened while Mr. Mc Neill was employed in this negotiation. For simultaneously with that arrival, a change had come over the mind of the Shah, who was no longer animated by the pacific spirit which he had manifested on the former evening; and notwith-

standing the declaration of the Persian Minister that Mr. McNeill had full power to negotiate for the Persian Government, this Treaty was at once rejected by the Shah, because it did not contain a surrender of that independence which the Heratees had so long and so bravely been fighting to maintain. The hostilities which had been suspended at the entreaty of Mr. Mc Neill, were now re-commenced; and Count Simonich, assuming a part the very reverse of that which the British Minister had acted, appeared publicly as the military adviser of the Shah; employed a Staff Officer attached to the Russian Mission to direct the construction of batteries, and to prosecute the offensive operations; furnished a further sum of money for distribution to the Persian soldiers; and by his countenance, support, and advice, confirmed the Shah in his resolution to persevere in his hostilities.

But in about ten days after this time, the progress made by the Persians in the siege not corresponding with the expectations which they had been led to form, the Persian Minister sent to Mr. Mc Neill, requesting him again to take up the negotiation, and to arrange matters between Persia and Herat in any manner he might think proper. An interview took place thereupon between Mr. Mc Neill and the Persian Minister, at which the latter accepted, with some trifling modifications, the Treaty to which Mr. Mc Neill had obtained the consent of the Government of Herat during his visit to the town.

The British Minister now a second time flattered himself that he had succeeded in his endeavours to restore peace, and nothing remained to be done for the full accomplishment of that object but that he should carry back the Treaty into the town, and get it signed by the Shah of Herat; but again some unknown and secret cause interfered to disappoint his well-founded hopes. The Persian Government again suddenly changed its purpose, and after having agreed to accept the Treaty, refused, upon various pretences, to permit Mr. Mc Neill to carry it into the town, in order to communicate to Kamran Shah its acceptance by the Persian Government; and afterwards the Persian Minister declared his acceptance of the Treaty as no longer binding, because the Affghans still continued to carry on their defensive hostilities notwithstanding a Treaty, the acceptance of which by the Persian Government had been studiously concealed from their knowledge.

Her Majesty's Government have, moreover, been informed in a manner which seems to entitle the report to some credit, that Count Simonich announced to the Shah that a Russian army was about to march on Khiva and Bokhara; and, it is said, that he also held out to the Shah the prospect, that an eventual adjustment of the frontiers between Persia and Russia, in the direction of Khiva and Bokhara, would be the consequence of a successful issue of the operations of the two Governments against Herat.

Later accounts which have reached her Majesty's Government, represent Count Simonich as having counselled, planned, and personally superintended an assault which was made upon the town by the Shah's forces, on or about the 23d June, and which ended in the defeat of the Persians with consider-

able loss; and it is said, that among those who fell on the Persian side upon that occasion, there were officers belonging to the Russian service.

The Undersigned is further instructed to state, that the British Government possess a copy of a treaty which has been concluded between Persia and the Affghan Ruler of Kandahar, the execution of which has been guaranteed by Count Simonich, and the stipulations of which are injurious and offensive to Great Britain. The guarantee which Count Simonich has given to this Treaty, tends to afford Russia, if she adopts the guarantee, a pretence to compel the Shah of Persia, not only to make himself master of Herat, but to deliver over that city afterwards to the rulers of Kandahar, to be held by them, together with their other possessions, in the capacity, which those Rulers engage by the Treaty to acknowledge, of tributaries to Persia.

The guarantee, moreover, contains a promise to compel Persia to defend the Rulers of Kandahar against attack from any quarter whatever. It is true, that in this stipulation no specific allusion is made to England; but the intention of the parties may be inferred from the original draft of this Treaty, of which, also, Her Majesty's Government have a copy, and which was less cautiously worded, and in which specific allusion was made to England, as one of the Powers against whom assistance was to be given by Russia to the Rulers of Kandahar.

The Undersigned is further instructed to state, that a Russian agent of the name of Vicovich, but sometimes calling himself Omar Beg, and said to be attached to the Staff of the General commanding at Orenberg, was the bearer of letters from the Emperor and Count Simonich to the Ruler of Cabool, copies of which are in the possession of the British Government; and that Count Simonich observed the most perfect silence towards the British Minister at Tehran with respect to the mission of this agent; a reserve which might seem unnecessary if this agent was merely to deliver the letters of which he was the bearer, and if his mission was to have no tendency prejudicial to British interests.

But the British Government have learned that Count Simonich announced to the Shah of Persia, that this Russian agent would counsel the Ruler of Cabool to seek assistance of the Persian Government to support him in his hostilities with the Ruler of the Punjaub; and the further reports which the British Government have received of the language held by this Russian agent, at Kandahar and at Cabool, can lead to no other conclusion than that he strenuously exerted himself to detach the Rulers of those Affghan States from all connection with England, and to induce them to place their reliance upon Persia in the first instance, and ultimately upon Russia.

If the British Government could entertain a doubt of the correctness of the foregoing information, that doubt would, in a great measure, be removed by the unfriendly language with respect to the British Government, which Count Simonich held some time ago to the agent of Cabool at the Court of Persia, and of which the British Government possess proof in the Report made by that agent to the Ruler of Cabool.

It appears, then, from the foregoing statement, that on the last occasion

when a communication took place between the Governments of Great Britain and of Russia, upon the affairs of Persia, the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh unequivocally disavowed having advised the Shah to make war; and asserted, on the contrary, that its instructions to the Russian Ambassador at Tehran were, to dissuade that Sovereign from attacking Herat at any time, and under any circumstances; but that, nevertheless, the Russian Ambassador in Persia has, during the whole period which has elapsed since the above-mentioned communication, strenuously exerted himself to encourage the Shah in his aggressive undertaking; and has contributed his own assistance and that of other officers under his orders, to promote the success of the enterprise; and it appears, moreover, that although her Majesty's Government was led to think from what fell from Count Nesselrode in a conversation which he had on this subject with the Earl of Durham, on the 1st May, 1837, that Count Simonich "would not long remain in Persia," that ambassador, nevertheless, has continued to remain in Persia, pursuing, with increased activity, and in the most open manner, the conduct of which his Government had expressed such decided disapprobation.

It further appears from the foregoing statement, that whereas Russia has of late years always professed a desire to concert with Great Britain the course of policy which the two Governments should pursue with regard to Persia, so that the identity of their measures in that quarter might be a manifest proof of their friendship and union, Russian agents in Persia and Affghanistan have lately been engaged in measures studiously concealed from the British Government, and planned in a spirit unfriendly to Great Britain, and for objects hostile to her interests.

The British Government readily admits that Russia is free to pursue with respect to the matters in question, whatever course may appear to the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh most conducive to the interests of Russia;—and Great Britain is too conscious of her own strength, and too sensible of the extent and sufficiency of the means which she possesses to defend her own interests in every quarter of the globe, to regard with any serious uneasiness the transactions to which this note relates. But the British Government considers itself entitled to ask of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh, whether the intentions and the policy of Russia, towards Persia and towards Great Britain, are to be deduced from the declarations of Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofinikin to the Earl of Durham, or from the acts of Count Simonich and M. Vicovich; and the British Government thinks itself also justified in observing, that if from any cause whatever, the Russian Government has, subsequently to the months of February and May, 1837, altered the opinions which were then expressed to the Earl of Durham; and if that Government has, in consequence, thought proper to give to its Ambassador in Persia instructions diametrically opposite to those which were then described by Count Nesselrode and M. Rodofinikin, and which M. Rodofinikin offered to exhibit to the Earl of Durham,—then, and in such case, the system of unreserved reciprocal communication upon Persian affairs, which of late years has been established between the two Governments, gave to the British Cabinet

a good right to expect, that so entire a change of policy on the part of Russia, together with the reasons on which it was founded, would have been made known to her Majesty's Government by the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh instead of being left to be inferred from the acts of Russian agents in Persia and Affghanistan.

The Undersigned in conclusion is instructed to say, that her Majesty's Government is persuaded that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh will see in this communication a fresh proof of the anxious desire of the British Government to maintain unimpaired the friendly relations which so happily subsist between the two countries; and to which the British Government justly attaches so great a value: because, explanations sought for with frankness and in a friendly spirit, tend to remove misunderstandings, and to preserve harmony between nations.

No. 110.

Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—(St. Petersburgh, October 20, (*November* 1), 1838.)

Communicated by Count Pozzo di Borgo, November 11.

(Translation.)

M. Le Comte, *St. Petersburgh, Oct.* 20 (*Nov.* 1), 1838.

THE Emperor has read with serious attention, your Excellency's despatches giving an account of two consecutive interviews in which Lord Palmerston, speaking of the present situation of affairs in Persia, explained the apprehensions which the expedition of the Shah against Herat, has given rise to on the part of the Government of the East India Company.

On this occasion, Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not conceal from you, M. le Comte, that public opinion in England, ascribes to Russian influence a decisive part in the events now passing in Persia, and attributes to our Cabinet, intentions dangerous to the security of the British possessions in Asia.

This consideration is so serious, it is calculated to have so pernicious an influence on all our relations with Great Britain, that we do not hesitate a single instant to meet the English Cabinet with a frank and spontaneous explanation, in order completely to remove its apprehensions as to the intentions and views of our Government with regard to the affairs of Asia.

The policy, M. l'Ambassadeur, which the Emperor pursues in that quarter, is guided by the same principles which direct it in Europe. Far from any idea of encroachment, that policy has only for its object the maintenance of the rights of Russia, and respect for those legitimately acquired by all other Powers.

The idea of assailing the security and the tranquillity of the state of possession of Great Britain in India, has consequently never presented itself, and will never present itself to the mind of our August Master. He desires only what is just, and what is possible. For this twofold reason, he cannot entertain any combination whatever directed against the British power in India. It would not be just, because nothing would have given cause for it.

It *would not be possible*, by reason of the immense distance which separates us, the sacrifices which must be made, the difficulties which must be overcome, and all this, to realize an adventurous scheme which could never be in accordance with sound and reasonable policy. A single glance at the map ought to be sufficient to dissipate, in this respect, all prejudice, and to convince every impartial and enlightened man, that no hostile design against England can direct the policy of our Cabinet in Asia.

This, M. le Comte, is what the Emperor has himself just declared to Lord Clanricarde, at the very first interview which His Majesty had with him, on the day of his audience of reception, which took place at Tsarskoyé-Selo on the 16th (28th) of this month.

That Ambassador will not fail to report to his Government all that our August Master was pleased to say to him. The confidence which we place in the Representative of Her Britannic Majesty, renders it unnecessary for us to add any comment whatever to the report which he will lay before his Cabinet. We confine ourselves to referring to that report, in the full persuasion that he will have paid a just tribute to the political principles which the Emperor was pleased verbally to explain to him.

If the British Government places in those principles the confidence which they are calculated to inspire, it will be easy for you, M. l'Ambassadeur, to clear up the doubts which it has conceived as to the conduct which we have adopted in the midst of the recent events in Persia, and specifically with regard to the expedition of Mahommed Shah against Herat.

In order to enable your Excellency thus to place in their exact truth, facts which appear to have been strangely distorted, I lose no time, M. le Comte, in communicating to you the whole of the details contained in the present despatch, authorizing you to place it without the least reserve before the English Cabinet.

That Cabinet knows, as well as we do, the origin of the enmity which subsists between Persia and Herat, the most western part of Affghanistan. That enmity is of ancient date. The Persian Government thinks itself entitled to exact a tribute from that country, and to claim to exercise over it a supremacy, which, even under the reign of Futteh Ali Shah, Abbas Meerza, and Mahommed Meerza (the present sovereign) appeared in arms to sustain under the very walls of Herat. In despite of these rights on which the Court of Tehran relies, the Affghans of Herat make continual incursions into Persia, reduce to slavery the inhabitants whom they carry off from the eastern provinces of that country, and keep up therein incessantly the elements of disturbance and revolt.

No doubt the repression of these robberies was loudly called for by the well understood interest of the security and tranquillity of the Persian Government. That Government had an unquestionable right to employ for its own defence the means which belong to every independent Power, and to direct its arms against neighbours who disturb and insult it. In engaging in a conflict with a province touching her frontier, Persia did then absolutely nothing contrary to her rights: she afforded no cause of well-founded

complaint to a third Power, which was a stranger to this dispute between two conterminous countries. Still less could she expect to irritate and to offend the British Government, which, by its engagements with the Court of Tehran, has expressly bound itself not to interfere in favour of either party, if war should break out between the Persians and the Affghans.

All these considerations put together, establish beyond a doubt that Mahommed Shah, in determining to make war against Herat, was completely within the limits of his rights as an independent sovereign, and that he has in no respect failed in the obligations imposed upon him by the faith of Treaties.

Nevertheless, if this war, as we have just said, has appeared to us to be completely justified in principle, both by the indisputable rights possessed by the Persian Government, and by the continual grievances occasioned to it by the depredations of lawless tribes, we have, on the other hand, never hesitated to consider as unseasonable and hazardous, any military expedition which the Persian Government might undertake in the state of weakness and exhaustion in which it is placed. Instead of urging it on in an enterprise, which, in our view, offered no chance of success, *we have done all that was in our power to divert it therefrom*, and to induce it to prefer an amicable arrangement with the Chief of Herat, to a state of hostility indefinitely prolonged.

It is in this sense that have been framed all the instructions with which the Imperial Cabinet has furnished its Representative at the Court of Tehran, from the time that we were apprised of the resolution which it had taken to direct its arms anew against Herat.

In 1836, as in 1837, the counsels of our Cabinet, dictated by a true spirit of conciliation, and of sincere goodwill, have constantly had for their object the consolidation of the tranquillity of Persia, and of the neighbouring provinces, by an arrangement which should put an end to their dissensions, and should prevent Mahommed Shah from engaging in a hopeless contest.

During the winter of 1837, the arrival at Tehran of an Envoy from the Chief of Herat, gave us a prospect of the possibility of a pacific arrangement between the two contending parties.

Count Simonich received in consequence a positive order "to employ all his credit with the Shah to dispose him to a formal accommodation." Such are the very terms in which is conceived the Despatch which, by the Emperor's command, I addressed to that Minister on the 4th of May, 1837.

If our counsels have unfortunately remained without effect, we are not the less conscious of having employed all our care to prevent the renewal of a war, of which we had seen beforehand the lamentable issue.

Assuredly it is not upon the Cabinet of Russia that can fall the reproach of having suggested or *encouraged* that fatal enterprise. If it were requisite to give, in this respect, a proof of the sincerity of our intentions, of the steadiness of our principles, it would be sufficient to quote the single fact, that the Emperor has called upon the Persian Government to send back the

battalion formed of Russian deserters, and that too at a moment when we were not ignorant that that battalion constituted the principal force of the troops assembled in the camp before Herat.

It is precisely with the object of insisting upon that demand, that our Minister applied for and obtained an authority to join the Shah.

On his arrival in camp, Count Simonich, witnessing the distress in which the Persian army was, did not think that he ought to refuse his assistance to the Shah, when that Sovereign earnestly entreated him to examine the works of the siege.

Assuredly, we will not deny the part which General Simonich took in those works. Any English officer, placed in similar circumstances, would unquestionably have acted in the same manner in order to render to a friendly Sovereign the assistance which he might have applied for in so critical a situation.

Nevertheless, even if the Shah had succeeded in coming victoriously out of that dangerous situation, even if the city of Herat had been forced to open its gates to him, the intention of our Cabinet would never have been to give, in that quarter, to the Persian Power, an extension which might have become a subject of apprehension to the neighbouring countries.

Far from that, our Minister, in the supposition of a favourable issue, had deemed it his duty to suggest eventually to the Court of Tehran, the plan of a pacific arrangement, by means of which Herat would have been given over by Persia to Kohundil Khan, Chief of Kandahar.

Already a negotiation had been entered into for that purpose between the latter and Mahommed Shah, under the good offices of our Minister.

That arrangement, if it had actually taken place, would have had expressly for its basis the *independence of Affghanistan*, by imposing upon the Shah " the formal obligation in no way to assail the *integrity* of the country of which the Sirdars are actually in possession, nor the tranquillity of the tribes of which they are the Chiefs."

Such an arrangement, pacific and inoffensive, would have served, according to all appearance, to strengthen the internal peace of Affghanistan, to put a stop to the dissensions which have too often agitated that country, finally, to cause to revive therein a state of prosperity and tranquillity, which would have rendered that country accessible to the *commerce* and to the industry of all the nations which are interested in turning to account the resources of Central Asia.

According to the intimate conviction of our Cabinet, the resources of that country are sufficiently extensive to be freely opened to the *commercial activity* of all countries, which, without desiring to exclude each other, ought to contend among each other by a frank and honourable competition.

For our part, M. l'Ambassadeur, we consider this competition as entirely pacific and commercial, but by no means as political or as hostile.

Strong in our rectitude and in our conscience, we shall never have any thing to conceal or to dissemble which we have designed or undertaken.

We are then the first frankly to admit to England, that a Russian agent lately proceeded to Cabool for the purpose of *commercial inquiry*.

The fact of the appearance of this agent, of whom Lord Palmerston has spoken to you, M. le Comte, is thus completely correct. But the origin and tendency of his mission seem to have been represented to the English Government with comments of which we are desirous to demonstrate the xaggeration and the falsehood.

For that purpose it will be enough for us to say, that the mission of M. Witkewitsch [Vicovich] to Cabool, was simply occasioned by the mission of an agent, whom Dost Mahommed Khan sent to us in 1837, to St Petersburgh, with the intention of forming commercial relations with Russia. In order to ascertain the advantages and the degree of security which such an enterprise might offer to our merchants, in a country hitherto unknown to Russia, our Government determined in the first instance, to send thither an agent charged with letters in reply to those which Dost Mahommed Khan had been the first to address to us.

Such is the clear and simple statement of the circumstances which have led to the momentary appearance of a Russian traveller at Cabool. It had for its object neither a Treaty of Commerce nor any political combination whatever, which a third Power could have reason to complain of, or to take umbrage at. It has produced, and was intended to produce, but one result; that of making us acquainted with a country separated from our frontier by great distances; which oblige our Government to increase its precautions, in order that the activity of *our commerce should not run the risk of engaging there in ruinous enterprises*, without having been enlightened beforehand as to the chances to which it might be exposed.

In thus replacing the facts in their full truth, our Cabinet can offer to that of London the positive assurance that, in the mission of M. Witkewitsch [Vicovich] to Cabool, and in the instructions with which he was furnished, there has not existed the smallest design hostile to the English Government, nor the smallest design of injuring the tranquillity of the British possessions in India.

If there is one Power which might have any apprehension to entertain, or any complaint to prefer, it would be Russia, who is not ignorant of the indefatigable activity displayed by English travellers to spread disquiet among the people of Central Asia, and to carry agitation even into the heart of the countries bordering on our frontier.

Whilst on our part we ask nothing but to be admitted to partake, in fair competition, the commercial advantages of Asia, English industry, exclusive and jealous, would deprive us entirely of the benefits which it pretends to reap alone; and would cause, if it could, the produce of our manufactories to disappear from all the markets of Central Asia: witness the remarks of Burnes, and the tendency of English travellers who have followed his steps on the road to Bokhara, and to the very gates of Orenberg.

If we adduce these facts, if we point out the restless activity of certain

unaccredited and unrecognised individuals, it is certainly not our wish to impute to the Government to which they belong, the blame of which they are deserving. On the contrary, we consider the British Cabinet to be altogether a stranger to the tendency which we have just alluded to. But in like manner as we place a just reliance on the rectitude of the intentions of the English Government, so also are we entitled to expect that it will not raise a doubt as to our own.

Great Britain, like Russia, must have at heart the same interest, that of maintaining peace in the centre of Asia, and of avoiding the occurrence of a general conflagration in that vast portion of the globe. But, to prevent that great calamity, it is necessary carefully to maintain the tranquillity of the intermediate countries which separate the possessions of Russia from those of Great Britain. To consolidate the tranquillity of those countries, not to excite them against each other by nourishing their mutual animosities; to be contented with competing in industry, but not to engage in a struggle for political influence; finally, beyond every thing else, to respect the *independence* of the intermediate countries which separate us, such is, in our opinion, the system which the two Cabinets have a common interest invariably to pursue, in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between two Great Powers, which, that they may remain friends, require not to touch each other, and not to come into collision with each other in the centre of Asia.

These remarks, M. le Comte, which the Emperor commands you to communicate with the most perfect frankness to the English Ministry, will serve, I hope, to satisfy it, above all, as to the intentions of our Cabinet, and to place in its true light, the conservative and disinterested policy of our August Master.

After having acquitted yourself of this first duty, have the goodness, M. l'Ambassadeur, distinctly to enter upon the questions more immediately connected with the present situation of Persia, and upon which the attention of the Emperor is at present fixed. Your Excellency will have the goodness, in the first place, to remind Lord Palmerston, that of all the political matters which we have had to treat with England, that relating to Persia is precisely the one on which we have always been sufficiently fortunate to establish a perfect agreement between our Cabinet and that of London; and this for the simple reason that our well-understood interests are the same with regard to Persia, seeing that we should deplore as much as England to see that country again become the scene of a political disturbance to which we could not remain strangers. Impressed with this conviction, our Cabinet was the first, before the accession of the present Shah, to propose to the English Government to consider of the means of establishing between Russia and Great Britain, a perfect understanding on the subject of the affairs of Persia, in order to preserve that country from the calamities of a disputed succession, and of a civil war.

The result of this overture completely answered our expectation at that time. The two Cabinets, you are aware, M. le Comte, acted from that time in a spirit of conciliation and of good understanding, which has fully insured

the success of all their measures. Instructions drawn up by common consent, were sent to their Representatives at Tehran; Mahommed Meerza, supported by the two Courts, ascended the throne; and the internal peace of Persia, notwithstanding the elements of trouble which at that time appeared to place it in jeopardy, has not for an instant been exposed to the slightest disturbance, thanks to the unanimity which subsisted between Russia and Great Britain.

It will not be without advantage, M. le Comte, to place again before Lord Palmerston, at the present time the despatch, which at that period he addressed to the Minister of England at St. Petersburgh, and which the latter was then directed to communicate to us.

Your Excellency will find a copy of it annexed. With this document in your hand, you will have the goodness, M. l'Ambassadeur, to make known to Lord Palmerston, that the same sentiments which guided us in 1834, and which led us at the time to desire a friendly understanding with England upon the affairs of Persia, are now also the motive of the present step, and inspire us with the full confidence of seeing it lead to results fully as satisfactory as that which preceded it.

Your Excellency will then without reserve express the regret which we feel at seeing the relations of good understanding between the Court of London and that of Tehran, disturbed for the time, as well as our sincere desire to see them speedily re-established on their ancient footing.

Have the goodness, M. le Comte, to add, that it is far from the intention of our Cabinet, to constitute itself a judge of the positive grievances which Great Britain may have to allege against the Persian Government. Those grievances, however, as we are not ignorant, relate to objects of a secondary importance. It would, therefore, seem to us allowable to believe that the Persian Government might easily come to an understanding with the English Ministry as to the means of removing those difficulties in an equitable manner.

But there is a circumstance of a more serious nature, and a consideration of a higher order, which make us determine to open ourselves without reserve towards the British Cabinet, and to communicate to it, in a friendly manner, the opinion which we entertain upon the actual state of affairs in Persia.

That state of affairs is complicated, and becomes more serious in our view by reason of the menacing attitude recently assumed by England towards the Court of Tehran.

In fact, the naval demonstration to which the British Government has had recourse in the Persian Gulph, the occupation of the Island of Karrak, and the reports spread abroad as to the approaching re-appearance of the Zil-Sultaun and of the Persian Princes, who are said to have placed themselves under English protection, are so many circumstances which must necessarily inspire Mahommed Shah with the most serious apprehensions.

In this state of things, that Sovereign has thought it necessary to have recourse to the friendship of the Emperor, to request his good offices with

England, in order to arrive at an amicable understanding, and to remove the grounds of alarm which the attitude recently assumed by the British Government, has necessarily occasioned to the Court of Tehran.

The Emperor, yielding to the wishes of the Shah, does not hesitate at the present time to appeal to the sentiments of equity entertained by the British Cabinet, with the view of inducing it to put a stop to a state of things which, if it should still be prolonged, would end by seriously endangering the tranquillity of Persia, and would thus become, to Russia herself, a matter of uneasiness, which *would compel her, in her turn, to take measures of security and of precaution.*

In order to prevent, in time, any further complication, of which Persia would infallibly have to regret the lamentable consequences, the surest method would, in our opinion, be to see the Missions of Russia and of Great Britain replace themselves on the same line, and proceed together to strengthen the authority of a Sovereign whom the two Courts have, by common consent, contributed to raise to the throne.

Thus, in order not to act at present for a purpose contrary to that which she desired, in 1834, to attain, in order not to excite the disturbances which at that time she desired to prevent, England, according to our intimate conviction, ought not to delay to re-establish her relations with the Court of Tehran upon their ancient footing, to recall her squadron from the Persian Gulf, and to evacuate the island of Karrak which her troops in that quarter have occupied for a time.

On her thus replacing matters in their ordinary position, England will find us ready to second her in the endeavour to maintain, hereafter, the Persian Government within the limits which its own interest recommends it not to transgress, and for the future to renounce every expedition like that which it has just been forced to abandon.

It is in this sense that our Mission at Tehran will be instructed to act henceforward, in concert with that of England, as soon as we shall have acquired the certainty that the step which your Excellency is directed now to take, has attained its end, and that the Cabinet of London has consented to desist from its hostile attitude towards Persia.

Our attitude, M. le Comte, will necessarily be regulated according to the definitive determination which the British Government shall think fit to adopt. Assuredly it will rest with that Government alone to re-establish, between the Missions of Russia and of Great Britain at Tehran, that happy agreement of views and of actions which we had so much at heart to form in 1834, and which had at that time been attended with consequences so beneficial for the consolidation of the internal tranquillity of the Persian Monarchy.

If the British Ministry, as we sincerely desire, decides upon reverting to this course, it may have full assurance that it will find for this purpose, in the Representative of the Emperor at Tehran, the most active and honest co-operation. Colonel Duhamel, whom our August Master has been pleased to appoint to succeed to Count Simonich, is sufficiently known by the mode-

ration of his character, that his appointment alone may be the surest indication of the line of conduct which he is directed to follow; as his former honourable conduct is likewise the best guarantee for the fidelity with which he will fulfil the intentions of our Government with regard to the affairs of Persia.

Destined for the last six months to replace Count Simonich, Colonel Duhamel, whose departure had been unavoidably delayed, must, at the present time, be on the point of arriving at his post. His presence cannot fail to have a beneficial influence on the counsels of the Shah, provided that the English Government should, in its turn, be pleased to combine its efforts with ours, in order to restore to Persia that repose which is to her a primary condition of existence, at the same time that it is a pledge of peace for the two Great Powers who are called mutually to exercise an influence on the destinies of Central Asia.

Your Excellency is requested, by command of the Emperor, to urge these considerations upon Lord Palmerston, on delivering to him a copy of the present despatch. We would fain hope that the sentiments which have dictated it, will be appreciated by the British Cabinet, and that it will be pleased to receive this communication in a manner conformable to the sincerely friendly intentions of our August Master.

Receive, &c. (Signed) NESSELRODE.

His Excellency Count Pozzo di Borgo,
&c. &c. &c.

Inclosure in No. 110.

Viscount Palmerston to the Hon. John Duncan Bligh.

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 5, 1834.

In acknowledging the receipt of your despatch of the 6th of August, I have to instruct you to take an opportunity of expressing to the Russian Government the satisfaction of His Majesty's Government at the decision which has been taken by the Shah of Persia to nominate Mahommed Meerza as the successor to the Throne, an event which it is to be hoped will avert the danger of civil war in Persia on the next demise of the Crown; and you will also say that his Majesty's Government are gratified to find that the Governments of Great Britain and Russia are acting with regard to the affairs of Persia in the same spirit, and are equally animated by a sincere desire to maintain not only the internal tranquillity, but also the independence and integrity of Persia.

His Majesty's Government will at all times find a real pleasure in co-operating with that of Russia for such purposes; and instructions have been sent to the British Resident at Tehran, to communicate confidentially with the Russian Representative in the furtherance of the common views of the two Governments. I am, &c.

The Hon. John Duncan Bligh, (Signed) PALMERSTON.
&c. &c. &c.

No. 111.

Viscount Palmerston to the Count Pozzo di Borgo.

M. le Comte, *Foreign Office, December* 20, 1838.

I HAVE not failed to communicate to her Majesty's Government the despatch upon Persian Affairs addressed to your Excellency by Count Nesselrode on the 20th October (1st November), and of which your Excellency, by instructions from your Government, gave me a copy on the 11th of last month.

I can assure your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have given to this important communication all the attention which it so justly demands, and I have great pleasure in being able to state to your Excellency that this communication has in its general result been highly satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government.

The leading principle which invariably directs the conduct of the British Government in the management of its relations with Foreign Powers, is an anxious desire to preserve for the British Nation the blessings of peace. This desire must inspire Her Majesty's Government with an earnest wish to maintain with all States the most friendly relations. But as regards Russia, this wish is peculiarly strong. Because an alliance of long standing between Great Britain and Russia; commercial intercourse valuable to both countries; and common interests of the highest order; must necessarily lead Her Majesty's Government to deprecate as a great misfortune, any event which might tend to interrupt the good understanding which so happily subsists between the Cabinets of Petersburgh and London.

But all nations have interests which cannot be abandoned; and which must be protected at whatever hazard or sacrifice. And when those interests appear threatened with danger, it is the duty of the Government of the Country concerned, to seek explanations from that quarter from whence such danger appears likely to come.

The proceedings of Russian agents in Asia had for some considerable time been so much at variance with the professed policy of the Russian Government, and so inconsistent with the friendly relations subsisting between Great Britain and Russia, that the British Cabinet deemed it its duty to ascertain by frank explanations with that of St. Petersburgh, whether any change had taken place in the declared policy of the Imperial Government with regard to the affairs in question, or in its friendly dispositions towards Great Britain.

The despatch from Count Nesselrode which your Excellency has communicated to me, contains upon these points assurances the most full and complete; and Her Majesty's Government accept as entirely satisfactory, the declarations of the Imperial Cabinet, that it does not harbour any designs hostile to the interests of Great Britain in India; that its own policy with respect to Persia remains unchanged, and is the same which in 1834 the two Powers agreed to adopt, (and which I must be allowed to remind your Excellency the British Government and its agents in Persia, have from that time to this, undeviatingly pursued); and that in future the Russian agents

in Persia will unite themselves with those of Great Britain in earnestly dissuading the Shah from engaging again in any expedition similar to that which he has lately undertaken against Herat.

If such shall continue to be the policy of Russia, and if her agents in the East shall faithfully obey their instructions, there seems every reason to hope that nothing can hereafter occur in those quarters, that can be calculated to disturb the good understanding between the two countries; and I beg to assure your Excellency, that it is the most earnest wish of the British Government that this good understanding should be firmly and perpetually maintained.

The two Cabinets being thus entirely agreed as to the future, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that no good could result from any controversial discussion as to the past: and therefore although there are many passages in Count Nesselrode's despatch, to which, under other circumstances, Her Majesty's Government would have felt it their duty to reply, yet as matters stand, they prefer letting those passages go by, as belonging to discussions now happily closed; making however this reservation, that Her Majesty's Government desire that their silence may not be understood as implying acquiescence in the reasonings, the views, or the statements of any passages in that despatch, to which I have not specifically adverted in this letter.

With respect to the unfortunate change which of late has taken place in the relations between Great Britain and Persia, that change has been deeply regretted by the British Government. But it has not been of their seeking; and has been forced upon them by the conduct of the Shah, and by those evil advisers by whom he has allowed himself to be influenced.

It rests therefore with the Shah, and not with the British Government to determine when and how soon the relations between Great Britain and Persia shall be replaced upon their former footing of friendship; but Her Majesty's Government are led to hope from the last accounts which they have received from Persia, that such a satisfactory arrangement may by this time have already been effected.

I have, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency Count Pozzo di Borgo.

&c. &c. &c.

No. 114.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received Dec. 5, 1838.)

(Extract.) *St. Petersburgh, November* 20, 1838.

COUNT NESSELRODE proceeded to talk of Persian affairs, and of the note which I had presented to him. He protested against the existence of the slightest intention on the part of Russia hostile to our Asiatic dominions. He said that naturally they desired to possess influence in Persia and in Turkey; but that such influence was not for the purpose of injuring British

possessions or British interests. Count Nesselrode acknowledged that Count Simonich had certainly acted in a manner of which we had a right to complain: and therefore that functionary had been recalled.

No. 116.

Count Nesselrode to Count Pozzo di Borgo.—Communicated by Count Pozzo di Borgo, 25th March, 1839.

[Translation.]

St. Petersburgh, February 21, *(March 5,)* 1839.

M. le Comte,

YOUR Excellency's despatches of the 17th and 27th of January, inform us that the affairs of Persia will probably form the subject of a serious discussion in Parliament, and that the English Ministry will possibly find itself obliged to give publicity to the communications which have been exchanged on this subject between our Cabinet and that of London.

The Emperor directs me to state to you in his name, that he does not see any inconvenience in that publicity. The policy of our August Master does not fear the open day. On the contrary, His Majesty will be glad to see that the explanations which he has spontaneously offered to England should be generally known. Such communication, by replacing the facts in their exact truth, will enlighten the minds of all upright men, and will dispel the uneasiness which malevolence seeks to propagate as to the intentions of Russia.

With this persuasion, the Emperor authorizes you, M. le Comte, to declare to Lord Palmerston that he has not the slightest objection to the publication of the despatches relative to the affairs of Persia, of which you have been instructed to deliver copies to the English Ministry.

In conformity with the orders of his Majesty, I will once more recapitulate the whole of the explanations which we have given to the British Cabinet, and thus make as complete as possible the information which your Excellency has successively communicated to it.

I will begin, M. l'Ambassadeur, by summarily recounting what has passed with regard to the affairs of Persia.

It was after the return of the Emperor from his last journey to Germany that the attention of his Majesty was for the first time called to the serious apprehensions which the English Ministry felt, at the part which our Government was supposed to have taken in the events in Persia, specifically in the expedition of the Shah against Herat; an enterprise which public opinion in England was more and more inclined to consider as directed by our influence, with an object hostile to Great Britain.

So soon as the Emperor was apprised of the existence of those apprehensions, his first care was to tranquillize them. He immediately met the English Ministry frankly, by a complete explanation of his policy with regard to the affairs of Asia. He declared his intentions, his principles in that respect, at the very first interview which he granted to the Marquis of Clanricarde. On my part, I executed with respect to your Excellency the

orders of our August Master on this important question, by my despatch of the 20th of last October.

That despatch contains a positive assurance that it never entered into the views of the Emperor to assail in the smallest degree the security of the British possessions in India. It expresses, on the contrary, our sincere desire to maintain the existing state of things in the centre of Asia, and speedily to re-establish on their ancient footing the relations of friendship between England and Persia. It declares our firm intention of continuing, as we did in 1834, to act in common concert with the British Government, in order to secure the tranquillity of that country, to consolidate the authority of the Shah, and to maintain him within the limits of his true interests, by dissuading him from any fresh aggression equally hazardous to his own security as to that of the neighbouring States. Lastly, it expresses our expectation of seeing England on her part revert to the ordinary and regular state of things, recall her squadron, and abandon the Island of Karrak, which has been temporarily occupied by the troops which she has sent to the Persian Gulf.

This overture preceded that which the Marquis of Clanricarde was instructed to make to us on the same question, and of which he acquitted himself by his note of the 9th of November. We had just given the explanations which the British Government was desirous of obtaining. We had been the first to dispel the doubts which it had appeared to entertain. It had not had occasion to wait for the satisfactory explanations which it had a right to expect from our sincerity. The Emperor had himself just offered them.

Such has been our conduct towards England.

With regard to Persia, the course which the Imperial Cabinet has pursued has been equally frank and equally correct. As soon as we were made acquainted with the embarrassments in which the Shah had involved himself, notwithstanding our wishes, notwithstanding our counsels, General Duhamel, who was then proceeding to his post, received orders to make to that Sovereign the representations which appeared to us most appropriate to his position, and to his true interests.

Our counsels may be briefly stated in two words:—To re-establish his relations of friendship with England; to abandon the expedition against Herat, which we had always disapproved as unseasonable, and as dangerous; in short, to return without delay to the centre of his dominions, in order to maintain there order and tranquillity. Such is the sense of the instructions with which General Duhamel was furnished on going to Tehran.

At the moment of his arrival there, the force of events had already realized our anticipations, justified our remonstrances, accomplished our expectations.

The siege of Herat was raised, the Persian army was broken up, the Shah had returned to his capital.

It only remained for us to employ our efforts to restore a good understanding between the Courts of London and Tehran. We have laboured in that work of conciliation, and we will continue to contribute towards

it without remission. Assuredly an exclusive, jealous, and narrow policy might have counselled us to take advantage of the present circumstances, to keep alive the difference between the two Governments, in order to turn to account for the advantage of our own preponderance the rupture of their relations. Far be from us such a thought, which the conservative policy of the Emperor reprobates. Instead of widening the breach which the late events have produced in the mutual relations of the Courts of London and of Tehran, our august Master has no other care than to close it for ever; instead of perpetuating their misunderstanding, he has sincerely at heart to end it at the earliest period. It is to the accomplishment of this object that the Representatives of the Emperor have received instructions to direct their attention at London as well as at Tehran.

Their efforts appear already not to have been without effect.

The first steps which General Duhamel has taken since his arrival at his post, have been received with deference. The Shah has repeatedly expressed his desire to be made acquainted with the opinion of the Emperor on the actual state of affairs in Persia; his intention to act in conformity with our advice; in fine, his wish to see our good offices actively employed at London, to smooth away the differences which have arisen between the two States. Such are the feelings which our Minister has found, and which he endeavours to keep up at Tehran.

On your side, M. l'Ambassadeur, you have obtained satisfactory assurances on the part of the English Ministry. It received our communication of the 20th of October with a just sentiment of confidence. Appreciating the motives which dictated that communication, it manifested to us in its turn, its firm intention of replacing matters in Persia on their ancient footing, by re-establishing with that country its relations of peace and good understanding.

By my despatch of the 29th of January, you have been instructed, M. le Comte, to make known to the British Cabinet, that in taking note of that promise, we looked to receive proof of its entire fulfilment.

Subsequently I have had the opportunity of expressing this expectation verbally to Mr. Mc Neill on his passage through St. Petersburgh.

He has assured me that the re-establishment of the diplomatic relations between the two Courts would not experience any difficulty, from the moment that the Shah should consent to offer to the English Government the satisfaction which it had demanded, and which it had a right to expect, for the insult offered to the English Mission, by the arrest of its messenger in the camp before Herat.

That demand, M. le Comte, has appeared to us to be founded in justice. From the beginning we had not hesitated to declare to our Minister in Persia, that the circumstances which had attended the arrest of the English Messenger appeared to us to be of a nature not to be justified on the part of the Persian Ministry, and to demand an equitable reparation. We had expressed this opinion even before the arrival of Mr. Mc Neill at St. Petersburgh, resting it solely on the information which the correspondence of our Mission had furnished us with.

But after the more detailed explanations which the Minister of England has himself communicated to me, and which I made it my duty immediately to lay before the Emperor, his Majesty has been pleased to order General Duhamel formally to advise the Court of Tehran not to delay the satisfaction which England is entitled to demand for the reparation of a wrong which is evidently imputable to the Persian Government.

Such, M. l'Ambassadeur, is the clear and plain statement of the instructions with which General Duhamel is furnished, with respect to the affairs of Persia.

With regard to those of Affghanistan, my despatch of the 20th of October has already furnished you some preliminary information, which I will now make as complete and as precise as possible, in order to leave nothing doubtful or vague.

I have already informed you, M. le Comte, that during the siege of Herat a negotiation had been commenced between the Shah and the Sirdar of Kandahar, with the view of placing the latter in possession of Herat, when that city should have been taken by the Persians.

I have moreover announced to you that this negotiation had, at the request of the Shah, been supported by the good offices of Count Simonich, at that time our Representative at the Court of Tehran.

In fact, with the co-operation of that Minister, an Act had been drawn up and agreed upon between the Shah and Kohundil Khan, with the view of placing Herat in dependence on that Chief, and of securing thereby the tranquillity of the Eastern frontiers of Persia, by putting an end to the acts of plunder by which they are incessantly disturbed.

Count Simonich considering that he was acting for the interests of the Shah, took upon himself to give to that Act a guarantee which the Persian Government and the Sirdar of Kandahar unanimously required of him, as a pledge of the reliance which they might thereafter have to repose in their mutual obligations. Full of suspicion, each of the other, they equally felt the necessity of appealing to the impartiality of a third party. This motive decided our Minister not to refuse his guarantee, which was demanded from him by both parties as an indispensable condition to their engagements.

The Draft of Convention containing those stipulations, reached us in the month of April, 1838. Nothing in that Act manifested an aggressive or hostile design. A strictly defensive system was the basis of the stipulations agreed upon on either side. Notwithstanding this, the Emperor would not confirm the guarantee which our Minister had given to that Act. The engagements recorded in it, although purely defensive, were placed beyond the limits which our August Master has laid down for his policy. Consequently His Majesty ordered Count Simonich to abstain from making himself guarantee to a transaction to which our Cabinet thought it right to remain completely a stranger. That order was despatched to our Minister in Persia on the 26th of April, 1838, before the departure of the Emperor for Germany.

Meanwhile, Count Simonich, without waiting for the decision of the Imperial Court, had affixed his name to the Act, which in the interval had been signed between the Shah and Kohundil Khan.

That fact could not produce any change in the determination once taken by the Emperor. He had disapproved the guarantee, when it was conceived and planned. He refused to ratify it, when it was given without his sanction.

General Duhamel has in consequence received orders to declare to the Shah, as well as to the Affghans, that the compact which his predecessor had guaranteed, has not received the sanction of our August Master.

To this declaration General Duhamel added,

That the intention of the Emperor has been, and will continue to be, not to maintain with Affghanistan any other than purely *commercial* relations:

That his wishes have been ill-expressed or ill-understood, *if any political tendency* whatever has been attributed to them:

Finally, that Russia will not take any part in the civil wars of the Affghan Chiefs, nor in their family feuds, which have no claim to our intervention.

Such is the language which General Duhamel is ordered to hold to the Sirdars of Cabool and of Kandahar. On his arrival at Tehran, he found that his predecessor, as Lord Palmerston has told you, had sent Lieutenant Witkewitch (Vicovich) to Kandahar.

General Duhamel, forthwith, without applying for, and without waiting for fresh instructions, but acting strictly in conformity with the determinations taken once for all by the Emperor, recalled Lieutenant Witkewitch (Vicovich) from Kandahar.

Such, M. l'Ambassadeur, has been the conduct of our Cabinet in the affair of Affghanistan.

We leave to the English Ministry the task of judging, if it can still raise the slightest doubt as to the sincerity of the intentions and of the measures of Russia, of which we have just related the whole course. Let us recapitulate the facts such as they have taken place.

In England, uneasiness was excited as to our pretended views of aggression directed against India. The Emperor tranquillized those apprehensions by the most positive language, and by the most frank assurances.

In Persia, a serious controversy has arisen between the Shah and England. The British Minister has left Tehran. A rupture has taken place. Far from making that rupture serve for the advantage of our exclusive influence, we only aim at re-establishing a good understanding between the two Courts.

England demands satisfaction from Persia. Instead of preventing that act of reparation, we are the first to counsel the Shah to acquiesce in it, because we find that justice is in this matter on the side of England, wrong on the side of Persia.

In Affghanistan, a Convention is concluded under the guarantee of the Minister of Russia. The Emperor refuses to ratify it, because he cannot and will not have with the Affghans any relations but those of commerce, and in no wise any political interests. A Russian agent appears at Kandahar with the appearance of a diplomatic mission. That agent is recalled.

Every considerate observer, who will cast his eye upon the facts which I have just recited, will be forced to admit, M. le Comte, that our Cabinet has

done all that depended upon it to maintain in its relations with Central Asia that state of peace which it is the mutual interest of Russia as well as of England to preserve from all attack.

It rests now with the British government to co-operate on its part towards this result, which is so necessary, and so desirable. We can on this matter only refer to our preceding communications, and once more recall to the English Cabinet the wishes which we have expressed to it in our despatch of the 20th of last October.

To re-establish promptly the relations of friendship between the Courts of London and of Tehran; to put an end to the hostile measures adopted in the Persian Gulf; to abstain from disturbing the tranquillity of the people of the centre of Asia by nourishing their animosities; to be contented with competing in industry in those vast countries, but not to engage there in a struggle for political influence; to respect the independence of the intermediate countries which separate us; such is, we once again repeat it, the system which England and Russia have a common interest invariably to pursue, in order to prevent the possibility of a conflict between these two great Powers, which, that they may continue friends, require to remain each within its own limits, and not to advance against each other in the centre of Asia.

We leave it to the enlightened judgment of the English Cabinet to weigh these reflections in its wisdom. It is too much interested itself in the preservation of the existing order of things, not to be itself convinced that the tranquillity of Asia can only be ensured in a durable manner by a mutual agreement of pacific views and measures. It is important that there should be in this respect a complete reciprocity between the two Powers who exercise in common an influence over the destinies of that vast portion of the globe. We submit these considerations to the spirit of equity and of wisdom of the English Cabinet, congratulating ourselves that we offer to it in the explanations contained in the present despatch, a fresh proof of our sentiments of conciliation and of frankness.

It is with this purpose that your Excellency will have the goodness to deliver to Lord Palmerston a copy of this despatch, which serves as a complement to our preceding communications of the 20th of October, and of the 29th of January. Receive, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

His Excellency Count Pozzo di Borgo,
&c. &c. &c.

No. 117.

Viscount Palmerston to Count Pozzo di Borgo.

Monsieur le Comte, *Foreign Office, April* 4, 1839.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency, that I have not failed to communicate to my colleagues the Despatch from Count Nesselrode of the 21 February / 5 March on the affairs of Persia, of which your Excellency delivered to me a copy on the 25th of last month; and I feel great pleasure in expressing to

your Excellency the satisfaction which the renewed assurances contained in that despatch have afforded to Her Majesty's Government. Her Majesty's Government have also been much gratified by learning that one of the first acts of Colonel Duhamel, on entering upon his functions at Tehran, was to recall Captain Vicovich from Affghanistan.

With respect to the relations between Great Britain and Persia, I beg again to assure your Excellency, that her Majesty's Government are waiting with great anxiety for the moment when Great Britain may be enabled to re-establish those relations upon their former footing of friendship; but it rests with the Shah, and not with her Majesty's Government, to take the steps which are necessary for bringing about that result.

I have, &c.

His Excellency Count Pozzo di Borgo. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

&c. &c. &c.

APPENDIX.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Mc Neill.

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1838.

I INCLOSE, for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and at Vienna, directing them to apprise Hoossein Khan, if he should arrive at either of those capitals, that, under existing circumstances, he will not be received at this Court.

I am, &c.

John Mc Neill, Esq. (Signed) PALMERSTON.

&c. &c. &c.

Inclosure.

Viscount Palmerston to Earl Granville and Sir Frederick Lamb,

My Lord, / Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 20, 1838.

BY intelligence recently received from her Majesty's Envoy at the Court of Persia, it appears that certain Persian authorities, acting, there is too much reason to suppose, under the immediate orders of the Shah, intercepted one of the messengers of the British Mission on his return from Herat to Tehran; and having brought him back by force to the Royal Camp, took from him his despatches, and otherwise maltreated him. For so outrageous a violation of the law of nations, his Majesty's Minister in Persia has demanded redress; and it will depend upon the course which the Shah may take in this matter, whether her Majesty's Minister will remain in Persia or not.

Meanwhile, her Majesty's Government have been apprised that Hoossein Khan, who was some time ago appointed by the Court of Persia to proceed to England, as Ambassador from the Shah, to congratulate her Majesty on her accession to the throne, has actually set out, and has probably by this time made considerable progress on his journey.

Her Majesty's Government, fully concurring in the view taken by Mr. Mc Neill, of the unjustifiable conduct of the Persian authorities, have entirely approved of the course which Mr. Mc Neill has adopted in this transaction; and under these circumstances it is obvious that the Queen cannot receive at her Majesty's Court any Ambassador from the Shah, neither can her Majesty's Secretary of State hold any communication with such Ambassador on any matter of business whatever, until information shall have been received that the Shah has made full reparation for the outrage committed upon the British messenger.

I have, therefore, to instruct your Excellency to take measures for obtaining early intelligence of the arrival of Hoossein Khan at $\frac{\text{Paris,}}{\text{Vienna,}}$; and upon being informed of his arrival, you will immediately apprise him of the determination of her Majesty's Government, not to receive him nor to hold any communication with him under existing circumstances; and you will point out to him the mortifying position in which he would be placed, if, instead of waiting where he is, to learn the result of this affair in Persia, he should persist, notwithstanding this intimation, in continuing his journey to England.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

His Excellency the Earl Granville, G.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.
His Excellency Sir Frederick Lamb, G.C.B.
&c. &c. &c.

THE END.

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