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AUSTRAL AFRICA

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BEING

INCIDENTS AND EXPERIENCES
IN BECHUANALAND, CAPE COLONY, AND
ENGLAND

BY

JOHN MACKENZIE

VOL. II

London
SAMPSON LOW, MARSTON, SEARLE & RIVINGTON
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BOOK IV

THE BECHUANALAND EXPEDITION UNDER SIR CHARLES WARREN

CHAPTER I

A COLONY DESERTED—OUTBURST OF LOYAL PUBLIC OPINION AT THE CAPE—RESPONSE OF ENGLAND

DURING my stay in Capetown I had opportunities of meeting the leaders of public opinion, and those who were credited with being such. I shall reproduce a specimen of these conversations, my interlocutor being a distinguished Cape Colonist and politician, and the date August 1884.

"Do you know, I feel inclined to blame the English colonists, especially in and near Capetown, for an almost entire silence on political questions, except on the most formal and conventional lines."

"We have been very much discouraged," said my friend; "and have come to the conclusion that it is best to keep quiet."

"But, in that case," I replied, "how is it that none of you can speak six words on politics without mentioning the question of race? What has race got to do with it? It is not surely seriously meant that one race is to expel the other?"

"There are Afrikander Bond agitators who would drive out every Englishman, and, indeed, every European if they could; but I grant 'driving out' is not really an alternative."

"It seems to me the absurdest thing for a people who are of mixed races to speak in public so much about 'race-hatred' and 'race-lines.' It really seems to me that Englishmen are more to blame for this than the Dutch-speaking people."

"Ah! but you don't know the Dutch," my friend contended. "They are so able to conceal their real intentions; they are 'slim,' to use their own word. The Afrikander Bond is really a republican and seditious institution, and its bitterest utterances are spread and circulated throughout the country by newspapers which are published in the South African patois."

"But, my dear sir, why all this life and activity on one side, and no movement or organisation, nothing but helpless grumbling, on the other? Republicanism comes to a people like measles to children. You can't prevent the attack; you can mitigate the symptoms and hasten the recovery. And that is what you Cape colonists have yet to begin."

"I don't quite follow you; but if you mean that we should engage in political discussion on these contested subjects, then I differ from you entirely. I think our rule hitherto has been a very wise one—to keep quite silent, and leave all the agitation to the other side. Our idea is that the Afrikander Bond movement, if only let alone, and not opposed in any way, will die a natural death."

"Well, you have certainly a very queer idea of a natural death," I replied. "You say the Afrikander Bond people have their own meetings, their own publications, which are largely circulated. You say this literature is disloyal and pernicious at times, if not always. This movement is thus a lusty, youthful movement, and is well fed, and fed regularly; so, pray, what is to kill it? Permit me to say you are talking sheer nonsense; and your abstention from speech and writing on these subjects takes away the only chance there is of stable improvement in the country."

"But the Afrikander Bond people would be too prejudiced to read our literature if we produced it," was my friend's plea.

"Well, I must say I have no sympathy with your position. If you have truth and progress and wisdom on your side, why be afraid to speak out, and why be afraid of the results when you have spoken? We have all read of the enemy who sowed tares while men slept. Here in the Cape Colony the tares are sown while you are all looking

on; and you have not the nerve to speak out the truth."

"It is not the want of nerve; we do not approve of speaking out."

"That is too ridiculous. You cannot believe that the inculcation of one set of doctrines will commend their opposites. It is, on the whole, more honouring to you to put it down to a want of nerve."

"It is no want of nerve," said my friend, now becoming more intensely earnest; "but let me tell you plainly why it is that in South Africa we have been so quiet, and have submitted to everything in silence. It is," lowering his voice and speaking with feeling, "because we have not confidence in the South African policy of the English Government. I am not a politician as to English politics—I am a colonist; but the vacillation of England has undone South Africa, and taken the heart out of its loyal people—Dutch as well as English. That is the true cause of our silence. You say we are to speak out and instruct the people—what are we to say?"

"Say! Why, say what you would say if you were in any other colony. Speak out the whole duty of the Colonial man. That will be one and the same whichever language the colonist speaks. The great moral, social, political, economic, and other doctrines—who is to teach these to your enfranchised but very ignorant country electors? I know of no other country in which Englishmen have said of political opponents what you have just said of the Afrikander Bond politics. For my own part, however deep the treachery of a few may be, I don't believe in the essential disloyalty of the Bond throughout the Colony. In my opinion, there is a good idea underlying the existence of the Bond—the future union of the people. And it strikes me that the Bond has had its real origin where your own silence has begun—in disapproval of the vacillation of England in South Africa and in preparation for possible desertion."

"If England would only announce a wise and helpful policy and stick to it!"

"Just so," I replied. "But I thought she had done so, and I believe she will stand to it. It is for colonists to help her to do so. How is she to know of your existence, or of the thousands of colonists like you who are gloomily keeping quiet in the Cape Colony, while bluster and swagger are shouting at the top of their voice?"

"Well, upon my word, I think you are right. We have duties to perform as colonists, and we are not performing them as we might do."

It was felt on all hands that a South African crisis had arrived owing to the hostile attitude of the Transvaal. The struggle was a far-reaching one. It affected the welfare of the whole country. Some English colonists had resigned themselves to what they thought was the inevitable, and, as already stated, were in some cases applying themselves to the study of the Dutch language, believing that in a few years it would be the recognised language of the country. But the recent movement of England towards Bechuanaland had raised their hopes once more. The question to be practically settled now was—Would the Supreme Power in South Africa be what might be termed Afrikanderism, or would it be the Imperial Government with its impartiality as to race, its progress, equal law, and complete freedom?

These questions were filling the minds of the best men in the Cape Colony in August and September 1884. In Capetown they became the chief subjects of talk. I counted it a privilege to mingle as an item in a community passing through such a crisis. The idea of holding a public meeting was suggested probably by several people about the same time; and when it once was fairly thought of, it was regarded as supremely reasonable and desirable. There should be a public meeting such as had never been held in old Capetown! Local politics should be shelved, questions of birth or race should be ignored, all should unite in expressing loyalty to the Queen, and desire for upholding the Imperial Government as supreme in South Africa. Timorous souls had to be reassured by their friends, opinionative men reasoned with and convinced, unbelieving and cynical men persuaded by word and action that this was

not a movement of professional politicians, but the genuine outburst of the long pent-up opinion and sentiment of the capital of a great colony. Informal and casual discussions gave place to the usual Committee, by which definite arrangements were made for the meeting. On entering the large Committee-room by invitation, I found a full attendance of the leading men of Capetown. I was struck with the dead silence which had fallen after I entered the room. It was, after a moment, broken by a gentleman with that candour and directness which come so markedly to the front when men are working for a great and worthy object.

"There's no use beating about the bush. We were talking about you, Mr. Mackenzie, when you entered the room."

"Well," I said, "perhaps I had better retire while you finish your conversation—is that it?"

"No, not at all. It is your presence that is wanted. The fact is, some are in doubt as to the advisableness of your speaking at the meeting."

"Well, you surely can't expect me to give a verdict on that question. Settle it among yourselves."

"Well, you see, your history in Bechuanaland, your recall to Capetown, and so on——"

"Ah! now I see what you are driving at. I cannot tell you whether, from your point of view, I should speak at such a meeting as you are going to hold. But I can at once assure you that I should never think of thrusting my personal affairs before the public of the Colony at a crisis like the present. I am too deeply impressed with the great issues which are at stake."

This statement cleared the air entirely, and the utmost cordiality prevailed. I was shocked that any one should have imagined that I would select such an opportunity for self-vindication, which, it was well known, would imply the condemnation of others. I never, however, cared to make any inquiry as to who were uneasy on this account. As to personal explanations, I felt that I could wait. There was now work before me which I could do, and which I felt called upon to perform. As to speaking at this great meeting, I had a strong impression in my own mind that I was

going to do so, and felt that I had, in a real sense, a message to deliver; but I was equally clear that I must be placed on the platform by the judgment and wishes of the managers of the meeting, and by the general desire of the public.

Certainly no one who attended the meeting in the Exchange, Capetown, on the evening of the 24th September 1884, will ever forget the event. Notwithstanding a heavy shower of rain the hall was crammed. Men crowded at the door, climbed upon the open windows, and stood outside by doors and windows, in order to hear what was said. In a place like Capetown there are many who feel they cannot attend such meetings, and some who stayed away assured me they wished to be present, and would willingly be under the table, were that practicable, so great was the enthusiasm. The Mayor of Capetown was in the chair, and near him sat Sir John Molteno, the first Premier of the Colony after it secured responsible government. On the platform and near it were members of the Cape Parliament, of both sides as to local politics, professional and commercial men; and the hall was filled with an eminently respectable and representative gathering. The pent-up enthusiasm and loyalty of the people were evidently to be restrained no longer, for on the appearance on the platform of the Mayor and speakers, the audience rose and struck up "Rule, Britannia!" after which three cheers were given of such volume and force that one could not but think of the fixings of the roof of the building.

The Mayor, P. J. Stigant, M.L.A., said:—

"Citizens of Capetown, we have met here this evening at a critical period in the history of this Colony. We are here this evening owing to the crisis in Bechuanaland. I feel satisfied, from my knowledge of the citizens of Capetown, that you will give a fair and impartial hearing to both sides of the question, if it is possible there can be two sides to the question. I fear that we have been too lukewarm. We intend to prove to-night our loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen—(great cheering)—our loyalty to the flag under which we live, our loyalty to ourselves and to the Constitution under which we are governed. (Cheers.)"

The first resolution expressed the opinion—

"That the intervention of Her Majesty's Government in Bechuanaland for the maintenance of the trade route, and the preservation of

native tribes to whom promises of Imperial protection had been given, was an act dictated by the urgent claims of humanity no less than by the necessities of a wise and far-seeing policy."

It was moved by the Hon. A. Ebden, M.L.C., who specially censured the sectional and anti-British tone of the *Zuid Afrikaan* newspaper. Mr. W. Thorne, merchant, in seconding the resolution, read to the meeting an extract from the insulting speech of President Kruger in Pretoria, in which he had characterised the High Commissioner and Mr. Mackenzie as liars, as showing the true state of affairs and the real feelings of those who were opposed to the Protectorate.

The second resolution was moved with great eloquence and ability by the Hon. J. W. Leonard, Q.C., who had been Attorney-General in the previous Cape Ministry. Himself a colonist, born and educated in South Africa, it was with great appropriateness that this resolution was entrusted to him. I shall give Mr. Leonard's speech without abridgment. From it the English reader can see the gravity of the crisis at the Cape at this time. The call by Mr. Leonard, on behalf of all loyal colonists, upon Her Majesty's Government to exercise the functions of the Supreme Power in the country is one which it ought never to have been necessary to make. It will be well if the events of this crisis have taught Her Majesty's Government a permanent lesson as to our neglect of administrative duty in South Africa. Mr. Leonard said :—

"Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, the resolution which has been entrusted to my charge reads as follows :—'That this meeting is further of opinion that any failure on the part of Her Majesty's Government to maintain its just rights under the Convention of London, entered into with the Transvaal, and to fulfil its obligations towards the native tribes in the Protectorate of Bechuanaland, would be fatal to British supremacy in South Africa, and fraught with disastrous results to all loyal subjects of Her Majesty in this country.' Gentlemen, the resolution which I have just read to you is one of supreme importance. It is so important in its tenor that I can conscientiously say that I wish the task of advocating it had been entrusted to better hands than mine. (No, no.) At the same time, while I feel a diffidence which you will perhaps not believe in, in addressing a meeting of citizens such as I see before me, I can candidly say I am proud to speak to such a number of loyal British subjects as I speak to now.

(Cheers.) I am proud to address such a meeting as this, composed of such men as yourselves, composed of gentlemen whom I see on the platform around me. And respecting the objects for which this meeting has been called, you will permit me to say a few words before addressing myself to the substance of the resolution which I have just read to you. I have heard, and it has been said in the streets—our enemy has done this thing—it has been said that this meeting has been called to sympathise with the gentleman for whom I, at all events, entertain a profound respect, Mr. Mackenzie. (Cheers.) But, gentlemen, while I entertain a profound respect for Mr. Mackenzie, I fully recognise the fact that there are many men who differ from him and from his views, and I fully recognise the fact that the rumour I have just mentioned has been set on foot in order to detract from the importance of this demonstration, and in order to have it go abroad that Mr. Mackenzie has himself got up this meeting, and in order that they may be able to protest that this assemblage has met to do him honour. The object which we all have in view is not that; and, holding as free men any position with regard to Mr. Mackenzie individually, I take it there can be but one view as regards his action in Bechuanaland. However we estimate his appointment to his position, these, gentlemen, are not the subjects we have come here to discuss to-night. We have come here to-night in the interest of no faction, in the interest of no party in the State, in the interest of no nationality. (Hear, hear.) We have come here, gentlemen, to-night to raise our voices in support of public and in support of political morality. (Hear, hear.) We have come here to raise our voices in protest against the enemies of law and order—(hear, hear)—against sedition and murder—(hear, hear)—against the destruction of defenceless human beings, against those who advocate the violation of public faith and the tearing up of public treaties. (Cheers.) These are the objects we have in view. (Renewed cheering.) We have come here to-night to discuss, not the merits of any official, be he ever so high or ever so low—in the service of the crown. It is time for us to speak; as Mr. Ebden said, we, as loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen, as law-abiding citizens, have kept silence far too long. (Hear, hear.) Events have been occurring in South Africa which I know have stirred the ire of every honest man in the country; events prejudicial to civilisation, prejudicial to humanity, events prejudicial to our trade and our commerce, prejudicial to the very stability of government itself in this land. We have kept silence hoping almost against hope that the time would come when wiser counsels would prevail and when the voice of sedition, the voice of faction, and the voice of disloyalty should no longer be heard, that the common bond of one interest should incite us to work for the common good; but, gentlemen, our hopes have been idle, our hopes have been frustrated, and the time has come to speak. The crisis, gentlemen, is upon us—a crisis the gravity of which I wish I could impress upon the mind of every one here. It should be impressed upon the minds of you all and upon the English Government, that upon the outcome of this crisis

depends the question whether the British flag is to fly in South Africa as the flag of South Africa or not. (Hear, hear.) I challenge contradiction to that statement. I know that treason is rampant in the land; I know that disloyalty is promulgated in public meetings, in the press of this country, in the press of Capetown. I know who are the parties, and some of them may not be very far from me. And I say, gentlemen, upon our united voice depends the question of what is to be the future of the south-eastern half of this glorious continent now in our possession. Upon the voice of the people of this country depends in a great measure the decision which will be come to by the men who administer the government of the mighty Empire of England. We have been challenged by an official in the service of the Crown, a member of the present English Administration—Mr. Ashley—to give an expression of our opinion, and I say we shall be false to ourselves if we do not respond in a manner that, perhaps, is little expected either in this country or elsewhere. (Cheers.) Now, gentlemen, I am not going to make a long speech, as there are others to speak after me. The resolution which I have put before you contains two assertions. The first assertion, which is by far the most important part of it, is—(a voice: Read it again)—well, I will read it again: 'That this meeting is further of opinion that any failure on the part of Her Majesty's Government to maintain its just rights under the Convention of London entered into with the Transvaal, and to fulfil its obligations towards the native tribes in the Protectorate of Bechuanaland, would be fatal to British supremacy in South Africa.' (Cheers.) That is the first portion of the resolution which I have now to commend to the acceptance of this meeting, and I am almost inclined to say it needs no proof; but I wish to ask your indulgence first to refer to a few circumstances in support of what is there stated. I will not go further back into the history of this country than the conclusion of the Pretoria Convention. We know that was concluded when Britain had suffered defeat; you know what the main provisions of that Convention were, and that Her Gracious Majesty the Queen was to be the suzerain of the Transvaal; you are aware the boundaries were all delineated in that document. Well, gentlemen, when that Convention was concluded, it was manifested that the people, whom its deputies were supposed to represent, did not exactly like it. But, gentlemen, there were 13,000 British troops then massed on the south-east slopes of the Drakensberg, eager to avenge the defeat inflicted upon them. (Cheers.) I will say no more. The Convention was accepted, and the troops were sent, some to India, some to England, and some to other divisions of our Empire. As soon as they were withdrawn, it became manifest that the era of intrigue had commenced. Certain individuals in this Colony and certain individuals in the interior States had made up their mind to trade upon the ignorance of the poor people in the Transvaal, who thought the people of Great Britain had been defeated at Laing's Nek and Majuba, and the object of their intrigues was to destroy the British supremacy in South Africa. I know there are some who will dispute what I am saying, and that remarks will be made that I am speaking

the thing that is not. But I ask the men who have lived in the country, who have followed the current of events, is not what I put before you what has been written and what has been said? I say their object was to degrade the British flag and to bring about a state of things when it would no longer fly in this country with honour to itself or for the protection of people living under it. This has been the object of some of the people of the Transvaal, and *per fas et nefas* to make this Colony a hide-bound dependency of the British Crown. Their object —that of the mass of the people—I do not say all of them—has been to aggrandise the Tranvaal State. The object of these intrigues was to cross our northern boundary, to take the land down to the Indian Ocean on the east, and down to the Kalahari on the west, in order that this portion of the British Empire might for ever be shut in, and destroy British sentiment, the object being that the Transvaal, by its powers of unlimited expansion, should become the paramount State in South Africa, and with them was to rest whether we should be graciously allowed to guard our coasts, or whether that simple privilege should be denied us. (Cheers.) That, I say, must have been the object apparent to every man who knew how to read public events as they occurred before him. That is the doctrine which has been promulgated by those colonists in the country, which has been promulgated in a portion of the press of Capetown and elsewhere. With this object in view, every effort was made to put an end to Her Majesty's suzerainty, and every effort was made for the expansion of the Transvaal boundary, and it is matter of history how bands of marauders were sent over their western boundary and took advantage of little petty feuds which had occurred from time immemorial and had never had any serious results, and in the name of civilisation—such civilisation as it was—to interfere in order that they might obtain possession of the lands and cattle of a defenceless people. These people, I say, gentlemen, were encouraged by the sentiment of a great many people in the Transvaal—I should be sorry to wrong them by saying the whole. These are 'pioneers of civilisation'; they were called so by at least one of the newspapers in Capetown, and it said it was proud so to call them. I shall show what class of colonisation it was, presently. At all events, we know how Mankoroane was driven back; how Montsioa was pressed harder and harder from time to time. It was then that a Deputation of the Transvaal State was despatched to Great Britain. Well, what was the main object of that Deputation? First of all, it was not, of course, to do away with the Queen's suzerainty, because no one knew exactly what that was. In the language of one newspaper, it was suggested that perhaps it meant to haul up our flag on a pole, or perhaps it might mean hauling it down. The main object of that Deputation was to remove the difficulty which tied the Transvaal down within certain limits; it was necessary that the Transvaal should extend and that colonisation should go on. Very well, gentlemen, we know what the Transvaal Deputation did. I am not going to take you through newspaper reports of the history of the past. It was fortunate for us that we had friends of South Africa who

could put things in their true light. (Hear, hear.) I am not going to mention names. (A voice: Forster.) Yes, Forster if you like, a very good man too. There were friends there who, although they held the highest official position, who, however much they had been vilified, were able to put things in the proper light, and the result was, that the Transvaal Deputation did not succeed in getting that boundless power of expansion across our northern boundary which they desired, and a new Convention was entered into, and a new Commission issued to Her Majesty's High Commissioner here to secure British protection to the tribes north of the Orange River. I do not know whether you are aware of the terms of that new Convention, or the terms of that new Commission which Her Majesty was pleased to issue. Few people, perhaps, knew these things, but it is mere or less my business to know them, and I shall first tell you what they are, as they appear in an interesting publication which you have all seen, the *Government Gazette*. (Laughter.) The boundaries of the Transvaal are there laid down beacon by beacon, with an accuracy that could not be exceeded if the subject matter of the Convention were a farm on the Wynberg Flats. It was then provided that the Government of the South African Republic should strictly adhere to the boundaries defined in the first Article, and that it should at all times prevent any of its inhabitants making encroachment upon land beyond the said boundary. Well, gentlemen, I take it if you or I had entered into a contract as clearly defined as that, and had broken it, we should soon have been made to feel the consequences. It was further provided that the Government of the South African Republic should appoint Commissioners upon the eastern and western boundaries, whose duty it would be to strictly guard against irregularities by trespassing over the boundaries. Now, gentlemen,—well, I won't say what came into my mind. (A voice: Speak out.) I will tell you presently. Simultaneously with this Convention published in the *Gazette*, I find this new Commission issued to the Governor of this Colony as High Commissioner,—the old Commission wasn't wide enough, and a new Commission was passed under the Great Seal in order to give the High Commissioner greater powers than he had before. [The learned gentleman quoted from the Commission to show that Bechuanaland was specially taken under British protection.] Well, gentlemen, these things being so, the Transvaal Deputation returned to this country. Well, it is only last month that this new Convention was ratified in the Volksraad, ratified under every circumstance of contumely. I need not repeat to you what a gentleman said just now, who read to you what was said at the time. It was ratified, and Her Majesty's High Commissioner deputed a Commissioner, but they did not—such little things count for nothing when "colonisation" is at stake. The Convention was, however, formally ratified, and the moment it was ratified the subjects of the Transvaal broke it. You will remember, gentlemen, that the Transvaal undertook to observe the boundaries, and to do its utmost to prevent its inhabitants from crossing over the boundaries, and to appoint a Commission to guard those boundaries. (A voice: No.) Well, we won't discuss that. You

have all heard of Rooi Grond as a camp of marauding scoundrels and murderers. Rooi Grond, gentlemen, is recruited from the Transvaal, and the men there are armed and equipped from Transvaal magazines. (Shame.) Rooi Grond is, to the greater extent, Transvaal ground—I believe the boundary cuts right through the encampment—to all intents it is Transvaal ground. This is the way, gentlemen, in which the Convention has been maintained. I can produce incontestable proof—but you don't want proof—that they were supported by Mr. Joubert, General Joubert of the Transvaal. (Shame.) Well, gentlemen, you don't want proof of these things, you don't want proof of what has been virtually admitted in this Colony; but I can produce proof from the newspaper press of Capetown published in the Dutch language, and they urged that Montsioa should be crushed and destroyed. That was a chief actually taken under Her Majesty's protection. (Hear, hear, and Shame.) That there should be no misapprehension, however, I will tell you almost the words of the paragraph I mean. There was some talk about a waggon load of ammunition being sent to Montsioa and those loyal natives, and it was suggested that it would be an excellent thing if one of the bullets should find its way into Mackenzie's body. (Shame.) It was well it did not do so, because we know, even with the present Administration, England could not stand still if the highest representative of Her Majesty in that territory were massacred. Well, gentlemen, Montsioa himself was all but annihilated, women and children fired upon, the sub-Commissioner, Mr. Wright, taken prisoner, and he would doubtless have been shot had he not cleverly escaped; what was to be done? Mr. Bethell shot dead—(Yes, no)—I can tell you the man who shot him if you like, or one of them—shot dead as he lay wounded and defenceless on the ground. (Loud cries of Shame.) And these, gentlemen, are the "colonisers" for whom a portion of the press of this Colony is not ashamed to stand up. (Hisses.) Well, gentlemen, we know that the appearance of Mr. Rhodes was the signal for a fresh attack on Montsioa; we know how Mr. Rhodes was treated by these people, and how he left the country, and how Joubert went then and obtained from Montsioa that sham letter and sham statement which appeared in the newspapers, accepting the protection of the very men from whom the British Protectorate was to protect him. He now comes under Transvaal Protection and places himself unreservedly in the hands of the humane Mr. Joubert. It is not necessary for me to go into further details to show how the Convention has been broken. It is admitted, and it is published in our papers in this city. These things are before you and they are read, and I am not going to waste your time in endeavouring to prove what is not seriously contradicted. What is proved is that there is a spirit of insolence against Great Britain, and a spirit intolerant to the commonest doctrines of humanity, if it comes from British lips. Is not my proposition proved?—(Yes, yes)—and all these things are intended to put an end to British supremacy in this country. I will say this, that unless we are prepared to assert British supremacy, not

only this country, but the whole civilised world will not long treat with respect a Power which allows others so lightly to break their engagements ; they must show that if a treaty is made they have made up their minds to stand to it and require the other party to stand to it too. (Hear, hear.) Otherwise her voice in the councils of the world will soon be silenced, the proud position won for her by her warriors and statesmen will be lost, and she may write 'Ichabod' on her gates. All loyal subjects in this country must take their stand. Already in the metropolis of the Colony we have been defied, and Great Britain has been dared to send troops through this country. (Laughter.) I am not going to waste time in combating such puerilities as to the right to send British troops over British territory, and I am not going to prove that the Queen of England can send her troops where she will, no matter what man shall say her nay, at all events, wherever her own dominions extend. It would be a disastrous thing to every one if Great Britain should lose her supremacy here, and the withdrawal of the British flag from this country would be disastrous not only to loyal subjects of Her Majesty, but to the sedition-mongers, the traitors, and the rascals who have for years past endeavoured to break down our British supremacy. (Cheers.) All South Africa would then be reduced to the same state as the Transvaal, a country without a Government, and I should be sorry to see this Colony in the state of the South African Republic, and I should be sorry too to see this country under the flag of mighty Germany or of republican France. (Hear.) But I will say here, gentlemen, that those gentlemen who talk about German rule would soon find they were not under the mild rule of England's Queen. (Hear, hear.) Well, gentlemen, I came to say my say, and I think I have said it. We, as loyal subjects of the Queen, as law-abiding and law-loving people, whether born subjects of Her Majesty or not, have been challenged to say our say ; we have been told England durst not move hand or foot to maintain her honour, to uphold her supremacy because of the "colonists." I am not going to speak of the "colonists" of Rooi Grond who slaughter young people of 5, 6, 7, and 8 years of age, nor of "colonists" who shoot women, but I claim to-night to speak for 10,000 or 100,000 in this Colony, and I say that is our answer to the taunt which has been put upon us. What is said here to-night will go forth, not only, I hope, to the furthermost part of the Colony, but go forward to England as a standing refutation of the calumnies that have been put upon us as a people. (Here, hear, and great cheering.) We are strong in our right, we are strong in having our quarrel just, we are strong numerically—much stronger than those sedition-mongers of whom I have spoken—we are strong as loyal and true subjects. (Loud and long-continued cheering.)"

Mr. Fairbridge, a lawyer and man of letters well known in Capetown, succeeded Mr. Leonard in a short racy speech.

Mr. Fairbridge pictured graphically the advantages which had been

brought to South Africa by its connection with England, going back for his illustration to the time when the country, under the Dutch East India Company, laboured under arbitrary tyranny, and when no man could carry an umbrella or dress his wife in a silk gown without the consent of the Governor! He concluded by expressing the strong conviction that the time had come to speak out against being "given over to Boerdom."

I was the next speaker on the list, and was called upon to support the foregoing resolution. My reception by the Capetown public partook of the nature of a revelation to myself and to others also. No audience was ever more genuinely enthusiastic and hearty. They rose in a body and cheered for what seemed a very long time. This was certainly a singular way of showing the unpopularity which had been brought against me as if it were a crime; and yet I was facing an openly-called public meeting of the citizens of Capetown. Of course I felt that the idea underlying these gentlemen's approval of myself was their deep love for the dear old country, whose position in South Africa I had striven to uphold to the best of my ability.

I at once eschewed all personalities—the subjects of discussion were too great to introduce Mr. this or Mr. that amongst them. When in England I had found the people there were anxious to devolve certain duties upon the colonists themselves; and while in the Colony I found the people had a clear idea of the duty of England toward them. As in England I had endeavoured to show that the mother country had still a special duty to discharge in the case of South Africa; so here in the Colony I should no longer dwell on the duty of England, of which they seemed to have a clear idea, but direct attention to the duty of the colonists in the present circumstances of the country. Their first duty was to recognise their corporate existence in the Cape Colony. They were a corporate body; and as such their interests were one and the same, no matter what language they might speak. They must learn the lesson which had been learned in America, and think of themselves as South African citizens. The Cape Colony was not the only corporate body in the country—there were others who of course had their own interests, which it was quite right that they should seek to promote. But what astonished me was that some Cape Colonists had such jumbled ideas on this point that they seemed to confound the interests of the Cape with those of her neighbours. This was clearly a very grave mistake, and might bring great mischief to the Colony. The word "expansion" had been used by some one that evening. The idea underlying it had characterised the past history of Europeans in South Africa, and was destined to do so in the future. It was from

the non-recognition of this law that all the troubles of the Imperial Government had sprung. The attitude of the Imperial Government in South Africa reminded me of the mother who is always seeing that the legs of her child are becoming too long for its dress, and the child's arms too long for its arms, and that somehow or other she must again and again set to work in order to make her child respectable, and to "look like ither folk." Now, this South African child is always growing, and its frocks are always getting too short, and the mother country is irritated periodically on this account. This growth, or expansion, or whatever you like to call it, has gone on long enough now for every one on both sides of the water to take it into account as the law of our life in South Africa, to legislate for it, and to make up our minds that it is going to take place. This law, I was happy to find, was now recognised by both political parties in England during the time I was there, and they regard this question as outside party politics. It was a new departure, they said, with reference to native policy in South Africa. The Imperial Government had at length recognised this great movement—and had proposed to regulate it, and to legislate for it and not ignore it as in the past. Philanthropists, who were well acquainted with Colonial affairs, had also come to see that the true interests of the natives lay in the management of the spread of the Europeans, and not in attempting to arrest it. Now, in Capetown a very adroit thing had been done by that division of the local press, which had already been characterised by a former speaker with the liberty with which one fellow-townsman speaks of another. This expansion was claimed in a certain newspaper to be a Dutch idea; and it was declared that the English attitude was to forbid and to stop it. But this was not really so. The real question was—Were they to go north with the stain of human blood on their hands, or were they to go north as Christians, clean-handed? Even in Bechuanaland the freebooters were tired of their own evil courses; and if people in Capetown praised them it was more than they did themselves. When the policy which I advocated was fully understood I had no doubt that it would meet with general approval throughout the Cape Colony; for Dutch farmers to whom I had explained it had expressed themselves warmly in its favour. Although I was interested in the black people, I considered their case in connection with the past history of the country. It had never been my advice to black men to be exclusive, or to regard large open spaces which they could not use as land for which they ought to fight. What I advised them to do was to waken up, and plough more, and improve their grounds, and occupy as much as they could with advantage, and then await the coming of the wave of white men. But how are we to protect these well-doing and peaceful natives? To control the introduction of Europeans peacefully into their country will need the guidance of a Central Government, which will be a boon to both colonists and natives. I believed that this peaceful and orderly progress—this respect for people's personal rights—would be approved by the general public opinion of the Colony.

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I was certain they would much prefer it to the degradation of freebooting, or of volunteering to serve one native chief against another in a native quarrel. The Cape Colony was really only at the commencement of its history—that is, if they cared to have a great future for their country. If they wished a future they must work for it unitedly and forget divisions ; and they must, as a corporate body, assert themselves now. Speak wisely, speak constitutionally, speak out and stick to it. I did not say to them, the gentlemen of Capetown, that their house was on fire, but I did say that their window was being blocked up. The Germans on the west, the Transvaal on the east, were moving to shut them up on the north—and if they did so the future of South Africa would be in other hands than theirs. They might not be able to face by themselves the responsibility connected with this great territory to the north. But here came in the immense advantage of their connection with a great empire like England. It was a legitimate use of that connection for her to help them in a matter of this kind, and so to regulate affairs for them that they would not be robbed as a colony of a place in the future history of Southern Africa. Let them bring all necessary pressure to bear on their Ministers, so that they should come to a good understanding with the mother country with reference to their northern outlook.

Mr. Wiener, M.L.A., was the next speaker. He moved—

"That this meeting is of opinion that the Colonial Government should render all the assistance in its power to Her Majesty's Government in keeping open to the trade of this Colony the route to the interior, upon which the expansion and development of the Colony and the progress of civilisation so much depend."

He thought in the circumstances of the country it was right for them to call on the Imperial Government to put down lawlessness and to endeavour to establish the supremacy of Her Majesty's Government. If they asked the Imperial Government to do that, he thought it was but right on their part to request their own Government to assist in so laudable an object.

Mr. Lewis, M.L.A., seconded the motion, and emphasised the fact that the objects before them were of equal value to all colonists of whatever race.

He was well known to be a staunch liberal in politics, but the recent action of the Home Government had almost driven him to be a Tory, and he would almost as soon turn Turk as turn Tory. The Imperial Government must uphold the Protectorate, and the Cape Government in his opinion ought to render assistance.

Mr. Walter Searle, merchant, moved the next resolution :—

"That it is expedient, pending the ratification of the Convention of London by the Volksraad of the South African Republic, that the Colonial Government be authorised to open negotiations with Her Majesty's Imperial Government, with the view of submitting to Parliament next session a measure for the annexation to the Cape Colony of the territory on the south-west border of the South African Republic, now under the protection of Great Britain."

Mr. Searle in his speech remarked that this was the counterpart of the resolution which had been passed two months before by the Cape Parliament. Sufficient time had not yet elapsed to see what action the British Government would take when they heard of the disgraceful breaches of the Convention which had been signed in London. There could be little doubt that they would act promptly. The speaker said the ground he would have gone over had already been fully occupied by Mr. Leonard; and he concluded with some kind remarks about myself and the speech which I had just made, and the nature of the opposition I had met with.

Mr. R. M. Ross, merchant, seconded the resolution.

He said they had simply to ask their Parliament to carry into effect its own resolution. The question which they had to deal with was not one of nationality, but one of humanity, and one of the suppression of lawlessness. The British Government seemed prepared to meet the Colony, but they also wished the Ministry of this Colony to meet them. They wished the British Government to support them in arresting lawlessness; and when the accounts went home of what had then taken place, he thought the British Government would comply with the wishes of colonists.

Mr. Ohlsson, M.L.A., moved the next resolution:—

"That a petition embodying the foregoing resolutions be prepared by a Committee to be appointed by the meeting, and presented to his Excellency the Governor for transmission by cablegram to Her Majesty the Queen, and that loyal subjects in other parts of the Colony be requested to frame similar petitions."

The speaker expressed his conviction that that meeting was one of the most important ever held in the Colony. It was a matter which brooked no delay, as was proved by the action taken in the annexation of Angra Pequena. He had every respect for the Germans, but he did not wish to see them too close neighbours. They must act at once in this matter. He was sorry to say it, but they had traitors in the Colony; but he was not going to discuss what certain newspapers had said.

Mr. J. R. Ross seconded the resolution.

He said he was not going to make a speech at that hour. The only speech he would make was to ask them to rise and give three

cheers for Her Majesty the Queen and the flag of Old England. The audience rose, and the cheers were heartily given.

Mr. Inglesby proposed, and Mr. E. Moore, Mayor of Woodstock, seconded the last resolution, which gave the names of the Committee proposed to be appointed:—

Messrs. Searle, St. Leger, Dormer, Leonard, Q.C.; Wiener, M.L.A.; Faure; Lewis, M.L.A.; Stigant, M.L.A.; Fairbridge; Ohlsson, M.L.A., with the mover, and power to add to their number.

The Hon. A. Ebden again spoke.

He first moved a vote of thanks to the chair, which was carried amidst cheering, and then called upon the meeting to rise and give three cheers for Mr. Mackenzie, which was very heartily done. The assemblage, having lustily sung the National Anthem, quietly dispersed.

The *Cape Times*, whose account of the meeting is here followed, remarked concerning it on the following day:—

"The public meeting of yesterday evening was as successful as the most sanguine could have hoped. A full room, a hearty good-humoured spirit, an honest and overwhelming enthusiasm shown at the proper point—what more could have been desired by the most earnest believers in the virtue and might of public meetings? . . . If Mr. Mackenzie was ever tempted before to regard the people of Capetown as cold-blooded beings, or at the best as lukewarm Laodiceans, he may now rid himself for once and all of that suspicion, and give us credit henceforth for the same warm humanity that glows in English veins. The demonstration supplied the missing link that was needed to complete the chain of sympathy between the Queen's subjects in South Africa and her subjects in Europe. All that we regret is that the sympathy should even yet appear to any as influenced by race or hereditary tradition instead of being the instinctive response of all who enjoy British liberty to an appeal in behalf of the freedom and humanity of which we were wont to regard the British flag as the emblem and pledge. It would be unjust to the people of this Colony to countenance any such distinction. . . . It was not to England that the wrong is done by the lawlessness supported from the Transvaal, or to any abstract English quality, but to the Cape Colonists of every class, and at the instance of a domineering State whose aggressive course has been stimulated all along by adventurers from Europe, for whose benefit the Transvaal surrenders all her wealth, abiding herself in a poverty-stricken and squalid condition. This Colonial aspect of the question was brought out very clearly by Mr. Mackenzie yesterday evening. It was indeed the salient point in his address, this recognition of Colonial interests and Colonial duty without tolerance of any distinction therein between

colonist and colonist. And this point was insisted upon and accentuated in perfect liberality of mind as regards other communities whose interests may clash with ours. It is natural, in Mr. Mackenzie's philosophy, that they should have their interests, and do their best to assert them. He did not blame them for that; indeed, not only for the Transvaal no bitter word fell from his lips, but even for the Goshen freebooters he had a kindly thought, which reminded one of the Scotch minister's prayer for the 'puir deil.' But if Mr. Mackenzie was indulgent to our neighbours, and pitiful even to the unhappy ruffians who are miserable in their iniquity, he could hardly restrain his indignation at our blindness and sloth, at the easy-going mind with which we would suffer ourselves to be walled in and cut off from all progress and development, leaving to others the good things and the noble prospect which are our own by inheritance and right. Mr. Mackenzie's words will be read with attention, as they were heard with eager interest. A plain unvarnished tale it was that he told, using a simplicity and directness of speech that was more telling than any laboured eloquence. And what he said went home; he taught his hearers something, and sent them away with a clearer and better view of their part and duty as colonists in a community which must either live and act and energise in one spirit, or fall into hopeless ruin."

The *Volksblad*, a newspaper printed partly in Dutch and partly in English, declared that the meeting was the most important which had been held in the Colony since the famous gathering in 1849, which protested successfully against the formation by the English Government of a penal settlement at the Cape.

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The appeal from the Cape Colony produced a profound impression in England. The idea of deserting fellow-subjects, of abandoning a British colony, was hateful to every one, when thus presented to the public mind by the news from the Cape; and yet the only interpretation which could be put upon the earnest cry from Cape Colonists was that the Imperial attitude had recently amounted to practical desertion. Public opinion at this time was happily and strongly expressed by Mr. Forster at a public meeting organised by the South African Committee. Before addressing that meeting Mr. Forster telegraphed to me at Capetown for information concerning the true state of affairs. I considered that this reference by Mr. Forster

to my observation and my judgment, at an important crisis, was a great responsibility as well as a gratifying expression of confidence from a leading statesman and close student of South African questions. I replied that the Colony condemned the action of the Transvaal in Bechuanaland, and agreed in the necessity that England should uphold the Protectorate.

Mr. Forster, in his speech at the public meeting, stated clearly his own broad object, and that of the South African Committee, as being to secure that England performed its duty to the natives in South Africa, and did it so that it should improve our relations with the colonists, both Dutch and English. He deprecated the treatment of this question as one of party. He said they wanted to know what support had been given to Mr. Mackenzie in Bechuanaland—what moral or material support, either by our Government or the Cape Government? Especially, they must know what police he had to support him in keeping order. He did not suppose that any one could have been so foolish as to imagine that Mr. Mackenzie, by merely going and saying that order ought not to be broken, and that robbery ought not to be committed, would prevent robbery or disorder. It was clear to him, from a most careful perusal of all the newspapers he could get at, that Mr. Mackenzie was succeeding in Bechuanaland, and that the party who were opposed to him, and who were in favour of the filibusters, felt that they must take immediate action, or that the whole matter would be quietly settled; and so they went on stealing and committing atrocities. It was fully understood that Mr. Mackenzie was to have a sufficient police force; and he quoted what Mr. Chamberlain had said in the House on the subject, to the effect that if hereafter there should happen again what had happened in the past, and if the freebooters from the Transvaal State should attack Mankoroane or Montsioa, they would be outside the Transvaal, and, under the new arrangement, they would come into conflict with the police established and maintained at the cost of the Imperial Government and the Cape Colony, who would, he had no doubt, be able to give a good account

of them. Mr. Forster went on to say that it would be for the Government to say whether these police were there or not. They were also anxious for information as to why Mr. Mackenzie's resignation had been accepted; as to the action of the Cape Government; the advice given by Sir Hercules Robinson; and, above all, what the Imperial Government was doing, for up to this point it had done nothing. Mr. Forster described the attack on the Protectorate and the annexation of Montsioa by the Transvaal, and said there never had been a greater insult to the British crown. He was told that they ought not to mind being insulted by poor people like the Boers, and he would not care if it were only that; but this insult was accompanied by the utter ruin of the people who were under our protection. It was true, a change of Cape Ministers had taken place. But Mr. Upington, the present Premier, had declared that it was the duty of the Imperial Government to support the Protectorate by force of arms. And no change of Ministry at the Cape released the Imperial Government from its solemn obligations. With reference to the coaling-station policy, Mr. Forster said if that were followed he could only say he was glad that he was an old man, because it would mean that the days of English power were quickly coming to an end. In a short time that policy might land us in having a Gibraltar in a German South Africa, and that would be a serious matter to deal with. He took great pleasure in preserving our relations with the colonies, and nothing had given him greater satisfaction than one bright spot in this prospect, which was to know, as he did know, that both in Canada and in Australia there was the greatest feeling upon this question—a trust and a hope that England would not sacrifice her possessions, and a determination to support her in the fulfilment of her duty and the preservation of her power. The chairman had stated that there were wider interests concerned than those of the Cape. That was quite true. It was really a question whether England was to retain her empire or not. He had long believed that unless England fulfilled her duties to the natives of the colonies, their punishment—their Nemesis—

would come to them, and they would lose an empire which they were using for bad purposes. He knew that the fulfilment of our duty and the preservation of our power were one and the same thing; and he trusted that, quite irrespective of any feeling of party, there would be such an outburst of English feeling throughout the country as would tell the Government that they would be supported in spirited and firm action, and that they would be greatly blamed if they persevered in letting things alone—in letting things get from bad to worse, until they got rid of the difficulty by having no Cape Colony.

The statesman who uttered these words has passed from us, but his spirit, in its massive broadness and love of justice and righteousness, is shared by some of his countrymen and admired by all. The public press of the country was all but unanimous in upholding the view which Mr. Forster had put forward. A higher and clearer conception was now entertained than ever before of our duty and obligation in Native Territories, as well for the sake of the colonists as for the protection of the natives and the progress of civilisation and commerce. The wave of loyalty and the earnest appeal from colonists for help to cope with filibustering beyond their borders, were met by an adequate response, not only in the press, but in the House of Commons, and at length by Her Majesty's Government. The request of the High Commissioner for the services of Sir Charles Warren and a force adequate to establish order in the Protectorate, was met by the organisation, equipment, and despatch of the men and material of the Bechuanaland Expedition, with the appointment of Sir Charles Warren as General of the little army and Special Commissioner of Bechuanaland.

CHAPTER II

PLATFORM AND PRESS WORK AT THE CAPE—ARRIVAL OF THE BECHUANALAND EXPEDITION

EARLY in October I lectured, at their own request, to the young men of Capetown on the question which was filling every one's mind at that time. It was requested, after its delivery, that this lecture should be published and circulated in Dutch as well as English. A Committee was formed to arrange this, and the lecture was widely circulated throughout the Colony, and I afterwards met Free State and Transvaal people in Bechuanaland who were familiar with its points. The lecture was entitled "Bechuanaland and our Progress Northward." In it I again pressed the oneness of colonists' interests, whatever their race or language, and the great advantages of the English connection, leaving out of sight all question of sentiment or predilection.

I asked my hearers to "consider the noble body of young nations with which you are associated as an English colony—in Australia, in Canada, in New Zealand. Is it nothing to belong to a family of nations like this, each one of which enjoys freedom like yours, with which it is perfectly content? I have seen in one room in London representative men from these English colonies—not all of them with English names, but all of them proud of English liberty. Is South Africa out of place there? Can she elsewhere meet with nobler comrades, or better partners, or worthier compatriots, in social or commercial or political life? Is there somewhere else a truer liberty than that of England, or a higher model than the English Constitution? Gentlemen, I may with truth say that nowhere are men so free as under our Queen—under no constitution are the noble qualities of the subject so earnestly evoked, or so confidently trusted to, as under the flag of the English Empire. This is brought forcibly home to us by

the responsible Government which we possess in the Colony, and in connection with which its affairs are now managed."

It having come to my knowledge that there was an uneasy feeling in the minds of many colonists that some professed leaders of opinion were still secretly in favour of a return to special legislation for the coloured people of the Colony, which would mean a system of serfdom or slavery, I thought this a good opportunity of challenging the open utterance and upholding of such a view.

"History tells us that if we shut the hatches on any class of men, if there are human spirits within their bodies, they will burst those hatches, and burst them in blood. It is one thing to apprentice the starving child at your door till it attains a certain age; but England has most wisely, and once for all, saved us the heart-burnings and dangers connected with the dreadful system of domestic slavery; and instead of owing her a grudge for having done so, every intelligent colonist ought to thank God for the happy settlement of a question in this country which in the United States it cost so much blood to settle. . . . With no social grievance, with no hatch battened down over their heads, our labouring population throughout the Colony will continue to be contented, happy, and useful; while we shall feel that in our treatment of them we have been guided not only by justice, but by the hard-bought experience of others. Gentlemen, I find those topics are relegated to a dusky, doubtful atmosphere, with moles and bats and other objects of aversion. I beg to open the shutters, and let in God's light on those questions, in order that it may become apparent to all intelligent and true-hearted colonists that on those very questions we are now practically united, and that therefore our reserve and our fear concerning them are quite unnecessary."

There followed, of course, no defence of the old system here denounced; and so the community was able to feel conscious of having reached sure footing on the basis of the new doctrines. Certain speakers might still mysteriously hint that the old "paternal" way was the best in dealing with the blacks; but that meant little or nothing that was objectionable when the great doctrine was received that the English and the United States doctrine of the equality of men before the common law was the best for the Cape Colony also.

I also sought to bring home to my audience of young colonists and their friends the English view of a certain recent development in Cape Colony politics. They were

then very much exercised in the Colony as to whether England would or would not uphold her Protectorate in Bechuanaland; and her long hesitation was being severely condemned.

"And why is there any hesitancy on the part of England to carry out her obligations? Why? The reason, to my mind, is as plain as daylight. You, the Cape Colonists, or rather your political guides, have managed to diminish, if not to destroy, the good feeling toward yourselves which I know was very strong at the beginning of the present year in England. Conservatives, Liberals, and Radicals shared it. The new departure, which had been publicly supported in a general way by your present Governor, and which had also been approved and endorsed by the two last Governors of the Cape Colony, was looked upon with great interest, because it was an honest attempt to meet the requirements of your South African life as to expansion and progress, while not treating the natives with injustice. In course of time you are asked to co-operate as to Bechuanaland. Your members of Parliament have a debate in which they are unanimous, at least concerning one thing, which was gracefully called 'eliminating the Imperial factor.' Here at your own door, in my humble opinion, you have the great reason for England's present hesitancy. How can England vindicate her promises and establish a Protectorate and gratify the unanimous wish of to-day, and yet have respect to the 'elimination' debate and its unanimous vote of three months ago? Just when English politicians for the first time in their history were approaching the question of your expansion—from the Colonial side, as you would say, and not with irritation as before, but with serious desire to strengthen and help you—your wise men, hand in hand, have climbed to the giddy height which at present marks their attainments as your Parliamentary guides; and from that sublime knoll or 'kopje' they looked on every side over the political horizon, and the result of their survey was this—'Let us eliminate the Imperial factor.' Allow me to say that whether they spoke their own minds or not on that occasion, they did not, in my humble opinion, speak the mind of the Colony, and certainly they did not speak the mind of Capetown. Viewing matters as you view them to-night, and as I doubt not the great body of colonists would view them had they a chance of expressing their opinions, you have the strong desire in your minds that the Imperial Government should not be eliminated, but should remain at the head of affairs, especially at the head of trans-Colonial affairs."

I unfolded to a Colonial audience the scheme of Territorial Government, with which the reader has already made acquaintance, and showed that young men such as those whom I was addressing were the true source from which the Central or Imperial Government in South Africa should

draw the means for protecting and upholding peace and order in such native territories.

"We have too long seen how many Europeans a native chief can call into the field as against another native chief. But we have never yet seen how many good men will spring into the saddle when the Queen and the Central Government call for assistance to quell disturbance in a native territory. In my mind it is as if it were an ascertained fact that the good and respectable people of the Colony and of South Africa are both able and willing to keep the peace and protect the development and expansion of the country, if they were only shown how this can be done.

What inducement would I hold out to young colonists to enrol in this force? First and crown of all, the great inducement of upholding the right and saving the whole country from moral deterioration and degradation. These men would really be in our southern country the true knights of our day, doing battle with the wrong, and proving the strength of their beliefs with their rifles. We sing of such men in the dim history of the past; we sigh and wonder why it is that such noble deeds are no longer transacted. Be roused from such reveries! Wrong-doing is rampant. With the memories of the pure homes which you have left crowding on your minds, with your earnest hopes and determinations as colonists filling you with resolve, let it not be said that true-hearted, noble men are wanting at a time like the present when right and truth and justice, when God and Queen and adopted country, call upon us to be true!

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I have another inducement to mention in connection with my plan. And please to remember that I am speaking of a plan supposed to be under the management and control of the High Commissioner and Central Government. If there are unoccupied tracts of country suitable for farming purposes in many native territories, why should not our trans-Colonial volunteers have the first pull on these farms? I lately came across a young Scotsman who had served in the Canadian police, and had been to the Far West with that force. I saw him in Scotland, and he was about to return to a farm which had been granted to him by the Canadian Government. Now I am quite aware that we have not here at our disposal the illimitable prairies of Canada, but such as we have we can wisely distribute to our best and bravest, and not let matters drift till those very acres, after much cheating, meanness, and bloodshed, fall into the grasping hands of men to whom, to say the least, this country owes nothing!"

The lecture was much approved by men of widely-differing views on other subjects. The High Commissioner found the amusing "knights" (quite invisible to him) once more called upon to do their duty. The anti-British people

found there was a muscular side to truth, right-doing, and loyalty; and that South African native land was not always to be obtained by lying and pretence. Only a few weeks, and the men who listened to the lecture, and who afterwards read it in Dutch and in English, were asked in the Queen's name to come forward to assist Sir Charles Warren to establish order in Bechuanaland, and nobly did they respond.

As soon as loyal political activity set in, the intelligent colonists bethought them of some way by which to give permanence to it. A project for a Colonial Association was set on foot by a leading Eastern Province politician. The Empire League was projected in Capetown under very distinguished patronage. Great things were expected from it by its originators; and great things were accomplished by it at the time. It enabled the people in various parts of the country to express their united attachment to the English Government; and this was of the very utmost consequence at that crisis. But the Empire League had not the elements of permanence in its constitution. Its programme made no local practical appeal to the manhood of a young country except to look to England. I at once pointed this out, upon being introduced to the embryo League and its authors, when its documents were printed and it was too late to make changes. They would see that the colonists would find the attitude of the League uncomfortably monotonous; it was like a man looking permanently over his shoulder; they gave their League nothing to do on the soil of South Africa except to look over the ocean to England. It was all very well to say "Hooray!" when excitement was great, as at that time. If they would have their League a permanent institution, they must give it work to do in South Africa, where the political education of the people of a healthy, practical, and broad-minded character was certainly a pressing need. There were many of my opinion, but it was then too late to make alterations. Although I foresaw its weakness from the first, I of course approved of the League as far as it went, and assisted at its first public meetings both in the Cape district, in Port Elizabeth, and in Grahamstown.

I was pleased to receive from the Cadet Corps of students at the Stellenbosch College an invitation to lecture on Bechuanaland. The prettily-situated town of Stellenbosch lies to the east of Capetown, with which it is connected by railway. It may be said to be devoted to education. The training of Colonial youth can be begun and "finished" in this South African seat of learning. Boarding-schools abound. The teaching is of a high character. The best men for their work seem to have been sought as professors and tutors, irrespective of nationality. The South African College, Capetown, is of course metropolitan in its situation, and excellent as to its staff and its teaching; but Stellenbosch is a healthy rival. Early in the century the Dutch Reformed (Presbyterian) ministry in the Cape Colony was supplied from the colleges of Holland and of Scotland. If the children of Dutch-speaking colonists desired to enter the service of their Church, that could only be accomplished if means were secured to enable the student to proceed to Europe to complete his education. The establishment of the Cape University rendered this unnecessary with reference to the literary part of the course, and the formation of the Stellenbosch College obviated the necessity of the visit to Europe so far as theological and kindred subjects were concerned. The son of the soil can now equip himself at the district school, at one of the colleges affiliated with the Cape University, and at the Stellenbosch College of the Dutch Reformed Church. In the due course of years, and after the successful passing of numerous examinations, he finds himself a duly licensed minister of the Dutch Reformed Church of South Africa (Presbyterian), eligible for "a call" to minister to congregations of that Church anywhere in South Africa, and qualified also to enter upon service as a duly accredited minister in the Presbyterian Churches of America, Scotland, and Holland. Thus the Cape farmer, like the Scottish, is now often able to see his son, after many struggles and hardships, "wagging his head in a pulpit"; and as a matter of fact, since the establishment of the Theological College in South Africa, the ministry of the Dutch Reformed Church has naturally fallen into the hands

of its own South African children. I may as well mention here that the Dutch Reformed Church, while containing within her pale practically the whole Dutch-speaking population of South Africa, and conducting her ministrations chiefly in the Dutch language, requires of all licentiates that they be also qualified to preach in English. In a country such as South Africa this is a wise resolution looked at from the highest grounds, for language is only a means to the ministrations of the Christian pastor. When the Dutch ministers bestir themselves in preaching in the English language, they not only retain their own young people, but attract to their church Presbyterians from other countries. When this course is not adopted and the Dutch language is alone used, there is a tendency on the part of their own young people to attend some other church at least during part of the day, where the service is in the English language; while, of course, no Presbyterian strangers are attracted to ministrations in the Dutch language only. The Reformed Synod has done its duty and indicated its wish in demanding the qualification to preach in English from every candidate for license, leaving the question of the use of the two languages to the conscience of the individual and the action of the ordinary motives that sway human conduct.

In Stellenbosch there was a vigorous Young Men's Christian Association, whose hall had usually been placed at the service of the lecturers to the Cadet Corps of the College. There came a blast of prospective disapproval of my lecture from the anti-English newspaper at the Cape which frightened the Committee who had charge of the hall, and caused them to remember that politics were eschewed by the rules of the Young Men's Christian Association, and therefore the hall could not be granted. Young men, however, are never turned aside from a purpose by action like this. It needed only to introduce seats into one of the large halls of the College and otherwise arrange it; the Cadet Corps set about that themselves, and soon accomplished it. The notice that the usual hall could not be obtained was received only on the morning of the day on which the lecture was delivered; but when I arrived in the evening I found that every

necessary arrangement had been made. Perhaps amusement was as strong as vexation among the officers and men of the corps that some people should be so easily frightened, and that other people who professed to be leaders of Colonial opinion should interfere to prevent the students and public of Stellenbosch from receiving at first-hand information concerning an important question.

The lecture contained a plain statement of what had happened to me in Bechuanaland, and what had taken place after I left that country. Its present condition was also depicted. The same mischief-making newspaper having referred to the coming of Sir Charles Warren at the head of the Bechuanaland Expedition as if it were a mission of vengeance and punishment, I called attention to that officer's previous history and repute in the country, and especially to the fact that he had settled land questions before in South Africa, and had given great satisfaction in doing so. Nothing should be allowed to stop him till the affairs of all Bechuanaland were in his hand.

In referring to the visit of the Colonial Ministers to Goshen, I expressed the hope that good might result if they induced the volunteers to leave Goshen, and then handed the settlement over to Sir Charles Warren. If this were not done, if Sir Charles Warren did not enter Bechuanaland, I saw a grave dilemma for the Colony in the future. "Suppose you succeed in preventing him, and suppose your first Cape Parliament had presented to it a petition from the volunteers, or a considerable number of them, asking for union with the Transvaal, while the rest asked for annexation to the Cape Colony, how would you proceed? The English Government would expect the Convention line to be upheld; you would feel it to be very invidious to have to oppose the Transvaal single-handed; and you would then see fully what I wish to point out to-night, that this is a question which ought not to be decided by the wishes of the volunteers or freebooters."

As the attention of all South Africa had now been given to this subject of Bechuanaland, and as it was of the utmost importance that calmness and confidence should be produced in men's minds instead of the miserable passions which were being inflamed by those who were expecting, if not working for, a contest between the freebooters and their friends and the English Government, I felt it to be my duty to bring forward the suggestion that when Bechuanaland was once in his possession, Sir Charles Warren, in settling all land matters, should be assisted by a South African representative Commission. This Commission might consist of two members from the Cape Colony, and one member from Natal, one from the Free State, one from the Transvaal, and one representing the native interests. The last to be nominated by the High Commissioner and approved by the chiefs; the others to be nominated by the Executive of the respective Governments. By this means the Imperial Government would obtain the voice of South Africa

as against the freebooters. And the sitting of such a Commission might grow in the course of time to something more permanent, by which the united judgment of South Africa could be ascertained.

The lecture was very well received, and especial commendation was bestowed on the proposed Commission; "it would be the saving of the country," one of my audience remarked. After the lecture was over and the usual thanks had been proposed, the students rose and marched out. Whether resolved upon beforehand or as an impromptu I cannot say, but as they marched out they struck up "God save the Queen." Their parents and seniors looked astonished for a moment, but there was not displeasure in a single countenance. And why should there be? The young men themselves were a fair sight to look at, and they sang the old anthem well. In my ears it was the anthem of South African freedom, peace, and loyalty. The men who sang would uphold their singing. I heard in it the knell of freebooting and disorder on our borders, and of that narrow separative bigotry and pride which have worked such mischief among the colonists within the Colony. March on, with God's blessing, young South Africa! My children will see better days than their father.

The proposal for a South African Commission to assist Sir Charles Warren in settling land claims in Bechuanaland met with no favour from a small section of colonists who were then shouting and shrieking, "Stand aside and let England assert herself!" Nor did it meet with the approval of those who still hoped to see this great question settled without the presence or help of the Imperial Power. As the publication of this lecture was also called for in pamphlet form—both in English and in Dutch—I remarked in the preface that one reason for giving heed to my suggestion was, that it was disapproved by extreme men on both sides.

In the month of November a similar lecture was delivered by me in Port Elizabeth, at the request of a local Committee, and before the largest audience I had addressed in the Cape Colony. I had the pleasure of being received with the same cordiality as in Capetown. But what struck me at the Port Elizabeth meeting was the great cordiality with which

the speech of a merchant who was a German by birth was received. "I love my fatherland," said this gentleman; "I am proud of the Emperor and his great Chancellor, but I have long loved to think of myself as a British citizen—a subject of the Queen." This statement was received with the utmost enthusiasm, and the cheering lasted for several minutes. The incident was to me full of meaning. Here was national sentiment in its place—a German, and yet a British colonist. In the enthusiasm of the people I saw the longing for administrative strength and union, which are destined to accomplish so much in South Africa when once they are rightly established there. In this gentleman's evidently sincere declaration in favour of the English flag and the freedom of an English Colony, I thought I saw a lesson for the great minds presiding over the mighty German Empire, whose life-blood is steadily departing from it by emigration.

The next place to which I was invited was Grahamstown, the capital of the English settlers of 1820, and a very pretty Colonial town. Here I was among a people who had been favourable to the politics of Mr. Upington and Mr. Sprigg; and Mr. Ayliff, one of their citizens, was a member of the Ministry. But the views of Grahamstown as to Bechuanaland were "as sound as a bell." The Ministers could collect information in Bechuanaland, and influence freebooters to leave it, but they ought to do nothing to keep Sir Charles Warren out of that country. It was a question of supremacy and loyalty. Bechuanaland was an Imperial obligation, and Grahamstown would not see an Imperial officer hustled out of the country. Both Port Elizabeth and Grahamstown spoke very clearly about the necessity for the settlement being an Imperial one, as it would overtask the power of the Colony to carry it through alone. It was also regretted that the Ministers were not accompanied by a representative of the Imperial Government on their journey into the Protectorate; and it was suggested that the Imperial influence and protection should now be extended in Bechuanaland as far west as was necessary to prevent another happy hunting-ground for freebooters between the Protectorate and the German border.

Once in the Eastern Province of the Colony, I received numerous letters from the various towns, inviting me to come and lecture on the all-engrossing questions of the day, and expressing the utmost pleasure at the outburst of healthy public opinion which had taken place in other parts of the Colony. I was also deeply impressed with the kindness of many friends, some of them before unknown, who now expressed the hope that when Sir Charles Warren arrived in South Africa, Sir Hercules Robinson would recommend to him my return with him to Bechuanaland, to assist him in his work. These expressions meant more than kind approval of an individual, and had reference to the all-pervading desire of the people that the strong voice of English public opinion should be effectually heard in South Africa in its unhappy and divided condition.

"In any case, Mr. Mackenzie," said one of the most influential men in the Eastern Province, "you should be in Capetown when Sir Charles Warren arrives. The High Commissioner and the Special Commissioner will naturally wish to consult you concerning a country which you know better than any other man."

And so I concluded my Eastern Province visit and reached Capetown in time to be a spectator of the splendid reception given to Sir Charles Warren on his arrival in the country. The High Commissioner, however, made no request for my services or my advice. The mention which he did make of my name to Sir Charles Warren, according to the published statement of the Special Commissioner (4432; 119, 163), was to dissuade Sir Charles from conversing with me concerning the actual condition of Bechuanaland! And Sir Charles loyally followed the advice of the High Commissioner. But the friendly instincts of the public, crowding on the Cape Docks alongside the steamer, made it an easy matter for the Deputy Commissioner, who had become identified with certain strong sentiments of the colonists, to pass through the crowd and to shake hands with the Special Commissioner from England while the latter was still on board ship. It was a meeting in which the people had evident sympathy. But beyond this, and two short visits to Sir Charles

at his quarters in Capetown, where I had the pleasure of being introduced to his staff, I saw nothing of the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland on his way to that country.

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Sir Charles Warren and staff, with special-service officers, left England on the 14th November 1884. The time on board the *Grantully Castle* was carefully utilised in the thorough consideration of all the details of the difficult and delicate work which was before the Expedition as a military undertaking. Committees and sub-committees were formed for the consideration of various divisions of the subject; these sat, discussed, and drew up reports; and in this way much preparatory work was accomplished, and information concerning the future scene of operations of the utmost importance, from a military point of view, was generally diffused among the heads of the Expedition. The officers selected to assist Sir Charles Warren were men eminently qualified to do so. The second in command was Colonel F. W. E. F. Walker, C.B., of the Scots Guards, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General. Colonel J. Duncan was Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General for lines of communication. Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Cottingham, of the Royal Artillery, had charge of the Remount Department. Lieutenant-Colonel C. W. Murray, of the Gloucestershire Regiment, was Deputy Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, and so was Major R. E. Allen of the East Yorkshire Regiment. Captain A. J. Watson, Suffolk Regiment, was Acting Brigade-Major; Captain R. H. Jelf, R.E., was Director of Military Telegraphs. Cape people were glad to find that young Captain Sir Bartle Frere, son of their late Governor, was Aide-de-Camp to Sir Charles. Captain M. F. Walker was also Aide-de-Camp and Acting Military Secretary. Lieutenant A. E. Haynes, R.E., was Private Secretary.

When it was announced in Capetown, on the 4th December, that the mail steamer had arrived with Sir Charles Warren on board, the joy and excitement were unprecedented. The principal streets of the town were profusely decorated. Mottoes of loyalty to the Queen and of welcome

to Sir Charles were to be seen on every side. Indeed, no servant of the crown at any period of the history of the Colony ever received such a welcome from the inhabitants as that accorded to the head of the Bechuanaland Expedition. The reason was twofold,—it was an outburst of rejoicing on the part of the intelligent and the loyal that Imperial influence was at last being thrown in on the side of order and progress in South Africa; and the intelligent colonists were to be no longer left alone to battle with the pernicious doctrines of the freebooting and retrograde school of politics. While this was the great reason, and it would have animated the public of Capetown and of the Colony, no matter who had been sent out as head of the Expedition, yet the grateful joy was increased to enthusiastic confidence when an officer appeared in that capacity who was approved at the Cape as heartily as in England. The first of the addresses of welcome was from "the Colonists of the Cape of Good Hope," and was as follows:—

"We, the undersigned Colonists of the Cape of Good Hope, beg to welcome you to South Africa as a representative of Her Majesty the Queen, specially commissioned to assert Imperial authority and restore law and order in Bechuanaland. We beg to assure you that your appointment has been hailed with the utmost satisfaction by all loyal subjects of Her Majesty in South Africa, both on account of your own experience in South African administration and of the proof it affords of the determination of the British Government to check lawless and disloyal proceedings fatal to the interests of good government and civilisation in South Africa.

"Without presuming to dictate or suggest any line of action in reference to the responsible duties which await you, we beg to express the earnest hope that no settlement of the difficulties in South Africa may be recognised by Her Majesty's Government which does not provide adequate guarantee for the orderly government of the country, based on a loyal recognition of British supremacy as well as the effectual discouragement of lawless enterprises so fatal to the progress of South Africa."

The reply of Sir Charles was as follows:—

"Mr. Ebden, Mr. Fuller, Mr. Searle, and Gentlemen—I assure you it is a great pleasure to me to find myself once more in the old Colony—a country in which I take so much interest and in which I feel almost as if I were at home. I have to express to you, and to the gentlemen who have signed this address, my grateful acknowledgment for the welcome you have accorded to me.

"It has given me great pleasure to learn that, in the execution of the duty entrusted to me, I shall enjoy your support; and I shall endeavour to deserve the confidence which you so kindly express."

The Town Council of Capetown, as representing the inhabitants of that city, also presented Sir Charles with a warm address of welcome, in which the following sentences occurred:—

"The Town Council are fully conscious of the unexampled difficulties surrounding the questions which will engage your Honour's attention; but they are fully persuaded, from their knowledge of your Honour's eminent services in this and other portions of Her Majesty's empire, that nothing will be wanting which prudence, sagacity, and experience can devise for settling the affairs of Bechuanaland upon a sound and enduring basis.

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"The Town Council of Capetown respectfully wish your Honour God-speed on your anxious and responsible mission, believing that it will result in the reign of law and order being restored, and tend in a considerable degree to the return of that political quietude on which the progress and wellbeing of South Africa so greatly depend."

This address was not agreed to unanimously. Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. O'Reilly were dissentients. Mr. Hofmeyr explained that he was not to be understood as disapproving of Sir C. Warren; but held that the Council was going out of its way to address him, as the settlement of Bechuanaland was an Imperial responsibility and not a Colonial question.

As the reader is aware, at the time of the arrival of Sir Charles Warren a correspondence was proceeding between the Cape Ministry, the High Commissioner, and the Imperial Government, with reference to the projected settlement by the Ministers of the affairs of Goshen. For a few days the question was undecided whether or not the Expedition was to proceed to Bechuanaland or to return to England. But on the 9th December the Bechuanaland Field Force was placed under the command of Sir Charles Warren. Lieut.-General Sir Leicester Smyth, commanding Her Majesty's troops in South Africa, rendered Sir Charles Warren every assistance in his power, loyally recognising his special qualifications for the responsible work to which he had been appointed by Her Majesty's Government. When a senior

officer in charge of a military district thus cordially assists his junior in rank and in years in discharging, on his separate responsibility, duties of active service connected with that district, such loyalty to duty and large-minded recognition of actual merit ought not to be passed over without special mention. It is, therefore, a pleasing duty to emphasise the fact that the successful Bechuanaland Expedition, under Sir Charles Warren, was carried through while General Sir Leicester Smyth was in command of Her Majesty's Forces in South Africa, and in constant and hearty co-operation with Sir Charles Warren; and that when the military duties were virtually over, Sir Leicester is understood to have expressed to the authorities at the War Office a very high opinion of the manner in which they had been performed by Sir Charles Warren. How pleasant it would have been had such loyalty and co-operation characterised the history of the civil department of the Expedition, and had the connection between the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland and the High Commissioner been as happy as that between Sir C. Warren, as Commander of the Bechuanaland Expedition, and Sir L. Smyth as the Officer Commanding in South Africa.

Although the result of the visit to Rooi Grond of the Colonial Ministers, Messrs. Upington and Sprigg, was not decided when General Warren arrived in Capetown, the leading Colonial towns had already expressed strong disapproval of the action of the Ministers, and especially of the speech of Mr. Upington, the Premier. The avowed object of Ministers was to render unnecessary or prevent the march of Sir Charles Warren and his force to Bechuanaland. Taken in connection with the speeches which had been made in the Cape Parliament with reference to the exclusion of the Imperial factor from South Africa, the interference of the Cape Ministers in Bechuanaland, after an expedition had been resolved upon by Her Majesty's Government, under an experienced officer, well-known in the country, excited the liveliest suspicion and apprehension on the part of the most intelligent colonists; and anxiety was very great throughout the Colony till it was known that the Expedition was to proceed.

There can be no doubt that this decision on the part of Her Majesty's Government gave great satisfaction throughout the country. Giving the Colonial Ministers credit for the best intentions, every one felt that by their proposed settlement of Goshen they were imposing work on the Cape Colony which the Colony could not perform. There was really no power in the Colony available to coerce the freebooters of Bechuanaland. Therefore, under the Colony's rule they would not have been coerced; and so, being masters of the situation, the freebooters would have had the choice of going over to the Transvaal, which would thus have secured, through Messrs. Upington and Sprigg, the territory which had been refused to the Transvaal Deputation in London; or the freebooting community of Goshen, joined to the already preponderating ignorance of the Colonial electorate, would have swamped the progress of the whole country for many years. And yet the two Ministers in question are themselves men of education, and professedly inspired with the highest motives.

The portion of the Bechuanaland Field Force supplied from Her Majesty's Army consisted of the 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons from Natal, under Colonel F. G. S. Curtis; a battery of Royal Artillery, under Colonel G. B. B. Hobart, also from Natal; the 7th Company of Royal Engineers and Telegraph Company, under Colonel A. G. Durnford, from England; 1st Battalion of Royal Scots, from the West Indies, under Colonel H. G. White; 10th Company Commissariat and Transport Corps, under Major W. D. Richardson, Assistant Commissary General, from England; detachment of Ordnance Store Corps, from England, under Major E. E. Markwick. There was also a very efficient Medical Staff under Deputy Surgeon-General J. G. Faught, as Principal Medical Officer. The Force was accompanied by one Army Chaplain, and by four Acting Chaplains—belonging to the Episcopal, Wesleyan, Roman Catholic, and Presbyterian Churches. A Scripture Reader also laboured among the men of the Force.

Sir Charles Warren had entrusted the selection of the men to be enlisted for the regiment of English volunteers to Captain J. W. Harrel, late 2d (Queen's) Regiment, who had also

previously served in South Africa, both in Zululand and in Bechuanaland. There were very great difficulties connected with this enlistment, but these were most successfully encountered by Captain Harrel as representing Sir Charles Warren, assisted by Colonel the Hon. P. Methuen, C.B., who also personally inspected and approved of each man, and afterwards commanded the regiment. Its name was the 1st Regiment of Mounted Rifles, but it was more frequently called Methuen's Horse. Six hundred men were selected out of immense numbers who crowded Captain Harrel's office in Leicester Square, London, every day. The work of restoring order in South Africa had evidently stirred the mind of the English people; and several good regiments could have been enrolled instead of one. Owing to some legal difficulty, the enlistment could not be ratified till the men reached Capetown, and in the meantime they secured their passage free to the Cape. To the honour of the men, and the credit of Colonel Methuen, now in command, as well as of Captain Harrel, who selected them, only one man took advantage of this difficulty, and refused to enrol in Capetown; and in his case it was only a temporary whim, for he was afterwards found in Bechuanaland enlisted in another regiment. Captain Harrel commenced inspecting volunteers in London on 14th November, and the regiment of 600 men was in camp north of the Orange River, 570 miles from Capetown, before the end of the year.

A regiment of Mounted Rifles was raised, by direction of Sir Charles Warren, by Colonel F. Carrington, C.M.G., from the Cape Colony, excluding Griqualand West. This regiment was composed of colonists of all races selected from a large number of applicants. The men were previously examined in riding and shooting. The 2d Mounted Rifles—or Carrington's Horse, as it was usually called—was a fine body of men, fully acquainted with all the ways of the country. The whole regiment was enlisted at different centres in the Colony, and concentrated at Barkly West on the Vaal River, fully equipped, in the space of six weeks.

The 3d Mounted Rifles or Gough's Horse was recruited at the Diamond Fields by Colonel H. S. Gough, and consisted

largely of an excellent stamp of men who, living in Kimberley and feeling the effects of the anarchy in the neighbouring country of Bechuanaland, were anxious personally to assist in the re-establishment of peace and order so necessary to the prosperity of the Colony. Many of the officers and men had formerly served under Sir Charles Warren.

A regiment of Pioneers was organised under Colonel C. E. Knox, part of which was mounted, the rest being Engineer Artificers, or men otherwise capable of performing the duties of volunteer sappers, under the Officer Commanding Engineers. This regiment did capital service in different parts of Bechuanaland in road-making and well-sinking—a company of them, under Captain J. C. Campbell, R.E., having carried their operations as far north as Shoshong.

Besides the above regiments from the army and of volunteers, Captain F. J. Kempster, on the order of Sir C. Warren, enrolled a corps of natives of South Africa, some of them being men who had served under the General in the Griqualand West wars of 1878. Their specific function was to guard the baggage and supplies. They also did good service in pioneer work in connection with the Royal Engineers. The enrolment of these men had been fully sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government. And yet the High Commissioner saw fit to make this one of the formal charges against Sir Charles Warren which he brought before Her Majesty's Government. But in bringing together the resources of peace and order in South Africa as opposed to freebooting and rapine, Her Majesty's Special Commissioner would have been very short-sighted indeed if he had not for many reasons enrolled some of the native races in his force. It is to be regretted that these reasons did not occur to the High Commissioner, who ought to have had before his mind the pacification of the whole country. The loyal Colonial press did not join the High Commissioner in condemning the enrolment of natives. There can be no doubt that the omission of such a regiment in the force would have been regarded as a source of weakness by all intelligent colonists who wished well to the Expedition. It was absurd to suppose that such a corps was in any sense out of place in an

expedition against men who had themselves consented to enrol as the volunteers of native chiefs, and who had fought against natives under these native chiefs, and alongside the native forces of these chiefs for the space of two years. In South Africa we do not want a mischievous classification suggested, of white against black, or Dutch against English, or *vice versâ*, but we do want all the weight and resource of the party of peace and order as against the freebooting and lawless party, irrespective of colour or language.

Troops were at first forwarded by ordinary passenger trains, afterwards separately by special trains. The outfit and equipment of the volunteers did not come from England concurrently with the men. Some of it arrived three weeks later. At first the Cape railway officials added to the delay by mixing up Bechuanaland and other articles at the Capetown Station. The Commissariat and Transport Company came to the Cape in a different ship from that bringing their equipment, which came a fortnight later.

The clothing of all the Bechuanaland Field Force—regulars and volunteers, officers and men—was made of brown or yellow corduroy, and consisted of tunic and pantaloons, with "putties" of blue stuff supporting the lower part of the leg, and keeping out the dust. The only men not in cords were the Native Guides, who had been favoured with the old red coats formerly worn by the English infantry, no doubt because they were most easily obtained. Some of the regiments wore helmets, but the volunteers, officers and men, wore wideawake felt hats to match the gray cords,—not the handsomest but the most serviceable and most comfortable head-covering for South Africa. The Guides wore Scotch bonnets. It was a special arrangement in the Bechuanaland Force that all officers and men should carry rifles, artillery officers and men included. The advantages of the uniform selected were considerable. The men were often marching through country exactly the colour of their clothing, so that when stretched on the ground at any distance they could not be distinguished. It did not soon get torn by thorn-bushes, did not soon look dirty, and was easily washed. The only complaint heard about the cords was their strong smell when

first unpacked and distributed. After a good washing this, of course, disappeared. There can be no doubt that even in this matter of the choice of clothing an impression was produced in South Africa. Officers and men dressed alike in the cords so much worn by the Boers themselves,—every man a rifleman—routine and red tape had evidently been put aside on this occasion; the Force had the appearance of meaning "business."

With reference to the successful enrolment of so many men in South Africa for the purpose of asserting law and order in Bechuanaland, there can be no doubt that it was a genuine expression of the opposition and disgust excited throughout the Colony by the lawless proceedings of white men in Bechuanaland, which had put an end to the interior trade with the Colony. There was also a strong glow of grateful feeling in the minds of Colonists to the Imperial Government for coming to rescue the country from lawlessness, and from bondage to the retrogressive party in the Colony, who were inspired and stimulated from the Transvaal. To crown these reasons there was another—the personal popularity of Sir Charles Warren; each man felt he was to be "under Warren," and that meant a great deal to every Colonist who volunteered. Not only at the Diamond Fields but throughout the Colony this name of itself was sufficient to evoke enthusiasm; it was generally felt that the cause which had "Warren" at its head would be worth fighting for, and would be successful.

Sir Charles Warren gave himself little rest after his arrival in Capetown. At one time the public heard of him as transacting business in Capetown; he was next reported to be on the banks of the Orange River; and in a few days he might have been again seen in Capetown in no apparent hurry, and ready to spare a few minutes to speak to old South African friends, many of whom visited Capetown expressly to meet him. The camp at Langford soon swelled in numbers. The Engineers and Commissariat and Transport Companies were the first to occupy the ground, and were joined on the 16th December by forty Mounted Volunteers from Kimberley, as reports had reached the General that

certain disaffected persons were planning an attack on the newly-formed camp. The idea of interfering with the transport of the troops was more or less openly referred to by the disloyal papers; it was even mentioned as a possibility to Sir C. Warren himself by those who were recognised as prominent adherents of the anti-English faction, and anonymous letters received by Sir Charles threatened the same thing. It would seem that one attempt to wreck a train was actually made. Sir Charles Warren was informed that a number of stones had been placed on the line at a certain place in the northern part of the Colony. It was said that this was done by native farm-servants, but whether at the direct instigation of their masters, or from overhearing the openly-expressed wish of the latter was not known.

In these circumstances it was difficult to ascertain exactly how the military were to be transported,—whether they were to travel by night or by day, or if they were to be massed in numbers anywhere on the line in the Colony. While these and other questions were occupying people's attention, it was announced that a considerable number of soldiers and volunteers had actually reached the camp at Langford, on the Orange River; that volunteers from Kimberley had joined them; and that enlistment of Colonial volunteers was going on briskly throughout the Colony. The party of outrage were overawed; the highest and best feeling of the Colony was evidently against them, and by and by military trains were run without hindrance or accident.

On the 30th December Sir Charles Warren arrived in Kimberley, formerly the capital of the Crown Colony of Griqualand West, and the seat of the great diamond mining industry. It may be said without exaggeration that the whole town of Kimberley turned out to meet its former Administrator, and to welcome him as the head of the Bechuanaland Expedition. Kimberley had most strongly denounced the settlement provisionally made by Messrs. Upington and Sprigg as derogatory to British honour and detrimental to the best interests of the country. And now in their welcome to Sir Charles Warren there was a unanimity in loyalty to the Queen, and in desire for peace

and progress in the country, as well as an enthusiasm for Sir Charles himself, which were not only gratifying to the General personally, but were most helpful at that time to the cause of law and order. It is true, that for some reason or other, the cause of Colonial volunteering, which had flourished in a remarkable manner when the Diamond Fields was a Crown Colony, had been neglected since annexation to the Cape Colony. Before that event Griqualand West had been able to send a regiment of first-class volunteers to the assistance of the Cape Colony in the Kaffir war of 1877-78, under Sir Charles (then Major) Warren. Since annexation, however, the volunteers at Kimberley had been disbanded. Certain guns had been removed from Kimberley, which had been presented to Griqualand West by the Imperial Government, and the arms and ammunition of the Griqualand West Volunteer Force had also been in part, if not wholly, removed. To such a marked extent had this disarmament of Kimberley taken place that Mr. Cecil Rhodes, himself a resident in Kimberley, at that time Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland, as well as Member of the Cape Parliament, directed Sir Charles Warren's attention to the subject, and suggested that a sufficient number of stands of arms should be forwarded to Kimberley, and held there in reserve. It is understood that Sir Charles Warren followed this advice as a precautionary measure, and in case of general disturbance. While, however, Kimberley had thus been practically disarmed, a number of the citizens had already enlisted under Colonel Gough, and the feelings and opinions of the people now freely expressed in addresses, resolutions, and speeches were themselves more powerful than any other weapon, and were most influential throughout the country. When Kimberley thus unanimously and enthusiastically pronounced for loyalty to the Queen, for justice to all classes without respect to race or colour, and for peace and progress, Her Majesty's Special Commissioner and head of the Bechuanaland Expedition felt that his confidence in his old and fast friends had been amply justified, and that an important element in the success of the Expedition had been secured.

During the deliberations on board ship it had been

settled that Barkly West was a suitable site for a camp. Leaving Kimberley, therefore, on the day following his arrival there, Sir Charles crossed the Vaal, and reaching Barkly West, was able, from the reports and advice of officers of his Intelligence Department, who had been some time in the district, to fix on a site for the camp and make a bargain with the owner of the land. It may not be out of place to mention that both here and at the Orange River Sir Charles experienced no difficulty in dealing personally with the farmers who owned the lands needed by him. But at both places contractors or speculators appeared as the candid friends of both parties, and especially of the farmers, in each case strongly advocating great increase of Government expenditure. In both cases Sir Charles flatly declined to have anything to say to these outsiders. At Barkly West the farmer was intelligent enough to see that his wisest course was to distrust his professed friends and trust the General. This was not so clear to the Dutch-speaking farmer on the south bank of the Orange River; he was over-persuaded to hold out for exorbitant prices which it had not occurred to him to ask when himself dealing with the General. In this case the lesson was a sharp one,—the camp was moved off the farmer's lands entirely, the river was crossed, and a camp formed at Langford on the north bank of the Orange River.

Opposition to the Expedition in the Cape Colony was now confined to the perfectly constitutional and pacific form of resolutions, which were forwarded to Capetown from branches of the Afrikander Bond throughout the Colony. The documents were of one general purport—to disavow disloyalty or seditious sentiments, and to state the strong opinion that, as the settlement of a late Cape Minister (Mr. Rhodes) had been accepted, that of the present Ministers should not be rejected. Both should be adopted.

CHAPTER III

URGENT ADVICE AND ITS RESULTS

LEAVING Barkly West on the 1st January, Sir C. Warren returned to Langford by a road passing to the west of Kimberley. This road was more direct, and avoided proximity to the Free State, whereas the ordinary road from Hopetown to Kimberley proceeded for miles close to the Free State, and is said to pass over into the State at certain places. While there was no reason to suppose that the Free State authorities would have objected to the use of this intersecting road by the Expedition, its use might have led to possible complications, or have been made a grievance by disaffected people. Then there were the great difficulties of marching volunteers, newly enrolled, through a large town such as Kimberley—difficulties which were not diminished when the inhabitants were full of kindness and enthusiasm towards the Expedition. What Sir Charles had to find out, therefore, was, whether there were watering-places on the western road at sufficiently frequent intervals for men, horses, mules, and cattle. When he had satisfied himself that this was the case by personal inspection, as he rode from Barkly West to Langford, the first party of men were moved from Langford on the 2d January, the day after the General's return to that place. There being no telegraph on this route, the services of the Army Signallers, under Captain A. Davidson, were brought into requisition. There were a few roadside canteens on the way; and as so many of the men were newly enrolled, a staff officer was told off to take charge of each resting-place; and the canteens were "put out of bounds." There were practi-

cally no irregularities either on this or on any other part of the road north. There was, however, some disaffection among the Dutch farmers of this district, which was at first expressed with some force and bitterness. When, however, they saw that no offence whatever was given; and that, for everything obtained, reasonable payment was at once made, while person and property were everywhere respected; the farmers seemed to change their minds, or overcome their first prejudices, and became friendly and willing to oblige. No doubt an armed force under another leader, and composed of different material or manifesting a different spirit, could have easily increased the disaffection among these farmers. Parties of about 100 men now left Langford every day for Barkly West. On the 9th January, heliographic communication having been established along the route as far as Barkly West, Sir Charles proceeded to take up his quarters at the latter place, leaving the officer next him in rank (Colonel Walker, C.B.) in charge at Langford. Afterwards the Headquarters Staff proceeded to Barkly West, when Lieutenant-Colonel W. C. Molyneux took charge of the line of communication between Langford and Barkly West, Colonel J. Duncan at this time being in charge of the base at Capetown. On the 22d January the whole of the troops had arrived at Barkly West, and were encamped on the bank of the Vaal River.

When the High Commissioner asked for the services of Sir Charles Warren as leader of the Bechuanaland Expedition, he did not seem to contemplate his exercising any civil functions whatever. The High Commissioner asked for him—

"To organise police and command the whole Expedition."

And in stating his qualifications, the High Commissioner mentioned that Sir Charles—

"Had already conducted a successful campaign in Bechuanaland. He is respected by the Boers, and was greatly liked by the volunteers, who would gladly serve under him again" (4213, 102).

So far from wishing to bestow any civil duties or responsibilities upon Sir Charles Warren, the attitude of the High

Commissioner would seem to have been rather to divide with him even the purely military or police work. This is shown by the request of the High Commissioner already spoken of, that Mr. Rhodes, his Deputy, should organise in Kimberley the Colonial volunteers who should form part of the Bechuanaland Expedition (4213, 103).

But the requirements of Bechuanaland at this crisis in our South African history do not seem to have appeared in quite the same light to Her Majesty's Government, or to the people of England, as they did to the High Commissioner and one or two friends in Capetown. Her Majesty's Government decided that they needed in Bechuanaland not only the kind of officer described by Sir Hercules Robinson, but a Special Commissioner for the discharge of civil and political duties. This was an important and far-reaching decision. As a military commander, Sir Charles Warren in Bechuanaland was placed in practical independence of the General Commanding in South Africa, from whom, nevertheless, and from the Secretary of State for War, he was to receive his orders. Sir Charles was selected as qualified for the military work in Bechuanaland, and it was necessary to his success that he should have local command and feel local responsibility. There was not the least slight involved in all this upon the General Commanding, who had never been in Bechuanaland, and had never either managed or mismanaged any military affair in that country. But the case was different with the High Commissioner. He had had charge in Bechuanaland; he had asked for a soldier and policeman, and besides these, he got a Special Commissioner as well, holding a Commission from Her Majesty for the discharge of civil and political work in Bechuanaland. According to this Commission, which was almost identical in its wording with that of the High Commissioner, Sir Charles Warren was to represent Her Majesty's crown and authority in Bechuanaland; to transact in relation to Bechuanaland all business which might be lawfully transacted by him with the President or Representatives of the Free State or the Transvaal, and to invite and obtain their co-operation towards the preservation of peace; and to take all such measures as

might seem to him necessary in connection with the native tribes. The instructions of Sir Charles were as follow:—

"DOWNING STREET, *November* 10, 1884.

"SIR—I am directed by the Earl of Derby to inform you that you have been selected by Her Majesty's Government for the appointment of Special Commissioner in Bechuanaland.

"2. The general object of your mission is, as stated in the memorandum submitted by you to the Secretary of State for War, to remove the filibusters from Bechuanaland, to restore order in the territory, to reinstate the natives on their lands, to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent further depredation, and finally to hold the country until its further destination is known. You have also correctly defined the outlines of the policy to be adhered to, and your own duties as Special Commissioner.

"3. You will, as Special Commissioner, be under the direction of Sir Hercules Robinson, Governor of the Cape Colony and Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, who will, however, be requested to leave you a very large discretion as regards all local matters. I approve of your proposal to communicate as soon as possible with the President of the Orange Free State, and with residents in the Colony and elsewhere.

"4. With regard to all operations in the field, and the organisation of the mounted Volunteer Force, you will receive your instructions from the Secretary of State for War and the General Commanding in South Africa, and will not be accountable to the Colonial Government or to the High Commissioner. Should you require assistance in the discharge of your civil and political duties which cannot be rendered by the military officers on your staff, you should apply to the High Commissioner to sanction any necessary payments from the fund at his disposal for the purposes of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

"5. You will of course clearly understand that Her Majesty's Government have agreed that the Cape Ministers shall in the first instance endeavour to effect a peaceful settlement of the difficulties in Montsioa's country, and that active military operations shall not be commenced until a reasonable time has elapsed. It is not possible to judge how much time may be so occupied, but in a recent telegram of the 31st ultimo Sir H. Robinson has indicated that six weeks might be required. Her Majesty's Government sincerely trust that the Cape Government may be able to propose such a settlement as can be honourably accepted, but it is obvious that in the unfortunate event of their failing to do so, no time should be lost in removing from the Protectorate those who have violated its independence and seized the lands of the protected chiefs.

"6. The Cape Government have stated that (if their mission be successful) they think they will be in a position to submit to the Colonial Parliament as soon as it meets a scheme for the government of the country pending its annexation to the Colony. Should their

expectations be fulfilled, it will become a question for the consideration of Sir H. Robinson, after consultation with you, whether you should continue in charge of the Protectorate until the necessary measures for taking it over have been adopted by the Cape Parliament. If, on the other hand, the annexation of the territory to the Colony should for the present prove impracticable, it will be necessary to maintain within it a sufficient armed police force; and if it is necessary to increase the force now in Bechuanaland, suitable men for this purpose will doubtless be procurable from among the mounted volunteers, whom you are about to enrol.

"7. Your full knowledge of the affairs of Bechuanaland renders it unnecessary to give you detailed explanations respecting the circumstances and the persons with whom you will have to deal; and Lord Derby only desires to add in conclusion that he will always be glad to receive, and will attach much value to, any recommendations or observations with which you may favour him from time to time on questions of policy and civil administration.—I am, etc.,

"ROBERT G. W. HERBERT.

"Sir Charles Warren, K.C.M.G."

Now, as we have remarked, this was not the officer whom the High Commissioner asked for: or rather, it was that, and a great deal more; the Special Commissionership of Sir Charles Warren represented a feeling sincerely entertained in England and in Downing Street, of dissatisfaction with the past history of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, as managed by Sir Hercules Robinson. I do not think people in England were quite prepared to attach blame to the High Commissioner—they simply, as Mr. Forster said, did not understand what the High Commissioner meant by recent changes in Bechuanaland; their suspicions were aroused, and they considered that the Protectorate now needed the fresh and untrammelled mind of a Special Commissioner, as well as the services of a soldier and head of police. Past mistakes might have been the fault of Sir Hercules Robinson's peculiar position as Governor of the Cape Colony as well as High Commissioner. Without probing the cause, the dissatisfaction which was felt was real, and the measure of it was the amount of power and responsibility which had been conferred on the Special Commissioner. It may be said, and said with truth, that if Her Majesty's Government had not left even a formal or nominal oversight to the High Com-

missioner, the objects of Her Majesty's Government would have been far better secured, and without misunderstanding. But what was retained to the High Commissioner in the letter, was taken away in the spirit and circumstances, of the instructions to the Special Commissioner. There can be no doubt as to the meaning of Sir Charles Warren's instructions. You are practically free and you are responsible in your military capacity. As to civil and political questions, we do not rescind the Commission so recently granted to Sir Hercules Robinson as High Commissioner for South Africa. But while you will thus be under his direction as the High Commissioner for South Africa, as Bechuanaland is in South Africa, Sir Hercules will be requested to leave you a very large discretion as regards all local matters. Should you require assistance in the discharge of your civil and political duties which cannot be rendered by the military officers on your staff, you should apply to the High Commissioner to sanction the necessary payments.

Most people will regard these words as meaning that the power and the responsibility in Bechuanaland were to belong to the Special Commissioner, who was not the Deputy of the High Commissioner, like myself or Mr. Rhodes, but who held his Commission directly from Her Majesty, as did the High Commissioner himself. The probable reason why formal supremacy was still yielded to the High Commissioner was in order to facilitate any measures which might be taken for the speedy annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony, and not with the view of curtailing the local freedom of Sir C. Warren. This is indeed made quite certain by a despatch of Lord Derby to the High Commissioner, in which Sir Hercules Robinson is informed that "Sir Charles Warren's appointment is civil and political as well as military," and that "his (the High Commissioner's) assistance was indispensable to secure the co-operation of the Cape Colony" (4432, 57). The High Commissioner was also informed that Her Majesty's Government "would not, of course, hold him responsible for all the details of Sir C. Warren's proceedings"; and Sir Hercules Robinson was asked to give him a free hand as far as possible (4432, 58). It is quite true that this

attitude of seeking for immediate annexation was an unfortunate one, even for the cause of annexation itself. But that was probably not understood in Downing Street. The reader already understands that leading Colonists were most anxious at that time to secure the active presence of the Imperial Government in the country on the side of peace and orderly progress. There was a short time of suspense when the public did not know as a matter of fact whether the authorities in Downing Street were going to consider the position of the Imperial Government in South Africa in a large-minded way, or whether they were going over to the side of Van Pittius and Mr. Upington,—of Van Niekerk and Mr. Rhodes. At length they gave abundant evidence that they did not contemplate a degradation so great, by their approval of the following memorandum which Sir Charles Warren wrote on the subject of the duties of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland:—

"LONDON, *October* 29, 1884.

"1. The object of this mission and expedition is to remove the filibusters from Bechuanaland, to pacificate the territory, to reinstate the natives on their lands, to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent further depredations, and finally, to hold the country until its further destination is known.

"2. It is to be understood that although the filibusters are for the most part whites, they are in the habit of employing natives in their pay. The pacification of the country, therefore, will extend not only to the whites but also to the native population, and will render necessary an armed native police similar to that established with success in 1879, during a portion of which time the number of the native police was in excess of that of the white police.

"3. The first object of the expedition is to remove, expel, or capture the filibusters; and in order to do this successfully it is desirable to limit as far as practicable their powers of recruiting their strength from the neighbouring territories of the Transvaal and Orange Free State. It will be therefore necessary, as far as it is practicable, to alienate the sympathies of all the respectable whites from these filibusters. With this object in view, I propose to visit the Dutch-speaking population about the most important centres, and to explain to them personally the object of the expedition. These centres are the Paarl District, Cradock, and the Orange Free State. I would visit President Brand at Bloemfontein, with whom I am on intimate terms, and confer with him on the subject. I would also propose to call together, provided that the Transvaal Government sees no objection, a few of my

old friends among the inhabitants of the Bloemhof district, and explain to them the object and policy of the British Government.

"4. The policy, as I understand it from the advices from Capetown as enunciated by the High Commissioner, is, there is room for all. It is impossible to ignore the fact that in process of time the white colonists will extend throughout the country, wherever the natives are, no matter what impediments are put in their way. All classes appear to agree to this, from the aggressive filibusters on the one side to the natives themselves on the other. The only question is, how this is to come about: (*a*) It can be done in a manner actually beneficial to the native; (*b*) It can be done by violence and by the destruction of the native races. The first policy is that of a Government which has the interest of the natives at heart. The second is that of the filibusters. The carrying out, however, of such a policy as that under (*a*) is a matter of the greatest delicacy. It can only be carried out by Imperial officers, who must have no stake whatever in the commercial interests and speculations of the country. There is land in Bechuanaland which may be occupied by whites, and reports were sent in 1878 to 1879 as to how these lands might be given out. But no spoliation of the natives should take place, no farms should be taken from them, and their waters should be left entirely in their hands. The natives should be confirmed, after due inquiry, in what they rightfully possess; but there are thousands of acres of arid land, called 'dry farms,' which may well be given out to white settlers, under due supervision, under the occupation clause, where water may be stored by means of dams, or where wells may be dug at their own expense. The native chiefs fully recognise that the white population will extend over the country. All that they seek is a policy of 'give and take'—that is to say, they are quite willing to give up portion of their dry land, provided they in their turn are able to enjoy the protection of a powerful and just Government.

"5. It is considered that when it is fully understood by the white colonists that the British Government does not wish simply to hem them in and prevent their further expansion, but is willing to further it under due control and without violation of native rights, properties, and privileges, the sympathies of the better classes in the Orange Free State and Transvaal will become lukewarm towards the filibusters, whose actions they will understand are damaging their own prospects in the future. This will be more particularly the case when they understand that the British Government is firmly resolute in its action, and is determined to employ force in the cause of justice whenever it may be necessary."

This was, on the whole, a fresh and independent statement of the policy which Sir Hercules Robinson himself had adopted and enunciated in London, and was surely a reason why the High Commissioner and the Special Commissioner should pull well together in upholding the peace and pros-

perity of the country on lines which had been publicly advocated by both. The news of these things gave great pleasure in Capetown and in South Africa generally. My own friends warmly congratulated me; the views of Sir Charles Warren, they said, had so much in common with what I had been teaching.

"It was," I replied, "the view of a gentleman who had intimate knowledge of what he was speaking about, and who was well known to be no partisan or adherent of a class."

"Well, the question now is," said a somewhat cynical gentleman, "which Sir Hercules Robinson is to receive Sir Charles Warren on his arrival, and co-operate with him—the Governor of the Cape Colony as exhibited in recent muddles in Bechuanaland—or the High Commissioner for South Africa as he landed in Capetown last March, advocating the very views which are to be upheld by Sir Charles Warren as Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland?"

"The unusual personal popularity of Sir C. Warren is a powerful factor in the case, and his views are really those of the great body of the intelligent colonists," remarked an old colonist.

"Well, gentlemen," I said, "I have been a prophet of good among you, having foretold, when you were all hanging your heads, that serious and intelligent interest in your affairs on the part of England, of which this Expedition is the expression. You are quite right; Sir Charles Warren expresses views generally approved both in England and in this Colony. But mark my words, unless a miracle takes place, just because Sir Charles holds these views, and will certainly stick to them, he will meet with such opposition as I had to contend against. Shame will compel it to keep silence for a while; for he really comes to you bringing freedom from a social tyranny under which you were all groaning. Then he is General Sir Charles Warren: a little time must be allowed for that also; but my opponents will be his opponents before he has gone far in his work."

These remarks were made by me in Capetown while Sir Charles was still on the ocean, and were verified much sooner than I anticipated.

For my own part, I thought the coming of Sir Charles Warren and the Bechuanaland Expedition was in more ways than one an event of the most important and beneficial kind to all South Africa. Here was a Special Commissioner possessing as no other man did the regard and the confidence of all nationalities in South Africa. He came with authority and at the head of a force, which was specially intended to repress disorder and lawlessness which had for years disgraced the whole country. The absence of a General Government, the powerlessness of each local state or colony to do anything outside its border for the benefit of South Africa, had been clearly shown. The necessity for temporary help in this matter from the Imperial Government was apparent to many at this time. It seemed to me, therefore, that if Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Charles Warren realised the greatness of the opportunity for South Africa, and acted in sympathy with one another, and with the views which both had expressed, great and permanent issues to South Africa might follow from the coming of the Special Commissioner and the Expedition, besides the pacification of Bechuanaland. There were other causes of anxiety beyond Bechuanaland; and the present want of adaptation in our arrangements in South Africa, through which the Bechuanaland disturbances had been possible, might be much remedied, if not removed, by wise co-operation and public spirit on the part of the two Commissioners. I held it as proved that the right exercise of the important functions of the High Commissionership of South Africa was incompatible with local responsibility such as that of the Governorship of a Colony. Would a loyal servant of the crown do the best for South Africa, even at some self-sacrifice? Would he recognise obvious facts, and take advantage of them for the good of the country, even if, through the means which were used, he should appear to decrease while his neighbour increased? All this would soon be answered by events when the Special Commissioner should begin his work in Bechuanaland.

On the arrival of the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland in South Africa, it became the duty of the High Com-

missioner to bow to the decision of Her Majesty's Government in making the appointment, which decision was that the touchstone as to local Bechuanaland affairs was now to be—not the judgment of the High Commissioner, but the fresh judgment of the Special Commissioner, specially appointed to the work. It would, therefore, be the duty and the pleasure of Sir Hercules Robinson to speed Sir Charles Warren to the scene of his labours, and while he was in Capetown to give full information concerning the Protectorate to the officer now specially appointed to settle its affairs. The strangely-opposing statements as to matters of fact in the Protectorate would be clearly described by him. His own giving up one Deputy Commissioner holding the views which were common to himself and the Special Commissioner, and appointing another Deputy with opposite opinions, and his reasons for doing so, would merit early mention and explanation. He would give to the Special Commissioner the true history of the Hart River Agreement, with its added Article, and explain why no mention of this fifth Article had been made to Her Majesty's Government by himself and Mr. Rhodes, who wrote his report in Capetown, and in daily communication with the High Commissioner. He would inform the Special Commissioner very clearly now, that these Transvaal people had positively refused to submit to the Imperial Government, and he would also explain why he had informed Her Majesty's Government that they had submitted. Then would come the very important fact that they nearly all belonged to the Transvaal, but that he (the High Commissioner) had not carried out as yet the instruction of Lord Derby as to the delimitation of Stellaland and the Transvaal, with his reasons for this delay. The fact would be stated that the body of the people of Stellaland itself had repeatedly expressed their loyalty to the Imperial Government, and that a document of this nature, incidentally mentioning Sir Charles's name and welcoming his coming, which had received nearly 200 signatures, had been received by the High Commissioner, and was at that time in the possession of Mr. Rhodes; while the Transvaal party, by

the pen of Mr. van Niekerk, had invoked the help of the Almighty in their opposition to the Imperial Government. The High Commissioner would inform the Special Commissioner that Stellaland was in eager and friendly expectation of the coming of Sir Charles. He would state that there were perhaps thirty or forty who were still "Transvaal" in their sympathies, and of these the majority were connected with Goshen as well as Stellaland, and had actively assisted in the attack on the Protectorate, and were, therefore, to be reckoned with as Goshenites. There was thus no Stellaland difficulty whatever. The Hart River border and the Goshen border were purely Transvaal questions. These were the leading facts connected with Stellaland at the time when the Special Commissioner arrived in Capetown to assume local management and local responsibility in Bechuanaland. We should expect that they would be most carefully and fully placed before Sir Charles Warren by Sir Hercules Robinson with every paper which could throw light on the question, as a clear matter of duty to Her Majesty's Government in connection with their appointment of a Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland. I most sincerely regret to have to state that none of the matters above cited would appear to have been explained to Sir Charles, and I understand that no documents were placed in his hand to enable him to ascertain what had really happened in the Protectorate.

It was, of course, within the power of the High Commissioner to adopt a very much less worthy course in dealing with the Special Commissioner. He might stick to his own idea of that officer's duties, as head of the military and police, and practically ignore the special political and civil appointment. Things might happen so that the Special Commissioner before he left Capetown should virtually occupy just the position which met the High Commissioner's approval. The High Commissioner might at once proffer and press advice, and support that advice with arguments—acting the part of the advocate now, and no longer that of the impartial judge or giver of facts—personating, in fact, the Local Commissioner of Bechuanaland,

and not acting as the High Commissioner of South Africa. Then he might strengthen his advice by a solemn statement of its importance, and communicate to the subject the element of urgency. This, in point of fact, would be to deprive Her Majesty's Government of the specific benefit to the public service which they had in view in appointing a Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland, and if adopted and successfully carried through by the High Commissioner towards the Special Commissioner, this course of action would amount to carrying on the administration of Sir Hercules Robinson in Bechuanaland through Sir Charles Warren.

It would appear from Sir Hercules Robinson's own account of what took place at Capetown on the 6th December that, most unfortunately, this latter course of conduct towards the Special Commissioner was that which Sir Hercules Robinson, the High Commissioner for South Africa, chose to adopt. Within a few hours after Sir Charles Warren's arrival in South Africa, and before he had entered Bechuanaland, or seen its people, Sir Hercules Robinson earnestly pressed and urged certain opinions concerning Bechuanaland upon Sir Charles, and for his immediate and practical adoption. These opinions were on points much controverted, for the consideration of which there was ample time after Sir Charles had reached Bechuanaland and had seen and heard for himself.

Aware of the views of Sir Charles, as expressed in the memorandum which had been approved by Her Majesty's Government, the High Commissioner now presses upon the Special Commissioner the services in Bechuanaland of Mr. Rhodes, who had publicly denounced similar views. He is aware also that Van Niekerk and his immediate followers have bitterly opposed the Imperial Government at Hart River, and (a part of them) in the actual fighting at Montsioa's. He, nevertheless, recommends that Her Majesty's Special Commissioner should at once and by telegram sanction the land-grants of these men without any inquiry. He is aware that those who submitted to the Imperial Government (whatever their number) have been ignored and ill-used by the avowed opponents of the

Imperial Government (whatever their number), yet his pressing advice is that power and sanction should still be given to the same enemies of the English Government. He is aware it is asserted that the unexamined ratification of land-claims will confer Imperial sanction upon such transactions as the bestowal of thirty farms on one trading firm for ammunition supplied to the freebooters, thus throwing away land to the value of some £15,000 at once, although, as he also knows, the freebooters themselves are anxious that the past management of their affairs should be overhauled in the interest of the incoming Administration. He has been informed that the new Transvaal boundary takes away from the natives most valuable arable lands, and that if the Stellaland titles are also sanctioned *en bloc*, many of the tribe whose protection is one of our objects will become entirely destitute through our action. Yet he presses upon the Special Commissioner while he is still in Capetown that these land-claims should all be ratified by telegram at once, and without inquiry. He is aware that the misrepresented Stellalanders, through whose country the Expedition will actually pass, have sent a welcome to Sir Charles; the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes suppress that welcome, and represent the condition of Stellaland as urgent, and to be affected beneficially through Van Niekerk and through a large and unexamined grant of native land.

After earnestly pressing such advice on Her Majesty's Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland while barely landed in Capetown, Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa wrote out the draft of the suggested telegram to Van Niekerk. "Captain Bower was then called in," says the High Commissioner's account of the transaction (4432, 117), "and the rough draft of the telegram given to him to be copied. He remarked that Mr. Rhodes was in his office. The latter gentleman was accordingly invited to join us," etc. The impression produced on the mind of the Special Commissioner by the fact that advice was tendered at all by the High Commissioner at that stage, that he pressed it on his adoption, and even drafted a telegram to be sent, was naturally one of urgency. To

Sir Charles it all meant, as he tells us, that "an agreement made by Mr. Rhodes with the Stellaland Government terminated on the 8th of December, and that to avoid disturbances and war there it would be necessary in some way to renew the agreement" (4432, 119).

Sir Charles Warren further says:—

"Your Excellency wrote out the telegram in question without consulting me as to its nature, and the Imperial Secretary brought it to me for signature, and informed me it was necessary for me to sign it as Special Commissioner, and that if not sent at once, so as to be in Stellaland on the 8th December, disturbances would certainly ensue. Under such circumstances I felt that, as matters were still in the hands of your Excellency, I should do right to follow your instructions; but I did not consider that I took any responsibility in a matter on which I was not permitted to use my own judgment. Owing to the sending of this telegram, your Excellency has stated that I am bound to Mr. Rhodes's agreement. I reply that if so, the whole matter ought to be investigated by Her Majesty's Government, as it appears to be useless to send out a Special Commissioner to arrange affairs, and to use his own judgment, and then for the High Commissioner to bind him over to his views on the second day after his arrival in the Cape Colony" (4432, 163).

The telegram drafted by the High Commissioner, and suggested by him as urgent to the Special Commissioner, the latter being at the time occupied with the gravest military duties, was sent in the following terms:—

"*From Sir Charles Warren, Capetown, to Mr. Gert van Niekerk, Stellaland.*

"6th December.—I desire to acquaint you that I am prepared to adhere to the settlement arranged between you and the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes, provided that it is respected by the people of Stellaland. I understand from Mr. Rhodes that he has arranged with you for the postponement of the inquiry into the cattle-thefts and the transfer of Government. I propose to ask him to return to Bechuanaland shortly to co-operate with you in maintaining order" (4275, 71).

We have nothing to do here with paltry questions as to who proposed verbal alterations in Sir Hercules Robinson's suggested telegram. We observe that the scene of the conversation was the Government House, and that Mr. Rhodes happened to be there, on his way to England once more, but his course might still be diverted, as before. The telegram was suggested, drafted, approved when rewritten,

after alterations (having now the names of Sir C. Warren and Mr. van Niekerk on it), by the High Commissioner for South Africa. It was then sent by him to Sir Charles "for his final approval and initialling." Who sent this telegram to Van Niekerk, the open opponent of the Imperial Government, and volunteer of Massow,—chief and volunteer now both in the Transvaal, and no longer in the Protectorate?

"Why, Sir Charles Warren," says Sir Hercules Robinson; "is not his name on it? Did he not initial it, having of course approved of it?"

The Special Commissioner replies in effect:—"My name is on the telegram; I initialled it. But the idea of telegraphing to Van Niekerk, the terms to be offered, the actual draft of the telegram, the necessity and the urgency, do not belong to me, but to Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa. I am not responsible for the course then taken—that lies with the High Commissioner. My responsibility at Capetown was limited to acquiescence in the judgment of the High Commissioner, I being under the mistaken impression that the facts of the case were before me. The quality of my action was that of trust in Her Majesty's High Commissioner. His telegram was a grave blunder; but it was one of many into which Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes had led him. I trusted them till I knew the truth of matters from the people of Stellaland themselves."

The contention of the High Commissioner afterwards was that, having initialled the telegram, Sir Charles Warren was henceforth bound to assist the High Commissioner, Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes, and Messrs. van Niekerk and Delarey, in their strange doings. Nothing which the Special Commissioner might afterwards ascertain for himself in Bechuanaland could absolve him from upholding this telegram. It might have been unwise in Sir Charles to sign, but in any case the Special Commissioner had done so at Capetown. Now the marvel and the mystery are that these things were said by the High Commissioner at all concerning a disadvantageous and even shameful agreement, which the Stellalanders themselves treated in two quite different ways—the Hart River party openly declaring it to

be temporary; the loyal Stellalanders denouncing it altogether as having been made with the Transvaal enemies of the Protectorate. Why Her Majesty's High Commissioner should be the only party seriously holding to such an agreement, to the disadvantage of his own Government, is simply a marvel, which the reader must not expect me to explain.

Perhaps the real purport of this telegram when read in the Transvaal, to which it was addressed, and where it found Mr. van Niekerk, would be best brought out by a paraphrase of its contents, which I shall here attempt:—

"*From Her Majesty's Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland, Capetown, to the Administrator of the (revived) Republic of Stellaland, (residing at) Christiana, Transvaal.*

"6th December.—I have been forty-eight hours in Capetown, and have seen Sir Hercules Robinson, Captain Bower, and Mr. Rhodes. I have been urged by them to send you at once the following message. I desire to acquaint your Honour that under Sir Hercules Robinson's advice I am prepared to follow Mr. Rhodes in his submission to your Honour. You stipulated for three months' independence at the least; I hasten to inform you that I offer you and your friends an extension of that time before any one asks for it. I propose to ask Mr. Rhodes shortly to return to Bechuanaland—which of course includes part of the Transvaal, as you reside there. You are pledged to oppose the Imperial Government; Mr. Rhodes also regards the Imperial Government as a great danger in the country; I have pleasure in securing your services to co-operate with Mr. Rhodes."

It appears to me that the only question which was of any importance to responsible Imperial officers in Capetown on the 6th December, was the action of local politicians who were known to be enemies of the Imperial Government; and, especially whether or not the Transvaal Government would be drawn into supporting the claims of its burghers on its western border. The attitude of the small Hart River party, which looked to Van Niekerk and Delarey as their leaders, was not by itself of the slightest political importance. It was well known that the great body of Stellaland people were favourable to the Imperial Government. There was therefore no pressing necessity for any telegraphic message whatever. A letter might have been sent, informing the officers to whom Mr. Rhodes had entrusted the Government, that no step would be taken in

Stellaland affairs till such time as the Special Commissioner himself reached Stellaland. There was not the slightest reason for expecting hostility from the Stellalanders, while the Transvaal at Hart River was the same as at any other portion of its border.

Then it should have been remembered by his advisers in Capetown that Sir Charles Warren was well known in Bechuanaland and even in the Transvaal. It was generally agreed by those who knew him that his desire would be, if possible, to effect a settlement without bloodshed, while fully prepared to clear and to hold the Protectorate according to his instructions. He had come out to South Africa distinctly to uphold the character and the position of the Imperial Government in that country. That character had been decried in Capetown and scorned in Bechuanaland. The Transvaal party had carried its insults to a climax in declining at Hart River to recognise the Protectorate, and in formally annexing Montsioa while under that Protectorate. While Sir Charles picked no quarrel, and respected all private rights by enforcing discipline among his men—and while as Special Commissioner he conducted all affairs with calmness and open-mindedness—clearly enough it was the Imperial Government which had now to be "conciliated" by those who had insulted it. The freebooters and their friends recognised the altered state of affairs at once. President Kruger had intelligence and patriotism enough to guide him to bestir himself to make peace with his offended adversary while yet in the way. It was at this singularly inopportune time that Sir H. Robinson came in on the other side and urged upon Sir Charles Warren to go on with backing out and submission, and to uphold an undertaking with freebooters at the Hart River which they themselves had broken, —which did not confer a single benefit on any friend of the Imperial Government, and which was afterwards proved to be literally destructive of the primary object of the Protectorate. This advice, ill-judged and mistimed, was calculated to compromise from the first the objects of the Expedition. Besides this, the "conciliation" of Van Niekerk and Delarey, to have been efficacious, must have gone further

than Sir Hercules advised, and have yielded the land-claims of Goshen freebooters, in which Van Niekerk and his friends were far more interested than they now were in British Stellaland.

No one, of course, means that Sir C. Warren at the head of a force should have broken a permanent and binding deed of submission signed by a predecessor who had no force. Submissions are always unpleasant; but whether they are binding or not depends, of course, on their terms, and not on their pleasantness or unpleasantness. In this particular case, as mentioned elsewhere, in the sheer exuberance of their strength and triumph, and with the cherished purpose of joining the Transvaal, Van Niekerk and Delarey positively declined to submit to the Imperial Government, or to make the agreement of the 8th September a permanent one. Their confident expectation, however, was doomed to disappointment. Instead of finally driving away the Imperial Government when they got rid of me, instead of being able to join the country of the Protectorate to the Transvaal, the freebooters were confronted with the unexpected action of the people and Government of England in sending out Sir Charles Warren to uphold the policy which was announced to them in Stellaland when the Protectorate was declared. The fact that the freebooters had declined to make a binding agreement of a permanent nature with Mr. Rhodes ought to have been, of course, a clear loss to the freebooters. They had miscalculated the action of the Imperial Government. In openly determining to keep themselves free to join the Transvaal, they, of course, left the Imperial Government equally free of all obligation on the 8th December, and all Stellaland matters would thus have to be arranged *de novo* with the Special Commissioner. It was under these auspicious circumstances that Sir C. Warren was advised by Sir H. Robinson to render permanent, on behalf of the freebooters, an arrangement which they themselves had left temporary!

The practical upshot of what was done in so short a space of time in Capetown was that the Hart River people held that their independence as a Republic was confirmed

for another month, under the name of Sir Charles Warren. At Capetown this name was now supposed to be in effect a ratification of all the freebooters' claims to land, whether they had fought against the Protectorate or not. The people of Stellaland who had submitted to the Imperial Government again protested against this continued outrage, feeling assured, however, that the time of their deliverance drew near. Mr. Rhodes returned to Hart River as Deputy Commissioner for Bechuanaland, addressing his communications direct to the High Commissioner. The Special Commissionership was thus practically disposed of by Her Majesty's High Commissioner, and the English Government could gain nothing from the appointment so far as the influence of the High Commissioner could reach. Soon remarks came to be made in an "inspired" quarter in Capetown, showing how it was contemplated to conduct the civil and political work of Bechuanaland through Mr. Rhodes, while Sir Charles attended to the military and police affairs.

We come now to follow into practice the arrangement which was sketched in the telegram of the 6th December. Although conflicting rumours were heard as to the conduct of the Transvaal, Mr. Rhodes was able to send a reassuring telegram to Capetown from Taung, in which he stated that—

"As far as he could gather, the Transvaal would do everything to avoid being drawn into the matter. They are afraid, owing to the large number of men being despatched, that the Expedition is really against them, in order to recover the Transvaal" (4310, 45).

Stellaland peaceful, the Transvaal overawed, it was in these circumstances that the urgent telegram had been despatched from Capetown.

It is instructive to turn to what happened in Stellaland itself at this time. After the three months had expired, during which Stellaland was to be under the rule of the Hart River party, a public meeting was held at Vryburg on the 8th December. No one was present to represent the Imperial Government, or to give information to the meeting on its behalf as to the future. The Hart River party had seized upon all the offices, and as their doings had

the sanction of Mr. Rhodes, no opposition was made by the loyal people. But since the hostile visit of Mr. van Niekerk and his followers on the 18th September, no further attention had been given to British Stellaland by the Hart River Executive. A single public notice had been issued in that interval, postponing for a month the business of the promised cattle-inquiry; and that represented the "administration" on the part of Van Niekerk of the affairs of Stellaland for three months, so far as the general public of Stellaland were aware. At the public meeting referred to, a resolution was drawn up addressed to the High Commissioner, deeply regretting that the time during which Mr. van Niekerk was to have supreme rule over Stellaland had been extended for another month—namely, to the 8th January 1885—without consulting the public of Stellaland. The resolution went on to say that, as a further proof of their loyalty and devotion to Her Majesty's Government, they had decided to support any orderly Government of Stellaland as far as lay in their power, and during the interval in question to do nothing which might be interpreted as acts of violence or interference with the Government which had been acknowledged by the Deputy Commissioner. They trusted, however, that it might please his Excellency the High Commissioner from that time to take such measures for the governing of Stellaland as might be more acceptable to the whole population of that country, and until such time as either the Imperial or the Colonial Government should annex the country (4588, 107). The High Commissioner informed the Secretary of State that "this resolution was not sent to him direct at the time, as understood by Sir Charles Warren." It is not known whether it was delayed for a day or two in transmission, but it is said the document was posted at Vryburg on the 8th December. Fearing that their request for information might share the fate of their other communications, and elicit no reply from the Imperial officers in Capetown, these Stellalanders sent a letter to Mr. Adriaan Delarey ("Groot Adriaan"), who was then in Vryburg, having been sent to overawe or prevent the public meeting of the people. The letter to Mr. Delarey was signed by

Stellaland country people only, as it was strenuously asserted by Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, and repeated by the High Commissioner, that people loyal to the Imperial Government were found only in Vryburg. We quote the first sentence of this letter, written in very remarkable circumstances :—

"Whereas the period agreed on between Messrs. Niekerk and Rhodes at Hart River on the 8th September 1884 (*vide* Article V. of the Agreement) expires to-day, we have assembled in the capital of Stellaland, trusting that the Government will acquaint us with what has been done."

In the course of his reply Mr. Delarey said :—

"As regards the present condition of our country, I can only inform you that the Imperial Government has considered it advisable to grant our Government a month longer than was originally stipulated in our agreement of the 8th September 1884, and under the same conditions."

This was signed by Mr. Delarey as "Member of the Executive Council," and was thus, from Mr. Rhodes's point of view, an official document. It was information with which the Stellalanders had to be content at that time. But how very different the peaceful and loyal attitude of the Stellalanders from what had been said of them in Capetown to Sir Charles Warren!

Mr. Rhodes did not go to Vryburg, as was stated in Capetown, but to the Hart River, and there, on the 24th December, met a few Transvaal burghers, more than one of whom was said to be warmly interested in Goshen and its recent hostilities against Her Majesty's Government. Mr. Rhodes told these people on the Hart River that he "was prepared, on behalf of the High Commissioner, to endorse the terms of the future Government of Stellaland, which he had proposed to the burghers assembled at Commando Drift on the 8th September" (4310, 53). The following is the text of the document which was then agreed to :—

"That the agreement entered into on the 8th September 1884 between the Commission elected by the burghers of Stellaland and C. J. Rhodes, Esq., Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland, shall be fully carried out; and that the military officers shall make this resolution known to the people; and further, that in case troops are

marched through Stellaland to Land Goshen, the burghers will remain quiet and cause no collision" (4310, 54).

Gracious Van Niekerk!—pacific Delarey!—it was, of course, easy to promise all this on the Hart River. In reality these Transvaal burghers would be entirely guided by the policy of the Transvaal Government. As in the agreement of the 8th September there was a supplementary Article, so there was an important Appendix to the resolution as quoted above. This Appendix was agreed to at the same meeting and on the same date, Mr. Rhodes being present. Its first Article was that the cattle-thefts should be inquired into before or on the 15th January; that the Republican Government of Stellaland should be "taken over," with its liabilities, in conjunction with an Executive Council to be chosen by the people; or that a loan of money should be made to the Stellaland Republic to pay its debts and carry on its government. The Hart River people obviously began to feel that there were things which could be carried too far. It was one thing to have Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower following them about with their offers and their favours; it was another thing to have to deal with Sir Charles Warren as Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland and head of the Bechuanaland Expedition. He would soon be in Bechuanaland and know everything, and know that they were not in Bechuanaland but in the Transvaal. Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey evidently did not relish certain possibilities. They were Transvaal burghers, and they had no ambition whatever to touch Stellaland affairs any more in present circumstances. Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that their request to be relieved should be granted, and hinted to the High Commissioner that his friends did not really possess the ability to carry on a Government (4310, 53)—a statement which was of course eminently true. In the telegram in which Mr. Rhodes announced to the High Commissioner that the Transvaal was "afraid, owing to the large number of men being despatched, that the Expedition was really against them and to recover the Transvaal," and that the Goshen freebooters would now take care not to commit acts which would further jeopardise their position—the Hart River people, under Mr. van Nie-

kerk and Mr. Delarey, ought to have been included, as having greatly calmed down since (only a few weeks before) they called upon the Almighty to help them against the Imperial Government (4275, 24). But Mr. Rhodes puts the attitude of his Hart River friends in quite another light. He says :—

"As they feel they are unable, owing to lack of funds, to carry on their own government, they request your Excellency to assume the government of Stellaland, and appoint your own officers. Thus of their own free-will they ask you to grant what they declined to have forced on them about four months ago" (4310, 45).

In view of the approaching Expedition, Goshen freebooters, who are a large body of men, are afraid, and are leaving Bechuanaland; even the Transvaal itself is alarmed for its own position, and will do nothing in behalf of freebooters anywhere; but the handful of Transvaal freebooters on the Hart River, not sharing the general and natural alarm, "of their own free-will" (according to Mr. Rhodes), ask the High Commissioner to assume the government of Stellaland! Misrepresentation could not possibly go further than this.

Having determined that the affairs of Stellaland and its past history should not come before the Special Commissioner, who would only have to "deal" with Goshen, the High Commissioner on the 1st January thus instructs Mr. Rhodes as to the course which he is to follow in Stellaland :—

"Our only object now in Stellaland is to provide the means to continue some kind of government there, so as to prevent affairs drifting into hopeless confusion while Warren is dealing with Goshen" (4310, 52).

We have already spoken of the baneful attitude of striving after immediate annexation on the part of the High Commissioner, instead of upholding the affairs of the Protectorate with ability and decision. Human nature being what it is, there was really little or no prospect of the speedy annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. Sir Charles Warren was going to "deal" with Goshen—that is, he was going to drive out the freebooters. The Imperial Government would stand by that. In these circumstances the

High Commissioner seemed to think that Mr. Upington and Mr. Sprigg, and their fellow-Ministers at the Cape, would most humbly and meekly assume the administration of Goshen on Imperial lines—they having made a very different settlement, which had been rejected. From the tone of their minute of the 15th December, the High Commissioner ought to have seen that there was not the slightest prospect of Colonial annexation on the lines which had been laid down :—

"The proposals of Ministers have not met with the approval of Her Majesty's Government, and consequently it is beyond the power of Ministers to take any further action in the matter."

And as if to prevent the very mistake which the High Commissioner unfortunately made, the Ministers took their farewell of the subject in the following terms :—

"The settlement of affairs is now entirely in the hands of Her Majesty's Government ; and in closing this prolonged correspondence, Ministers would simply express the hope and desire that, whatever may be the course taken by Her Majesty's Government, it will be such as shall tend to show to persons of every nationality in South Africa the advantages enjoyed by those who live under British rule" (4310, 13).

It is possible that, as Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Hercules Robinson may have been advised to cherish hopes of the speedy defeat of the Cape Ministry which was responsible for this decisive minute ; but it is quite certain that, as High Commissioner, it was his duty at once to inform Her Majesty's Government and the Special Commissioner that Bechuanaland was now, in December, virtually in the hands of Her Majesty's Government, and that effectual steps should at once be taken for its proper government. Instead of taking this course, Sir Hercules Robinson persisted in the vain and most unfortunate illusion as to immediate Colonial annexation, which had already done so much harm. On the 29th December he whispers his policy to the Secretary of State and to Mr. Rhodes in the following terms, which were soon read by all in the Bluebooks :—

"I think it will be more politic to adhere for the present to the settlement of the 8th September than to assume the direct government

of Stellaland, as we have at present no jurisdiction there, and could only obtain it by annexation to the empire, which had better be delayed until we can come to some arrangement with the Colony as to taking over Bechuanaland. It we were to annex at once, the Colony might leave the country on our hands" (4310, 46).

Two months later on, Sir Hercules advises Lord Derby:—

"If you desire Colonial annexation, I advise that till meeting of Colonial Parliament no action be taken under Order in Council" (4432, 59).

The argument seems here to be—If we take in hand with Stellaland as part of Bechuanaland in a workmanlike way, and establish order and good government there, the Colony may be repelled from annexing; but if we leave everything in disorder and allow the local debt to increase without inquiry (as it had already done five-fold since I had charge), because we have given up power and control,—we shall find that these circumstances are calculated to induce the Cape Colony at once to annex the country! It is seldom that an experienced administrator misses the mark so far; but nothing which the High Commissioner says or recommends concerning Stellaland, after he adopted the make-believe Colonial policy, has any resemblance to what one would have expected from an officer of his position in the Imperial service.

But there is another assertion in this telegram which merits special attention. The High Commissioner said—"We have at present no jurisdiction there"—in Stellaland. How does this accord with the telegram already quoted from Sir Hercules Robinson to the Secretary of State, announcing the recognition of the Protectorate by Van Niekerk and Delarey, on the 8th September,—the Protectorate, of course, specially including jurisdiction? As to the matter of fact, Sir Hercules Robinson was under a mistaken impression when he said we had no jurisdiction in Stellaland at that time. The reader is aware that Her Majesty's authority was announced in every part of Bechuanaland south of the Molopo in May 1884; the necessary treaties were made, and jurisdiction was expressly secured by them. All this was fully recognised at the time in Stellaland, as well as in

Capetown and London. Did Sir Hercules Robinson entertain the opinion that the action of Mr. Rhodes at the Hart River, in cancelling the authorised actions of his predecessor in office, had really been efficacious in removing Her Majesty's jurisdiction and protection from any part of Bechuanaland where that jurisdiction and protection had been established according to instructions? The High Commissioner and his second Deputy might take one method or another of administering the Protectorate; but they had no authority to give it up; they could not divest themselves of jurisdiction where the Secretary of State had expressly desired it to be secured and announced; and any document or settlement containing such a provision would be vitiated by its presence.

Without any sovereignty, however, the land-gifts of Mr. Rhodes were very sacred in his own and the High Commissioner's eyes; and, without any jurisdiction (from his point of view), the High Commissioner recommended Mr. Rhodes, as his "only object," to set up "some kind of government" in Stellaland; and Mr. Rhodes was authorised to pay, as he had proposed, a certain sum per month for officials' salaries, "as a loan to the present local Government, pending the final settlement of the country" (4310, 52). With this instruction from the High Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes reached Vryburg on the 8th January, and held a public meeting the same day. Mr. Rhodes tells us that his arrival at Vryburg was coincident with the expiry of the extended term of provisional administration agreed upon on the 8th September. The meeting was held outside the landdrost's office, over which the Stellaland freebooter-flag was again flying. Much comment was caused by the fact that "Administrator" Van Niekerk and Mr. Adriaan Delarey were absent. Mr. Rhodes says he assured the public (1) that their land-titles as registered would be recognised; (2) that they should carry on their own government; (3) that an investigation into cattle-thefts would take place; (4) that a loan of money would be advanced for monthly payment of salaries (4310, 57), beginning on the 8th January (4432, 8).

This was the first occasion on which Mr. Rhodes, as Deputy Commissioner, had confronted a meeting of Stella-

landers in Stellaland itself. It was anything but a pleasant experience, either for them or for him. He knew the people blamed him for misrepresenting and ignoring them. The character of Mr. van Niekerk was openly assailed, and the trouble and suffering which had taken place were ascribed to him. Mr. Rhodes found it impossible to prevent the people speaking out their minds as to the double-dealing which had taken place; and what was not said in the morning was declared at a second meeting in the evening. The chairman—

Mr. van Riet said the great question of the threatened danger arose out of having an unprincipled man like Van Niekerk any longer at the head of their affairs. He would make a few remarks on the events of the day. The Deputy Commissioner of Her Majesty the Queen of England arrived that morning, and Stellaland was once more under a British Protectorate. Could any one present enlighten him as to what this British Protectorate truly was? He was anxious to learn. At one time he flattered himself that he understood perfectly well what a Protectorate was. He knew what a French Protectorate was, and a Dutch, German, or Portuguese Protectorate. But this British Protectorate in Stellaland puzzled him. When Mr. Mackenzie came there not long ago, and empowered by the Earl of Derby and Her Majesty's Imperial Ministers, established the British Protectorate—what he established corresponded exactly with his (the speaker's) own notions of what a Protectorate should be. It was the inauguration in the country of law, order, and justice for all law-abiding people of whatever nationality, which were guaranteed by a police force. In addition to these indications of a Protectorate, there was the Union Jack, which, though a foreigner, he at once recognised as the flag of a great empire. . . . But unhappily for the law-abiding people, this state of affairs lasted but a little while. Bluster and Filibuster did not like it. The door was closed by this British Protectorate against their usual means of livelihood. They could no longer with impunity rob their neighbour of his bread by driving off his cattle, nor did they dare to repeat any longer the practice of enriching themselves at the cost of some hapless Colonial trader's hardly-earned savings, his merchandise, and perhaps his life. Their occupation gone, what did they do—this noble pair, Bluster and Filibuster? They were not clever, they lacked intelligence and brain, but they made up for these deficiencies by their astonishing cunning. The speaker then described the intrigue set up at the Cape, which led to my recall, and the appearance of Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, with Bluster and Filibuster's old green flag again. Bluster and Filibuster then had it all their own way. Mr. Rhodes gave them four months to govern themselves, and had returned that day as the four months had expired. He had made certain promises, but what

guarantee had they that they would be fulfilled? What guarantee had they that Bluster and Filibuster would not have it all their own way again? Did the Government of Stellaland remain as it was, with Van Niekerk at its head? And what power had Mr. Rhodes as Deputy Commissioner? One thing was certain, they could not live under Van Niekerk. That man was hateful to every one who had a spark of honour, truth, and uprightness left in him. . . . As matters stood they were governed by a man domiciled in the Transvaal whose sole interest and real sympathy were with the Transvaal, and opposed to the Cape Colony, because it is British. Mr. van Riet then in open meeting in Vryburg gave instances of Van Niekerk's misdoings as to money and cattle of the most glaring kind; and there was no voice to contradict. The speaker said he could go on all night giving them further distinct and unchallengeable proofs of Van Niekerk's misconduct. He was, however, their "baas" (master)—at least Mr. Rhodes recognised him as such. . . . Many of them had invested their all in Stellaland, and they had led miserable lives in consequence of the Van Niekerk party—the party of lawlessness. He must tell them seriously that the way Van Niekerk and many of his friends, whom he would mention at the proper time, had been carrying on secret negotiations with the Goshenites, and had actually assisted them with men, arms, and ammunition, had jeopardised Stellaland itself. . . . He hoped the time was near when honest men would again find grace in the eyes of Englishmen, and when Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner would be able to see into the innermost recesses of Van Niekerk's heart and read his character like a book. Then the Stellaland problem would be solved, and difficulties which had been created in certain minds would vanish . . . and the Queen's subjects would once more carry their heads erect in the streets of Vryburg, and the peaceful law-abiding farmer would once more appreciate the freedom and security enjoyed under the British flag. "Who knows," added the speaker, "but it will be General Warren himself who in a few days will bring us those blessings?" This last sentiment was received with prolonged cheering.

Several other speeches were made of the same nature. In each one reference was made to my own work in Stellaland, coupled with indignant protests against gross misrepresentation, and being kept any longer under the sway of Van Niekerk. If there was to be a re-election of officers for an Executive, they demanded, by a resolution which was carried unanimously, that the elections should not be conducted under the auspices of Mr. van Niekerk or his friends. A deputation was afterwards appointed by the meeting to request further information from Mr. Rhodes on certain points. One of the questions brought up by the deputation on meeting

Mr. Rhodes was as to whether the Hart River ward was part of Stellaland? Now, this was where Mr. Rhodes's "Government" and "Executive" lived. This was the "Stellaland" of Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner. The district in question had been placed mostly in the Transvaal, as the reader is aware, on the 27th February 1884, and a few days after Lord Derby had expressly requested the High Commissioner to have the line marked off for his own guidance, even before the Transvaal Raad sat, or accepted the new boundary-line. Nothing had been done by the High Commissioner in this vital matter, the ideas of Captain Bower evidently standing in the way of it. On the 8th August the new line had been agreed to by the Transvaal Volksraad —thus formally including the Hart River district in the Transvaal. Instead of then acting with promptness, and excluding those freebooters whose lands fell into the Transvaal, it was after it was certain that they were Transvaal people and not in any sense Stellalanders, that submission had been made to them by the Imperial officers, Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, in the end of August and beginning of September! And now, nearly a year after the Convention had been signed in London, it was still necessary that the Stellalanders, who submitted to Her Majesty's Government nine months before, should put the question to Mr. Rhodes as to whether Hart River district was to be regarded as in Stellaland in connection with the projected Stellaland elections? Mr. Rhodes did not know—would find out before the date of the elections! As a Cape newspaper remarked, "The Hart River ward is a portion of the Transvaal Republic, with which Mr. Rhodes has no more to do than with Kamschatka."

But the preceding was not the only hard nut which Mr. Rhodes was asked to crack on his first meeting with the loyal Stellalanders in the Protectorate. They urged him to take steps to have the line beaconed off, so that the onus of keeping the peace on the Hart River might rest on the Transvaal. They also stated one peculiar hardship of Mr. Rhodes's agreement, against which they had before protested. They understood this agreement to mean that

the Imperial Government would be absolved from its land promises if the Stellaland people joined in Goshen or Transvaal disturbances. But as the Hart River people were living in the Transvaal, it would be impossible to deprive them of their farms; and thus any rising or disturbance connected with Hart River, Goshen, or the Transvaal, which were all connected, could be visited only upon the loyal Stellalanders; and any stipulation as to keeping the peace with reference to the true inhabitants of Stellaland, was quite unnecessary, as they were well known to welcome the coming of Sir Charles Warren into the country (4432, 158).

It was questioned at Vryburg whether Van Niekerk would come forward as a candidate for the Presidency or Administratorship in the new election, or appear any more in the country; but, of course, till the election, Van Niekerk and Delarey were at the head of the so-called Stellaland Government. Such was the miserable muddle in which Stellaland had been placed, and such the "some kind" of Republican Government within a British Protectorate which Sir Charles Warren found there on his arrival in the country.

Returning to the telegram of the 6th December, it is evident that it would not have been sent from Capetown by the High Commissioner himself if Sir Charles Warren had not initialled it. As a matter of fact, the telegram treated of what was now Sir Charles's work, and no longer that of the High Commissioner. This is clearly stated by Mr. Rhodes in his account of what took place:—

"It was not only with the concurrence, but at the special request, of Sir Charles Warren, the Commissioner sent out from England for the purpose of settling the affairs of Bechuanaland, that I returned to Vryburg to resume the duties of an office which, it might naturally be thought, had lapsed from the moment of that officer's arrival in South Africa" (4432, 85).

In the same despatch, and with the most charming openness, Mr. Rhodes declares that in returning to Bechuanaland he hoped that the power which was thus conferred on him by the Special Commissioner was to be exercised by him "under the directions of the High Commissioner," and the sole

consideration which induced him to go at all, was to uphold the agreement of the 8th September! Those accustomed to take evidence will not be at all surprised to find that the impression on Sir Charles Warren's mind was, that Sir Hercules Robinson recommended that Mr. Rhodes should proceed to Bechuanaland until the Special Commissioner arrived, and that Mr. Rhodes himself expressed a strong desire to go (4432, 163). And so, after the direct interchange of telegrams between Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner (each message literally passing the Special Commissioner on its way), as to the transaction of supposed Stellaland business with the Transvaal party at Hart River, Sir Hercules mentioned to Mr. Rhodes that he would send copies of the telegrams to Sir Charles Warren (4310, 46). The High Commissioner would thus inform the Special Commissioner as to the manner in which Sir Hercules Robinson, Mr. Rhodes, and Mr. van Niekerk were discharging the Special Commissioner's duties—professedly at his request; for without his approval the business could not be said to be done. This intention may not have been at once carried out by the High Commissioner, for the first questioning and doubtful remarks of the Special Commissioner as to the actions of Mr. Rhodes were apparently founded on a "Reuter" telegram (4432, 6). On the same day, however (14th January), the copies of telegrams containing the news of what Mr. Rhodes had been doing at Hart River on the 24th December reached the Special Commissioner at Barkly West from Capetown. The Special Commissioner on the same day disapproved of what Mr. Rhodes had been doing in the Transvaal and in conference with a Transvaal burgher, Mr. van Niekerk (4432, 13). Sir Charles said he did not see how he could find fault with Transvaal people coming into Bechuanaland if the Deputy Commissioner for Stellaland went within the Transvaal and held meetings there. To this the High Commissioner replied that Mr. Rhodes in the Transvaal was merely explaining to Mr. van Niekerk and the other "leading Stellalanders" (!) the policy of Her Majesty's Government, and that he seemed to have aimed at dissipating any false impressions that might have arisen, rather than at

concluding a fresh agreement. It was just similar to the idea which had occurred to the Special Commissioner, to go into a district of the Transvaal where he was well known, so that he might explain to his old friends the object and policy of Her Majesty's Government (4432, 14). Now, the reader knows that this was an entirely incorrect statement of what took place. Mr. Rhodes did not go as a friend among friends to make explanations. He went as an Imperial officer, and met those whom he recognised as the Government of Stellaland, although they were living in the Transvaal; and he transacted official business with them. Specifically, he renewed, so far as he was concerned, an engagement which the other side held to have lapsed. What he did, however, never received the approval of the Special Commissioner, for whom he was acting.

Reuter's telegram, with its announcement concerning Mr. Rhodes's promise to ratify all land-claims in the Stellaland land-register—the study of a map of Stellaland made by a Stellaland official, and regarded in Stellaland as representing more or less correctly what the land-register stated in words and numbers—the fact that the words in a land-register conveyed no adequate idea of what they represented on the ground, while this chart showed plainly that Stellaland claims were impinging on the Barolong country to the north—at once aroused the suspicion of an officer with the exact training of the Royal Engineers. It was in vain that the High Commissioner declared that they were not responsible for the map—only for upholding the words in the land-register. What if the words in the land-register were correctly represented by the map? What if, by agreeing blindly to the land-register of the freebooters of Stellaland, we were giving away even more than was indicated in the map? So the Special Commissioner, who up to this time had received no report whatever from Mr. Rhodes, telegraphed to the High Commissioner on the 16th January:—

"In the meantime Rhodes's promises, if as stated by Reuter, should not be approved" (4432, 7).

The High Commissioner, on receipt of this opinion from the Special Commissioner, telegraphed to Mr. Rhodes:—

"We are of course bound by agreement of 8th September to recognise titles issued and registered by Stellaland Government before that date; but Warren thinks, and I concur, it is undesirable for you to endorse titles until their genuineness is ascertained" (4432, 11).

To Sir Charles Warren, however, the High Commissioner replied:—

"I consider we are bound by Rhodes's agreement of 8th September last, which has been adopted by you in your telegram to Niekerk and approved by me and the Secretary of State. It runs as follows:—'That the land-titles issued by the Government of Stellaland be recognised.' We cannot go behind this whether it is good or bad."

The Secretary of State had of course been informed of the telegram of the 6th December to Van Niekerk sent by Sir Charles Warren from Capetown, and of Mr. Rhodes's meeting with "Van Niekerk and all the principal leaders" on the 24th December, and how "they had unanimously resolved to carry out settlement of 8th September." Lord Derby, on the 3d January, going of course on the information before him, "fully approved" of adhering to the settlement of 8th September. It was approved by the High Commissioner and Special Commissioner—why should he object? When, therefore, after his arrival in Barkly West, the Special Commissioner begins to come into contact with Stellalanders and men fresh from Stellaland, and is astounded at the misinformation which he received in Capetown, the first questionings of a resolute and upright mind, determined at all hazards to find out the truth and to act according to instructions, are confronted with the authority of the Secretary of State, of the High Commissioner, and of the Special Commissioner himself, when he initialled the unworthy telegram to Van Niekerk of the 6th December!

At Barkly West Sir Charles was on the highway to and from Stellaland. Every day men came to welcome him; and bitterly complained of misrepresentation, breach of Imperial engagements in Stellaland, and the throwing away of the proffered submission and loyalty of the Europeans who had settled in Stellaland. Travellers in no way connected with Stellaland themselves, but who had recently passed through it, gave the same account. It was declared

that the Stellaland movements of Mr. Rhodes had nothing to do with the Imperial objects of the Protectorate, except as adapted to local Cape politics. On the 16th January the Special Commissioner telegraphed to the High Commissioner:—

"I hear that the loyals in Stellaland, in protected territory, comprise more than half of the population, and are all against Niekerk and his government, who are living on the Transvaal side, and afraid to go into Vryburg" (4432, 7).

To this the High Commissioner contented himself by replying that—

"If so-called loyals in Stellaland comprised more than half of the population, they can turn out Niekerk and his government and put in their own men" (4432, 8).

Perhaps this appeared to Sir Charles a somewhat cool way of receiving an important statement concerning the standing of the Imperial Government in Stellaland,—a statement which was in direct antagonism to the information supplied to him on the subject in Capetown. On the same day Sir Charles complained that the action of Mr. Rhodes was—

"Causing serious complication, and must lead to civil war if not controlled. He should be told at once to take all orders from me" (4432. 8).

It was the Special Commissioner's impression that when Mr. Rhodes went forward from Capetown he would report to him and take orders from him, and merely hold the position till he (Sir Charles) arrived, otherwise he would not have consented to his going (4432, 119). This was certainly not Mr. Rhodes's impression; while the High Commissioner seemed to think it enough to transact the business through Mr. Rhodes, and at intervals, send statements of what was done to the Special Commissioner. On being requested by Sir Charles to send a copy of the instructions under which Mr. Rhodes was working, the High Commissioner replied that Mr. Rhodes had received no written instructions from him.

"He was simply instructed verbally to carry out agreement of 8th September and endeavour to keep the peace in Stellaland and Manko-

roane's country, pending your arrival in Bechuanaland. He was also told to communicate with me through you, when you were accessible, and when communicating with me direct, to send you copies" (4432, 9).

This, at least, is a very fair statement of what Mr. Rhodes should have been told, but is quite opposed to Mr. Rhodes's view of the case. On the 5th January Mr. Rhodes telegraphed to the Special Commissioner—

"The Governor will send you copies of my telegrams and correspondence" (4432, 120).

As nothing was in writing, Mr. Rhodes must have forgotten these important directions of the High Commissioner —so necessary to be observed with honour and open-mindedness by a person endeavouring to fill the delicate position which he then occupied. The High Commissioner did not agree to Sir Charles's request to place Mr. Rhodes under the Special Commissioner's orders, but offered to withdraw Mr. Rhodes altogether (4432, 8).

The general result of what took place by the manœuvre of the 6th December is well brought out by the way in which Mr. Rhodes now writes to the High Commissioner concerning Sir C. Warren's position. Mr. Rhodes hears that President Kruger was on his way to meet the Special Commissioner, and that Mr. van Niekerk would also be present. Mr. Rhodes thought his presence at the interview would be helpful to Sir C. Warren, but first addressed the High Commissioner to find out "if he had sanctioned the meeting between the Special Commissioner and President Kruger." Of course Mr. Rhodes had read the Special Commissioner's instructions and Commission. Another instance shows still more clearly how the matter now stood in Mr. Rhodes's mind. Mr. Gey van Pittius was on a pilgrimage along with his Bestuur. They were all humble enough now, and came to Van Niekerk that he might intercede with Mr. Rhodes, who in turn might help them with Sir Charles Warren. A ladder is thus ascended, one rung after another, and Van Pittius hoped thus step by step to reach the Special Commissioner. Sir Charles replied that he did not want to see Van Pittius; but Van Niekerk of

course was helpful—writing not only to Mr. Rhodes, but also to the High Commissioner, possibly surmising that Mr. Rhodes had not forgotten the discourteous treatment which he had received from Mr. van Pittius at Rooi Grond. This was true; Mr. Rhodes was indeed so strongly opposed to showing any consideration whatever for Mr. van Pittius, that in a telegram to the High Commissioner he suggested that Sir Hercules should "*decline to allow* Sir Charles Warren to see Gey!" (4432, 7). These words explain a good deal.

If the reader has followed intelligently the unpleasant events just narrated, he will not be surprised to hear that I received a message at Capetown on the 16th January, informing me that Sir Charles Warren would be glad if I could come to Barkly West at once, as he considered my presence there of great importance. I started the same day, but went first to Government House to take leave of the High Commissioner. I found Sir Hercules Robinson had left for Wynberg, where he was staying at that time, so I left a note. The High Commissioner was, of course, aware (as is the reader) that Sir Charles had known me before in Bechuanaland; and I did not regard it as in any way wonderful that he should ask for my assistance again. Perhaps nothing proves more clearly the change which had taken place in the views and methods of the High Commissioner than that he should have requested Sir Charles Warren when in Capetown "not to inform Mr. Mackenzie of the purport of the telegram of the 6th December, or to let him know that Mr. Rhodes was to return to Bechuanaland previous to his departure from Capetown" (4432, 119). Sir Charles was, however, informed that Mr. Rhodes's agreement "did not substantially differ" from that made by me. It was, no doubt, supposed that this would be a recommendation to it in Sir Charles's mind. But, as the reader knows, the statement itself was incorrect and misleading.

With reference to the request that I should not be informed concerning the telegram of the 6th December, I have no hesitation in saying that I am very sorry that such singular advice should have been given by Sir Hercules Robinson to

the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland; and equally sorry that Sir Charles Warren should have followed it, although I am not surprised that he did so. The reader will not misinterpret my meaning when I say that I have no doubt in the world that half an hour of my company with the select circle in Government House on the 6th December would have had, as the doctors say, the most beneficial effect—acting as a gentle alterative and sedative to Sir Charles's too eager advisers, and giving the Special Commissioner the advantage of the observation and experience of yet another mind. Had I been permitted to share in this interesting interview, the facts of Stellaland history would have been brought out then, as Sir Charles afterwards found them on the spot. The simple facts of the case, plainly stated, would have probably taken away all idea of urgency, and it is not unlikely that a letter rather than a telegram would have acquainted Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey, and the other officers to whom Mr. Rhodes had yielded the government of Stellaland, that no change in the affairs of that country would take place till after the arrival of the Special Commissioner; and that he hoped then to meet all friends of the Protectorate. Urgency and one-sidedness, however, had their perfect work at the interview in question, so that Sir Charles, when he afterwards referred to his treatment on that occasion, did so with indignation, declaring that "he had been virtually debarred from forming any sound opinion as to affairs in Bechuanaland while in Capetown" (4432, 119). But the information which I should have been happy to give at Capetown I was ready to give to Sir Charles Warren elsewhere, when requested by him to do so; and it was prompted by this feeling that I left Capetown for Barkly West.

I have stated candidly and without ill-feeling my own opinion concerning the "urgent advice" tendered to Sir Charles Warren by Sir Hercules Robinson on the 6th December. There can be no doubt that in this deplorable incident we have the true cause of the estrangement and unpleasant relations which afterwards subsisted between the two Commissioners, with the consequent loss to the Imperial service.

A fair consideration of what happened, as narrated in the Bluebooks by Sir Hercules Robinson himself, leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that the responsibility for the incident rests with Sir Hercules Robinson. Of course the act of initialling a certain telegram was Sir Charles Warren's, and he is responsible for that act; but the prior and general responsibility for the line of conduct and of policy then pursued rests with Sir Hercules Robinson, who was then in charge of what was called the Protectorate of Bechuanaland. As much interest has been shown in this matter in this country, and many questions have been put to me on the subject, I have endeavoured to make the matter plain. Her Majesty's Government may learn from this incident a lesson as to loosely-defined appointments and overlapping responsibilities; while officers in Her Majesty's service ought to beware of such urgent advice as was tendered on the 6th December, by Sir Hercules Robinson to Her Majesty's recently-appointed Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland, before the latter had even reached the scene of his mission.



ON THE VAAL, NEAR BARKLY WEST.

CHAPTER IV

SIR CHARLES WARREN AND PRESIDENT KRUGER AT FOURTEEN STREAMS

BARKLY WEST is a small frontier Colonial town, built on the northern bank of the Vaal River. On the opposite side stands the site of Peniel, one of the earliest diamond-mining towns, at the time when Barkly West was known by its earlier name of Klipdrift. Diamonds are still found at Peniel, and also occasionally in Barkly West itself. The "river stones," as they are called, are usually more valuable than those found in "dry diggings" or mines. The banks of the Vaal River, which are well wooded in this neighbourhood, have many picturesque spots formed by the frequent windings of the river. In the course of years these beautiful river-banks will probably be occupied by residences of men of business from Kimberley, when once the railway makes the intervening 25 miles of journey to occupy less time than at present. As the old name implies, there is a stony "drift" or ford near the town where waggons used to cross when the river was not in flood. A pont or floating-bridge was added when traffic increased, which enabled people to cross at all times, whether there was much or little water in the river. The next improvement was the erection by a company of a very fine bridge across the Vaal River near Barkly West, so that the old stony ford and the floating-bridge are equally disused, and the new bridge on its rocky piers is alone in use. It is well known that Mr. John Paddon, of the enterprising firm of Hill and Paddon, of Barkly West, has shown singular energy and public spirit in the erection of

this bridge, which, I am informed, is so strongly constructed as to be capable of bearing the weight of railway traffic, should the northward railway line cross the Vaal at this point. The river scene, with Barkly West in the background, is from a photograph taken near this bridge.

As it was resolved to place the reserved stores at Barkly West in an entrenched camp, a fort was designed by Lieutenant-Colonel A. G. Durnford, commanding the Royal Engineers, and built just outside the town, on the site of some old diamond "diggings"—if, indeed, mining among stones and pebbles with hardly any soil can be called "digging." The town of Barkly West is in fact rather disfigured by the immense number of loose stones of every shape and size which are to be found on all sides. The well-built and sightly fort was held to be ornamental, as well as necessary from a precautionary point of view. The town population, though small in number, were all of one mind in their loyalty; and it was arranged that in case of disturbance the inhabitants themselves were to do picket duty on one side of the town, while the troops protected the rest of it. The garrison consisted of a company of the Royal Scots. A troop of the 3d Mounted Rifles occupied the stages between Barkly West and Taung, and forwarded all despatches both ways.

The camp of the Bechuanaland Expedition was a short distance from the village, but Sir Charles and his staff had quarters in Barkly West. The house which the General and Special Commissioner used as headquarters was built on the high bank of the Vaal, and from it good views of the river could be obtained.

The following description of headquarters in Barkly West appeared in a Colonial paper, and was written by a veteran Colonial journalist, who had known Sir Charles while Administrator of Griqualand West:—

"When one writes of 'headquarters' in a town people are apt to picture to themselves quarters in which every luxury in life abounds. In their mind's eye they see the General in full uniform, decorated with medals, stretched out one-half of the day on a couch smoking his hookah, and reading the last novel, in a well-furnished house, with walnut suite and choice works of art, pictures and sculpture decorating

the walls; and spending the other half over breakfast, luncheon, and dinner, feasting with his staff on all the luxuries that the season affords, and many that come with no season in this part of the world. As, for instance, turtle-soup, sent out from Birch's; native oysters—real Colchester natives, born to their vinegar only and pepper, tinned at Colchester, and despatched direct; champagne from the maker, iced by Dallamore; chicken and asparagus, grouse, snipe, and pheasants, and so on, hermetically sealed in England, and landed on the banks of the Vaal as fresh as if all had been served up in the ordinary way at the United Service Club. Alas! The picture is very unlike what is presented to those who call on the General at his Barkly quarters, which are the old house in which Judge Barry once lived, and which has been allowed to fall altogether into decay; the walls in no room have any of the whitewash or wall-paper left, that once made the place look bright and tolerably residable. The wattle and daub in some rooms, and the stonework in others, break the monotony of whitewash and paper, which are only to be seen in patches. The furniture and household appliances consist of two long tables; one is covered with notebooks, manuscripts, a revolver or two, a few cartridges, bits of leather-strap, a sixpenny bottle of ink, three pencils, four paper collars, two walking-sticks, and a bottle that has been used as a candle-stick, with a bit of candle still sticking out of its mouth. The other table is for meals at meal-time, and used, when there is nothing in the eating line going forward, for brushing and packing clothes on, and doing the odds and ends of work essential to military campaigning. There is never a chair to be seen; chairs are too great luxuries, according to General Warren's notion, for soldiers on the war-path. The General sits on his own clothes-box when he has to write, and which he makes high enough for him to reach his writing-table by piling up a lot of old clothes upon it. When a visitor, particularly distinguished, calls on him, he is asked to take a seat, and he accepts the offer, and an empty ammunition-box is handed him. Sir Bartle Frere, who is on the staff, does the polite most usually, and asks the visitor to 'please excuse the chair,' for they really have not one in the establishment. When the staff are tired of standing, they clear off the corners of the tables and perch themselves upon them. Their cooking and eating appliances consist of one saucepan, a tea-kettle, and a gridiron; their dinner and breakfast services do not go beyond a meat dish, half a dozen plates, the same number of knives and forks, six tea-cups and saucers, and I don't believe there is a tea-pot; but I have a notion they boil their tea in a kettle, or make it in a jug; and I may mention that both breakfast and dinner services are of tin and enamelled ware. There is but the General and his staff here, but they look as jolly and in as vigorous health as can be imagined, or as could be wished."

This friendly and pleasant description was of course never meant to be taken seriously, and no one laughed more heartily over it when first published in the local paper than

the General's A.D.C., Captain Sir Bartle Frere, whose department was thus described, or rather caricatured.

I arrived at Barkly West on the evening of the 19th January, taking up my quarters at the house of my old friend, the Rev. Wm. Ashton. Sir Charles Warren on the following day informed the High Commissioner:—

"Mackenzie is here, and will be able to give me much information which I have been unable to obtain from other sources."

The High Commissioner expressed no opinion on this telegram, but hearing from Sir Charles that Mr. Rhodes was also coming to see the Special Commissioner, the High Commissioner replied that—

"He was very glad that Rhodes was coming to see Sir Charles at once. Being clear-headed, honest, and quite disinterested, as well as fresh from Stellaland, he will be able to furnish you with more reliable information as to the present position there than you will be able to obtain from any other source" (4432, 13).

It seemed quite impossible for the High Commissioner to perceive that it was because he had received an amount of reliable information about Stellaland and Bechuanaland that Sir Charles had resolved to send for me. "Every one is asking for you," I was informed while still in Capetown. My testimonials were now from Bechuanaland rather than from Sir Hercules Robinson, although up to this time he had not written a single word against me. I do not think there can be any harm in stating the first matter on which Sir Charles Warren consulted me at Barkly West. It was about the awkward position of Mr. Rhodes in Stellaland, administering the affairs of a country a large number of the inhabitants of which, Sir Charles had now ascertained, were opposed to him, as he had persistently ignored and insulted them, and had handed them over to the mercies of the Transvaal party. Sir Charles had already asked that Mr. Rhodes might be placed under his orders; the High Commissioner, in reply, had offered to withdraw him. After hearing the circumstances under which Mr. Rhodes had been reappointed at Capetown, I thought that, as he had been recommended by the High Commissioner to go into

Bechuanaland, Sir Charles should do nothing to alter that arrangement. If there had been a misapprehension at Capetown, and Mr. Rhodes should refuse to take orders from the Special Commissioner, or should the High Commissioner decline to give his sanction to this, the matter would be different. But my view was that, if possible, the services of Mr. Rhodes should be retained by Sir Charles, for the reason that he personally enjoyed the confidence of the High Commissioner.

After Mr. Rhodes's arrival in Barkly West, this question was happily settled by Mr. Rhodes himself telegraphing to the High Commissioner, and requesting to be allowed to take orders from Sir Charles Warren, as the dual control did not answer. In reply, the High Commissioner said :—

"I hope you will see the thing through. Warren has no power under his Commission to appoint a Deputy, but I have no objection, if you are both agreed, to your receiving your instructions from him and reporting to him direct."

Another matter was also happily settled under Sir Charles Warren's auspices after the arrival of Mr. Rhodes at Barkly West. A short time before leaving Capetown I had been challenged by some, and invited by others, to give in the newspapers my opinion of the proposed Goshen settlement of the Cape Ministers, which was generally condemned, but supported by the branches of the Afrikander Bond. With considerable reluctance, I had commenced to give a plain and straightforward account of recent events in Bechuanaland. The series of letters was interrupted by the telegram from Barkly West, and was never completed. It is a fact that many unfounded charges made against me in pamphlets, speeches, and public despatches have never been replied to by me, owing to the pressure of other and, I hope, better employment. I took occasion in the first of those Capetown letters to expose some glaringly inaccurate statements (incidentally favourable to Mr. Rhodes), made in a letter to the chief Mankoroane by Mr. Donovan, Barkly West, whose name has already appeared in these pages. In the course of my remarks I mentioned that Mr. Donovan and Mr. Rhodes were intimate personal friends, and that it

had been stated that Mr. Donovan had been reinstated as chief's agent with Mr. Rhodes's approval. I mentioned also that there was a "big thing" in land speculation in Bechuanaland. The editor of the *Cape Times*, the paper in which these remarks had appeared, in commenting upon them, said:—

"With regard to Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Mackenzie has never, even by insinuation, charged him with complicity in a land-jobbing scheme. That land-jobbing schemes are on foot in Bechuanaland there can be no reasonable doubt, and it is quite possible that the promoters of such schemes should think to curry favour with Mr. Rhodes for their own ends, and even to a certain extent succeed without awakening his suspicion. We do not know that any suggestion in Mr. Mackenzie's letters went even so far as this, but we are very sure that no word of his was fairly open to any construction inconsistent with Mr. Rhodes's personal honour."

But a Diamond Fields paper had gone beyond my statements, and charged Mr. Rhodes with being himself connected with land speculation; and it was of this article that Mr. Rhodes complained. Of course I was not responsible for the views of another writer, nor, indeed, did I agree with his view. It was not unnatural that Mr. Rhodes, who was Member of Parliament for Barkly West, should be as friendly with his constituents as circumstances would admit; and it was quite well known that a few more of these constituents, greater and less than Mr. Donovan, were interested in Bechuanaland land affairs.

Mr. Rhodes took exception to the statement that he was a personal friend of Mr. Donovan, and in proof declared to me that he had never dined at Mr. Donovan's house, nor had he invited Mr. Donovan to dine with him. As to the intimacy, he explained that it was sought entirely by Mr. Donovan, and he gave me to understand that to him it amounted to a nuisance. While declining all responsibility for the newspaper's statements, I said that if Mr. Rhodes would address a letter to me, and state what he then said about the one-sidedness of the connection between him and Mr. Donovan, I should have pleasure in withdrawing what I had said about their friendship; and I would also state, as I had already done in conversation, that it was

not my opinion that he was personally interested in land claims in Bechuanaland. Accordingly Mr. Rhodes wrote his letter of explanation as to his connection with Mr. Donovan, and I wrote an answer withdrawing my statement about Mr. Rhodes's personal friendship with that gentleman; and made it quite clear that I was not, and had not been, of opinion that Mr. Rhodes was personally interested in land claims in Bechuanaland. Mr. Rhodes expressed himself as satisfied, and Sir Charles Warren, to whom the matter had been submitted by common consent, pronounced that the affair would be satisfactorily concluded by the publication of the letters. The letters were accordingly sent for publication, and appeared in Kimberley under the heading "Mr. Rhodes's Vindication." There could be no doubt that Mr. Rhodes was pleased with the settlement; he came to me and said so, grasping my hand, and expressing very kind wishes as to our future co-operation. In fact, it was speedily announced in the village that Sir Charles Warren, Mr. Rhodes, and Mr. Mackenzie had made everything right, and had agreed to work together. The statement found its way into the papers—"Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Mackenzie were now cordially co-operating with the Special Commissioner."

I should scarcely have troubled the reader with this affair —which I believe is the only one of the kind with which I have been connected—had it not been for the after-treatment of the matter by Mr. Rhodes. After his separation from Sir Charles Warren, and his retirement from Bechuanaland—events which took place during my absence from headquarters—Mr. Rhodes, dating from Capetown, wrote a long official report of his doings in Bechuanaland; and in his account of this affair at Barkly West suppressed all mention of an honourable settlement under the auspices of Sir Charles Warren, with which he had expressed his satisfaction at the time, but declared that, although I had grossly attacked his character, he had let the matter drop in the interests of the public service! (4432, 86).

On the 19th January, inquiry was made by the Imperial Secretary as to whether Sir C. Warren wished to

retain the services of Mr. Wright, Assistant Commissioner at Mafiking, who had requested and obtained permission to proceed to Barkly West to meet the Special Commissioner :—

"Our money," said the Imperial Secretary, "is running short, and if he is not required, his services might be dispensed with from the end of the month" (4432, 11).

The reader will remember the circumstances under which Mr. Wright was appointed, the good service which he had rendered, his capture under a flag of truce and imprisonment by the freebooters. Residing afterwards for a time in the Transvaal, he had been requested to supply information to Mr. Rhodes regarding the charges of cruelty by the Boers, which was at once published along with his name. As he fearlessly collected and forwarded reliable evidence which told heavily against the character of the freebooters, Mr. Wright became very unpopular with the enemies of the Imperial Government. Having obtained from him these important services, in rendering which he had made himself odious to the lower classes in the Transvaal, where he had been looking forward to practise as a law-agent, the Imperial Secretary proposed on the score of economy to turn him adrift! It was a good thing for the name of the Imperial Government at this crisis that such ideas of common justice or policy were treated with the contempt which they deserved. The Imperial Secretary was informed that "Mr. Wright's services were required for the present"; and it will be seen that Sir Charles was soon able to employ Mr. Wright in a way more calculated to raise the Imperial name and authority than the summary dismissal of a deserving officer who had rendered peculiar service in circumstances of peril.

The changed attitude of Her Majesty's Government implied in sending out the Expedition, and the rapidity with which it had been conveyed to the banks of the Vaal, as well as the healthy public spirit which was inducing colonists to come forward as volunteers, were in themselves events of the utmost value to the Imperial Government and to South Africa at this crisis in its history. The large number which had already assembled, and the rumours of many more troops on their way, excited considerable misgiving—

especially in the Transvaal. For several years, as the reader knows, the attitude of the Transvaal had been anything but satisfactory, until the culminating insults to England were perpetrated of attacking the people in the Protectorate, and then annexing their country to the Transvaal. Having to answer for these things to a Special Commissioner, who was also at the head of a force, and who was well known personally for his fair-dealing, sympathy, and straightforwardness, President Kruger thought it well not to allow events to take their course on the western border of the Transvaal, and resolved himself to pay a visit to the disturbed districts. I have not often been able to approve of the President's line of action, but it gives me pleasure to do so now, and to mention that I have no doubt that the course which he at this time pursued was for the good of the country, and was undertaken by him with the earnest desire of preventing an actual conflict. Accompanied by Dr. Leijds, his able Attorney-General, and Mr. J. N. de Villiers, the President went first to Rooi Grond and harangued the freebooters there. He was reported to have told them that they must submit to the decision of others, and no longer take the law into their own hands. He was on his way to meet General Warren, and would do for them what he could. But if they created a disturbance, he also would be against them as well as the General. Let the cry "Shoot the Englishman" no more be heard, or "*Verdomde* Englishman." Such cries were treasonable, wicked, and foolish. Speaking expressly to his own burghers, he said, "Do not interfere in this matter, I warn you; do not stick your brand in this fire. If your own brother wants to go to Goossen, prevent him; if he persists, give up his name and he shall be punished according to law." These were sound words, and they were spoken by President Kruger. Why were they not spoken years before? They were spoken and they were obeyed now because the party of order in South Africa had secured the help of the Imperial Power, and Sir Charles Warren was at Barkly West. Sir Charles declined to meet the President at Christiana, or indeed to enter the Transvaal; but hearing that there was a Transvaal law prohibiting the President

from leaving the country without the sanction of the Volksraad, which was not then sitting, he agreed that the meeting should take place on the border, a short distance within the Transvaal, at a place called Fourteen Streams, from a series of gentle falls in the Vaal River in the neighbourhood. In order, if possible, to arrest the actions of ill-disposed persons who were endeavouring to foment distrust and strife, and to produce a feeling of confidence throughout the country, Sir Charles informed Sir John Brand, President of the Free State, of the intended meeting at Fourteen Streams, where the Free State, Transvaal, and Cape Colony converge; and invited him to be present if he could make it convenient. Sir John and his Executive Council thought it was not expedient for them to attend that meeting, but a good many Free State burghers came to see Sir Charles, as they were personally known to him.

On the morning of the day on which the Special Commissioner left Barkly West for the Transvaal border he informed the High Commissioner that—

"Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Mackenzie were going to accompany him."

The High Commissioner made the following remarks upon this resolution of Sir Charles:—

"I presume, in determining to take Mackenzie with you, you have not overlooked the fact that, like myself, he is not a *persona grata* to the Transvaal Government, and that they have officially protested against his employment, and urged that his presence closed the way to Transvaal co-operation in settlement of border difficulties (see p. 46 of 4213); however unjust this may be, I fear his presence with you, if he shows, will not increase your chances of doing any good with Kruger" (4432, 17).

This was a case in which the judgment of the Special Commissioner differed on a matter of local policy from that of the High Commissioner; and the event abundantly justified Sir Charles's action. President Kruger from the first treated me with respect, and volunteered the remark during the interviews that their objection to me as Deputy Commissioner was that I had been appointed before the ratification of the Convention by the Volksraad. This was not a sincere statement, but it was indicative of the fact that they

had no ground for objection to me beyond my devotion to the interests of the Imperial Government and of the Cape Colony, as distinct from those of the Transvaal.

The General and Special Commissioner with his staff left Barkly West on the 22d January, in order to meet President Kruger at Fourteen Streams, near Blignout's Pont, on the 24th. An escort of nearly two hundred men of the Inniskilling Dragoons and Methuen's Horse accompanied the General. Sir Charles Warren, as I learned, took this large escort for several reasons. Dark hints had reached headquarters that to "pot Warren" was regarded in certain quarters as a most advisable move. Every one in South Africa was agreed that in the circumstances of the country this would have been a deadly blow to the reawakened party of order at that time. Then Sir Charles's mind was deeply impressed with the unreliable nature of the past communications of the Transvaal Government with Her Majesty's Government concerning Bechuanaland. Above all, there was the attack on the Protectorate—when its people were robbed and shot down—followed by the annexation of Montsioa's country to the Transvaal, which was announced directly to the Secretary of State, the High Commissioner being ignored and passed over.

Such were probably some of the reasons which induced Sir Charles Warren to resolve to show in a quiet but unmistakable way his disapprobation of the past and distrust of the present attitude of the Transvaal. General Warren therefore proceeded to the place of meeting with studied circumspection and precaution. Scouts moved in advance, skirmishers occupied the country for a considerable distance on either side of the road, and in this way the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland arrived at Fourteen Streams. The camp of Her Majesty's Special Commissioner here was about two miles from the place of meeting. President Kruger was escorted by fifty of the State Artillery. As Sir Charles approached the beacon showing the boundary-line of the Cape Colony and the Transvaal, President Kruger, State-Attorney Leijds, Mr. J. N. de Villiers, and Commandant Henning Pretorius advanced to meet him. Sir Charles

was now accompanied only by officers of his personal staff, and by Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Wright, and myself. When Mr. Rhodes afterwards came to review this meeting—having in the meantime separated from Sir Charles—he declared that this expression of "distrust on the part of Sir Charles was deeply wounding, and justly so, to the susceptibilities of Mr. Kruger and the officers of his Government by whom he was accompanied"! (4432, 87) Thus do men put on record their own complete want of insight or their bitterness of spirit.

Our situation at Fourteen Streams—within the Cape Colony and yet within touch of the Free State, the Transvaal, and Bechuanaland—was suggestive enough to the thoughtful mind. My attention had already been directed to this locality, and I was glad of this opportunity of visiting it. The ground lying for many miles north of the Vaal, and in the fork between that river and the Hart River, is most of it low-lying as compared with the bed of the Vaal River at Fourteen Streams; and this large district therefore is capable of irrigation. The Vaal has already been utilised in this way on its left bank, and the rising township of Warrenton is characterised by its fruitful and well-kept gardens and fields, with the produce of which Kimberley market is regularly supplied. But the district to which I specially refer is near Warrenton, but on the right bank of the river. It is admirably adapted for a European city; or for a series of colonists' holdings, after the necessary and not extensive work has been accomplished connected with the leading out from the river of a canal or water furrow. If South Africa is to have its Ottawa rather than its Washington, then the site of that Ottawa is no doubt the district through part of which Sir Charles Warren had just travelled on his way to Fourteen Streams. I was so impressed with the importance of this part of the country, that I had already directed to it the attention of Mr. Forster. Then I could not but remember that the Colonial Border Commission of 1882, which had been sent to report on the northern Colonial boundary, reported to the Cape Parliament that the Colony had obtained some seventy farms more than was just, from the land of the

Batlaping; and the Commission proposed that the rest of the Batlaping country should be annexed to the Cape Colony, so that some part of what remained might be saved to the natives. This, however, was not agreed to by the Cape Parliament, the majority in which seemed to be disinclined to interfere with the Transvaal pretensions to the ownership of Bechuanaland. It is important, however, to bear in mind the very grave statement of this Colonial Commission, that seventy farms—in other words, some 400,000 acres of land belonging to the Batlaping, that is to say, to the Imperial Colony of Bechuanaland—were wrongly joined to the Cape Colony by its present northern boundary. In these circumstances it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the irrigable district to which I have referred, being in the same neighbourhood, and formerly Batlaping country, should be handed over by the Cape Government to Her Majesty's Imperial Government for Imperial or general purposes, which might include the introduction of suitable immigrants and the laying out of a European town. In general, I do not conceive it to be my duty to advocate the claims of certain places any more than of certain persons. What I do wish, however, is to make known to the English and Colonial politician the capabilities of this very important district of country. This is all the more necessary that leave has lately been asked of the Colonial Government to grant certain privileges to a Company who desire to possess themselves of the district in question. The work required ought not to be handed over to a Company—it ought to be done by Government; and the suggestion given above is, in the circumstances, not an unfair one to the Cape—indeed it would be beneficial to it in many ways.

The interview between Sir Charles Warren and President Kruger on Saturday, the 25th January, lasted several hours. A good spirit prevailed, differences of opinion were calmly stated, and the great object of the meeting was steadily kept in view—namely, a satisfactory settlement. The Saturday meeting might be described as an introductory one, at which the whole question was freely discussed, but no conclusions pressed for on either side. There was no interview on the

intervening Sunday. At the General's camp there was church parade, and there were many visitors to Sir Charles from the Free State. There were a good many complaints of stock-thefts—strange to say, no longer the monotone sounded by Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower against Mankoroane, but against people who were making Stellaland their headquarters. It seemed that the farmer who brought the President's message concerning the meeting was riding Mankoroane's favourite riding-pony, recently stolen from him (4432, 17). The meeting on Monday brought to a successful conclusion the interview between the Special Commissioner and the President.

At the Saturday meeting Mr. Rhodes commenced the business by informing the President that he was now working under Sir Charles Warren. He then stated that "one great difficulty in his work had always been that part of Stellaland which fell into the Transvaal by the London Convention. Although he knew at the time that it no longer belonged to Stellaland, he had been compelled at times to send police into this part for stolen cattle" (4432, 26). The President acquiesced, and said he had told the people of that district that the boundary-line would soon be marked off. Sir Charles said it would be necessary for each side to appoint a Commissioner in terms of the Convention. But the President had evidently set his heart on another plan, and gave it up very reluctantly. He proposed that Sir Charles should leave his force where they were, as they were not necessary, and their movement must incur great expense. The President proposed that Sir Charles and he should each take an escort of twenty-five men and proceed along the line together, authoritatively fixing the places for the beacons. Mr. van Niekerk would show them the beacons from Kopje Enkel to Pudumo, from thence the General and the President would do the work themselves. Of course, had this little plan been carried through, the equality of the British and Transvaal Governments would have been demonstrated before the eyes of every ignorant borderer, whether black or white.

Sir Charles referred to the reports of secret accessions to

the Goshenites, which the President declared to be quite untrue.

"Suppose," said the General, "I went up with fifty policemen, and when I arrived found that your information was incorrect, what then?"

"If my information is not correct," said President Kruger, "you may never believe me again!"

"I have the interests of the country sufficiently at heart," said Sir Charles, "to think that it is best to take up a force strong enough to enable me to carry through my work without question, and the troops are ready to hand."

President Kruger then pleaded hard for the "rights" of the Goshen volunteers. They had gone through great hardship in acquiring their rights (secured from Moshette by the treaty of 1882), "which were given," said President Kruger, "to the whites as his people, for they went and lived under him."

Sir Charles Warren laid down a doctrine which strikes at the root of freebooting as a means of obtaining native land: "I cannot recognise whites as being the people of any native chief; if they are so considered, they are liable to be put in native locations."

The President also stated that the Rooi Grond people did not knowingly attack the Protectorate.

I reminded the meeting of the announcement of the Protectorate in May last, and described the hostile attitude of the volunteers. If the Protectorate had not been established in May it had not been done since, and thus there was no Protectorate.

President Kruger said that I was sent up prematurely by the Government; they objected to me because the new line had not been agreed to by the Transvaal.

I ventured to explain that the Protectorate and the boundary-line were separate matters, and the Protectorate did not seem to depend upon the ratification of the boundary-line.

Mr. Rhodes remarked that he held General Joubert personally to blame for his own treatment at Rooi Grond,—a statement concerning his local rival which seemed to please rather than displease President Kruger.

General Warren said he recognised no Government at Goshen, and no corporate rights whatever.

Mr. Rhodes, addressing the President, said, "Suppose these people had rights, does not the President think they have forfeited them? Does not the President know that since these rights were obtained these men have been openly engaged in war against Her Majesty's protected subjects? Some of them may not be as guilty as others, but is not any body of men bound by its leaders? The Goshenites did not do as the Stellalanders—sit down quietly and argue their supposed rights, but instead proclaimed war against the Queen's Protectorate—in your own papers too, and insulted the Queen's representatives. I was one of the representatives they last insulted." The reader will observe that Mr. Rhodes here laid down accurately doctrines which ought to have precluded him from submitting to the hostile terms of Van Niekerk and Delarey.

The President replied that he was not pleading for the misdeeds of these people. He wrote to the Rooi Gronders, advising them to do nothing. He was sorry when he heard the way Mr. Rhodes had been treated. It was reported that Joubert encouraged, instead of stilling the combatants, but that he (President Kruger) did not believe.

With reference to grain, said by President Kruger to be now ripening in Goshen, Sir Charles Warren remarked that, considering that it was sown in a country conquered when under our protection, the utmost consideration that he could allow those who had sown in lands thus acquired, was to regard them as squatters, and claim from them one-half the year's crops—the land itself being regarded as native territory. If it could be shown that the cultivation had taken place merely for the sake of establishing a claim to land in our Protectorate, such conduct would vitiate every claim. The people now in Goshen were to evacuate it. Those found there by Sir Charles would be treated as robbers and trespassers, unless there were special reason to the contrary. Individual claims to land would be considered, but not in behalf of any man who had assailed Her Majesty's Protectorate.

Sir Charles Warren announced that Mr. Wright and

two British officers would be sent to Rooi Grond to get the names of the people there; he would then be able to judge of their position.

A very important point was made when President Kruger, pressed by Sir Charles, declared that the western boundary-line of the Transvaal would no longer be regarded as a tentative arrangement as before, but would be observed by the Transvaal Government as finally settled.

In reply to General Warren's question whether the President would assist Her Majesty's Government in the arrest of two men charged with the murder of Mr. Bethell, President Kruger said there was no extradition treaty yet, although it was stated in the Convention that such a treaty should be made. He did not like to promise anything then. He would help the General to the best of his power as far as the law would allow.

Sir Charles Warren impressed upon President Kruger that he would in no way be responsible for the natives on the Transvaal side of the new line, or for any opposition which they might show to the line; and as he had no land for them in the Protectorate, he would not permit them to enter it. It would be for the President to provide for them in the Transvaal. After discussion this was fully understood and agreed to, the President protesting that he could not prevent individuals who chose to do so from crossing into the Protectorate. Thus the responsibility for the peace of the natives living in the disturbed Hart River district was thrown entirely upon President Kruger, to whom, of course, the district had for months belonged.

President Kruger then agreed to assume entire responsibility for the piece of land added to the Transvaal by the new boundary-line, and containing nearly all Mr. Rhodes's Government and friends in what he called Stellaland—a course which showed conclusively that the President was anxious to meet the wishes of the General, and which also simplified Stellaland matters henceforth. The President asked definitely what message was he to take to the people of Goshen? In reply General Warren said those who knew they had no claims should leave the country at once; those who thought

they had claims could wait and have them investigated. As a broad principle he did not recognise any right whatever, but there might be individual claims. In order to prevent any mistake, the General offered to furnish the President with a statement or public notification, which the latter said he would read to the people at Rooi Grond. This was accordingly done, and copies of the notification were forwarded to President Kruger to be circulated by him.

The references to Mr. Gey van Pittius at the meeting were somewhat amusing.

President Kruger explained that in saying, as he had recently done, that Mr. Gey van Pittius on one side of the border, and he (President Kruger) on the other would preserve order, he was merely recognising Mr. van Pittius as Mr. Upington had done. .

"In what light do you look upon Mr. van Pittius now?" inquired the General.

"All on the other side of the line will be British subjects in future," said the President. "I told them so when I saw them lately, and advised them to write or go to see you. I brought them down to Niekerk's Rust that they might be nearer to you and Mr. Rhodes if you should want to see them."

The General mentioned that he had received a letter from a man styling himself Administrator of Goshen, and had written back to Mr. van Niekerk forbidding the people then at Niekerk's Rust from going back to Goshen.

President Kruger said, "This assumption of the style of Administrator was owing to Mr. Upington's visit to Rooi Grond. I told them they should address you as burghers only."

"But they are not burghers as I understand the word," said General Warren. "These men do not belong to the country, but are renegades and waifs at variance with the constituted authorities of the country."

When again asked directly as to the status at that time of Mr. Gey van Pittius in the Transvaal, the President replied, but with evident hesitation, that he was not a burgher—he might be an inhabitant of the Transvaal—he was not a burgher.

General Warren replied that a man could not thus divest himself of his nationality. Mr. Gey van Pittius had been acting in direct opposition to Her Majesty in her Protectorate, and if he had no nationality and was a mere waif, he must consider him as a robber.

President Kruger said the case of Van Niekerk was exactly similar.

The General replied that this was not so, as Gey was allowed to live in the Transvaal at the time that he was making actual war on Her Majesty's Protectorate, and yet was not a burgher of the Transvaal. On this point, however, the President had perhaps more local information than was possessed by the General as to the similarity of Van Niekerk's position to that of Van Pittius.

Sir Charles Warren brought under the notice of President Kruger the facts which had come to his notice of certain meetings which were being held along the Colonial border by those who were disaffected and desirous of war, instancing a meeting taking place that very day within the Colony at a place which he named. The State Attorney, with his European and legal upbringing, said there was no law to prevent these meetings, provided they were conducted in an orderly manner; but the President thought that measures should be taken in both countries to prevent attendance at such gatherings.

At one stage in the interview on Monday, the President said he wanted to consult with Sir Charles privately about a matter. I and others left the room for a short time. It is singular that such a course was adopted in connection with the business which was thus brought forward in private, as it was only the proposition by President Kruger that Mr. van Niekerk should be the Transvaal Boundary Commissioner to co-operate with the Commissioner appointed by Sir Charles Warren. Sir Charles objected to this appointment on the ground that "Mr. van Niekerk was mixed up in the land question too intimately to form an efficient representative." Mr. Rhodes's objection was that "Mr. van Niekerk's duties as Administrator of Stellaland would obviously interfere with his accepting such an office"! The President then said

he would look out for another Commissioner, and the meeting again assumed its more open and formal character. Sir Charles mentioned that Captain Conder, R.E., had been selected by him as representative of the Imperial Government in laying down the line, and that he would be at Kopje Enkel in four days for the purpose of commencing operations.

Thus ended an interview of a most satisfactory character to all who wished well to South Africa. The Transvaal President had been treated with candour, openness, and firmness. With the utmost courtesy Sir Charles Warren had enabled President Kruger to realise his own standing and that of his Government in the eyes of the people of England. He found himself now on the bank of the Vaal River in the same position as that in which he and his fellow-Delegates had found themselves in London. Sir Charles Warren said now what the English Government and English public opinion said then. The contest was in no sense a race contest. It was a struggle for political ascendancy on the part of the Transvaal—in which its inhabitants and its Government had gone to a very offensive length, and were unwilling to admit that they had been foiled. That contest was practically ended at Fourteen Streams. President Kruger declared openly that he was on the side of Her Majesty's Government, and would counsel all whom he met on the border to obey General Warren. So unexpected in some quarters was the tone and result of the meeting that certain extreme papers refused to believe the accuracy of the telegraphic reports of what had happened. There is no doubt that this interview to a great extent brought affairs to a favourable crisis. Great issues had, therefore, depended upon the attitude and conduct of both Sir Charles Warren and President Kruger; and I have myself no doubt that whatever blame may attach to President Kruger for his unsatisfactory attitude, and that of his Government at other times, at Fourteen Streams the President did good service to South Africa. As to Sir Charles Warren, he had now a fair opportunity of showing whether or not he possessed other qualifications than those of a leader of irregular forces; and

the results of the meeting at Fourteen Streams fully justified the action of Her Majesty's Government in also imposing on him civil and political functions. If he had been the man he was described to be by one or two people in Capetown, the interview at Fourteen Streams would have been of a very different nature. The Colonial papers contained warm congratulations on the successful termination of a critical interview. But from other quarters from which friendly congratulation might certainly have been looked for, no cheering word came. They had foreboded evil, and why should good be the result?

A coach which at one time had run between Bloemfontein and Kimberley had been purchased for the use of the General's personal staff—the carriage of rations, blankets, papers, orderlies, and any one on the staff who was knocked up in person or in horseflesh. The coach was gaudily painted, and still announced its former destinations in legible characters on its panels. This coach, with its lively span of mules and its driver with his long whip, with its living freight inside and its bundles of blankets on the top, was a sufficiently picturesque object, and people wishing to visit headquarters were sure they were right when they saw before them the red-painted coach. Mr. Thomas Atkins came to connect the quiet nature of the Expedition in some way with this coach and its papers; and one of the orderlies who usually rode in it was heard to declare, after the meeting at Fourteen Streams, that for his part "he had no idea that he had come to Bechuanaland to assist in a Lord Mayor's show!"

On leaving Fourteen Streams Mr. Rhodes and I found ourselves occupants of the General's coach—I because I had not yet procured a horse, and Mr. Rhodes because his horses had strayed away. "The two Deputy Commissioners" were that day the subject of some amusement to certain members of the staff, who had read something about Bechuanaland, and who now beheld before their eyes proof of our "cordial co-operation under the Special Commissioner." It was pronounced a fortunate thing that Mr. Rhodes's horses had strayed, in order that we might thus

enjoy one another's society in the coach! And certainly, so far as I was concerned, I was in the most "co-operating" mood, and willing to show it in any reasonable way.

The Special Commissioner proceeded from Fourteen Streams to Taung *viâ* Pokwani, having an interview with Botlasitsi Gasebone at the latter place. Here also he met the Rev. H. Bevan, in charge of the mission at Pokwani connected with the Church of England. While acting as Administrator of Griqualand West, Sir Charles had known this hard-working missionary, and was glad to renew his acquaintance. Mr. Bevan is not married, but had a native "boy," who assisted in providing the cup of tea with which his master regaled his visitors. It proved to be an "uncanny" cup. The General took to bed, and when his friend appeared at dinner in the evening, charged the bachelor missionary with poisoning him with "that cup of tea!" Of course had a Mrs. Bevan poured out the tea no such charge would have been made, but this view did not seem to make any impression on the mission priest. Although Botlasitsi had been more or less mixed up with the attacks on Mankoroane, he welcomed Sir Charles Warren into the country.

Next day we met Mankoroane on his way to Barkly West, to meet General Warren. He was delighted to see him again, and said he would now get "sleep," which includes many blessings besides itself. Sir Charles told him he had no time for lengthened interviews just then—the time for palaver had not come yet. The General selected a site for the camp at some distance from the native town, and near the Taung River, which was pronounced by young Englishmen "a fraud" when they saw only pools here and there in a river-bed, and no running water except after heavy rainfall. A spring was found in the neighbourhood of the camp, and an Abyssinian and other pumps were also successfully used here, so that there was no water difficulty, although the large native population had to draw their usual supply. "Johnnie" was the name by which Thomas Atkins addressed himself to every native. "Boy" was always used by volunteers from the Colony when addressing a coloured man. The name of a chief, however, was worth retaining

in memory, or rather, something to remind the Englishman of it. So Mankoroane was dubbed Macaroni "for short," and of course no one forgot that. "I say, Bill, there goes Macaroni—my eye, what a tall hat!"

"Never mind the hat; what a fine horse. But just look how it straddles as if it had a leg too many and couldn't get them right anyhow, while old Macaroni sits quiet on top as if he were in an arm-chair."

"Don't you know," breaks in a Colonial volunteer, "that a horse with that pace can always fetch a higher price if the purchaser is a Dutchman with a heavy corporation and a tender regard for his 'inwards'? That straddle, as you call it, is called *trippling* in Dutch, and all Dutchmen are fond of it. A good *trippelaar* will carry a man nearly six miles an hour, and not feel it much."

I now come to mention a correspondence which took place between Sir Charles Warren and the Ministers of the Cape Colony, concerning certain signs of sedition and danger within the Colony, to which the attention of Sir Charles Warren had been called by people of undoubted character and means of observation. President Kruger had acted well; would he be able to fulfil his own resolves? One or two papers had openly threatened the Expedition in the Colony. No doubt the great body of Colonists were not only quiescent, but thankful in their hearts that such a force, under such a leader, was to establish peace on the northern border of the Colony. But Sir Charles was anxious that the Cape Ministers should in some practical way make it known and felt throughout the Cape Colony that they, like President Kruger, were to be regarded as actively co-operating with Her Majesty's Government. From the outset Sir Charles was careful to limit his charge of active opposition to a small minority, and suggested that if it were judged undesirable to forbid their meetings, they should have the proceedings accurately reported to Government, which, of course, would act as a deterrent. The Special Commissioner remarked that the Ministers were no doubt aware of these meetings from the police reports of the districts in question. On the day on which the telegram of Sir Charles was laid

before them the Ministers replied that they were quite unaware of such meetings, and that no communication on the subject had been made to them by any official. They therefore requested to be placed in possession of any information which Sir Charles might have. But distrust of the stability and ultimate intentions of the Imperial Government showed itself here also, and very strongly. The people who had given the information to Sir Charles, apparently prompted to do so by the worthiest motives, in every case earnestly stipulated that on no account were their names to be sent to Capetown. So Sir Charles was in a fix. He went so far, however, as to particularise a certain district, and further gave the information that "secret meetings, from which loyal persons were excluded, were frequently held only a few miles from our line of communications." Sir Charles recommended that the police should be increased in the northern part of the Colony, and that Kimberley should again be allowed to have a volunteer force for its own defence. Sir Charles was about to proceed northward, representing the party of order in South Africa; he asked, therefore, and not without reason, for the open co-operation of the Ministers entrusted with the Government of the Cape Colony. It is true that as individuals they had protested against his going into Bechuanaland, and looked for evil to result from it; as Ministers they had proposed an alternative policy with reference to Goshen; but their efforts had not secured the approbation of Her Majesty's Government; and Sir Charles had been requested by the Imperial authorities to carry out the policy expressed in his instructions. The situation was no doubt a trying one for the Cape Ministers, but it was one of their own choosing and bringing about, and loyalty and every generous and manly feeling ought to have prompted them to second the efforts of Sir Charles Warren as far as possible, now that the Expedition was on the northern border of the Colony and about to proceed northwards. So important was the matter in the estimation of Sir Charles that he requested that a copy of his telegram should be sent for the information of the General Commanding in South Africa.

Then took place the strangest of all the strange things recorded in these pages. The meetings referred to by Sir Charles were undoubtedly being held as indicated by him. It was also undoubtedly quite possible for the Ministers to find out what Sir Charles knew by asking a few well-directed questions of those who might be presumed to have information on the subject. People who did not wish to be known as having volunteered information concerning disloyal action would not have hesitated to speak out the truth fearlessly if they had been, along with others, formally asked to do so by the Cape Government. This, however, was not done, and a very remarkable attitude was now taken up by the Colonial Ministers towards an Imperial officer, for they asked Sir Charles, through the High Commissioner—

"Whether it was true that the Rev. John Mackenzie, the late Deputy Commissioner of Bechuanaland, was then in the camp of Sir Charles Warren, and personally advising him?" (4432, 20)

I will admit that the "quarter of an hour" after the arrival of that telegram was about the unhappiest in my life. Never in all my wanderings and experiences of different tribes and peoples had I met with such injustice or such meanness. The reader of these pages knows whether I deserved such treatment from any Cape Colonist, and least of all from those Ministers, towards whom, at the time of their greatest unpopularity, I had, when alone in doing so, publicly shown consideration and friendliness. As a matter of fact, I had had nothing whatever to do with those reports, most of which had reached Sir Charles Warren before I joined him. I was inclined at first to disbelieve them, but of course could not do so after the documents were shown to me. In so far, however, as I had any opinion, or exercised any influence at that time, it was exercised (rightly or wrongly) quite in the direction of minimising those reports. And yet here I was formally charged by implication with the fabrication of them! It is no doubt in circumstances such as those in which I was then placed that young men of unformed character make shipwreck of their lives as Christian and unselfish men, losing all confidence in their fellows, and coming to the conclusion that all are adventurers

and opportunists, and that one event happeneth to right-doing and to wrong-doing.

I at once informed Sir Charles that I would leave. "This was the sort of thing which these men had done to me before. I had hoped that my life in the Colony had rendered the repetition of such a mean trick impossible. Now I shall remove myself out of the way of such insult."

"Never think of it," said Sir Charles; "the mistake was your leaving your work before, as you did. I have work for you to do, and hope you will stay and do it. I am master in my own camp, and also in local affairs in Bechuanaland as long as I am in it. I want your assistance." And so on public grounds only I remained at headquarters.

Sir Charles pursued the correspondence, but took no notice of the above question of Ministers, which was then repeated. Sir Charles thought his silence might lead them to pause and consider the unwarranted nature of their interference with the camp of an Imperial officer. Instead of coming to any such salutary thoughts, however, the Cape Ministers now openly accused Sir Charles Warren of having made charges which he was unable to substantiate, and that he hesitated to admit that in making them he was acting on my advice! (4432, 24) Mere surmise is not usually the basis of Ministerial utterances, and the Colonial Ministers were surely not warranted in thus addressing an officer in the position of Sir Charles Warren, who was engaged in a difficult and delicate work for the direct benefit of the Colony. And their mere surmise was absolutely without any foundation or justification whatever. Of course the real question was thus evaded by the Ministers, which was not about Sir Charles Warren's camp, but about secret and seditious meetings in certain parts of the Colony, and about the request of an Imperial officer that special attention should be directed by the Cape Government to the northern part of the Colony, while he proceeded into Bechuanaland. In acting as he did, Sir Charles hoped to counteract this seditious movement before there was any general or definite

understanding among those who were disaffected. The least consideration will show that the action of Sir Charles was essentially pacific. Had he wished for war he would doubtless have taken no notice of the information about these meetings, and allowed the disaffected full opportunity to carry out their plans; and he could always have said in self-justification that the peace of the Colony had not been entrusted to him. It would appear, therefore, that at this time the peace of an English colony was more intelligently upheld by President Kruger and by Sir Charles Warren than by those who, by virtue of their office, were responsible for its tranquillity. We learned afterwards, from sources which we regarded as absolutely reliable, that at the time of this correspondence no hope of a peaceful solution was entertained in influential quarters in Capetown. It was said there was sure to be a fight,—reckless men would begin it, and "Warren was dying for war." And more than this, our information was to the effect that this mode of settlement was really the one which was favoured in certain quarters, only, of course, no responsibility for it must rest on them! What had to be done, therefore, was for each one to endeavour to devolve all blame on some one else, unless, indeed, a common scapegoat could be found on whose devoted name and reputation might conveniently fall the weight of having involved South Africa in war. I thank God that peace was preserved, and I thank Him also for deliverance from the fate to which some men had doomed me. I did not at the time fully understand what I was risking. I had already done my utmost as an individual for the peace of the country and for the preservation of good feeling as between English-speaking and Dutch-speaking men. But had war taken place in Bechuanaland, the Cape Ministers would probably have been joined by the High Commissioner and his personal following, in gravely showing how it had been caused by me; and that which men in their distinguished position gravely declared, would always have been believed by many.

While the correspondence with the Cape Ministers was going on, the Special Commissioner was unceasingly occu-

pied with other important duties, which caused him to return to Barkly West from Taung for a few days—after which, on the 2d February, we finally left the Colony for the north. Mr. Rhodes had also visited Barkly West and Vryburg, from which he proceeded once more to Mr. van Niekerk's farm in the Transvaal, to ensure the attendance at Vryburg of the "Administrator of the Stellaland Republic" when Sir Charles Warren should arrive at that place. A rumour came from Stellaland that my Dutch-speaking friends there were anxious in some way to bear public testimony to their appreciation of my brief work among them. They said they had a great reception for Sir Charles, but they wished also, if possible, in some way to mark their respect for myself. I took every opportunity to discourage anything of the kind, which might lead to misunderstanding on the part of their present Deputy Commissioner.

I was greatly surprised about this time on being informed by Sir Charles Warren that Mr. Rhodes had announced to the Special Commissioner that if I went into Stellaland, he (Mr. Rhodes) would not go! What had happened? What had become of recent hand-shakings and vows of cordial co-operation and good wishes? What of earlier unfavourable reports of my work in Stellaland persisted in for months and repeated in England, against the truth of which I had always protested? Did Mr. Rhodes hope by this method to obtain release from a difficult position, believing that the General would wish me to go on? Or was it that Mr. van Niekerk and his friends had suggested this manœuvre in the hope of cowing the loyal party in Stellaland by the effacement of their friend? I do not know why Mr. Rhodes should have so soon forgotten his pledges and made such a stipulation. But the course of duty was obvious. Mr. Rhodes was accredited; I was now, it would appear, tacitly discredited at Government House. Stellaland, as it then was, was clearly a matter to be dealt with by those who were at the time responsible for it; and so I counted it no hardship to be directed by the Special Commissioner to proceed to Kuruman in Western Bechua-

naland, and report upon the condition of that part of the country. The chief reason why I mention the matter here is to direct the reader's attention to the fact that, from reasons beyond my own control, I was not in Stellaland when the important events of the next chapter took place.

CHAPTER V

SIR CHARLES WARREN IN STELLALAND—ARREST OF VAN NIEKERK—DEPARTURE OF MR. RHODES

SIR CHARLES WARREN arrived at Vryburg on the 7th February. Mr. Rhodes and Mr. van Niekerk from the Transvaal had missed Sir Charles on the road, Mr. Rhodes coming on as far as Taung, where I had the pleasure of spending the evening of the 6th with him before I left for Kuruman. Mr. van Niekerk's horses had failed, as usual, and he spent the night a few miles from Taung. Next day, however, the Administrator of Stellaland and the Deputy Commissioner by rapid riding were able to retrace their steps, and be in Vryburg in time to join those who welcomed the General and Special Commissioner on his entry into Vryburg. Two addresses were presented to Sir Charles—one by the long-ignored inhabitants of Stellaland itself, and the other chiefly from the inhabitants of the eastern district, a great number of whom had, by the recent arrangement with President Kruger, no right to be at Vryburg at all, except as spectators. Sir Charles replied to both addresses in sympathetic language. He said to the people of Stellaland that he trusted to see them more united and enjoying better days. The debts of Stellaland would be inquired into at once, so that some final arrangement might be carried out. The Special Commissioner said also that he was about to call a meeting of Stellalanders for the following Saturday, and hoped to conclude arrangements for proceeding with the elections under the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes. In reply to Mr. van Niekerk's followers, Sir Charles retained

the same friendly tone, but did not mention the affairs of Stellaland, while a word of suitable warning was introduced. He said:—

"I thank you for your hearty expression of welcome. I am aware that, owing to the presence of political agitators and speculators in the country, the mission on which I have been sent has been made use of to try to increase the disturbance, and I am glad to find that you so fully recognise that it has for its object the restoration of peace and order in South Africa. I congratulate you on the views you have enunciated, and on the desire you have expressed for drawing the two white races into a closer bond of friendship; and I feel sure that with such wishes on both sides, we cannot fail to be successful. I can assure you that I will do all in my power to act in a right spirit and to do justice, and I cannot too strongly impress upon you all here to-day the necessity of assisting, not only in word but in deed, in restoring peace to this country; for I can see that the present condition of affairs only tends to enrich a few speculators, and does nothing for the farmers except impoverish them and the country they inhabit" (4432, 139).

It thus became plain that Sir Charles Warren no longer intended to discuss the affairs of the Protectorate with the Hart River party. It was equally evident that Sir Charles was looking forward to co-operation with Mr. Rhodes as Deputy Commissioner.

Sir Charles Warren had been flooded with information by correspondence and personal interview, showing what the past history of the country had really been. What the Stellalanders wanted was an opportunity of again expressing their real sentiments in Vryburg, their only town. Sir Charles Warren was satisfied that the objects of the Expedition and of the Protectorate would not be hindered, but advanced, by the holding of a formal public meeting of Stellalanders, to which all were invited. Accordingly intimation was given that a public meeting would be held at Vryburg on the 14th February, when the Special Commissioner would hear the views of the Stellalanders, and state his own, concerning the affairs of the country.

Sir Charles Warren now spent a week in Vryburg in examining the financial and other affairs of the "some kind" of government which he found in Stellaland, over which Her Majesty's Government had ceased to exercise any

control since my departure from Bechuanaland six months before. In consequence of reports which reached him before his own arrival in Vryburg, the Special Commissioner had directed two officers connected with the Intelligence Department to secure, under Mr. Rhodes's direction, the public documents in the Deeds' Registry and other Government offices. This was accomplished with the concurrence of Mr. van Niekerk. Although Mr. Rhodes obeyed his orders on this occasion, he tells us that he considered the act of the Special Commissioner as a distinct invasion of rights which ought to have been considered inviolable. Things had surely come to a strange pass when the Deputy of the High Commissioner could write thus of the action of Her Majesty's Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland, and apparently hold that the documents connected with that part of Bechuanaland called Stellaland were to be to him as a sealed book!

During the week which intervened before the public meeting, there were discussion and correspondence at Vryburg between Sir Charles and Messrs. Rhodes and Van Niekerk, on the best method of carrying on the affairs of Stellaland until the anticipated annexation to the Cape Colony took place. The matter was also submitted to the High Commissioner by Sir Charles for his recommendation. I have already mentioned that Mr. Rhodes had given it as his opinion to the High Commissioner that it was extremely advisable for Her Majesty's Government to undertake the direct responsibility of the government of Stellaland; he declared on another occasion that "the condition of Stellaland at that time (December) was one of total anarchy," and stated his fear that "the present absence of all government tended to increase the risk of disturbance" (4310, 52). So much for his 8th September arrangement, as carried out in Bechuanaland. When he arrived at Vryburg in January, Mr. Rhodes had promised to the Stellalanders a fresh election of the Bestuur (4310, 58), and explained to them that it was only his absence at Fourteen Streams with Sir C. Warren that had prevented his carrying the elections through. But at that time, as it will be remembered, he "did not know" whether the Hart River district was in Stellaland or not.

Mr. Rhodes, no doubt, got a lesson in geography, among other things, from Sir Charles Warren at Barkly West, and he learned it to such purpose that, when he met President Kruger at Fourteen Streams, he thought it his duty to tender an explanation of his action (if not an apology for it), in having sent policemen into the Hart River district, although it was not part of the Protectorate! This was all very good as to sending policemen into the district after stolen cattle. The President at once accepted his explanation. But it was not so much what Mr. Rhodes sent into this district of the Transvaal, as what he brought out of it. It was there that Mr. Rhodes had founded his brand-new Republic, with its Administrator and Executive. Of course these officials would no longer be available—they were now, alas! in the Transvaal. The fact was, as Sir Charles had pointed out (from what Stellalanders and others had told him while he was still at Barkly West), the opponents of Van Niekerk and the Hart River party were in the majority in Stellaland. The High Commissioner had replied that in that case the elections would decide accordingly, and Van Niekerk's party would be turned out of the management of affairs. Both Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Rhodes, however, came now to entertain another view about an election for the Bestuur. Mr. van Niekerk declared with gravity that an election in Stellaland would only cause strife; and Mr. Rhodes was of opinion that "direct government"—government by officers nominated by him as Deputy Commissioner (4310, 52) and not elected—would alone save from chaos (4432, 43). These were remarkable statements, to say the least, when made by those who had not administered the affairs of Stellaland within that country, but had pretended to do so from the Transvaal. So far as Sir Charles Warren, on the other hand, could gather, he saw no reason to distrust the people of Stellaland; and encouraged them, therefore, to look forward to a fresh election of a Bestuur, according to the earlier idea of the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes. The responsibility was with the Special Commissioner, who was now in Stellaland himself. His instructions were to hold the country till its destination

should be known. The question was, How was this to be done? By "some kind of government" had been the deliverance of the High Commissioner to Mr. Rhodes. But what kind? was now the inquiry of Sir Charles Warren. The Special Commissioner stated clearly his own view to the High Commissioner:—

"My only course is to treat these districts as other districts of Bechuanaland where the troops are in occupation. This will not interfere with any existing necessary portion of the Executive (Bestuur); neither will it cause the assumption of any responsibility for the debt, but it will do away at once with much of the expense. Will you suggest any alternative, as Niekerk is returning to take up his appointment as Commissioner on the Transvaal south-western border?" (4432, 43).

It is of importance to notice that Sir Charles expressly informed the High Commissioner at the outset that he did not purpose to arrest the action of the Stellaland Executive (Bestuur) any more than, in other parts of Bechuanaland, he would arrest the action of native chiefs among their own people. Such as it was, the Executive of Stellaland, found there by Sir Charles, was not to be superseded by him, but rather supplemented where deficient by the abundance of skilled help at the Special Commissioner's disposal. He had already informed the Stellalanders that he hoped their affairs would be carried on under Mr. Rhodes as Deputy Commissioner. On the one hand he saved himself from the disadvantages of a rigorous military rule, under which the popular voice would not be heard; on the other he showed that he accepted the help of the officer formally recommended to him in Capetown by the High Commissioner. The telegram above quoted fully shows that Sir Charles Warren then expected that Van Niekerk would soon leave Stellaland and enter the service of the Transvaal Government.

Although Sir Charles, in the telegram which I have quoted, had with perfect clearness defined the course which he proposed to take, the High Commissioner made no reply to Sir Charles's plan, except to ask if he meant something widely different from what he had stated. He asked if Sir Charles meant the establishment temporarily of British military rule instead of Stellaland civil rule while the troops were

in occupation of the country? (4432, 43). Now the answer to that question was already before the High Commissioner in the telegram to which he was replying. Sir Charles had expressly said that he did not mean military rule instead of Stellaland rule, but along with it and as supplementary to it. The High Commissioner went on to say:—

"To the first course, namely, the establishment temporarily of military rule while the troops are in occupation, I see no objection, if it is desired by both parties. It would leave Her Majesty's Government free to act as it might seem fit as regards the future" (4432, 43).

In the same telegram the High Commissioner again skilfully brings forward the Secretary of State as upholding the opinions of Sir Hercules Robinson:—

"The assumption permanently by the Imperial Government of the direct civil administration of Stellaland is a course which, as already explained, is open at present to grave political objections, and the Secretary of State having decided against it, a further reference home would be necessary before it could be adopted" (4432, 43).

Of course the word "permanently" in the above sentence entirely altered the meaning. No one was then thinking of a "permanent" measure. It was true that the Secretary of State had approved of the High Commissioner's policy of "letting alone" Stellaland till Colonial annexation should take place; and it was perhaps premature for Lord Derby to have done so before the Special Commissioner had reported on the subject, after reaching Bechuanaland; but, of course, he did so on the strength of the telegram of the 6th December. On the other hand, that which looked to be a difficulty to the High Commissioner was simple enough to Sir Charles Warren, whose instructions were quite plain, and told him to "hold the country till its destination was known." There was thus really nothing to contend about; for "some kind of government" was all that the High Commissioner wanted, "pending annexation to the Colony"; and that "some kind of government" would not be altered for the worse by the aid and co-operation of English officers, told off for the purpose by the Special Commissioner.

On Saturday, the 14th February, the meeting called by the General and Special Commissioner was held at Vry-

burg. This was the third occasion on which the Stellaland people had met an Imperial officer in public meeting at that place. The first occasion (that of July, already described) was when the exchange of flags took place; the second public meeting of Stellalanders was held under the replaced flag of the Stellaland Republic in January, when Mr. Rhodes met the people of Stellaland for the first time, and had to answer as best he could their remonstrances as to their treatment by him for four months. The third meeting was now called by the Special Commissioner fresh from England, commissioned to expel the enemies of the Protectorate, and to hold the country till its destination was known.

The proceedings commenced with a review of the 6th Inniskilling Dragoons—men and horses being much admired by the assembled Stellalanders. Sir Charles Warren then addressed the people and laid the circumstances of the country before them. He spoke first on the subject of the land-grants of Mr. Rhodes; and the principle which he laid down was roughly that which he had mentioned to the High Commissioner while still at Barkly West. They could only apportion among the Stellalanders that part of Bechuanaland which was fairly Stellaland. Sir Charles made this point quite clear, and asked that information on the subject might be given to him afterwards by those who were acquainted with it. It was one thing to promise over 2,000,000 acres of native land to freebooters; the question demanded attention whether there was so much land within what could be fairly called Stellaland. In the Bluebooks, unfortunately, acrimony and prejudice characterise the strictures of Mr. Rhodes on Sir Charles's doings at Vryburg in February; and the High Commissioner struggles in vain to be impartial. But, putting all that aside, the three officers were substantially of one opinion that the agreement of Mr. Rhodes must not be carried out at the expense of native territories lying outside the boundaries of Stellaland. Thus, in a very practical way, all assented that it was unwise absolutely to promise so many farms, of so many thousand acres each, without reference to the boundaries of Stellaland; and it was acknowledged by the High Commissioner and Mr. Rhodes,

as well as by Sir Charles Warren, that Mr. Rhodes's agreement must not be so interpreted. This, however, was entirely to give up that inviolableness for which both Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner at other times pleaded with a vehemence which was quite misplaced.

The next subject introduced to the notice of the meeting by Sir Charles was that of the Stellaland debt. This amounted to some £2000 when I was in Stellaland in July. The reader is aware that at my first meeting in May I proposed to look the facts in the face, while the sum was still a small one. The obligation belonged entirely to Stellaland—this was fully understood on all hands, and in July we had gone as far as to compute how much would fall on each farm. I recommended to the High Commissioner that due steps should be taken at once to scrutinise the "goodfors," and that the amount of the legal debt should then be advanced as a loan upon the security of the Stellaland farms. The people had submitted to our terms; we were permitting them to retain their farms; they were willing to pay up this debt at once, but were quite unable to do so then. I considered it would be a wise and indeed a "paying" step, in every way, to meet the difficulty by a loan of £2000. I stated these views more or less clearly at Vryburg in May, and again in July, and my attitude for several weeks was not disapproved of by the High Commissioner. My difficulty in this, as in other matters, was produced by the new hope of the High Commissioner for immediate annexation to the Cape Colony. When I heard of this I proposed that an accountant should be sent up at once, approved by the Colonial Government, so that they might have confidence in his management of this department from the beginning. But the High Commissioner's attitude was to leave the matter entirely and not touch it,—a course which I thought not only unwise, but out of the question, after the views which I had put forward in May, and which had not been objected to by Sir Hercules Robinson. As a matter of fact, whensoever Colonial annexation did take place, it would be the annexation of the Imperial Protectorate of Bechuanaland, and I could never see how our mismanagement or neglect of

the Protectorate would further the real interests of any Government—the Imperial or the Colonial. Although the High Commissioner rejected my recommendation in 1884, he himself carried out in 1885 the very policy which I had pressed on him in vain, approving and furthering the course which he censured me for recommending, only the sum we had to pay ultimately was much larger than that asked by me.

Mr. Rhodes met the subject of the debt of Stellaland in what I think I must call a characteristic method—he simply shirked it. Captain Bower, however, asserts in his report of their joint proceedings that the question of the Stellaland debt "formed a part of the agreement actually signed by Mr. Rhodes" (4213, 126). This, however, was another incorrect statement by Captain Bower, and is given in such a way as to be gravely misleading. The High Commissioner also on the 8th October informed the Secretary of State:—

"Mr. Rhodes made a new agreement with Mr. van Niekerk and the leaders of the Losasa meeting which I think is more favourable than that concluded by Mr. Mackenzie at Taung" (4252, 18).

There is no justification whatever for a remark of this nature when we come to look at Mr. Rhodes's agreement; and it is deeply to be regretted that a distinguished officer should have made it. He could only uphold the assertion by stating that I had promised to liquidate Stellaland debts with Imperial money, which was not correct; and that Mr. Rhodes by his treatment had successfully eluded responsibility for that debt, which was equally at variance with fact; for Mr. Rhodes himself has declared:—

"I would point out that a debt does exist which must be met at some time by either the Imperial or Colonial Government" (4310, 53).

It is quite certain that shirking a debt will not abolish it either in public or private life. Mr. Rhodes's "preferable arrangement" was to take no notice whatever of the debt, and to resign all charge of the affairs of Stellaland into the hands of Van Niekerk and Delarey, so that he had no control whatever of its management or of its expenditure! This is seriously represented to the Secretary of State by the High Commissioner as preferable to lending £2000 on the security

of Stellaland farms, and then facing the administration of the country. But when Sir Charles Warren was approaching Bechuanaland, Mr. Rhodes calmly informed the High Commissioner, after several months of Mr. van Niekerk's management, that he (Mr. Rhodes) considered either the Colonial or Imperial Government was responsible for the Stellaland debt!—which, in the meantime, had been increased in the most wonderful manner.

When Sir Charles Warren confronted the Stellaland people with the results to them financially of the arrangement made by Mr. Rhodes at Hart River, he informed them that Van Niekerk and his Government had been spending, without any Imperial control, money which was to be charged against the Stellaland farms, at the rate of over £10,000 per annum, while the income was only about half that sum. Sir Charles remarked that the expenditure had been monstrous—£15,000 in seventeen months! It seems Sir Charles had been informed that Mr. van Niekerk had expressed a wish that his followers should say nothing upon any subject at the public meeting; so Sir Charles relieved his audience of the difficulties attendant upon this obligation, by calling for a show of hands! In this way the meeting pronounced an opinion plainly and strongly enough on certain points, which must have been anything but pleasant to Mr. van Niekerk or Mr. Rhodes. Was the Volksraad meeting warranted in voting over £2000 to Mr. van Niekerk, and other sums to other officers, after the Protectorate had been established? Not a hand was held up for this. Was the meeting invalid? A great show of hands showed the general opinion. Shall the question of officers who were paid in farms, and then in "good-fors," be inquired into? There was an immense show of hands, demanding inquiry, in spite of Mr. Rhodes's agreement, and although it was well known that Mr. van Niekerk was among those suspected. After discussion, it was agreed that the Government "good-fors" were at once to be examined, and those decided to be legal, after due scrutiny, were to become a charge upon the revenue of Stellaland.

The last matter brought forward by the Special Commis-

sioner at the public meeting was the subject of the future "some kind" of government of Stellaland. Was the present form of government to go on? Not a single hand was held up in favour of this. Wherever this Hart River arrangement had been admired and extolled, it certainly was not in Stellaland. The General asked to be told in the same way how many wanted another form of government that would reduce the expenditure? All held up their hands for this, Mr. van Niekerk among the rest. The General explained that he wanted all these matters settled satisfactorily at once, as it was understood that annexation to the Cape Colony would soon take place. In conclusion, as Sir Charles informed the High Commissioner—

"He then declared, with the people's concurrence, that military rule was established in the country, and would be administered as far as was necessary to supplement the existing inadequate machinery of the administration" (4432, 44).

The meeting then separated, with three cheers for the Queen and for Sir C. Warren.

The following is the text of the proclamation of Sir Charles Warren:—

"*Proclamation by Major-General Sir Charles Warren, K.C.M.G.,*
"*H.B.M. Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland.*

"Whereas certain freebooters have invaded and occupied lands in Bechuanaland, belonging to tribes under protection of Her Majesty the Queen; and whereas it is necessary to expel these freebooters by a military force; and whereas these freebooters are connected with and in communication with persons inhabiting the settled districts of South Africa; and whereas some of these freebooters are now living in the district called Stellaland; and whereas the district called Stellaland has a nominal government, administered partly by persons living outside Stellaland, who admit that they have no power to govern Stellaland, and who cannot enter Vryburg, the seat of Government, without the presence of an armed force, and who state that any fresh elections in Stellaland will cause a breach of the peace; and whereas there is no law or real government in Stellaland, and immediate steps are required in aid of law and order, and to avoid the risk of disturbances;—military rule is hereby declared in Stellaland, while Her Majesty's troops are in occupation, to be applied so far as is necessary to supplement the existing inadequate machinery of the government; always provided that no responsibility of any nature whatsoever is incurred by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the debt of Stellaland, and

the 'good-fors' issued by the so-called government, the circumstances of which debt should be inquired into by an adequate court, after consultation with the people of Stellaland, who must take upon themselves all responsibility with regard to all retrospective claims for the administration of government up to the present date.

"Given under my hand and seal this fourteenth day of February 1885. (Signed) CHARLES WARREN,

"*H.B.M. Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland*" (4432, 94).

Mr. Rhodes very much objected to this proclamation, and would no doubt have wished to burn it as he had burned another. But the times had changed somewhat since he made that little bonfire. He has, however, relieved his mind at great length in his report in the Bluebooks, which is a diatribe on Sir Charles and all his friends, from beginning to end. He is greatly scandalised that the Government which he and Van Niekerk had created should have been termed "so-called," although the High Commissioner had also erred in miscalling it in this very way. He also strongly objected to the word "freebooters" as applied to his Transvaal friends. If the quieter people of Stellaland did not complain of it—knowing its applicability to many—least of all could those Hart River people object to it, with whom Mr. Rhodes had negotiated.

There was a discussion in Capetown as to the "military rule" which Sir Charles Warren had proclaimed in Stellaland. Englishmen are happily ignorant of military rule or martial law in Great Britain. But in countries less favoured it is well known that the civil business not expressly interfered with by the proclamation of martial law goes on as usual. Sir Charles in his proclamation expressly stated that the civil administration of Stellaland was to go on as before, only supplemented by such help as the Special Commissioner might deem necessary. He was informed from Capetown that by his proclamation he had swept away the whole of the previously-existing Stellaland Government, and that there was nothing now in Stellaland except the will of the Commander-in-chief. One of these statements, however, destroys the other. In reality, the views communicated to Sir Charles by the High Commissioner were only another way of saying what Sir Charles

himself asserted. The legal opinions obtained by the High Commissioner declared that Sir Charles's will was now the only law in Stellaland; but then, that will, publicly declared, had retained intact in Stellaland its own civil administration, strengthened by Imperial help.

We are told in the interesting life of Lord Lawrence that when he wished to pursue a certain policy towards the ryots or cultivators of the soil in India, he was confronted with the decision of an Indian Chief-Justice before whom a test case had been tried. The Viceroy was clear that if the Chief-Justice was right in his interpretation of the law, the law itself must be changed, and prompt legislative action would be necessary. Before taking any steps in this direction, however, Lord Lawrence submitted the question to the whole of the judges of the High Court, when it was found that fourteen out of the fifteen were in favour of reversing the decision of the Chief-Justice,—the one dissentient being the Chief-Justice himself![1] This anecdote is not to be lost sight of in connection with Sir Charles Warren and his difficult and delicate work in Bechuanaland, confronted as he was, now and again, by the legal opinions of Mr. Upington, the Cape Attorney-General.

The reader will not be surprised to be told that Mr. Rhodes began to find Vryburg an unpleasant place to live in. It had always been so to him; but now, he himself declares, it became unbearable. Sir Charles had publicly stated his express intention of carrying on Stellaland affairs through Mr. Rhodes as Deputy Commissioner. But it was more than Mr. Rhodes himself could face. The Stellaland which he had known was Stellaland no more; it belonged to the Transvaal, and with it had gone his friends. The Stellaland which remained was that which he had ignored and ill-used, and the people of which seemed to retain an awkward remembrance of these events. Of course he ought never to have attempted to mix up his "make-believe" Colonial policy with that of the Imperial Government in their instructions to Sir Charles Warren. No doubt it would have been pleasanter for him to have remained in

[1] *Life of Lord Lawrence*, vol. ii. p. 551.

Capetown, and left the Special Commissioner to fulfil his own duties in the whole of Bechuanaland. But other hopes would seem to have been in the ascendant when the fatal telegram of the 6th December was concocted. Stellaland might be made a sealed book to the General,—sealed by that great and efficacious telegram. Sir Charles would be delighted with all he saw in Vryburg; Mr. van Niekerk would explain successfully every charge brought against him; and a day or two after his arrival at Vryburg, Sir Charles would pass on to Goshen—leaving Stellaland and the Stellalanders in the hands of Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Rhodes, backed by Sir Charles's Force. But a genuine Sapper and Miner is an awkward man to deal with—there is somehow a thoroughness about his training which seems to characterise all he does. Sir Charles had already drawn a line between Vryburg and Hart River; he had unearthed a whole population of loyal Stellalanders, which certain officers had declared did not exist anywhere; and he showed the farming population of Stellaland what the Hart River Government was costing them per month.

Mr. van Niekerk now came forward, probably under vigorous prompting, and said he wished Sir Charles to institute an inquiry into his past administration of Stellaland. The Special Commissioner readily granted the request; and a Committee of officers, under the presidency of Captain Trotter, R.A., and consisting of Major Barker, R.E., Captain Williams, Lieutenant Scholtz, and Assistant Commissioner Wright, was told off for the purpose. This was going on when the public meeting took place. But on the evening of that day, graver charges were brought forward, and Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Celliers were arrested on a charge of murdering a fellow-volunteer named James Honey; and Big Adriaan Delarey, Mr. van Niekerk's Prime Minister, only saved himself from arrest by immediate flight into the Transvaal.

When these arrests took place, Mr. Rhodes said in conversation that of course the General could not help himself; if such affidavits had been brought before him, he also would have arrested these men But it was quite evident to

Mr. Rhodes that Vryburg was no longer a place for him The difficulty, however, was how was he to get away, as Sir Charles had publicly expressed his willingness to go on co-operating with him? He eventually adopted the course of informing the High Commissioner that Sir Charles was guilty of daily breaches of the agreement of the 8th September! The High Commissioner mentioned this to Sir Charles, who requested Mr. Rhodes to explain himself. The "daily breaches of the engagement of the 8th September" then resolved themselves into three: Sir Charles's public statement that the size of Stellaland must qualify the promise of farms, to which no Stellalander had objected; Sir Charles's order to Mr. Rhodes to obtain possession for Sir Charles of the papers in the public offices in Vryburg; and lastly, Sir Charles's alleged interference to prevent the cattle arbitration! These and the use of the words "freebooters" and "so-called Government" by Sir Charles, were exceedingly poor reasons for Mr. Rhodes's assertion of daily breaches of the engagement referred to; but they were all he could give. Sir Charles informed the High Commissioner that—

'He was quite at a loss to understand Mr. Rhodes's object in sending such statement to High Commissioner. His conduct is most inconsistent. He concurred in necessity for arrest of Niekerk. He acquiesced in northern boundary of Stellaland, and agreed in establishment of military rule, urging me strongly to guarantee the debt and pay up the good-fors in cash. He proposed on Sunday last to act as Deputy Commissioner under military rule while I went up to Rooi Grond" (4432, 54).

Another desperate effort was now put forth by Mr. Rhodes in his own behalf, on the old Capetown lines. On the 21st February he sent to Capetown the following alarmist telegram:—

"The new policy is already showing its effects. The people are flying from the country in all directions. You can ask the General himself. To avoid a breach of the peace by holding elections, I propose nominating a Bestuur" (4432, 53).

The reader will be reminded of the Kimberley telegrams preceding my return to Capetown, and the entrance of Mr. Rhodes into office as my successor. That Mr. Rhodes for

a time entertained hopes of securing the management of Stellaland under the High Commissioner, and free from all responsibility to Sir Charles Warren, is indicated in his own report of what took place, which was written some time after. He says:—

"In acknowledging the receipt of Sir Charles Warren's proclamation, I was careful to place on record my emphatic dissent from its terms, and I prepared to leave Bechuanaland for the purpose of consulting with your Excellency upon the situation" (4432, 90).

But why should not Sir Charles be ordered out of Stellaland by the High Commissioner? His presence anywhere else in Bechuanaland is of course a sufficient guarantee for peace; and if the High Commissioner will only upset what he is doing, and place Stellaland in Mr. Rhodes's sole control, he will be equal to the occasion. In the telegrams which mentioned that he objected to elections, and proposed to nominate a Bestuur or Executive, if still left in charge by the High Commissioner, he brings things to a head in this style:—

"The two days have elapsed, and I have not a word from you; but before inspanning I submit one more proposition for his Excellency's consideration. I am prepared to administer Stellaland with ten policemen, and if you have any reliance on my judgment, I state it will remain perfectly quiet whatever happens in Rooi Grond. But I must have entire control" (4432, 53).

This was the Stellaland whose peace was so uncertain as to need the telegram of the 6th December! This was the Stellaland in which elections would be dangerous, but an executive nominated by Mr. Rhodes would answer perfectly, provided he got entire control!

It certainly was not contemplated by Her Majesty's Government, or by the English people, that the work of Sir Charles Warren would be marred by intrigues of this nature, which had hitherto existed only by misrepresentation of a most unusual kind. The above telegram contained Mr. Rhodes's idea of himself in Stellaland. Another telegram reached Capetown the same day giving Sir Charles Warren's opinion on the same subject. Sir Charles said:—

"Rhodes was only sent to Stellaland pending my arrival. I

consider his presence here in Stellaland as prejudicial to peace. You have said that he need only stay here so long as I wish. I have to submit that he should be withdrawn at once. Until he is removed I do not consider it safe to move on" (4432, 53).

The day following Mr. Rhodes departed from Stellaland.

Mr. Rhodes appeared to be ashamed to admit, when he got to the Diamond Fields, that he had quarrelled with Sir Charles Warren. He said he had come away because there was no longer anything for him to do. His courage soon rose, however. His action on his arrival in Capetown was thus severely criticised by the *Cape Times*:—

"Mr. Rhodes has arrived in Capetown, where he makes no secret of his disapproval of Sir Charles Warren's course at Vryburg. The position of Imperial officers in Bechuanaland has been singularly unfortunate. Sir Charles Warren fared, as Mr. Mackenzie fared, in lacking moral support where it was their right to look for it; and in each instance Mr. Rhodes appears to have promoted, if not caused, the discord."

His opposition to Her Majesty's Special Commissioner ever afterwards was bitter and relentless. In the Cape newspaper, which gave expression to his changing views; in his place in the Cape Parliament, in a speech disfigured by its personalities; and afterwards in the columns of *The Times*, Mr. Rhodes attacked the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland. In Capetown, Mr. Rhodes was all against the Imperial Government in South Africa,—it was a danger in the country of which he had before given warning. In London, Mr. Rhodes was all for the Imperial Government in South Africa, and earnestly advocated the extension northwards to the Zambesi of the colony of Bechuanaland. When the retrogressive and dangerous measure in connection with the Transkei franchise was recently brought forward and supported by the present Cape Ministry, Mr. Rhodes, I am glad to say, took the right side, and strongly opposed it. But when the "Dutch interest" recently moved almost in a body for the removal of all excise duties on the manufacture and sale of Cape spirits, to the serious loss of the Colonial revenue and the permanent detriment of a mixed population, Mr. Rhodes was

almost the only Englishman who voted with the majority in favour of untaxed "Cape smoke,"—a measure which may be taken as a moral and economic test of the present Cape Parliament and Ministry. With reference to Bechuanaland, Mr. Rhodes from the first occupied a false and untenable position in that country, whether as acting for me, or as posing as a "colonist," or as acting under Sir Charles Warren. In his highest moments, Mr. Rhodes must strongly disapprove of obtaining office by such methods as the Kimberley telegrams, the telegram to Van Niekerk of the 6th December, or his telegram just quoted from Vryburg, in which he tried to upset the position of Sir Charles Warren. As politicians, whether we are young or old, we should do well to remember that the ploughman who makes a straight furrow keeps steadily in view a permanent object at the other end of the field, high enough to be seen in the hollows, large enough to be observed in the distance, and stable enough to resist the strongest wind. Our crooked furrows are ploughed across the field of life when we have no life-object before our eyes, when we are mere imitators of some one else's crooked furrow, or when our life-object is too low or too small or too shifting to serve a good purpose. My reader can excel himself and improve upon himself, provided he keeps the true Life-Object before his eye.

The arrest on the charge of murder, or of being accessory to murder, of Van Niekerk and Celliers, the "Administrator" and the "Commandant-General" of Stellaland, on the evening of the public gathering, and the precipitous flight into the Transvaal of Big Adriaan Delarey, "General" and Member of Van Niekerk's "Executive," were events of great importance in Bechuanaland and in South Africa, and demand the special attention of the reader.

In such organisations as the volunteers of Massow or of Moshette, dissension and partisanship were to be looked for. The lines of separation would seem to have been roughly the Transvaal party on one side, and the Europeans, Free State, and Cape Colony people on the other side. The Transvaal party dominated at Rooi Grond at all times; but in Stellaland the petition for annexation

to the Cape, which was conducted by the other side, and steadily opposed by Van Niekerk and his Transvaal party, showed that a large number in Stellaland, when they had a chance of expressing their feelings, testified to their dislike of the Transvaal. But in both cases, the proximity of the Transvaal and its friendliness to the volunteers, were powerful arguments in its favour. The policy pursued in both camps by the Transvaal party was at all hazards to retain the official power in their own hands. This was not done without bloodshed. The death of a Cape Colonist called Macgillivray, who was kept prisoner for a time at Rooi Grond, has never been cleared up. His bones, with rudely-made heavy iron fetters on his leg, were found in the veldt. The wretched man probably escaped from his guards at Rooi Grond, as did Mr. Wright afterwards, but being ignorant of the country, and unable to free himself from his heavy irons, he either wandered till death put an end to his misery; or his jailers having missed him, proceeded on his easily-followed track, shot him, and left him unburied. The bones and the shackles were found; and some such explanation must necessarily be given.

Turning to Stellaland, we are confronted with the finding of part of the remains (several months after his disappearance) of one of the volunteers, called James Honey. Strange to say, although scarcely anything was left of his remains, beyond a shattered skull and some bones, in the pocket of the jacket which was still round the skeleton, letters were found written to Honey by his wife, thus removing all doubt as to identity. Honey and certain other volunteers of Massow were more influential than Van Niekerk in times of danger and of action. Massow bitterly complained of the action of his volunteers in curtailing his own lands near Mamusa, and declined to give his consent to their spoliation. In this, as it would appear, he was supported by many influential freebooters, but opposed by Van Niekerk. As Gey van Pittius offered his services to Montsioa, his enemy, and was ready to turn against Moshette, whose volunteer he had been, so Van Niekerk and his fellow-volunteers appro-

priated without compunction the land of Massow, in whose behalf they were fighting, as well as that of Mankoroane, against whom they fought. But Van Niekerk went beyond this, and offered a reward of £1000 (I suppose in land or cattle!) for the head of Mankoroane and certain of his headmen. A plan was devised for their assassination, in which Honey was to play a prominent part. This nefarious scheme would seem to have been allowed to drop, and there was anxiety shown by Van Niekerk to destroy all traces of the formal order or agreement on the subject, because he wished to stand well with the British Resident at Pretoria.

But whatever may have been the political jealousies and rivalries between the more intelligent freebooters and the out-and-out Transvaal frontier men, the arrest of Honey by order of Van Niekerk was ostensibly on the charge of stealing cattle from the Transvaal. From evidence brought forward at the preliminary examination, which will be found in the Bluebooks (4432, 189), it would appear that on the 7th February 1883 Van Niekerk and his Commandant Celliers and twenty-five men went in search of Honey to Motlhabani's village; but Honey was not there. In the afternoon, however, he arrived with some friends, and hearing the intention of Van Niekerk, dismounted, and went to him unaccompanied by any one. The charges against him were formally read to Honey by Van Niekerk's secretary. Honey at once offered to appear at Vryburg and stand his trial. On this occasion he was not arrested, but was allowed to go back to his encampment. Next day Honey's Colonial native servant Arend was arrested, by Van Niekerk's order, while he was looking after his master's horses in the veldt, on the charge of cattle-stealing. He was taken to Van Niekerk's waggon. On the same day, Honey was informed by letter that there was to be an important meeting, at which he was asked to be present; and although he must have been aware of the opposition to him, he made his appearance at Van Niekerk's waggon in the afternoon of the 8th February, as requested in the letter. Honey was now examined by Van

Niekerk on the charge of cattle-stealing in the Transvaal. He denied the theft; he had only bought cattle brought for sale to his waggons. He was told by Van Niekerk that he would have to stand his trial in the Transvaal. Honey bethought him of the usual excuse in these regions for not undertaking an unpleasant journey—his horse was knocked up! Mr. van Niekerk did not see the validity of this plea in another's case, and Groot Adriaan Delarey declared he would have to go even if he (Delarey) had to tie him to his own horse's tail! Van Niekerk and three others having consulted together, Honey's arrest was decided upon, and some ten men rushed on him together, seized his pistol, and made him a prisoner. Honey asked Van Niekerk for payment of £100 which Van Niekerk owed him, as he might need the money. Van Niekerk said he could not pay him. Van Niekerk, having arrested Honey and Arend, despatched a party of twenty men to escort them as prisoners to Christiana, in the Transvaal. The party slept on the road the first night at a farmhouse in the Transvaal. Three of Honey's friends rode up to this house the next morning, accompanied by a coloured servant. Without question or parley, Groot Adriaan, who had twenty men with him, fired on the three men, and shot an Englishman called Wells through the leg, completely disabling him, and placing his life in danger. For this Delarey was afterwards awarded six months' imprisonment by the Transvaal Government, but was released at the end of three months. A Stellaland volunteer had been previously sent on to Christiana to try and set the Transvaal law in operation against Honey, but without result. Hearing of this failure, Groot Adriaan and another took Honey's servant and rode on to Christiana, leaving Honey and his escort at Van Niekerk's house at Kroomellenboog, near Christiana. It would seem that there was no evidence whatever against Honey, and as Groot Adriaan and his companion made no sworn deposition at Christiana, the Transvaal magistrate was unable to detain Arend as a prisoner, or to undertake the prosecution of Honey. It is said he recommended Groot Adriaan to take them over the

border and deal with them there. It would certainly have more befitted his office and duties if he had insisted on at once setting Honey and Arend free, for at that time they were both illegally held as prisoners in his district, and without any reference to his orders. He ought also to have arrested Delarey for shooting Wells; but he allowed him to return unmolested to Stellaland, and no step would ever have been taken for his arrest but for the representations of the British Government. Unable to secure the imprisonment of Honey on any charge whatever in the Transvaal, Delarey left Christiana and returned to Kroomellenboog, where Honey and his escort were, and the whole party prepared to return to Stellaland, retaining their prisoners in strict charge. Van Niekerk's first plot thus broke down entirely.

Following the published synopsis given in the Bluebook, it would appear that the news of the shooting of Wells by Groot Adriaan was at once communicated to Van Niekerk, who remained at his waggon on the Hart River. Adriaan Delarey also asked Van Niekerk for more men for his return to Stellaland. Van Niekerk now concocted a second scheme. He began by making a show of consulting Massow, the supposed master of the volunteers, as to "what he was to do with such rascals as Honey"; and was told by the chief that he was to punish evil-doers according to law as "Administrator." "Commandant" Celliers was now started by Van Niekerk with a second party of men, with the order to shoot Honey. It is said one of this party was privately promised by Van Niekerk himself that if he secured the death of Honey he would receive full volunteer rights to land—a privilege which this man did not then possess. "Commandant" Celliers was also consulted by "Administrator" van Niekerk concerning the death of Honey before he gave that officer his orders. Celliers affirmed that these were in writing; and Arend testified that a paper was produced by Celliers and read by a young man present. It would appear that Celliers and his party rode into the Transvaal as far as Kroomellenboog, where they learned that their fellow-free-

booters, under Groot Adriaan, had left for Stellaland, but not by the road leading to Vryburg or to Van Niekerk's waggon. In short, Honey was being escorted, not to any further inquiry or trial, but to a place where he could be conveniently put to death. It would seem that Celliers, on his overtaking the others, had a special conference on the 10th February with Groot Adriaan, who then remained in command of those escorting Honey—Celliers and the others with him following behind as a reserve. Groot Adriaan next went aside and consulted with one of the men who was said to have received special instructions.

On the march Honey rode in front in charge of Groot Adriaan and five others; the native prisoner Arend, who was still tied by the arm to a volunteer who had him in special charge, rode with the second party under Celliers, which numbered about twenty-two. When they came to the neighbourhood of Motlhabani's town the party struck off from the waggon-road and took a footpath, which they also left and went across country, riding through the bushes. Honey dismounted when they came to an open place and demanded what they meant by such unusual travelling; and said that it was impossible to frighten him by their repeated threats. The escort dismounted, and Celliers and Groot Adriaan once more consulted. Adriaan also called another aside and talked with him. Adriaan expressed the decided opinion that the native servant should be shot first; but Celliers declined to sanction this, pointing to Van Niekerk's order, which mentioned Honey only. After a good deal of consulting and taking one another aside among the bushes, in which Groot Adriaan figured prominently—first with one and then with another of two men whose names are united with his in the infamy of that day's actual work—one of the three, returning from such a consultation, shot Honey from behind, the bullet coming out at his breast. Honey fell, but appealed to the men around him—"Why do you shoot me, comrades? You all know I have a wife and children, and none of you will provide for them." Another of the three shot Honey through the leg, and he now lay quite powerless on the ground. Groot

Adriaan Delarey next carefully fastened the miserable victim's hands together behind his back, and laid him on his side. He then took a stone and dashed it at Honey's head. That did not appear to cause death, so Adriaan took a larger stone with both hands and dashed it at his victim's head. Adriaan Delarey would appear to have been the only one who adopted this method of treating a man who had just appealed to them as men and as comrades. The majority of the party now went on to Van Niekerk's and reported themselves, Celliers informing Van Niekerk that his order concerning Honey had been carried out. Groot Adriaan and those specially instructed remained behind with the mangled remains, and did not make their appearance at Van Niekerk's waggon for hours after the rest.

Van Niekerk now sent men to Honey's place to seize on Honey's property and take it to Vryburg. Van Niekerk next gave orders to call a public meeting of freebooters for Monday, the 12th February. There were about forty or fifty people present at this meeting. Van Niekerk read the affidavits against Honey for cattle-stealing in the Transvaal, which a Transvaal landdrost had refused to act upon. A sentence of outlawry was then pronounced upon Honey, being read by Van Niekerk from a waggon, on the 12th February—Honey having been assassinated on the 10th of that month. Sham inquiries were also ordered by Van Niekerk; sham declarations were drawn up and handed in by those who had received the orders. Van Niekerk's Secretary gave Celliers a sum of money for one of the three men already referred to, with orders to procure him a horse also, so that he might be off. It seems there was, not unnaturally, a good deal of fencing, as to responsibility, between Van Niekerk and Celliers—the "Administrator" and the "Commandant." It would appear that the original "order" (if there was one) was written in the veldt in pencil. Celliers declares there was an order, and that he acted on it, but afterwards expressed a wish to have a copy of the order in ink. Van Niekerk took the pencil-order as if to copy it. He then produced another paper, which stated that Van Niekerk had not shot Honey, and demanded that

Celliers should sign that. According to his own statement, Celliers did so, but never received from Van Niekerk the promised copy in ink of the order to shoot Honey, upon which he said he acted. Celliers also declared that his signature was obtained by Van Niekerk under threat of imprisonment. For the purpose of a historical account it is unnecessary to form an opinion about these assertions. The positions of "Administrator" and "Commandant" are explanatory enough of themselves. Our object is not that of the prosecutor, to fasten guilt on certain men; or that of their defender, to screen them as far as possible; but rather to narrate, as the historian, as clearly as we can, from published records, what would appear to have actually taken place.

It is of great importance, from every point of view, to bring out clearly the leading facts in this revolting transaction. The fate of James Honey ought to be to young men an effectual deterrent from joining any lawless organisation such as that of Stellaland or Goshen. It was degrading enough to hire themselves to native chiefs for what they could plunder from other native chiefs and people; but the hideous deaths of Macgillivray and Honey point to still deeper depths. Europeans in South Africa have probably never reached such a low level as when they planned and carried out the murder of James Honey. It has surely never been exceeded even in the dark annals of heathen and savage treachery. It is also of special importance to the English reader to remember that we have here the direct result of the retreat from the country of Her Majesty's Government after occupying Bechuanaland for three years. I am fully persuaded that the English friends of the orderly development of South Africa will be shocked when they discover the degradation of Europeans themselves, which was involved in the impolicy of retreating from the country. The same thought also, I know, has made deep impression on the Colonial mind. The good-feeling and intelligence of the country rises against the continuance of such savagism among Europeans. Without arrogating judicial acumen or deep

legal knowledge, I have endeavoured to place the broad facts before the reader as a matter of history, and from the moralist and historian's point of view.

If the question is asked who killed James Honey—an Englishman by descent, a Cape Colonist, and a member of the freebooting community of Stellaland?—Honey himself supplies the answer in the unavailing appeal which he made as above quoted. James Honey was killed by his comrades. But in justice even to freebooters it must be stated that he was not killed by their open vote; as a matter of fact, the majority of them knew nothing of the foul deed till after it was done. Without doubt, the death of Honey lies at the door of the well-known men who then and afterwards ruled the freebooters in the Hart River district; and in another sense, at the door of the poor wretches who, probably selected on account of their extreme poverty, were willing to obey the order which they received in hope of a reward, and who shot their defenceless comrade in the back unawares, untried, unshriven, wasting his last moments in appealing to their humanity. There were, no doubt, many accessories; but the plan and execution were thus confined to a comparatively small number. What was the death of Honey? Again its authors shall tell us. By their sham declarations of Honey's escape as a prisoner, by their sham sentence of outlawry pronounced on Honey two days after his death, the men who killed him proclaim in unmistakable language their intense desire to hide the event from the outer world; they had murdered their comrade in a hideous manner and in cold blood, and they feared the consequences.

Let us suppose for a moment that the freebooters had a Government with its "Administrator," and its "Commandant," and its "Generals," and its "Executive," and its "Government Secretary," and its "Field Cornets"; and that it was this "Government" which sentenced Honey to death. Where, then, are the legal proceedings of a real Government? Of what was Honey charged that was worthy of death? Where and when was he tried? If Van Niekerk and his comrades had felt any confidence in their own status as a Government, they would never have sent Honey to be tried in the Trans-

vaal. It is easy to call one another by honorary names; it is not very difficult to attach payment in "good-fors" to certain offices; but the hollowness of the whole thing, in the minds of the Stellalanders themselves, is shown in their conduct towards Honey. Even if the Stellaland Government had tried Honey for his life at Vryburg or elsewhere, and if there had been a record of the case, and if his execution for a capital offence as a public action had been there openly stated, the freebooting Government would still have been held guilty of his blood, as having illegally assumed such power to themselves against the proclamations of their several colonies and states. But we find no such record; the miserable self-condemned men, who had hardly washed off their comrade's blood from their hands, having seized his property, next set about concocting false documents to hide the deed which they had committed! This was the action of criminals who knew they were no Government. To suppose for a moment that they acted in good faith as a Government is impossible, in the face of their own anxiety to hide their bloodguiltiness.

As to the policy of arresting Van Niekerk, the fairest and least irritating answer to any one is, that Sir Charles Warren had really no choice in the matter. Certain affidavits were lodged with the proper Stellaland authorities, and the law simply took its course. The criticisms adverse to the action of Sir Charles Warren were based upon the supposition that he went out of his way, or strained something, in order to make this arrest. Nothing of this kind is true; Van Niekerk was arrested by the usual legal process in Stellaland, and by the officers of his own recent appointment. These critics of Sir Charles seemed to expect that he would interfere with the course of justice in Bechuanaland, and prevent even the arrest or the preliminary examination of a man charged by his fellow-volunteers with being concerned in the murder of a comrade. To have refused to sanction the arrest, or to have prevented the preliminary examination, would have been an attitude unworthy of an officer holding a commission from Her Majesty as Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland. Although Mr. Rhodes

acted as the friend of Van Niekerk at Vryburg—as stated by Sir Charles Warren—he nevertheless declared, as we have seen, that with such affidavits before him, Sir Charles was bound to make the arrest. As to the "prejudicial effects" of the arrest and preliminary examination of Van Niekerk, in the Cape Colony and elsewhere in South Africa, a good many unsupported averments were made, much calculated to mislead people at a distance. It was a poor compliment to pay the people of the Cape Colony, to assert that the arrest and preliminary examination of certain men, on suspicion of having taken part in the murder of a comrade, would produce any feeling in the Colony but that of security and satisfaction that the reign of the freebooter was at an end in the country.

Some reserve was of course shown in Capetown official documents which opposed the action of Sir Charles Warren in arresting Van Niekerk. But the columns of an "inspired" newspaper in Capetown advocated without reserve, from Mr. Rhodes's and Captain Bower's standpoint, the cause of Van Niekerk, and actually went the length of proposing a subscription for the defrayal of his expenses! The High Commissioner contented himself at first with informing Sir Charles that he would have been glad if he had been consulted before Sir Charles made this arrest (4432, 45). But Captain Bower wrote a long letter on the subject of the arrest to the High Commissioner, which the latter at once telegraphed to Sir Charles Warren. As to information, this document contained only what Van Niekerk and his friends had chosen to tell the Imperial Secretary, and was entirely incorrect and unreliable. Sir Charles Warren declared he had "read the statement from Captain Bower with intense surprise and astonishment" (4432, 61). On one point, indeed, Captain Bower was plain enough; and that was as to his own estimate of the nature of the deed, and also his knowledge of Van Niekerk's asserted connection with it. Captain Bower gave full credit to the sham account of Van Niekerk and his comrades as follows:—

"The Government of Stellaland freebooters arrested Honey on the charge of theft and conspiracy, but he escaped, and for some time his

whereabouts was not known. After his escape the Stellaland Government issued and published a proclamation, dated the 12th February 1883, declaring Honey an outlaw, and forbidding him, for the safety of his life, to return to Stellaland. This proclamation will be found at p. 42 of Bluebook, c. 3686. Honey, however, did return, and was, I believe, about March 1883, shot by four men, it is said by order of Mr. van Niekerk the Administrator of Stellaland, at a place which was then within the so-called Stellaland Republic, but is now within the Transvaal, having been added to the South African Republic by the London Convention of February 1884. I have no desire to palliate this act, which was a brutal murder. In the exceptional state of the country at the time, it may have had the appearance and the excuse of lynch law, but it was nevertheless a cowardly murder.

"I must, however, point out that at the time of my visit to Bechuanaland, in March 1884, I was perfectly aware of the principal facts as stated, and it was with a full knowledge of these facts that I accepted Mr. van Niekerk's assistance in restraining Massow from an attack on Taung, Mankoroane's town. . . . On Mr. Mackenzie's return to Capetown I proceeded to Bechuanaland, and Mr. van Niekerk mentioned the subject to me. He did not refer to his own share in the matter, but spoke of it in connection with Delarey. I was, however, perfectly aware that the act had in some way been authorised by Van Niekerk. I informed him that I had no authority to promise an amnesty. I said, however, that I had good legal opinion to the effect that the matter was not and could not be brought within any civilised jurisdiction. . . . Mr. van Niekerk's influence has since then been utilised by both Mr. Rhodes and myself. We were both cognisant of the facts, and I certainly understood that the question of the murder had been buried" (4432, 56).

When Her Majesty's Government find their officers taking up ground like this, they can fully gauge the mischievous and far-reaching effects of deserting Bechuanaland in 1881. Had Sir Hercules Robinson not withdrawn the police and declared the native chiefs beyond the Colonial border "independent," as he then did, there had been no freebooters, no Honey murder, and no open-eyed employment of the murderers by Imperial officers.

What was specially mean and unjust, on the part of Mr. van Niekerk's friends and correspondents in Capetown, was to connect my name with what was called "condoning" this offence. The reader knows that in May 1884 I was not aware of Van Niekerk's supposed complicity in this dark deed; and it was at this time only that I offered him an appointment. The two or three persons who gave them-

selves to the spreading of that report were fully aware, I regret to say, of its entire incorrectness. When they were effectually silenced at the Cape, the same false story was repeated by them in England. Now not one of those misleaders of the public mentioned at that time the fact that Van Niekerk himself, in the heyday of his power, insisted that all my Stellaland undertakings in behalf of the Imperial Government should be repudiated by my successor, and that he was obeyed. Van Niekerk thus threw back in the face of Her Majesty's Government the appointment which I had provisionally conferred on him, and distinctly and openly proclaimed his hostility to the Imperial Government, which he publicly pledged himself to oppose by force. It was absurd to speak of "condonation" by a Government which had been repudiated, even if "condonation" had taken place. One would have expected that perfidious actions such as those of Van Niekerk towards the Government of Her Majesty would have occurred to the minds of Her Majesty's servants when he was charged by his own comrades with a capital offence. Instead of this, an action which was never performed, of an officer all whose actions had been annulled, was brought forward, if perchance the release of Van Niekerk might thereby be secured. If Van Niekerk's name had been Smith or Brown, and had Brown or Smith played fast and loose with the Imperial Government, and done it open despite; and had he then been formally charged by his fellow-freebooters with being involved in the murder of a comrade —not one of the loud friends of Van Niekerk would have had a good word to say for the seditious Smith or the abandoned Brown. But in the case of Van Niekerk my annulled action in Stellaland was quoted and was misdated, so as to make it appear that I knew all about this charge, and yet had appointed Van Niekerk to a Commissionership; and that, therefore, Sir Charles Warren had done wrong in arresting him! Captain Bower wrote in Van Niekerk's behalf, "Mr. Mackenzie was also acquainted with the facts, and on his arrival at Vryburg he informed Mrs. Honey, who came to demand the punishment of the murderers, that he could do nothing for her" (4432, 56). When brought to book for

this, the Imperial Secretary had to admit (4432, 65) that what transpired between Mrs. Honey and myself was on the occasion of my "second visit to Vryburg," after which he well knew I had no dealings with Van Niekerk. There were, therefore, no grounds for dragging in my name at all. In order to do so, my "knowledge of the facts" was placed by Captain Bower before my "arrival at Vryburg," leaving the reader to suppose that my first visit to Vryburg was meant—and leaving Captain Bower also the loophole to make his exit, as he did, by saying, "I have made no statement regarding the implied condonation by Mr. Mackenzie of the alleged offence of Van Niekerk." It will be universally held that to misarrange the sequence of events in a sentence, so as to convey a false impression, is an action as little to be commended as the making of an open misstatement.

In answer to Captain Bower's letter, telegraphed to him from Capetown, with the probable object of effecting the immediate release of Van Niekerk, Sir Charles Warren pointed out the grave difference between Captain Bower's narrative and the undoubted facts as already brought out in the examination. He also pointed out that the Court consisted of Van Niekerk's own nominee officers, who were conducting the inquiry in a very lax way; and that yet, such was the general aversion and disgust of the people to the crime which had been committed, that witnesses were cheerfully coming forward—the reign of terror being at an end. It was merely a preliminary examination, and not the trial of Van Niekerk and Celliers. When the facts of the case were elicited, then it would be a matter for legal advice as to what further proceedings should be taken, if any were deemed necessary. Sir Charles distinctly declined to quash the examination, informing the High Commissioner:—

"I cannot stop this inquiry without rendering myself liable to Her Majesty's Government for endeavouring to defeat the ends of justice. Whether Captain Bower or the Deputy Commissioner (Rhodes) attempted to condone the offence imputed to Mr. van Niekerk I cannot say, but whatever may have occurred in the past, I can see no reason why the facts of the case cannot be brought out clearly. I have sent for Mr. Mackenzie to ascertain exactly the course which he pursued here; but whatever he may have said, it must be recollected that

the accused himself demanded, and Mr. Rhodes agreed, that all acts of Mr. Mackenzie should be cancelled" (4432, 61).

When this announcement of Sir Charles's firmness reached Capetown, Captain Bower wrote a second letter to the High Commissioner, which was also telegraphed to Sir Charles, in which he explains :—

"My letter was written in the full belief that the proclamation of Honey's outlawry was issued and published previous to his second arrest, and that he might have been aware of the risk he ran in returning to Stellaland. The action taken by me in Stellaland was based on this supposition, which I have never before heard questioned ; but if I have been misinformed, and the proclamation of outlawry was only published after the murder was committed, I at once admit that the crime assumes a different complexion."

And then comes a notable sentence from Captain Bower, which the reader will duly mark :—

"What is taking place in this case only shows how difficult it is, in regard to Stellaland matters, to arrive at the truth" (4432, 61).

It was in connection with this correspondence that I was summoned by Sir Charles Warren to Vryburg from Kuruman. On my way I had opportunities of meeting farmers at their own places and on the road. The recent arrest was in every one's mouth. Certainly Van Niekerk had no friends among the farmers in Stellaland so devoted as his misguided upholders in Capetown, who all the time, however, were really not upholding Van Niekerk but themselves and their makeshift policy, which they were under the delusion of supposing Van Niekerk had meant to assist them to carry through. "The General is quite right," said the Stellaland farmers to me; "Van Niekerk was our head, but the law is the 'baas' (master) of all." I had only to lay the facts already known to the reader before Sir Charles Warren, to show clearly enough that nothing which I had done as Deputy Commissioner was opposed to the examination of Van Niekerk and Celliers, which was then proceeding.

I found that during my absence from headquarters a wonderful change had taken place at Vryburg. Van Niekerk was in jail, and Mr. Rhodes had left Stellaland.

It was not, of course, known what would be the result of recent measures in centres of disaffection, although there was prevailing satisfaction in Stellaland itself. In this connection, it was especially unfortunate that the Imperial staff in South Africa was divided at such a crisis. Government House, Capetown, was everywhere known to be opposed to the proceedings of Sir Charles Warren, while the intelligence and influence of the Colony rallied to his support, after they had recovered from the first shock, occasioned by the unexpected nature of his action, and by the "round assertions" already referred to. The disaffected contented themselves with grumbling; for, after all, the name of Van Niekerk was not one to conjure with, and it was quite clear that the Special Commissioner had acted within his powers. The courage, firmness, and clear-headedness of Sir Charles were soon fully recognised throughout South Africa, and the leading papers in England joined in upholding the head of the Bechuanaland Expedition in the important step which he had taken. It was held to be an action worthy to succeed the quiet, firm, and easily understood attitude of the General in his interview with President Kruger at Fourteen Streams. And it is quite evident, as time goes on, that it will become increasingly a matter of surprise and regret that Imperial officers should ever have held two opinions as to this arrest, and that the Special Commissioner should have had not only to face the natural opposition of the professed friends of the freebooters, but also the nagging opposition of his own fellow-servants of Her Majesty in South Africa. Despite, however, the solemn assurances from the highest quarters to Her Majesty's Government as to the bad effects "on the Dutch population" of this arrest, the news which they received from Bechuanaland itself became more and more reassuring. The atmosphere was cleared. The truth could be spoken out without fear. And whoever among Colonial politicians was "sullen" or "irritated," it was a great mistake to confound the moods of individuals with the views and feelings of the Colonial community; and plainly, the Stellalanders themselves were neither "irritated" nor

"sullen," but thankful for assured peace and protection.

It may be as well to mention here the assertion made in a pamphlet published in England against Sir Charles Warren while the latter was still in Bechuanaland, to the effect that when Van Niekerk was induced to leave the Transvaal to come to meet Sir Charles Warren in Vryburg, a guarantee was given to him of a safe conduct back again. It was only after the pamphlet in question had been published in England, and had appeared in South Africa, that Sir Charles Warren first heard of this safe conduct to Van Niekerk. He gave no such order, and was never informed by any officer that such a guarantee had been given. That he had inveigled Van Niekerk into Bechuanaland and then arrested him, was the charge thus brought against Sir Charles in England by this pamphleteer. The assertion was at once authoritatively contradicted by telegram as soon as it reached Bechuanaland. Had such promises been made to Van Niekerk by his officers, Sir Charles would, no doubt, have felt himself bound by them. But neither Van Niekerk nor Mr. Rhodes ever mentioned such a promise to Sir Charles. The officers referred to in the pamphlet, when asked by Sir Charles if they were aware of this promise, declared in reply that they knew nothing of such a guarantee. So that, if it was given at all, it must have been given privately, and without any warrant, by the writer of the pamphlet himself, or by Mr. Rhodes. The statement made in the pamphlet was calculated to do Sir Charles Warren much injury in England, as to his character and good faith; and it is only fair to state explicitly that he knew absolutely nothing of any promise or guarantee to Van Niekerk till after the publication of the pamphlet in question,—the apparent object of which was to secure by such methods the recall of Sir Charles Warren from South Africa.

In reality the action, which was taken by Sir Charles Warren simply as a matter of duty, turned out to be highly advantageous in the interest of the Expedition. A glance at the map will show that it was better that freebooting

and its friends should be brought to book at Vryburg than at Rooi Grond; and it presented a clearer issue when freebooters were tried for the murder of one of themselves, and a Cape Colonist, rather than for the murder of Mr. Bethell, with whose family Sir Charles Warren is connected by marriage,—a connection, by the way, which was exaggerated when the anti-English paper in Capetown said that Sir Charles was coming out to avenge the death of his nephew! The case really tried and decided by the arrest and examination of Van Niekerk was, the Queen *versus* the enemies of the Imperial Government and supremacy in South Africa, —peaceful progress *versus* freebooting and reactionary policy. To bring about this issue was the highest service which Sir Charles Warren and his Force could render to South Africa, and especially to the wretched Stellalanders, whose poverty in some cases had led to cringing servility to the evil men who had seized on the management of their affairs.

The examination of Van Niekerk was conducted by his own officers only, and was never of a very severe or thorough nature. I found when I reached Vryburg that there was a strong inclination on the part of the Stellaland Attorney-General abruptly and prematurely to close the case. The expected arrival of a most important eye and ear witness induced even such officials to continue the examination and receive this additional evidence. But the determination of the Stellaland officials to treat Celliers as a prisoner and not as Queen's evidence, showed at once that the case was really being tried by Stellaland law and in accordance with the views of Stellaland officials, although there was military occupation; and that these officials were fully exercising their civil rights as if military rule had not been proclaimed; and it showed also with equal clearness that it was not the intention of the Stellaland officials to take the course most surely calculated to bring out the facts of the case known to Celliers as the messenger between Van Niekerk and Groot Adriaan Delarey. It was a clever stroke of political business to insist upon the prosecution of Celliers as well as Van Niekerk, as it shut his mouth from giving evidence.

DEATH OF JAMES HONEY—PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION OF VAN NIEKERK AND CELLIERS AT VRYBURG. II. 150

Captain Bower informed Sir Charles Warren in the letter from which I have quoted that the spot where the body of Honey was found had been placed in the Transvaal by the London Convention. This boundary-line had been lost sight of by Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower, but both now found reason to make mention of it. Van Niekerk and Delarey could govern or misgovern Stellaland from the Hart River district, despite the boundary-line; but if the connection of these men with a murder was inquired into, it was remembered at once that the district in question was really not in Stellaland! It was now decided by the Stellaland Court to adjourn, in order to determine formally and conclusively the place in which the murder was committed. How this was done I cannot say; whether the Stellaland authorities decided that the death of Honey must have taken place where his body was found, or whether they took the testimony of some of the twenty-eight men who were present on the morning of the 10th February two years before, I am not aware. The result of this inquiry as to the locality was, that the Stellaland Court came to the decision that the place in which the murder had been committed was in Bechuanaland, but not in Stellaland.

The Stellaland authorities having discharged the prisoners, they were at once arrested by Major Lowe, Special Magistrate for Bechuanaland, acting under orders from Sir Charles Warren, in accordance with an Act of Parliament (26 and 27 Vict. Chap. XXXV.) relative to the trial of criminals in the Cape Colony, for crimes committed by British subjects in native territories south of the 26th degree of latitude. The evidence was accordingly retaken, and the prisoners Van Niekerk and Celliers were handed over to the Colonial authorities along with the evidence. Van Niekerk was speedily released. Celliers was also released after some time, the loyal man suffering more than the open enemy of the Imperial Government. The Colonial Public Prosecutor did not find evidence enough to warrant him to go on with these cases. This would probably have been the decision of the Stellaland Court also, if it had not come to the conclusion that the crime was not committed in Stellaland.

Eye-witnesses had been spirited away. One forthcoming eye-witness of the actual murder was not able to speak clearly as to Van Niekerk's written order. The men whose hands had actually done the deed had fled into the Transvaal and were not forthcoming. The witness who was on the spot, and could have confirmed the evidence given as to the actual killers of Honey, and who knew about the order for his death, was kept in the position of a prisoner himself, both in Bechuanaland and in the Cape Colony.

The release of Van Niekerk and Celliers was supposed by short-sighted men to be a condemnation of what Sir Charles Warren had done in arresting him. This was in no sense true. Adverse critics spoke of it as an "abortive prosecution," a failure, and so on. This was only foolish talk. Such criticism went on the supposition that the real object was to secure the hanging of Van Niekerk. Now the examination had no motive of vengeance or personal feeling in any way. The release of Van Niekerk, the flight of Delarey, the absence of the other tools of the freebooters, had been sad calamities, if the desire had been to hang some or all of them. But these events were not adverse when viewed as Sir Charles Warren viewed them.

The view of Sir Charles Warren is given as follows:—

"The arrest of those accused of the murder of Honey (including Niekerk) at once changed the aspect of affairs, and in a fortnight after that event the excitement in the Cape Colony and the adjoining territories began rapidly to subside, although some of the politicians of Capetown by their action kept it up to some extent" (4588, 53).

Freebooting itself had been effectually arrested and dethroned and disgraced; it had been proved to be the false, cruel, oppressive, and murderous system which the freebooters of both Goshen and Stellaland knew it in their hearts to be.

When Van Niekerk was released, the High Commissioner conceived it to be his duty to inform the Secretary of State of the fact, and took occasion to assert that the prosecution of Van Niekerk "had done much to excite distrust in the British Government throughout the Dutch population in South Africa" (4588, 30). This letter of the High

Commissioner led to the dignified and guarded remark from Her Majesty's Secretary of State, that—

He was "glad to learn that the criminal charge had not been established against a person with whom Her Majesty's representatives had held friendly official relations" (4588, 35).

It is implied in the statement of the High Commissioner that the Dutch-speaking colonists would object, and had objected, to the examination of one of their number for the murder of an English colonist. It is to be regretted that Her Majesty's High Commissioner allowed himself to make such a statement concerning the Dutch-speaking Cape Colonists; a greater insult to them, or a more groundless charge, could not have been penned. Our whole contact with Van Niekerk, as a Government, was a mistake; and the fact that, in the circumstances which we have related, the preliminary examination did not encourage the Colonial Public Prosecutór to go on with the case against him, left the connection of Van Niekerk and his comrades with the death of James Honey, as indissoluble as it was in their own minds, when they joined in the sham sentence of outlawry upon the comrade whom they had killed two days before. As Captain Bower justly remarked, this sham outlawry of Honey by Van Niekerk and those acting with him, caused the crime to assume a different complexion (4432, 61). No washing or white-washing can change the nature of the action of the 10th February 1883. Sir Hercules Robinson, in common with most other people, might be personally glad that Van Niekerk had got off; but many will seriously question whether Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa ought to have entertained, much less formally expressed, views which might effectually discourage other public officers from arresting, without fear or favour, men charged with crime. If Her Majesty's Government, in entering such a country as Bechuanaland, cannot arrest a man like Van Niekerk or Delarey or James Honey, its highest right to be in that country at all is denied to it. Most unfortunately, this high and impartial attitude was entirely lost sight of, on this whole question, by Sir Hercules Robinson.

CHAPTER VI

SIR CHARLES WARREN AND THE LAND SETTLEMENT

THE Bechuanaland military telegraph was carried as far north as Mafiking, and afterwards—temporarily—to Molepolole. During this time 346 miles of telegraph were in working order, with nineteen offices. Captain Jelf, R.E., superintended the construction and afterwards the administration of this most useful work. He was always at the front himself, but, of course, never out of communication with his men. The work was carried on methodically, and the men were evidently giving hearty as well as intelligent service. The Bechuanaland telegraph, in its construction and administration, was certainly most creditable to Captain Jelf and his officers and men. And not the least noticeable feature was the invariable politeness and kindness of those who were in charge of the various telegraph-offices. Sometimes people came to telegraph who had never done such a thing before, and they could not have fallen into better or more friendly hands. One of the best "hits" of a friend of mine, who often saw the funny side of things in Bechuanaland, had reference to the new telegraph. Some one wanted to see the General, who was usually easily accessible at certain hours. On this occasion, however, he was pronounced by my friend to be engaged; and the explanation which he volunteered, when the visit was afterwards mentioned to the General was, that no one consulting the "Jelf-ic (Delphic) oracle" should be interrupted. The Special Commissioner had been telegraphing to the High Commissioner at the time.

The enterprise of Baron Reuter's agency in Capetown had despatched a representative to Bechuanaland, who preceded the Expedition, and visited the various points of interest at an early date, describing the condition of Rooi Grond and Kunwana, with the result of the visit of President Kruger to the freebooters of Goshen, and the doings of Mr. Rhodes at Vryburg before the arrival there of Sir Charles Warren. His early communications were, no doubt, forwarded to the northern telegraph terminus of the Colony by such means as he could procure; but after the military telegraph was laid down, the Colonial papers were served more regularly and with more recent intelligence, as "Reuter" was accorded the privilege of using the line. When the difference took place between Sir Charles Warren and Mr. Rhodes at Vryburg, some of Reuter's messages were unpleasant reading to the friends of Mr. Rhodes; and the Cape paper which had identified itself with Mr. Rhodes throughout, began to throw discredit upon the reports of Reuter's agent sent by the military wire—there was a "censorship," and so on. This was indignantly denied by the agent of Reuter in Bechuanaland. The *Cape Argus*, however, afterwards returned to the charge, announcing now that the agent for "Reuter" was no other than a servant of the General, and an illiterate person to boot! leaving its readers to imagine who was the true telegrapher of "Reuter's" communications from Bechuanaland. Some one had been hoaxing the Cape editor; for the person indicated by him was indeed with the General in Bechuanaland, but had probably never had anything to do with a news-telegram in his life. But the more successful the Special Commissioner was in Bechuanaland, the fewer were the startling items for the newspapers; the agent could not report engagements and slaughter which did not take place, and which it was every one's effort, if possible, to prevent. As to the rules of a military telegraph line, they are, of course, well known to be strict military rules. Thus, if a sutler proposed to send a telegraphic order for something forbidden in the camp, the fact would, no doubt, be reported. If information were proposed to be telegraphed tending to defeat

or impede some object of the Expedition, that would also be made known. If opinions were proposed to be expressed, all along the military line, directly subversive of confidence, order, and discipline in the Force, no doubt that also would be reported; and the messages, in all such cases, would not be sent. Of course no one intending to send such messages would attempt to use for their transmission a military line; and if Reuter's agent had thought it his duty to join the Cape junto in denouncing Sir Charles Warren and all his ways, he could have done so, and have sent his messages as he did before the telegraph was laid down. That he saw no reason for such measures is shown by his joining the head-quarters' camp, after he had seen what was to be seen; and by his choosing to remain in the camp, and to send his communications along the military wire.

Questions connected with the settlement of land in Bechuanaland came before Sir Charles Warren at a very early date. It was his opinion that with the staff of able men around him, who had come into the country with minds perfectly free from bias or prejudice, he would be able, with the sanction of the High Commissioner and of Her Majesty's Government, to constitute a Land Commission or Land Court, before which all the conflicting claims could be brought, with a view to consideration and settlement. As the reader is aware, the native chiefs had from the first requested such help in the settlement of these perplexing questions; but the High Commissioner had strongly objected to this course, holding that such difficulties would be faced by the Government of the Cape Colony, after annexation. Once more Sir Hercules Robinson discouraged the idea of actively settling Bechuanaland affairs, with the intention of handing over the hard work to the Cape Colony, as if an unsettled Bechuanaland would be most acceptable to the Cape Colony. This was not the view of Sir Charles Warren, nor was it the view of Her Majesty's Government in sending out the Expedition. It was quite evident that a land settlement was absolutely necessary to the idea of the pacification of the country, which was the specific mission of Sir Charles and his Force. The work lay to Sir Charles's hand; and

with his staff of officers, he was in a position to see it carried through. But the High Commissioner objected that sovereignty in land was still vested in native chiefs; and that it would be inconvenient to move in the matter till annexation had taken place and Crown titles could be issued. "A more proper course, in my opinion," said the High Commissioner, "would be to ascertain the territorial rights of the chiefs, and then to leave the chiefs and their Councils to decide on the claims to land within their territories" (4432, 15). This was proposing the continuance of the very state of things in Bechuanaland which had produced the confusion in land-titles. Sir Charles Warren pointed out (4432, 46) that it would be almost impossible to define tribal boundaries, and the definition would be of no practical value when made, in the circumstances of the country. What was wanted was not to define the tribal position or territories of chiefs, but to settle the rival and disputed claims to certain fountains and plots of land, all over the country. The chiefs were all glad to be under the Protectorate, and would agree to the decision of such a Court. Sir Charles also reminded the High Commissioner that the power which had been exercised so freely by Mr. Rhodes in Stellaland, in endorsing so-called native titles, could be exercised in other parts of Bechuanaland in endorsing other native titles. Thus, when annexation afterwards took place, the land question would already have been settled; and the endorsement of the British Land Commission, held with the sanction of the chiefs and of the Imperial Government, would secure Imperial or Colonial titles when the time came to issue these. Sir Hercules Robinson said that if a Land Commission sat, its decisions must be submitted to the Colonial Government, so as to secure its approval (4432, 47). Sir Charles pointed to the case of Goshen, where the great body of the claimants had already been promised their land by the Cape Ministers,—an arrangement which the Expedition was sent out to prevent. It was, therefore, obvious that if the Expedition was not to be a fiasco, it was necessary that the land question should be cleared up by the Imperial Government, before Bechuanaland

was annexed to the Cape Colony (4432, 83). There can be no doubt that Her Majesty's Government expected that Sir Charles Warren was entering upon the consideration of the land question; and that the settlement which he came to, guided by the decisions of his officers, was one that should be upheld, not only by Her Majesty's Government, but by the Colonial Government. The Secretary of State indeed would seem to have looked forward to a probable, or rather an absolutely certain, difference between Sir Charles's settlement and that which had been proposed by the Cape Ministers; for Lord Derby expressed the hope that "no minor differences would make the Colony hesitate to accept Warren's arrangements" (4432, 69).

The High Commissioner having, on the 23d March, informed the Secretary of State that the Cape Ministers were desirous of finding out the wishes of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony, in order that they might frame their policy, the Secretary of State replied on the 28th March—

"That Her Majesty's Government continued to consider it desirable to bring Bechuanaland and Kalahari under the control of the Cape Colony as soon as possible, due provision being made for native interests; and that Parliament had advanced a loan for the construction of the railway between the Orange River and Kimberley in confidence that no minor differences would make the Colony hesitate to accept Warren's arrangements" (4432, 69).

The High Commissioner, armed with this statement, approached his Ministers on the 30th, with a view to secure their good offices in bringing about the speedy annexation of Bechuanaland. The reply of the Ministers on the 7th April (4432, 140) may be said once more to have shut out all hope of speedy annexation. They denied point-blank that the loan of money for the construction of the railway in question had had any connection with the annexation to the colony of Bechuanaland—the question had never been mentioned in the negotiations. On the contrary, the uncertainty of annexation had been mentioned; also the direct interest of the Imperial Government in the proposed railway, in the conveyance of troops, supplies, and the munitions of war.

The Ministers then reverted to their minute of the 26th July and their Goshen provisional arrangement of the 22d November, "neither of which proposals," they added, "were assented to by Her Majesty's Government." Ministers added that they were unaware of the arrangements which the Special Commissioner was making; and upon these would depend their action as to bringing forward a bill for annexation in the next Colonial Parliament (4432, 141). This having been communicated to the Secretary of State, he replied on the 7th May, agreeing to the reasonableness of the stipulation that Ministers must first know what land arrangements Sir Charles Warren was making in Bechuanaland, and that the Special Commissioner should be desired by the High Commissioner to furnish a report on "the proposals which it may be expected that he has by this time matured" (4432, 156).

After he had been some two months in Bechuanaland, and had made himself thoroughly master of its affairs as Special Commissioner, Sir Charles Warren made a report on the subject for the information of Her Majesty's Government. This document was sent through the High Commissioner, who thought fit to cover it with remarks of his own to the following effect:—

"GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CAPETOWN,
"*April* 1, 1885.

"The Right Hon. the Earl of Derby, K.G.

"MY LORD—I have the honour to enclose, for your information, a copy of a despatch received from Major-General Sir Charles Warren, reporting on the recent position of affairs in Bechuanaland.

"It is of course not possible that Sir Charles Warren can have any personal knowledge of the circumstances which he relates. The account given by him is similar to what I have already myself heard from Mr. Mackenzie, and, having had an opportunity of hearing both sides, I am unable to admit its correctness.

"The narrative given by Sir Charles Warren comments unfavourably on Mr. Rhodes's action in Stellaland, and it would be in accordance with the usual practice if I were to give Mr. Rhodes an opportunity of making an explanation. I think, however, that to do so would very possibly initiate a correspondence which might easily become acrimonious, and could not be of any benefit to the public service.

"It is of no public importance to ascertain whether Mr. Rhodes

or Mr. Mackenzie has acted with the greater wisdom. Nor is it of advantage to discuss whether Mr. Rhodes or Mr. Mackenzie's agreement is the most beneficial to Her Majesty's Government. The important point is that an agreement was made by Mr. Rhodes at a time when there was no Imperial military force available. This agreement was approved by your Lordship, and Sir Charles Warren telegraphed to Mr. Niekerk promising to respect it.

"I think, therefore, that if the agreement made when there was no force available be now repudiated, when the troops are in the country, such an act would justify an accusation of bad faith on the part of Her Majesty's Government.—I have, etc.,

(Signed) "HERCULES ROBINSON,
"*High Commissioner.*"

The letter of the Special Commissioner, on which these strictures were made, was in the following terms (4432, 107 and 108):—

"MAFIKING, *March* 20, 1885.

"SIR—I have the honour to report, for the information of the Secretary of State, upon the recent position of affairs in Bechuanaland.

"At the time (May 1884) Mr. Mackenzie arrived in Stellaland as Deputy Commissioner the Convention of 27th February 1884 had not been ratified by the Transvaal, and there were two portions of Stellaland—one under British protection, the other not yet under the Transvaal, theoretically under the chiefs Massow and Mankoroane, but practically under a sort of crude Republic administered by a party.

"It being uncertain then whether Stellaland would be eventually divided, Mr. Mackenzie made his agreement with the representatives of the people of Stellaland as a whole, and promised them the farms allotted to the original volunteers, or land in lieu, subject to the examination of their claims by a Land Commission. It has been stated that there was at the time a difference of opinion between the Volks Committee and the Volksraad on the subject, but it has been ascertained that the persons who transacted business with Mr. Mackenzie represented both Volksraad and Volks Committee. At the time this agreement was first made, Mr. Niekerk was appointed to and accepted the post of Special Assistant Commissioner, but he subsequently precipitately retired towards the Transvaal, and during the month of July attempted to hold meetings in the eastern side of Stellaland hostile towards the Protectorate, and on the 16th July succeeded in getting together a hostile meeting at his farm, Niekerk's Rust.

"On 28th July the flag of the British Protectorate was hoisted at Vryburg by the loyal people of Stellaland, among whom was a large number of farmers.

"On the 30th July Niekerk held a meeting on the Hart River, where a portion of the eastern Stellalanders, outside the Protectorate, repudiated Mr. Mackenzie's action and the Protectorate.

"This took place only ten days before the ratification of the Con-

vention of the Transvaal, that is to say, the persons living in territory about to be taken over by the Transvaal, and wholly outside the Protectorate, took upon themselves to legislate for, and to repudiate the action of the Deputy Commissioner within the Protectorate, knowing that those within the Protectorate wished for British rule, and to abide by Mr. Mackenzie's agreement.

"The ratification of the Convention took place on 8th August, on which day the people on the eastern side of the Convention line became subjects of the Transvaal, and should have been governed by the South African Republic. Thus Niekerk and his hostile party were entirely cut off from the Protectorate.

"Just at this critical time a change was made in the Deputy Commissionership, and Mr. Rhodes, a Member of the late Cape Ministry, pledged to certain Colonial views, and, judging from his public utterances, pledged to eliminate the Imperial factor, was sent to take the place of Mr. Mackenzie.

"It does not appear that he had any written instructions, neither does it appear that he was aware of the Secretary of State's explicit orders regarding the demarcation of the Convention line, February 1884.

"Mr. Mackenzie left Vryburg on 4th August, meeting Mr. Rhodes on the road to Taung, and then informed him that there were grave charges against Niekerk, of which he had become aware since his succession, and begged him not on any account to have any dealings with Niekerk.

"He stated that, from his point of view, Stellaland was pacified, and that Goshen was the great difficulty.

"There can be no doubt that Mr. Mackenzie was right in this matter, that Stellaland under the Protectorate was perfectly peaceful, and that disturbances were only likely to arise from the admixture of Niekerk and his party from the Transvaal in the affairs of the Protectorate.

"Instead of acting on Mr. Mackenzie's advice, both Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower ignored the Convention line, and appear to have proceeded into the Transvaal, where they threw themselves into the arms of Niekerk's hostile party. Captain Bower was present at a very stormy meeting of Transvaal Boers with a few Stellalanders, and then his life was threatened. Under these circumstances he laid the groundwork for an agreement in which Mr. Rhodes subsequently concurred, and the adhesion to which has caused and will cause most serious complications in the settlement of Bechuanaland. It has been stated that this agreement was an improvement on that made by Mr. Mackenzie, but this can only be said from a Transvaal point of view. The loyals one and all say it only put money into the pockets of the Transvaalers; and it is obvious to an Imperial servant that the agreement rendered the just solution of Stellaland affairs a most difficult matter; in fact, it simply gave to a band of marauders what they asked, while Mr. Mackenzie's agreement only promised land after due scrutiny into titles.

"At the same time, Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes, by some action which I do not understand, resuscitated the Stellaland Republic, which had lapsed under Mr. Mackenzie, and again put up the Stellaland Republic flag, and resuscitated the Stellaland officials drawn from the Transvaal who had repudiated Mr. Mackenzie, and shown themselves hostile to the Crown. For more than six months the loyal people of Stellaland have been cowed and coerced by this foreign Government established in the Transvaal by the Deputy Commissioner; a Government whose principal acts have been intimidation and attempts to crush out the loyalty of the people.

"I have to point out that the people of Stellaland, represented by the Select Committee, addressed a solemn protest to Mr. Rhodes against his going into the Transvaal and negotiating with Mr. Niekerk concerning the affairs of Stellaland on the following grounds:—

"(*a*) That he, Niekerk, had been deposed from office.
"(*b*) That he was in opposition to Her Majesty's rule.
"(*c*) That he did not represent the public.
"(*d*) That he was a Transvaal subject, and inhabited the Transvaal.

"For '(*d*)' might have been substituted that Niekerk, as a British subject, was guilty of sedition by his acts.

"I can find no reason why these troubles should have been brought on Stellaland, and I am quite unable to comprehend why Mr. Rhodes should have been placed in a position independent of me and my work, it being quite impracticable to separate Stellaland from the rest of Bechuanaland.

"I have noticed with much concern that your Excellency has somewhat supported Mr. Rhodes in his action in Stellaland. I beg to state most emphatically that it will be next to impossible for Her Majesty's Special Commissioner to do substantial justice in the very difficult and complicated cases which occur in Bechuanaland, if he does not receive the cordial support and assistance of the High Commissioner.

"I have also to point out that there is great danger that the money spent on this Expedition will be entirely thrown away if the interested policy of Colonial politicians is permitted to make way against the Imperial policy, and that it is useless to turn the freebooters out of Goshen if the Cape politicians are to be allowed to put them back again.—I have, etc.,

(Signed) "CHARLES WARREN,
"*Special Commissioner in Bechuanaland.*

"His Excellency
The Right Hon. Sir Hercules Robinson, G.C.M.G.,
High Commissioner for South Africa."

Now it was one thing for the High Commissioner in Capetown to be buoyed up by the misleading statements of

my successors, and to come to the conclusion that their assertions were facts, and their opinions were well founded and worthy of his acceptance. He says he heard the two sides, and he preferred the statements of Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower. He was shut up to follow some guidance, having himself no personal knowledge of the country or its people, and he made his choice. But it was quite another thing when Sir Charles Warren—beginning in Capetown with the High Commissioner himself, and with Mr. Rhodes and Captain Bower; and afterwards leisurely traversing Bechuanaland, personally meeting the Stellalanders of both parties, and of no party—in the end formed his opinions on the inquiries and observations which he had made among whites and among natives. His deliverance on evidence thus obtained occupies a higher ground than the opinion of the High Commissioner; for besides having the benefit of the opinions of officers, the Special Commissioner had the advantage of intimate personal contact and acquaintance with the people and the country, and thus formed opinions of his own at first-hand, which were at once reliable and authoritative. The reader of my story sees that my statements of fact, and my views of necessary policy, received the endorsement and approval of a man so shrewd, so just, and so straightforward as Sir Charles Warren, after careful examination on the spot.

On no question were the views of the High Commissioner and those of the Special Commissioner so diametrically opposed as on the land settlement of Stellaland, made between Mr. Rhodes and the Hart River faction. Again and again Sir Charles Warren urged that these titles to land should also be matter of examination, but he was always met with a refusal on the part of the High Commissioner, and confronted with his own telegram to Van Niekerk of the 6th December. It was a new element in the discussion, however, when Stellaland proper, freed from the domination of the Transvaal party, declared their wish to adhere to the agreement which the Stellaland representatives had first made with me. This was done by decision of the Stellaland Bestuur on the 20th March, and by a public meeting after-

wards convened in Vryburg, the minutes of which were forwarded to the High Commissioner and to the Special Commissioner. No one could wonder at the action of the Stellalanders; it was their first opportunity of fairly expressing their true opinions, and they availed themselves of it. It was a distinct gain in the work of pacifying and settling the affairs of the country, that the representatives of the Stellalanders desired the scrutiny of a Land Commission, and were prepared to abide by the agreement which they had made when neither they, nor the Imperial officer with whom they were treating, was under any compulsion or overawing force. The views of the Bestuur, the remarks of Sir Charles Warren strongly supporting them, and the despatches of the High Commissioner vehemently upholding the settlement by Mr. Rhodes, having been considered by the Secretary of State, his decision was announced on the 30th May in the following words :—

"I have to request that you will inform Sir Charles Warren that in the view of Her Majesty's Government the Stellaland titles must be generally recognised and upheld, but that the decision to uphold them in accordance with Mr. Rhodes's agreement of the 8th September last would not justify the maintenance of a title in any exceptional case of flagrant coercion or unfairness; and that if any such cases exist he should report the circumstances for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government; but that no detailed investigation need take place into the titles generally, which appear to rest on the basis of arrangements no longer open to question" (4432, 204).

As in the other deliverances between the two Commissioners, Her Majesty's Government here tried to steer a middle course. One Commissioner reminded them that their first duty in the country was the effectual protection of those for whose sake the Protectorate was established. Another Commissioner informed them of an agreement purporting to have been made in Stellaland and with Stellalanders, which ignored the Imperial Protectorate, cancelled all its doings, and ratified unexamined a number of land claims. The first Commissioner produced the repudiation by the Stellalanders themselves of this action by Mr. Rhodes, as having been transacted by him out of Stellaland, after formal protest by the Stellaland representatives, with men who at the

time were unrecognised in Stellaland as Stellaland officials; and who trusted for their support not to Stellaland, but to the hostile Transvaal. These undeniable facts seem to have had some weight, and Her Majesty's Government at once gave up the high ground claimed by the High Commissioner for the agreement made by Mr. Rhodes. It was conceded that there might be, in certain circumstances, examination and report upon claims made under this settlement; it was not a thing to be blindly ratified. But the question of what appeared to be practical utility would seem to have come in. If the settlement were to be worked out under the auspices of Sir Charles Warren, his contentions and those of the Stellalanders, as expressed by the Bestuur, might be followed. If, on the other hand, the settlement was to be worked out under the auspices of Sir Hercules Robinson, and in connection with the Cape Colony, then it would be inadvisable to go against a thing upon which he had so much set his heart as upon Mr. Rhodes's agreement. The Secretary of State, however, declared that "flagrant coercion or unfairness" was not to be tolerated by Her Majesty's Government even in the sacred agreement of the 8th September. The inviolable nature of the obligation (which, as I have shown, never really existed) was thus disacknowledged by Her Majesty's Government; the peace and success of the Protectorate was the first question; the agreement of the 8th September would be followed after that had been fully secured. Cases of flagrant coercion and unfairness were not few or difficult to find, although, unfortunately, they had escaped the observation of both Captain Bower and Mr. Rhodes. We shall see how they were disclosed and reported to Her Majesty's Government, the fight in behalf of the wronged people of the Protectorate being no longer with freebooters, but with misguided servants of the Crown.

A previous declaration on the land settlement had been made by the Secretary of State on the 14th May (4432, 187). In that letter he endeavoured at once to answer the High Commissioner and the Special Commissioner, and to show where he concurred with the one or the other, or both. He said it appeared to him that both Commissioners held

that a settlement of the land claims in question was only possible after independent investigation and report by British officers. This of course was diametrically opposed to the view of Sir Hercules Robinson, which, as we have seen, was that everything must be left unsettled by Sir Charles Warren, and that the settlement must be committed to the Cape Parliament. As titles which might be issued after this investigation by British officers would issue in the name of the chief or chief in council (the soil being still native soil), and hearing from the High Commissioner that there was good prospect of speedy annexation, the Secretary of State concurred with Sir H. Robinson that it was better to defer the appointment of this Land Commission until the question of immediate annexation had been considered by the Cape Parliament. But he expressed his strong adherence to Sir C. Warren's views as stated in his memorandum of October 1884,—views which, in fact, appeared to the Secretary of State to be those of Sir H. Robinson also. In the method of examination into titles proposed by Sir C. Warren the Secretary of State saw no difficulty. The good faith of the land transactions would have to be proved to the satisfaction of the British officers appointed to examine into them—on which their validity would be upheld.

Sir Charles Warren, in urging upon Her Majesty's Government the necessity for a Land Commission, the labours of which would include every part of Bechuanaland, stated that numerous cases of flagrant injustice and coercion were already known to him in connection with Mr. Rhodes's agreement, and demanded inquiry. Early in August Sir Charles Warren appointed a Committee to inquire thoroughly into this very important matter. Seven gentlemen were selected for this work, every one of whom brought to it special qualifications. Major Lowe and Major Harrel had previous acquaintance with Bechuanaland; and the duties of both had recently brought them into close contact with the natives and the farmers. The whole recent history of the land question in Mankoroane's country was known to Major Lowe officially. Three officers of Engineers were selected—one of whom, Captain C. R. Conder, R.E., had

himself gone over a large part of the country, and was possessed of very valuable local information. Captain Leverson, R.E., of the Intelligence Department, had also a considerable amount of local information. As Secretary to the Special Commissioner, Lieutenant A. E. Haynes, R.E., had had special opportunities of becoming acquainted with the documentary aspect of the question. Captain Trotter, R.A., of the Intelligence Department, and Acting Special Commissioner in Stellaland, was minutely acquainted with the farmers' side of the question. Of this specially qualified Committee I was appointed chairman.

The Committee sat at Taung, and the meetings extended over several days. Valuable documentary evidence was supplied by Captain Conder on the Barolong country, and also on Stellaland; by Major Lowe on the condition of the Batlaping; by Major Harrel on the treatment of natives; and Captain Leverson furnished his own observations, and those of Captain Thornton and Lieutenant Wemyss, on Stellaland. There was also correspondence bearing on the question, and the Committee examined six Europeans who were then at Taung—every one of whom was well acquainted with the country, having resided in it many years. One was the Rev. J. Brown of the London Missionary Society, who had been in the country nineteen years. Mr. van der Merwe was a Dutch-speaking colonist who had been employed in collecting salt in one of the "salt-pans" near Mamusa, and who had also traded in Bechuanaland, in salt, and in other things. He had been in the country for nine years. Mr. M'Carthy had lived in Taung for nine years, and in Bechuanaland as a travelling trader for ten years previously. Mr. O'Reilly, the discoverer of the first South African diamond —a hunter, trader, and farmer—came into Bechuanaland first in 1856, and had resided in the country since 1860. Mr. Greef, a Cape Colonist, had been in Bechuanaland since 1857, and had traded over the whole country, having had a trading station at Rooi Grond ten years before. Mr. Metrovich had been in Bechuanaland since 1862, but had known the tribes since 1853, when he was in business in Hopetown.

There are two styles of agriculture in Bechuanaland. First there are the "rain-lands" or cultivated lands, which were entirely dependent on the rainfall of the country. This was the old agriculture. Then there was the higher agriculture connected with irrigation. This had been practised only since the contact of the Bechuana with missionaries and other white men. Mr. O'Reilly mentioned the names of several places where irrigation was successfully carried on by natives, and where, besides maize, millet, and pumpkins, there were raised wheat, potatoes, onions, etc., and where fruit-trees were also planted. Green forage, raised by irrigation by natives, had been brought to Taung for sale to Mr. O'Reilly. When Mr. Brown came into the country there were few ploughs in it, the gardens being cultivated in the old way by the women with the hoe: now ploughs were quite common. The irrigation and improvement in agriculture was also testified to by Mr. Metrovich and Mr. Greef. Mr. M'Carthy mentioned ten or eleven places where fountains had been led out, and irrigation was successfully carried on, by the natives.

The natives examined were Jan Mohutsiwe, a headman whose lands were at Moshumankani (in Stellaland); Molema, son of the late chief Mahura and cousin of Mankoroane, whose lands were at a place called Massow (in Stellaland); Bohosing, eldest son of the late Mahura, whose place was Didibaneng (in Stellaland), where he planted fruit-trees and had grown wheat and potatoes, having constructed a water-furrow and a dam for irrigation; Motseokae, whose place was at Moeding (Tiger Kloof, in Stellaland nomenclature); Tokwe, who was headman of the villages on the Pudumo Valley (Stellaland and Transvaal). These men, besides giving evidence as to their own holdings, were able also to communicate important facts from their intimate knowledge of the country generally. The Committee were impressed by the statements of these natives, every one of whom had been impoverished by the war, and deprived of his lands by the settlement of Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner.

After hearing the European and native evidence at

considerable length with the reports and other documents laid before the Committee, and after full discussion and consideration of the various points which were raised, the Committee requested Captain Conder to draw up the draft report. This document, which shows remarkable ability and care, as well as thorough acquaintance with the details of the question, was divided into twelve separate findings. The country concerning which the Committee was reporting extended from Setlagoli and the neighbourhood of Kunwana on the north to the Cape Colony on the south; from Takong and Ganyesa on the west to Kunwana and Abel's Kop on the east, including an area of some 6500 square miles. The distribution of Batlaping land after the Convention boundary-line of the Transvaal had been laid down, was—

In British Stellaland . . .	4000	square miles.
In Transvaal do. . . .	1000	" "
Batlaping land in Stellaland (total) .	5000	" "
The Committee found also claimed for Stellaland—from Barolong Territory . .	1000	" "
	6000	" "
Balance not claimed of Batlaping land .	500	" "
Total reported on by Committee . .	6500	" "

The Committee found, both from the evidence given and their own personal knowledge, that the ground round Taung remaining to Mankoroane was very inferior in quality (especially as cultivable ground) to the country which had been taken from him by the Stellalanders. In short, the district round Taung was never sufficient to support the Batlaping population. It was shown by the evidence, supplemented by personal knowledge of the Committee, that the country referred to, which is now included in Stellaland, had been absolutely necessary to the support of the Batlaping tribe. An evident injustice was thus done to the tribe as a whole, when it was "coerced" into relinquishing this country. It is clear from the evidence that the Batlaping had, for many years previous to the events of 1882, been

increasing in material prosperity and civilisation, that the area of cultivation was increasing, and the native trade constantly extending. It was shown by the evidence of a trader that as many as 12,000 sacks of grain were sold in 1881 to four traders alone in the country north of Taung. This fruitful region was occupied partly by residents in Taung, who had lands and cattle stations there, and partly by others of the tribe who had left Taung to reside permanently in villages at Morokane and its neighbourhood.[1] The Committee found that these districts were not hunting-grounds, but cattle-grazing places and important centres of native cultivation. The Committee reported that the present condition of Mankoroane's tribe was one of extreme and increasing destitution. A proportion of eight-tenths of the lands had been lost, and a number of cattle, estimated at from 30,000 to 60,000 head, were seized during the disturbances. The greater part of the tribe was now crowded in the immediate neighbourhood of Taung, living from hand to mouth. The main part of the tribe still remained together, expecting an equitable land settlement, which would restore them, if not to their former condition of prosperity, at least to one of possible existence. The Committee felt it their duty to state that this condition of affairs had been brought about by the encroachments of the Stellalanders, who had gradually taken possession of a district occupied by a pastoral and agricultural population, transforming that population into vagrants of a most unhappy description, and who now proposed to eject them completely from their lands. Unless steps were promptly taken disturbances were likely to occur. The obligation of Government to provide for this vagrant population was, in the opinion of the Committee, one which the people of Stellaland would recognise and respect. There was necessity for prompt action to relieve the actual destitution. The Committee disapproved of doling out food

[1] The manner in which the more distant stations from Taung had to be relinquished first, during the war, was described in Captain Conder's report from information obtained by him from the native owners. He also gave the names of those native farms which had been occupied and cultivated in the season of 1883, and the crop of which was standing in the gardens in 1884, when the Protectorate was first announced.

in charity as had been done, and rather recommended useful public works such as well-sinking or dam-making.

The Committee then gave their specific recommendation as to the restitution of Batlaping lands, which, after much deliberation, they decided should be in a block northward of Taung, and form part of the Taung district.[1] This area, including about twenty-five Stellaland farms, was the least which—along with increased cultivation in the district south of Stellaland—could, in the opinion of the Committee, be possibly made to support the large population which had to be provided for. The Committee also pointed out the great extent of valuable arable land belonging to the Batlaping which had been included in the Transvaal by the new western boundary-line of the Republic; and mentioning the fact that the Imperial Government were making friendly arrangements for such of Moshette's people as might have lands in Bechuanaland, expressed the opinion that the Transvaal Government might be expected to provide for the destitute Batlaping whose lands had fallen within the Republic.

Some practical suggestions were next given in matters of detail, as to steps which ought to be taken to carry out this decision. Whether the particular suggestion adopted by the Committee were agreed to or not by Her Majesty's Government, the Committee wished it to be clearly understood that they considered it urgent that a block of land should be placed at the disposal of the Batlaping in time for the approaching ploughing season. The conclusion of the report was as follows:—

"The injustice done to the tribe, as a whole, renders it, in the opinion of the Committee, unnecessary that each case of coercion and injustice should be gone into at length in their report. Two thousand families have been driven from their homes and deprived of their means of subsistence; and the chief Mankoroane points out in his

[1] Captain Trotter agreed with the rest of the Committee in everything except as to the policy of giving back some of the farms included in the block indicated by the Committee. He recommended that farms from another well-known district in Stellaland—that of Morokane and Molelaring—should be given back to their native owners instead of certain farms within the native block which were of exceptional value, and on which large sums of money had already been expended by European farmers.

letter that the English force has, by its presence, hitherto rather forwarded than restrained the perpetration of this injustice by acting as a protection to his assailants rather than as a help to his people to regain part at least of their country. It appears, as detailed in Captain Conder's report, that encroachments by white farmers have actually continued since the establishment of the Bechuanaland Police, and even since the arrival of the Field Force, and have only been arrested for a time through the action of Major Lowe and Captain Trotter, R.A., acting under the orders of the Special Commissioner. In the opinion of the Committee, it is time for Her Majesty's Government wisely to exercise its supreme function in Bechuanaland, and to arrange that while the people of Stellaland shall have no cause to complain as to the loss of their farms, the natives of the Protectorate shall see that the Protectorate of England is a reality, and that Mankoroane's Batlaping as well as Montsioa's Barolong have not trusted in vain to the promises of Her Majesty's Government" (4643, 21).

Sir Charles Warren forwarded this report to Her Majesty's Secretary of State, and with it the following covering letter, which was dated the 22d August:—

"With reference to your letter of 30th May requesting a report upon cases of flagrant coercion or unfairness in connection with the Stellaland titles, I have the honour to inform you that information regarding such cases was brought to me from time to time at an early date, and I have constantly urged the importance of a speedy land settlement, supposing that the facts were known to Her Majesty's Government. The startling conviction has been gradually forced upon me that the true state of affairs in Stellaland and Mankoroane's country is not known to Her Majesty's Government.

"2. In order to bring the information on the subject before Her Majesty's Government in an entirely reliable manner, I deputed seven officers to collect facts,—officers whose duties have made them most conversant with the real state of the country. The report of this Committee is now enclosed with the documents and evidence which were laid before them (4643, 16-50).

"3. I have to express my great regret that former descriptions of Bechuanaland forwarded by the High Commissioner have been so entirely misleading, having been based for the most part upon the erroneous reports of Captain Bower and the loose reports of Mr. Cecil Rhodes.

"4. The report of the Committee is not merely concerning a few cases of coercion and hardship, but brings to light coercion and injustice harrowing in detail, extending to some 2000 people who, in the ignorance of facts on the part of Her Majesty's Government, and actually under its auspices, have been reduced to complete destitution and homelessness.

"5. The Committee make suggestions which may to some extent repair the injury inflicted, and I trust that immediate steps may be

taken on their behalf. Apart from the positive injustice to these persons which should be redressed, I have to point out that the wrongs inflicted on them may lead to a serious conflict between races in those parts, unless redress is given, and also that the knowledge of their present treatment has a most damaging effect upon the tribes to the north recently taken under British protection."

As was to have been expected, this report produced due impression in Downing Street, where the condition of the Batlaping tribe was not officially known. The Secretary of State, Colonel the Right Hon. F. A. Stanley (now Lord Stanley of Preston), informed the High Commissioner on the subject:—

"I have on previous occasions reminded you of the necessity of making fair and adequate provision for the requirements of the natives, and I am confident that you fully understand that Her Majesty's Government would not be able to approve any settlement not complying with this condition" (4643, 59).

CHAPTER VII

THE MARCH TO MAFIKING

WHILST he was still in the Cape Colony, representatives of several of the Bechuana chiefs were sent to meet Sir Charles Warren and to welcome him. Moshette was represented among the rest, and his felicitations were as warm as those of the others—although evidently accompanied by fear on his part that he might suffer some penalty for his action, from his neighbours and professed allies in the Transvaal. As Sir Charles moved northward, he was met on the road by numbers of natives with empty waggons, asking for employment as riders of transport (carriers). A good many of these men were hired at Vryburg by the Commissariat Department. This fact was thus mentioned at a certain mess:—

"I say, if what I hear is true, we shall have a lively time of it now. The Commissariat people have engaged a number of Barrel-organ (Barolong) waggons to take loads to Mafiking." It was proposed to turn the punster out, but it was ruled that he looked too hungry to bear such punishment.

Before proceeding northward from Vryburg, Sir Charles Warren made provision for the peace of the districts which he was thus leaving behind. Captain Harrel (having now the local rank of Major) was despatched to the south-western part of Bechuanaland—his headquarters being at Takong and Motito. In case of disturbance this appointment would have been of the first importance, as Major Harrel and his troop of the 1st Mounted Rifles (Methuen's Horse) held the country between certain districts of the Cape Colony and

Rooi Grond. As Major Harrel had previously made the acquaintance of the chiefs in this district of Bechuanaland, they welcomed him and his men as friends. The various chiefs waited on Major Harrel at Motito, and fully reported to him the state of their districts; and these reports were duly forwarded from time to time for the information of the Special Commissioner. "Another despatch from the Tycoon of Takong!" was a not infrequent exclamation from the pleasant and able officer who received these communications at headquarters. Some of the headmen were so gratified at the appearance of the Expedition in their country that, having greeted Major Harrel, they were not satisfied till they reached headquarters and paid their respects to Sir Charles Warren himself. It was a satisfaction to me also, again to meet these people in Sir Charles Warren's company.

The difficulties of Major Harrel's district were greatly caused by one or two white men, who, being afraid that their claims to land and to other "perquisites" might not be ratified, were doing what they could to stir up strife and opposition among the natives; and were also in the meantime removing from the country as fast as they could anything which was movable and saleable. To meet the case of these disturbers of the peace, the cutting and carrying from South Bechuanaland of growing timber as firewood was forbidden by the Special Commissioner. Then there was much disquiet on account of the fact that certain farms had in some cases several European claimants—besides their native owners—who could show a title from Mankoroane or from some other chief. But Major Harrel was able to allay anxiety by assuring those who consulted him that the land would not be seized by force or without inquiry. As the Stellaland border came close to Takong, where part of Major Harrel's men were stationed, the peace of this district was also one of his responsibilities. Major Harrel received information of the suspected murder in this district of Stellaland by farmers, of certain natives —presumably engaged in stock-lifting. Major Harrel at once sifted the matter in the locality referred to, made arrests, and sent the prisoners and the witnesses to Vryburg.

While the story of the native witnesses was certainly calculated to excite the gravest suspicion, the authorities at Vryburg found, after the preliminary examination of the prisoners, that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the detention of the farmers, and so they were released. But the prompt arrest of these white men and their examination on this charge was not abortive of good result, although the accused were liberated: for it was thereby made apparent that once more human life was to be held sacred, and law and order were to be upheld.

Major Lowe and his police had their headquarters, as formerly, at Taung; a company was at Manyiding under Lieutenant St. Quintin, and another at Vryburg under Captain Puzey. The Major continued to exercise great influence with Mankoroane and the natives, while his men were well acquainted with the country and with its varied inhabitants. I have elsewhere stated my own belief that the peace of the only district of the Protectorate which remained under our charge before the Expedition arrived, was preserved to us, not by the agreement with Van Niekerk and Delarey made by Mr. Rhodes, but by the arrangements which Major Lowe was known to have made as head of the police. He had served under Sir Charles Warren in 1878; and gave up a very good position in the Border Police of the Cape Colony to organise the Bechuanaland Police under me in 1884.

On the knoll, near Taung, on which Major Lowe had laid out his police camp, a large and important fort was built by the Royal Engineers, added to and considerably strengthened by the Royal Scots under Colonel White, whose regimental headquarters were at Taung for some four months. Large store-sheds were erected within the fort, and supplies of all descriptions were kept here. The river passed close to the fort, and the military camp was about half a mile away on one side, while the native town was at the same distance on the other. This was the largest fort which was built by the Expedition. It was capable of holding a large number of men, and indeed it would have taken a considerable force effectually to defend it. The natives assisted with the rough labour and in clearing away the thorn-bushes which grew

around the knoll. Besides four companies of the Royal Scots, there were also three troops of Mounted Infantry commanded by Major Booth, and two guns of the Volunteer Battery under Captain Whittaker and Captain Lodge, forming the Taung garrison.

At Bank's Drift, a stage south from Taung, an excellent fort was erected by a company of the Pioneers under Captain Twycross and Lieutenant Elliott Bell, by direction of Colonel Durnford, and completed by the Royal Scots under Major Logan. A well was dug inside this fort and water was obtained. The Hart River was some six hundred yards distant from the height on which the fort was erected; but this well, had occasion arisen, would have rendered the fort independent of the river. Bank's Drift is on the southern border of Bechuanaland, and was a position of considerable importance.

The fort at Vryburg was on the ridge on which the Stellalanders' laager had stood, and conveniently near to the spring or fountain which the Batlaping called Hohodi. The village of Vryburg was half a mile on one side. The military camp was on the ridge immediately adjoining the fort. The mahatla bush was soon cleared away for firewood in the neighbourhood of the camp, where it was at first quite dense. Commissariat store-sheds were erected here also; and the Acting Special Commissioner for Stellaland (Captain Trotter, R.A.) had his quarters in the fort and his office in Vryburg. It was in this fort that Van Niekerk and Celliers were confined for some time—after the alarm had arisen that an effort to rescue the former was to be made. The fort at Vryburg occupied a strong position, and with the camp dominated the surrounding country. But it gained a bad reputation for dust-storms, which blew there nearly every day. It was always admitted, however, that Langford Camp on the Orange River was for dust unrivalled by any other locality, including even the fort at Vryburg. Colonel Walker was for some time in command at Vryburg, after the departure of Sir Charles Warren to the north. When the headquarters moved on to Mafiking, Colonel Cotton took the command; while Colonel Knox of the Pioneers, and Colonel Gough of the Diamond Fields Horse, were also stationed here.

It was said in certain quarters that Sir Charles Warren was needlessly delaying the Expedition in Vryburg on account of the examination of Mr. van Niekerk; and that the escape into the Transvaal of the Rooi Grond freebooters was attributable to this delay. There is not the shadow of foundation for this assertion, as the advance from Vryburg was made as soon as the troops had arrived there in sufficient numbers to warrant this move. Any one who looks at the map can see that it was quite impossible to surprise or to intercept the freebooters of Rooi Grond from the south, as they could always retire into the Transvaal. They were practically able to use the whole western border of the Transvaal as a base of operation. Members of their "Intelligence Department" could be sent through the Transvaal to Barkly West; while Hart River was really an outpost of Rooi Grond, with numbers of the Goshen volunteers there, ready to carry messages. The actual freebooter occupants of holdings in Montsioa's country were none of them far from the Transvaal border; so that with the information which they possessed, it was always possible for them to anticipate the advance of the Force, by retreating to a place of safety within the Transvaal border. Then the interview with President Kruger had given assurance that claims to land would be considered, and officers were nominated for the purpose. It was well known that Mr. Gey van Pittius, and the responsible heads of the Rooi Grond freebooters, were safe in the Transvaal before Sir Charles reached Stellaland, and were thus quite secure from arrest. The only chances, therefore, of securing malefactors were their extradition by the Transvaal; or their assembling in numbers to oppose the troops; unless, indeed, they should run the risk which was run by Van Niekerk and Delarey in appearing personally within the Protectorate.

Captain Trotter, R.A., of the Intelligence Department, was appointed to the difficult post of Acting Special Commissioner at Vryburg. It is needless to say that his duties required the utmost tact, straightforwardness, and firmness; it ought to be mentioned that in discharge of them, Captain Trotter secured the approval of the Special Commissioner

for whom he was acting, as well as much popularity and goodwill from the Stellalanders, with whom his duties brought him into constant contact. He was well supported by Captain Ingram and Lieutenant Scholz; and the town affairs of Vryburg were under the supervision of Captain Vincent as Commandant. The election of a Stellaland "Bestuur" or Executive was a step which Sir Charles Warren resolved on after much deliberation. He found that such an elected Executive had existed in Stellaland, and had been recognised by the High Commissioner. Mr. Rhodes had promised a fresh election, but afterwards seemed to fear the exercise of the public vote, and proposed instead to nominate a Bestuur. After his departure the election took place, the majority of those returned being the men whom I had found as the elected representatives of the Stellalanders when I first entered Stellaland. The reader is aware how faithfully these men stood by their submission and allegiance to Her Majesty's Government under persecution locally, and under obloquy and misrepresentation of no ordinary kind. Some of these men were possessed of ability as well as the advantages of education, and I believe they acted with the same faithfulness under Sir Charles Warren that they showed on the first establishment of the Protectorate. The reader must not suppose I am going out of my way to praise men, merely because others have unjustly blamed them and undervalued them. I know these persons were found by me among freebooters, and were the trusted officials and representatives of freebooters. But they submitted to the Queen, when asked to do so; and they were afterwards loyal and helpful, as Imperial officers can testify. The value of such a Bestuur, in the peculiar circumstances of Stellaland, was very apparent. Of course, Sir Charles was in a position to hold Stellaland, whatever were the views or feelings of its people; but he had no wish to do this. His desire was to ascertain the claims and grievances of the people, through a recognised and trusted channel, although there was a force in the country; and it was a fact that when the power of the Van Niekerk faction came to an end, there was a sense of relief from one end of the country to another. Thus Sir

Charles Warren was in the position of being trusted as heartily by the Stellaland farmers as by the natives on each side of them, and it was his full intention to do justice to all. The High Commissioner spoke slightingly of this Bestuur, having the impression that the elections had been affected by the presence of the military. It is a conclusive answer to this, however, that the Stellalanders themselves had, on a previous occasion, chosen the same men as their representatives when there was nobody but the freebooters in the country to influence the voting; and they selected them then for the specially important work of representing the Stellaland volunteers, when they heard that the Protectorate was to be established in the country. But leaving out of sight the fact that these men were the only persons who ever had been thus approved by the public vote of their comrades, the matter can be put on a broader basis by arguing that an elected Bestuur, having the sanction of Sir Charles Warren, was probably as useful and as respectable as would have been a Bestuur of Stellalanders nominated by the Deputy Commissioner.

While the troops were collecting at Vryburg, pioneer parties were busy at work on the northward road, which was so selected as to avoid proximity to the Transvaal. A well was sunk here, a "drift" across a sand-river was improved elsewhere, and in this way the Maretsani River was reached by the pioneering party on the 26th February. At the other end, the troops were steadily diminishing, and Langford Camp, on the Orange River, was finally evacuated on the 11th February. The necessary concentration of troops at Vryburg was completed on the 5th March. But before this time letters were received from Mafiking of a disquieting character, which induced Sir Charles Warren somewhat to anticipate the concentration of the Force at Vryburg. With a detachment of cavalry, and followed at intervals by reinforcements, Sir Charles pushed on to Setlagoli River, which he reached on the 28th February. This was within some fifty miles of Rooi Grond. Sir Charles telegraphed to the Secretary of State and to the High Commissioner from this advanced post that the country

was peaceful as yet, but that there were rumours of ambuscades. Moshette's people were friendly; there was plenty of grass; the country was beautifully wooded; but water for the horses, mules, and oxen was scarce, and wells were being dug every twelve miles on the road. The General went on to say:—

"Health of troops most excellent. No loss of horses from the (climatic) sickness as yet. People in Stellaland quietly disposed. Inquiry into Honey's murder continued. Section of Afrikanders in Transvaal who have no property wish to fight for farms somewhere—either here or in Matebeleland, and may coerce others. Rumours from all quarters for weeks past that Transvaal intends fighting in the beginning of April; that Afrikander Bondsmen from Colony and Free State will join them. They are waiting till their crops are carried in. The boundary-line is being examined previous to laying it down. Our commissariat and telegraph service admirably performed" (4432, 21).

The route selected by Sir Charles, as advised by his military staff, was not that recommended to me and insisted on by Captain Bower and the High Commissioner, which closely skirted the Transvaal, and even entered it at one point. The military road made for Groot Chwaing; having, however, a stage at Leuuw Pan, twelve miles from Vryburg, where a good well was dug by the Pioneers, and small forts were erected. At Groot Chwaing a Stellaland farmer had already done some work in opening up a spring of water. The supply was increased by the labours of the Engineers; and this became a well-watered and important military station. From Groot Chwaing to Setlagoli, the road was the old missionary and trading route to the north. The country in the neighbourhood of Setlagoli is beautiful, and admirably adapted to stock-farming. The military station at Setlagoli was situated on the "kopje" or little hill on which the Barolong town had once been built. It is a strong position, having the water at the bottom of the hill, and commanding the country on all sides. The Kunwana Hills on the Transvaal border were in sight here, to the east; and had disturbances taken place, Setlagoli Fort would have been one of great importance. Colonel Methuen had his headquarters here during the greater part of the time of the military occupation of the country. Colonel

Carrington also with his regiment of Colonial volunteers (Carrington's Horse) occupied this advanced post for some time. Afterwards Carrington's Horse and Methuen's Horse, no doubt, thought their life at Setlagoli a somewhat inactive one; and perhaps the men were in their hearts disappointed that those qualities of the Englishman and loyal colonist, which they had volunteered to exhibit, were to be accepted in South Africa without further proof. There being no fighting, they and their comrades in the Expedition had the equally hard task before them of months of quiet self-restraint, and adherence to rigid discipline, at Setlagoli and other stations in Bechuanaland. Fortunately there was hunting to be had, in the neighbourhood of most of the forts. We learned that as many as forty head of antelopes fell to the rifles of some of Methuen's Horse in a single day, while several of the members of the Colonial regiments of Carrington's and Gough's Horse were crack shots. It was said that in Vryburg and elsewhere, there were frequent friendly target competitions, between those who were on the side of the Queen and of order, and visitors to the camps, who in certain circumstances might have been ranged on the other side; and on every such occasion the Queen's men gave a very good account of themselves. I believe the result of this sort of intercourse and competition left the best impression on both sides. The Englishmen saw in their Dutch-speaking visitors what they themselves might have been, if their ancestors had come to South Africa, and for generations had been receiving less and less impulse and guidance from the outside civilised and Christian world, Colonial and European. The Dutch-speaking men, on the other hand, saw bodies of well-conducted Englishmen, neither robbing hen-roosts nor insulting women, capable of covering all the ground which they as frontiermen knew, and possessed, besides that, of another world of knowledge and attainment of which they were ignorant. These were not "muffs" who could be surprised in small troops like antelopes, and, like antelopes, could be shot down without any risk whatever. They were horsemen and riflemen equal to themselves, and were only specimens of

what England still possessed in large numbers in every county, and in every colony.

The influence of so many Colonial volunteers in the Expedition, who were connected with Dutch-speaking families, was also highly beneficial. It was evidently no race question: here were men bearing names similar to their own in the Transvaal, but educated, and standing side by side with other subjects of the Queen, to uphold law and order. Here were Englishmen wearing their own yellow cords and wideawake hats,—riflemen like themselves, but possessed also of appliances and of force which the Transvaal men were shrewd enough fully to appreciate. Here were also colonists of their own race, and others of English descent, who had never been out of South Africa, and yet were delighted to serve the Queen under Sir Charles Warren. Thus the lessons of the ordinary and permitted intercourse at the camps along the line of march, did good and not evil to both sides.

On our way to Mafiking we had the benefit of the military telegraph to Setlagoli; and beyond this, Captain Davidson's heliographic signalling was very well done, while Captain Jelf and his men were coming on. One of the messages which reached us on the road was not of a pleasant kind. It would seem that in due course the correspondence between the Cape Ministers and Sir Charles Warren concerning sedition in the Colony reached London. Apparently following the Capetown insinuation, that I was responsible for Sir Charles Warren's discovery, and for his remarks on it, the Secretary of State telegraphed to the High Commissioner to inform Sir Charles Warren that my presence in his camp was inexpedient, and that the ultimate settlement would be very difficult unless he separated from me! (4432, 73). This was truly an amazing statement to be made in London and with official authority,—being in the teeth of the confidence and good wishes and pledges of backing-up, with which the same Secretary of State sent me forth a year before to Bechuanaland, to do exactly what they afterwards sent Sir Charles to do. The policy of Her Majesty's Government was still the same, as shown by their instruc-

tions to Sir Charles Warren: my own efforts, in various ways, had been steadily pursued in the same direction. The unpopularity of the Imperial Government in the Transvaal, and in certain circles in the Cape Colony, fell naturally enough upon those who upheld its claims. Sir Hercules Robinson recognised this when he informed Sir Charles Warren that he (Sir Hercules) was not, any more than myself, a *persona grata* in the Transvaal. It would not have been incorrect or inappropriate for Sir Hercules to have informed Her Majesty's Government, in connection with the ungrounded mention of my name by his Cape Ministers, and their opposition to Sir Charles Warren's proposals as to the northern part of the Colony, that too much must not be made of adverse expressions regarding persons, as he himself—the Governor of the Cape Colony—occupied a similarly unfortunate position in relation to his own Ministers. All Capetown would have borne out Sir Hercules in a statement at once truthful and helpful, which would have enabled Her Majesty's Government to see that it was really itself which was attacked in South Africa, in the persons of those who were regarded as true to its interests; which was thus attacked, not by the intelligent or progressive party, nor by the body of the Colonists, but by those who had opposed the appearance of the Bechuanaland Expedition, and the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. With such advices as Her Majesty's Government had from Capetown, the Secretary of State recommended to Sir Charles Warren my discharge from the Expedition.

But the information, which does not seem to have been conveyed to Her Majesty's Government by the High Commissioner on this matter, was at once sent direct by Sir Charles Warren, in the following terms:—

"*March* 6, 1885.

"I request permission from Her Majesty's Government to use my own discretion with regard to the presence of Mackenzie, at present in my camp. I consider that his presence is urgently needed at the investigation which I am carrying on both in Stellaland and Goshen. He has been persecuted, treated with great injustice, and I am sure you will agree with me, when what has happened of recent date is reported fully. The majority of Boers in Stellaland are strongly in his favour" (4432, 35).

Such was the opinion of the Special Commissioner, after personal intercourse with all classes in Bechuanaland. In the exercise of his discretion, Sir Charles Warren sent this telegram straight to London; and, after consideration, on the 10th March, the Secretary of State replied direct to Sir Charles Warren:—

"As you consider the presence of Mackenzie essentially necessary for the present investigation, Her Majesty's Government leave you free to act at your discretion with regard to Mackenzie" (4432, 35).

Although Her Majesty's Government did not again refer this matter to Sir Hercules Robinson, my friend and former chief had been good enough to furnish them with some very recently formed opinions concerning myself; and this deliverance was probably in the hands of the Secretary of State when he sent out to Sir Charles Warren the above message. Sir Hercules said he "concurred in the view of Lord Derby," and "considered that the presence of Mackenzie with Expeditionary Force, Bechuanaland, was mischievous" (4432, 35). On the same day, Sir Hercules was informed by the Secretary of State that Her Majesty's Government were leaving Sir Charles Warren free to act at his discretion in this matter. Sir Hercules Robinson had long before been induced to desert his own policy; but he had never, before this date, spoken against his own officer. I shall only say that one could well understand Captain Bower or Mr. Rhodes asserting that my presence in Bechuanaland was "mischievous,"—that is, destructive of misunderstanding and helpful to the due ascertaining of the actual condition of the country; but that Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa should oppose, or use his political influence against, one whose whole efforts he well knew to be pacific,[1] and removed from narrow party lines, is what I could not, and did not expect.

As we approached Mafiking, we learned that the chief Montsioa had not arrived from Kanye, where he had been for some months. His son was in charge of the town which the chief and his people had so long defended, and in which they had suffered so much. Before reaching the town, Sir Charles

[1] See vol. i. p. 168.

was welcomed on all hands by the delighted people. They regarded the General as an old friend, and they were glad to see me again also, and Mr. Wright, whom they had last seen at Mafiking when he was led away captive by the freebooters, under a flag of truce. Every one was struck with the pretty appearance of Mafiking, nestling among the rocky eminences covered with trees, and surrounded by walls and stockade. Sir Charles telegraphed to the High Commissioner:—

"The natives are far advanced in civilisation, in many cases quite as far advanced as white men. This is the prettiest town I have seen in South Africa. There are large trees in their natural condition surrounding the town" (4432, 83).

Sir Charles Warren arrived at Mafiking on the 11th March, and at once visited Rooi Grond. He informed the High Commissioner the same day that—

The first object of the Expedition had now been completed. The filibusters had been cleared out of Bechuanaland with the exception of a few who have submitted, and the territory has been pacified, and Goshen has ceased to exist. "I have been to Rooi Grond, and there has been no opposition, but the freebooters have returned to their farms in the neighbouring district of the Transvaal, but could be gathered together to re-enter Montsioa's territory in a few days, at the instigation of political agitators. Nobody put in an appearance to make any claim. I found about ten families living in houses on this side of the line" (4432, 83).

The appearance of Sir Charles himself at Mafiking and Rooi Grond was unexpected. Some of the Goshen people were still at their mealie lands in the Protectorate, which they had cultivated after the visit of the Cape Ministers. They at once left for the Transvaal, without asking for any interview either with Sir Charles or with the Commissioners appointed by him. But the day after his visit to Rooi Grond, Sir Charles was waited upon by a few Rooi Grond inhabitants—consisting of those who were not "Transvaal" in their sympathies, but who in other respects had made common cause with those who obeyed the orders of Mr. Gey van Pittius. They now, however, professed to throw off all allegiance to the Bestuur of Goshen, and rested their claims as individuals upon the word of Moshette, but more especially upon the promises of the Cape Ministers, for the rati-

fication of which they said they were patiently waiting. The following is the address which they presented to Sir Charles at Mafiking on the 12th March :—

"GOOSSEN, *March* 12, 1885.

"SIR—Your sudden and most unexpected appearance among us yesterday prevented us from paying that respect which we deem your due. We therefore trust that although late now, you will nevertheless accept and welcome this address in the same spirit of pleasure as that in which we bid you welcome here. For although full of doubts and fears, we cannot but hope that your advent will be for our good, as we have the fullest confidence in your integrity and the justness of our cause ; and have we not the word of the Prime Minister of the Cape that there is also justice in the great British Empire ? And can this attribute be wanting in one of its first officers ? Surely not ; nay, to convince us we need only look to Stellaland, where now, through him, law and order are established, and the people soon to have their own government. Why, then, should we shrink from an investigation of our cause, when by that alone we will be able to prove that our case and Stellaland are but parallel ; and if so, dare we not hope to expect to share in similar benefits ?" (4432, 139).

Sir Charles referred the deputation who presented this address to his public notification already in their possession, and told them he did not hold himself responsible for the peace of Rooi Grond as matters at present stood there. It may be asked, How could men have the audacity to present such an address to the Special Commissioner, seeing they had insulted Mr. Rhodes, taken Mr. Wright a prisoner under a flag of truce, and carried on war upon a chief and tribe under British protection ? This unheard-of boldness is fully explained in their own words. Their assertion that their position towards Her Majesty's Government was the same as that of the Stellalanders was not true ; but had they confined their remark to the Hart River Stellalanders—those recognised and honoured by Mr. Rhodes and the High Commissioner as the Stellaland Government—then their contention was unassailable ; in short, the Hart River people and they were practically one. In insulting Captain Bower, in prompting their native allies to invade Stellaland, in threatening invasion themselves till the Protectorate was removed from them by Mr. Rhodes, in (many of them) bearing arms against the Protectorate in Montsioa's country, the Hart River Stella-

landers and the people of Goshen stood exactly on the same indefensible ground. Sir Charles would deal out the same justice all round; all who submitted to Her Majesty's Government would meet with consideration, all who fought against it would receive none. Mr. Rhodes had succeeded in overcoming all this so far as the High Commissioner's influence went, in behalf of his clients at the Hart River. Mr. Upington had failed to see, in that case, why he should not be equally successful, in similar circumstances, in Goshen. And now the men of Goshen themselves come forward, and ask an Imperial officer that the Stellaland measure should be meted out to them at Rooi Grond.

As the inquiry into the death of Mr. Bethell, which Sir Charles Warren had been instructed by Her Majesty's Government to hold, necessitated the disturbance of the grave, for the purpose of examining the body of the deceased, it was decided by Sir Charles that the re-interment should take place, not at Rooi Grond, but at Mafiking. And as Mr. Bethell was murdered after he had been nominated to an appointment under the Crown in the Protectorate, the General further determined that the funeral should be conducted with military honours.

Accordingly, soon after the arrival of Sir Charles Warren at Mafiking, a party was despatched to Rooi Grond early in the morning, to make the necessary examination. After considerable difficulty Mr. Bethell's body was found, and examination of the wounds seemed to prove the truth of the circumstances attending his murder as narrated by Israel Molema, and also showed that the body had not been mutilated, as had been reported, but had been interred by the Goshen freebooters in the same way as were those of their comrades who fell in the same and other fights. During the forenoon, Sir C. Warren and staff, accompanied by a large escort of the troops present at Mafiking, arrived at Rooi Grond. As soon as the body was identified and the examination completed, the coffin was placed on a gun-carriage and covered with a Union Jack; and the escort, under command of Colonel Curtis of the Inniskillings, returned to Mafiking, where all preparations for the funeral had been

previously made. On arrival at Mafiking, about 4 P.M., the funeral procession was at once formed in accordance with the usual military rules. The spectacle was most imposing, and every detail of the day's proceedings was calculated deeply to impress those who were present.

The procession was joined by the native men of Mafiking, and there were many spectators from different parts of the neighbourhood. At the special request of the brothers of the deceased—two of whom were attached to the Expedition, and were naturally present on this occasion—I conducted the service at the grave. The coffin was removed from the gun-carriage, and lowered into the grave, by six of the headmen of Mafiking. The firing party consisted of 100 Dragoons under command of Captain Pennefather. The three volleys of musketry, which conclude a military funeral, and which, with the interspersed bugle-notes in the otherwise dead silence, produce a weird and melancholy effect, were fired over the grave; and the troops then returned to their quarters.

Mr. Christopher Bethell of The Rise, Yorkshire, had been six years in Bechuanaland at the time of his death. As already stated, he had acted under Sir Charles Warren in 1878-79. He had seen the country abandoned by its English protectors in 1881, and had after that event given Montsioa all the assistance in his power, in preserving to him and his people their country. It was, no doubt, owing in considerable degree to his efforts that Montsioa was so long able to hold out. It was, of course, a great pleasure and satisfaction to Mr. Bethell when the Protectorate was established, and peace appeared within sight. The qualities thus exhibited by Mr. Bethell may be said to be characteristically, although, of course, not exclusively, British. Young Bethell had his faults; but he was a hater of injustice; he instinctively stood up for the weak, especially when they were deserving and brave. He had not the slightest personal antagonism to the white volunteers of Moshette, except as the destroyers of a native chief and people, who had befriended Englishmen when they were refugees from the Transvaal. There was nothing to

hinder Englishmen like Mr. Bethell or Mr. N. Walker, who lost his life in the same engagement as Mr. Bethell, from leaving Mafiking and returning to England, or going elsewhere. But these young men had lighted on a case in which it seemed to them that the right side was going to the wall; and so they stepped into the breach and died in it. It is our inborn love of fair-play and justice to every man as a human being, which is at the bottom of our popularity and our success among native races. An Englishman cannot help seeing men where others see only chattels.

To me, the military funeral of Mr. Bethell seemed like a penitential act on the part of England; as if she said—I abdicated my rightful place in South Africa; I left Bechuanaland, and in my heart left South Africa. Returning to my work, I find that some have lived to uphold that position for me which I had myself deserted, and some have died in doing so. Let us hope that England has also buried out of sight that policy of desertion and retreat which may be said to have caused this valiant Englishman's death. Let me distinctly add, however, that this does not mean excited restlessness or domineering interference: I am no admirer of the attitude of "trailing one's coat," whether in the village street or the "street" of South Africa, or of the world. To have remained in Bechuanaland in 1881, instead of leaving it, and to have quietly discharged there those duties which we are now performing in that country, would have been no case of "coat-trailing," but rather of recognising duty, and steadily and quietly performing it. And I thought, and think still, that that is a suitable lesson for us to draw from the military funeral of one who a short time before was a solitary upholder of the English name on this highway into the interior.

One of the objects which Sir Charles Warren, as head of the Bechuanaland Expedition, was charged by Her Majesty's Government to accomplish, was to inquire into the circumstances attending the death of Mr. Bethell, and if he found it had taken place contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, to endeavour to bring to justice the perpetrators of the crime. Having been asked by Her Majesty's Govern-

ment what course he would advise in this endeavour, the High Commissioner, having first consulted the Attorney-General of the Cape Colony, replied :—

"We see no means by which Boers who killed Bethell can be brought to justice—the locality of death was beyond jurisdiction of Colony and Transvaal. The offenders are not amenable to any tribunal enforcing British law, no Order in Council having as yet been issued" (4252, 22).

The Order in Council was issued on the 27th January 1885, and thus part of the legal difficulty was removed. Her Majesty's legal advisers in London held that the crime was now justiciable by a civil court established under the Order in Council, as the crime was committed within the Protectorate, and after the Protectorate was established. Having regard to the delays and difficulties which might be anticipated in the creation of a competent civil court, the Secretary of State and his Imperial advisers recommended that the criminals should be dealt with according to the principles of justice, administered under the best conditions attainable; and that the General Commanding should be at liberty to constitute a tribunal of officers or others, for trying the facts in such a way as he might consider best adapted for securing substantial justice. It was distinctly added that the tribunal for inquiring into their guilt would in no respect form a "court-martial in the technical sense of the word" (4310, 60). The Secretary of State concluded this despatch by urging Sir Charles Warren—

"To use such endeavours as may be possible to secure the persons of the two men who are said to have committed this crime, with a view to their being made amenable to justice;" and that "they are to have as full and fair a trial as can be ensured to them" (4310, 60).

Soon after his arrival at Mafiking, Sir Charles Warren, in accordance with his instructions, appointed a Tribunal of Inquiry into the circumstances connected with the death of Mr. C. Bethell, Mr. N. Walker, and certain natives belonging to the Protectorate. The tribunal consisted of officers connected with the Expedition, and its chairman was Colonel Curtis of the Inniskilling Dragoons. The tribunal held many sittings at Mafiking, and examined a

number of witnesses—white men and natives. The force of the evidence collected as to the death of Mr. Bethell was to confirm the account of it already given.

There was little or no doubt when the inquiry began that Mr. Bethell, as narrated elsewhere, had been found wounded on the field of battle by some Rooi Grond freebooters, and had been shot in cold blood, after conversing with his murderers. There was also little doubt as to the identity of those who were concerned in this degraded action; and it was known that these men were in the Transvaal. As to the death of Mr. N. Walker, there was no additional light thrown on the subject, and no reliable information given as to the disposal of his body. With reference to natives, the tribunal made careful inquiry regarding outrages perpetrated by Rooi Grond armed parties upon native travellers on the highroad to the interior. Mr. Wright had been asked for information on this subject by Mr. Rhodes, while the latter was Deputy Commissioner; and incurred much local odium by communicating the facts, which were at once published. Mr. Upington, on his visit to Rooi Grond, published his disbelief in the correctness of the reports of these dark deeds. It is convenient to be able thus summarily to dispose of what is unpleasant. There can, however, be no doubt of the substantial truth of the charges of murder and highway robbery, perpetrated on native travellers by some of the Rooi Grond volunteers in Bechuanaland; the evidence of eye-witnesses, which came before the tribunal, was quite conclusive on that point.

Although President Kruger, at Fourteen Streams, had replied guardedly to Sir Charles Warren's inquiry as to the extradition of the men charged with the murder of Mr. Bethell, he did so apparently in no unfriendly spirit. He said he would assist Sir Charles as far as the law would permit. Of course the law would permit him to hand over the accused men to undergo a fair trial for a cruel murder, although there was no treaty to compel him to do so. From information which reached him from other quarters, Sir Charles found there was reason to believe that in the Transvaal this act of murder would be separated from the

ordinary filibustering on the border, so that while the latter found sympathisers, the former would be denounced; and if the men were asked for on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, they would be given up by the Government of the Transvaal. Before the time came for taking this step, however, the power to address the Presidents of the Free State and the Transvaal, had been taken from Sir Charles Warren, and that responsibility now rested with the High Commissioner. When Sir Charles Warren asked for instructions, Sir Hercules Robinson laid the matter before the Attorney-General of the Cape Colony, Mr. Upington, —expressing, while doing so, his own opinion as High Commissioner:—

"It appears to the High Commissioner that Sir C. Warren should decide in the first instance whether he will deal with the offence as a civil crime or as a crime against the usages of war."

The High Commissioner went on to remark to Mr. Upington:—

"The accused was said to be in the Transvaal, with the Government of which we have no extradition treaty. The Transvaal Government might no doubt, if it pleased, surrender Joel van Rooyen without a treaty, but it is unlikely that it would do so if the men were to be tried by what would practically be a drum-head court-martial" (4432, 104).

These were very remarkable statements when made by Her Majesty's High Commissioner; and made at the time when he was applying for legal advice on the case on which he appeared to have already formed his opinions.

In his formal reply the Attorney-General of the Cape Colony found that sufficient evidence had been obtained to justify the arrest of one Joel van Rooyen, but Mr. Upington saw grave difficulty in connection with his arrest, as we had no extradition treaty with the Transvaal; and—

"Accordingly he failed to see how it was possible for any British officer legally to demand the surrender of Van Rooyen."

But even if the accused were handed over, fresh difficulties would begin. If tried by civil law, it must take place in accordance with the law of the Cape Colony; and on this point Mr. Upington remarked:—

"To obtain in Land Goshen at the present time a jury of nine men qualified to serve as jurors seems to be an impossibility, and any attempt to secure a trial according to the criminal law of the Cape Colony would, in my opinion, result only in failure."

Mr. Upington, on the other hand, had—

"Serious doubts as to the validity of military tribunals under the circumstances"; and it appeared to him "only fair to inform the Government of the South African Republic of the nature of the court before which it is proposed to try the alleged criminals, in the event of their rendition being demanded" (4432, 105).

Here was a conflict of opinion between the advisers of Her Majesty's Government in London and the Attorney-General of the Cape: the latter had "serious doubts" as to the validity of the advice tendered in London.

The High Commissioner explained, in answer to an expostulation on the part of Sir Charles Warren as to the use of the expression "drum-head court-martial," that—

"He had no desire to cast any doubt on the fairness of the tribunal of officers or others authorised by the Secretary of State, but was anxious to present the light in which a military trial without a jury, and unrestrained by any technical considerations, would probably be regarded in the Transvaal, and the prejudicial effect which such a proposed mode of trial would probably have upon the surrender of the alleged criminal."

The responsibility of deciding what course he was to pursue was thrown upon Sir Charles Warren by the High Commissioner, who informed him:—

"If you elect to proceed with the trial according to civil law, the trial would, in the opinion of the Attorney-General, result in a failure. If by court-martial, it appeared very doubtful whether the Transvaal Government would comply with an application for extradition."

In these circumstances Sir Charles, having no rash project in view, and being only anxious to rightly understand and carry out his instructions and orders, took neither the one course nor the other, but referred the whole correspondence to Her Majesty's Government for fresh instructions (4432, 114). It was quite evident that all these matters were, or they were not, foreseen by Her Majesty's Government; and until they gave definite instructions, meeting the

difficulties which had now been advanced, Sir Charles felt it would be premature for him to put forward his individual opinion, especially as it was thus shown by the High Commissioner, and the Attorney-General of the Cape Colony, how futile it would be for him to attempt to carry out the orders which he had already received. The Special Commissioner, it is true, did not coincide with these views; and he strongly disagreed with the opinion that, if the extradition of a criminal were asked on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, it would be necessary or even desirable to give any information concerning the steps which would be taken, by a Government of the standing of that of Her Majesty, to secure for the prisoner a fair trial. Such explanation, in his opinion, would amount to an admission that some of our English methods of procedure were untrustworthy, and not likely to secure the ends of justice; and yet that one of these modes was contemplated by the Special Commissioner. Besides, those who knew Bechuanaland were aware that the Cape Attorney-General was quite mistaken in taking it for granted that a jury of the peers of the accused could not have been enrolled in the "Land Goshen." They were still at Rooi Grond in sufficient numbers, and as to their character, Mr. Upington had himself borne testimony to it; while if the accused objected to any of them, there were hundreds of still more respectable freebooters to draw from, in Stellaland.

Where the mistake really lay was in the fact that from the beginning Sir Charles was unaccompanied by a qualified barrister, well acquainted with Roman-Dutch law. If such a gentleman had enrolled as a volunteer, he would have conferred a special benefit on Her Majesty's service. It would be ridiculous for a Special Commissioner and head of a Field Force to consult a lawyer as to every step taken or contemplated in a disturbed country. But when the upper hand had been obtained in such a country, a good lawyer is no doubt a useful man at headquarters. He would have been of great service to Sir Charles Warren from the date of his landing at Capetown. He was needed at Fourteen Streams, where President Kruger was fortified by the advice of an

able and intelligent Attorney-General; the trial of Van Niekerk, directed by such a man, would have been conducted in a much more thorough manner than that which was followed by Van Niekerk's own nominee Attorney-General; and when the trial of the murderers of Mr. Bethell came to be considered, we should have heard no opinion from any one to the effect that it was impossible to give a prisoner a fair trial in Bechuanaland, according to the civil law of the Cape Colony.

After due reconsideration of the whole matter, the Secretary of State, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, adhered to his despatch of the 10th December, but now informed the High Commissioner that he, as the highest political officer in South Africa, should address the Transvaal Government on this subject, and should request on the ground of comity, and in the interests of humanity and justice, that the accused be handed over to Sir Charles Warren to be dealt with either by a civil or by a military tribunal, as might be deemed best on technical grounds. And the High Commissioner was recommended, with becoming dignity, to assure the Transvaal Government that whether the accused were tried by a civil or military tribunal, every care would be taken that they should have a full and fair trial.

The High Commissioner having requested that certified copies of the documentary evidence should be forwarded to him, Sir Charles Warren complied with this request, sending also, through the General Commanding at the Cape, an analysis of the evidence taken before the tribunal. In this whole matter, Sir Charles Warren simply acted in accordance with his instructions, and with the views of Her Majesty's Government; and they upheld his contention, that it was uncalled for and unnecessary for him to volunteer explanation to another Government, as to the constitution of a court which should have the sanction and approval of the British Government. It does not appear that the High Commissioner took any further action in this matter. He had already informed Her Majesty's Government that, in his opinion, the Transvaal Government had "learned a useful lesson" from the Expedition. Now, to identify the Transvaal

Government with the freebooters, is not complimentary; but to identify them as a Government with such actions as the murder of a wounded European, is unjust and uncalled for. The High Commissioner, however, tacitly leaves them in this low position, by not giving them the opportunity of handing over the suspected men to stand a fair trial. Even if, as in the case of Van Niekerk, no one had been hanged, and thus the arrest and trial had been "abortive" in the estimation of the unthinking, the public branding, not only by Her Majesty's Government, but by the Government of the Transvaal, of the crime which had been committed, would have been a most valuable lesson for the Transvaal and for South Africa.

It is surely of the utmost importance that extradition treaties should be made as between all the colonies and states of South Africa. I do not say that without such treaties the good sense and feeling of the various Executives would not in most cases be operative. But all such officers would prefer to be supported by the sanction and command of law; and it is only fair to them that they should have this support, so that the giving up of a criminal should not be a matter of personal choice on the part of officials.

It is also worthy of remark that it was well known at Mafiking where the men were located who were "wanted" in connection with this proposed trial. Some of them were living near the Transvaal border; and the desperadoes who hover about a camp were, it was said, quite prepared to "land" them at Mafiking any time they were wanted. It would appear that some of those who spoke were inhabitants of the Transvaal; and they said it would be no "invasion" of that territory for them to enter it! As inhabitants of the country, they were of course free to enter it; but they were not free to steal men from it. Such plans met with no countenance from Sir Charles Warren.

. . . . . .

"The chief Catch-it-Easy, sir, has arrived and desires to see you."

"The chief Who?"

"Catch-it-Easy, sir."

It was suggested by some one that possibly Ga-se-itsiwe (Haseitsiwe) or Gazizibi might be the person referred to. It turned out that it was the chief Haseitsiwe, and his son Bathoeng, from Kanye, who arrived at Mafiking on the 25th of March, to see Sir Charles Warren. Haseitsiwe had befriended Montsioa by letting him graze his cattle in his country, and by sending men to help him, when attacked after the establishment of the Protectorate. He had lost men in the fight near Mafiking; and Mr. van Pittius's people had invaded his country, killed his people, and driven into the Transvaal over a thousand head of cattle. Haseitsiwe appeared to be in indifferent health; it was said he had addicted himself much to drinking Cape brandy. Further mention of his affairs will be found in the chapter describing the Special Commissioner's visit to his town. In the meantime he had paid the highest compliment he could to Sir Charles as the Queen's representative, having left his own country and come into another chief's territories in order to see him and "hear his news." His own news was about his losses encountered when fighting in behalf of Montsioa.



THE CHIEF KHAME.

BOOK V

THE PROTECTORATE ENLARGED BY THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT—ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE CHIEFS IN NORTH BECHUANALAND—SIR CHARLES WARREN VISITS SHOSHONG

CHAPTER I

THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PROPOSALS DECLINED

On the same day that the High Commissioner heard from Sir Charles Warren that he had reached Mafiking and Rooi Grond, and that the freebooters had fled into the Transvaal, with the exception of a few who submitted to the Imperial authority, he despatched from Capetown a long telegram (4432, 48) to the Secretary of State, which consisted chiefly of an accusation of Sir Charles Warren, and an offer on the part of the High Commissioner to proceed at once to Bechuanaland and relieve Sir Charles Warren of the duties of Special Commissioner, limiting his future position and duties to those of the military head of the Force. This was the old insuppressible desire, breaking out once more, to abolish the Special Commissionership. It was taking for granted that a Special Commissioner was not really necessary, as well as a General, in Bechuanaland—the very question which Her Majesty's Government had settled by the creation of the office. When Sir Charles Warren reached Rooi Grond, his work as General was complete; but his work as Special Commissioner had hardly commenced; and yet it was these civil duties which the High Commissioner proposed to assume. In short, the long telegram to London of the 11th March was a similar effort, on the part of the High Commissioner, to that of the telegram to Van Niekerk of the 6th December, and had the same object in view—the supersession of an officer, and the abolition of an office, both of which had the recent approval of Her Majesty's Government and of the public in England.

The charges brought against Sir Charles Warren as Special Commissioner by Sir Hercules Robinson were—his employment of myself; "his dismissal of Rhodes, who is disinterested;" his selection of a certain gentleman from the Colony as legal adviser who had been recently dismissed by the Cape Government from its service; "his arrest and prosecution of Van Niekerk;" "and his enrolment and equipment of a black regiment." With reference to myself and Mr. Rhodes, fairness to the Special Commissioner demands that it should be remembered that he endeavoured to utilise the services of both. The question of the sober, progressive, and beneficial supremacy of the Imperial Government in Native Territories in South Africa, had to some extent become connected with my name; and those who disapproved of that course, in behalf of what they called a "Colonial" policy, disapproved also of me. In this matter, Sir Charles Warren's instructions, and the expressed views of Her Majesty's Government, were quite clear; and it was equally plain that on this point Sir Hercules was simply turning his back on himself. As to the legal adviser, it was also a matter which ought never to have been mentioned in such a connection by Her Majesty's High Commissioner. Sir Charles Warren had newly arrived in the country, and the gentleman in question (whose name I do not further parade) was well known to him as an old Griqualand West official. His "case" was one on which two sides were very earnestly taken in the Cape Parliament, and hard things were said as to his dismissal by the Government of Mr. Upington. I was told that this gentleman was received by the High Commissioner at Government House, just before starting for Bechuanaland; and no word to him, or friendly hint by telegram to Sir Charles Warren, was ever given by the High Commissioner. If this gentleman was really untrustworthy, why did not the High Commissioner at once oppose his appointment? Not opposing his appointment, why did he further injure the man, and make capital out of his case, as against the Special Commissioner? In the appointment of this gentleman, Sir Charles had only the interest of the Expedition at heart. When Her Majesty's Government, found-

ing on the statements of the High Commissioner, decided that this legal adviser was "not desirable," the Special Commissioner at once dispensed with his services,—deeply regretting, however, that a more straightforward course as between individuals, and as to the public service, had not been followed on this occasion by the High Commissioner. As to the arrest and examination of Van Niekerk, enough has been said elsewhere. In objecting to the enrolment of native guides, the High Commissioner was probably not aware that he was in the unusual attitude of opposing what had already received the sanction of Her Majesty's Government.

The High Commissioner also dragged "the Dutch" into this telegram against Sir Charles Warren, saying that "they would be rendered sullen and irritable" by his actions. It is easy to make a statement of that kind; but in this instance it is impossible to justify it. Her Majesty's Government were left to infer that "the Dutch" were opposed to the Special Commissionership of Sir Charles Warren, and that the assumption of power in Bechuanaland by the High Commissioner would be a popular movement. I am not aware of anything whatever which could be brought forward in proof of this. There was widespread confidence in Sir Charles Warren in connection with his Griqualand West land settlement; and in so far as there was opposition in the Cape Colony at this time, it was mainly directed against the High Commissioner's own advice dissuading Her Majesty's Government from sanctioning the Goshen settlement of Messrs. Upington and Sprigg. It was, therefore, quite misleading to those at a distance, to connect Sir Charles Warren's name or doings with an anti-Imperial opposition which was anticipated by Sir Hercules Robinson, and by Her Majesty's Government, from the beginning of the Protectorate; and it was, to my mind, quite unfair for the High Commissioner to press into his service the utterances of the extreme section of Dutch-speaking colonists, whose views are usually expressed by the Afrikander Bond. Sir Hercules Robinson was himself aware that he had been opposing the wishes and policy of these people, when, in England, he advocated the Bechuanaland Protectorate. He was aware that they

disapproved of all the objects of the Expedition—not merely the arrest of Van Niekerk; and that "they viewed with alarm" the report that it was Sir Charles Warren's intention to ask for the extradition of Mr. Bethell's murderers. At one of their meetings these Bondsmen evidently spoke under the afflatus of plenary inspiration from Capetown, discoursing of "the legitimate duties of General Sir Charles Warren"; and "emphatically condemning the violation of the agreement of the 8th September, made with the Stellalanders by the Special Commissioner, Mr. Rhodes." These resolutions of the Bond extended to the Goshen settlement of Messrs. Upington and Sprigg the same commendation as that which they bestowed on the Stellaland settlement of Mr. Rhodes; and it was thus quite absurd for one Imperial officer to represent as to another, that such people spoke against something which he had done. These men, in short, were objectors to the Expedition itself, as extending and establishing the influence of the Imperial Government; they would "eliminate the Imperial factor," and could approve of no Imperial officer, while opposed to the presence of the Government whom these officers alike served. These Bondsmen objected to the Expedition leaving England—they objected to its entering Bechuanaland, and, naturally enough, they objected to its quiet and masterly work there. Had it not been for this school of politicians, in the Transvaal and in Capetown, no Bechuanaland Expedition would have been necessary; and their objection to one or other of the doings of Imperial officers, acting in obedience to their instructions, is not for a moment to be confounded with the opinion and the desire of the loyal, patriotic, and intelligent body of the Colonists. It was, therefore, not at all necessary to dwell on the dismal "consequences" should Her Majesty's Government not take the High Commissioner's view of things. Beyond mere personalities, there was nothing whatever in his prognostications, as was amply shown in the after history of the country. He was mistaken in saying that through Sir Charles's action they would "be rendered irritable and sullen"; or that a "continuance of this policy"—that is, employing certain officers, dispensing with the service of another "dis-

interested officer," and examining yet another officer on the charge of murder, with the usual enrolment of natives in the Expedition—"a continuance of this policy" would lead to dreadful results. A more complete breakdown never took place in an accusation brought to Her Majesty's Government by one officer in high position against another.

After these charges against Sir C. Warren, the High Commissioner went on to make his proposals in the telegram of the 11th March:—

"With prudent management," said Sir Hercules, "the military operations are at an end. Pending annexation to the Cape Colony, a few hundred men would soon be enough to maintain the Protectorate."

The High Commissioner thought there were two alternatives; and the first was that he should at once proceed to Bechuanaland, and supersede the Special Commissioner:—

"In this case," said the High Commissioner, "I think I can now undertake to settle Bechuanaland difficulty peaceably before meeting of Parliament here in May. . . . There will be then fair prospect of annexation, and failing that, I believe that Protectorate would be maintained by 200 police, at cost of not more than £50,000 per annum, of which Cape Colony would perhaps pay share" (4432, 48).

How inviting was the picture thus drawn! Reduced expenditure, speedy annexation, or the long-promised share of the expenses of the Protectorate to be "perhaps" borne by the Colony! And all this if the Government would only withdraw the Special Commissionership from Sir Charles Warren. Gloomy indeed were the results of the other alternative as pictured by the High Commissioner. It was likely to lead to war—to the presence of considerable military force in Bechuanaland for some time to come, with a troublesome and costly Protectorate or Crown Colony on their hands for an indefinite period. The second alternative, the consequences of which were to be so dreadful, was—

"That Warren be made independent of the High Commissioner, and solely and directly responsible for his proceedings to Her Majesty's Government."

After drawing this powerful contrast, the High Commissioner magnanimously concluded:—

"If Her Majesty's Government prefer to leave the civil settlement in Warren's hands I am quite satisfied, but it will be then only fair that I should be relieved of all responsibility for proceedings which are, as I have shown, contrary to my views, but which I am not allowed to control" (4432, 48).

The authorities at Downing Street were thus asked to vote for Robinson, with reduced expenditure and relief from responsibility; and they were told to beware of Warren, for he meant war, expense, and troublesome responsibility. Now, the question of annexation to the Cape Colony had nothing to do with the name of one officer or of another. Sir Hercules Robinson might be expected to know that his Ministers had apparently a large and united majority in the present Cape Parliament, however strongly public opinion might be against them out of doors concerning Bechuanaland. But neither loyal public opinion nor the views of Ministers pointed in the way of speedy annexation. The practical question, therefore, was, Were the Imperial instructions to Sir Charles Warren to be upheld? Was the land settlement of Bechuanaland to be carried through by British officers totally unconnected with local speculations? Were the genuine rights of industrious natives to be upheld as the owners and occupiers of lands which they had improved? Then it was evident that, guided by such a policy in Bechuanaland, the High Commissioner could no more induce the present Cape Ministers to annex that country than could Sir Charles Warren. There existed in the Bechuanaland settlement a deep question of right and wrong, of the utmost moment to all South Africa; the Expedition had appeared to uphold the right; and in the end, the least expensive and the only worthy policy would be, to carry this through quietly and steadily. Sir Hercules Robinson in Bechuanaland would not be in a position to do more for speedy Colonial annexation than Sir Charles Warren would do; for both would be bound to oppose the settlement of the very Cape Ministers who were, strangely enough, expected by Sir Hercules Robinson not only to consent to have their views and methods condemned and effaced, but to condemn them practically themselves!

No copy of this telegram against him was supplied to Sir Charles Warren by Sir Hercules Robinson. The defendant was thus unrepresented at the court of Downing Street, except in the consciences and common-sense of his judges; and he did not even know that a formal charge had been made against him—he could only "gather" that this was the case, when the decision of Downing Street was announced to him.

The action of the High Commissioner in despatching from Capetown this telegram concerning the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland placed Her Majesty's Government in a very serious dilemma, and it was not till the 21st March that they came to a decision. If they thought of assigning to Sir Charles Warren the whole control of Bechuanaland, which they had already all but given him, they no doubt feared the fulfilment of Sir Hercules Robinson's prophecy that, in such a case, annexation to the Cape Colony would not soon take place—more especially as such annexation had to be transacted through Sir Hercules, as both High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. If, on the other hand, they abolished the office of Special Commissioner, why had they created it? They had desired and had expected from Sir Charles Warren calm, unfettered, and impartial action as Special Commissioner in Bechuanaland; and they had desired this as distinct from such service as Sir Hercules Robinson had been able to render, as Governor of the Cape and High Commissioner. For them to draw back from securing those special services from Sir Charles Warren in Bechuanaland, would be to stultify themselves in having sent out the Expedition, with such instructions as they had given to Sir Charles Warren. It was thus as clear that the services of Sir Charles Warren must be retained as Special Commissioner, as that the co-operation of Sir Hercules Robinson must be continued, with a view to Colonial annexation.

It may be well here to observe that the idea of immediate Colonial annexation thus pressed by the High Commissioner, which was destined to exercise continuous and prejudicial influence on the mind of Her Majesty's

Government, was an entirely new phase of the Bechuanaland question. When the Protectorate was first assumed, no one in England thought of this speedy annexation; but the High Commissioner had been encouraging Her Majesty's Government to hope for this, as a practicable and most desirable consummation, ever since Mr. Rhodes went into Bechuanaland. Like will-o'-the-wisp, however, Colonial annexation was always apparently near, and always found to be far away. Having this tempting but misleading light before their eyes, Her Majesty's Ministers felt that the connection between the Governor of the Cape, who was also High Commissioner, and Bechuanaland must be retained, in order to secure the speedy annexation promised by Sir Hercules Robinson. Had they been duly informed of the fact that there was then little or no prospect of immediate annexation to the Colony; had they been assured that the eager attitude of seeking for this annexation was calculated to be much misunderstood in South Africa, and likely to delay annexation itself; had they been informed that, with such a force in the country, the present was the time to think of the shameful condition of Zululand as well as Bechuanaland, and to consolidate generally the position of the Imperial Government in native territories in South Africa—then had a true service been rendered to both countries. Then had Sir Hercules Robinson vindicated for himself the position of an officer who could rise above questions of overlapping Commissionerships, and forget himself in the good of the whole of South Africa and the prosperity of the Empire. On the contrary, the telegram of the High Commissioner began and ended in personalities, instead of broad considerations of policy; and when "policy" on the part of the Imperial Government was indicated or implied by him, it was that nerveless and purposeless "policy" with which Her Majesty's Government had been credited by its enemies, of shrinking from the performance of duty, and of endeavouring to back out of unavoidable responsibility.

While the telegram of Sir Hercules Robinson was under their consideration, Her Majesty's Government had the subject of Bechuanaland, and their future policy in South Africa,



ON THE LIMPOPO RIVER EAST OF SEOSHONG, NORTH BECHUANALAND.

pressed on their attention from another quarter. The Bechuanaland Protectorate was destined to confer a richer benefit upon Her Majesty's Government in South Africa than that Government had planned for in first assuming it. Gradually the light of the reality dawned on reluctant minds; and what was undertaken professedly on behalf of two native allies, turned out to be a movement indispensable to the continued supremacy of England in South Africa. There can be no doubt that the movement of Her Majesty's Government in Bechuanaland interfered with certain projects in Berlin. In an interview with a representative of the English Colonial office, the far-seeing Chancellor of the German Empire made no secret of this feeling on his part. Prince Bismarck regarded this movement as cramping German energies in the colonisation of the Angra Pequena district. The Prince said that the coast was barren and of no value, except as it gave access to the interior. On the other hand, Mr. Meade, who ably represented the English Colonial office on this occasion, said that England was within her rights in South Africa in taking over the Kalahari District, which merges into Bechuanaland. It was true, he said, that behind the coast-line of Angra Pequena there was a waterless tract some thirty miles broad, but behind that again there was a better country; and Lord Granville had explained that there was no desire on the part of Her Majesty's Government to interfere with Damaraland or Namaqualand behind the coast-line; and there could be therefore no objection, from our point of view, to Germany going into the interior even as far as the 20th degree of longitude, which was pointed out to Prince Bismarck on the map, and beyond which westward we did not propose to go.

The telegram which announced the settlement between the English and the German Governments reached us in Bechuanaland in the following terms:—

"*March* 14, 1885.

"German Empire has been informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin that Bechuanaland and Kalahari, as limited by first section of Order in Council of 27th January, are under British protection. As soon as practicable Warren should communicate with Sechele and Khame, and take care that no filibustering expedition takes possession of country, more especially Shoshong" (4432, 48).

The importance of this announcement of policy in Bechuanaland, to all South Africa, and to Her Majesty's Government as the Supreme Power, cannot be over-estimated. Whatever high and far-reaching idea was before Her Majesty's advisers, or however sharp the goad which had pricked them to such a declaration, the credit of the great movement westward and northward undoubtedly rests with the Ministers who advised and announced this extension of the Protectorate. Zigzag—advance (1878), retreat (1881), advance (1884), retreat again (1884); but now (1885) the advance was in circumstances and in terms as if a man had finally made up his mind to a straightforward course, and there was to be no more shrinking from his own shadow and the sound of his own voice. Sir Charles Warren was credited in some newspapers with having simply gone into North Bechuanaland and "annexed" territories there; some of them went so far into detail as to assert that he had yielded to my advice in doing so. Now no such indiscretion is chargeable to any officer in South Africa. It was a policy resolved on in London, and announced first in Berlin. It was for Sir Charles Warren, and those serving under him, to act their humbler but still important part in carrying out in Bechuanaland a resolution which was worthy of the intelligence and wisdom of an Imperial Government. Our position and work in Bechuanaland were no longer confined to the protection of two native chiefs; it was no longer to be restricted to the border of the Transvaal, as Lord Derby had previously resolved: it emphasised a special interest in Shoshong, and a special duty in extending British protection to that important town and district, as far as the 22d degree of latitude. In short, it was a step which, if rightly followed up, settled the future of South Africa, and settled it in peace.

I need not say that this announcement gave great satisfaction among all loyal and intelligent people in South Africa. To those of an opposite view it brought consternation. They were, so to speak, counting the days when "Warren would leave the country," and matters could be resumed where they were left off before he came; but England beyond Shoshong! If she stood to it, not only was the future of

the country settled, but England's supremacy in it was also established. Would she stand to it? This was the question which was asked by every one. It is no exaggeration to say that Ministers and Opposition in the Cape Colony, Dutch-speaking as well as English-speaking colonists—always excepting a few extreme men—were delighted at the announcement. But did it mean anything? Would England stick to it?

Of course politics and soldiering are not compatible; but it was quite evident that this announcement gave the utmost pleasure in the Bechuanaland Force. The men felt that this vast region had been "proclaimed" while they were in occupation of the country, and that their presence as an Expedition had had something to do with this extension of Her Majesty's dominions. The same question—Would England stick to it?—was asked in this quarter also, and as a truthful narrator, I must add that opposite answers were given, and in the most forceful language. To no class did the announcement give greater pleasure than the respectable Dutch-speaking farmer. "Ya, als dit waar is, dit is de beste nieuwes; maar is Engeland vertrouwbaar?" (Yes, if it is true it is the best news; but is England to be relied on?) As to the natives in North Bechuanaland, with whom I had been for many years intimately acquainted, I felt that with wise and careful treatment, our position could from the first be assured on a right and advantageous basis to them and to us. But while our minds were engaged in considering these inviting and important matters, which had thus been put into Sir Charles Warren's hands by Her Majesty's Government, a message arrived from the Secretary of State direct, to Sir Charles Warren, of a very different nature indeed:—

"*March* 21, 1885.

"You should obtain the sanction and concurrence of High Commissioner on all questions of policy whenever practicable, and use special caution in all matters affecting the Dutch population" (4432, 57).

What had happened? On the crest of the wave as to an intelligent and progressive policy, here was the succeed-

ing and disgusting trough of personal attack and defence. It was impossible to say what had happened. But censure was undoubtedly implied. And yet no officer had ever been more successful up to that time than Sir Charles Warren, in civil as well as military matters. As to the "Dutch" population, Sir Charles was beyond all doubt the most popular Imperial officer in South Africa among the Dutch, as well as the English, at the very time when this censure and caution reached him! What had happened? The first impulse of an honourable, earnest, and high-minded public servant, receiving such an unlooked-for blow in the dark, was to tender his resignation. A man might go on under the reproaches and misstatements of enemies, but bereft of the confidence and support of friends, and apparently of the Government which had selected and sent him out, his chance of thoroughly accomplishing his work seemed to be at an end. His very popularity and success had become his fault—he would resign. But that wire which brings such varied messages every day across the ocean, sent these words to Bechuanaland from London:—

"Don't resign, whatever you do."

It was an instance of one honourable and sympathetic mind feeling for and accurately interpreting the workings of another, although six thousand miles apart. The sender of this friendly message was no partisan; he was one of the noblest of Englishmen, and well known as the special friend of South Africa. He was the friend of Sir Hercules Robinson, as well as of Sir Charles Warren; above all, he was the friend of justice and right. His message turned the scale; a sense of public duty without reference to personal treatment carried the day. And so, instead of resignation, the following message was sent:—

"*March* 23.

"I have experienced so entire an absence of support from High Commissioner since I took up my duties as Special Commissioner, and my position in Bechuanaland is so restricted as to local matters by High Commissioner, that I have found great difficulty in carrying on work under the present conditions. I beg to point out that whilst I have not legal advisers on the spot, legal adviser of High Commissioner in matters relating to Bechuanaland and Imperial policy

is Prime Minister of Cape Colony, who has expressed strong political views as to Imperial policy here. Have now successfully carried out first object of this Expedition; other objects are well in hand, and I have reduced disturbed state of country considerably. I believe that hitherto I have acted strictly in accordance with my instructions, but I gather from your Lordship's telegram that the High Commissioner has made statements as to my treatment of Dutch population which he has not informed me of, and about which I am ignorant. I have recently asked several questions of High Commissioner, who has sent me his opinion and that of Attorney-General. I should feel obliged if Her Majesty's Government would give instructions as to these points, as views of High Commissioner are not, it appears to me, in accordance with those expressed by Secretary of State in recent despatches forwarded to me. Have sent copy to High Commissioner."

Sir Charles at once sent a copy of his telegram to the High Commissioner, although himself still ignorant of the charges brought against him. The charges of the High Commissioner were mere personal ones, and but for his gratuitous assertion about the Dutch population, must have entirely fallen to the ground. On the other hand, the statement of Sir Charles was categorical, and the details represented the width of the separation between the views and policy of Sir Hercules Robinson then, and his views and policy a year before.

It was natural for Sir Charles to conclude that in some way matters had been so stated in London as that he having received the censure, the High Commissioner had received the *kudos*. This was far from being the case, however, as appeared when the Bluebooks were issued containing the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the High Commissioner. We have seen that the hope of immediate annexation to the Cape Colony was the will-o'-the-wisp which gave the connection of Sir Hercules Robinson with Bechuanaland its value in the eyes of the Secretary of State. And so Her Majesty's Government were at this time in the position of a parent who finds two children quarrelling, and without inquiring into the merits, or "who had begun it," applies chastisement to both. In this instance, as is usual, I believe, in domestic practice, the elder brother received the severer reprimand. The telegraphic message to the High Commissioner was to this effect:—

"Warren will be reminded of instruction to communicate through you, and to use utmost possible caution in dealing with Dutch population. Entire separation between administration of Cape and Bechuanaland very undesirable as regards policy" (4432, 57).

There was nothing here to show the High Commissioner that he had made anything by his telegram. Sir Charles Warren was to be reminded of his instructions and to use caution. The alternative of separating the offices was objectionable, not on personal grounds, but on grounds of policy. The real meaning of Lord Derby was made very plain in other communications to the High Commissioner of the same date.

These were severe and quite unexpected utterances to the High Commissioner. Again Sir Hercules was informed that there was a Special Commissionership; and "as far as he had gone, Sir Charles was backed by the people of Stellaland and by the public opinion of England." As a matter of course, Sir Hercules would not be held responsible for the local details of the action and policy of the Special Commissioner. The resignation of the latter would create serious difficulty and cause much dissatisfaction in England. Again Sir Hercules was told that where he came in, was in connection with the expected annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape, this being the alternative to the practical co-operation of the Colony, one or other of which Sir Hercules had taught Her Majesty's Government to expect, through him :—

"DOWNING STREET, *March* 21, 1885.

"SIR—I have the honour to acquaint you that I have this day sent you a telegram observing to you that Sir Charles Warren's appointment is civil and political as well as military, and that any measure which would cause him to resign would give rise to much dissatisfaction in this country, and create serious military difficulty.

"I assured you at the same time that your assistance was indispensable to ensure the co-operation of the Cape Colony, and I observed that some sacrifices of opinion might be necessary, as any appearance of differences between you and General Warren would have a very bad effect.

"I added that I relied on you to avoid them as far as possible.—I have, etc., (Signed) DERBY.

"Sir Hercules Robinson."

"DOWNING STREET, *March* 21, 1885.

"SIR—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your telegram of the 11th inst., and to acquaint you that I have this day telegraphed to you in reply that Her Majesty's Government had carefully considered your message, but that they feared that the supersession of Sir Charles Warren by your proceeding to Bechuanaland would be construed as an indication of a change of policy, and would undo the progress already made.

"Moreover, Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that your presence at Capetown was of great importance, as there was no one equally capable of overcoming objections such as you had mentioned to some of the acts of Sir Charles Warren. They would not, of course, hold you responsible for all the details of Sir Charles Warren's proceedings, and considered it preferable that you should not supersede him at present, but give him a free hand as far as possible.

"I added that Sir Charles Warren appeared to possess the confidence of the people of Stellaland, and that public opinion in this country approved his proceedings as far as they had been reported.—I have, etc., (Signed) DERBY.

"Sir Hercules Robinson."

On the 23d March Sir Hercules Robinson pursued the telegraphic correspondence with the Secretary of State, sending no less than four messages that day, and three messages on the day following. In these the High Commissioner reiterates his disapproval of Sir Charles Warren's proceedings on the score of their expense (4432, 58); and proceeds to give illustrations of his meaning. An impression was given of the imminence of Colonial annexation, as the Cape Ministers were represented as moving in the matter and desirous of knowing the wishes of Her Majesty's Government concerning the Bechuanaland and Kalahari Protectorate, and Sir Hercules would be glad to be placed in a position to reply to them. All the movement of which we read in the Bluebook is on the part of the High Commissioner and not by his Ministers. Then Sir Charles Warren is put into the position of urging increased expenditure, while the High Commissioner keeps it down. Sir Charles Warren, on the 20th March, suggested, "as an economical method of working under Order in Council, that magistrates should be appointed within certain areas, and that these magistrates, sitting as a bench of judges," should try cases of appeal. A provisional Attorney-General or Crown Pro-

secutor for Bechuanaland would be necessary. Sir Charles informed the High Commissioner that it had been originally proposed to empower the Special Commissioner to attach to his staff a barrister cognisant of the local laws, in whom he could place implicit confidence, and who would advise in the numerous legal difficulties inseparable from the condition of affairs in the country. The time had arrived when the Special Commissioner needed a legal adviser, and he therefore asks advice from the High Commissioner as to what he should do in this matter. These rudimentary requirements of the Special Commissioner are thus referred to by the High Commissioner, in one of the telegrams of the 23d March:—

"Warren wants me to act at once under Order in Council, 27th January, to divide Protectorate into districts—appoint magistrates, judges, and Attorney-General or Crown Prosecutor and legal adviser attached to his personal staff. The expense will be very heavy, and, in my opinion, in large measure unnecessary" (4432, 59).

The reader will observe that this was not a careful or correct representation of what Sir Charles Warren had asked. Sir Charles Warren desired a barrister as legal adviser. In Sir Hercules Robinson's telegram quoted, it would appear that several high legal officials were asked for. Sir Charles did not apply for judges, but suggested that the district magistrates might, in the meantime, form an inexpensive Higher Court. Sir Hercules reports that the Special Commissioner had applied for judges as well as magistrates. Making allowance for loose or ambiguous language, as also for the brevity of a telegram, the reader will not fail to observe that there still remains here an incorrect and exaggerated statement by the High Commissioner of the Special Commissioner's request, which statement was at the time the only information on the subject before Her Majesty's Government.

The other telegram from the High Commissioner, of the 23d March, directed against Sir Charles Warren, had reference to the action to be taken in the northern part of the Protectorate. Sir Charles Warren had a plain duty imposed on him by the message of the Secretary of State concerning

Shoshong. He was to "communicate with Sechele and Khame, and take care that no filibustering expedition takes possession of the country, especially Shoshong" (4432, 48). There were rumours afloat that a "trek-party" was getting ready in the Transvaal whose destination was northward. But leaving this rumour out of notice, Sir Charles felt that a district which was now under British protection should at least be accessible to a British or Colonial force. A single travelling waggon might pass where a relief party would fail to do so. Besides, the Pioneers and other members of the Force would cost no more, when employed in opening up new wells in North Bechuanaland, and thus improving the trade highway into the interior, than they would cost in their camp at Mafiking or elsewhere, doing nothing but "holding the country" and waiting for that Colonial annexation which some thought so near, but which was really so far away. And such operations, while beneficial as far as they went, could be given up at any time, supposing that Colonial annexation did soon take place. The High Commissioner strongly opposed this project for opening up and improving the highway from south to north as far as Shoshong, in the manner in which it had been managed up to Mafiking. This was "in large measure unnecessary" in the judgment of Sir Hercules Robinson, "would entail enormous expense," and "would detain the troops in the country for a considerable period." And yet the High Commissioner recommended that "100 mounted police be left at Shoshong, 50 at Sechele's, and 50 at Haseitsiwe's" —without sanctioning the employment of means by which they could be got there, or sustained there afterwards. To place a body of British troops or police at Shoshong, as thus recommended, with no available road suitable for their movements at all seasons of the year, was to perpetrate a military indiscretion.

Although part of a British Protectorate had been boldly annexed by the Transvaal Government only a few months before, and although Sir Charles Warren was of opinion that the assurances of a desire for peace on the part of the Transvaal Government would not mean more than they

had meant at any time during the last four years, if Imperial influence and force were removed from Bechuanaland, the High Commissioner thought there was not the slightest probability that the same thing might take place farther north—no filibustering expedition would assail a British Protectorate! (4432, 59). The High Commissioner thus eloquently described what had flowed from the Expedition:—

"The main object of Expedition has been accomplished. Freebooters have fled from Goshen, Montsioa has been reinstated in his location, Transvaal has been taught useful lesson, British honour and authority have been vindicated, and Protectorate could be maintained for the future with a few hundred police. Is it the wish of Her Majesty's Government that the Protectorate should be annexed to the Cape Colony during coming session?" (4432, 59)

Alas that Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa—the eyes and the ears and the judgment of Her Majesty's Government at that time—should have shown such haste to banish from a troubled and distressed and unsettled country that well-regulated Expedition whose presence there was still so much needed! As to Bechuanaland itself, what claim had been settled, what dispute adjusted? Was it not openly stated in the Transvaal that as soon as Warren left, the Cape Ministers would return, having annexed the country, and resume their previously announced arrangements? Then was not the Expedition one against filibustering? Why should it be hastened out of South Africa, while filibustering was only "scotched" in Bechuanaland, and while it was still in the ascendant in Zululand? O for an unfettered, broad-minded servant of Her Majesty in South Africa at this juncture—one who could have discerned the great opportunity presented of conferring a lasting benefit upon all races and classes, by utilising, for the common good, the presence in the country of a well-equipped Expedition—an officer who would have risen above personalities, and above distracting local influences!

With some seven or eight telegrams from Sir Hercules Robinson, and with the one from Sir C. Warren, given above, before them, Her Majesty's Government stated their mind once more on the 28th March (4432, 69). Sir Hercules

was assured that he would not be at all held responsible for Sir Charles Warren's local policy. Colonial annexation was still desired by Her Majesty's Government, due provision being made for native interests :—

"Inform Warren Her Majesty's Government do not desire large operations in direction of Shoshong—road and telegraph not sanctioned. He should confine himself to such police protection as absolutely necessary."

"We agree that it is undesirable to divide the Protectorate and create establishments under Order in Council. As Warren has difficult questions, legal and constitutional, it seems right he should have legal adviser, who might conduct trial of murderers."

What Sir Charles had asked was—say three magistrates, who along with Major Lowe would have formed a Higher Court. The legal officer asked for by Sir Charles was granted. I am fully of opinion that Her Majesty's Government would have granted the whole of Sir C. Warren's request, as to the rudimentary steps for establishing order in the country, as also for opening up and improving the highway into the interior, if these matters had been adequately described to them. The concluding paragraph of this telegram is worth transcribing in full :—

"It is impossible to express an opinion on the differences between you and Warren without much further information. We rely on your consulting fully and frankly together. Warren should refer to you all matters involving political principle, and if you cannot agree with him, consult me by telegram. Send copy to Warren" (4432, 69).

Similar views were, two months afterwards, expressed in a despatch by the Secretary of State (4432, 203); and both officers were exhorted each to duly consider the views of the other, and send the result of their highest judgment for the guidance of Her Majesty's Government.

Withdrawing our attention from these unhappy and unnecessary differences, I have to notice an exciting report which reached headquarters on the 21st March, to the effect that the boundary-survey party under Captain Conder had been arrested by the Boers at Kunwana, with the question, Should men at once proceed to their rescue or assistance? Officers in charge at Setlagoli, as the station

next to Kunwana, were of course anxious that no time should be lost, and pressed for instructions. It was recommended that the General himself should at once proceed to the spot, but this was postponed, although every one was ready at the various stations on the military line. Patience, however, on this occasion had its reward, at these stations as well as at Kunwana. It seems that on the morning of the 21st March, Lieutenant H. B. Mackay, R.E., was in charge of the surveying party, Captain Conder having gone forward to headquarters. They had reached the vicinity of Kunwana on the previous night, and were proceeding to resume their progress northward by the road when a burgher appeared, calling himself the veldt-cornet, and ordered the survey-party to stop; and the "burgher guard" of the Transvaal armed themselves under the delusion that the party were invading the Transvaal territory. Lieutenant Mackay pointed out that they were the survey-party, and were privileged by agreement to inspect the boundary-line. The veldt-cornet and his followers appeared to know nothing about this subject, which was only to be explained by the fact that they had evidently been drinking. There was considerable discussion, in the course of which Lieutenant Mackay asked the supposed leader to lunch. Finding, however, that matters were not mending, and that the armed and half-tipsy men did not disperse, and that no one seemed to know about the Boundary Commission or the survey-party connected with it, Lieutenant Mackay quietly gave orders to inspan, resolved now to take the direct road to headquarters in order that the incident might be reported to the Transvaal authorities, and that the burghers near Kunwana might be duly informed of the existence and the duties of the Boundary Commission. The armed burghers watched every movement, but did not interfere. Lieutenant Mackay certainly used praiseworthy tact and patience on this occasion. It is especially interesting to notice, in this connection, that young Mackay, although of Highland descent, is a Canadian born and bred, being one of those colonists who, in accordance with a recent regulation, received a Commission in the Royal Engineers. We had here an exemplification, in a

natural and gratifying way, of the oneness of the Empire—a young Canadian officer surveying in Bechuanaland in Her Majesty's service. The Transvaal-artillery officer in charge on the border, hearing what had occurred, at once visited General Warren at Mafiking, and expressed his great regret; and Captain Conder obtained from his Transvaal fellow-Commissioner, who was also away from the main body when the incident took place, a similar statement of regret in writing. We heard afterwards that these small commandos of burghers assembled on the border-line were disbanded by the Transvaal authorities.

I have spoken with approbation of the action of President Kruger at Fourteen Streams, and of his efforts then put forth for the peace of the country. That healthy and earnest attitude would no doubt have been continued throughout but for the unfortunate difference and estrangement between the High Commissioner and the Special Commissioner, which soon became known everywhere in South Africa. A short time after Sir Hercules Robinson had proposed to Her Majesty's Government to supersede the Special Commissioner in Bechuanaland, President Kruger telegraphed to the High Commissioner at the Cape that—

"With regard to Sir Charles Warren, his actions were not likely to promote peace and a good understanding in South Africa. In the interest of the whole of South Africa, I think another policy in Bechuanaland very much wanted. This Government remains always very anxious to co-operate with Her Majesty's Government in restoring peace in South Africa."

It will not excite the reader's surprise to be told that in a telegram of this nature, unfavourable mention was made of myself. President Kruger said he considered that my presence in Bechuanaland "was absolutely dangerous for the maintenance of peace" (4432, 131). Up to that time, I had had the honour of being bracketed with the High Commissioner himself, in receiving my full share of the maledictions of a man whose injurious South African policy I had had some hand in defeating. Having lost his Imperial identity, and posing now as Governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Hercules was cursed no more, although neither was he

blessed; but the censure of the President fell upon those who were quietly, faithfully, and successfully upholding Imperial interests and the policy of Her Majesty's Government in Bechuanaland. So far as I am aware, there was not the shadow of a reason in Bechuanaland for this telegram of President Kruger; it was a pure case of meddling with affairs beyond his borders,—as if officers in Bechuanaland had begun to interest themselves in the affairs of the Transvaal, and discussed the question as to whether or not every step of its Government, at that particular time, was a wise one. Such meddling on the part of Sir Charles Warren would have been highly censurable; but it was President Kruger, and not a British officer, who was guilty of this uncalled-for meddling. To the best of our belief in Bechuanaland, this was a politically-inspired telegram, deserving from Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa only the most formal acknowledgment, if even disapprobation was not absolutely called for by such a telegram, coming from an official whose hostile action, and hostile want of action, had been for years so inimical to England and to the peace of South Africa. Instead of coldness or censure, the President received the following message from the High Commissioner, in acknowledgment of his unwarranted meddling with affairs beyond his borders, which were in the hands of a responsible Imperial officer:—

"I will place Her Majesty's Government in possession of the views of your Government by the outgoing mail. Has your Honour any objection to my communicating a copy of your telegram to Sir Charles Warren?"

To which polite inquiry the reply of course was, "No objection" (4432, 131). And so next day the views of President Kruger on the Special Commissioner's action and policy in Bechuanaland, were conveyed to him by Sir Hercules Robinson! This telegram was so grotesquely out of place at the time it arrived in Bechuanaland—the boot was so evidently on the other leg, as some would say—that Sir Charles connected the local events then transpiring, with his acknowledgment of this telegram of censure from the head of an outside Government:—

"If President Kruger has not sent his message merely for political purposes, and really wishes to assist in restoring peace in South Africa, he can commence at once within his own territories. He is at present allowing the filibusters who were in Goshen to congregate in parties dangerously near to the border-line, and he permits Nicholas Gey to assert at Lichtenburg a claim as Administrator of part of Her Majesty's Protectorate. Nicholas Gey is at present acting in a hostile manner to Her Majesty's Government from within the Transvaal. He has an organised band acting under his orders in the Transvaal, and is preventing my carrying out my investigation of the claims of those filibusters who wish to submit their claims to me."

Sir Charles then quoted a letter of Gey's which had just been handed in by two of his own freebooters, who wanted to separate from Gey, and to lay their claims, such as they were, before Sir Charles Warren. Gey refused their documents in the following terms:—

"LICHTENBURG, *April* 2, 1885.

"S. Hartmann and P. F. de Villiers.

"DEAR SIRS—I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your honoured letter of 2d inst., requesting me, as Administrator of Land Goshen, to give copies of documents having reference to Land Goshen, as per list, and in answer I have to say that I sincerely regret that I cannot comply with your request, unless your deputation or delegates are provided with good permits given by the general public of said land, of which I am Administrator, temporarily at Lichtenburg" (4432, 169).

On receiving this communication from Sir Charles Warren, establishing the fact by documentary evidence that the Goshen organisation was still intact and in vital, although repressed, existence in the Transvaal, what course did Sir Hercules Robinson take? He contented himself with inquiring of Sir Charles Warren whether Sir Charles wanted him to send a copy of the preceding telegram to President Kruger. Now Her Majesty's High Commissioner had the President's accusations of a brother officer before him, accompanied by such protestations of love of peace as had emanated at intervals from the Transvaal during all the time of the disturbances; and he had the striking facts brought to light by Sir Charles Warren's telegram. It will, I think, be the general opinion that, in the interests of Her Majesty's service at this juncture, and in the exercise of that cordial co-operation with the Special Commissioner to

which the High Commissioner had been so recently exhorted by the Secretary of State, action ought to have been taken by the High Commissioner himself, in virtue of those very prerogatives of which he was sufficiently tenacious. This opinion is all the stronger when we find that when he did address the President he took care that all the criticism of the President's action should be put forward in the name of Sir Charles Warren, and not his own. The Special Commissioner came to South Africa empowered and authorised to address directly the Presidents of the Free State and Transvaal, and no one has attempted to show that he in any way misused that power. But acting on the unsupported general accusations of the High Commissioner, which probably had reference only to the arrest of Van Niekerk, and have been already specified, Her Majesty's Government had practically withdrawn from Sir Charles a power which they had conferred on him in England as Special Commissioner. Now, Sir Charles Warren may be interfered with and accused by President Kruger, without remonstrance from Her Majesty's High Commissioner; and as to the Transvaal double-dealing or want of efficiency (as proved by Gey's letter), the High Commissioner requires to be fortified by special request of Sir Charles, before he even sends a copy of his telegram to President Kruger. It is as plain as daylight that good and salutary influence for the peace of South Africa was being thus frittered away and destroyed. Sir Charles Warren replied plainly and pointedly to the inquiry of the High Commissioner:—

"I can see no use in your Excellency's forwarding my telegram to President Kruger, unless you show him by your accompanying observations that you intend to support me in my position in Bechuanaland. If your Excellency were to send to President Kruger the letter I have sent you from Nicholas Gey, and point out to the President the hostile attitude of Nicholas Gey and his organised marauders within the Transvaal, towards Her Majesty's Government, and point out that he should either be dealt with in the Transvaal or handed over to me, I think great good would be effected" (4432, 169).

The High Commissioner, in addressing President Kruger, began:—

"Sir C. Warren states that Nicholas Gey," etc. etc.; and concludes with

these remarkable words: "I trust your Honour will be able to give me an assurance that effectual means have been taken by your Government to prevent a renewed attack upon the Protectorate from the Transvaal, in the event of the troops being withdrawn" (4432, 170).

Transvaal "assurances!" No one knew better than Sir Hercules Robinson that these were always forthcoming; and no officer in Her Majesty's service knew so well how worthless and misleading they had proved; and yet he gravely asked for one more of them, and expressed the conviction that there was to be some connection between more "assurances" from the Transvaal and the withdrawal of Her Majesty's troops from Bechuanaland. If the "assurances" of the Transvaal had been consulted, the troops had never left Capetown or entered Bechuanaland; and in themselves they were of no more value then than they were before. The President lost no time in sending the "assurance" asked, along with the following remarks upon the facts established by Sir Charles Warren:—

"I do not believe anything about parties congregating near to the border-line, and do not believe it because my last report from the border guard says everything is as quiet as possible, and every man obedient to my orders. This Government is, and always remains, perfectly willing to co-operate in every possible way in restoring peace" (4432, 170).

The President mentioned in his telegram a letter which he was sending, and which treated of the Imperial policy which ought to be pursued in Bechuanaland. The High Commissioner did not wait for the letter; the telegram was enough. When the letter came it proved rather too much for the High Commissioner's views, but was very admirable from the standpoint of the Cape Ministers. President Kruger was good enough to inform Sir Hercules Robinson as to what would restore confidence in Her Majesty's Government in South Africa; and this was—

"To follow in Bechuanaland, and especially in Land Goossen, a policy in the same spirit as that of the Hon. C. J. Rhodes in Stellaland and by the Cape Ministers in Goshen" (4588, 16).

Of course, this was the very thing to prevent which the Expedition had entered Bechuanaland. This letter was

forwarded to London by the High Commissioner, without any remark.

What his high office and duty imperatively demanded of the High Commissioner now, was to point out to the President the undoubted existence of an organisation unfriendly to the Protectorate within the Transvaal; and to remark that, if the President was without information to this effect, that fact rendered the case all the more serious. As the President had disowned Gey in his interview with the Special Commissioner, he might have no objection to give him up to Sir Charles as a disturber of the border, if he persisted in his hostile pretensions; or if the President regarded him as a Transvaal subject, in that case the President would hold Gey responsible to the Transvaal Government for any hostile act towards Her Majesty's Protectorate. A telegram of this description would have been of great value at that time in South Africa. It would have shown that the interests of Her Majesty's Government, and the peace and political morality of the country, were objects of supreme consideration on the part of Her Majesty's representatives. No such telegram was sent to President Kruger; but prompt use was made of this correspondence of an entirely different kind, and in another direction. The High Commissioner, addressing the Secretary of State on the 22d April, brought prominently forward Sir Charles Warren's demand for Gey van Pittius, as if that had been the main subject of the correspondence and a very serious question!

"Although he has declared and levied war on a chief living within the Protectorate, I am not clear," said the High Commissioner, "that his offence could be classed amongst those which are usually included in extradition treaties." He went even further than this, and said, "I do not know that Gey can be proved to be guilty of any crime cognisable either by the Transvaal or the Cape laws. I think, therefore, that the demand should not be made without very careful consideration, and then only if it be decided that it is to be enforced at any cost" (4432, 168).

Thus President Kruger was skilfully played off as against Sir Charles Warren by the High Commissioner, Sir Hercules giving his vote in an apparently serious and dignified way against Sir Charles, and his supposed desire to

make trouble and expense. Now the correspondence which Sir Hercules forwarded, was not about Gey at all, in the first instance; it was about President Kruger's unfavourable criticism of Imperial policy in Bechuanaland. The hollowness of this interference was exposed by Sir Charles by a statement of facts; and remembering the President's disavowal of Gey at Fourteen Streams, he mentioned to the High Commissioner the dilemma into which the President could very easily be put. If the President really wanted peace, here was its present disturber, Gey, within the Transvaal. Make him keep the peace or expel him from the Transvaal. But, as we have seen, no such pressure was brought to bear on the Transvaal Government by the High Commissioner; the pressure was brought to bear by him on the English Government, to the damage of the Special Commissioner, as if to say: Behold the next thing for which Sir Charles Warren wants expenditure and war! Sir Charles Warren never meant to make the delivery of Gey a *casus belli*. This was the High Commissioner's construction. Sir Charles Warren merely showed how the President might better serve the cause of peace within his own borders than by meddling with a responsible Imperial officer beyond them. Lord Derby, as was to be expected, followed the guidance of the High Commissioner, and said:—

"He had received his despatch, enclosing copies of a telegraphic correspondence with Sir C. Warren, relative to the proposed surrender or punishment of Nicholas Gey."

Lord Derby naturally disapproved of making such a *casus belli* as was brought forward by the High Commissioner; but most significantly added:—

"No effort should be relaxed in pressing the Government of the South African Republic to break up any bands of freebooters, however small, who may be lurking on the border with a view to a renewal of the disturbances" (4432, 203).

This was exactly what Sir Charles Warren desired. Had Sir Hercules Robinson sent a telegram to this effect as soon as he got the news, he would have fulfilled his duty; and he would never have heard more of the extradition of

Gey from Sir Charles Warren, who, although he wanted peace in the country, and fair-play as between public men, had certainly no wish to see Mr. Nicholas Gey van Pittius.

It is not unworthy of notice that a short time after this correspondence, having heard how the wind was blowing, Mr. Gey van Pittius also addressed himself to the High Commissioner, and was not afraid to accuse Sir Charles Warren in his communication. He represented himself as an ill-used but most loyal and devoted person :—

"I am here (district of Pretoria, Transvaal) quietly waiting for justice at the hands of Her Majesty's Government; for what the Cape Government will do, and for the final decision respecting the agreement dated the 22d November 1884, made with the Cape Ministers, and which, as far as I am aware, has never been definitely rejected by Her Majesty's Government." And again: "I ever cherish the hope of being enabled to live on my lands under Her Majesty's flag" (4588, 20).

While the chief towns of the Cape Colony supported Sir Charles Warren, and expressed the opinion that he should preside over the land settlement of the country, Sir Hercules Robinson, as we have now seen, was not without supporters in his wish that the Special Commissionership should be suppressed. Those who had objected to Sir Charles's entering the country naturally objected to his remaining in it.

Perhaps the "roughest" item in the personal treatment of Sir Charles Warren by Sir Hercules Robinson was the action of the latter in connection with a petition dated 13th April 1885, which professed to be from Stellaland, and to establish the soundness and legality of the position of the Stellaland freebooters, in a way which was distinctly opposed to the view already taken by Her Majesty's Government on this matter. This petition was in favour of Mr. Rhodes's settlement, which had recognised the status of the new Stellaland Republic. The document in question, as mentioned elsewhere, was never scrutinised or examined in any way, nor was it forwarded through an Imperial officer to the High Commissioner. It was sent by the Hart River party to Mr. Rhodes, who forwarded it to the High Commissioner, with the request that, in sending a copy of the petition to Sir Charles Warren, the names of the signatories should not be

appended, as Sir Charles might do the signatories an injury! Sir Hercules Robinson actually received this document as High Commissioner, and forwarded a copy of it to Sir Charles Warren with only one name attached, along with Mr. Rhodes's letter, making the above request. The petition and Mr. Rhodes's letter were in like manner forwarded by the High Commissioner to the Secretary of State, without remark (4588, 26). These things having come to the knowledge of the Stellalanders, over a hundred of the very people who signed this petition addressed Sir Charles in a separate document, and explained that they had no intention that such an insult should be dealt to him, as they had never entertained any fear as to their suffering injustice at his hands on account of their opinions. They explained also in the same document that their reason for signing in favour of Mr. Rhodes's agreement was a report which was circulated that Sir Charles would probably deprive many of the volunteers of their farms (4643, 61). Comment is needless on an episode of so humbling a character.

CHAPTER II

JOURNEY TO SHOSHONG

In view of the extension of the Protectorate as far north as the 22d degree of latitude, a correspondence took place between the High Commissioner and the Special Commissioner, as to the course which should be taken to bring this important step on the part of Her Majesty's Government to the notice of the chiefs whose countries and people were affected by the announcement. Sir Charles Warren recalled the fact that treaties had been made with chiefs in South Bechuanaland, who were less powerful and influential than the chiefs of North Bechuanaland. Sir Hercules Robinson suggested that a copy of the *Cape Government Gazette* containing the announcement of the British Protectorate over their territories, should be sent to the chiefs in question; but he "saw no harm" in making a treaty with Haseitsiwe, Sechele, and Khame, similar to what had been made with Mankoroane and Montsioa (4432, 101). The High Commissioner also thought the handing to those chiefs of a copy of the *Cape Government Gazette,* with its announcement concerning their country, should be accompanied by a clear statement that they were to pay hut-tax to the Protectorate (4432, 111). Sir Charles Warren thought the chiefs in question would resent the course suggested as a very high-handed proceeding (4432, 125), if the Protectorate were merely announced, and taxes demanded, without a treaty having been previously made; and requested the High Commissioner to reconsider the subject. On the 12th April the High Commissioner requested from the Special

Commissioner, his views in detail as to the establishments which would be necessary in Bechuanaland, should annexation to the Cape Colony not take place; as a comprehensive scheme, for the permanent administration of the whole Protectorate, would then have to be decided on. The scheme was to show the probable revenue and expenditure, so that, if necessary, a vote might be taken for any contemplated deficiency before the close of the current session of Parliament (4432, 147). Sir Charles Warren replied on the following day that he would direct attention to this important matter, and that he considered it necessary to visit personally Molepolole and Shoshong as soon as possible, so as to judge of the administration required and the revenue obtainable (4432, 151). Sir Charles added that he "begged to impress upon the High Commissioner the great importance of the recent addition to the Protectorate—especially towards the north." No answer whatever was given by the High Commissioner to Sir Charles Warren's proposal to visit Shoshong; and the Special Commissioner left Mafiking on the 20th April on his way northward. Sir Charles was accompanied by Mr. Baden-Powell, C.M.G., who had already spent some time in Bechuanaland, and who was much interested in the settlement of that country, as well as of other parts of South Africa; by Sir Bartle Frere, A.D.C.; Surgeon-Major Jazdowzki; Captain M. F. Walker, Military Secretary; Lieutenant A. E. Haynes, Private Secretary; Captain Warren; and Lieutenants A. Bethell and Perring, Intelligence Department; and by an escort of some twenty men of the 2d Mounted Rifles, under Lieutenant Lord Clandeboye.

Heliographic communication had preceded the laying of the telegraph throughout the whole of Bechuanaland, and was established between Molepolole and Mafiking, while the Special Commissioner was in North Bechuanaland. The rolling nature of part of the country made this a work of some difficulty for Major Davidson and Captain Anstruther; and stages had occasionally to be erected for the operators, so as to make them visible at the next stations. If an outsider might express an opinion, I venture to say that it

would be well to make horse-riding part of the ordinary drill of an army signaller. His work is usually done in haste; horses are usually available in South Africa; and it would be well if every man were able to ride with ease, and so quicken the general movement.

Topographical work was done by Commander Bethell during the time he was connected with the Expedition. This work was carried on by Major Barker, Captain Conder, Captain Leverson, and other officers of the Royal Engineers; and the latitude and longitude of some twenty-eight places have been fixed for the correct mapping of the country. To the north, surveying was carried as far as Motshodi, by Major Barker; the road to Shoshong was done by Lieutenants Mackay and Bythell, as also by Lieutenant C. E. Haynes, who also surveyed the road to the Matebele country.

Arriving at Kanye, the Special Commissioner and his party "out-spanned" on the plain at the foot of the hill on which this large native town stands. The town is practically in the same locality, and, indeed, within a short distance of the very place where the Bangwaketse tribe were living when first described by Campbell, and afterwards by Moffat. A few hundred yards from where our tents were erected, stand the church and the mission house of the London Missionary Society. The Rev. J. Good was absent, having gone to Kuruman to attend the meeting of the missionaries of the district, where all local plans, etc., are discussed, and forwarded to London for ratification. Mr. Good had sunk a well, procured a pump, irrigated a small garden and orchard, and had surrounded himself, on what was a bare knoll when he went there, with flowers and foliage and fruit—an epitome of what Southern Africa will become in every case where intelligence and energy and perseverance are brought to bear upon the difficulties in the way. Mr. Good has here a good church building, which is crowded to overflowing. A native minister was in charge, who was one of my own students when at Kuruman, and a most reliable man. Mr. Good was the first European missionary stationed here, and whilst labouring

in the face of many difficulties, has made considerable impression by his Christian life and teaching, and has now great encouragement in his work.

The Special Commissioner had an interview with the chief Haseitsiwe and his headmen on the 23d April. The Protectorate of Her Majesty was announced, and the co-operation of the natives in upholding the Protectorate was duly brought forward, but nothing definite was agreed to. The matter was not pressed, as it was known we should return by the same road.

The most important subject brought forward on this occasion at Kanye was that of the traffic in liquor, which was going on in that town in an open and unrestrained fashion—the only place in Bechuanaland where this was the case. Sir Charles Warren had a long conversation on the subject, with the chief and his headmen. It was one thing for missionaries or native Christians, or even passing English travellers, to recommend the cessation of this noxious traffic; but for an officer of the Queen, and her representative in the country—an officer who was also a soldier, and well known as such—for him to appeal to the chief against the ruin of his tribe, was an entirely different thing; and the chief himself and his son and headmen were evidently much influenced and impressed with what was said by Sir Charles Warren. Their native law had long been against the introduction of brandy; but they complained that the white men refused to obey it, and some even threatened to make such restrictions matter of complaint to the white man's Government! The natives were therefore thankful to hear Sir Charles say that he would give the traders up to a certain date to remove their drink, and that after that date he would confiscate all that remained in the country.

It was very remarkable that a difference of opinion on this drink question also, arose between Sir Hercules Robinson and Sir Charles Warren. Sir Charles, founding upon the fifth section of the Order in Council, wished to establish the Bechuana law and custom concerning strong drink, which forbade its public sale. This was the law of all the chiefs

without exception, although, as in the cases of Haseitsiwe and of Mankoroane, the local practice fell far short of the law. What seemed to be required in Bechuanaland under the Queen, was a system of roadside hotels at suitable distances and places, and the total suppression of canteens and the bottle traffic. To the credit of the Free State Government, it has led the way in this healthy and intelligent legislation; and in that country there are no canteens—only hotels, where liquor may be sold to those staying on the premises. The Order in Council appeared to have expressly recognised the idea essential to the wise administration of the "Territorial Government" of a Native Territory—that native laws and customs were not necessarily abrogated by the establishment of the Queen's supremacy; but that it would be lawful and expedient for them, in certain cases, to go on concurrently with whatever other laws the Queen might establish. The chiefs in their treaties gave the Queen the power to change laws in their territory, but did not make it compulsory for her to do so. The law of the Cape Colony was selected to be followed in Bechuanaland, as being on the whole a more desirable code than that of any other part of the country; but the Order in Council itself expressly stipulated that native laws and customs were, if found necessary, to go on concurrently with this law. In European districts, such as Stellaland, the Cape code would be followed "so far as applicable"; in districts where natives predominated the same Cape law would be the model for administrator and for magistrate to keep in view, with, however, the full freedom which the fifth section conferred, of sanctioning native usages where they seemed on the whole to the advantage of the community; and the sixth section makes the very important general reservation of the right to judge, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, where the law of the Cape Colony might be inapplicable in any part of Bechuanaland. The two sections read as follows:—

"5. This Order shall not (except as herein expressly provided) abridge, affect, or interfere with any power or jurisdiction exercisable otherwise than under this Order—whether by virtue of any statute or

Order in Council, or of any Colonial law, or of any treaty, or otherwise; and whether exercisable by Her Majesty or by any Colonial legislature, or Colonial or other court, or under any Commission, or (as between the natives of African race of the territories within the limits of this Order) any native laws or customs by which the civil relations of such natives are now regulated; and all powers and jurisdictions in this Article mentioned shall continue to exist concurrently with, and independently of, the powers and jurisdiction exercisable under this Order.

"6. The civil and criminal law to be administered under this Order shall be the civil and criminal law in force in the colony of the Cape of Good Hope at the date of the commencement of this Order, so far as applicable" (4432, 2).

From these words it is quite plain to the ordinary reader that Her Majesty's advisers had wisely reserved to her administrators great power as to all parts of Bechuanaland, and specifically so in reference to native laws and customs. This was not the view which the High Commissioner took. He missed the evident intention of Her Majesty's Government, and regarded himself as committed exclusively to Cape law, whether "applicable" or not (4432; 129, 202). Sir Charles "did not agree" with this opinion (4432, 201); and afterwards, in writing his report on Bechuanaland administration, he enclosed a copy of the correspondence on the liquor question, and stated "most emphatically" the conviction that "the economical government of the country depends in a great measure on the adherence to the native rule, and keeping intoxicating liquors out" (4588, 62). When in England judges and magistrates utter such opinions, people agree, but add, What are we to do against use and wont, even when the customs are ruinous? It is so difficult to uproot them, for they have long had the sanction of law. But in the case of Bechuanaland, our administrators seemed determined to introduce this custom, against the openly-expressed wishes of the chiefs, and ignoring the wise provision made in the Order of Council to meet such cases as this. As a matter of fact, I learn that there are now not only hotels, but mere drinking-canteens in Mafiking. I am aware that the law prohibits the sale of this drink to natives. For whom, then, are these canteens opened and licensed by

the administration of Bechuanaland? If not in view of the violation of the law by natives, or by Europeans acting in concert with them, these places have been opened and licensed for the Police Force which is sent to Bechuanaland for its protection. It was the opinion of Sir Charles Warren that the open sale of liquor to a military or police force in such circumstances was a nuisance in every way, and the greatest unkindness to the men. The men are there for a purpose; they are not there to test moot points as to their "right" to eat this or drink that; and to do them justice, there are not usually many "sea-lawyers" among them. Strong drink being what it is, it ought to be in the hands of the officers in charge of the force, and not an article of free sale to men engaged in such delicate and important work as that of a Border Police Force. I am not advocating mere asceticism, but true manliness, and true kindness to such as have a special weakness. The fact is, service in such a force, under wise guidance, might enable a man to overcome evil habits; having open air, in a splendid climate, plenty of exercise, and a copious supply of good food. I am well aware that such a force does not exist for the sake of its men; I am aware that the Force and its regulations exist for the benefit of Bechuanaland. But I am clearly of opinion that the regulation of strong drink in the Force, and the suppression of open canteens, supported almost entirely by the Border Police Force, are measures equally in the interest of the peace of Bechuanaland, and of the members of the Force as individuals. Those who hold other views will say they do not tolerate drunkenness, and that the men agree on entering, that they shall be liable, for such offences, to summary dismissal from the Force, and that this is rigidly carried out. But who is benefited by this process? Not the man—not the country or its inhabitants—only the canteen-keeper, and those speculators who may be at his back.

On our return to Kanye from the north, after careful explanation of the objects of the Protectorate, Haseitsiwe and his headmen signed a document in no way differing from the treaties signed by Mankoroane and Montsioa,

save that it contained a proposed method of requiting Her Majesty's Government for establishing the Protectorate, by granting to Her Majesty a large tract of unoccupied land belonging to the tribe. Submission to the Queen's Government and obedience to her laws were plainly guaranteed; and it was asked that the native law forbidding the introduction of strong drink into the country should be retained, and that the land set apart for the Queen's subjects should be occupied by the owners of the land, and not be kept unoccupied by speculators; in other words, that the unsaleableness of land should remain the custom of the country in the meantime. It was also stipulated by the chief that his people should be allowed to go on hunting in this wide country while it was unoccupied and while the game lasted. And further, the chief wanted to have a voice with reference to those who were granted farms by Her Majesty's officers. This probably meant nothing more than that the chief wished to place his local knowledge of men at the service of Her Majesty's Government, with the object of preventing the misappropriation of land. The proposals of Haseitsiwe were practical and business-like, and such as would save the country from disturbance and filibustering. I do not know whether they have fallen to the ground or not; I suppose no one knows.

Leaving Kanye, we passed through the lovely country between it and Molepolole, the town of the Bakwena. Sechele, the chief of this tribe, had had the advantage of the teaching and the example in his town for many years of Dr. Livingstone, the ruins of whose Mission House at Kolobeng are still to be seen. Returning on one occasion from a visit to the Colony, he found that house broken up, his books and medicines destroyed and scattered about the premises, by a commando from the Transvaal. Dr. Livingstone took steps to have the actions of the Transvaal burghers brought under the notice of Her Majesty's Government. He considered that his losses could not be covered by £300; but the question which he brought forward was the greater one of the conduct of rough borderers to whom independence had been given, but who had bound themselves by a treaty

which, Dr. Livingstone showed, they were not observing. This representation of "a certain Mr. David Livingstone" was taken no notice of by Her Majesty's Government—no expostulation was then addressed to the Transvaal, such as that of Sir George Grey, which in 1858 saved Kuruman to the natives, and the free highway into the interior to England. In these circumstances—regarding the country as abandoned by England, and in the hands of borderers, to whom had been given independence and recognition and no defined boundaries, and no doubt impelled by a noble desire to find other highways by which Christianity and civilisation might reach the interior of Africa—"Mr. David Livingstone" abandoned the unequal conflict on the border of the Transvaal, yoked in his oxen to the lumbering waggon, and turned their heads in the direction of the then unknown interior of Africa. For years he struggled unknown as a Christian explorer, supported with large-mindedness by a noble Society whose work was primarily that of a Missionary Society, till success crowned his heroic efforts, and he was "a Mr. David Livingstone" no more. In thus seeking new mission fields, and new routes to them, Dr. Livingstone left behind him unsolved the great problem as to the contact of Europeans and natives in South Africa.

In the interviews which took place between Sir Charles Warren and the chief Sechele and his council at Molepolole, there was a feeling of doubt and opposition which, I was privately assured by one whose local rank and ability gave him the fullest means of knowing, had been encouraged by men living in the Transvaal. I, of course, do not mean the Transvaal Government: President Kruger would be warranted in saying—as he did in several other cases—that he knew nothing of this effort; and yet there it was, and these people published to the world that Sechele had declined all offers of Protection, and that a body of Goshenites held themselves ready to support that chief! Had Sebele, the chief's eldest son, been the source of authority at Molepolole, these intrigues might have obtained a little better footing; although the good sense of the tribe would never have allowed them

to go so far astray as to propose active opposition to the Imperial Government or to make common cause with the people of Goshen. It became quite evident that Sechele and the Bakwena tribe were not willing to be such facile tools of freebooters as Moshette and Massow and their people had been.

The Bakwena headmen, and notably Khosilintsi, next brother in rank to Sechele, and the real ruler of the tribe, expressed pleasure in the coming of Sir Charles Warren, and the friendship of the Queen's Government,—going back and illustrating his speech by what had happened to them during and since the time Dr. Livingstone was with them. He said they were English, and they were thankful for the friendship of the English. But as to this Protection, what was it? They did not know what it was, and how could they say they liked it? Sebele, the chief's son, went further, and wanted to decline it—saying that the "steenbok" (a little antelope) had no strength, and yet there were always "steenboks"—God took care of them. The older men rebuked the young chief for this speech: they all saw, of course, that he was arguing, not in the interests of the tribe, but in his own interests as its prospective chief; for if this English Protection came, when was he to rule as chief? Having heard all his headmen, Sechele said he agreed with what his brother Khosilintsi had said about being English; but he considered English Protection was still a thing that needed explanation. Sir Charles Warren should dry the tears of the chiefs in the south—especially of Montsioa and Haseitsiwe, whose cattle had been taken, and whose men had been shot down, in defence of the Protectorate, and after it had been proclaimed. If it were a true Protectorate and gave even-handed justice, he was for it; but these things had to be shown first in our dealings farther south. These were the opinions of a chief who was a sincere admirer of the English—another condemnation of our vacillation. This discussion of the question took place on our northward journey to Shoshong.

As we approached Sechele's on our way south, we learned that a rumour was abroad that the General's party

were to be attacked or captured from the Transvaal, and that Lentshwe's people at Motshodi were in the plot. The news had been telegraphed to headquarters at Mafiking, and Colonel Walker, the officer commanding, had quietly taken the necessary precautionary measures. A letter to Sir Charles Warren from Sechele, solemnly warning him of his danger and of the general badness of the chief Lentshwe at Motshodi, and of Sechele's wish to do the right thing, made pretty evident the source and the objects of this rumour. When Sechele was afterwards questioned as to the sources of his information, and when he found that general statements would not suffice, he mentioned two post-runners belonging to his own tribe who had carried the mail to Shoshong through Motshodi. But when these men were examined, their statements did not tally with those of Sechele. In fact, it was generally agreed that as to this alleged rumour there was great appropriateness in the name "Such a lie" (Sechele) which my punning friend coined for him.

On our return from Shoshong, however, we found that Sechele and the Bakwena had considerably changed their views as to the advantage of the Protectorate. The action of Khame had no doubt considerable influence with them, although as an older man Sechele would be the last to admit that he was following the lead of one whom he still called a child, although that "child" has children and grandchildren. Taking a great interest in the Bakwena clan, and knowing that Sechele was naturally an inveterate intriguer, I now placed myself at the disposal of chief and headmen to discuss the Protectorate—what it meant and what it did not mean. We drew maps on the sand with walking-sticks, and overlapping claims were brought forward with great earnestness. Sechele was specially anxious that his title to a certain distant tract of country should be recognised—a district, he said, which he was willing to hand over entirely to Her Majesty's Government. Khame had already offered the same tract or the greater portion of it to the Queen. Possibly the old chief, who knew this, wished to have the pleasure and excitement of marshalling his arguments in opposition to those of Khame. I told him, however, that,



MOLEPOLOLE, TOWN OF THE BAKWENA TRIBE.

as far as I knew, all outlying boundaries would be matter for after-consideration by Her Majesty's Government; it was for him to define what he claimed as his country, and from that to apportion to his people what they were using, and what they needed, and sanction the occupancy of the rest by Europeans. This policy, clearly explained in his own language, was fully agreed to by perhaps the most pragmatical man in Bechuanaland—the chief Sechele,—and by his brothers and sons. Within their own district, Sechele wished to rule over his people; but he and his headmen were willing to hand over to Her Majesty's Government the whole of the unoccupied part of their country, which was defined first in the sand with our sticks, and afterwards on paper in a document signed by the chief and headmen (4588, 47). "Territorial Government" from the native side had thus secured the approval of the Bakwena chief and council; and clearer-headed people will not be found in the country, with just that amount of prejudice, and contact with enemies of the Imperial Government, which made their hesitancy and their arguments of great interest.

One day, after our arrival at Molepolole from Kanye, the chief Sechele brought certain travellers from the north to the General's tent, that they might themselves communicate their news, and be cross-questioned as to the sources of their information. This is a custom everywhere followed in these regions—strangers on arrival invariably proceed to the chief's court-yard and tell their news; and on this occasion, Sechele honoured his guests by at once despatching them to tell the news to the General. From telegrams and daily papers, we were now reduced to this primitive method of obtaining information—the reports of travellers on foot. On this occasion the native couriers informed us that a war-party of Matebele had taken the field, and, it was supposed, were going to attack Khame. The report was so far correct, as we found afterwards, that the war-party was abroad, but had gone across Khame's hunting-country, and made for Lake Nghabe, where the Matebele were repulsed by the Bechuana under the young chief Moremi; and a mere remnant of the war-party returned to Matebeleland without captives, without

cattle, decimated by fever and by hunger, and disgraced. Sir Charles, although anxious personally to visit the important town of Shoshong, was arranging not to do so, but to return southward from Molepolole. When, however, this report reached him, he resolved to delay his return to Mafiking, and to visit Shoshong. He was not accompanied by an army, and he did not anticipate fighting; but to have quietly returned southward on hearing a report of Khame's danger, and at the same time have sent on messengers to assure that chief, by word of mouth, of something which we were calling Queen's Protection, was a course of action repugnant to Sir Charles's mind, as it would have been to the mind of any British officer. So orders were given to make ready for the journey from Molepolole to Shoshong.

It was thought advisable to leave the mules at Molepolole, and to employ oxen only for the coach, and for the waggons with food, forage, tents, etc. By taking this course we obviated the necessity of taking so many waggons, as mules require artificial forage when doing hard and continuous work, whereas oxen can do a fair day's work with only the grass which they pick up at outspanning time. After considerable discussion, it was decided to take the eastern road leading past Motshodi and along the Notwani River till near its junction with the Marico River, where the Shoshong road, leaving the river, proceeds northward. As long as we were travelling with Major Edwards, that officer took charge of the trekking—when to inspan and when to outspan. The road led through very dense thorn-trees on the Notwani—quite a different country from that of South Bechuanaland. Our coach got sadly scratched by the thorns. Nothing could be piled on the top of the vehicle any more; and soon the ornamental trappings were transferred to the cruel thorn branches on each side of the road. The pace of the oxen was only some three miles an hour; that of the mules was between four and five miles an hour. It was necessary also to perform a good part of the "trekking" during the night, as it was then cooler for the oxen. When these arrangements did not fit in quite pleasantly was in the early morning—three o'clock perhaps—at which hour the slow ox-waggons

had to span in and go on. Those on horseback did not need to leave the encampment for an hour and a half, or perhaps two hours longer. But the blankets and rugs had to go on with the waggons, as it would have been cruel to load up a riding horse with such things. So, after the cup of cocoa or coffee, which was the signal to get up, you saw your bed neatly folded and packed away inside the coach. You could go on with the waggons if you liked at the pace of two and a half or three miles an hour in a bitterly cold morning, or you could lie down by the fire and try to fall asleep as you were; or you could light your pipe and tell or listen to some yarn, until it was time to start. One officer usually coiled himself up into the very smallest compass, so that a Spanish mantle covered all except the huge boots which stuck out from the dark circle. Another got as nearly as possible inside, or rather below, the neighbouring warm bush, and seemed comfortable; while others roasted themselves, Bushman fashion, first one side and then the other, till it was time to mount horses and ride on. It was easy to see whether it was a novice or a traveller who had selected the site for the night's fire and camping-ground. If the former (until experience taught him) an open space was chosen, without reference to the direction of the wind or the chances of shelter from tree or bush. After the horses had been knee-haltered, they went to graze in charge of guards, while nearly every one, from choice or orders, did something for the general comfort. The largest dead trees to be found in the neighbourhood were collected near the fire. Sometimes the fire was made at the root of one of those withered-up monarchs of the forest, when all hands would bring the tree down with a crash before turning in, lest during the night it should fall on the sleepers. We had more than one Canadian woodsman among us—mighty men to drive their axes into the trees; but they never drove axes into harder timber than the motshwiri or white iron-wood of Bechuanaland.

At Motshodi we had an interview with the young chief Lentshwe of the Bakhatla tribe, part of which is still in the Transvaal, whilst another part, long separated, lives at Gamoshopa, under Pilani. Lentshwe was a little afraid of what

the Special Commissioner would say about his quarrel with Sechele. It appeared that his father, having asked and obtained permission to enter Sechele's country, afterwards refused to render, as a tenant, any tribute or recognition of any kind to that chief. Sechele attempted, as the owner of the country, to compel such recognition, but was defeated, and Lentshwe now held his position by force of arms. An exactly parallel case was that of Mokhosi, who had similarly opposed and repelled the forces of Haseitsiwe when they attacked him at Ramotsa on the Notwani River.[1] Beyond expressing friendliness on the part of the Queen's Government, and the wish that peace might be established on a permanent basis, the Special Commissioner felt that it would be entirely out of place to enter into the consideration of such questions. At Motshodi we were again in the neighbourhood of the Transvaal boundary-line as shown on the maps; but the country on this part of the Transvaal is largely unoccupied. Whilst some Transvaal burghers have mortgaged or sold their farms, and are looking out for others which they hope to get for nothing, it must never be forgotten that the Transvaal itself has room for a much larger population than it now contains. Wide districts are said to be owned by individuals and by companies who have never even visited their property. Their taxes are paid by their local agents, and they are waiting till the price of land shall be higher.

The natives at Motshodi enjoy the ministrations of a missionary sent from the Dutch Reformed Church—himself a Dutch-speaking Cape Colonist—and educated as a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church at Stellenbosch. They enjoy also the services as schoolmistress of a lady whose father and whose grandfather have done very much for the education and the uplifting of the Cape Colonists—by all of whom, and throughout South Africa, the name of Murray

[1] During this fight some of Haseitsiwe's men crossed the sandy river bed, which is here the Transvaal boundary-line, in pursuit of those who had fought with them in Bechuanaland. The invasion of Bechuanaland by these people was not taken into account by the Transvaal Government; but the invasion of the Transvaal by Haseitsiwe in pursuit of those who had fought with him in his own country, cost him close on 1000 head of cattle!

is justly revered and loved. We were unfortunate, however, in passing through Motshodi at a time when none of these Christian workers were at home; a Conference at Pretoria of all connected with the Mission had called them away; and no doubt with that duty would be combined the bringing home to this isolated corner of the annual supplies for the Mission family. The Christian party at Motshodi does not include Lentshwe, who, however, as we were told, does not oppose their efforts. I was much struck with the quiet, friendly, and intelligent conversation of several of the Christian Bakhatla who came to the waggons. As it had been rumoured that a journey to the north might be undertaken by some one connected with the Expedition, Mr. Brink had left orders with the servant in charge of his house that the party were to be supplied with firewood, or with any other convenience which his premises afforded. I was personally very glad that we had come across one of the mission stations of the Dutch Reformed Church—of which there are some twelve altogether. I had the utmost satisfaction in directing the special attention of the members of the Expedition to the subject, which was a surprise to many and the cause of much congratulation to all. It was felt on all hands that the community which supports Christian missions among the natives—not to speak of the Colonial gentlemen and ladies who give their lives to this work—must be as much opposed to filibustering and lawless border outbreaks, as are the people of England. I have no doubt that as they become familiar with the friendly character of the natives, the value of the vast unoccupied territories, and the possibilities of expansion of Europeans under Imperial control, they will conscientiously and intelligently support such a scheme of Territorial Government as is recommended in these pages.

Many were the questions which I had now to answer as to game, large and small—scarcely a trace of which can any longer be seen here. My replies were invariably "on ahead" or "some miles to the west." The same answer was given by Khame at Shoshong when the question was put to him. One evening, however, while we were travelling on

the Notwani River, a single gnu or wildebeest crossed the road some distance before us—chased, some one afterwards said, by something which desisted from following when it came near the road. This wildebeest fell to the rifle of one of the officers, and we had gnu-steaks for supper. This was a change from guinea-fowl, partridge, pheasant, and smaller birds which were to be found along the road. Of course we were not hunters, and we were anxious to go as fast as the oxen would allow us—otherwise it would have been possible, no doubt, to find "those giraffes" about which there were so many jokes. At Lotlaka, an old river-course which we came to one morning after leaving the Notwani River, it was announced by those who knew, that there was the fresh spoor of a lioness at the brackish fountain; she had drunk at it a short time before we came up. It was of course always necessary to ask permission to hunt guinea-fowl along the road-side. I think I never heard so many requests made as here to be allowed to "look for guinea-fowl"; and I don't think those who went took their fowling-pieces, but their rifles on that occasion. If they were in search of the lioness, they did not find her—she must have heard the unusual noise of the waggon-drivers and conceived a "superstitious" dread of staying there any longer.

At Konoa, some eighteen miles south of Shoshong, which we reached in the evening, it was found that one of the party was missing. He was one of several who had gone forward in front of the waggons. Guns were fired, and search parties directed to proceed a short distance from the camp, but not to go far, as the cattle-posts of the Bamangwato were all round Konoa, and the lowing of the cattle, and even the voices of the herds, could be heard from our camp; so that it was judged the wanderer, if he left the large waggon-road, must necessarily find his way to one or other of those cattle stations. Next morning our friend made his appearance in good time, and reported that he had carried his explorations farther than he had thought—had been benighted; but, in answer to unofficial questions, treated with disdain the idea that he had been lost or had missed his way. It was not regarded as a matter for cross-

questioning or further inquiry. When our party returned to Konoa on our southward journey, a number of the Bamangwato people living at the various cattle stations came to see Sir Charles, and to greet their old teacher. They seated themselves in a semicircle on the ground. By and by I heard one strapping young fellow say to his comrades, "Shall I tell them about the white man who was lost?"

Several answered, "Yes, do tell," evidently regarding the promised story as very amusing.

An older man said, "I have been looking all round for our white man, but don't see him; he is perhaps lost again."

"Is it not said that some have been left behind, and that they are going on to Matebeleland?" was the reply of one of the herdboys, who had probably been recently in Shoshong, and had heard of the proposed arrangements concerning Major Edwards's party.

The one who had first spoken, and who was an excellent mimic, then shouted out, in imitation of a European's broken pronunciation of Sechuana, "Sechele-tsela, tsela-Sechele"—adding a too common English expletive, to indicate the white man's impatience at his own linguistic efforts, or the stupidity of those who could not understand him. This was what our young friend had said on the occasion when he was not lost, only taking observations, "Sechele, the road; the road, Sechele;—— ——." The voice and attitude were so well imitated that those of our party sitting near me, who could not, of course, understand a word of the introductory narrative, were able at once to make out the drift of the story which was being told, or rather acted. It seems that so persistent and even peremptory were the demands of our friend to know the "Sechele road," that a party were about to start and put him on the western road to Sechele's, when, fortunately, they heard the waggon-whip or the firing of the guns at Konoa, and declined to take any step whatever. The wrath of our young explorer must now have been very great, judging from the manner in which it was depicted to us. There was, however, no remedy—the natives would do

nothing till daylight came. His case was not a bad one; there was plenty of milk, sweet and sour, for his supper, and a place was given him where he could sleep. Placed on his way by his friends and hosts, it was easy for the explorer to find the camp, as he did, early next morning. The fact was, he had passed Konoa the evening before, without noticing the large pool of water there—had wandered much too far westward, so that when he luckily stumbled on a cattle-post, the herds thought of the western "Sechele road" rather than the eastern one, on which we were travelling; and had his peremptory demands been acceded to, he would have found himself in the morning on another road altogether, and some twenty miles from his camp. It was fortunate for him that, although lost, he was found by friendly people, who took a calmer view of his position than he did himself.



ENGLISH TRADING STATION AT PANDAMATENGA, NEAR THE ZAMBESI.

CHAPTER III

SIR CHARLES WARREN AT SHOSHONG

At Shoshong we had almost reached the most northerly European settlement. To the north-east, there are the English missions and trading stations in Matebeleland. But to the north there is nothing till you reach the English trading station of Pandamatenka, a short distance south of the Zambesi, the goods for which are supplied from the south *viâ* Shoshong. There are also the mission stations of the Paris Missionary Society in the Barotse Valley, between the affluents of the Zambesi. Farther north still, there is the residence of Mr. Arnot, a Scotch evangelist, unconnected with any Missionary Society, and able, through his own resources and God's help, to carry on his solitary, self-imposed, and Christian labours, at his most distant European residence. Having crossed the Zambesi, however, Mr. Arnot now communicates with Europe chiefly by way of the west coast. The French missionaries, on the other hand, retain a close connection between the Barotse Valley and South Africa. Their staff of native evangelists is supplied by volunteers from the churches which were planted in Basutoland some fifty years ago by the Evangelical Christians of France. M. Coillard, the able and devoted head of the Zambesi Mission, laboured both in Basutoland and in Bechuanaland, and is well known not only to the Protestant churches of France, but to missionary circles in Great Britain. The Paris Society has a station at Seleka's, due east of Shoshong. It was members of this Mission who were, some years ago, refused permission by the Transvaal Government to pass through the Transvaal

country, for the purpose of carrying the Gospel to the heathen beyond. Thus the descendants of the Huguenots, who, as South African borderers, have had little contact with the Christian world for generations, did not recognise as brethren, or sympathise with, the actual descendants of Huguenots from France itself, when they appeared as

MOLAI.

evangelists of that Church for which their common ancestors had suffered and died. The Paris Society carries on its labours in Basutoland, under Her Majesty's Government; and its evangelists labouring on the Zambesi are constantly visited and reinforced from Basutoland. The Zambesi is thus shown in practice to be the natural limit of Austral Africa.

Shoshong and its neighbourhood had been the scene of the justly famous Roualeyn Gordon Cumming's hunting exploits, and, strangely enough, an officer in Sir Charles Warren's party at Shoshong was closely related to the old family of the Cummings of Altyre, of which the intrepid African hunter was a son. Having been asked if any of the people still remembered Gordon Cumming, I was able to produce two brothers —now old men—who had been his trusted servants and guides, accompanying him not only to the hunting-field, but

MOLAINYANA.

also in his journeys to the Cape Colony. Molai, the elder, and Molainyana, the younger of the two brothers, were pleased to see any one related to their old master, of whose mighty deeds [1] they are still fond of speaking. The sketches, taken on the spot by an officer, partake, I need hardly say, of the nature of caricatures. They, all the same, vividly recall the originals as they stood at our camp at Shoshong.

The chief Khame was not aware of our proximity to Shoshong, so that on our arrival we found he had ridden out for a short distance in another direction. On his return he expressed great pleasure that Sir Charles Warren

[1] See *Ten Years North of the Orange River*, p. 115

had himself come north. He had heard that Major Edwards was deputed to visit the chiefs, but was glad that Sir Charles had come personally. He contradicted the report which had reached us at Sechele's town as to the attack of the Matebele, and said that for more than twenty years the Matebele had never tried to assail Shoshong, or to conquer the

PREMISES OF NATIVE TEACHER AT SELEKA'S.

Bamangwato, although they had passed through distant parts of his hunting-grounds on their way to and from Lake Nghabe. Soon after the arrival of the party, a fine ox from the chief was driven to the encampment, with the message that this was some food for Sir Charles and his young men after their long journey.

Khame produced the most favourable impression upon

every one by his quiet and sincere manners. It became quite evident that he possessed the affection and respect of his people, and the Europeans at Shoshong were all of one opinion as to his goodness and uprightness as a chief. The Rev. J. D. Hepburn, who had been my fellow-missionary here, and who had since carried on the work with so much earnestness and success, both at Shoshong and at Lake Nghabe, was absent from his station at the date of our visit, having gone to attend the Missionary Committee deliberations at Kuruman. We found that the Rev. Edwin Lloyd, a young missionary, had recently arrived from England. He was engaged in house-building, and in the acquisition of the Sechuana language, dedicating another young life to the noble work of the pioneer evangelist. It was somewhat singular that, although we had now visited four mission stations, we had found no missionary at home except Mr. Lloyd. It was the time of the meetings of the Conference or Committee; but there were many jokes on the subject, and on the supposed "good time" which the missionaries would be having at Pretoria or at Kuruman. There was one satisfaction about it, that no adverse critic of the business transacted by Sir Charles Warren in North Bechuanaland could point out that it had been carried through by the influence and help of the various missionaries, and that the natives did not really want the Protectorate. This is the line adopted by those who are vexed to see peaceful settlements, especially such as would secure the natives in the possession of their land.

There was a very high wind the first night we were at Shoshong. Our encampment was in an open unprotected space, which received the full force of the gale. Tent-pegs and flaps were loosened, and the noise became something special. In one tent, which was shared by two, the noise was so great that one of the occupants "took up his bed" and went outside; the other remained behind, cogitating, amid the noise and clatter of the storm, the stirring events of the twenty-five years which had intervened since he had first unyoked his ox-waggon on the same open space at Shoshong. What had

brought me to that creaking, clattering tent at Shoshong—on "special service" with Her Majesty's Special Commissioner? I shall not trouble the reader with my cogitations, save to record that I felt assured, as I lay there, that I was at Shoshong as I had been in England, in Bechuanaland, and in the Cape Colony, in furtherance of one great work which God would establish in His own time—the peaceful opening up of South Africa under Her Majesty's Government.

The Special Commissioner and Khame had interviews of a more or less informal character before the subject of the Protectorate was brought before the tribe. Khame spoke to the General of the visit of some German gentlemen a few months before, whose object appeared to the English traders at Shoshong to be semi-political and semi-commercial. In Khame's country, as in Matebeleland, there is no German trade; and there never has been any but English trade, which is now open and established as far as the Zambesi. Since Dr. Livingstone visited Khame's father on ox-back some forty years ago, the increasing trade of North Bechuanaland has been exclusively in the hands of English houses. Only two articles made out of England have driven English manufacturers out of the Bechuanaland market—American axes and American ploughs; all other articles supplied to the trade in Bechuanaland are of English manufacture. It seems, however, that the German visitor to Shoshong of the previous year threw out some hints about an association which he hoped to form in Berlin to push German trade in Bechuanaland. As the country is already thoroughly well supplied with English goods, for which there is a steady demand, it is difficult to see how the commercial part of this project would pay its Berlin projectors. It seems easier to follow its political aspect. First form your Berlin and Bechuanaland Trading Company, and then, whatever its commercial gains or losses, Prince Bismarck will be able to "protect German trade" in North Bechuanaland—a trade which in this instance has been for forty years exclusively in the hands of the English. The visit of General Warren to Khame had nothing in it inimical

to any European Power. The visit arose in connection with the management of the extended Bechuanaland Protectorate, and from the Special Commissioner's praiseworthy anxiety to see and understand the country and people thus placed under our care. Then, again, nothing is more natural than that Khame, a Christian chief, whose religious teachers have been Englishmen, whose traders have been chiefly English, and whose town and country are constantly visited by a succession of English travellers and hunters, should form a favourable opinion of the English people and the English Government. That Khame entertains this high opinion there can be no doubt. That it is a sincere and, as the chief thinks, a well-grounded opinion, is evident from his action in inviting the English Government into his country, and in trusting himself and his people to the honourable character of the English people and English Government. It is not often that such confidence is expressed by the less civilised in a more powerful and highly civilised Government. It is surely better to be thus welcomed by a friendly chief than to regard him and his people as our "natural enemies," and to shoot them down first and then occupy the country which we have made desolate.

Before I had been long at Shoshong, Khame expressed to me his great satisfaction that I was one of the "English" party. Nine years had elapsed since I had parted from my pupil and friend, and from the Bamangwato. They had been in good hands after my departure, and while I expected to be remembered by some of the people, I had no anticipation of the warmth of the reception awaiting me, and I have pleasure in mentioning it as showing the character of the people. Khame said to me in his quiet way, "When year after year passed and you remained at Kuruman, we came to have no hope of seeing you again. When we heard you had entered the service of Government we thought there was even less prospect than before; but when I heard that you were with General Warren, and that the English were to send messengers to me to speak to me about the Bamangwato country, I prayed to God that you might be sent: and now here you are. I am thankful;

and my heart says, if you now appear at a time when we thought of you as so far from us, may we not hope to see you again? Your coming now is to my heart an argument that you will come again." It is pleasant to hear such words of attachment after sixteen years' intercourse, succeeded by nine years' separation. The same sentiments evidently animated the people. It was indeed pleasant to have native men and women holding up little children to look over the hedge as we passed, and saying, "There he is,—that one; that is our teacher; now you have seen Makence." It was quite evident that the children had heard of "Makence" before.

Among the old men of the tribe was one whom I well knew, and of whom I was told that he had for some time been giving the chief great trouble in the town. Many wondered what position he would take up with reference to the Protectorate and the action of Khame. When the time came for this old man to sign the paper in the khotla, he called out to me to come and write his name for him while he made his cross, adding that he had no hesitation in taking a course which I recommended. The action of this man recalled many scenes of a somewhat difficult and eventful life as a missionary among an ignorant people. He represented the old-world native element in the town, and the missionary is of course an opponent of the heathenism and old-world ways to which they cling. But he is not the less a sympathetic friend of the people themselves, who usually recognise this; and while they "come short," as they would say, of accepting his heavenly message, they in many cases bestow their regard and their confidence upon the messenger himself as a friendly man.

I need not say that many exciting but almost forgotten passages of my former life at Shoshong were brought back to my recollection by this visit. I remembered how I had lived through tribal feuds and wars at Shoshong, and had more than once helped to make peace, and bring about reconciliation. It had been my duty to attend to the wounded when they had come to blows. On one occasion I saved a man's life who, in the midst of a fight, had fled

for refuge to my house, pursuers being close behind him. Giving up his gun, bandolier, and powder-flask to his pursuers, as he was now "a dead man," I refused to give up the man himself, because he had got within the walls of my house, and I was God's servant and the friend of both sides. After some demur, the men recognised my position and my claim, and left the man safe in my house. In my storeroom at Shoshong I have had entrusted to me, at the same time, the property of two rival chiefs. When one was expelled or fled, the victor has received his own property, and in one instance did not even ask for his rival's money, although he knew it was in my hands. In another, the victorious chief asked but did not press for it; and on each occasion I was able to hand over the property entrusted to me to its owner. On another occasion, while firing was going on, I entered the town to secure the property of absent Englishmen and remove it to my own premises, and firing ceased while I was thus employed with my servants. In the same way, I was able to remove a troop of cattle belonging to an Englishman from the care of those who were fighting, and place them with my own cattle, where they were perfectly safe, although war and cattle-lifting were going on all round.

When I first came to Shoshong I received a letter from the nearest Transvaal veldt-cornet, informing me that it was the law of the Transvaal Republic that a missionary must first receive the sanction of the Transvaal Government before settling among the natives. Considering the position of Shoshong on the map, the reader will see at once the policy of the Transvaal with reference to supremacy in the interior of South Africa. This letter was no doubt meant to put me in the awkward dilemma of either acknowledging the claim of the Transvaal to the Bamangwato country, by asking Transvaal permission to take up my residence at Shoshong, or of asserting the independence of the native chief, and repudiating the claim of the Transvaal. I wrote no reply; but having occasion soon after to visit the Transvaal for supplies, I made a point of at once waiting upon the veldt-cornet who had written the letter, and purchased from him

some of my supplies for the year. I waited for him to make some reference to his letter addressed to me, but he made no reference to it whatever. Of course I followed so good an example, and was silent on the subject also; and never heard more of it. I thus escaped expressing an opinion on a question which did not belong to me as a missionary. In a few years after going to reside at Shoshong, I was on general friendly terms with the inhabitants of the Transvaal districts adjoining Bechuanaland, and was welcome in any house where I was known. This line of remark looks like boasting, and perhaps it is so. But even an apostle gave way to the temptation so far as to declare truthfully what he was, and what he had been, in answer to those who maligned and misrepresented him. And so, having lived many years among turbulent and plotting men in a disturbed country, and having lived there only as a peacemaker and an acknowledged friend of all, I leave the two or three would-be politicians who have traduced me to explain how one who had often, in the course of twenty-five years, a most difficult and delicate part to perform, became all at once, in the same country and among the same people, "injudicious," "mischievous," "a firebrand," and so on.

The first formal interview between Sir Charles Warren and the chief Khame, his headmen, and tribe took place on the 12th May. The Special Commissioner announced the boundaries of the Protectorate on the west and on the north. What was the 22d degree of latitude? it was asked. When told whereabouts it would be on the ground, there was curiosity and amusement on the part of the people, but disappointment as well as surprise on the part of the chief. Could a man be cut in two? Could a man or a house be protected and only half of it be attended to? He wanted much to know why his country should be cut in two, and, if divided, why just at that line, and why without any local inquiry or consultation. He declared that the 22d degree represented nothing in the Bamangwato country; and he trusted that the definition of the Protectorate would be changed by Her Majesty's Government, so as to include all his country and not part of it.

Khame's brothers and headmen spoke freely in the public courtyard on this public business, after the manner of the tribe. They were unanimous in welcoming the Protectorate, and also in speaking against the white man's drink, and their dread of the white man's law as to the sale of land. Of course by the sale of land they meant the land which they claimed for their own use; they were no doubt going upon what they knew of the dispossession of native landowners farther south, and the fear that this might be repeated in their own case. Sir Charles Warren thoroughly agreed with the Bamangwato chief and headmen in wishing to exclude drink from their country, and to make the lands in actual possession and occupation of the tribe unsaleable. The question then arose as to the expense of the Protectorate. How was it to be defrayed? Sir Charles pointed out that what Her Majesty's Government meant to bestow upon the tribe and the country was protection; and that people might be asked to contribute towards the practical local working of a Government which brought such a great blessing as stable and assured peace. In reply Khame acquiesced in the reasonableness of this co-operation, and pointed in general terms to the largeness of the Bamangwato territory, and his willingness to set aside part of it at once for the use of Her Majesty's Government. Pointing to the large council-yard of the tribe which was filled with men, Khame said: "Although we are numerous, the country is very great, and stretches out in all directions. What we want," added the chief, "is to go forward and improve, and I think we can do so if we are wisely connected with the English, for after we have seen your ways, we shall adopt some of them. But at first we shall not be able to understand, as we do not know how you would take possession of a country like this; but we are willing to be taught by the English how to manage a country like this, and we put confidence in the way they do these things." Sir Charles Warren closed the first meeting by remarking that he was much pleased with what the chief had said; that it was evident he had the wellbeing of his people at heart; and that he (Sir Charles) had great pleasure in making the

acquaintance of such a man. "I can assure you," said Sir Charles, "that it is the wish of the Queen and the people of England that your interests should be protected and your lands not unduly narrowed. I am aware that your hunting-ground is being denuded of game, and some parts of it will soon cease to be of the value it has been to you, and I am prepared to bring for the consideration of Her Majesty a scheme by which these parts of the country may be utilised for the furtherance of the Protectorate. It is desirable that we should know how far your garden-lands and grazing-grounds extend; and with regard to your hunting-ground, how far some parts are more valuable than others. I am prepared to make such representations to Her Majesty as will accord with your views. For myself," added Sir Charles, "the only wish I have is to make the Protectorate a real one, and thus ensure the progress of the country."

Next day the adjourned meeting was resumed in the "khotla" or public courtyard of Shoshong. To the surprise of his English visitors, this Bechuana chief, living so far away in the interior of the country, had arrived at an intelligent and practical conclusion as to what he and his people ought to do for their safety and their future improvement. The chief produced a map, which it was understood had been drawn for him by one of the European residents at Shoshong, which showed roughly but clearly enough the country claimed by Khame and his people as Bamangwato territory. In the map also was shown a smaller block of country which the chief wished to retain for the use of the tribe, including the Basilika and the Machwapong, lying to the east. Khame then produced a written statement, of which he handed an English translation to the Special Commissioner, along with the sketch of the Bamangwato country.

The first part of this "remarkable document," as it was called by a leading English paper, contained the chief's thanks for the Protectorate of the Queen, and his cession of jurisdiction, not only in the part of the country to be peopled by white men, but also in the part of the country which the chief wished to retain for his own use. This part of the

document, which seems to have been overlooked by adverse critics in Capetown, was very much in the form in which Mankoroane and Montsioa had ceded jurisdiction in their territories in the previous year. Khame's words were as follow (4588, 45):—

"I, Khame, chief of the Bamangwato, with my younger brothers and heads of my town, express my gratitude at the coming of the messenger of the Queen of England, and for the announcement to me of the Protectorate, which has been established by the desire of the Queen, and which has come to help the land of the Bamangwato also. I give thanks for the word of the Queen which I have heard, and I accept of (receive) the friendship and protection of the Government of England within the Bamangwato country. Further, I give to the Queen to make laws and to change them in the country of the Bamangwato, with reference to both black and white. Nevertheless, I am not baffled in the government of my own town, or in deciding cases among my own people according to custom; but, again, I do not refuse help in these offices."

Khame also undertook to do all public work required in his people's district at their expense under the superintendence and by the direction of the Local Commissioner. He also pledged every able-bodied man as available for the defence of the country; and stated that he expected that the white settlers who came in would be all of them available in the same way—the final appeal, when unitedly they had done their best, being to the protection and help of the Queen. His words on these important points are:—

"That which I am also willing to contribute is to make due arrangements for the country of the lands and cattle stations of the Bamangwato, whether as to roads or bridges or schools or other suitable objects. And, further, I shall be ready along with my people to go out all of us to fight for the country alongside the English; to stop those who attack or to go after them on the spoor of stolen stock. Further, I expect that the English people who come into the country shall protect it and fight for it, having provided themselves with horse and gun for the purpose. Having done this, without doubt if there came a great difficulty, we would appeal for help to our Queen in England."

Khame had for many years been aware of the advantages to his people which the English had brought into his country. His people were in possession of ploughs, spades, waggons, axes, guns, horses, clothing, as well as the Bible and other

books. The chief of course desired teaching and trading to go on as before. But he warned the Special Commissioner that he was aware there were men who would give themselves out to a stranger as settlers, who were only hunters or trappers of game, although white men; and that he considered such men ought not to obtain the grant of a farm; for if they did, they would never improve it or work it, but would make it a convenient base of operation from which they would kill every kind of game, and when they had cleaned all out, then leave the country without improving it at all. On this subject the chief said:—

"The right kind of English settler in the country will be seen by his doings on his place. Some may make themselves out to be settlers for a time only while they are killing game, after which they would take their departure with what they had collected, having done nothing with their place. Therefore I propose that it be enacted that the English settler who newly arrives should build his house and cultivate his lands and show himself to be a true settler and worker and not a travelling trader. Those who shall be received in this country to become settlers in it ought to be approved by the officer of the Queen appointed to this work, and I add, let us work together: let me also approve of those who are received."

Khame pressed upon the attention of the Special Commissioner and Her Majesty's Government the Bechuana laws concerning strong drink, and concerning the sale of land, to which he and his people attributed the disinheriting of the natives in the south of their holdings. He said:—

"I have to say that there are certain laws of my country which the Queen of England finds in operation, and which are advantageous for my people, and I wish that these laws should be established and not taken away by the Government of England. I refer to our law concerning intoxicating drinks, that they should not enter the country of the Bamangwato, whether among black people or white people. I refer further to our law which declares that the lands of the Bamangwato are not saleable. I say this law also is good; let it be upheld and continue to be law among black people and white people."

As was to have been expected, the attitude of Khame with reference to Cape brandy and other strong drink, although approved by Sir Charles Warren, was met with hostile criticisms and even jeers by Cape politicians, who have since

removed all hindrances and taxes on the free production and sale of spirits in the Cape Colony! But, thank God, this matter is in the hands of Her Majesty's Government—that is, in the hands of the English people; and the question is—Is Bechuanaland to be flooded with strong drink, against the wish of those chiefs and people from whom we receive jurisdiction there? These matters must be taken in hand in England and Scotland, and must be seen through by lovers of justice and fair-play, who have the true prosperity of South Africa at heart.

It is easy to misapprehend Khame's words concerning the sale of land. The chief was of course anxious that the white occupants of the country should be friendly and industrious people, who would value their farms and improve them. He did not wish the control of the grantees to leave the hands of Government for some time at least; whereas, if the grantees' land was at once saleable, the protection of the country and its peace might be endangered, instead of being enhanced, by the influx of unsuitable men into the country as settlers. Of course, when a Government opens up to public auction a block of Government farms, and they may be bought by any man or body of men, no matter what their character or views, the Government, in that case, must be prepared to protect those purchasers or their tenants; if they pay their taxes, they can claim Government protection. But Khame was thinking of a more rudimentary state of things, when every farmer would be expected, should there be necessity, to assist in the defence of the country. In the one case the land would be bought from a stable Government exercising sovereignty; in the other the land would be granted in a protected native territory under special conditions.

The boundaries of Khame's country, as given by the chief, represent the facts of the tribe's possession and use of the country, as well known to the chief, his headmen, and people. I have stated elsewhere that the Bechuana are not accustomed to draw a boundary-line, as this is known to civilised nations; but they know well the most distant points of their country in any given direction, so

that it is no effort to draw a line from one of these most distant points to another, and thus enclose the country of the tribe. It was in this sense that Khame proceeded to describe the limits of his country. He said :—

"My country has got known boundary-lines. On the east the boundary is that of the Transvaal, going with the Limpopo until the Tolo River joins it. The Tolo is then the boundary, but I come back to Makobe's hill, and then go along the villages of the Makalaka, who live between me and the Matebele. From thence to the Gwai River till it falls into the Zambesi. Then I ascend along the Zambesi till where it is joined by the Chobe. Then I go with the Chobe, and with the Mababe, and the Tamalakan and the Botletle, till you come to Moreoamaoto. There the line crosses over, and makes for Gaina and Sebati, and Monkatuse, and Goodira, and Khaui, and thence to Tsitli, which is between Lopepe and Boatlanama. Then it makes for Lotlaka and Lelwala and Mogonono, including the grazing-grounds of these places. Thence it proceeds to the Limpopo, where the Notwani joins it. The word which I hear which speaks about the 22d degree as shown in maps ought to be taken away. I do not express thanks for it ; it speaks of nothing which has existence ; boundary-line there is none at the 22d degree ; it is to cut my country in two. But I say, is not this a word spoken before my boundaries were known ? On account of matters of this description, and to make known to the Queen the largeness of the country which is now under her protection, I put in a map in which it is tried to show with correctness the boundaries of the country of the Bamangwato."

It is not, of course, possible to uphold a boundary-line as thus loosely stated except in a general way. Sechele and Lobingula might take exception to the line as thus described; they could not gainsay the facts upon which Khame founded his claim. Perhaps more attention than was necessary was given to the question of the boundary between Khame and Lobingula, seeing that no line had ever been agreed upon, and there were over 200 miles of territory to go upon; while both chiefs expressed friendliness to the English Government. The fact is, another question is involved in this boundary-line—the supposed cessions to white men by the chief Lobingula to dig gold at the Tati River. We have seen that when gold was discovered at Tati, the chief Matcheng addressed the Governor of the Cape Colony as the highest representative of the Queen in the country. Matcheng, although then chief of the Bamang-



MODERN GOLD-MINING AT TATI.

wato, had grown up as a captive among the Matebele, and might be supposed to know the truth on this subject. He regarded the Tati as Bamangwato territory, inasmuch as it was the hunting-ground of the Bamangwato, and of their vassals; and as they hunted as far in that direction as the town of Makobi, which is on the Inkwezi River. Having first recognised the claims of the Bamangwato, the gold diggers, feeling insecure at Tati, resolved also to propitiate Lobingula and obtain his sanction to their digging; and afterwards obtained cessions from him. In such a deserted and ungoverned country, however, the friendly attitude of both chiefs did not seem to be enough to induce capitalists to engage in quartz-crushing at Tati; and these rich mines have never been adequately worked. It is to be hoped that the English Government will be able to settle this boundary question in a very easy manner; and as to the claims of holders of chiefs' concessions, these can be decided on their own merits, just as a title to a farm granted by a native chief, and need not interfere with the larger political question at all. On the north and north-west there is absolutely no one to dispute the claim of Khame to the country which he proposed to hand over to England; and, as elsewhere related, a certain tract of country claimed by both Khame and Sechele has been offered by both chiefs to Her Majesty's Government!

Khame further explained his proposal in the following words:—

> "My people enjoy three things in our country. They enjoy their cultivated fields, their cattle stations, and their hunting-grounds. We have lived through these three things. Certainly the game will come to an end in the future, but at present it is still in my country, and while it is still there I hold that it ought to be hunted by my people. What I wish to explain is that my people must not be prevented from hunting in all the country, except where the English shall have come to dwell. My people shall be stopped by the cultivated lands and the cattle stations of the English inhabitants of the country."

This was no doubt a wise reservation, for a certain class of official is always willing to make difficulties, and he would probably soon make out that the Bamangwato were "trespassing" if found outside the part of the country reserved

for their corn-fields and their grazing. Nothing could be more reasonable than that hunting should go on when not checked by farm-holdings and while the game lasted, and that the natives should not be excluded from hunting any more than the English, whose country it would then be. The chief again referred more fully to the support of the Queen's Protectorate:—

"I know that the help and the protection of the Queen require money, and I agree that that money shall be paid by the country protected. I have thoughts as to how this can be done; I mean plans which can be thought out at the beginning, so that the Queen's people may all be pleased, the black people and the white people. I propose that a certain country of known dimensions should be mine and my people's for our cultivated fields and for our cattle stations, as I have shown in the map. Then I say, with reference to all the country which remains, I wish that the English people should come and live in it; that they should turn it into their cultivated fields and cattle stations. I speak thus, in effect inviting the English, because it is a nation with which we have become acquainted and in whose ways we have had pleasure. Then I request that the Queen's Government appoint a man to take charge of this matter, and let the protection of this country come from the English who will settle in it. I am of opinion that the country which I give over will exceed in value the cost of the Protectorate among the Bamangwato. But I feel that I am speaking to gentlemen of the Government of England. Shall I be afraid that they will requite me with witchcraft (deception leading to ruin)? Rather may I not hope that they will see both sides of the questions of to-day; that they will regard the protection, and then regard also the country which I now say is theirs."

The reply of Sir Charles Warren to the chief Khame and to his people was quite in accordance with his instructions and his duty at Shoshong. He said he would have much pleasure in bringing the proposals of the chief before Her Majesty's Government. They had been made in answer to the question how Khame was to assist in upholding the Protectorate, and it would be for Her Majesty's Government to decide whether to accept the offer of the chief, or to suggest a modification of it, or to make some proposal of its own. Sir Charles, however, expressed his own thorough approval as an individual of the objects sought to be secured by Khame, and regarded them as entirely compatible with the aims of Her Majesty's Protectorate.

The signing of the document by Khame, his brothers, and headmen was an impressive act, from the native point of view. It took place in the public courtyard, which was crowded with interested onlookers. A table and writing materials had been brought into the courtyard by the order of the chief. When the signing of the document began there was no confusion—no stepping forward of more than one person at a time, precedence on such occasions being regulated by a rigorously-defined and well-understood gradation of rank, till the "headmen" or petty chiefs were exhausted. It was regarded by every one, headman or commoner, as a great occasion in the history of the tribe. The Queen of the white men had extended her protection to them up to a certain line in their country; her messenger had announced this fact, and asked what assistance could the tribe render in this work. Chief and people submitted themselves to the Queen, and pointed to the vast unoccupied country on every side—inviting the English to take possession and occupy, and holding themselves responsible for the expenses of the district which they wished to retain for their own use. I may say that the action of the chief and people at Shoshong made a deep impression on the minds of those who accompanied Sir Charles Warren. Here was submission without bloodshed; the conquest of character and not of the rifle; confidence begotten instead of terror and the desire for revenge. English gentlemen are not slow to recognise the worth of such a man as Khame. He made no display, no pretence. The vassals of the tribe had been freed some years before through his influence. In a time of scarcity in his country, Khame is said to have devoted a large sum of money which he had laid by, to the purchase from white men of food for his starving subjects. He now yielded to the Queen a supremacy which native ideas and traditions enhance in importance, because he saw that this step would be for the benefit of the tribe.

The business transacted at Shoshong between Sir Charles Warren and the chief Khame gave me peculiar pleasure in more ways than one. The development of the Imperial influence—so valuable as an arbitrating and pacifying influence

—could not but follow the establishment of the Protectorate as now enlarged. I regarded the great work of the peaceful opening up of the country as having made rapid progress. Indeed I was impressed with the belief that there was a Divinity presiding over this movement, "rough hew" it and oppose it as stupid men might. If we look into Khame's proposals, I am not aware that, in the history of our dealings with unenlightened races, a more important transaction than that between Sir Charles Warren and the chief Khame has ever taken place. It carries one back to Penn's dealings with the Indians in America. Its importance consists, not merely in the vast extent and value of the territory thus offered to England, but chiefly as showing, for future guidance, the true way of overcoming the native difficulty in South Africa. In North Bechuanaland Khame had welcomed English settlers, under the control of the Queen, as natives had formerly welcomed missionaries and traders. That which I said to the young men of Capetown was certainly coming, although it might be delayed, had come already. Assured of a place in their own country as their own possession, the natives were willing that the wide unoccupied territory around should be tenanted and turned to use under Her Majesty's control. When a chief is willing to divest himself of his supremacy, and become with his people subjects of the Queen under such reasonable stipulations as those of Khame, surely a new day has dawned in our intercourse with native races; surely the peaceful progress of the country need no longer be delayed by filibustering, shirking responsibility, and costly expeditions. When the names of the natives and of the English witnesses were appended to the document at Shoshong—every headman knowing clearly what he was doing, and yet doing it quietly and earnestly—I felt that the English name and character still counted for something, despite all our stupid vacillation; and I rejoiced to think that the way was made quite plain for a most helpful and worthy policy on the part of England.

But, as we shall see, untoward influences in high places

were destined from the first to cause misapprehension in the mind of Her Majesty's Government and of the English people concerning North Bechuanaland, and concerning the policy advocated by Sir Charles Warren. But the way is still open to England to devise, in no niggard, short-sighted, or uncertain manner, a policy of peaceful progress and development in South Africa. The offer of Khame's territory should be accepted. A good understanding ought to be established with Lobingula and other chiefs in these regions. A great deal of our success will of course depend on the officers whom we employ, and the steps which we take. The ancient gold mines of Mashonaland and Bechuanaland may be thrown open gradually and peacefully, and many lovely districts opened up to European colonists, if Her Majesty's Government know how to go about this. And the natives, instead of being our "natural enemies," will prove our Divinely provided helpers in the great work of subduing the wilderness and compelling the mine to give up its treasures.

The natives would thus understand clearly what Her Majesty's Government as the Supreme Power in the country wanted to have—the charge of unoccupied territories; for the sake of the peace of the country and in the interests of black and white alike. They would understand also that the attitude of Her Majesty's Government was not to push or to hasten any forward movement; but to be prepared to regulate it when it came about naturally. The letter of Matcheng, referred to elsewhere in this book,[1] and more recently the attitude of the chief Khame and others, testify that, if peaceful progress northward is not brought about in South Africa, it will not be because the native chiefs have stood on their dignity and on their territorial rights. They have expressed their confidence in Her Majesty's Government in a remarkable manner, and have asked for its protection and for administrative help. If they ask in vain, then Englishmen have changed their nature.

Although the Matebele had never attacked the Bamangwato tribe at Shoshong since 1863, small war-parties, not

[1] Vol. i. p. 33.

always sent by the chief, had attacked distant villages of the Bamangwato vassals—killing and taking captive, according to their custom. They had also twice crossed through Khame's country as a large war-party, far to the north of Shoshong, in order to attack Moremi, the chief at Lake Nghabe, but on each occasion their efforts were directed against this chief exclusively. Although much stronger than the Bamangwato as a tribe, the Matebele have their country to defend; and a large body of men is always kept at home, in case of invasion by one or other of their enemies. There is really no inducement for them to attack Shoshong again, except to punish Khame for the brave resistance which he made on a former occasion, as it would be almost impossible to capture the Bamangwato cattle or horses amid the fastnesses of the Shoshong hills.

In any case, Sir Charles felt it would be his imperative duty to inform the chief Lobingula that the country, as far as the 22d degree of latitude, was now under the protection of Her Majesty. This was only fair to Lobingula, who had adopted his father's friendly attitude to the English; and in the circumstances already existing, was calculated to remove all likelihood of an attack on Shoshong by the Matebele. Who was to carry to Lobingula the Special Commissioner's formal but friendly announcement of the Protectorate over Khame's country up to the 22d degree? It became known that more than one officer would be glad to take charge of so important an undertaking, involving a lengthened waggon journey through an interesting country. The officer selected was a gentleman who had served under Sir Charles Warren in Griqualand West, and who now held the local rank of Major in the Bechuanaland Field Force—Mr. S. H. Edwards. Major Edwards, who was then hunting in Bechuanaland, had accompanied the Rev. Dr. Moffat, thirty-nine years before, on the first occasion when a waggon-road was made to the Matebele; he had since frequently visited the country, and was well known and much thought of by both chief and people. Major Edwards was accompanied by Lieutenant C. E. Haynes, R.E., and Lieutenant Maund, and their interesting reports will be found in the Bluebook (4643, 94-128). I have

since heard it frequently said that, had the Special Commissioner's choice fallen on another member of his Intelligence Department as the head of this Expedition, the world would have been spared an acrimonious pamphlet—much misleading information. Sir Charles made his selection conscientiously and took the consequences.

This Matebele party left Mafiking before Sir Charles Warren, but he caught them up at Kanye. From that place we travelled together till we reached Shoshong. After hiring fresh oxen there, they proceeded to the Matebele country, where they were very well received by Lobingula. The chief was, of course, disappointed that negotiations had not been made with him at once. Who was Khame, or Sechele, or Haseitsiwe? At the same time, he led Major Edwards to understand that he would not be indisposed to come to a more definite and friendly arrangement, in which he would be one of the contracting parties. Major Edwards had no power to enter into any such negotiations. The letter of Sir Charles Warren, which merely announced the Protectorate over Khame's country, and expressed a hope for peace and friendliness, was answered in the same spirit by Lobingula. The only fly in the ointment was that Khame should have made a line and not he, a greater chief. When asked informally in the course of conversation to define the Matebele country, the indunas or headmen of Lobingula claimed all Bechuanaland as theirs, exactly as President Kruger had done in London. This was done merely to show their contempt for all blacks who were not Zulus. Major Edwards pointed out that although they had, no doubt, used part of Bechuanaland on their way north, they had never returned to their former residence in the south; and that if a man deserted his cultivated field for so long, anybody would say he had lost all claim to it. To this the chief assented. It was then said by the indunas that Khame ought to have consulted them first "before he called in the white men"; and it was difficult to persuade them that this was not the true explanation of what had happened. Lobingula expressed thankfulness about the trade road being kept open, and said he wanted to see

Englishmen in his country. He did not express the same friendly feelings concerning the Transvaal, as he is no doubt kept well informed of the various schemes which are being constantly formed there, and are as often falling to pieces, for the invasion of the country lying to the north of that republic. The mission of Major Edwards was an important service in itself, and needs only to be crowned, in due season, by another mission to Lobingula, not now to announce to him what we are doing with other chiefs, but to arrange on what terms of friendship we propose to live with himself. It is not improbable that in the case of the Matebele we shall have an instance of a warlike tribe giving up its warlike courses. It is said by those who reside in the country that there is a considerable movement toward this within the tribe. Of one thing Her Majesty's Government may be certain, that Lobingula, if approached by those who are qualified for such work, will agree to a boundary-line probably more favourable to us than that of Khame; for his objection was not so much to Khame's line as that Khame, as a Bechuana chief, should have been consulted in the matter at all.

The country of the Mashona in not distant times extended over a much wider range than at present. The Bamangwato and Mashona were neighbours in the time of Kari, the grandfather of Khame, who fell in a battle which he fought with them. The Makalaka and Mashona were driven before the forces of Moselekatse when the latter left what is now the Transvaal some forty years ago. Frightful massacres took place, and the order seems to have been for the Zulus to spare no one. Driven to the east and north-east of what is now Matebeleland, the Mashona tribes have become the victims of annual raids by the Matebele, who may be said to have almost destroyed these tribes, and to have made a wilderness where once they lived. From the first it was comparatively easy for a warlike tribe to overcome an industrial people with only patriarchal government, and, however brave as individuals, unaccustomed to act together. The victory which was comparatively easy long ago has become more and more so, as the Matebele have

been able to procure muskets and rifles, while the law of both Moselekatse and Lobingula carefully excludes these weapons from the Mashona. In order that this law may not be evaded, traders were long positively forbidden to enter Mashonaland. This was afterwards relaxed in the case of English hunters; but the Mashona may still be said to be a disarmed people, for the Portuguese muskets, which some of them obtain by travelling to the east coast, seem to be of very inferior quality. "The barrel is a piece of gas-piping, sir," said a trader in describing them to me.

Not only have the Matebele excluded traders, but also missionaries, from Mashonaland. All native chiefs rightly enough, from their point of view, regard a mission station as an outpost of the white men. Other white men follow, and the inhabitants welcome them. Now the Matebele have objected to the commencement of this process in Mashonaland. They have wished to retain it as the happy hunting-ground of the chief's warriors, who might thus, without too much trouble and loss of life, secure the droves of cattle and the boys and girls of their Mashona owners. There are, it seems, very large and easily-defended caves and other mountain fastnesses in Mashonaland. Into some of these the cattle and the men retire—the women and children climbing still higher, or entering smaller and more inaccessible caverns. The first thing for the Matebele to do is to take the cattle. When, it may be after days' fighting, this is accomplished, the victors scour the mountain as far as they dare, showing no mercy to those who are grown up, and seizing all the boys and girls on whom they can lay their hands, they march them off, with the cattle, before the eyes of such survivors as still remain in the secret recesses of the mountain. Thus the industrious Mashona—the agriculturists, the weavers, the iron-smelters, and smiths—have been impoverished, and indeed well-nigh destroyed, by their purely warlike neighbours.

Having made a desert on every side, the Matebele tribe, it is said, are at present divided in opinion as to their future course. The past contact with Europeans, and especially with Christian missionaries; the gradual acquirement of personal

property by the common people, which was all but unknown thirty years ago; the advantages and the blessings of peace, have greatly affected the Matebele generally, and especially such parts of the country as have come most under Christian and civilising influences. The people there are known to be for peace, for friendly settlement with their neighbours, and for an alliance with the white people. But there is another party who bewail the decay of the good old times of rapine —there are no longer cattle to steal or children to capture. The Bechuana in Lake Nghabe district are too far away, too able to defend themselves, and too strongly defended by the river system in which they have taken up their abode. The Bechuana of Khame have been able all these years to hold their place and their country, and so have the Zulus of Mzila. No doubt the Matebele, who still love the old ways, hate that "tsipi" or metal found in the stones all over their present country, which, as they see, causes the eye of the most wary white man to glisten as he looks at the yellow specks in the quartz. That "tsipi" is sure to bring the white men in numbers into the country. They are aware that their presence would be welcomed by many among themselves. Why should they stay and fight for a country which is no longer suited for warriors? Why should they wait till their army has been thinned and defection take place? Let the chief move northward! It is whispered that the chief's Intelligence Department has been very busy of late on the north bank of the Zambesi, and that a considerable number of boats have been secured already. At the same time Lobingula is personally in favour of the English, to whose presence in his country and at his "head-place" he has always been accustomed. One would wish that the peace-party and not the war-party might carry the day in the councils of the Matebele. In that case stalwart Matebele men will assist in gold-mining, instead of butchering children and old people north of the Zambesi.

CHAPTER IV

REPORT ON THE PERMANENT ADMINISTRATION OF BECHUANALAND BY THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT, REQUESTED BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER

THE High Commissioner had taught himself and Her Majesty's Government that it would be a matter to be regretted if Bechuanaland should be "left on our hand," instead of being transferred at once to the Cape Colony. But this contingency had to be provided for; and so he requested Sir Charles Warren to draw up a "comprehensive scheme for the permanent administration of the whole Protectorate" (4432, 147), and the Special Commissioner did so after his visit to Shoshong. Thus instructed, and having had intimate knowledge of the government of the province of Griqualand West, Sir Charles more or less followed the methods which had been found useful there, in so far as they seemed adapted to the circumstances of Bechuanaland. In drawing up this report the Special Commissioner was not to regard the final destination of Bechuanaland as a matter for discussion: he was to take it for granted that the permanent administration of the whole Protectorate was to be in the hand of England. But the policy of the present Cape Ministry—the apparent divergence between their policy and that of their predecessors, as well as of the Imperial Government with reference to native territories—and the value of Bechuanaland to English people and English commerce, were matters upon which Sir Charles felt it to be within his province to touch. He had been sent into Bechuanaland with certain instructions, and to use an unbiassed judgment in

making his reports to Her Majesty's Government on the condition of the country. The Government of the Cape Colony had recently changed hands; and the attitude towards Bechuanaland of the new Ministry was far from being the same as that of their predecessors. Then the Germans had appeared on the west coast, and Her Majesty's Government, as a question of European politics, had extended the Protectorate in Bechuanaland. That Protectorate, in the hands of the Imperial Government, had become a most influential factor in South Africa,—holding the highway to the north, and having the disposal of vast tracts of unoccupied lands, into which thousands of settlers were eager to enter. The first idea, as we have seen, was to send a "Resident" into Bechuanaland, and to expel the freebooters, leaving the government of the country in the hands of the chiefs. It was represented that that would be no settlement of the difficulty, and so the Resident became a Deputy Commissioner, an officer who was to govern white men as well as natives. Then a Special Commissioner was appointed, with large powers. Then the Protectorate was extended to the 20th degree of longitude, and on the north to the 22d degree of latitude. It was in these circumstances that Sir Charles was asked by the High Commissioner for a "comprehensive scheme"; and having first seen the country and its people, the Special Commissioner not only sent one himself (4588, 51-62), but asked Mr. G. Baden-Powell, who had accompanied us to Shoshong, also to furnish his views (4588, 68-77). Sir Charles was aware that Mr. Baden-Powell's opinion was likely to carry weight at the Colonial Office, as he had already been employed in other parts of the Empire in Colonial affairs. I was asked also by Sir Charles to furnish some information bearing on the question of the government of natives and Europeans in such a country (4588, 63-68). The "comprehensive scheme" submitted to the High Commissioner at his request "for the permanent administration of the whole Protectorate" is a practical and business-like proposal, built largely upon what Sir Charles Warren knew of Bechuanaland and of the neighbouring province of Griqualand West. The report of Mr. Baden-Powell had a value

of its own, as giving the view of a fresh mind accustomed to such work elsewhere, and regarding the matter as one of Imperial interest. The two reports taken together indicate very clearly the kind of government which two capable officers, with exceptional knowledge of the country, decided to recommend for the adoption of Her Majesty's Government in Bechuanaland, "for the permanent administration of the whole Protectorate."

The High Commissioner had expressly requested a report on a comprehensive scheme for the permanent administration of the whole Protectorate, with the Special Commissioner's views in detail "as to the police force and civil establishment which would, in his opinion, be necessary for the protection and administration of the whole country under Imperial control." When the scheme which he himself had asked for came to hand at Capetown, Sir Hercules Robinson, on the 20th June, thus described it to the Secretary of State:—

"I have received Warren's scheme for future administration of Protectorate. It is diametrically opposed to policy laid down in telegram of Secretary of State of 28th May. Warren deprecates annexation to Cape Colony, and favours creation of Crown Colony up to 22d parallel, with Lieutenant-Governor, Legislative Council, and with full complement of administrative and judicial establishments. . . . I am afraid that Cape Colony will not now entertain question of annexation before next year; but I consider that an armed mounted police of 500 would be sufficient, pending Colonial annexation, to maintain order and prevent return of freebooters" (4588, 22).

Sir Hercules Robinson was alone in thinking that the right government of Bechuanaland would cause it to be refused by the Colony, and that its imperfect government would induce the Colony to annex it. No one else viewed the matter in this light. Much might be said for the very opposite view—that the right government of the country would be a strong inducement to the Colony to annex it.

But what strikes one, as having the appearance of unfairness on the part of Sir H. Robinson, is his omitting to mention to the Secretary of State that the report which he thus so unfavourably criticised, was prepared in accordance with his own request and instructions. In asking for Sir Charles's

report he had used the words "permanent administration," "comprehensive scheme," "whole Protectorate," "protection and administration of the whole territory"; and the idea underlying all his instructions on the subject was distinctly that the report of Sir Charles was to set forth a scheme of permanent Imperial administration, as the alternative to Colonial annexation. In fairness, this ought to have been clearly mentioned to Her Majesty's Government by Sir Hercules when he communicated, as above, his disapproval of the scheme of Sir Charles Warren.

It is unpleasant to observe that having asked for and obtained a comprehensive scheme from Sir Charles Warren, necessarily involving a considerable initial outlay, Sir Hercules Robinson brought forward his own scheme which was not comprehensive, which had no reference to the regulation of the whole Protectorate, nor to the permanent administration of any part of it; but which had the one recommendation of cheapness, along with that meagreness in all its details, by means of which it was supposed by Sir Hercules that Bechuanaland would be commended to the Colonial mind for annexation. The High Commissioner was of course warranted in bringing forward his cheap and temporary scheme; but in setting it off against the more expensive and "permanent" one of Sir Charles, it would have been well for him, as well as for Her Majesty's Government, to have recalled and mentioned his own instructions to Sir Charles, by which the latter was guided, and which contemplated not merely the protection, but the permanent administration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate by the Imperial Government.

The temporary scheme of the High Commissioner (4588, 106) was based on the astounding proposition that we had no interest in the country to the north of the Molopo, except as a road to the interior. "The chiefs" to whom our Protectorate had recently been announced "might be left to govern their own tribes in their own fashion," we "doing as little in the way of administration or settlement as possible." So that Sir Charles Warren had been asked by the High Commissioner to prepare a scheme for the administration of

a part of the Protectorate with the administration of which, according to the High Commissioner, we should not trouble ourselves! South of the Molopo River the High Commissioner recommended the proclamation of the country as British soil, and that a Commission as Governor of Bechuanaland be given to the Governor of the Cape Colony; and generally that Bechuanaland be treated like Tembuland, which had since been annexed to the Cape Colony. Thus the Governor of the Cape Colony—not the High Commissioner—was to have charge of Bechuanaland; and locally the country was to be under a chief magistrate and several resident magistrates. Whatever this might be, it was neither a comprehensive nor a permanent scheme; and it threw overboard entirely as to administration the greater part of the recently proclaimed Protectorate. It presupposed a similarity between the countries of Tembuland and Bechuanaland which does not exist.

One is not prepared to find that it is as Governor of the Cape Colony and not as High Commissioner that Sir Hercules Robinson, by his own suggestion to that effect (4588, 116), has become Governor of Bechuanaland. It is easy to see that it was his intense desire for Colonial annexation which caused this verbal anomaly in the proclamation. It would appear to be merely verbal, as the Governor of the Cape Colony, as such, does nothing except by the advice of his Ministers; and the Government of the Cape Colony do not seem to have been consulted concerning the present constitution, much less the actual administration of Bechuanaland. Indeed, so far as one can judge from the public utterances of leading members of the Cape Ministry, the present Bechuanaland constitution is disapproved by them. They advocate an extension of the Protectorate to the Zambesi; which is another way of saying that the present "Tembuland" constitution of Bechuanaland is unsuitable to the wants and the future development of that country. How the Governor of the Cape Colony came constitutionally to be also Governor of Bechuanaland it is difficult to see.

I feel bound to condemn in the very strongest terms the dictum of the High Commissioner that England has no

interest north of the Molopo River. So long as the spirit underlying that statement animates our policy there is little hope for the peaceful development of South Africa. I have shown that it is incorrect as to matter of fact, that the English people have very great interests in North Bechuanaland, and that in a few years that country and Mashonaland will probably be reckoned as more important than any other interior portion of South Africa. I have spoken of the unanimous wish of the loyal Cape Colonists that Bechuanaland should not be speedily united to the Cape Colony; and of the unanimous petition to the same effect from the Stellaland people. And the reader is also aware that the opinion of the natives of Bechuanaland is entirely in favour of the continuance of Imperial rule in their country. It is shown elsewhere that in carrying out this work of development in South Africa, it is possible for us so to do it as to make it a source of revenue rather than of Imperial outlay. And I have made it clear that the Imperial Government will first achieve for itself that position in the minds of all colonists to which it is entitled in South Africa, when it presides over the peaceful settlement of unoccupied native territories. This course will effectually heal past misunderstandings, and bring together and harmonise the present discordant elements in South Africa.

The alternative suggested by the High Commissioner in 1885 amounts to a return to the unworthy position taken up by him in 1881, when he informed Mankoroane and the other chiefs in South Bechuanaland, notwithstanding their acknowledged inability to cope with the influx of white men, that they were independent and could administer their own territories in their own way. Their requests for administrative help were disregarded, my own statement of facts and arguments as to the certainty of disorder and outrage were not attended to, and in the end not even acknowledged. In London Sir Hercules Robinson saw his way to adopt the policy which I was advocating for the regulated spread of the Europeans in South Africa under Imperial control; and Her Majesty's Government also more or less clearly took up that position. We have seen how the local influences by

which he was surrounded in Capetown deprived Her Majesty's Government of the untrammelled advice of a High Commissioner on those lines. As soon as opposition showed itself—which, if well met, ought only to have been the introductory test of the sincerity and ability of the Imperial Government—the High Commissioner retreated from his position, and entailed sad loss on the prestige of a Government already low enough in public estimation in South Africa, by his efforts after immediate annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. He thus practically endorsed the views of the anti-Imperial politicians, that there was no place or work for the Imperial Government in native territories. This adverse course of action now culminated in the statement by Sir Hercules Robinson that we had little or no interest north of the Molopo River; that we must administer Bechuanaland as best we could after the manner of Tembuland; that no attention whatever should be given to any requests for farms from English or Colonial volunteers; and as to filibustering, that we should endeavour to stop its spread northward from South Bechuanaland! Thus, when the colony of South Bechuanaland came to be incorporated with the Cape Colony and its borders defined, the state of North Bechuanaland would be parallel to that of South Bechuanaland when the disturbances began in 1881, after the declaration of Sir Hercules Robinson, in both cases to the same effect, that the native chiefs could regulate their affairs after their own way. Such zigzag statements are ruinous to South Africa, and to the reputation of the Imperial Government there.

There was one passage in the report of Sir Charles Warren which brought great discredit upon the scheme itself and upon the author of it, both in the Cape Parliament and with the High Commissioner, and tended with numerous other influences to prejudice Her Majesty's Government against the recommendations of Sir Charles Warren. It is time this matter were thoroughly cleared up, and all misapprehension removed. Having pointed out the immensity of the land of the Protectorate, Sir Charles showed that the value of the land available for Her Majesty's Government,

reckoning it at less than 1s. per acre, would be £1,750,000. Sir Charles then went on to say:—

"It is to be remarked, however, that the native chiefs have stipulated that the settlers are to be English or English colonists, as it would be no protection for them were the settlers to be Boers of Dutch extraction; and they have also stipulated that the land is not to be sold, so as to prevent English speculators from coming in and selling to Dutch Boers" (4588, 57).

I remember it was pointed out to Sir Charles Warren that the words quoted above were liable to be misunderstood; and that at Capetown they would serve the purpose of those who at this time seemed to be on the outlook for something on which to base their opposition to Sir Charles personally, and to the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland. In using the words "English colonists," Sir Charles regarded the character and political attitude of the applicant for a farm as what ought to affect his acceptance or rejection, and had not present to his mind the question of the man's birth or name. His contrast was between the loyal colonist and those who were opposed to Her Majesty's authority in South Africa. If the country was to be governed without expense to the Imperial Government as part of the Protectorate, and if the settlers and the Bamangwato were together to form its militia, it was, of course, of the highest importance that the white settlers should be such as would be a source of strength and not of weakness to the Local Commissioner of Her Majesty's Government—that is, they must be loyal-hearted men; and this was all that Sir Charles Warren ever meant. I do not say that this is made sufficiently clear in the sentence quoted, nor am I justifying an obscure sentence in a report; but what I do say is, an obscure sentence is explained by its context and by other utterances of the author. Now the real sentiments of Sir Charles Warren towards the loyal Dutch-speaking population were well known to be friendly in the highest degree, and if there were any doubt as to the meaning of the above sentence, it was only natural and fair to interpret it in connection with that well-known friendliness. Every one in South Africa knew that Sir Charles had not the slightest wish or intention that ques-

tions of blood or of birth should either qualify or disqualify an applicant for a farm under the Queen's Government in Bechuanaland; his mistake was in not stating his views on this point so clearly as to prevent the possibility of misunderstanding or cavil. His personal friendship with many Dutch-speaking people both in the Colony and in the Free State placed Sir Charles above all suspicion of narrow or clannish sympathies. As a matter of fact, few, if any, of his traducers had so many "Dutch" personal friends, or had so much sympathy for Dutch-speaking people as a class. His views are shown clearly in a speech delivered in London on the eve of leaving for South Africa. Sir C. Warren said:—

> "He thoroughly recognised the loyalty of the great majority of the Dutch-speaking element in the Cape Colony, and he fully believed that when the English policy was pointed out to them, they would be anxious for its fulfilment. . . . If the latter policy was carried out, South Africa might be peopled with our countrymen and the descendants of the present colonists, whilst the native race might continue in a condition which those who had their interests at heart would be thoroughly satisfied with."

No doubt the idea underlying this passage in his report was the result of Sir Charles's visit to North Bechuanaland, and his contact with its chiefs and people. Sir Charles and those who accompanied him were much impressed with the confidence which the natives of North Bechuanaland—more especially the Bamangwato—still had in the fairness and impartiality of the Queen's Government. There was not the same feeling expressed for the Colonial Government, except in so far as it was (as the natives said it must be) subordinate to the Government of the Queen in England; while of the Transvaal Government all had the liveliest distrust. Great shrewdness and common-sense were displayed by the natives in speaking on these subjects. Khame, for instance, said that practically the Bamangwato had been in the habit of dividing the white men into two classes: "Maburu le Makhoa," that is, Boers and white men. The first were those who came to shoot down game, and then to raise a claim for some fountain or farm; they were people

who usually travelled with their wives and children, and lived for months in the hunting-field on the game which they shot, bringing away the skins as an article of barter. The other class consisted of travellers, hunters, and traders; and although not all English, their common European training placed them very much on a level before the natives. To this class also was usually reckoned the educated Cape Colonists, both of English and Dutch descent, who occasionally visited Bechuanaland. Thus French, German, Austrian, Danish, Swedish, English, Scotch, Irish, Welsh, Italian, Cape Colonist—are all classed by natives as "Makhoa" or "white men," while the Transvaal burgher is placed in a class by himself. Of course the son of a Transvaal farmer who had received a European education, or had been brought up at Capetown, would, no doubt, be classed as a "white man" by the Bechuana if he appeared in their country; so that clearly their classification is not one of race, but of country, habits, and opinions. So far as the natives knew, the Queen was the head of all the white men who appeared in Bechuanaland from the Cape Colony or Natal. Whether or not they were right in this contention does not much matter; they looked to the Queen's Government as, in a real sense, over all the white men that came into their country. Hence the letters to the Governor and High Commissioner as representing the Queen from one chief after another in North Bechuanaland and in South Bechuanaland. The only exception to this was "the Boer," chiefly hailing from the Transvaal, who, of course, told the natives himself loudly enough that he was not under the Queen. It was the animus and policy and education of this man, as well as his own declaration, that differentiated him in the native view from all others of European descent. In unfortunately expressing this difference by the words "Boers of Dutch extraction," and again "Dutch Boers," Sir Charles Warren was no doubt liable to be misunderstood. What was objected to in Bechuanaland was not the "extraction" but the "persuasion" of these people; the natives did not object to people of "Boer extraction" coming among them under British control, but they were afraid of the consequences of

admitting men of the "Boer persuasion" who held anti-English and anti-native ideas, and who openly boasted that they were not under the Queen.

Then it must be remembered that, before the comprehensive scheme for the administration of the whole of Bechuanaland was drawn up, more than 1000 applications for farms had already been lodged with an officer appointed by Sir Charles Warren to receive them—from English volunteers in the force in large numbers, from Colonial volunteers of both Dutch and English extraction, and from farmers and farmers' sons living in the Cape Colony, in Natal, and in the Free State. These applicants addressed the Special Commissioner as an Imperial officer, and many of them stated in their application that they understood that land was to be "given out" under Her Majesty's Government. There were thus plenty of loyal applicants for farms in Bechuanaland,—men who were willing to render service in defence of the Protectorate when required to do so. There seemed, therefore, to be no difficulty whatever in at once finding suitable occupants for at least some of the vacant farms.

Probably the chief reason which induced Sir Charles Warren to emphasise so strongly the great confidence reposed in Her Majesty's Government and the English people by Khame and the other chiefs, was to show to all the unique position in which this confidence and approval had placed the English Government and people in Central South Africa. It had suited Her Majesty's Government to proclaim a Protectorate over part of North Bechuanaland, as an arrangement between England and Germany. When that arrangement was announced in North Bechuanaland the Protectorate was welcomed; but a lesson in geography was given to Her Majesty's Government, showing that by their proclamation they were protecting one-half of a chief's country and leaving the rest outside the Protectorate. Many thousands of square miles were offered to Her Majesty's Government for the use of Her Majesty's subjects. They were offered to Her Majesty's Special Commissioner as representing Her Majesty's Imperial Government, in connection

with the policy of that Government in establishing the Protectorate; and in upholding it, the land was to be enjoyed by those who had established the Protectorate and had borne the expense of the Expedition. The land of Australia no longer belonged to the English people, but to the local Australian Governments; tract after tract, native territory in South Africa, was passing into the hands of the Cape Colony, whose present Government gave no encouragement to the introduction of English or Scotch settlers or emigrants from overcrowded Britain. But here in Bechuanaland there was a noble sweep of valuable territory which was offered to the English ratepayer and the English Government by the grateful chiefs and people of the country. The object of Sir Charles Warren in emphasising this surprising fact was of course not to insult any one, but to explain and direct marked attention to this phenomenon in South African history,—the welcoming of the white settler by the native chiefs and their people. It was right to show the English that the offer was to them; it was at least some reward for their past efforts and expenditure. This was the response of the Bechuana; and too much attention could not be directed to a movement so clearly full of highest promise for the peaceful development of the country. If the public and Her Majesty's Government would only take the offers of the native chiefs into consideration, and accept and use the country which was offered to England without any purchase fee at all—if the English Government would only retain for itself the position and character to which individual men had raised it by their teaching, their trading, and their life in Bechuanaland—that Government would continue to be trusted by the natives; while, under a firm and wise Imperial administration of native and unoccupied territories, the power which was lately scorned and sneered at as worthy of elimination from South Africa would be regarded with esteem as the dispenser of boons; and to be "English" would be quite a popular claim at the office of the Local Commissioner in North Bechuanaland. In this case, while we shall remain of all varieties of "extraction," we shall be all loyal subjects of the Queen, and

obedient to her laws in the Protectorate. There is not the slightest doubt that views such as these animated Sir Charles Warren in drawing up his report.

The debate on Bechuanaland in the Cape Parliament of 1885 was one of which the best Colonists were thoroughly and avowedly ashamed. Mr. Rhodes availed himself of the opportunity to endeavour to vindicate his surrender to Mr. van Niekerk and Delarey, and conceived himself justified on the floor of a Colonial Parliament in attacking Imperial officers and their work outside the Colony. Messrs. Upington and Sprigg also seized the opportunity to attempt the justification of their settlement of Goshen. I am sorry to record that the speeches of these gentlemen were characterised by much bitterness and abuse. The debate had been raised in a temperate speech by Sir Thomas Scanlen, who moved that papers on the Bechuanaland question should be laid on the table of the House for its information. Mr. Leonard spoke well, and fully justified the stand which he had taken against sedition in the Colony at the great meeting in the Exchange. He contrasted his status and his views as a loyal Colonial-born man with the position of "Afrikanders from Europe," who were posing as leaders of a so-called "Colonial" or Afrikander party. Dutch members complimented Mr. Leonard on this speech. The other speakers at the Exchange meeting who were members of the Cape Parliament also stood true to their position; and there was not a word retracted or overthrown of what had been brought forward on that important occasion.

When the report of Sir Charles Warren was produced, his opponents immediately seized hold of the sentence which we have been discussing. Criticism of the scheme itself was never attempted; denunciation of this one clause was thought to be more effective for certain ends, when addressed to the Dutch-speaking members of the House. Now was the time, it was thought, to earn popularity with "the Dutch" in a cheap manner; and the Dutch-speaking members themselves had much less to say against Sir Charles Warren than those professed leaders of political opinion, who were seeking to make political capital out of

a word in an Imperial officer's report, and to put a meaning on it entirely at variance with that officer's well-known character and previous actions in the country.

It occurred to one of the debaters, who took up the position of a great friend of Sir Charles Warren, to telegraph to Sir Charles in Bechuanaland, and obtain from him an explanation of a sentence which was being openly used for the purpose of inflaming the minds of the Dutch colonists against him and against his proposals as to Bechuanaland. The following explanation was sent by Sir Charles to this member of the Cape Parliament:—

"In my report I stated the natives have stipulated that the settlers are to be English or English colonists, and it will be no protection to them were the settlers to be Boers of Dutch extraction; and I have elsewhere given my opinion that the occupation of the Protectorate by Dutch Boers would certainly lead to war, as this is what the natives have been fighting to prevent, and have prevented hitherto. The natives up-country only know the ignorant Transvaal Boer and the ignorant white man, and are quite unaware that there may be educated and civilised farmers of Dutch extraction in the Colony. All will agree that after the expenditure of so much English money by England, the English Government has acquired the right to give out the land to those they think most suitable, and should take efficient measures to prevent risks of war between natives and white men in the future. If I had the responsibility of settling this country myself, there are many Englishmen both from the Colony and the United Kingdom whom I should absolutely reject as settlers, and many enlightened colonists of Dutch extraction I should propose to accept."

A true friend of Sir Charles Warren and of the Imperial Government would have been able, with such a comprehensive telegram, to elucidate the true position of the Special Commissioner. The distinction between the "Dutch Boer" and the civilised and enlightened colonists and farmers of Dutch extraction was brought out. The reasonable right of England to administer a country which her character and her expenditure had procured for her was pointed out. The land was to be occupied by those who obtained farms, and the country was not to be a field for land speculation. According to Sir Charles Warren's explanation, the sons and nephews of those whom this Member of Parliament was addressing could get farms in Bechuanaland if they would

occupy and improve them, without distinction of race. Sir Charles pointed out how reasonable it was that such gifts of land under the Imperial Government should not be offered on the same terms to those who had a local history in Bechuanaland of an unpleasant kind, and who had hitherto boasted that they were not under the Queen. This speaker might have found fault with the use of the word "extraction," as I had done; but in common candour, not to speak of friendliness, he ought to have made it plain that the meaning of Sir Charles was quite evident, as not objecting to the blood, but to the upbringing and character of certain men who might ask for farms. Instead of taking this course, the speaker declared before reading it that he was sorry he had received the telegram, as it did not mend matters much. "He could not help thinking that there was some influence behind Sir Charles Warren to have induced him to propose such a settlement." This friend completed his practical condemnation of Sir Charles when he went on to mention "extenuating circumstances," and to say that Sir Charles had done much good for South Africa, and had been wounded in the service of the country, and "he would ask that these things should be remembered"; and further, that Sir Charles, "before leaving the country, would set himself right with regard to this matter." To talk in this way about a matter which was already as plain as daylight may have been thought a political necessity by those who wished to stand well with the Dutch members of Parliament whom they were addressing; but it was poor service to the solution of the question at issue, whether from the Imperial or the South African point of view.

It was reserved for other speakers with less pretence of personal friendliness to deal more satisfactorily with this matter; and, as I have just said, the speakers of Dutch extraction were far more moderate than were the English "leaders" in this debate. There were, of course, honourable exceptions; but, said the *Cape Times* of the 11th July, "the tenor of the debate is well described by one who asked if they had done yet with abusing Sir Charles Warren and Mr. Mackenzie?" How different the senti-

ment and how much higher the policy indicated at this juncture in a letter to the Cape papers by the Hon. R. Southey, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West, and before that date Colonial Secretary in the Cape Colony. Complaining of the unmeasured condemnation of Sir Charles Warren before his plans were fully known, Mr. Southey went on to say:—

"It may be that Sir Charles contemplates filling up the country which the natives are willing to alienate by emigrants from abroad, and not by Cape Colonists at all; and that if so he may have very strong and sound reasons for selecting English emigrants. When nearly seventy years ago the Dutch farmers abandoned their farms in the Zuurveldt, near Albany, and retired to the neighbourhood of Uitenhage, the Cape Government of the day recommended, and the Imperial Government adopted the recommendation that their vacated farms and other lands in their neighbourhood should be filled up by English emigrants; and the result was the arrival of the settlers of 1820. There was no outcry then about race distinctions, and who will now say that the effect has not been vastly beneficial to the country? There was a special object to be attained, and the Government did what they thought likely to effect it. Sir Charles Warren has a sufficiently difficult task to perform, and we ought not to make it more so. On the contrary, judging by what he has accomplished in face of much opposition and many difficulties, he appears to me to be entitled to the best support of all loyal subjects in this Colony."

These were the words of an able, trusted, and experienced Colonist, and Richard Southey had the courage of his convictions, and wrote in the papers in order to show that true Colonists were not joining in the detraction of Sir Charles Warren, whose name was wielded at that time as a partisan weapon in the local politics of the Cape.

The technical result of the debate was the production of those papers which in point of fact had already supplied matter for the discussion. There was no further motion brought forward, and there was not the slightest tendency, as far as one could judge from the reports and from the statements of those who were present, to move for the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape. Both in this session and the preceding one the debates on the annexation of Bechuanaland had been characterised by considerable influence and pressure from a distinguished quarter, but this

pressure was all in vain. The Dutch-speaking members were suspicious of this haste, and of the possible collision of the Colony with the Transvaal if the Imperial Government retired; while this retirement was just what the most intelligent and loyal colonists deprecated, and with the highest reason. So that there was no class or party in the Colonial Parliament favourable to the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Colony at that time, except a few individuals who were urged on by the influence already referred to. The state of the case was well brought out by one of the Dutch-speaking members of the House, who said—

"He had always been in favour of the annexation of Bechuanaland, but at present the Colony was not strong enough to keep the peace in that country."

The news of the discussion in the Cape Parliament produced an unfavourable impression everywhere—in England as well as in South Africa. Several Colonial friends having addressed questions to me on the subject, I conceived the idea of at once publishing in the Colonial press a brief statement on the question of Bechuanaland and the Cape Colony. So, while we were travelling southward from Mafiking to Vryburg, I took occasion once more to bring forward my views in a statement which was published in the leading Colonial papers. I dissuaded from immediate annexation. It was a grave question whether the Cape Government was able to coerce lawless men who had hitherto been harboured in the Transvaal, and to administer even-handed justice throughout so vast a territory. There was no longer any reason for uneasiness as to the future of the country to the north of the Colony if the Cape came forward with friendly co-operation. This did not mean the defrayal of half the outlay; it meant an annual reasonable grant from the Colony. It was agreed that the country ought finally to be joined to the Cape Colony. In the meantime the native chiefs and people, as well as the Stellalanders, unanimously expressed their preference for the Imperial Government. Mr. Upington had said he would not annex people against their will, and Sir Thomas Scanlen

was not more likely to do such a thing. The bugbear about race settlement was, I declared, a pure invention: Sir Charles Warren's explanation should satisfy every honest mind. I concluded with an appeal to all true-hearted and far-seeing men in and out of Parliament, English-speaking and Dutch-speaking, to put aside all personal questions; to think of the speedy, peaceful, and orderly opening of the beautiful country to the north, and of the unifying and uplifting of the South African colonies and states. Let all unite in a reasonable vote towards the expenses of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland, and the beneficial results of the decision would be felt by us and by our children.

The subject of the occupation of North Bechuanaland and the administration of the whole of the country by the Imperial Government were questions which excited great interest in England. I mention on another page the proposal from a lady of rank to assist the right stamp of farmer to settle in "our newest Colony." The friends of the natives who looked with great suspicion on all advance of the Europeans, under whatever circumstances, were constrained to approve of a scheme which had the approval of chiefs and people themselves. The statesmen and politicians who took a special interest in the question saw that here was a unique opportunity for inaugurating the peaceful development of the country. The following resolution of the South African Committee, at a meeting in the Mansion House, London, gave expression to a large amount of public opinion in July 1885:—

"That in the judgment of this Committee, in order to give the elements of stability and permanence to the work accomplished by Sir Charles Warren in Bechuanaland it is desirable that a Crown Colony should be set up in that country."

On the same occasion the Committee passed another resolution earnestly pressing upon Her Majesty's Government the establishment of a Protectorate in Zululand—"a duty which devolved upon Britain in consequence of the disorganisation and ruin of the Zulu people."

But Her Majesty's Government preferred the constricting and minimising policy which was now recom-

mended to them by Sir Hercules Robinson. They declined to interfere in Zululand, and they refused to establish a Crown Colony in Bechuanaland. The apparently cheap scheme of Sir Hercules Robinson, similar to that provided for the unimportant district of Tembuland, secured the approval of Her Majesty's Government (4588, 118), of course "pending annexation to the Cape Colony." This was a miscalculation of both duty and interest on the part of Her Majesty's Government. Since that time, and in less favourable circumstances, it has changed its attitude as to Zululand — part of which has been annexed and placed under Imperial administration. The other part in the meantime has been secured by the new Boer Republic, which has been acknowledged and treated with, by Her Majesty's Imperial Government, to its own disgrace, as the Supreme Power in South Africa. With reference to North Bechuanaland,—being "north of the Molopo River," it is confessedly beyond the range of vision of the present High Commissioner.

While Sir Charles Warren was at Mafiking, a Transvaal tax-gatherer had well-nigh set the country in a blaze. He had been raising the taxes in a native village close to the border of Bechuanaland, and set fire to the hut of a person who did not at once pay the sum demanded. In ordinary circumstances it is probable that no notice would have been taken of this event at Pretoria; but the British Protectorate in Bechuanaland had changed all that, and President Kruger telegraphed to Capetown that the local tax-collector had misconducted himself, and that he (the President) was sending the Native Commissioner to inquire into the circumstances. He also cautioned the High Commissioner against believing false reports concerning the event in question. We did not observe any incorrect versions of the affair; and we were glad that the publication in the newspapers of the outrage in question caused immediate action on the part of the Transvaal Government. The same Local Commissioner and tax-gatherer had figured prominently in the war with Montsioa. He had addressed Montsioa as the advocate of the freebooters while also a recognised

official of the Transvaal Government. We did not hear the result of the examination made by the higher official from Pretoria. The Bechuana have a clear idea of what tribute is, —the payment by a subject race to its conquerors; and they know also what tribal service to the chief means; but they are not quite sure under which head to reckon the tax levied upon the occupiers of native huts in certain parts of the Colony and in the Transvaal. In Bechuanaland I had no hesitation in classifying the tax as tribal service—the service of the people to the Government of the Queen; and the natives highly appreciated the distinction. In North Bechuanaland we heard many sad reports of the local misdeeds of some of those who levied the Transvaal taxes; and one of the strongest points put forward by Sechele, when he was asking for information as to what was meant by the Protectorate, was that he would object to such a method of taxation as that practised in the Transvaal.

While we were at Mafiking the Special Commissioner's camp was visited by "all sorts and conditions of men" from the surrounding countries. It would answer no good purpose to mention the distances traversed, or the dangers overcome, by those who had cases to bring forward, and by messengers and representatives of others, who wished to enter into communication with the Special Commissioner. Some of the visitors came in circumstances which were pathetic and even tragic, while the incidents of their journey included what was both interesting and exciting. People who can thus endure, and be true to one another in the most adverse circumstances, are surely worthy of consideration. It is a fact that a word spoken by Sir Charles Warren at this time would at once have led to war. Not only was this word not spoken, but, as a rule, such messengers did not even see the Special Commissioner, they having no business to bring before him connected with the Protectorate of Bechuanaland. But among other visitors to Mafiking were numerous burghers from the Transvaal, including several men of position and influence. The Cape Colonists, who, hearing of the number of mortgaged farms in the Transvaal, had been induced by the prospect of obtaining

cheap farms to leave the comparative comfort of the Colony for the rougher life of the Transvaal, had been almost to a man on the English side in the Transvaal contest. Many of them left the country at that time. Others succumbed to the general movement only when English vacillation had begotten the keenest distrust. Some of these people visited the camp; and no visitors were so proud of the General, of the dragoon horses, of the cannon, and of the sobriety and good behaviour of the members of the Force, as these loyal Dutch-speaking men. "They had always said that their neighbours did not know the English properly. There were men and there were boys among the English. They had seen the boys—now they saw the bearded men." And again: "Did we not say that all English troops were not ruffians? We are proud of your Force, Sir Charles, and of its appearance and its good conduct in the country. We think you have done far better service than if you had fought." Others of this class, however, gave vent occasionally to the slightest indication of a desire that "the other side," which had so long harshly domineered over them, "should be shown a little" of what could be done by a well handled and trained English force.

One of the results of the presence of the Expedition in Bechuanaland was the influence which it exerted on the policy of the Transvaal Government. From the date of the meeting between Sir Charles Warren and President Kruger, the attitude of the latter official and of those acting with him was of a pacific character. But President Kruger had his political opponents in the Transvaal. It was easy for them to assert that he had been overawed, and that true Transvaal patriotism demanded greater energy. "Thorough" ought to be the motto of the anti-English patriots within the Republic; there could be no compromise. So the Volksraad was asked to enact that certain disqualifications should be entailed by professions of approval of the English Government; certain pains and penalties were to be inflicted upon those known in the Republic as "loyaalen," *i.e.* loyalists, or those who had favoured the introduction of English rule into the Transvaal some years before.

These restrictions would at once have the effect of disqualifying a certain loyalist from taking his seat in the State Volksraad or Parliament. On this striking ebullition of prejudice and fear becoming known in Capetown, the High Commissioner pointed out to the Transvaal President that the new retrospective enactment, as reported in the newspapers, would be a breach of the London Convention, and asked for the text of the Volksraad's resolution on the subject. In ordinary circumstances a protracted and unsatisfactory correspondence would have been the only result of such a remonstrance; but in the altered condition of affairs, happily induced by the presence of the English Protectorate on the Transvaal border, there was nothing for the Volksraad to do but retrace its hasty steps and withdraw its ill-natured enactment, which would have ostracised the most intelligent part of the community; and this was accordingly done. When the terms of the resolution were sent to the High Commissioner, according to his request, he was informed at the same time that it had been withdrawn. This incident showed the violence and unreason of a certain party in the Transvaal, and showed also the beneficial influence of the Imperial Power in South Africa,—raising the tone of Transvaal politics to a higher platform, and securing without interference with local freedom the observance of treaty obligations. The would-be oppressors, as well as those who were to have been oppressed, on this occasion, have alike reason to thank Her Majesty's Government for delivering them from what must have proved for the Transvaal itself a disastrous enactment. Credit is due here to the High Commissioner for the prompt manner in which he acted on behalf of Her Majesty's Government; while no one knew more clearly than Sir Hercules Robinson, that the success of his remonstrance on this occasion, in contradistinction to the fate of so many others in his past experience, was entirely owing to the presence on the border of the Transvaal of Sir Charles Warren at the head of his Force.

It was surmised in the newspapers that there was possibly a modicum of German or pro-German policy and influence astir in the Transvaal at this time. Perhaps,

however, the personal rivalries and spites of local politicians had more than anything else to do with this ill-judged anti-English movement in the Transvaal. The "good friend" of Holland or of Germany in the Transvaal has a perfectly hopeless task before him. I have been assured over and over again by those who had the best means of judging, and whose local knowledge of the Transvaal was complete, that what the Transvaal burgher desires above all things is to be "let alone" by European influence of every kind. If he ever found that he could not expect to be left alone by European Powers, and he had to make choice of a European flag under which to live, the great body of the Transvaal people would desire the flag of England. Extreme partisans on the anti-English side, and extremely ignorant borderers, would form the only opposition. As this opinion has come to me from many channels, I have no hesitation in giving it as the index of Transvaal feeling on this question. Now, it is easy for the English Government to "let alone" the Transvaal local government, and yet discharge its duties satisfactorily as the Supreme Power in South Africa. The internal affairs of the country may be safely left to the growing intelligence of its own burghers, and to the rapidly increasing number of intelligent Europeans who are making the Transvaal their home. The true meaning of a Republic, as distinguished from a despotic oligarchy, will no doubt be one of the lessons which will be learned in the near future in this beautiful country,—so full of promise when intelligence, energy, and justice go hand in hand.

CHAPTER V

INCIDENTS OF MILITARY OCCUPATION—"PENDING ANNEXATION TO THE CAPE COLONY"

After some three thousand men had been assembled at Mafiking,[1] with Headquarters Staff, Commissariat and Ordnance Departments, and Engineers' Headquarters; and also with Field Military Hospital, and the picturesque-looking regiment of Native Guides, Mafiking and its neighbourhood presented a very striking appearance; and many people from the Transvaal and from other districts of Bechuanaland came to see the British Force. The Inniskillings—men and horses—were much admired. There were never such horses seen in Bechuanaland; and a finer body of men than their riders could hardly be shown anywhere. The Artillery, under Major Ollivant, was an unfailing centre of interest, and many requests were made for permission to inspect it; and the interest was of course heightened if the visitors came upon the gunners at drill. The water-raising appliances were also a source of great interest.

[1] The Expeditionary Force for the settlement of Bechuanaland, as finally agreed to by Her Majesty's Government on the 4th November 1884, was to consist of the following elements:—

Regular Army—Infantry	800	
,, ,, Cavalry	360	
,, ,, Artillery, 1 Battery	120	
,, ,, Engineers, 1 Company	60	
,, ,, Transport and Commissariat, 1 Company	80	
		1420
English Volunteers	600	
Colonial ,,	1500	
		2100
Native Guide Corps		500
		4020



APPLIANCES FOR RAISING WATER AT MAFIKING—Dûlâb, or Persian wheel. II. 298
Made of native timber, and erected by Royal Engineers under direction of Major Bagot.

I have already mentioned the completeness of the equipment of the Bechuanaland Expedition. Whilst its results were eagerly watched by the politician, scientific and military men were also interested in the doings of the well-appointed little army. I have mentioned the heliographic and telegraphic communication, by means of which the General, at any part of the long military line, was practically in communication with the whole. A Balloon Corps also formed part of the Expedition, under Major Elsdale, R.E. There were three balloons, which were conveyed in their own waggons, with all appurtenances. It was at Mafiking that the first balloon ascent took place; and I understand this was the first ascent which ever took place of a war balloon accompanying a British army. The necessary arrangements were made in a tree-sheltered but open space close to the native town, and opposite the headquarters camp. The first ascent was successfully made by Major Elsdale, the balloon being "tethered," or held by men. Sir Charles Warren then ascended, and remained some time aloft, keeping up flag communication with those below. The balloon proceeded some distance eastwards. A fine view of the country below was obtained through the clear South African atmosphere, and the Molopo district abounds in open prairie. Several officers ascended, and interesting experiments were made. Colonel Walker, chief of the staff, Colonel Curtis of the Inniskillings, Mr. Baden-Powell, and others were present; and there was a great concourse of native spectators. As the country here is about 5000 feet above the sea-level, the buoyancy of the balloon was appreciably affected; and with reference to one officer of goodly proportions and great weight, it was said that it could go no higher! The chief Montsioa, leaning on his staff, stood apart from his people, his eye following the balloon, but himself wrapt in thought. Turning to me, he said with great animation, "If the first white men who came into the country had brought a thing like that, and having gone up in it before our eyes, had then come down and demanded that we should worship and serve them, we should have done it. The English have indeed great power."

Similar thoughts were expressed on all hands, by visitors from the neighbouring Transvaal districts, as well as by the natives. The power of England was equalled by the self-restraint which enabled her officers and men to line the border of the Transvaal from Taung to Mafiking, and yet scrupulously avoid every occasion of interference with the Transvaal itself. One felt that when a balloon can be successfully raised and lowered and guided by those travelling in it, another epoch in useful invention will have been reached by human perseverance and intelligence. We have successfully imitated fishes in the ocean, but come short at present in our attempts to imitate the birds of the air.

The men of the Royal Engineers stationed at Mafiking were engaged for some time in assisting in building a Wesleyan Chapel at Mafiking. Officers and men were pleased to render this service to a deserving Missionary Society whose agents had long laboured among the Barolong. The previous chapel had been raised entirely at the cost of the tribe, and they were prepared to erect the new one also; so that it was a pleasure to help those who were thus helping themselves. I had not seen such bricklaying in the country: I do not think many buildings for a long time to come will excel this church at Mafiking in the excellence of the workmanship of the Royal Engineers. Colonel Durnford took special interest in this work, and was pleased to be able to render such substantial help to the people whose protection and welfare had been one of the leading objects of the Expedition. There were three "memorial stones" with inscriptions,—one bears the name of Sir Charles Warren, another that of the chief, while the third has the name of Kebalepile, Montsioa's eldest son; and these stones were duly "laid" in the presence of a large concourse of people, both native and European.

In his interesting speech made on this occasion, Sir Charles Warren spoke warmly of the work which the Wesleyan Society had accomplished among Montsioa's people, and of mission work generally in Bechuanaland. He reminded those whom he addressed of the spiritual nature of Christian

WESLEYAN CHURCH, MAFIKING, ERECTED BY ROYAL ENGINEERS.

worship and service. In the Christian Church there was really no visible altar—only a communion table—for the Christian sacrifices and offerings were spiritual, and consisted of the daily prayers and the consecrated lives of Christ's people.

Both Montsioa and his son spoke most gratefully of the assistance of Her Majesty's Government, but the chief mingled with his expressions of thanks a feeling of uneasiness as to the future, which, he said, still clung to him. He was led into this vein by being asked to say that the stone which he was supposed to be laying "was well and truly laid." With a pleasant twinkle in his eye the old chief said, "How do I know it is well and truly laid?" And then in a louder tone he added, "This stone is said to be well and truly laid." He then went on to say that this was one of the things which he took on trust. In a wider sense, everything was well while the English were in the country. Would they leave, and what would be his position and that of his people should they depart?

Having been asked to say a few words, I expressed my pleasure that English soldiers should leave such a memento of their stay in Bechuanaland. I had told the English people that the Bechuana were worthy of being helped, as possessing a desire for progress among themselves. It would be for them now to justify that opinion by their perseverance and industry. I had also told the Bechuana, and told the white men, that I thought it was the will of God that in South Africa white men and black should dwell together in the same land, and be helpful to one another. There was room for all. If there were not room any longer in the country, and still strangers came into it, I could see difficulty and hardship; but with so much unoccupied territory, that difficulty was not likely soon to occur. The Barolong people afterwards came forward with their subscriptions and gifts—little children and old people heartily contributing to this good work. The Superintendent, the Rev. Owen Watkins, arranged and conducted the various parts of the ceremonial with great ability and pleasantness; and the spectacle will always be remembered with interest by all who were present.

There was an open market at Mafiking, and articles of farm produce, etc., were exposed for sale by auction every day. Farmers and producers had thus an opportunity of dispensing with the services of speculators and middlemen, and prices were kept low. It was said that at that time the only cash in the Transvaal was derived from their own gold fields, or brought by native workers from the Diamond Fields of Kimberley, and expended by them in the purchase of cattle. The ordinary country business of the Transvaal at that time was said to be by barter only. The farmers had no money—only produce; and their dealers and traders had no cash—only goods in return. This, we were assured, was the general rule. To the better class of farmers, therefore, in the Transvaal, who had worked their lands and had not engaged in filibustering, the coming of the Expedition was a most welcome event, as it afforded them a ready market for some of their produce, with cash payment for what was purchased. Inasmuch, however, as the friendly policy of the Transvaal was not a thing to be reckoned on by the Expedition, the Transvaal farmers found to their chagrin that the main items of supply for men and horses had been secured without reference to the Transvaal.

The Provost-Martial at Mafiking was Captain Mills of the West Yorkshire Regiment. The sobriety of the men made his duties very light. The Corps of Guides gave him, perhaps, the greatest trouble—especially in the matter of getting out of bounds. Identification was much simplified in all such cases by the "tin ticket," or medal with a number on it, with which they, in common with all other members of the Force, had been furnished, and which they were bound to wear and produce when an officer on duty demanded it. The "tin ticket" was celebrated in verse by one of the English volunteers, the burden of the ditty being that the volunteer, now venerable through age, is telling his son, as he shows him his "tin ticket," that this piece of tin was the only honour its wearer acquired in an expedition in which there was no fighting; still he would stick to it always and prize it highly. The piece, of which I give

a few stanzas, was recited at an entertainment given at Mafiking by officers and men:—

"And O it was a goodly sight to see each gallant boy
In his putties and cord breeches, and his coat of corduroy;
But amidst this pomp and splendour, why, the thing that looked the best
Was the medal of the B.F.F.[1] each wore upon his breast.

"Aye, that was a medal surely, lad,—no bright and shining star,
No bronze gew-gaw for marching that, and glittering from afar;
But a simple tin-pot medal, with this touching legend stamped,
The number of the tramper, and the corps with which he tramped.

"Of course there came a grand review, a true red-letter day,
And all the Dutchmen came and grinned, and grinning rode away;
So each put back his rifle in obedience to the call,
And bethought him of his medal, which made amends for all.

"Thus you see, my lad, the medal that I once wore next my skin
Is no blood-stained medallion—'tis a simple bit of tin;
But the sight of it reminds me how I wore it on my breast
When I marched up thro' Stellaland, a-chucking of a chest."

In true "yarning" style this volunteer spun out seventeen such verses, and brought down the house at Mafiking when he recited them. Stanzas on a higher level might have been penned, depicting the moral victory, the triumph of right, the displacement and disgrace of filibustering, the welcoming good sense of South Africa, and the consequent opening up of unknown regions. All this was felt by many, but they did not sing it—that was reserved for the grumbling volunteer who was baulked of a fight.

As to the health of the troops, Dr. Faught, P.M.O., had a most gratifying report to make. There were natural causes for this to some extent. There was no enteric fever or sunstroke, owing to the wonderful salubrity of the country, arising from its high altitude and the absence of swamps or miasma. The deaths in the Force were 0·43 per cent in all—of which 0·14 were due to accidents. The Principal Medical Officer gave as his first reason for this gratifying state of things in the arrangement of the Force, the restriction of liquor to three glasses of spirits per

[1] Bechuanaland Field Force.

week, at regular intervals,—leading practically to the total cessation of drunkenness; his second cause was the good healthy food which was served out; thirdly, the excellent sanitary arrangements at the camp; fourthly, the good supply of water; fifthly, warm clothing. In connection with the health of the men, it may be mentioned that arrangements were made at Mafiking for bathing on an extensive scale,—a large pond or bath being made on the river-bank, into which the water was brought freely by pumping, and from which that which was used at once ran away. Arrangements were made so that a man could have a shower-bath if he liked by turning on the "hose," which was prepared for the purpose by the Engineers under Colonel Durnford and Major Bagot.

In all these matters, even to putting on a jersey at sun-down and wearing cholera-belts, it was evident that there was an old campaigner at the head of the Force, and that he was ably supported by experienced officers on his staff and by the officers generally. The Principal Medical Officer on several occasions spoke in the strongest terms of the necessity for preventing liquor coming into the camp for sale, if the high standard of health was to be kept up. The chaplains accompanying the Force unanimously agreed as to the great benefit derived from prohibiting the sale of liquor to the men. "The half-ration nights" were great fun. Some one was sure to say (without the slightest sincerity), "Half-ration night! I'm so glad;" to which some one else would answer, "So am I; it's so jolly." To which again some mentor would add, "Hope the enemy won't come when we're all tipsy." Then it would be earnestly discussed whether it was to be made into toddy or taken "half-and-half,"—the fact being that to healthy young gentlemen unaccustomed to drink raw spirits, the special interest was entirely assumed. The rule was that men who did not take spirits might have tea or coffee served to them instead; and the idea of these regular allowances of spirits was to help any of the men who might have a longing for drink by giving them a little regularly, and especially to prevent that desire for "a burst" on the first opportunity,



APPLIANCES FOR RAISING WATER AT MAFIKING. II. 305

1. Shadoof or pícottah, or sway-pole. 2. Mót, of Western India.
3. American windmill pump.

which long involuntary abstinence is said to beget. Whether it was of value in this particular way I have not been able to learn. But in such a country, and with such work in hand, it is perfectly certain that the supply of liquor should be entirely in the hands of the military authorities.

A company of native bearers, selected from the Guide Corps, was organised by the P.M.O., Dr. Faught, and trained by the Medical Staff at Mafiking. Had there been occasion for its services, it would have proved of the utmost value. Then a good deal of doctoring natives was done by the medical men at the various camps, especially for diseases of the eye. People came from a considerable distance to get the advice of skilled medical men like Dr. Faught, Dr. Jazdowski, and Dr. Maunsell; and others brought their relatives for the same purpose. The same thing happened in connection with our neighbours in the Transvaal. Poor Bonga, the "Secretary" of the "Goshen Bestuur," lay dying at Rooi Grond; a comrade of his came to the camp to ask for medical assistance. A doctor went promptly, but arrived too late. One of the acting chaplains, the Rev. A. Fisher, also went to Rooi Grond to visit Bonga before he died.

The health of the horses was one of the most gratifying items in a successfully-conducted Expedition. The two great bugbears besides open opposition were, the absence of a sufficient water-supply, and the asserted certainty of the loss of the half, if not more than that proportion, of the horses of the Expedition. The Transvaal burghers seldom "go out to war" in the summer months, as they always go mounted, and it is then dangerous to trust "unsalted" horses to the uncertainties of camp life. The "horse-sickness" of South Africa, with which the English army also became acquainted during the Abyssinian war, is a most deadly disease,—sometimes attacking a healthy horse and killing it in a few hours. It is no doubt a climatic disease. It is scarcely to be found in the Cape Colony; on high hills farther inland there is almost entire immunity from it, but in the valleys, and especially in damp marshy places, it is very destructive indeed. As is now well known to many, if a horse recovers from an

attack of this violent "horse-sickness," it does not take it again; it is now called a "salted" horse, and doubles or trebles in value. The precautions, which were strictly enforced by the General's orders, were that every horse should have a horse-cloth; and that every horse should have its nose-bag on during the whole night; and that horses should be in the lines before sunset, and should not leave them again till late in the morning. Long papers have been written on the disease by officers in the Veterinary Department. There is no doubt that whoever finds out how to cure horses of this climatic disease, in the way that climatic fever is cured by quinine, will be one of the benefactors of mankind, and of man's friend and companion—the horse. I need not add that this fortunate discoverer, if he has ordinary knowledge of the world, ought also to make a speedy fortune by his discovery. The death-rate among the horses of the Expedition was only 1·2 per cent.

While on this subject, it may be mentioned that the "lung-sickness" now so prevalent among cattle was introduced into the Cape Colony from Holland some thirty years ago by a bull which was imported from that country; and this deadly sickness has been in the country ever since. Inoculation is extensively used in South Africa as a preventive to the spread of this disease among cattle, which is almost as fatal as horse-sickness. A piece of the diseased lung, or some candle-wick or thick soft cord which has been saturated with the water found in the lung-cavity after the death of an animal from this disease, is inserted at the end of the tail of each animal on which you desire to operate. If the operation is skilfully done, it will prevent the spread of the disease in that troop. It will not cure but aggravate the case of such as may have caught the disease, but were inoculated before this was observable. So impossible has it been to stamp out this disease, that many stock breeders inoculate all their calves when weaned, in order that they may cope with infection. There is usually some slight loss from the inoculation, as this surgical operation in some cases leads to swelling of the wound. When lung-sickness broke out among the cattle of the transport-riders in the

service of the Commissariat in Bechuanaland, orders were issued that all cattle in Government service should be inoculated; and the matter ended there. This inoculation of cattle is at present the South African alternative to the method of stamping out this disease which is employed in this country.

It was fully believed in England at this time, and was stated in the House of Commons, that Sir C. Warren was engaged in settling the land questions of Bechuanaland; but Sir Charles Warren's Expedition was from January till August in the country, and yet no Land Commission was appointed, and no land settlement whatever was made; and nothing was attempted beyond collecting information by certain officers. The responsibility for this rested with the High Commissioner; and his apparent object was to hasten Colonial annexation by leaving matters unsettled, as is brought out in his correspondence with his Ministers on the subject of Colonial annexation. In the end of May, Ministers asked for—

"The report of Sir C. Warren relative to the settlement of Bechuanaland, which the Secretary of State has requested that Sir Charles should be directed to furnish to his Excellency, as without such report and full information regarding the present condition of the Protectorate, Ministers are unable to express any opinion upon the question of annexation" (4588, 25).

Whatever might have been the ideas or wishes of people in England, Sir Hercules Robinson was able to assure his Cape Ministers that—

"Sir Charles Warren has as yet made no arrangements for the permanent settlement of Bechuanaland, and it is therefore out of his power to report upon them. As to the full information desired by Ministers regarding the present condition of the Protectorate, if Ministers would state the points on which they wish to be informed, no time will be lost in telegraphing to Sir C. Warren for the information, if it should not be already in the Governor's possession." Ministers were carefully assured that "the arrangements for the disposal of the land in Montsioa's country, beyond the territory required for the tribe, had been left—in accordance with the pledge which the Governor had previously made to Ministers—for the consideration of the Cape Parliament when the question of annexation came before it" (4588; 24, 25).

On the 2d June Sir Hercules Robinson found it necessary to repeat the assurance to his Ministers—

"That no arrangements had yet been made by Sir C. Warren as to the future of the Protectorate, and no compacts had been entered into with the tribes south of the Molopo" (4588, 26).

Even if Sir Hercules had correctly estimated the chances of speedy annexation to the Colony, it is questionable whether Her Majesty's Government would have authorised or ratified the land settlement in Goshen which the Cape Ministers were pledged to bring about. In any case, as High Commissioner, he would have had little cause to congratulate himself on the results of the Bechuanaland Expedition; while as Governor, Sir Hercules Robinson would have had to sanction, despite his published disapproval, the policy and proceedings of his responsible advisers. It will be remembered how the painful catastrophe which must have resulted from the "backing-out" policy of the High Commissioner in Bechuanaland, was averted by the appearance of the Expedition. Further unpleasant complications must have been produced by the High Commissioner's proposed Colonial annexation; but these were averted by the failure of his efforts, and the practical refusal of his Ministers to annex.

The eventual annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony was the policy of Her Majesty's Government on assuming the Protectorate in Bechuanaland, and also at the time when Sir Charles Warren was sent out. But it was always understood in London that the local settlement was to be such as would be approved by Her Majesty's Government, and the element of haste as to Colonial annexation was apparently not present in the counsels of Downing Street. Towards this end I loyally worked as long as I was in Bechuanaland as Deputy Commissioner. Towards this end also Sir Charles Warren directed his endeavours as Special Commissioner. No doubt the enlargement of the Protectorate had an important effect upon this question, both among Bechuanaland people and in the Cape Colony. All those who welcomed Sir Charles Warren and his Expedition into South Africa were anxious that no immediate

annexation should take place. When the disagreement between Sir H. Robinson and Sir C. Warren became known in the Colony, public meetings were held in the chief Colonial towns, and resolutions passed in favour of Sir Charles Warren, and emphasising the importance of North Bechuanaland. These meetings began at Kimberley on the 8th April, where Sir Charles was best known, and where "admiration" and "confidence" were the warm terms used (4432, 142) concerning him. On the 16th April a similar public meeting was held in Port Elizabeth, where similar sentiments were expressed. Especial gratification was expressed at the extension of the Protectorate westward and northward; and the meeting trusted that such further steps would be taken as might be necessary to secure to Great Britain her legitimate influence in Southern Africa (4432, 188).

On the 14th April a novelty in the holding of Colonial public meetings took place. The natives of the King Williamstown division assembled at Debe, near Fort White, and passed certain resolutions, which were duly forwarded by one of themselves, Mr. J. Tengo Jabavu, who is also editor of a native newspaper. There were six resolutions, which we are told were passed with great enthusiasm. They were as follow:—

"1. This meeting desires to record its continued loyalty and devotion to Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen.

"2. This meeting wishes to express its unqualified satisfaction with the objects of the mission of Sir Charles Warren in Bechuanaland, and its admiration for the fearless manner in which he has set about examining the claims of those who must be considered robbers of the lands of the natives, until they prove themselves otherwise.

"3. This meeting expresses its strong opinion in favour of the Imperial Government taking over and administering as a Crown Colony all the native territories beyond the Cape Colony, as the anomaly of their administration by a Government responsible to a Parliament in which they have no representatives is productive of mischief, and the Colony is, moreover, at present unable to protect them from possible filibustering expeditions.

4. "This meeting having in view the fluctuations of native policies to which natives have been victims ever since the introduction of responsible government, would rejoice if the colony of the Cape of Good Hope would revert to the form of government which previously existed, and would respectfully urge the Imperial Government to consider this matter.

"5. This meeting having heard of the unceasing efforts of his Excellency the Right Honourable Sir Hercules Robinson to secure justice for the natives of Bechuanaland, and of his advocacy of a just and humane government for the natives generally, places on record its cordial thanks to the Governor and High Commissioner, and its unlimited confidence in his administration of Her Majesty's dominions in South Africa.

"6. This meeting resolves that these resolutions be sent to his Excellency the Governor with a humble request that his Excellency should forward them to the Secretary of State for the Colonies" (4588, 3).

These resolutions are worthy of serious consideration on their own merits, but especially as coming from intelligent and observant natives of South Africa. The reader will not fail to notice the advance which has been made when people whose ancestors were not long ago "in the bush," and in pagan ignorance and degradation, are able in some measure to grasp the value of a strong and free Government which recognises a place for the expression of public opinion. The third resolution expresses what I hold is a native sentiment throughout South Africa—anxiety that their affairs should be regulated in Native Territories by the Imperial Government. The fourth resolution expresses the feelings of many intelligent people, both Dutch and English; but with the advance of education the proposal will not be seriously brought forward by any political party.

On the 30th April a meeting of the inhabitants of East London (the district represented by Mr. Sprigg in the Cape Parliament) passed four resolutions, rejoicing in the extension of the Protectorate northward, and calling Imperial attention to the south-east coast line, at points where foreign interference could still take place. Thorough approval of the action of the Imperial Government in regard to Bechuanaland was expressed, and of the general results attained there by Sir Charles Warren, "and the meeting trusted that Sir Charles Warren might not be interfered with in any way whatever" (4588, 14).

At Aliwal North similar resolutions were passed at a public meeting held on the 4th May. Here the people were careful to say that they—

"Approved of the policy of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland

indicated in the original instructions to Sir Charles Warren, and called upon the Colony to support him in carrying to a successful issue the arduous duties imposed upon him." They further expressed the opinion that no settlement of the difficulty in Bechuanaland and the adjacent territories will be satisfactory that does not contemplate the permanent occupation of Central South Africa by the Imperial Government (4588, 15).

Similar resolutions were passed at Grahamstown, in which were expressed hearty approval of the Imperial policy in Bechuanaland and entire confidence in Sir Charles Warren, as to his ability and prudence in completing the settlement of Bechuanaland. Warning was here also given as to the importance of the south-east coast (4588, 21).

At all these meetings notice was taken of the Colonial help which had been rendered to Her Majesty's Government in the Soudan; in one place similar help from Cape Colony was proposed at once; in others loyal desire in that direction was expressed; in others regret that the present state of South Africa precluded the idea, but hoping for better days.

When so much was being said about Stellalanders and their wishes, it was not inappropriate that they should themselves speak out on the subject. Accordingly on the 14th May a public meeting, attended by some two hundred people, of whom nearly one-half were old Stellalanders, farmers and landowners, was held at Vryburg; and the following resolutions were unanimously passed:—

"First, Resolution expressed loyalty to the Queen, and requested that the boundary-line should be drawn speedily between Stellaland and Mankoroane, so that trespassing of natives might be stopped.

"Second, That Government will clearly make known its intention to adhere to the first agreement made with the Government of Stellaland, whereby volunteer farms were ratified.

"Third, Pleaded that Bechuanaland, including Stellaland, be proclaimed a Crown Colony; forced annexation to the Cape Colony at present would only cause dissatisfaction and be unjust; further, that in any settlement of the country Stellaland be not separated from Bechuanaland, but always be treated as a district of it, with Vryburg as capital.

"Fourth, That the settlement of country should be left entirely in hands of Special Commissioner, who should be left untrammelled in his work, and expressed confidence in Sir C. Warren, and believed that he would, if left to himself, effect a settlement with justice to the country and satisfaction to the inhabitants.

"Fifth, The Acting Special Commissioner (Captain Trotter, R.A.) was requested to forward resolutions direct to his Excellency the High Commissioner, so that he may be in possession of them at the opening of the Cape Parliament, and be enabled to inform it of the sentiments of Stellalanders, and may also communicate them to Secretary of State" (4588, 19).

The successful journey of Sir Charles Warren to North Bechuanaland evoked the greatest enthusiasm in the Colony, and indeed throughout South Africa, and raised the standing of the Imperial Government in the minds of the uninformed who had been taught to sneer at us. This local success was what all could appreciate. The "Afrikander" paper (the *Patriot*), published at the Paarl in the Cape Colony, has frequently in its columns amusing and sometimes lively rhymes in the South African dialect of the Dutch language. The "muse" of the *Patriot* was stirred by the necessary afflatus over the news of the chief Khame's offer of land to the Imperial Government. Grotesque but harmless joking, spiced with some jealousy, characterised this effusion, a translation of which was made at Mafiking by Mr. Wright. Sir Charles is represented as saying to Khame :—

"Khame, O Khame, Lord of Gamkwari ;
Khame, thou Prince of Seroromi,
Your might is well known thro' the wild Kalahari,
Your name's become famous far over the sea.

"Khame, I bring you great tidings of joy ;
Khame, my sweetheart, now give to me heed,
I bring now for you and your maidens so coy,
Protection 'gainst Africa's d——d thieving breed.

. . . . .

"Give me your country—to me it is needful,
For mine just at present is torn by the Bear,
And I am too tim'rous—yea, I ever am heedful
No insult to offer that brute in his lair."

It was pleasant enough to think that after Sir Charles had been many months in Bechuanaland, and had reached as far as Shoshong, there was no more hostility to Her Majesty's Government, or to him, than found expression in the lines from which I have quoted. When Britain really

presides over the orderly opening up of the country, opposition in such quarters will cease altogether. When, however, the *Patriot* could no longer object to what the Imperial Government was doing in South Africa, which was indeed generally approved, it took occasion to represent England as being very much afraid of the "Russian Bear." It would have been too great a change to have unqualifiedly approved of the British Government in columns where so much had been written against it.

At length, on the 7th July, Sir Hercules Robinson was in a position to lay before Her Majesty's Government a minute from his Ministers containing the terms on which they would consent to annex Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. This, then, was the "Colonial annexation," for the sake of which so much time and talent and money had been wasted during the preceding months in Bechuanaland. It was probably a very different proposal from what the High Commissioner supposed it would have been; but we are not able to pronounce decisively on this point, as the High Commissioner merely forwarded the conditions, without any accompanying remark or opinion for the benefit of Imperial deliberations. There were six conditions submitted as the basis of annexation to the Cape Colony :—

"1. All questions relating to the future settlement of Bechuanaland to be left to the decision of the Legislature of the Colony.

"2. To get the large expenditure to be incurred for good government and the establishment of a police force in a vast country from which little revenue is likely to be obtained, Her Majesty's Imperial Government to pay annually to the Colonial Government £50,000 sterling per annum.

"3. The country northward towards the Zambesi to be protected in manner to be agreed upon by Her Majesty's Imperial Government with the advice of the Colonial Government.

"4. The Expeditionary Force to be withdrawn from the Protectorate; and pending annexation, order to be maintained by a police force under control of the Colonial Government, at the expense of Her Majesty's Imperial Government.

"5. Sir Charles Warren's proposals regarding settlement of the country to be disallowed.

"6. Any territory proposed to be annexed, to be transferred to the Cape Colony free from debt, and no claim to be made for any expenditure incurred by Her Majesty's Imperial Government up to the date of annexation" (4588, 31).

Here, if never before, was the practical and effectual "elimination of the Imperial factor" at the Cape; nothing remaining for the Government in London to do but to be responsible for other men's decisions and to pay the money which other men spent. No more impossible, no more insulting, proposal was ever made to the English people or their Imperial Government. Basutoland had been handed over to the Imperial Government by a Cape Ministry on account of the weakness and inadequacy of the Cape,—a weakness and inadequacy which of course are not surprising; and the promise was given by the Colony of £20,000 per annum, if necessary, for the Imperial management of Basutoland. But as if talking in their sleep, other Ministers of the same Cape Colony, instead of offering Colonial money to assist Imperial management of Bechuanaland, as Sir Thomas Scanlen had done, now stipulate for entire Colonial management of that country, and for the payment of the entire Bechuanaland bills by the Imperial Government. This time it is the Cape Colony which kindly comes to the help of England, and therefore dictates its own terms. The brains and the policy and the profit belong now to the Cape; money only is the possession of England in the estimate of Cape Ministers. Now, how is this marvel of diplomacy to be accounted for?

The difference between the politics of Mr. Upington and Sir Thomas Scanlen has to be taken into account; but this would not explain conditions like the preceding. If Bechuanaland were sparsely inhabited, and only a small revenue could be raised at once by taxation, its valuable unoccupied land would be available for years as Crown lands, of which there were none in Basutoland. Thus a large and certain source of revenue existed in Bechuanaland, so that there is no adequate explanation here of the terms of the Cape Ministers. We come nearer the mark in our inquiries after the reasons for such unheard-of conditions when we remember that this is the Colonial party, and some of those are the veritable Ministers and men, who regard themselves as having been left in the lurch by Her Majesty's Government in Basutoland. On that occasion also they expected to dictate

the policy, and England to support it with her money and her men; and England refused. They have now an opportunity, as they think, for settling an old score, and the Bechuanaland annexation conditions may have been framed with such historical references. But, in my judgment, the real and obvious reason for the domineering attitude of the Cape Ministers was the entirely unwise and mistaken position of the Imperial Government as represented in Capetown by the High Commissioner, in beseeching and entreating for Colonial annexation, month after month, as if nothing else would do, and it must be at once attained at all hazards. The terms of the Cape Ministers were suitable as addressed to the attitude which had been unfortunately assumed by the High Commissioner. Here was the strong temptation which the Cape Ministers were not able to resist. If the weak-kneed English Government was dying to be rid of its recently assumed responsibilities in Bechuanaland, let it pay well for its release! Thus "backing out" was the worst policy even in view of annexation. If Sir Hercules Robinson in Capetown had upheld the Imperial authority in Bechuanaland from the first, as he thought of doing while he was still in London in 1884, if every opportunity had been adopted of settling the Protectorate and regulating its affairs—if, in short, we had done our work in Bechuanaland, and not gone a-begging to the Hart River Boers, and to the Colony to do our work for us, the annexation of a well-regulated territory would have appeared to the Cape Ministers eminently desirable. As matters were managed, the Ministers hung back the more they were pressed to annex a country, every question connected with which had been advisedly but mistakenly left unsettled by the High Commissioner, that it might be settled by the Colony.

A telegraphic reply was sent to the High Commissioner in answer to the Cape Ministers' proposals, which is not printed in the Bluebook, but which was doubtless short and sharp. It would appear that the Cape Ministers then saw they had gone too far, and requested the High Commissioner "to obtain for them some further explanation of the views of Her Majesty's Government with regard to the future of

the Protectorate" (4588, 118). The Ministers were informed by the Secretary of State that—

"With reference to the conditions submitted by them in their minute of the 7th July, I may observe generally that while they were intended only to lead to ultimate annexation, they appeared to Her Majesty's Government to involve this country in a heavy expenditure, not relieving it from its responsibilities nor securing it from future embarrassments, but taking away from it the control of native and other policy. Such an arrangement appeared to Her Majesty's Government to combine many disadvantages, and they have thought it preferable that they should for the present keep the administration of Bechuanaland affairs under their more direct control" (4588, 119).

The same despatch, however, which contains the preceding dignified sentences showing that Her Majesty's Government still possessed self-respect and exercised other faculties and capabilities besides that of paying money, contained also a statement which one cannot peruse without regret. The Secretary of State re-echoed the marvellous sentiment of Sir Hercules Robinson, that the interest of England "north of the Molopo was very limited!" This was a huge mistake. Commercially, as well as politically, the interests of England are very great indeed in the country referred to, as is elsewhere fully shown in these pages. The despatch went on to say that it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government holding this view as to the country north of the Molopo—

"That matters should as far as possible be kept on such a footing that on the one hand there may be no obstacle to the transfer of the annexed territory to the Cape Colony, if that course should hereafter prove to be on all grounds the most desirable; and that, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government may not be committed to any specific policy in relation to the more distant tribes and countries which further information and experience might show to be unwise" (4588, 118).

This is well worded, and, viewed in one sense—which is the fair meaning of the language—it is well conceived also. Her Majesty's Government in effect said:—We do not know about North Bechuanaland; there are conflicting reports concerning the country—we must know about it first, and then we can shape our policy. As to annexation to the Cape

Colony, the question now belongs to the future; we shall closely consider hereafter whether, on all grounds, this is the most desirable course. Other readers, I think less fairly, see in this despatch only a carefully edited statement of Sir Hercules Robinson's view—which was, that we have virtually no interests north of the Molopo—that immediate annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape is desirable, and that therefore we should do as little as we can in Bechuanaland: leave it all to the Cape to do. Nothing so ill-conceived in policy as to its results on South Africa generally; nothing so untenable in argument, and so derogatory to the name, and ruinous to the interests, of the Imperial Government, is likely to be long held by any English Ministry or sanctioned by the English people.

It has been elsewhere stated that numerous applications were made to Sir Charles Warren for farms in North Bechuanaland from colonists of every race, and from people living in the Free State and Transvaal. The recall of Sir Charles did not withdraw the thoughts of these people from this promising country. A movement for opening up for colonisation the unoccupied parts of North Bechuanaland was organised in the Cape Colony, chiefly under the auspices of respectable people living in Kimberley and the Eastern Province of the Colony. In their prospectus these gentlemen declared that—

"The approval of Her Majesty's Government on the one hand, and the friendly co-operation of the chief Khame on the other, are declared to be essentially necessary" (4643, 211).

These colonists decided to send their proposals to Her Majesty's Government through myself, possibly because I was well acquainted with the country of which they were treating. I have already stated my own preference for direct Imperial control in the matter of land management in Native Territories, and if such control had been exercised in North Bechuanaland, the course of the Association would no doubt have been quite clear from the first. In forwarding the proposal to Her Majesty's Government I mentioned other instances in which Her Majesty's Government had successfully presided over colonisation projects, as in the

case of the English and Scotch settlers in 1820, and more recently of the men of the German Legion in the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony. I thought that these instances should encourage Her Majesty's Government to give all reasonable assistance in the peaceful opening up and settlement of North Bechuanaland, whether in connection with this Association or by such other methods as might be deemed advisable (4643, 209).

Sir Hercules Robinson, to whom as High Commissioner the Secretary of State referred this colonisation scheme, branded it in his reply as a scheme for promoting European settlement "beyond the Molopo River" (4839, 67). There was, he said, no suitable land. The country was mostly uninhabitable by white men! There would be war if this thing was done. Mr. Shippard had just saved the Protectorate by arresting other settlers. No land should be acquired by Europeans from native chiefs except by Government, and any settlement of Europeans should be undertaken by Government rather than by private companies or commercial associations. This was exactly what the Association also held and had stated to the Secretary of State. One would suppose, after such agreement, that Sir Hercules Robinson would proceed to submit some alternative scheme by which orderly colonisation could be furthered under the Protectorate. The doctrine that a native chief cannot in any circumstances apportion land to Europeans, because Her Majesty's Government has proclaimed a Protectorate over his country, would be a just and righteous procedure only if we had an officer assisting the chief in such matters. But to say that because there have been great abuses in the past, therefore the chiefs shall be denied entirely the power to receive traders, missionaries, or settlers into their country, and to apportion to them places of abode; and yet that there shall be no officer to assist in this, or to do it for the chief, is unjust, impracticable, and unworthy of Her Majesty's Government as the Protecting Power. Sir Hercules Robinson lays down the astounding and retrogressive dictum:—

"I would not at present sanction any grant of land of any native chief in the Protectorate" (4839, 1).

Now our only right to interfere with such inherently competent actions on the part of chiefs in their own country is the general good of the whole community, expressed in our announced intention to transact this work better ourselves, and thus save the country from confusion and war. Sir Hercules Robinson comes forward with no alternative plan while opposing the scheme of these colonists. He refers Her Majesty's Government to a despatch already quoted, in which he proposed that we should leave the native chiefs of North Bechuanaland—

"To govern their tribes in their own fashion, until the course of events may render some change unavoidable"! (4839, 68).

Sir Hercules further proposes that—

"The Protectorate might be patrolled periodically by the Bechuanaland Police, who should see that the country is not occupied by either filibusters or Foreign Powers, and as little as possible should be done by us for the present in the way of settlement or administration" (4839, 68).

If a scheme proposing to introduce under Her Majesty's Government some 500 suitable families is not an inducement to extend settlement and administration to a country, then there is no inducement which can influence us. Is it really meant that we shall simply keep out all European colonists from North Bechuanaland as coming under the head of "filibusters and European Powers," and call that protection of the natives? What "course of events" would "render a change unavoidable"? No doubt some shocking outrage, which would appeal more powerfully to the feelings of certain people than wise policy or forethought calculated to prevent all such outrage. I feel confident that the British public will not uphold these views of Sir Hercules Robinson.

An inquiry was instituted in March 1886 in Bechuanaland by Mr. Shippard, at the request of the High Commissioner, with respect to the future of Bechuanaland (4839, 73). This inquiry had probable reference to the colonising project of the English and Colonial North Bechuanaland Association. It was, of course, well known in England and

in Bechuanaland that offers of land had already been made by the Bechuanaland chiefs to Her Majesty's Government through Sir Charles Warren, to be owned and occupied by white men under Imperial control. Jurisdiction had been offered for this purpose over white people and black people by two of these chiefs, and over white people and strangers by a third. The inquiry in question entirely ignored all this, and treated the question as if it were then a new one. The gentlemen consulted by Mr. Shippard were:—Colonel Carrington, C.M.G. of the Bechuanaland Police; the three members of the Bechuanaland Land Commission; Mr. J. S. Moffat, Resident Magistrate at Taung and formerly missionary at Inyati; the Rev. Messrs. Good (Kanye), Wookey (Molepolole), and Lloyd (Shoshong). These gentlemen did not recommend the immediate change of the Protectorate of North Bechuanaland into a Crown Colony; they were opposed to the immediate introduction of the new system of government which they saw at work in the colony of Bechuanaland. But they expressed the opinion that the Protectorate should be suitably represented by Residents or Commissioners. And it is very striking that officials consulted under the above circumstances, as well as missionaries, were unanimously of opinion that the present Protectorate should be upheld, and that Her Majesty's Protectorate should be extended to the Zambesi (4839, 87). All the gentlemen consulted were aware of Khame's offer and the offer of the other chiefs, but no question was put to them on the subject. One-half of those consulted expressed the opinion that white men should not be stopped from going northward, or from colonising under Imperial control; the others contented themselves by saying that they did not think the chiefs would foolishly sell land without consent of Her Majesty's Government.

The High Commissioner, in informing the Secretary of State of the result of this inquiry, declared that the unanimous finding of these gentlemen confirmed him in the views expressed in the second paragraph of his despatch of the 15th July 1885 (4588, 116). This was the paragraph which contained the memorable statement:—

"As to the country north of the Molopo River . . . it appears to me that we have no interest in it except as a road to the interior."

So the reader, whether in England or in South Africa, can have no manner of doubt as to what it is that blocks the way of the quiet and orderly opening up and development of the country. It is incredible that such good-feeling and willingness to co-operate as were expressed to Sir Charles Warren by the chiefs should be here entirely ignored and lost sight of; and the questions put concerning them be such as might be put concerning strangers who had never formally declared their views to a representative of the Queen.

The formal answer of Her Majesty's Government to the offer of land by the chief Khame was long delayed. It was sent to him in March 1886 by Administrator Shippard at the request of Sir Hercules Robinson. The latter had been reminded by the Secretary of State (4643, 242), that it would be well for him to send forward a reply to Khame in accordance with the view of both the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State that we had little or "no interest north of the Molopo" (4588; 116, 118). The message suggested by the Secretary of State, and forwarded by Mr. Shippard nearly a year after the offer of Khame had been made through Her Majesty's Special Commissioner, was in these words:—

"I have to express to you the appreciation entertained by Her Majesty's Government, of the cordial and hospitable reception given by you to British officers who visit you, and their hope that you will continue to remain on friendly terms notwithstanding the fact that Her Majesty's Government have not felt themselves able to recommend the Queen to accept your offer of land, although they fully recognise the spirit of confidence and amity in which it was made" (4839, 56).

This reply certainly demands reconsideration on the part of Her Majesty's Government as the Supreme Power in South Africa, and responsible for the peace of the countries under our protection. Never was a decision fraught with keener disappointment to many in England than was this answer to Khame. It was open to Her

Majesty's Government to seek a modification of Khame's proposal. If any one in London, or at the Cape, really supposed that Khame's proposed settlement included an inquiry as to the race and birth of the settlers, that matter could no doubt soon be explained by the chief himself to the general satisfaction of intelligent people. If the chief's strenuous stipulations as to keeping out strong drink from Bechuanaland were distasteful to Her Majesty's Government or its advisers at the Cape, let that be fairly and fully stated; and let it be avowed (if it is indeed so) that we decline to assist a chief in a humane project to save at least one small part of the world's surface from the curse of strong drink. It was stated in one criticism of the proposals of Khame, that the chief had retained too much land to himself and his tribe. It was also declared that Khame wanted the white men to be his vassals and to fight for him in his tribal quarrels. These were unfounded and even malicious misrepresentations. On the contrary, Khame, like Montsioa and other southern chiefs, gave himself and his whole country into the hands of the Queen, retaining for himself independent action such as levying war in no part of it. The white men who came in, according to Khame, were to be under an Imperial Local Commissioner: the policy to be pursued was to be dictated by Her Majesty's Government and not by Khame. And if it turned out that the country retained by him was too large for himself and his people, in dealing with that question, we should have to do with one of the most reasonable of men. It is extensively held in England—and the opinion is shared in the Cape Colony—that the proposals of Khame have been refused because, while conferring vast territories on England, they were, on the whole, too advantageous to the coloured man, and placed him from the first on too safe and secure a position as to his rights and his land. It seems very dreadful to express such a view with reference to our dealings as a nation. But I must admit there would seem to be some ground for this suspicion. Otherwise how can one account for all the misrepresentation which has been written, both concerning the country and concerning the proposals of an intelligent, humble-minded,



STORES OF MESSRS. FRANCIS AND CLARK, SHOSHONG—DR. HOLUB'S EXPEDITION ON ITS WAY TO THE ZAMBESI. II. 323

public-spirited chief? This whole question I am very confident in leaving to the close attention of the public, and especially to all those who desire the old record of England for fair-dealing to be kept up, and handed down by us to those who come after us.

[While this work is in preparation news comes from South Africa that the exploring expedition, under the eminent Austrian traveller Dr. Emil Holub, had met with a serious reverse in the unexplored country north of the Zambesi River, and lying between that river and Lake Bangweolo, where Dr. Livingstone died. This would seem to be the region in which Mr. Arnot, the Scotch evangelist, already referred to, has pitched his tent. While sorry for this reverse to my friends Dr. and Mrs. Holub, I am thankful that their lives have been spared; and I cannot but express the confident hope that the Austrian Government will adequately support this distinguished traveller, whose indefatigable work in African exploration is calculated to cast lustre on his country, as well as confer upon it commercial benefits. Soon after Sir Charles Warren left Shoshong in 1885 Dr. Holub arrived there from the South at the head of a well-equipped party, and determined to traverse and explore the vast regions north of the Zambesi. The illustration is from a photograph taken at that time.]

CHAPTER VI

BOUNDARY-LINE COMMISSION—LAND COMMISSION OF BECHUANALAND

We have seen that steps were taken by Sir Charles Warren and by President Kruger to have the western boundary of the Transvaal defined and beaconed off, according to the terms of the London Convention. Captain C. R. Conder, R.E., well known (like Sir C. Warren) in connection with surveys and explorations in the Holy Land and the neighbouring countries, was the Commissioner appointed by Sir Charles Warren. A few days after his nomination, in the end of January 1885, he was on the border, and ready to commence his important work. After six days he was joined by Mr. T. N. de Villiers, the Commissioner appointed by the Transvaal. Mr. de Villiers spoke lightly of the work before them, having the opinion that it could at once be settled by the two Commissioners marching over the ground, and having a party of farmers with them to build the beacons agreed upon. This of course implied singular oneness of opinion, or great power of acquiescence on the part of one side or the other. Captain Conder did not share in this sanguine view, especially when he saw which side was expected to yield; he naturally wanted to know the country, in order that he might accurately interpret the terms of the Convention. After careful investigation, he found that he did not agree with the views of the Transvaal Commissioner concerning several claims put forward by him with reference to the southern part of the proposed Transvaal boundary-line, or even as to the road to Kunwana

from Taung which was indicated by the Convention. The Transvaal Commissioner was for pushing the boundary-line farther into Bechuanaland in both these cases than the English Commissioner could sanction. Not being able to agree as to the corner beacon of the new south and south-west boundary-line of the Transvaal, it was impossible for them to lay down beacons south of Kunwana without the intervention of a referee, who, according to the Convention, was to be chosen by Sir John Brand, President of the Free State. Sir Charles Warren ordered Captain Conder to make an accurate survey of the country in dispute—to trace the roads and ascertain the exact positions of the existing beacons of Stellaland, so far as they were to be followed in terms of the Convention; and then, proceeding northward, they would come to a part unaffected by their differences of opinion as to the south-west corner of the boundary-line. In his report to Sir C. Warren on the work accomplished by himself and his assistants, Captain Conder says:—

"The survey proceeded as rapidly as possible, and I may say that in the course of a considerable experience I have never known so much accurate work done in so short a time. We were impeded by continual rain, by the very difficult nature of the country (from a surveyor's point of view), and by the sudden rise of the rivers" (4643, 170).

This accurate work included the fixing by triangulation of the position of all the existing beacons of the south border of Stellaland; and in laying down the results, a representation of the hills was given to the scale of three geographical miles to the inch. The attempted arrest of the surveying party by some tipsy farmers at Kunwana, which might have led to such serious results, has been elsewhere mentioned. A written acknowledgment having been obtained from the Transvaal Commissioner of the error of the Transvaal burghers, the work of the Commission was resumed. Captain Conder mentions in his report that Mr. de Villiers, on behalf of the Transvaal, proposed to him the exchange of Lotlakani for Kunwana. Sir Charles Warren, after a message from Moshette, had brought the peculiar circumstances connected with Kunwana before the High

Commissioner; and Moshette himself assured Captain Conder, as stated in his report, that he had no wish, and had never expressed any wish, to be included in the Transvaal, but, on the contrary, had a very strong objection to this. The representations of Moshette, however, asking to be included in Bechuanaland, and the proposal of the Transvaal Commissioner that the town of Lotlakani should be given as an equivalent, were not likely to be seriously entertained by the Governments which had so recently fixed the boundary-line in London; and so Kunwana falls into the Transvaal, while almost all the cattle stations of its inhabitants are in Bechuanaland.

When the Commissioners came into the neighbourhood of Rooi Grond, they found that almost all the beacons of 1881 had been thrown down, but their sites were easily discernible. As no alteration was made in the line here by the Convention of London, these beacons were rebuilt by the Commissioners; the aspirations of those who had thrown them down were not to be fulfilled. This rebuilding was carried on by order of Sir Charles Warren as far north as the pool of Ramatlabama, the work being done by Mr. Woolley on the English side and Commandant H. Pretorius on the side of the Transvaal.

The referee appointed by the President of the Free State was Chief Justice Melius de Villiers. He first met the boundary Commissioners on the 21st July at Christiana in the Transvaal. It being found impossible by the referee to adjudicate on documentary evidence alone, it was resolved to proceed to the disputed points as they exist on the ground. As the maps, etc. were exclusively the work of the English side, it was satisfactory to the Transvaal side that this course was taken. Several meetings were held at Kunwana. In the end, only one question was placed before the referee by the Commissioners—the definition of the garden-ground to be included, with the town of Kunwana, in the Transvaal. As to the disputed points north of Kunwana, the Transvaal Commissioner yielded to the representations of the English Commissioner; and with reference to the trade road from Kunwana to

Taung, Captain Conder yielded to the Transvaal Commissioner—not because he was convinced that the road selected by the Transvaal Commissioner was the one really meant by the Convention, which all local evidence showed was the one which he had claimed, but because the Transvaal Commissioner's proposed line corresponded with the sketch map which was appended to the Convention in the Bluebooks, and because the referee had openly expressed his reliance on the map, to which he attached great importance. These two matters having been thus settled by the Commissioners themselves, the extent of ground to be included in the Transvaal with the town of Kunwana was decided by the referee, after personal inspection of the country, in favour of the English Commissioner. Justice de Villiers's award is dated from Kunwana on the 5th August, and is accompanied by a report, both of which are to be found in the Bluebooks (4643, 158-162). As there is no probability of further dispute or repudiation by either Government, Justice de Villiers's award is not likely to be so famous as that of Governor Keate; but the award and the report testify to the ability and judicial character of the referee. The results of the settlement are thus summarised by Captain Conder:—

"The Transvaal loses more than 320 square miles of its extreme claim, including the springs of Maretsani and Mosimi and some excellent pasture land. On the other hand, the Transvaal gains about 220 square miles, which would not have been given had the real trade route from Taung to Kunwana been allowed. The spring and some of the pastures of Pudumo are thus thrown into the Transvaal, but this is the only valuable supply of water which has been lost" (4643, 163).

In forwarding to the Secretary of State Captain Conder's able report, Sir Charles Warren wrote in the highest terms of the manner in which Captain Conder had carried on the work entrusted to him, and recommended him to Her Majesty's Government for some recognition for his good services. Sir Charles also referred to the good services of the officers who had been associated with Captain Conder—Lieutenant H. B. Mackay, R.E., Lieutenant W. J. Bythell, R.E., and Lieutenant Woolley. In the same letter Sir

Charles recorded his strong opinion that "many of the Stellaland difficulties would have been avoided, if the High Commissioner had followed the injunction of Lord Derby when the Protectorate was first undertaken, and had forthwith defined this boundary-line" (4643, 128).

It has been narrated how the earnest representations of Sir Charles Warren regarding the land settlement of all Bechuanaland had borne fruit, and that the Secretary of State had expressed the opinion that this important matter should be entrusted to British officers, as being without local bias one way or the other. On the 20th August the Secretary of State suggested to the High Commissioner by telegram that inquiry might now be made into the circumstances of Stellaland titles, as annexation to the Cape Colony was no longer imminent (4643, 4). In giving this opinion the Secretary referred to a previous despatch of the High Commissioner himself, addressed to Sir Charles Warren, in which Sir Hercules Robinson had said "he was willing to acquiesce in the appointment of a Land Court or Commission to investigate the claims of Europeans to land in the territories of native chiefs within the Protectorate" (4588, 34). After referring to this despatch of the High Commissioner, the Secretary of State added that "some assurance that natives are adequately provided for was indispensable before sanction was finally given to claims for Europeans" (4643, 4). This no doubt was what was desired in England, and indeed what it was supposed Sir Charles Warren was doing; but it is already known to the reader that all Sir Hercules Robinson's influence had been exerted to leave everything unsettled in Bechuanaland, in order, as he thought, to advance annexation to the Cape Colony. The High Commissioner now lost no time in explaining to the Secretary of State that in the despatch which had been referred to, the High Commissioner did not intend to include Stellaland titles, but only European claims to land in native territories outside Stellaland" (4643, 4). Within Stellaland, the High Commissioner now proposed that the Land Commission should proceed on the basis of the freebooter treaty of 1882, which had been discredited by Her Majesty's Government, and of

Mr. Rhodes's agreement of the 8th September, already so frequently referred to. The stipulation of the Secretary of State, in answer to Sir Charles Warren's representations as to Stellaland titles, was also quoted with approval by Sir Hercules, to the effect that in "cases of flagrant coercion or unfairness" the title would be withheld, but such cases were first to be reported on; and also that no Barolong land would be given to satisfy Stellaland claims, nor would compensation be given for such claims,—they would simply fall to the ground. No notice was taken by the High Commissioner of the disloyalty and open hostility of a certain party of Stellalanders to Her Majesty's Government; it was only "as to Goshen" that "the claims advanced by persons who had taken part in a freebooting attack on the Protectorate were not to be entertained" (4643, 4); but the same men might get their land in Stellaland. "Locations sufficient for grazing-lands and garden-grounds" for native chiefs and people were to be defined and beaconed off, these locations to be inalienable. Here we find recognised clearly enough the right of property in land as claimed by the Stellalanders; but neither the native owners nor Englishmen nor other Europeans, being land claimants out of Stellaland, were recognised in this way. There was apparently in those cases no recognition of personal property in land, even when there had been occupancy and improvement of it. The "valid claim" of a European (not in Stellaland), if the land were needed for the natives, could be set aside; and this was precisely the thing which it was forbidden to do as to Stellaland. Thus the only really "valid titles" to land in Bechuanaland, concerning which the High Commissioner allowed little or no discretionary power, were those of the freebooters of Massow—a good many of whom had broken his own rule and had levied war against the Protectorate! Her Majesty's Government having resolved to withdraw Sir Charles Warren from South Africa, could not at the same time thwart Sir Hercules Robinson; and so the latter obtained the approval of Her Majesty's Secretary of State to the above method of apportioning land in Bechuanaland, although this officer had

himself only recently stated the desirability of "inquiring into the circumstances of Stellaland titles" (4643, 4).

The Secretary of State not only desired that the land settlement of Bechuanaland should be in the hands of British officers, but intimated his approval of the employment of officers of the Royal Engineers for this important work. The reason for this preference was no doubt that these officers, in the course of their duties under Sir Charles Warren, had acquired exceptional knowledge of the country which was to be settled. When the High Commissioner, in accordance with his instructions, inquired if Sir Charles Warren could recommend Engineer officers for the Land Commission, the Special Commissioner mentioned the names of Captain Conder and Captain Leverson and Lieutenant Haynes, and also Captain Trotter, R.A., of the Intelligence Department. It was at this time stated that the President of the Land Court might be "a judicial officer"; but it was still generally hoped and expected in Bechuanaland that the services of the Special Commissioner would be retained in Bechuanaland at least for a time; and there were still some, indeed, who ventured to hope that Sir Charles would also be asked to proceed to Zululand, and restore order there; but the number of those who continued to buoy themselves with such pleasant dreams of a persistent Imperial policy was not large, and consisted chiefly of such as held that the English Government which had then recently come into office, would give greater attention to Colonial affairs, and would certainly feel bound to grapple with the Zululand difficulty.

The reader of these pages is aware of the opposition which Sir Charles Warren had to contend with as Special Commissioner; and that the High Commissioner was understood to be opposing the policy which Sir Charles advocated. In the Cape Colony itself, those who had welcomed the Expedition were anxious that its work should be fully accomplished. In Bechuanaland this feeling was universal; there was an anxiety and a fear as to what might be the result to the country of opposition to the policy of the Special Commissioner. In these circumstances the appointment of the

members of the Land Commission was of a reassuring nature. To myself it was a matter of the greatest satisfaction. When, however, Captain Conder, who was not at headquarters, learned from the newspapers that the land settlement in Bechuanaland was not to be carried through under the auspices of Sir Charles Warren, as he had imagined, he telegraphed to Sir Charles, and with that officer's permission explained to the High Commissioner the exceptional opportunities which he had had of ascertaining the state of the country; that he had already expressed opinions in official reports to Sir Charles Warren on the subject; that he had seen certain suggested rules of procedure drawn up tentatively by Sir Charles Warren, for the use of the Land Commission; and that, if they were substantially adopted, he (Captain Conder) would be most happy to accept the position of a member of the Commission. This action was not taken in good part by the High Commissioner, who expressed his inability at that time to supply a copy of the rules which would guide the Land Commission, as they had not yet been determined on; but if Captain Conder was not willing to submit his own judgment to the views of Her Majesty's Government he could resign. Captain Conder availed himself of this permission, and after completing his work as Boundary Commissioner, returned to England. When this correspondence was going on, Sir Charles Warren had left Bechuanaland, and was already on his way to England. After this, several other officers in Bechuanaland were asked and declined to sit on the Bechuanaland Land Commission. It is quite evident, from the high character of these officers, that there was not the shadow of lack of interest in Her Majesty's service to be charged to any of them; nor were they without ambition to avail themselves of such an opportunity of advancing their own interests; but so great was the distrust of the policy which might be imposed on the Commission from Capetown, that they sacrificed their own interests rather than become members of it. Eventually Captain Duncan, R.N., who had been employed by the High Commissioner in doing similar work in Tembuland, was appointed to fill the vacant place.

I may as well mention here that some months afterwards, and when a good many of the first difficulties of the work of the Land Commission were being overcome by its members, a European township was originated and laid out close to the native town of Mafiking, and this was done without any reference to the Land Commission. The probable evil result of placing such a town in close proximity to a native town, would be universally admitted in South Africa. So deeply impressed was Lieutenant Haynes that this would be the inevitable result, that, protesting against it in vain, he tendered his resignation as Secretary of the Land Commission. This was accepted, but the acceptance was accompanied by a letter of extravagant severity from Mr. Shippard, President of the Land Court, in which he went so far as to make a remark damaging to the military career of a conscientious, high-spirited, and promising young officer. Young Haynes had been Sir Charles Warren's companion in the dangers of the Arabian Desert when the murderers of Professor Palmer were arrested and brought to justice; and in the Bechuanaland Expedition he had acted as Sir Charles's private secretary. At the time of his resignation, he had accomplished a careful examination of the Barolong country, the result of which was of course left for the use of the Commission. There are those who, we know, always hold that a young man has no right to differ from older men; in the case before us, they would say that Lieutenant Haynes should have contented himself with recording his strong disapproval of the ill-judged new township, and then have gone through with the work of the Commission. But the censure even of martinets will end here; and many will feel drawn to the young officer who sacrificed so much to what he considered his duty.

Both Captain Conder and Lieutenant Haynes seem to have regarded the civil work offered to them as involving personal responsibility, and they acted accordingly. I am not aware of the military etiquette in this matter. One would think that what is offered (not ordered) may be declined without offence; and what has been accepted may be resigned without necessary misdemeanour. In any case, it would be

unfair to suppose that any one of the half-dozen British officers who declined to serve on this Land Commission, were animated by other than the most loyal and devoted sentiments to Her Majesty's service and Her Majesty's Government; indeed, it would only be the truth to say that their declinature was owing to this thorough devotion and loyalty. Since writing these observations, I have met with a very striking passage in the published journal of General Gordon, written at Khartoum. I have no doubt that not only the Royal Engineers, who regard Gordon as peculiarly their own, but other officers in Her Majesty's service will sympathise with Gordon's clear and "straight" code. General Gordon's words have striking reference to more than one phase of the Bechuanaland settlement, and indeed of our South African policy:—

"It is a great question of doubt to me if public officials ought so to sink their personality as to allow themselves to overlook facts which must strike them as being not only evil, but also detrimental to our national interests, merely because such facts are likely to be disagreeable to our Government in requiring them to decide on difficult questions. . . . There is no doubt that —— had the destinies of Egypt and of the Soudan in his hands far more than Her Majesty's Government, and he did not succeed. His amiability did for him. It is not insubordinate to resign, if you do not agree to a policy, or feel you cannot carry it out with a whole heart. In military affairs it is different; one is ordered to go here and there, and one obeys (even if one thinks it is unwise), having represented it, but in diplomacy there is no such call."[1]

. . . . . .

The Bechuanaland Land Commission, to obtain which such a hard struggle had been made, commenced its operations soon after the departure of Sir Charles Warren. Captain Leverson inspected the southern part of the Protectorate. Captain Duncan examined the Stellaland titles; and a considerable portion of his time was taken up with endeavours to induce the grantees of certain farms in the south-eastern corner of Stellaland to give up their land for the use of Mankoroane's people, on the promise of receiving farms of equal value elsewhere in Bechuanaland (4889, 6). Lieu-

[1] *Major-General Gordon's Journal at Khartoum*, pp. 233, 234.

tenant A. E. Haynes examined the northern district from the Transvaal border westward to Morokweng and Honing Vley, and furnished the Commission with a report of his examination of the Barolong country.

The sittings of the Commission began at Mafiking on the 15th January 1886. The President of the Land Court, being also Administrator and Chief Magistrate, had twice to leave the Commission for other parts of the country; so that on the 10th February it was necessary to adjourn till a future date the uncompleted inquiry at Mafiking, as it had been advertised that the Commission would commence its sittings at Vryburg on the 15th February. The Land Commission remained at Vryburg from the 15th till the 25th February. They then proceeded to Taung, where they commenced their sittings on the 1st March; but the President was now called to Capetown on the 21st March, as Administrator, to confer with the High Commissioner, who was then about to visit England. During his absence, however, and that of Captain Duncan, Captain Leverson went on hearing claims—decisions being left over till the return of the other members of the Commission. On the 11th May the Commission reassembled at Mafiking and finished its public sittings there on the 21st May.

When I call to mind the ruined condition of Bechuanaland in 1883—the freebooting spirit supreme everywhere, and loyal and well-conducted men, whether Europeans or natives, hanging their heads in the utmost discouragement—I can only write with the greatest thankfulness of the results of the Bechuanaland Expedition, and of its local consummation, the land settlement effected by the Bechuanaland Land Commission. The members of the Commission deserve credit for the general result of their work, especially when we consider the grave difficulties under which they laboured from the terms of the constitution imposed on them by Sir Hercules Robinson.

Some of their decisions, however, are open to the gravest exception, as, for instance, the planting of a European town with a large commonage within some 700 yards of the native village of Mafiking, which Montsioa and his people

had defended so long and so bravely. It has been already noted that this action led to the resignation of the Secretary of the Land Commission, who was better acquainted with the Barolong district than any other member of the Land Commission. This idea, it would seem, did not originate with the Land Commission; and had all the members possessed the courage of young Haynes, the blunder would have been averted, and a more suitable site found for a European town. Indeed, there was no pressing necessity at this time for laying out a competing capital of Bechuanaland, for Vryburg was already the capital, and centrally situated, so far as the colony of Bechuanaland was concerned. There was no reason for the hasty construction of this European town, from an Imperial point of view. The defence of Mafiking was a simple enough matter, and was unconnected with a European township. The native trade at Mafiking was also confined to certain known limits, and had been peacefully regulated by the chief for years. Neither the defence nor the trade of Mafiking needed the European township, which was planned and laid out for an entirely different set of reasons. Montsioa had been able to defend Mafiking in the past. Now that the Imperial Government was supreme in the country, it was highly improbable that active opposition to Her Majesty from the Transvaal would be shown in unproductive attacks on a well-known native stronghold, while defenceless cattle stations and farms invited the attentions of the freebooters. The police horses, the police waggons and oxen, the policemen themselves, would certainly have been the objects of the special attention of the Transvaal freebooters, if they had gone into open hostility in Bechuanaland. In a state of actual war, such a place as Mafiking would no doubt be important, especially if the active co-operation of European police and native men became necessary. But, as already remarked, the defence of Mafiking in a time of war had nothing to do with the laying out of a European township at that place. Sir Charles Warren had his headquarters at Mafiking, and a military fort was begun by him there. This was at an exceptional time and as a purely

military measure. As to permanent policy in a native territory, Sir Charles has expressed very strong opinions in a despatch from which I am able to quote the following sentences :—

"I do not concur in the proposal to post small forces of police at the large native towns, as I do not see what use they would be there, and both police and natives become demoralised by contact with each other. . . . Any police necessary for the protection of Bechuanaland should be quartered apart from the Bechuana towns, and should only work with the Bechuana when actual fighting is necessary."

In pursuing the history of the land question in Bechuanaland I may as well mention here my own unwilling connection with Barolong affairs, after my return to England.

The chief Montsioa on the 13th March 1886 addressed to me a complaint against our administration of the affairs of his country, which he earnestly asked me to translate and forward to Her Majesty's Government. I confess I received this letter with great disappointment. I was grieved that a man with such insight and knowledge of men as Montsioa—"brave, sturdy, and outspoken," as Mr. Shippard describes him—should have conceived himself driven to adopt this extreme course. I felt also to the fullest extent the unpleasantness to myself of becoming mixed up in matters for which others were now responsible. Reports had reached me before to the same general purport, but I had taken no notice of them. When, however, I was personally addressed by the chief Montsioa, in handwriting and style known to me, which left me in no doubt as to the genuineness and urgency of the matter, from Montsioa's own point of view, I had no choice but to translate the chief's letter, and at the same time lay the facts of the case, so far as known to me, before Her Majesty's Government (4839, 95). This was not done in the spirit or in the language of controversy. I received a reply (4839, 105) from the Colonial Office—Sir Hercules Robinson being at this time in London—which I thought, without further explanation, was calculated very much to mislead the mind of Her Majesty's advisers and the public, especially as a question having been put on the subject in the House of Commons,

the official reply was given that the new European town was two miles from Mafiking. Most reluctantly, therefore, I felt bound to come forward a second time and contradict this glaringly incorrect statement (4839, 106), and to give in fuller detail what information I possessed on the subject.

The correspondence having been forwarded to the Administrator, Mr. Shippard, he made lengthened remarks on Montsioa's letter and on my own communication (4890, 36). According to the Administrator, the fears of the chief had been groundless, as the places occupied by the Barolong were always meant to be reserved to them. I can only say, of course, that this was not according to the chief's information when he wrote to me. The Administrator admitted that he had refused to grant individual titles to the holdings which certain of Montsioa's people had occupied and improved. No reason is given for this refusal. Sir Hercules Robinson had brought this question before the Commission, informing them that he was "personally unfavourable to allowing natives to hold land on individual tenure" (4839, 2). The Administrator went on to state why a "Native Reserve"—the block of land belonging to the tribe—should be inalienable, but he does not state why individual titles in this inalienable block of land should not have been given to their holders and occupiers. I am well aware of the line of argument followed by the professed friends, but real enemies, of the natives on this question; and I am glad to think that these people have usually had a larger success than that which they seem to have achieved before the Bechuanaland Land Commission. There is the man who professes his tearful interest in natives, and declares that it would be quite wrong to give "the poor natives" titles to their lands—they would only exchange them for drink—they ought to be taken care of on Government land, etc. etc.; the result being that this speculator by and by can pull the wires so as to have the natives shifted elsewhere. "It is Government land, you know, that they are squatting on," he will now say, without tears, "and one place is as good as another for these niggers." I have much pleasure in stating that the cause of right-dealing has

gained by the recommendation of the Land Commission, under the Presidency of Judge Shippard, that "Native Reserves" belong to the natives, and are distinct from Government or Crown lands, from which natives could be removed at any time, and on which they would have no inducement to make any improvement. The "Native Reserves" in Bechuanaland are inalienable: what is still necessary for Bechuanaland natives is the individual security inseparably connected with a personal title to one's own farm or holding, which is everywhere the great incentive to exertion and improvement.

I do not follow Mr. Shippard into the discussion of unprofitable personalities, as they add nothing to the elucidation of the subject in hand. As shown above, the statements which were made in London, and confuted by me, were not put forward by Mr. Shippard, nor connected with his name in any way. Even now, Mr. Shippard does not claim to be the author of the statement that the European town at Mafiking was situated two miles from the native town; nor has any explanation ever been given of a mistake concerning which there is something, to the public mind, very bold and unsatisfactory. It is quite natural that Mr. Shippard should feel offended at Montsioa's informal appeal, and should resent my interference, as it would seem to him. But there can be no doubt as to the genuineness of the letter, and I do not think a man of Montsioa's character and experience would thus have addressed to me personally a letter of strong appeal without the most urgent reason. Having received his letter, I should have been a meaner man than I am if I had not translated it, and given what information I myself possessed on the whole subject to Her Majesty's Government.

In this communication Mr. Shippard draws up "a case" for a European town close to a native one. His remarks will convince no one. It is a poor argument, for instance, for the rightness of a town site, to say that the Wesleyan minister has come forward, after the site has been decided on, and asked for a place in the projected town for a church and school. People in a wrongly-placed town must of course have churches

and schools. The truth, however, is, that instead of approving of the European township close to the native village, the Wesleyan Mission has most strongly opposed it; and in the Bluebooks and elsewhere has given the gravest reasons for this opposition (4890, 12). Throughout South Africa Wesleyan ministers labour among Europeans as well as among the natives, and many of the ministers are themselves of Colonial birth. Therefore their statements concerning the Europeans and natives at Mafiking—based on local knowledge—whether telling against the one race or the other, or equally against both, have as their only object the highest interests of all, and are therefore deserving of the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government. Then it is surely remarkable that those who disapprove of granting farms to native farmers in the vicinity of European farmers should see no objection to placing a European town close to a native one. In the one case it is difficult to conceive what harm the one farmer could do to the other, each one living on his three-mile-square farm; whereas, in the other case, the evil to the weaker and less instructed race from close contact with the more powerful in, practically, one town is evident enough. To say that the Barolong are able to stand it—as seems to be the hasty induction after a month or two of experiment—is another way of saying that the Barolong are not a weak or inferior race. But such a fiery trial of this question is what we had no right to impose on them. Then we are told, on the one hand, that Sir Charles Warren is really responsible for the European township at Mafiking, because he made a military fort there; and again, on the other hand, we are assured that a European town ought to have been nowhere else than at Mafiking—it is the only suitable site! I respectfully but very strongly dissent from these opinions; although I agree with the Secretary of State in his reply on the whole discussion, that it was then "too late to consider the propriety of removing either the township or the fort" (4890, 54).

Another recommendation of the Bechuanaland Land Commission calls for special remark. The long-established and well-known mission station of Kuruman is situated

some three miles from the source of the Kuruman stream, or river, as it is sometimes termed. The water of the stream was led out near the station, by the missionaries, more than fifty years ago, on both sides of the valley or river-bed, for the purposes of irrigation; and a considerable block of land is under cultivation, for the use not only of the missionaries, but of the native students in the High School and the Theological Seminary of the Moffat Institution; and also for the use of such natives as have obtained from the missionaries permission to occupy and cultivate lands within the bounds of the station granted to the Society in early years by the chief and tribe. The grant of the native chief Mothibi, which was ratified by his successors, included grazing rights for cattle and other stock belonging to the missionaries and the natives of the village, and secured to the missionaries the "uninterrupted use" of the water, which of course meant that no extensive irrigation or other use of the water should take place *between the source of the stream and the mission station*, except such as might have the consent of the missionaries; and this power and authority have been exercised for fifty years by the agents of the Missionary Society to the satisfaction of all concerned. In the first instance, no document was asked by the missionaries, as such procedure was unknown to the natives, who were then entirely ignorant of the use of books, letters, or title-deeds. After thirty years, and when the natives had attained to greater knowledge, a survey was made of the station, garden-plots, and village site. A title-deed was drawn up by Dr. Moffat, to which the names of such chiefs and headmen were appended as their missionary deemed necessary. When the land of Kuruman and the use of the Kuruman stream were handed over to the missionaries by the chief Mothibi, a quantity of European goods, representing a large amount of money in that country at that time, were handed to the chief by the missionaries Hamilton and Moffat, acting for the Missionary Society; and this was at a time when the Batlaping tribe was undivided. I have elsewhere spoken of more recent events connected with this important centre of light and civilisation, the influence of which has

been felt for progress and peace all over the country. For two generations these duties have been discharged, and those local rights have been exercised by the resident missionaries—as to the village garden-plots, and the water, and commonage; and the only opposition was that of certain traders already mentioned, who were afterwards ashamed of their action, and acknowledged the rights of the Society. The second document, which was secured by the missionaries from Mankoroane and his headmen in public council during the time of my residence at Kuruman, did not add to, so much as define, the undoubted position of the Missionary Society at Kuruman.

The agents of the Society were well known to be unconnected with trade themselves, although their presence and work always led to the development of commerce. Under the supervision of the missionaries, the natives learned a higher agriculture, and exchanged the hoe of their own ruder garden-work for the plough and the spade. What had been done at Kuruman was imitated by the natives themselves elsewhere, in the improvement of their own lands; and their skill in the use of field implements enabled people from this district to take a place in the service of white men quite different from that of the "raw native," to whom a plough or spade or pick was entirely new. The position and work which had been achieved at Kuruman were well known and acknowledged. Sir George Grey and Sir Bartle Frere had fully recognised them. It was probably known to the members of the Land Commission that Sir Charles Warren in 1879 had expressed his great pleasure at what he saw at Kuruman, and his wish that the efforts of the Society should not be hampered in any way by the too close proximity of a European population, and that, therefore, he removed his police camp to Batlaros, some nine miles to the north.

In these circumstances it might have been expected that the Land Commission would at least have sanctioned those rights which native authorities, and protracted use and exercise, had undoubtedly conferred on the London Missionary Society at Kuruman. But such has not

been the case. The claims and rights of a benevolent Society, of whose work in Bechuanaland and in South Africa most Englishmen are proud, have been whittled down by the Land Commission in a manner which, as it seems to me and to others, is at variance with justice and equity. I hear the Society was very imperfectly represented, and very thoroughly misrepresented, before the Land Commission. But I was told also, before I left Bechuanaland, that a gentleman, who was afterwards appointed a member of the Bechuanaland Land Commission, had openly declared to a resident there, on the occasion of a visit to Kuruman, that "the place was too good for natives and a mission station—it ought to be a European settlement." It would appear that this gentleman afterwards found the two other members of the Land Commission (who had not personal knowledge of the place) open to be influenced by his assertions; and the result is a formal recommendation of the Bechuanaland Land Commission that a European township should be laid out *between the source of the stream of water and the Moffat Institution and native village*, thus depriving the natives and the missionaries of that "uninterrupted use of the water" which had been secured to them, and entirely ignoring the actual exercise of ownership and authority as to this stream of water for two generations.

Now, it is a fact of which I am personally aware, that, at certain seasons of the year, the water supply at Kuruman is barely sufficient for the large area already under irrigation; and it is, I understand, the intention of the Directors of the Society further to improve their lands by the drainage of a certain part which is still under water, and producing only reeds and bulrushes. The water which now lies there will, of course, be released by this improvement; but the area itself will form a large addition to the area needing irrigation from the one source. The recommendation of the Land Commission makes some general mention of what might be accomplished by engineering and the storage of water. This is very good and true, and worthy of the consideration of a just and enlightened administration *below* the mission property and the native

gardens of the station, and *not above them, and between them and the source of the water supply.* To place a European town close to the source of the stream of water, is sure to lead to the oppression of the Educational and Industrial Institution at Kuruman and the inhabitants of the native village; and, if they resent injustice, the alternative will be litigation. This is a strange sequel, truly, to the hundreds of land grants, ratified by the same Commission, to freebooters and others, with a very different kind of record behind them in Bechuanaland as compared with the Society which commenced its elevating work among the Batlaping sixty years ago. I hear that the London Missionary Society has protested against such unexpected treatment; and I assert, without hesitation, that there is no body of unprejudiced Englishmen who would ignore its claim to the ownership of the Kuruman fountain.

While considering Stellaland claims, the Land Commission, in accordance with special instructions received from the High Commissioner, disallowed all the land claims of Groot Adriaan Delarey, "against whom," says the report, "a warrant on a charge of murder is in existence." This is the warrant, for the execution of which, in the case of Van Niekerk, Sir Charles Warren incurred the strongest displeasure of the High Commissioner. And yet, had Mr. van Niekerk been "white-washed" and not arrested by Sir Charles Warren, so must his friend and co-worker, Mr. Delarey, have been treated; and in that case, of course, he would have possessed his farms, probably worth at present several thousand pounds. Van Niekerk's advice to his freebooting friends was, that those who, like himself, preferred the Transvaal, should exchange farms, so as to secure their habitat within that calm retreat. But there were bolder spirits than Van Niekerk, who ventured to believe that the whole country would yet belong to the Transvaal; and Delarey was one of those who retained his land in what is to-day British Bechuanaland. When he fled from Stellaland to escape arrest, he of course left his land behind him. On the contrary, when Mr. van Niekerk was induced to leave the Transvaal and personally meet Sir Charles

Warren in the Protectorate, he risked nothing beyond his own person—his estates were already secured in the Transvaal. I do not know what that kind of Roman-Dutch law, which was quoted by Mr. Rhodes in the Cape Parliament in favour of freebooters, would have to say to the confiscation of a real "Dutch" burgher's private property in land, for the reason that there was a criminal warrant out for his apprehension! It is also a somewhat puzzling thing to consider that the High Commissioner himself here lays unhallowed hands on the sacred "engagement of the 8th September," and absolutely disallows certain of its express promises; for Mr. Delarey had of course acquired more than one farm. The engagement, then, can be set aside for a punitive object, but not for a remedial one; and that, too, before the man is brought to trial. Surely we must remember that "Groot Adriaan" is no ordinary freebooter; there is "his record" with that of Van Niekerk legible enough in Stellaland; and there is also his record in higher circles, for, like Mr. van Niekerk, to use the language of the Secretary of State, we have in Mr. Delarey "a person with whom Her Majesty's representatives had held friendly official relations." Like the baker and the butler of Pharaoh, Mr. van Niekerk and Mr. Delarey, up to a certain point, shared a common lot; then the most dissimilar fates awaited the modern heroes, as in the ancient story; him (Van Niekerk) the High Commissioner singled out for approval in despatches; the other (Delarey) he deprived of his land. And there has been no Joseph either to foretell or to explain action so inscrutable.

The stringent injunctions of the Secretary of State as to cases of "unfairness" and "coercion" in Stellaland, were duly communicated by the High Commissioner to the members of the Bechuanaland Land Commission. But then, on the other hand, they were bound by the instructions of the High Commissioner to uphold the agreement of Mr. Rhodes of the 8th September. The report of Sir Charles Warren's Committee, of which one of the Land Commissioners had himself been a member, was before them. The first effort of the Commission was to carry

out the recommendation of this Committee. But in their report they have to state that—

"Strenuous opposition was offered by the majority of the Stellaland farmers, who refused to give up their farms except on payment of exorbitant sums in cash; and the Commission, having no money at its disposal—having only land to offer in exchange, and deeming it inexpedient forcibly to eject farmers who had already made costly improvements—has been unable to secure more than seven farms for the natives in the above-mentioned block," with parts of two other farms which were divided by the new Transvaal boundary. In other parts of the country the Commission found themselves able to restore to Batlaping other five farms which had been included in Stellaland (4889, 30).

I do not feel inclined to underrate the ability or the right intention of the Land Commission: what was to blame was their constitution. With the instructions of the Secretary of State before them, and the weighty and unanimous recommendation of the Committee of Sir Charles Warren as to the restitution which would be necessary, the Land Commission found itself unable to go more than half-way to meet it; and they state that under their constitution and instructions they could do no more. Had the proposals of Sir Charles Warren as to the appointment of a Land Commission, made soon after he first faced the difficulties of his position in Bechuanaland, received true sympathy and encouragement from the High Commissioner, the intentions of Her Majesty's Government and of the English people would have been fulfilled in the settlement of the Bechuanaland land question under Sir Charles Warren's auspices, to which the ability and the special training of the officers under his command, as head of the Expedition, would have materially contributed. Greater satisfaction would have been given all round in Bechuanaland, and work of a higher nature would have been accomplished in that country than was possible under the Land Commission of Sir Hercules Robinson.

I was glad to find that the Land Commission had recommended that some forty or fifty farms should be granted to members of the Bechuanaland Police under certain conditions, "occupancy and improvement" being

one of them. This completed the carrying out of my proposal to the High Commissioner of June 1884, which he then totally rejected. The temptation of the lump sum of money to be obtained from the sale by auction of Crown land is usually too strong for a needy administration; and the Land Commission, apparently giving way to this feeling, does not see why Government should be deprived unnecessarily of "an important and legitimate source of revenue," and therefore recommends the usual public sales of land by auction in Bechuanaland. The leaven of the new idea, however, is working in men's minds, and the Land Commission expressly advises that Government should reserve to itself the right to dispose of land in other ways than by public auction. The advantage to a Government of an industrious population, will in a few years be far greater than the lump sum received from a speculator at a public auction of land, when the country itself remains a wilderness. Of course I do not advocate indiscriminate gifting, or even frequent gifting, but the obtaining of land on easy terms by poor but industrious and qualified settlers. It is of importance to note here the example of our Australian colonists as to land speculation. Baron von Hübner has the following remarks on the subject:—

"We can understand, therefore, why new land laws bearing on this burning question are now being debated in the Parliament of Sydney, and are coming to the front in the other colonies. The spirit in which these new laws will be framed is not open to doubt; they will tend to favour the purchasers of small lots and to hinder the formation of large landed estates."[1]

The chiefs Mankoroane and Montsioa were recommended by the Land Commission to receive £300 each per annum from the revenues of the country as an equivalent for any revenue they may have been receiving as chiefs; and in the case of Montsioa, "taking into account the establishment of a European township, and the consequent necessity for appropriating a certain extent of commonage near Mafiking, and last, not least, the unwavering loyalty and devotion of the chief Montsioa for many years to the British Crown."

[1] *Through the British Empire*, vol. i. 343.

I congratulate the Land Commission on their having placed on record the most intelligent recommendation which has yet appeared, from such a source, on the subject of native individual ownership of land in South Africa:—

"We are of opinion," they say, "that this should be steadily kept in view by the Government, with the distinct object of taking advantage of every favouring opportunity—at the request of the people or from other encouraging circumstances—to establish that system, so that at the earliest practicable period the native custom should be superseded by the better system of holding under individual right and by separate title-deed" (4889, 12).

Of course the present circumstances are perfectly suitable, for the individual native title need not be made saleable in the first instance. The Commission, however, would appear to have been misled in their view as to native ownership of land in Bechuanaland, having put forward the idea that the land belongs to the chief "as trustee for the people." It is easy for a stranger to make this mistake. If a stranger asks, What land is this? the reply will be that it is the chief's, and the chief's name will be given. If he sees a troop of cattle, and asks whose they are, he will get the same answer—they belong to the chief. If he asks, But are they really the chief's own cattle? the answer will be, No; they belong to So-and-So. And if he goes back in his questioning and refers to the lands concerning which he had inquired, he will find that they also belong to people in the tribe. The chief's name in an honorary sort of way is thus used; but the chief cannot take the troop of cattle, nor can he take the block of private gardens for his own use. They alike belong to private persons. Still, the deliverance of the Bechuanaland Land Commission as to personal titles, is a step forward towards peace, and towards the real settlement of the country on an enduring basis.

I am aware that the tendencies among certain classes in old countries is again towards communism in land. I speak only about South Africa, where the tendency is strongly from communism to individualism; and the well-doing native man will never have a fair chance till that

end is reached. Further, I would mention the paradox that your communistic man, if he left these British shores, where there is so much talk of land and so little land to talk about, and appeared in South Africa, I do not think his communistic ideas would long survive. If a farm of 3000 morgen (6000 acres) were placed at his disposal "to be his very own," he would no doubt grasp tightly his land-title, as any other landowner does! Individualism and competition are the great factors of progress in South Africa; and the Bechuanaland Land Commission has done well to keep before the view of Government the introduction among the natives, when they are quite prepared for it, of this well-tried and elevating principle.



ON THE NATA RIVER, NORTH BECHUANALAND.

CHAPTER VII

COLONISATION IN BECHUANALAND—DEPARTURE OF MILITARY—ENROLMENT OF IMPERIAL VOLUNTEERS AS IMPERIAL POLICE IN BECHUANALAND—THE TWO POLICIES

THERE was great enthusiasm in the camp in Bechuanaland, when the cable announced in June, that a lady of rank in England had expressed her willingness to provide a large sum of money, for the purpose of colonising North Bechuanaland. This took place when Khame's offer of territory had been published, and after some striking remarks had been made on the subject by Mr. Arnold White in the columns of an evening paper. It was evident to us in Bechuanaland that a movement of this kind, well directed and supported, would be most beneficial not only to the colonists but to South Africa; and we could not but admire the judgment and far-sightedness which had led this lady to take a most patriotic step. Many and, of course, fruitless conjectures were hazarded as to the fair proposer of this scheme. Mr. Arnold White was entrusted with the management of the enterprise; and soon we had the pleasure of welcoming him at the headquarters of Sir Charles Warren at Taung, a short time before Sir Charles left Bechuanaland. Mr. Arnold White proceeded into Bechuanaland as far as Vryburg, and formed the opinion that the country was unsuitable. Since that time he has succeeded in carefully selecting and placing a party of English colonists on land near King Williamstown. A local Committee of Colonial gentlemen has co-operated with Mr. White, and rendered him great assistance; and the Wolseley Settlement would

seem to have made a satisfactory commencement. Mr. Arnold White was, however, premature in his deliverance as to Bechuanaland. Or perhaps I ought to put it that a country which may not be suitable for the sort of colonist which Mr. White has in view, may be suitable for settlers of another description. It is doubtless of the greatest importance that agriculture should be more skilfully carried on than it is at present in most parts of the Colony; and skilful English settlers with a comparatively small holding, in order to succeed at all, must practise a good style of farming. If they are contented with their position, and with their prospects, the settlers of Wolseley, like the German settlers in the same district, will do much to improve the agriculture of that part of the country. But their position is not so favourable as was that of the English or Scottish settlers sixty years ago. Those early settlers got the usual large Colonial farms; these of to-day get only smaller holdings, which are indeed large farms as land is thought of in England, but small holdings as land is bestowed in South Africa. A South African farm consists usually of 3000 morgen or 6000 acres. Its holder encloses a portion near the spring or fountain,—raises his homestead, his garden, and his grain-lands there; the rest is sheep run and cattle ranch. No Dutch-speaking man thinks he has got a farm unless he occupies one of this size. Place a good English or Scottish farmer on such a farm in Bechuanaland, and after he has obtained a knowledge of local methods, he will achieve a success, and enjoy a degree of prosperity, and exercise a beneficial political influence, to which the occupant of the smaller holding will aspire in vain. In the course of time small agricultural holdings will be of greater importance; at present it is only fair to give a Scotsman, an Irishman, and an Englishman as large a farm as you grant to a Dutch-speaking applicant. Place him on such a farm, and he remains there for life, and steadily improves it. Give him a small holding only, and, in most cases, as soon as he can he will leave it for something else. Offer such a small holding to a Dutch-speaking colonist, and he will at once decline to settle on it. It is

to be hoped that another lady or gentleman, or several of them, will think of all the advantages accruing from the original idea of the lady who is now doing this good work through Mr. Arnold White, and will organise European settlements in North Bechuanaland, which would proceed on the principle of bestowing as large a farm upon a suitable European colonist as is invariably given to a Dutch-speaking applicant. In a few years, with diligence and industry, every one of those settlers on such farms would be in possession of a comfortable permanent home, and would take root as a true South African citizen.

I have already described Bechuanaland in an early part of this work. I may be now allowed to draw the reader's special attention to North Bechuanaland; and I shall give not merely my own views, but those also of other gentlemen whose names and opinions will carry conviction to the reader's mind. This is the more necessary as the unhealthiness of certain defined regions has been made to apply to the whole—this local unhealthiness being accounted for by the presence of large sheets of water in these localities. Then the "desert" character of certain other regions has also been spread over the whole, in order to mislead the public on the subject—so that no intelligent interest may be taken in it in England. Thus Bechuanaland is given out to be unhealthy as having too much water; while it is also declared to be worthless from not having enough water! And all this is brought forward to stand between Her Majesty's Government and the quiet and orderly settlement of those valuable regions: to stand between English taxpayers and a valuable country offered to them; and between English and Dutch-speaking colonists and the peaceable opening up of the country—the dreary alternative being that of filibustering. If the country were as worthless as Sir Hercules Robinson, after the visit of Sir Charles Warren to Shoshong, would have Her Majesty's Government believe it is, that would be no reason why we should not preside over and control the spread of Europeans in it. If young men are so bereft of reason as to apply in hundreds for farms in this dreadful country, the question to be considered is—Are

these farms, which are certainly vacant, and are offered to the Queen's Government, to be given out under control, or are they to be seized and distributed by filibusters before the eyes of loyal colonists, as took place in Stellaland, and has already taken place more recently in Zululand? It is shameful to discourage Her Majesty's Government from acting in behalf of the orderly and law-observing part of the population of South Africa. If the country offered by Khame and others is unsuited for Europeans, there will be the less to do for the local Commissioners of Her Majesty, and there will be the less responsibility! I have no hesitation, however, in asserting that the country still unoccupied is probably the most desirable part of all Austral Africa.

I shall first quote the testimony of Dr. Livingstone, who resided some fifteen years in Bechuanaland. As to the climate the Doctor says:—

"The whole of the country adjacent to the Desert—from Kuruman to Kolobeng or Litubaruba, and beyond up to the latitude of Lake Nghabe—is remarkable for its great salubrity of climate. Not only the natives, but Europeans whose constitution has been impaired by an Indian climate, find the tract of country indicated both healthy and restorative. . . . Cases have been known in which patients have come from the coast with complaints closely resembling, if they were not actually, those of consumption, and they have recovered by the influence of climate alone. . . . We required meat in as large quantities daily as we do in England, and no bad effects, in the way of biliousness, followed the free use of flesh, as in other hot climates. Mr. Oswell thought this climate much superior to that of Peru, as far as pleasure is concerned. It is the complete antipodes to our cold, damp English climate. The winter is perfectly dry; and as not a drop of rain falls during that period—from the beginning of May to the end of August—damp and cold are never combined. . . . You wish for an increase neither of cold nor heat; and you can sit out of doors till midnight without ever thinking of colds or rheumatism." [1]

With regard to the physical peculiarities of Bechuanaland, Dr. Livingstone makes the following interesting observations:—

"The peculiar formation of the country may explain why there is such a difference in the vegetation between the 20th and 30th parallels of latitude in South Africa and the same latitudes in Central Australia.

[1] *Missionary Travels*, p. 133.

ENCAMPED UNDER THE MOWANA (BAOBAB)—FOREST SCENE NEAR SELEKA'S, NORTH BECHUANALAND. II. 353

The want of vegetation is as true of some parts too in the centre of South America as of Australia; and the cause of the difference holds out a probability for the success of artesian wells in extensive tracts of Africa now unpeopled solely on account of the want of surface water. We may be allowed to speculate a little at least on the fact of much greater vegetation, which, from whatever source it comes, presents for South Africa prospects of future greatness which we cannot hope for in Central Australia. As the interior districts of the Cape Colony are daily becoming of higher value, offering to honest industry a fair remuneration for capital, and having a climate unequalled in salubrity for consumptive patients, I should unhesitatingly recommend any farmer at all afraid of that complaint in his family to try this Colony. With the means of education already possessed, and the onward and upward movement of the Cape population, he need entertain no apprehension of his family sinking into barbarism."[1]

In another passage, referring to the less watered parts of the country, he says:—

"The Bamangwato keep large flocks of sheep and goats at various spots on this side of the Desert, and they thrive wonderfully well wherever salt and bushes are to be found."[2]

The mowana and the mopane, the morala, and other trees are described by the Doctor as growing in these regions. With reference to Bushman-land, he says:—

"The grass here was so tall that the oxen became uneasy. We were rewarded, in latitude 18°, with a sight we had not enjoyed the year before, namely, large patches of grape-bearing vines. There they stood before my eyes; but the sight was so entirely unexpected that I stood some time gazing at the clusters of grapes with which they were loaded with no more thought of plucking than if I had been in a dream. The Bushmen know and eat them, but they are not well flavoured on account of the great astringency of the seeds. . . . The valley on the north side of Ngwa Hill is as picturesque a spot as is to be seen in this part of Africa. The open glade, surrounded by the forest trees of various hues, had a little stream meandering in the centre."[3]

Sir Charles Warren, proceeding upon the information placed at his disposal by natives and white men well acquainted with all parts of Bechuanaland, as well as upon his own observation in the country, reported to Her Majesty's Government that the country offered for English settlers was excellent land for such immigrants (4588, 12).

[1] *Missionary Travels*, p. 97. [2] *Ibid.* p. 160. [3] *Ibid.* p. 172.

Surgeon-Major Jazdowski, of Sir Charles Warren's medical staff, who accompanied the General as far as Shoshong, in an interesting report on the geological formation and general appearance of the country (4588, 95), says:—

"Many parts of the country between Molepolole and Shoshong greatly resemble the wilder parts of the north-west and central provinces of India—many of the trees, plants, and insects being of similar (sometimes of identical) species. . . . The recent epidemics in Bechuanaland (smallpox and measles) appear to have spread from the Cape Colony. Phthisis was nowhere observed, and it would appear that the climate of Northern Bechuanaland might vie with those commonly recommended for consumptive patients."

Mr. George Baden-Powell, C.M.G., M.P., accompanied Sir Charles Warren on his visit to the chief Khame at Shoshong. Having an extensive acquaintance with Australia and other colonies, this gentleman's opinion is of great value. In a report which he drew up, at Sir Charles Warren's request, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, Mr. Baden-Powell remarks:—

"The country is well suited for English emigrants, and their admission would be some return to the English taxpayer for the expenditure to which he has willingly consented, necessary to enable the Bechuanaland Expeditionary Force to re-establish Her Majesty's authority. . . . A large portion being land of high value for agricultural and pastoral purposes, and well suited not only for the South African grazing-farm system, but also for the more profitable systems adopted in Australia and elsewhere, where not only stock but crops are well cared for" (4588, 74).

I shall now present to the reader my own views on this interesting question; and I claim that a residence of sixteen years in North Bechuanaland, and about nine years in South Bechuanaland, ought to enable me to speak with some authority on the subject. And first with reference to the question of health, Bechuanaland is undoubtedly a far more healthy country than Britain itself. The climate has already been described by Livingstone; and is simply perfection, leaving nothing on that score to be suggested or desired. Of course there are diseases. Besides the usual ailments of infancy and childhood, there is the camp fever of the Dia-

mond Fields, which is unknown a few miles out of Kimberley, and occasionally a slightly contagious typhoid fever, of rather a severe kind—which I only met with once in the country, and which came by ascertained infection. It did not attack Europeans, although we were exposed to infection. The malarial fever may be said to be unknown in South Bechuanaland, and is not reckoned of any consequence till you reach the Botletle or Zouga River, north-west of Shoshong—or in the Mashona valleys, east of the Matebele country. The high-lying country of Matebeleland and the stretch between that and Shoshong are not much liable to fever. Certain low-lying parts of the Transvaal have proved fatal to the farmers, especially in very wet summers, and with their poor nursing and absolute want of medical attendance in the early years; but I have not heard of such suffering in any district of Bechuanaland till you reach the northern boundaries of the country. Not only the Zouga or Botletle, but also the banks of the Mababe, the Chobe, and the Zambesi Rivers, are liable to malaria in summer. When Bechuanaland is occupied up to these points the question of malarial fever will be a practical one; not till then.

I come now to give my own thoughts as to the capabilities of Bechuanaland as a field for colonisation. My mind reverts at once to thrifty and laborious people who are battling for dear life on some small holding in England or Scotland, and who can barely make ends meet. The hill-country farmer in Scotland is in a region where wheat will not grow at all—only oats or rye; and he may be seen in harvest-time hurrying his scarcely-ripened crop into the barn, while the snow is falling around him. Or the cottar-fisherman will explain how hard it is—with his plot of land, and fishing besides—to provide clothing and education for himself and his family. I do not think any class of men—or men of any colour—endure such hardships in South Africa. There are portions of Bechuanaland where, in my opinion, a body of some hundreds of agricultural emigrants would, like the Scottish settlers in Baviaan's river some sixty years ago, take root from the first, and make for themselves homes. If they came in considerable numbers, and accompanied by

a minister of religion, and possibly a schoolmaster, the children would not be losers by the change, while the church and schoolhouse would form that centre in South Africa with which all are familiar in Scotland, and give the people from the first a feeling of home. I would not suggest that such men should be merely agriculturists, but that, like most farmers in South Africa, they should follow both branches of farming. They would begin with some sheep or Angora goats, and a few cows. In the first instance they would have a freehold in the village with right of pasturage, and they would also have their farm itself in the neighbourhood, the size of which would depend upon its locality and capabilities. But with the milk of his stock and the produce of his land in maize, millet, and pumpkins, the farmer and his family would be from the first beyond the reach of want. Irrigation would, of course, enable him to raise wheat, and that would follow in many cases. As the cold prevented the hillside farmer from growing wheat in Scotland, so in Bechuanaland, the same man might be placed on a farm where a fountain had first to be opened up, and a dam and water-furrow made, before wheat could be grown; and there are good stock farms where wheat could be grown only by the artificial raising of water by pumping, which means expenditure of money. But what I want to show is that, in any case, the ordinary small tenant-holder would be clearly bettered by the change to Bechuanaland. He has, as we have seen, a finer climate. He can himself raise as good a house as native teachers put up.[1] With ordinary attention his stock will thrive and increase, while his maize, millet, and pumpkin field will, at any rate, surpass his patch of oats and potatoes. Of course in this country such a man has no difficulty in finding a market; his difficulty is to produce anything which he can spare to take to the market. He must, every year, devise some plan for paying his rent, as well as for purchasing clothing and groceries. To do this he probably fattens and sells one or two or more head of cattle. And so in Bechuanaland such plans can be made. There is a class in South

[1] See vol. ii. p. 252.

Africa as enterprising and persistent as the well-known Scotch pedlars. I refer to the travelling trader, or "smouse," as he is called in South African Dutch. The smouse is everywhere in South Africa, and may be said to buy everything which is for sale. He goes from farm to farm in distant parts of the country, buying farm produce in exchange for clothing, groceries, and hardware; for the trader's waggon is a magnified edition of the old pedlar's wallet as to variety, and may be said to be in reality a movable colonial store. These traders have long traversed Bechuanaland, from east to west, from north to south. The Bechuanaland emigrant, supposing no special arrangement had been made for his supplies, could always deal with them, and they would bring their wares to his neighbourhood, if not to his very door. It is, of course, well known that freshly-arrived emigrants have little or nothing for sale, and I do not minimise the difficulties and anxieties of the first years of the emigrant's life, no matter where he is. But with plenty of food, and with thriving stock and well-worked land, the industrious man would be able, by and by, to feel that his period of anxiety had passed, and he had a full hand, although it might be a rough one—the hand of honest toil, establishing a Christian and contented home in the wilderness.

My attention has been called to a graphic description of the settler's rough but satisfactory life as given in a Life of President Lincoln, now appearing in *The Century Magazine*. Describing the settlers in Illinois in 1830, the writer says:—

"They were mostly a simple, neighbourly, unambitious people, contented with their condition, living upon plain fare, and knowing not much of anything better. Luxury was, of course, unknown; even wealth, if it existed, could procure few of the comforts of refined life. But there was little or no money in circulation. Exchanges were effected by the most primitive forms of barter, and each family must rely upon itself for the means of living. The neighbours would lend a hand in building a cabin for a newcomer; after that, in most cases, he must shift for himself. Many a man coming from an old community, and imperfectly appreciating the necessities of pioneer life, has found out suddenly, on the approach of winter, that he must learn to make shoes or go barefoot. The furniture of their houses

was made with an axe from the trees of the forest. Their clothing was all made at home. The buckskin days were over to a great extent, though an occasional hunting shirt and pair of moccassins were still seen. But flax and hemp had begun to be cultivated, and as the wolves were killed off the sheep-folds increased, and garments resembling those of civilisation were spun and woven, and cut and sewed by the women of the family. When a man had a suit of jeans coloured with butternut juice, and his wife a dress of linsey, they could appear with the best at a wedding or a quilting frolic. The superfluous could not have been said to exist in a community where men made their own buttons, where women dug roots in the woods to make their tea with, where many children never saw a stick of candy until after they were grown. The only sweetmeats known were those which a skilful cook could compose from the honey plundered from the hollow oaks where the wild bees had stored it. Yet there was withal a kind of rude plenty: the woods swarmed with game, and after swine began to be raised there was the bacon and hoe-cake which any south-western farmer will say is good enough for a king. The greatest privation was the lack of steel implements. His axe was as precious to the pioneer as his sword to the knight-errant. Governor Reynolds speaks of the panic felt in his father's family when the axe was dropped into a stream. A battered piece of tin was carefully saved and smoothed and made into a grater for green corn."[1]

No country has ever been won to civilisation without the labours of such men; and their lot, I think, will be much lighter from the commencement in Bechuanaland than in many another part of the world.

I have been speaking of those who are in straits in this country, and who, I think, if transplanted to Bechuanaland, would live a happier life, while their absence would somewhat relieve the immense pressure which obtains in our island. They want a home, they want food and clothing, and wherewith to clothe and educate their children. These things I have said they can find in Bechuanaland.

But I must consider another class; I must think of my young friend with his capital in his pocket and plenty of pluck and persistence in his constitution. Do you recommend me to go to Bechuanaland for cattle-farming? I reply, first, by saying that thousands of Colonial farmers and farmers' sons from Cape Colony and from the Free States have asked for farms in Bechuanaland, many of them

[1] *The Century Magazine*, November 1886.

after personal inspection of the country. No doubt lung-sickness occasionally prevails in South African stock, as elsewhere when active measures are not taken. The wool can be deteriorated by scab and careless farming. The goats also have their diseases. I must caution my young friend that buying some breeding-stock, along with a fowling-piece and rifle, and giving a large order for cigarettes, will not ensure success as a stock-farmer or wool-grower in Bechuanaland, or, indeed, anywhere. That means hard work and close attention, especially at the outset. But if I am asked the difference between Bechuanaland and other fields, I reply once more that the climate is unequalled; the country is suited for stock-farming, and it has the unique advantage of an unlimited supply of native labour, the Bechuana men being unsurpassed as stock-herds, as they are accustomed to the work from early childhood. Instead, therefore, of driving away the natives out of a district, it is without doubt our true policy to induce them to remain in it, inasmuch as their labour is so advantageous to the European farmers. Where is my market? asks my young rancher. Where is Khame's market, and the market of his people, for ivory, feathers, cattle, and grain? Their market is at Shoshong, in competing traders' stores. Your market for large transactions would be at Kimberley, and Kimberley agencies. If you can produce what is worth buying, the Diamond Fields will soon hear of it and afford you a market; when the extensive gold fields are opened up to the north the digging population will have to be fed. And Kimberley being within little more than twenty days from England, why should not Bechuanaland meat, "tinned" at Kimberley, compete with Australian? How many miles has the Australian farmer from the interior to carry his produce before he reaches the nearest railway station? Talk about want of water in Bechuanaland; have we not heard of parts of Australia where the farmer has to load up water for his horses or bullocks,—so long is the stretch of waterless country? I cannot say to the young capitalist how much per cent per annum he will make as a farmer in Bechuanaland, but I do say the country is equal to others in which

energetic and intelligent farmers do very well indeed, and make admirable homes.

. . . . . .

In the end of May 1885 the Secretary of State telegraphed to the High Commissioner that they highly appreciated the ability and success with which Sir Charles Warren had accomplished the objects of the Expedition, but that it was absolutely necessary that the heavy expenditure connected with a considerable Force should be terminated as soon as possible.

"They would, therefore, be glad to know that the regular forces can now be dispensed with, and that armed police could be substituted for volunteers—many of whom, it is supposed, would be willing to enter the police force. Her Majesty's Government had no intention of creating a Crown Colony in Bechuanaland, but continued to wish that the Cape Colony should, if willing to do so, assume management of Protectorate without delay" (4432, 203).

Except in the mind of the High Commissioner, there was little or no prospect of annexation to the Cape Colony. It was evident, however, that Her Majesty's Government had adopted the opinion of Sir H. Robinson on this point, as also upon a certain change in the force in Bechuanaland indicated by the introduction of the word "police" as above.

In considering the question brought forward in the preceding telegram it is well to have a clear idea of the condition of the Protectorate at this time. As we have seen already, it was by the common consent of South Africa that the settlement of Bechuanaland had been left to the Imperial Government, there being no General Government in South Africa. If there had been a General South African Government, and if its settlement of a Native Territory such as Bechuanaland had been opposed by hostile bands proceeding from one of the (supposed) civilised parts of South Africa, the General Government would never have thought of charging the expense of putting down these freebooters to the native locality. It would have been a charge against the General Government, and if charged by it against any locality, it would have been recovered from the country whose inadequate local government permitted the assembling and

organising of the freebooters whose operations were the cause of expense.

In the absence of a General South African Government, the Imperial Government had undertaken the settlement of Bechuanaland. The local outlay incident to the ordinary administration of a Protectorate would soon be met by local taxation. There was no occasion in Bechuanaland itself for the continuance of military or of armed and mounted police. The Bechuana were entirely peaceful, and disposed to be industrious. Neither the Dutch-speaking nor English-speaking Stellalanders needed the presence of a large body of armed men.

It was, however, the unanimous belief at this time that a considerable armed and mounted force was still absolutely necessary in Bechuanaland; and all were agreed as to the reason for this—the hostility of Transvaal people and the uncertainty of the action of the Transvaal Government. The hostile attitude of the Transvaal had been the sole cause of the Bechuanaland Expedition. This was fully recognised by the Secretary of State (4213, 1), and he reserved to himself the right, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, to levy the cost where that cost had been created.

It was charitably hoped that the Transvaal had been taught at least one "useful lesson" by the Expedition,—that on no account would the Imperial Government consent to the extension of the western border of the Transvaal. That lesson had been presented, and had been looked at; but such a lesson could not impress the mind of Transvaal farmers in so short a time; and no one thought it had been inwardly digested, and really made a rule of conduct by the Transvaal Government and people. While, therefore, the body of armed men under Sir Charles Warren might be reduced, no responsible adviser of Her Majesty's Government thought that they should be removed. There was probably little difference of opinion even as to the amount of reduction which might safely take place. It was when they came to the methods of reducing the Force that the High Commissioner and the Special Commissioner differed in the advice which they gave to Her Majesty's Government.

The High Commissioner recommended that the Force under Sir Charles Warren should be withdrawn, and a new local Force under the High Commissioner be organised. The Imperial Expedition would depart; the Bechuanaland Armed and Mounted Police would remain in their stead. That is to say, the same men would be discharged and re-enlisted under another name and another head. The Force, as to its officers and men, was not actually changed by the plan proposed by Sir Hercules Robinson; only its management was to devolve on himself as High Commissioner. It was a proposal which appealed to those who look out for what is cheap, and to those who prefer the word "Police" to "Military Expedition" or "Field Force." The men—their arms and ammunition—even their uniform—were to be the same; but local "Bechuanaland Police" has a cheaper and more gratifying appearance than "Military Expedition" or "Regiments of Volunteers."

Of course 500 "armed and mounted police" would in reality cost very much what the men did before as "volunteers," more or less. But if some regulars had been kept in Bechuanaland, as part of our "war-footing" there, the expense would surely have been less on the whole, as fewer "police" would, in that case, have been necessary; and Bechuanaland is probably a healthier place for troops than Zululand or Natal. Such considerations may or may not have occurred to the High Commissioner and Her Majesty's Government. It was thought of supreme importance to resume the minimising policy, and to look at Bechuanaland affairs once more as if through an inverted telescope; and in this connection it would be both pleasant and even necessary that Sir Charles Warren should retire from a Protectorate out of which we were going to shrink as soon as there was a chance of our doing so.

Sir Charles Warren agreed that the Force should be reduced, but urged that its name and its character should remain unchanged, as an Imperial military force. He held that such a large and expensive body as would be necessary were never called Police except in cases where we bordered with uncivilised peoples, and where they would be a more

or less permanent institution. We had a peaceful Bechuanaland—a suspected Transvaal. The force to deal with that position of affairs was no other than an Imperial military force—composed and officered as at that time in Bechuanaland. It should be felt and understood both in England and in the Transvaal what had been the cause of the Expedition, and what was the sole reason for continued military outlay in Bechuanaland—the character and attitude of the Transvaal. Whether in Bechuanaland alone, or in Bechuanaland and Zululand, Sir Charles held that a considerable military force should be retained till the land question was settled in both these places, and till it became evident that the Government at Pretoria had a power which was felt in all parts of the Republic; and that that power was exerted for peace.

The position of Sir Charles Warren embodied a very important principle, which was obscured and liable to be lost sight of under the plan recommended by Sir Hercules Robinson. The reasons for the Bechuanaland Expedition had not been removed. The Imperial Force should remain in the country till the reasons for it no longer existed. The Transvaal was the cause of the expense to the Imperial Government —not the administration of Bechuanaland. Whensoever the Transvaal became trustworthy as a neighbour, Bechuanaland could be put on a peace footing; but it was entirely misleading to put it on a peace footing then, and call its little standing army a police force. The objection to this went even further. We all know the proverb about giving a dog a bad name. The plan of Sir Hercules Robinson gives the Bechuanaland Protectorate a bad name as to expense, when the outlay is not incurred by Bechuanaland at all, but by the Transvaal. It is of great consequence that members of Parliament in voting supplies, and leaders of public opinion, should clearly understand that the Imperial expense incurred in Bechuanaland, beyond a simple Administration and a hundred police, is not fairly a charge to be coupled with the name of that country, but to be charged in the minds of statesmen and of ratepayers against the Transvaal. The proposal of Sir Charles Warren would have left this crisp and clear before men's minds. The arrangement of Sir Hercules

Robinson completely obscures the facts, and one expects soon to hear the criticism in the House of Commons as to what a turbulent race there must be in Bechuanaland when it needs such a large force to uphold order there!

Sir Charles Warren commenced his southward journey from Mafiking on the 14th July. The natives were ill at ease when they saw the preparations for departure. "When will you return?" said the old chief Montsioa; "we have put our trust in you." A letter from Montsioa followed the General on his way south, addressed to the Queen of England! It was an earnest prayer that the Queen's Government might remain in Bechuanaland rather than that the country should be joined to the Cape Colony. I wonder if Her Gracious Majesty ever sees such epistles. That she would be influenced by them if she saw them is quite certain. At Setlagoli the General was interviewed by the chief Moshette, whose name was made so much use of by the Transvaal Deputation in pressing for more land. It appears that all Moshette's lands to the east of Kunwana have already been taken from him; and he came to represent to the General that his cattle, which had no longer grazing-ground in the Transvaal, were now all depastured in Bechuanaland, and he hoped his title to a suitable district of land would be upheld. Such is the sequel of the friendship reported by President Kruger in England to be existing between the Boers and Moshette.

Before leaving Setlagoli the General was invited to an "At Home" with Colonel the Hon. Paul Methuen and his men. After dinner in the Colonel's hut, the larder being well supplied with game, the General was asked to proceed to the open space in the centre of the station, and close to the fort, where a huge bonfire of wood was burning, and round which the men were gathered. A space had been reserved for the General and Colonel Methuen's other guests of the evening. The light of the huge fire of dry wood showed every face in a clear ruddy light. Behind were the horse-lines, with waggons and men's huts. Above us was the kopje or hill on which the fort stood. Sentries were on duty on all sides. The whole was bathed in the soft clear

moonlight of South Africa. There were, of course, a great many excellent singers among such a force as that of Methuen's Horse, and musical "reputations" had already been made in the regiment. There was, therefore, a succession of songs and recitations, with intervals for conversation. We had the old-fashioned, ever-fresh love-song, with clever burlesques of the same; we had the grave and the pathetic, very well rendered, and also the humorous and the comic. Every one spent a pleasant evening, for which the General thanked Colonel Methuen and his men.

The greatest event in the General's journey southward was his reception by the white population of Stellaland on the 23d July. A good many horsemen rode out of Vryburg several miles to meet the party of Sir Charles Warren, and escort him into Vryburg. An address was read to the Special Commissioner in Vryburg in presence of the whole male population, who were very enthusiastic. Flags and mottoes were displayed along the street; in short, the Dutch and English inhabitants showed by every means in their power their pleasure in welcoming Sir Charles Warren. A still greater surprise was in store for the Special Commissioner. On his return to Vryburg after a hasty visit to Motito, a police station on the west, under the charge of Major J. W. Harrell, and also a mission station, a deputation waited on Sir Charles and informed him that petitions were being signed throughout Stellaland having two leading ideas—the desire for the Imperial Government instead of annexation to the Cape Colony, to which they totally objected; and to secure that the settlement of the country should be left in the hands of Sir Charles Warren. There were not ten white men in all Stellaland who did not sign this petition. This document was accompanied by a letter from the Stellaland Bestuur addressed to the High Commissioner, in which reference was made to the statement of the Cape Ministry that any proposal for annexation to the Cape Colony must be accompanied by the assurance that there was no unwillingness shown to annexation by the inhabitants of the territory proposed to be annexed; and the High Commissioner was informed that it

was now clearly shown that the inhabitants of Stellaland were unanimously opposed to such annexation. The document itself asserted that the majority of those who had sent up the petition for Colonial annexation on the previous year were now included in the Transvaal, and consequently had no longer a voice as to the affairs of Bechuanaland.

This petition was the final and crushing answer to all the past misstatement—so glaring and so blameworthy—with reference to the attitude of the Stellaland people towards the Imperial Government and its officers. We hear no more of the possibility of any mistake on this subject; no one proposed the detention or the "scrutiny" of this petition from Stellaland.

But in forwarding this document the High Commissioner, instead of expressing his regret that the sentiments of a whole community had been so long misrepresented and misunderstood, led Her Majesty's Government away from the main question of interest after a veritable mare's nest. Her Majesty's Government held that by the treaties entered into with Mankoroane and Montsioa jurisdiction had been secured for Her Majesty's Government throughout South Bechuanaland. But the High Commissioner was very much exercised as to the political "situation" of Stellaland, inasmuch as Mr. Rhodes, with his sanction, had recognised the independence of Van Niekerk's Government. He had fervently hoped that Sir Charles Warren's military rule would have swept away that product of panic—the Hart River Republic in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. But Sir Charles Warren swept away nothing which he could turn to use, and the High Commissioner found the Bestuur and other local provisions which had been sanctioned by Mr. Rhodes continued by Sir Charles Warren. When this plebiscite of the Stellalanders in favour of the Imperial Government and of Sir Charles Warren came before him, the High Commissioner emphasised no point as to the gratifying ascendancy which the Imperial Government had now evidently won for itself in Bechuanaland, or the pleasure which it gave him to forward such an address from Dutch-speaking people. What delighted Sir Hercules was that,

now at length, he thought he saw a way out of the "corner" in which Mr. Rhodes and he regarded themselves as placed by their own policy. He said, therefore, in triumph:—

"I think that this petition may be taken as equivalent to an offer of the sovereignty of Stellaland (!) to Her Majesty, and in connection with the treaties already obtained from Mankoroane, Montsioa, and other chiefs, places the whole Cis-Molopo territory proposed to be annexed on the footing of a country acquired by cession" (4643, 15).

According to Her Majesty's Government, according to my own earnest striving in Bechuanaland, according to Sir Charles Warren, the land of Bechuanaland comes to us from the natives. According to Sir Hercules Robinson, it is not we who confer land in Bechuanaland upon the Stellaland farmers, it is the Stellalanders who cede land to us!

This position was never countenanced in any way by Her Majesty's Government. Although Sir Hercules omitted to mention it, the spectacle of a united white population in Stellaland, chiefly Dutch-speaking people, declaring their attachment to the Imperial Government, and their desire for its continuance in the country, was a result of the Bechuanaland Expedition which ought to be gratifying to any one who desires a speedy, amicable, and permanent settlement of South African difficulties. While one English-speaking politician after another was grimacing and jibing in the Cape Parliament against the Imperial Government, and against its officers in Bechuanaland, with the idea that cutting such capers would recommend them to the "Dutch," the Dutch and the English of Stellaland agreed to praise and thank the Government and the officers who were blamed in Capetown. Is not the lesson a plain one? The Imperial Government, being its own interpreter and speaking and acting for itself in Bechuanaland, is welcomed and desired; the Imperial Government, as misrepresented and caricatured by professional politicians in Capetown, becomes so hideous and undesirable that it is perfectly natural for the Dutch members of Parliament to say, "If, Englishmen, such are your ideas of your own Government, how can you expect us to be loyal to it?" The irresistible inference is—Let the Imperial Government continue to speak for itself in

South Africa in the management and control of Native Territories.

On the 13th August the Secretary of State informed Sir Charles Warren of the intentions of Her Majesty's Government concerning Bechuanaland. The objects of the military expedition had been successfully accomplished, and Her Majesty's Government had determined to withdraw the force under Sir Charles's command, and to substitute for it a mounted police force under the control of the High Commissioner, and there would consequently be no further occasion to employ in Bechuanaland a military officer of Sir Charles's high standing. The despatch went on to say:—

"In your memorandum of the 29th October 1884, which was approved by Her Majesty's late advisers, you stated that 'The object of this mission and expedition is to remove the filibusters from Bechuanaland, to pacificate the territory, to reinstate the natives on their lands, to take such measures as may be necessary to prevent further depredations, and finally, to hold the country until its further destination is known.' As Her Majesty's Government have now decided upon the course to be taken with regard to this country in the immediate future, the objects of your mission have been accomplished; and I have now only to acknowledge the zeal and ability with which you have discharged your important duties, and to convey to you the high appreciation of Her Majesty's Government" (4588, 119).

This is pleasantly put, and it was true. But the real explanation of the course taken was that, on the advice of Sir Hercules Robinson, Her Majesty's Government were now to give their attention to every method by which they might depreciate Bechuanaland as an Imperial possession, and belittle our interest there. Having yielded so far to the policy and representations of Sir Hercules Robinson, they thought they had no alternative but to remove Sir Charles Warren from the conduct of affairs, for in his view our interest in Bechuanaland was very great indeed, and after his visit to the north he had gone so far as to—

"Protest earnestly against any such step as immediate annexation by the Cape Colony being taken, which might in itself alter the relation of Her Majesty's Imperial officers and the land question" (4588, 120).

As a matter of fact, Sir Charles was not an officer of higher military standing than the gentleman who succeeded him, for although at this time holding the local rank of Major-General, Sir Charles did not then, and does not now, hold a higher rank in the army than that of Colonel. The reference, therefore, was probably to his standing and capacity as a Civil Administrator, and the implication was that under the proposed "Tembuland" constitution of the Protectorate there would not be scope for his energies or his abilities.

In this connection it ought to be mentioned that although the advice of Sir Hercules Robinson was followed in this matter, it was generally disapproved of both in England and at the Cape. There was a strong feeling among many in both countries that Sir Charles Warren should remain longer in South Africa; and as misunderstandings had unfortunately arisen between him and the High Commissioner, it was desired that Sir Charles should be appointed an Imperial Commissioner for native affairs outside the Cape Colony and Natal. Resolutions to this effect were adopted at a public meeting held in London on the 16th September, and were forwarded to Her Majesty's Government by Alderman Sir R. Fowler, Bart., M.P., who was chairman of the meeting. The speakers at the meeting were gentlemen who were either connected with the Cape Colony or had long interested themselves in its prosperity (4643, 54).

The removal of Sir Charles Warren from Bechuanaland at this time by Her Majesty's Government was undoubtedly a deliberate throwing away of an amount of ability, local influence, and popularity of which Governments are usually glad to avail themselves. The disagreement with the High Commissioner was a misfortune; but it had expended itself; and there was abundance of work for each officer without clashing. Granted that our object in South Africa is to further peaceful and orderly development in other native districts as well as Bechuanaland, it was advantageous to have an officer specifically in charge of this department of work, and not hampered in doing it by the local politics of a colony. The recall was therefore retrogressive—a blunder in policy.

After staying some time in Vryburg Sir Charles proceeded southward to Taung and to Bank's Drift, at which places he remained during the rest of his stay in Bechuanaland. In leaving Stellaland, Sir Charles Warren and his Expedition parted from people who had from the first appreciated their work in the country. On the other hand, there was general interest felt in those Stellalanders who had rallied round the first representative of Her Majesty's Imperial Government when he came amongst them unarmed and unsupported. Their previous history as freebooters was not forgotten, but British officers laid special stress on their submitting to Imperial authority when asked to do so —as distinguished from the open opposition of others. With a loyal population in Bechuanaland, with the disaffected cut off from the Protectorate by the Transvaal boundary-line, all felt that Sir Charles's successor would enter upon his duties under more favourable circumstances than any of his predecessors; and the large Imperial Police Force would be necessary only in case of invasion from the Transvaal.

The work of evacuation now proceeded; and quietly and without stress or jar, or apparent effort, troop after troop of the compact little army marched out of Bechuanaland. Some volunteers re-enlisted as "police"; others returned to their homes in the Colony and in England—many of them with a strong desire to return to Bechuanaland again if that should be possible.

The new Bechuanaland Police were speedily enrolled under the leadership of Colonel Carrington of the 2d Mounted Rifles, who was recommended to the High Commissioner by the General Commanding in South Africa and by Sir Charles Warren. The old Bechuanaland Police, under Major Lowe, were disbanded, but any men who chose to enlist under the new conditions were welcome to do so, and nearly all came forward under their commander, Major Lowe, who remained in Bechuanaland. Before we left Taung, Colonel Carrington had arrived with Captain Goold Adams (Royal Scots) and other officers and men, who were to take over the duties from the retiring force. Colonel

Carrington for a short time acted also as Administrator, pending Mr. Shippard's arrival from the Colony.

With the departure of Sir Charles Warren there was some tendency to "crow" on the part of the Transvaal borderers, who had now been for a long time—as they no doubt thought—on their good behaviour. Meeting two of Mankoroane's men on a public road in that part of the country which had been recently added to the Transvaal, the Transvaal burgher force flogged the men and took their pack-ox from them, because they were in the Transvaal without a pass. At Colonel Carrington's request, Major Lowe addressed the officer in charge of the Transvaal police, remonstrating with him on such conduct while as yet the boundary-line was not clearly marked off, and demanding back the ox. Colonel Carrington also informed the High Commissioner of this act of violence, and the latter addressed the President at Pretoria, who replied that he had "never heard of this flogging, but would inquire." In the meantime the local officer of the Transvaal police, in reply to Major Lowe's letter, apologised for the action of his men, who, he said, had been severely punished; and gave assurances that such conduct would not be repeated. A Cape paper, which had given itself to writing down the actions of Sir Charles Warren after Mr. Rhodes's departure, incautiously denied the truth of the first telegram, which announced the outrage on these men; and asserted that the story was evidently got up by the friends of Sir Charles Warren. I am not aware that any after acknowledgment was made in its columns of the promptness with which Colonel Carrington and Major Lowe acted in this matter; and the intelligent conduct of the officer of the Transvaal police. It was a good beginning on the part of the new Administration.

The duties of the Bechuanaland Imperial Police have not been onerous, as the Transvaal has respected its western boundary-line ever since the arrival of the Bechuanaland Expedition. They would not have done so but for the continued presence of the Imperial Police—hence the necessity for the latter in the country. This sober view of their

value and work does not seem to have sufficed in the minds of the authorities at the Cape. Something must be reported as having been accomplished by the Imperial Police. Luckily for those cherishing this ambition, an officer, formerly in Her Majesty's army and latterly holding a commission in Methuen's Horse, along with one or two Colonists, contractors, and others, resolved that they would form a pioneer settlement in North Bechuanaland. Some of these men had already lodged requests for farms with the officer appointed by Sir Charles Warren to receive them—the presumption being that they meant to occupy them, as that was an understood condition. It would appear from the Bluebooks that these men drew up a prospectus—a copy of which they submitted to the Acting Administrator, who in turn forwarded it to the authorities at Capetown. Of course a single word could have stopped the project at this time, had that been thought desirable; but the word was not spoken, and the expedition left Vryburg without let or hindrance on the part of the local Government. When the time was ripe, however, telegrams were received from the Cape—the Imperial Police were despatched after their former officer and his friends—arrests were made at Molepolole—and the Protectorate was saved! No doubt the project of these men was an ill-conceived one. But when the arrests were made at Molepolole, it would be difficult to say who were the more ridiculous—the four Englishmen who were arrested for embarking in an ill-judged colonisation scheme, of which, however, they had made no secret, and which was only now pronounced to be dangerous; or the Imperial Police, whose officers had been fully informed of that scheme from the first, and had neither disapproved of it nor forbidden it, but who were now ordered to pursue and arrest the "colonisers" after they had travelled more than a hundred miles.

I ask the reader to turn to the map and fix his eye on the Molopo River, and then on the country lying to the north of it. He will then be able to appreciate the wisdom of our present Imperial attitude, adopted by the advice of Sir Hercules Robinson. On the 5th July 1885 the High Commissioner informed the Secretary of State that—

"As to the country north of the Molopo River, which was only taken under British protection in March last, it appears to me that we have no interest in it except as a road to the interior" (4588, 116).

This declaration was received in London on the 5th August. On the 13th of that month the Secretary of State replied to the High Commissioner:—

"The interest of this country in the territory north of the Molopo is very limited" (4588, 118).

I have given the dates in order that the reader may discover who pitched the tune of this harmonious statement. Sir Hercules Robinson has the merit, as Chief Representative of Her Majesty in South Africa, of advising Her Majesty's Government that we have no interest in the country north of the Molopo River—no interest in that splendid country which a few years hence will be, in every one's estimation, the most valuable portion of South Africa. Such a statement is inexplicable, as coming from the eyes and ears and judgment of an experienced public officer, to whom have been committed the protection and upholding of the interests and rights of Her Majesty's subjects in Southern Africa. It is a declaration which makes one ashamed. I again beg the reader to turn to the map and look at the source and the course of the Molopo River and ask himself the question—Why do our interests extend just up to that river and yet do not cross it? As to the country north and south of that river, the more beautiful and the more valuable is to the north and not to the south of the Molopo. Look at the map and you will see that political vantage in South Africa necessarily includes possession of the territory to the Zambesi, which is a natural boundary of the Southern Dominion. Does the separated and unhappy condition of South Africa need a unifying power which shall at the same time be an elevating and helpful one? England is that power, and the control of the occupation of the vast regions of the north is her great and useful work in the doing of which all South Africa will gather round her. Is any class of Englishmen of opinion that the offer to them direct—through the Imperial Government—of thousands of square miles of valuable unoccupied territory is of "no interest" to

them? It is of the utmost interest, as I have shown elsewhere; and I expect that Englishmen will soon make this known.

There is, of course, the ridiculous aspect of this official statement concerning the little-known Molopo River, that it is the limit of the interest and the influence of England; and it is this aspect of the subject which has struck a friend of mine more than the serious view which I have endeavoured to unfold. He sends me some verses, which he says have been suggested to him by the telegrams in the Bluebook, which I have just quoted. My friend thinks highly of his rhymes, and declares they will enhance the value of my book if I will only give them a place in it. I do not quite agree in this estimate of their value; but as they are amusing, I present them to the reader, "without alteration," as the rhymester requests:—

CABLES OF RHYME.

1. From the Cape.

Important Statement as to Geography, Natural History, and Policy.

Molopo's our utmost limit,
Further north we dare not go;
Terram terribilem, I deem it—
Full of antelopes, you know.

2. From Downing Street, after visit to Berlin.

An Imperial Protectorate Assumed.

We've promised to protect the niggers[1]
Up to and beyond Shoshong;[2]
Control the settlers and gold-diggers;
Help the weak, and guide the strong.

3. From the Cape.

Novel Method of an Imperial Protectorate.

I'll buy a broom, and stand opposing
The European north-bound wave;[3]
Settlers stopping, highway closing—
Surely that will trouble save.

[1] Very colloquial expression. In official documents not in rhyme, it is always "natives," "native races."

[2] Shoshong is at least 200 miles north of Molopo, our "utmost limit."

[3] "The white people are at present kept out of the Protectorate."—*Report of Colonel Carrington of the Bechuanaland Police* (4839, 75).

4. From Downing Street.

Troubled by New Facts. No Department for them. Therefore they are of no Consequence.

We hear of land for landless legions :
  We hear of cotton, rice, and tea—[1]
And gold of Ophir : all in regions
  Too far north. Don't you agree ?

5. From the Cape.

Cordially Concurring.

Agree ? I do, divine Saint Downing ;
  Single is my eye, you know,
To keep you smiling—never frowning,
  South or north of Molopo.

6. From Ditto.

Confidential.

English interests reach Zambesi,
  Let me in a whisper say ;
But wire your wishes—'twill be easy
  To give reasons either way.

[1] Travellers say nothing of "tea" in those beautiful northern regions. As in the case of the rude word "nigger," it was probably my friend's rhyme that needed "tea" here. Tea, however, grows well in Natal, and will no doubt flourish on the hill-slopes of Mashonaland. Iron is already worked there, and is abundant ; but, then, it has a syllable more than tea. My kind friend must excuse me for these criticisms and corrections, but something is due to the gravity and dignity of official intercourse ; and for my own part, I had rather have prose with fact than verse with ——. "Don't you agree ?"

CHAPTER VIII

HOMEWARD BOUND—SIR CHARLES WARREN IN THE FREE STATE AND THE CAPE COLONY

As the time approached for his departure from Bechuanaland, Sir Charles Warren was visited by a great many friends of every nationality. People from Griqualand West, from the Free State and the Transvaal, as well as from the western parts of Bechuanaland, came to pay their respects, and in every case to express their regret at his departure. The changeableness of the Imperial Government was the great subject of complaint. "Let the Force leave, but let Sir Charles remain." It is, however, an officer's duty to speak well of his Government and of those who are to succeed him; and those who were departing from Bechuanaland exerted themselves on every occasion, so far as I am aware, to bespeak a kind reception for Mr. Shippard and the officers who were to work with him.

At length, towards the end of August, I saw the old red coach inspanned for the last time at Bank's Drift; the General was leaving Bechuanaland, and before proceeding into the Colony was to pay his long-promised visit to his friend, President Sir John Brand, of the Free State, at Bloemfontein. The friends and companions of the last seven months were now to separate. Some accompanied the General—others were ordered southward to Barkly West. I turned my horse's head in the direction of Kuruman, where I had left my family, after completing my tour of Bechuanaland as Deputy Commissioner, more than a year before. Like those friends from whom I parted at

Bank's Drift, I was also bound for England; but it was not likely that I should be able to "travel down through the Colony" with them, or "go home together in the steamer," as was very cheerily proposed.

The visit of Sir Charles Warren to Sir John Brand at Bloemfontein was attended with the most pleasant incidents, including a heavy fall of rain, at which no one grumbles or expresses impatience in South Africa; rather does each one congratulate himself and his neighbours on the fall of "de lieve regen." Nothing could exceed the kindness of the President and his family to Sir Charles and the officers who accompanied him, or the warmth of the welcome of the Free State people. There were festivities, public-speaking, and addresses from the inhabitants of Bloemfontein. Said the burgesses of the capital of the Free State:—

"We take advantage of the present opportunity to congratulate you on the termination of your late labours in Bechuanaland, the effects of which all South Africa hope will be the inauguration of a long and prosperous career for that large but as yet undeveloped country.

"The general interests of the various states and colonies of South Africa are so intimately associated and intertwined—the progress or non-progress of one reacting on the whole group—that the anticipated prosperity of the adjoining territory of Bechuanaland must be to them very naturally a subject of considerable interest and satisfaction."

In his reply, Sir Charles concurred in the remark that the various colonies and states were bound together by common interests. Referring to the Free State farmers who were now living in Bechuanaland, and others who had visited him there, Sir Charles said:—

"I have received great support from them in the cause of law and order, and they have expressed a great desire to render me all the assistance in their power, for which I thank them sincerely. In conclusion, I beg to state how striking are the improvements that have been made in this city since I was last here; and permit me to add my sincere wishes for its future prosperity and that of the Orange Free State, and my congratulation on the recent timely rains."

The next address presented to Sir Charles Warren was from the inhabitants of the Colonial village of Barkly West. It was signed by the Rev. W. E. Hunter and by Mr. J.

Melvill Dutoit, the Chairman of the Village Board, and contained expressions of warm approbation of what had been accomplished in Bechuanaland. The address went on to say:—

"We take this opportunity of bearing testimony to the orderly conduct of the troops composing the Expedition, both when passing through the town and when stationed here."

Sir Charles, in reply, referred to this passage in the address, and said he was much gratified to receive this additional testimony to the discipline and orderly conduct of the troops under his command, which had contributed so much to the peaceful settlement of affairs.

Several addresses were delivered to Sir Charles Warren when he reached the Diamond Fields, in which he was warmly congratulated on the "bloodless victory" which he had achieved, and which would tell so much to the advantage of the whole country. The following sentences occur in the addresses from Beaconsfield, and Dutoit's Pan, and from Kimberley:—

"We further desire to record our loyal thanks to Her Majesty's Government, who despatched the Expedition, and our warm appreciation of the enthusiasm with which our fellow-subjects, the people of the British Isles, supported the action of Her Majesty and her advisers; and of that new Imperial policy towards the Colonies, which will, we are assured, be fruitful of the most brilliant results to the British Empire. It is with warm admiration that we have observed your firmness and politic conduct of an Expedition, by which a bloodless victory has been achieved over lawlessness and violence that will be of benefit to South Africa for all time to come."

"To the full development of this policy in future we anxiously look forward as the means by which British supremacy may be maintained, and the blessings of commerce and civilisation be carried to far distant tribes, as well as the opening up of extensive fields for immigrants from the over-crowded countries of the Old World."

"The prospect of the establishment of a Crown Colony in Bechuanaland, and the possibility that at no distant day a Protectorate will be declared extending far into the interior of South Africa, is, we consider, entirely due to the faithful carrying out by you of that generous and beneficent policy that has always marked the dealings of the Home Government with South Africa."

"We rejoice that Her Majesty's Ministers have been pleased to acknowledge in no half-hearted manner the excellent and delicate services your Excellency has rendered, without spilling one drop of

blood; that the press of England is universal in support of your Excellency's policy, while the press of South Africa, with two exceptions, has also been throughout in accord."

If Sir Charles Warren had visited all the Colonial towns from which he had warm invitations, his journey would have taken a long time indeed. When he had selected his route the people who found that their district was not to be visited sent letters, addresses, or deputations, to wait on the General at some point on the route which he had chosen. Thus at Cradock an address was received from Middleburg, as well as from the people of Cradock; and in a similar manner addresses from Graaff-Reinet, Somerset East, Uitenhage, Bedford, King Williamstown, and Aberdeen were received and acknowledged by Sir Charles Warren, although he did not visit any of those places. The following words were addressed to Sir Charles by a deputation from the farming district of Middleburg when presenting the address from that district:—

"Had there been more time, and had it been more generally known that you would be visiting this part, no doubt many other addresses from the Middleburg district would have been presented to you to-day, for all loyal colonists appreciate your conduct as a general and as a statesman. (Cheers.) When you came to the Colony a few months ago it was in a very unsettled state, the atmosphere of South Africa was weighted with intrigue and rebellion. Your foresight as a general has tided over and avoided coming to blows. There is more credit due to you for the peaceful solution of our troubles than if you had obtained a great victory with the loss of thousands of lives on both sides. (Great applause.) Your success has inspired not only respect from the Colony and surrounding states, but you have gained the hearts and goodwill of the very people whom you went to reduce to order. (Applause.) And also you have gained the esteem of the different tribes up to the Zambesi. You have opened up a trade route to the interior which is worth many millions to the mercantile community of England."

The visit of Sir Charles Warren to Grahamstown was accompanied by demonstrations of enthusiastic welcome on the part of the whole population. The day was observed as a general holiday—all stores being closed. A promenade concert was given in the gardens by the volunteer band, and a banquet in the evening. In the afternoon of the following

day Sir Charles was "at home" at Bishopsbourne, and in the evening a conversazione was given in Grahamstown. I give the following sentences from the address to Sir Charles presented by the Mayor, Town Council, and inhabitants of Grahamstown :—

"We would express our gratitude for the wise and firm policy which the Imperial Government has adopted in asserting its authority over Bechuanaland, and in forming the Protectorate into a Crown Colony, under which form of rule we are of opinion it should remain at least for some years to come, and we would record our conviction that the steps thus taken will tend to the prosperity and peace of South Africa, and the wide extension of British commerce and influence into the interior.

"In conclusion, we feel that we cannot too highly applaud the firm yet conciliatory character of the conduct of your administration in Bechuanaland. We recognise that its success has been rendered exceptionally difficult through the persistent and embarrassing opposition that has been offered in many quarters to your important undertaking ; and whilst regretting your departure from these shores, we trust it may be the pleasure of our gracious Sovereign to avail herself of your great ability and experience in other departments of the public service in South Africa."

In his reply Sir Charles described the uneasy and hostile feeling which so extensively prevailed when the Expedition arrived :—

"It was not long, however, before these views changed, and many of the people gave me the reasons why. They had been told that the Expedition was an avenging one ; they had been told we were coming up bent on rapine and slaughter ; they had been told we should leave as quickly as we came, if we ever lived to get up there. Soon they learned for themselves the facts of the case. They ascertained that the object of our mission was the peace of the territory, while at the same time we were prepared for all emergencies. Those who had independently persisted in their loyalty against all odds gave us active assistance. Those who had repressed their loyalty for fear of being left in the lurch, soon were enabled to speak out their sentiments. Those of a different nature, who were ready to resist, gave in their adhesion when they found we only wished to do justice.

"The Dutch in this country are of the same old stock as the English, and most of us glory in the fact that we can be led but cannot be driven. The same 'game' spirit of independence exists in each true-hearted man, whether of Dutch or English or German extraction. True hearts abound in this land, and I am proud to say that many men who commenced by offering opposition, have not been ashamed to review the circumstances regarding facts, and have become fast friends

and supporters. To the excellent conduct, discipline, and soldierlike spirit of the troops composing the Field Force, I attribute in a great measure the alteration of sentiment evinced in the territory. Nothing could exceed the excellent spirit shown by all our soldiers, whether of the regular or irregular forces ;—particularly am I indebted to those who were recruited in these parts, and who formed some of the finest bodies of men ever raised in South Africa."

At the banquet in Grahamstown the following words were uttered by one of the leading citizens, and fairly represented the views of the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony :—

"Sir Charles had successfully accomplished his work, and that without any support either from the Colonial Ministry or the High Commissioner. (Cheers.) No good Governor had been sent here who had not been opposed by wire-pullers until he was recalled, before the good he was doing for the Colony and for the honour of England was fully accomplished. So it had been with Sir Charles Warren. But what he had done would, he hoped, stimulate the Imperial Government to send him out to settle the affairs of Zululand. If they were wise, they would, instead of recalling him, send him there. Had he been the Governor of Natal, he did not think there would have been a Majuba Hill or Laing's Nek. He was recalled now, through the influence of wire-pullers, before his work was fully accomplished."

At Port Elizabeth the same enthusiastic round of welcome awaited Sir Charles Warren. The town was decorated in the gayest manner; and even Port Elizabeth closed its warehouses at noon on the 17th September for the reception of Sir Charles Warren. In this important town party differences were entirely sunk. Foresters, Oddfellows, St. Patrick's, and other societies, turned out in full regalia. Thus escorted into the town, the Special Commissioner for Bechuanaland was met at the Town Hall by the Mayor of the town (Mr. H. W. Pearson). Mr. Albert Lehmann read the address. Sir Charles dined at the club that evening; afterwards there was a torchlight procession. Next day the town was still *en fête*. The public luncheon was largely attended and very enthusiastic—the balcony being crowded with ladies. In the evening there was a promenade concert in the Drill Hall. The recent pleasant experiences of the General, and the officers accompanying him, were not without a certain embarrassment; as Captain Trotter remarked at the public luncheon in the magnificent Town Hall, in returning thanks for the

army, navy, and volunteers, "He could not be expected to say much in replying to the same toast for the fourth time in one week." The following concise but comprehensive address was "signed by about 1800 inhabitants of Port Elizabeth":—

"We, the undersigned, residents of Port Elizabeth, desire to welcome you in our midst after your successful, though happily bloodless, campaign in Bechuanaland. The peaceful termination of your mission, we do not hesitate to say, is due to the firm and vigorous manner in which you proceeded to carry out the work entrusted to you. Any weakness or vacillation on your part, in the critical state of affairs and opinions which prevailed in the country on your arrival, might have led to serious troubles; and we earnestly hope that the policy inaugurated by you will be maintained with equal consistency and firmness by your successors, so that there may be no recurrence of the lawlessness which your arrival in Bechuanaland put an end to. We should have rejoiced to know that to your hands were entrusted the care and settlement of the new Colony which, under proper management, we feel assured will become a prosperous and important section of the British Empire; but as Her Majesty's Government consider that an officer of your standing is not required for the position, we can only hope that you will find elsewhere a field where your great abilities can be usefully and beneficially employed. Wishing you continued success in your career, which we shall watch with deep interest."

The natives residing at Port Elizabeth also presented a separate address to Sir Charles through one of their number, Mr. Makwena. It was signed by 46 natives, who were, however, the representatives of about 1000 others. Sir Charles specially requested that the original of the address should be given to him. The following sentence shows the tenor of the address:—

"We can assure your Honour that this event (the coming of the Expedition) will never be forgotten by the natives, and that Her Majesty's Government will, by noble acts of this kind, gain a host of faithful adherents and loyal followers not to be repented of."

The following remarks of Sir Charles Warren are worthy of attention, as having been addressed to so influential a community as that of Port Elizabeth concerning the value of Bechuanaland:—

"It is a great pleasure to find that the native races to whom Her Majesty has extended protection are a people for whom one can have respect and esteem, a people in many respects advanced in civilisation,

in some cases as well-educated as white people; a people whose many good qualities are the theme of favourable comparison from those who have lived in the East Indies.

"I can speak most highly of the Bechuanaland tribes. They have constitutional government among themselves, and are ready, if properly handled, to form a valuable addition to the subjects of Her Majesty. They are very industrious, and have hitherto been able to grow large crops of Kaffir corn and mealies for the supply of other markets. It seems to me for the benefit of South Africa that these extended gardens should continue to be worked, and should not be turned into cattle runs in a country where breadstuffs are scarcely yet matters of export, and where there are vast extents of land which can be used for cattle, and which as yet are not occupied by anything but game.

"The future trade route into the interior of South Africa from a southerly direction depends very much upon the manner in which the affairs of Bechuanaland are arranged. If faith is kept to native tribes, and they continue to exist in peace and prosperity, while selected settlers are allowed to occupy the lands offered to them, all difficulties in the future may vanish, and the trade with the interior may be connected with this and other seaports of the south; but if, on the other hand, filibusters are permitted to return and harass the natives, the country will revert to an unsettled state again, and the trade route of the future will be drawn in the direction of other ports than those of the Cape Colony."

The Mayor of Port Elizabeth, referring to the Colonial Volunteers, said:—

"Their motto as volunteers was 'Ready, aye ready.' They knew that the volunteers of this Colony were ever ready to do their duty in the field, for the honour of England and their Queen. They were willing to render active service and dangerous service, to lay down their lives, and, if necessary, to sacrifice everything in the world for their country. (Cheers.) He trusted it would be a long time before they would be called upon again, but if they unhappily ever were, he felt sure they would be found ready. (Cheers.)"

The following sentences occur in the speech in which Mr. W. Hume proposed the health of Sir Charles Warren:—

"Our object is to show people in England that we consider it an unwise measure to remove Sir Charles from South Africa—(cheers)—that our opinion is identical with that of the meeting of Cape merchants held yesterday in London under the presidency of the Lord Mayor, and to express the earnest hope that the English Government will not agree to any settlement of Bechuanaland affairs that does not meet with the approval of General Warren. (Cheers.) Other things have been done and said to throw discredit upon Sir Charles Warren's

administration of affairs. It had been said that his proceedings stirred up feelings of race hatred. Is that so? (Cries of 'No.') The answer, I think, will be found in the splendid reception given to Sir Charles in a neighbouring Dutch state, when everybody, from the head of the State downwards, accorded him a hearty welcome. We find also that addresses have been sent to him from such districts as Cradock, Middleburg, and Graaff-Reinet, and we know that among the respectable Dutch farmers in the neighbouring republics Sir Charles is held in the highest honour. Let any one compare the present state of feeling between English and Dutch with what it was only a year ago, and then he will find what little truth there is in this allegation. Sir Charles has also been blamed for taking Mr. Mackenzie into his counsels. When I remember the enthusiastic reception you gave Mr. Mackenzie in this hall, I feel sure that you do not blame Sir Charles Warren for that. (Cheers.)"

Sir Charles and party sailed from Port Elizabeth on the 19th September. The jetty was decorated, and a large crowd assembled. The Mayor and a deputation of leading citizens completed their perfect hospitality by "seeing Sir Charles off." The General called on his little party, in acknowledgment of the great kindness of the Mayor and people, to give them three cheers at parting, while the volunteer band struck up "Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot."

When Sir Charles Warren reached Capetown he found that, if that were possible, the friendliness and the enthusiasm which had been expressed elsewhere were to be outdone by the reception awaiting him under the shadow of Table Mountain. Some months before, when other Colonial centres of influence had held meetings expressing confidence in Sir Charles, and their sympathy with him in the difficult circumstances under which he was carrying on his work in Bechuanaland, friends wrote from the Cape explaining that no meeting would be held in Capetown. Praise of the Special Commissioner, or confidence in his policy, was, it was said, regarded as so much censure in another high quarter; and in these unhappy circumstances the citizens contented themselves at that time with silence, having no wish to give offence where it could be avoided. But it was universally agreed that as Capetown had welcomed Sir Charles to Africa, when all his difficulties were before him, so now the capital of the country would, with equal

enthusiasm and sincerity, tender him its thanks for work accomplished, and bid him God-speed on his return to England. The "wet-blanket," which sometimes rests on Table Mountain, found its way into the Committee-Room, where the gentlemen were assembled to consider what was to be done in the way of a parting tribute to Sir Charles Warren.

"Well, of course, we shall have an address: that is the orthodox thing, you know, and will be quite sufficient. A well drawn-up and dignified address will be just the thing for Capetown."

"Now, look here, ——," was the sharp rejoinder, in which evidently all the gentlemen present agreed, "we are not going to be content with an address. We shall give adequate utterance to the opinion and the enthusiasm of Capetown, and we oppose no one else in what we are doing to honour Sir Charles Warren. We shall be glad of your help, but it must be in full sympathy with the strong feelings of the town, or we had rather be without it."

The wet blanket disappeared from the Committee meetings at Capetown.

The Reception Committee at Capetown had only a short time for preparation at the last, and only a brief period before the departure of the mail steamer to England, in which to transact all they had determined on. Long before the steamer appeared in sight from Port Elizabeth, a crowd had collected at the quay, while a still larger mass of people was steadily gathering at the Exchange. Flags and suitable mottoes, such as "Well done," were displayed along the line of procession to the castle, where Sir Charles was the guest of Sir Leicester Smyth, the General Commanding in South Africa. Sir Charles's carriage was unharnessed and ropes attached, by which the crowd pulled it to the Commercial Exchange. The first address was presented to Sir Charles by the Hon. A. Ebden, M.L.C., the gentleman who had tendered to Sir Charles the welcome of the Colony on his arrival. He said that—

"It would be sheer affectation for them to conceal that there had been differences of opinion as to the way in which Sir Charles had carried out the policy entrusted to him by the British Government.

But it was sufficient for them to feel satisfied in their own minds that he had discharged that duty—that he had accomplished his mission with honour to himself and to the advantage of the country."

In the evening there was a torchlight procession and the presentation of two addresses—the first (read by Mr. Short) being from the young men of Capetown and neighbourhood, connected with the Literary and Debating Societies; and the second from a number of Capetown gentlemen and the neighbourhood, who desired to present to Sir Charles some substantial token of their esteem and confidence. The "stoep" or piazza of the old Town Hall, where the ceremony took place, presented a very striking appearance. The torches were thrown into a heap and made a brilliant bonfire, lighting up the whole square. The Town House was further illuminated with lanterns and lamps, and festooned with flags. Mr. T. E. Fuller, M.L.A., who made the presentation of a shield to Sir Charles and an album for Lady Warren, in the course of his speech said:—

"Nothing can be more fatal to the interests of this Colony than that territories should be extended by lawlessness. If territory is to be extended—as it will be—let it be extended by the ordered march of civilisation and progress. And because we believe that these interests have been carefully guarded, in the name of the Colony we ask your acceptance of the shield. And we ask you to accept it because from first to last in this business we believe that you have maintained the stainless honour of an English gentleman. Whatever may be the opinion on the individual acts of Sir Charles Warren, note this, ladies and gentlemen, that those who doubted him when he advanced have trusted him when he returned; and that because they learned to know that his word was his bond and his law. Sir Charles Warren, whatever may be the value of the gift which we ask you to accept, you will always keep it and regard it as a lasting token that your labour, the honour of your character, and your work in South Africa will ever be remembered. An address accompanies the shield, but I shall not read it now. I can only assure Sir Charles Warren that it is full—brimful of those hearty expressions which he has already heard."

Sir Charles Warren, in reply, said:—

"Mr. Fuller, ladies and gentlemen—I can assure you that I most deeply appreciate this mark of affection and esteem. I have been so intimately acquainted with the people of South Africa during the past few years, in so many ways, that I have learned to identify myself with your feeling, and I feel myself as much at home in this country as I

do in the Old Country. (Cheers.) When I returned home in 1879, I felt deeply concerned in regard to this country, but I put over the chimney-piece in my study the motto of President Brand, 'Alles zal recht komen.' I often pointed out this to my friends, and said, 'I don't know how it will come, but I am sure it will all come right in time.' The first ray of light shed upon the subject, as far as I was concerned,—the first time I had any hopes of matters coming round,—was when the Rev. John Mackenzie came home to England. I say it was in a great measure due to his exertions at that time that we have peace at the present time. As matters went on, and when I was ready to come out here, I told my friends at home—and I have recently been reminded of it by one of the general officers in England—that I believed we should carry this work out without bloodshed. And it is a matter of the greatest moment to me to feel that I have the sympathy of the whole people with me, and that we have carried this work to a conclusion not only without bloodshed, but with the result, as far as I can see, of uniting the people together. I thoroughly appreciate the manner in which you have received me, and I thoroughly understand that in receiving me in this way it is your expression of thankfulness to the Old Country for having come forward and assisted you in time of emergency. I again thank you most heartily for this mark of your affection and esteem."

The following paragraphs are taken from the different addresses:—

"We, the undersigned residents of Capetown and its neighbourhood, beg most heartily to welcome you on your return from Bechuanaland, and on the completion of the arduous duties with which you have been entrusted in asserting British supremacy in Bechuanaland."

"We entertain no doubt that the Expedition you have commanded has been and will be fruitful of good to the whole of South Africa, and that, to no small extent, in consequence of your own courageous determination to discourage lawlessness and uphold British authority.

"We have noted with pleasure the growing confidence which a firm and just rule has inspired in the Bechuanaland settlers of all nationalities."

"It is a matter of the highest satisfaction to us that the settlement of Bechuanaland under direct Imperial control has been peacefully effected, at the earnest desire and solicitation of its inhabitants, and with the cordial approval of the majority of Cape Colonists of every nationality."

"We trust that the reception accorded to you on your journey northward by the native chiefs and peoples may lead to the peaceful extension of British rule over territories still more distant—an extension which, under the direction of a firm and unwavering policy, will conduce to the best interests of South Africa and the mother country."

In the replies of Sir Charles to these addresses, there occur the following passages:—

"I well recollect the enthusiasm with which I and my staff were received on landing here about ten months ago, and I know it was not merely because the General and staff of an Expedition had landed —it was because the peace of South Africa dangled in the balance— because you were all aware, though all did not acknowledge, the critical condition of affairs; because you were rejoiced that the Old Country had come to the rescue, and was determined, with your assistance, to restore order in the land.

"I recognise the gathering to-day as of a different character; the work has been done, peace has been restored, you desire now to record your gratification that this has been accomplished without bloodshed, and that the results are likely to assist in uniting races in this country."

"You have been pleased to say that it is not necessary you should offer an opinion as to differences on points of policy, or approval of every act of an administration beset with difficulties.

"It would, to me, appear unnatural to suppose so large a body of the people could agree in every point of action, unaware as you are, for the most part, of the facts concerning them. It is sufficient for me to know that you see and recognise the results—but let me say that I think hereafter it will be acknowledged that the points on which you may not now agree are those on which the success of the Expedition most depended, and which I would not withdraw from had I the power to do so. I feel that I have your sympathy when I say that I have worked without regard to expediencies, and with a desire to maintain right, honour, and justice.

"I am well aware that it is the conviction among many among you that these are the principles after which I have been striving, however imperfectly I may have acted up to them; and it is this bond of union between us which has brought so many of the people of South Africa, of all classes, creeds, and races, to express so favourable an opinion as to our work, as they know that a peace built upon such foundations has a good prospect of enduring."

The "culminating point" in the celebrations in honour of Sir Charles Warren in Capetown was the luncheon given to him in the Exchange buildings. The chair was occupied by the Hon. R. Southey, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of Griqualand West. "The health of the Governor" (who was not present) was proposed by Mr. Fuller, M.L.A., who spoke highly of his action in upholding the Convention of London:—

"In fact, we owe the Bechuanaland Expedition to the Governor of the Colony, and we believe that the Expedition has been a splendid success,

the more gratifying as it has been unaccompanied by bloodshed. There were all sorts of stories afloat that Sir Charles Warren had gone up to Bechuanaland to provoke a war with the Transvaal. Sir Charles Warren has given the lie to that accusation. At any moment he might have provoked war with the Transvaal; nothing seems to me clearer than that. But he went to put down disorder and lawlessness, and above all, he went to declare in the face of South Africa that the Imperial Government would hold her own in this country. Differences on matters of administration have arisen; but we desire to put these differences aside in drinking the health of the Governor, bearing in mind the signal services which he has rendered to this Colony."

The Hon. R. Southey, in proposing the health of their guest, said:—

"There are many of us, and there are many in this country, who expected that if an Expedition such as went to Bechuanaland were sent up there, there would certainly be a war of races, bloodshed, and no end of troubles. It is quite possible that such events might have happened if the work had been entrusted to inexperienced or injudicious hands. A young Cape gentleman said to me last year when I was in Edinburgh, that if an Expedition were sent out to go up to Bechuanaland, they would never get beyond the town of Wellington. (Laughter.) I did not argue the point with him,—I simply smiled. I have been credibly informed since I came here that the young gentleman in question himself went up with the Expedition to Bechuanaland. (Renewed laughter.) Those who feared that the result would be bloodshed and trouble had confidence in the Commander of the Expedition; so had we all. I think the best thing we can do now is to say that we confirm the sentiments we have already conveyed to Sir Charles, and retain the opinions which we have already expressed.'

In replying, Sir Charles Warren said:—

"It is most gratifying to us to think that in endeavouring to do our duty we have secured your approbation, and to learn from you that through our endeavours we have assisted in uniting the races in South Africa, whose unanimity for a time appears to have been suspended. On one point I am particularly gratified, and that is, that this toast should have been proposed by a gentleman whom I so much esteem and revere as Mr. Southey,—a gentleman who knows the country so thoroughly, and who has done so much for South Africa during so many years. I have been thanked for the work done in Bechuanaland, but I cannot forget that what you attribute to me is due to the faithful and loyal services of every officer and man, in his proper sphere, to Her Majesty the Queen. It is owing to their good work that I am now here to receive your congratulations. And if there is one of all others I would particularly thank for services rendered in Bechuanaland—one whom you all know here, one upon whose good sense and upon whose

judgment I always could rely, and on whose perfect loyalty to the Queen I was at all times enabled to depend to so great an extent—it is to Colonel Walker that I feel so much is due for the success of the Expedition. (Cheers.) And, gentlemen, if I may at this moment say another word upon these matters, I beg to express my sense of gratitude to the Lieutenant-General Commanding in South Africa—(loud cheers)—for the counsel, advice, and support which he at all times rendered to me in my difficulties. There is one great power which I have not had the opportunity of thanking since my stay in this country, but which I would now thank, and that is the press of this country. (Applause.) I can assure you that I have felt very deeply the manner in which the press has taken up the interests of this country. In one instance a gentleman, who has constantly been reading a paper that did not agree with what has been done, has entirely changed his views, and has entirely agreed with what we have accomplished. (Laughter and cheers.) But what I have so much relied upon during my work in this country is that sympathy which exists among the people. It is that sympathy which will in the future unite South Africa. When we went up into Bechuanaland we had the sympathy of a great portion of the people, because the cause we had in hand was a good cause. There are many here I would wish to thank for the assistance they have rendered to us, and I may mention the civil servants of the Cape Colony. And there is one in particular, and that is Colonel Schermbrucker. And I may also include the magistrates and the various officers with whom we have come into contact. And now may I say one word with regard to Bechuanaland itself. We are told on the one side that it is a howling wilderness, and on the other that it is a wonderfully fertile and well-watered country. It is a well-watered country. Bechuanaland is as well watered, and far better watered, than some of the best parts of this country, and if it only had those dams and wells which exist at the present time in this part of the country, it would be said to be an excellently watered country. What requires to be done at the present time is the solution of the land question, and I believe that under the able direction of Mr. Justice Shippard that will be carried out thoroughly."

Mr. Leonard, Q.C., proposing the health of the Chairman, said:—

"There were some among them there, he dared say, who knew the Chairman well before he (the speaker) was born, but whether they had known him for short or long, they must agree he was one of the best of the men who had served the Crown in this Colony. He had been amongst the public life of the Colony for nearly half a century, and it was very gratifying he should be present at that meeting, which was remarkable as closing an old and lamentable chapter, and opening a new and, he believed, a lastingly good one. (Hear, hear.) The citizens of Capetown, on this occasion, had declared that at all events, as far

as in them lay, they would utter a protest against Imperial and Colonial interests being trampled in the dust. (Cheers.)"

Mr. W. E. Moore, Mayor of Woodstock, said :—

"Unintentionally a name which was a household word in that country had been omitted, and that was the name of the Rev. John Mackenzie. (Loud cheers.) At this late hour of the day he would merely ask them to wish him long life and prosperity."

The toast having been honoured, Sir Charles Warren said :—

"Numbering as I do Mr. Mackenzie as one of the best friends I have in the world, I would ask for the privilege of responding to this toast. (Hear, hear.) I fully intended to have referred to the services of Mr. Mackenzie when I spoke about the work that Sir Bartle Frere wished to do in former days, but it escaped my attention. Sir Bartle Frere had selected Mr. Mackenzie, as many of you know, to act as Resident in Bechuanaland in 1878. I have a strong conviction that the peace of South Africa at the present time is in a very great measure due to the exertions of Mr. Mackenzie. (Cheers.) As I said last night, when I felt in despair in 1878 and 1879 in regard to South Africa, but still had over my chimney-piece the motto of President Brand, 'Alles zal recht komen,' then it was that Mr. Mackenzie shed light for me on the subject, and it was owing to him that there was a prospect of affairs coming to a satisfactory conclusion. I thank you on his behalf for the manner in which you have received this toast. (Hear, hear.)"

Mr. Walter Searle proposed the health of Mr. Arnold White, as connected with the new Colonisation Scheme, and wished him success. Mr. Arnold White replied, and spoke hopefully of the work which he had in view.

The enthusiasm of the people of Capetown was by no means exhausted by what they had transacted, for on the day of sailing Sir Charles Warren found himself surrounded everywhere by people pressing to bid him a sincere and grateful farewell. Several leading citizens accompanied him to the ship, and a large crowd had assembled on the quay, who raised a concluding cheer as the head of the Bechuanaland Expedition left South Africa.

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While such were the views of the leading and progressive people at the Cape, the strongest disapproval was expressed by all the leading organs of public opinion in England con-

cerning the recall of Sir Charles Warren. This judgment will now be still further confirmed when this step is understood to be part of the old shrinking and costly policy, to which I have shown that we are still committed by the adopted recommendations of Sir Hercules Robinson.

It was cheering for me in the quiet of Kuruman to read in the papers, and to hear from private sources, of the warm reception of Sir Charles Warren by all classes of colonists on his way home, as shown in the preceding extracts. I give them to the reader not chiefly as a testimonial to Sir Charles, but that I may place the leading and most intelligent colonists in their right position before the English public. The actions and the views of Sir Charles Warren are worthy of the record which I have given of them, for they indicate a South African policy worthy of the Imperial Government of Great Britain, and of that great South African Dominion to the administration of the affairs of which we are plainly and loudly called. But I have had special pleasure in giving the preceding extracts as showing the true spirit of the loyal Cape Colonists—whether English-speaking or Dutch-speaking. They are willing to co-operate, ready to follow; but for some time to come they look earnestly—and I feel certain they will not look in vain—for the leading and guiding hand of the Imperial Government, in general and trans-Colonial affairs in South Africa.

My friends who were with Sir Charles very kindly wrote to me and confirmed the reports in the papers that my services had been warmly remembered in the Colony. This news cheered and nerved me to prepare for the discharge of the next duty which seemed to lie before me. Ever since our visit to Shoshong I had entertained but one opinion as to where that next duty lay. I felt it lay in England, and not in South Africa. I was sure from the first that evil men, and jealous men, and simply stupid men would do their best to mar good, far-reaching, and peaceful work. Principles would be lost sight of behind men's names. And, if not prevented, the real loss would eventually fall on the people who least deserved it, on the young Englishman or young colonist who might obtain peacefully and

honourably good land in a native territory; and on the native whose rights and industry must first be overthrown by filibusters before his land is "protected." I felt, however, that with all my personal buffetings, the cause which I had at heart had made some progress. The state of affairs was very different indeed from what it was when I left Bechuanaland for England in 1882: different in Bechuanaland, in South Africa generally, and different in England also. But we were not yet in our true position: not yet where we must be. Fatal accident had been prevented, but the carriage was not yet exactly on the rails. It would, no doubt, be the place and the interest of some to cry out that everything was right—nothing could be added or improved. Others would say curtly, "Are we out of it again? Thank God for that!" Whereas in reality our work is still incomplete, and our position critical and insecure; while, of course, we are not "out of it," and, from the highest reasons, cannot be "out of it."

At Kuruman I met my old friends,—European and native,—and had to thank them for their kindness to my wife and children during their long stay at our old home. Mr. and Mrs. Wookey and Mr. and Mrs. Price were very kind and hospitable, as were also our friends the Willmores, the Chapmans, and the Jarvises; and all assisted us in every way in our arrangements for leaving Kuruman. I was glad to be able to recommend the natives to place their claims to their holdings before the Land Commission, and to assure them that they would meet with attention there. But special messengers from one of the chiefs following me to Kuruman, and laying special matters before me into which I had no right to enter, with the earnest and urgent request that I would stay in the country, made it plain enough that my work was not in Bechuanaland at that juncture. I had never anticipated or desired to take part personally in the actual land settlement, and I had confidence in Mr. Shippard and his Commissioners. But the natives abhorred our frequent changes; and it was natural enough that both the natives and the Europeans in Bechuanaland should look upon me as an old friend. So with the kind help of the

friends whose names I have already mentioned I was able to remove my little people and my few sticks of household furniture in ox-waggons from Kuruman to Kimberley, where one of my sons is residing, with whom I resolved to leave his mother, while I returned to England to lay once more the South African question before the English public and the English Government. Although feeling my own inadequacy, still, having the progress of the past to argue from, I could not but take courage and hope to see the full establishment by Her Majesty's Government of a policy fraught with many blessings both to England and to the various peoples of South Africa. And so, with such constant musings, I took leave of "dear old Kuruman," as those who have lived there often call it.

Before entering Kimberley I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Shippard on his way to assume his duties as Administrator and Chief Magistrate of Bechuanaland. I had previously met Judge Shippard, and was anxious for his success in Bechuanaland. It was not much that I could do to help him in a roadside interview; but I felt pleasure in answering his questions, and placed what information I had entirely at his service,—not only out of respect to him but as a duty. To my mind the success of the Imperial Government in Bechuanaland was of the first importance in the interests of the whole country, and my sympathy for Judge Shippard as Administrator and Chief Magistrate was not lessened, but increased, when I perceived that in the constitution of Bechuanaland and of the Land Court the High Commissioner had, unfortunately, rendered success very difficult of attainment.

A short distance south of Kimberley my train passed that of Sir Hercules Robinson, Her Majesty's High Commissioner for South Africa, Governor of the Cape Colony, and more recently appointed Governor of Bechuanaland, on his way to visit the latter country. His entry into Bechuanaland would thus be only a few days later than that of Mr. Shippard. This would enable Sir Hercules himself to preside over the initiation of the new order of things in Bechuanaland. It was thus evident that from the first Sir

Hercules was to treat Bechuanaland, as far as he could, as an appanage of the Cape, and not as a Crown Colony. The Administrator of a Crown Colony would probably have had more opportunity afforded him for personal effort and for making his report to the High Commissioner. But under the "Tembuland Constitution" proposed by Sir Hercules Robinson the Administrator is also Chief Magistrate; and Sir Hercules assumed the position and the active duties of Governor.

By this early visit of Sir Hercules Robinson and Captain Bower to Bechuanaland, Judge Shippard was prevented from shaping his own course as to local matters, and from making his own impression, as a new Administrator, upon the people who were to be under him; which was probably a disadvantage to himself and to the country. As it was, the event was hastened which brought Stellalanders, who had more than once publicly and formally complained of misrepresentation, face to face in Stellaland with the officers against whose statements they had earnestly protested. This was one speedy result brought about by the recall of Sir Charles Warren, and by the approval of the "Tembuland Constitution" for Bechuanaland. It would not appear that good-feeling or confidence was evoked on either side by this visit to Stellaland, but rather that distrust and dislike were increased. The leaders of the Stellalanders who had hitherto been represented at Capetown as without influence and without followers among the people of Stellaland, were now acknowledged to be so influential—but given out now to be also so dangerous—that although Sir Charles Warren had found them most serviceable and helpful to his administration, they were arrested under the new *régime*, and heavy security was demanded from them and their friends before they were set at liberty. It was asserted that they were guilty of seditious practices. But this was in direct contradiction of evidence given by the newly-appointed Resident Magistrate of Vryburg, who, when called upon by these Stellalanders, gave evidence as a witness on their behalf. The Stellalanders stated their case with ability, and the papers are given in the Bluebooks. The arrest

of these loyal people was the inappropriate work of the Imperial Police. The necessity for the whole action taken against these men does not appear from the papers published. That they would have occupied such a position had Sir Charles Warren remained in the country, no one will for a moment believe. It was surely absurd to charge them with sedition after their past history and conduct in Bechuanaland. But the same apparently punitive spirit as against Vryburg, and the surrounding district, would seem to have been shown in other ways. The dignity and advantage which are conferred on a town by the presence of an Administrator and Chief Magistrate have been denied to Vryburg, and conveyed to Mafiking, at the extreme north-east corner of the colony of Bechuanaland. This miserable course of action on the part of Imperial officers is mentioned by me with the utmost possible reluctance and pain; for I feel that every failure of the Imperial Government in a native territory tends to rebut the main contention of this book. And, in point of fact, if we, as an Imperial Power, could do no better than we have done in Stellaland before and after the advent of Sir Charles Warren, we should have forfeited that right to be there which our righteousness and our power confer on us; for in Stellaland our officers, who have cringed in weakness, have also shown unrighteousness and even petty spite when possessed of power. We can do better than this, and can do so easily, if only the life-giving breath of public opinion be brought to bear on the question.

Although there had not been that amount of co-operation between the Cape Ministry and Her Majesty's Government which the latter had been led to expect from Sir Thomas Scanlen, the Upington Ministry cordially accepted from Her Majesty's Government the proffered loan of money for the completion of the line of railway from the Orange River to Kimberley, and hastened the progress of the work, which included two bridges—one across the Orange and the other over the Modder River. The Bechuanaland Force on its southward journey were thus able to avail themselves of the trains at a point some miles south of Kimberley. A



BEFORE THE RAILWAY—WAGGON UPSET—ALL HANDS TO WORK.

few days after I passed through, the work was completed as far as Kimberley, and the new line was formally opened by Sir Hercules Robinson in December.

The commercial importance of this northern railway to the Cape Colony and to British commerce cannot be overstated. But that importance is curtailed through the ending of the line at Kimberley. If the Cape were wise and could borrow money, having looked at the western, and especially at the eastern, sea-coast on the map, and recognising the evident fact that its own salvation commercially (for large efforts) depends upon its being able speedily to run up a railway, not into but alongside the Transvaal through Bechuanaland, the Colony would secure, for some time longer at least, that pre-eminence to which it has been accustomed, but which is sadly handicapped by the geography of the country. From conversations which I had about the time of my return to England, I had hoped that something would have been done in this matter.

I need not enlarge upon the beneficial results to England and to the Cape of a railway reaching Mafiking, and afterwards Shoshong. While it would tap the trade of the interior everywhere and direct it to Capetown, it would also benefit Bechuanaland and the Transvaal. Thus to the most prejudiced minds not only the advantages of railways, but also the benefit of having the Imperial Government in the country, would be apparent. I was glad to see that the then Premier of the Cape Colony (Mr. Upington) had referred recently to the vast importance of this extension of the railway, and promised to do what he could to hasten forward the work to the northern border of the Colony. Of course there is a choice of routes from Kimberley to Pretoria or northwards through Bechuanaland. Those having stores in Pretoria, or elsewhere in the Transvaal, would naturally advocate the Pretoria route. If the Cape were wise, however, it would favour the direct northern route, fully assured that the line would thus command the Transvaal trade all the same; whereas, when the great development of the north took place, its direct Cape route would be open, and thus geographical facts would be at least for a time beaten by the

enterprise of far-seeing men. The Cape and Her Majesty's Government should manage this matter between them. They have both done much more foolish actions. The money expended on the railway would come back again—every penny—not soon, but without doubt. Anywhere else than in South Africa such things are done. When is genuine orderly enterprise to open its eyes in South Africa? Hitherto it has had no chance with the miserable strifes on its frontiers, its political feuds, and our own unfortunate fleeing from the management of affairs. Can't this good old lumbering ox-waggon of a colony be pulled out of the dreadfully deep mud, or sand rather, in which it has so long stuck fast?[1]

I was only a day or two in Capetown, but in that brief interval had the opportunity afforded me of meeting a number of friends who kindly asked me to dine with them in a quiet way at the City Club. We were a mixed gathering as to country, local politics, and religion; but we were heartily bound together by common views as to the policy which ought to be pursued by England in South Africa. In crossing the water once more I felt that, with a single notorious exception, the whole English press of the Colony was behind me in well-directed efforts for the development and permanence of the Imperial Government as the Supreme Power in South Africa, and as having the administrative responsibility, in a divided South Africa, for the management of trans-Colonial Native Territories.

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The following axioms are borne out by the narrative over which the reader has travelled in these pages, and they are verified by the wider induction to which he is introduced in my concluding chapters:—

[1] As these sheets pass through the press I hear the report of the successful progress of the Delagoa Bay Railway. So much the worse for the local interests of our oldest South African Colony. But the Cape Colony, the Transvaal, and South Africa generally, will be saved by Imperial administration in Bechuanaland and other Native Territories. Holding to a true policy here, Delagoa Bay will be in Africa what Goa is in India. But the English public and patriotic colonists must unite in upholding Her Majesty's Government in this necessary policy.

1. In South Africa, with all our failures, our success has been great and far-reaching, and is an encouragement for the future.

2. Our failures in the past have proceeded from causes which are known and can be avoided.

3. To shirk responsibility is not to escape from it finally; it is to lose self-respect and the active sympathy of others, and bear the burden still.

4. To flee from one difficulty usually brings you face to face with another, and both difficulties have then to be met and overcome.

5. It is mean to desert an officer when he is carrying out your instructions; and to do so only leads you to further humiliation, whether that officer be High Commissioner, or Special Commissioner, or Deputy Commissioner.

BOOK VI

THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA—THE PAST, THE PRESENT, AND THE FUTURE

CHAPTER I

THE PAST WORK OF ENGLAND IN SOUTH AFRICA

THE whole white population in our two South African colonies—the Cape Colony and Natal—amounts to 372,000. To these may be added 1000 white men for Basutoland, Zululand, and Bechuanaland respectively. The total number of European subjects of Her Majesty in South Africa would thus be 375,000. In the same area the total native population amounts to 1,698,000—the grand total of British subjects being over 2,000,000.

The total number of whites outside British territory in South Africa is 122,000, which is nearly equally divided between the Free State and the Transvaal Republic. To these may be added perhaps a score of Germans at Angra Pequena on the south-west coast. On the south-east coast a few hundred officials, soldiers, and half-castes, placed at the long-held but almost useless stations along the coast, represent the sum total of the Portuguese occupation and development of the country during hundreds of years.

As to the relative numbers of the component elements of the population of the Cape Colony, the coloured people exceed the whites in number, in the proportion of over two to one. In Natal, the whites are outnumbered by the natives, in the proportion of at least twelve natives to one white man. If we take the Cape Colony and Natal together, there are some seven natives to every white man. We must not therefore mislead ourselves or others in speaking of these British colonies as if the population were like that of Australia, Canada, or even New Zealand. Basutoland,

Bechuanaland, and Zululand may be said to be practically Native Territories under Her Majesty's Government, like so many districts in India.

The natives of the Transvaal stand to the white population in the same proportion as in Natal. By most stringent and dangerous repressive legislation—made possible only by the presence of free countries on its borders—the "Free" State has secured that its European population cannot be much outnumbered by the native servants of the burghers. There is no native population in this State which is not in the service of the white men; and the number of coloured servants that a European may have is regulated by law.

The following table may assist the reader in considering the Austral African question as it now stands:—

APPROXIMATE POPULATION OF AUSTRAL AFRICA FROM THE CAPE TO THE ZAMBESI.

British Territory.

	Whites.	Natives.	Total.
Cape Colony, Transkei, etc.	340,000	760,000	1,100,000
Natal	32,000	388,000	420,000
Basutoland . . .	1,000	150,000	151,000
Bechuanaland . .	1,000	200,000	201,000
Zululand . . .	1,000	200,000	201,000
Totals .	375,000	1,698,000	2,073,000

Total under British Government and Protection	2,073,000
Total of native tribes to the north friendly to Imperial Government (say)	1,000,000
Total .	3,073,000

Independent States.

	Whites.	Natives.	Total.
Free State . . .	62,000	71,600	133,600
Transvaal . . .	60,000	700,000	760,000
Totals .	122,000	771,600	893,600

Total in Independent States	893,600
Approximate grand total	3,966,600
In round numbers	4,000,000

ESTIMATED AREA OF AUSTRAL AFRICA.

British Territories.

	Square Miles.	Square Miles.	
Cape Colony, former area		199,406	
Do., recent additions:—			
Griqualand West	17,800		
Griqualand East	7,480		
Transkei	2,535		
Tembuland	4,055		
		31,870	
Cape Colony, total area		231,276	
Bechuanaland		180,000	
Basutoland		10,290	
Natal		21,150	
			442,716
Native Territories unoccupied and occupied by tribes friendly to the Imperial Government			350,000

Independent States.

Free State	70,000	
Transvaal	114,000	
		184,000

When so much is made of questions of race by South African politicians of a certain school, it may be instructive to give the reader some idea of the "race" question in that country. The European population in South Africa is not of one or two, but of many nationalities. First of all we have the descendants of the officers and soldiers of the Dutch East India Company. They became "burghers," or rather vassals to the Company. They had been hired by the Company in other European countries, as well as in Holland itself—hence the great variety of continental names among this part of the population. But about 200 years ago there was an important and homogeneous addition to the Cape population, consisting of over 150 French Protestants—men, women, and children. These formed a small section of that noble body of Frenchmen whose exit from France, on account of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, impoverished that country in after ages, while it enriched England and other free countries of Europe, and reached even to the distant Cape of Storms in its widening

beneficial influence. This was the most important addition to the Cape population which took place during the sway of the Dutch East India Company. Under that rule the French refugees found liberty of worship, but only to a certain extent. The use of the French language was forbidden in public worship, and in documents addressed to Government; and a French traveller visiting the Cape, less than a hundred years after the arrival of the refugees, found only one old man who understood French.

A third element in our South African population was introduced by the arrival of the English settlers of Albany and the Scottish settlers of Glen Lyndoch, more than sixty years ago. This movement was afterwards extended and developed by the addition of the Queenstown District. It was in 1820 that the sum of £50,000 was voted by the British Parliament towards the colonisation of what is now known as the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony. Applications for passages from 90,000 persons were sent in, but only 4000 persons could be accepted. There were several English parties of settlers, under their leaders, who spread themselves over a beautiful and productive country; there was a Scottish party also, which took fast root in the hills and dales of the Bedford district, where its descendants are still to be found. Governor Sir George Grey, who had previous intimate knowledge of both Australia and New Zealand, reported concerning these British colonists some forty years after their arrival:—

"The British settlers of 1820 have succeeded as well as emigrants have done in any part of the world—better than in very many."

But in face of all this, and of the fact that at the present day the greater portion of the Grahamstown, Queenstown, King Williamstown, and other Eastern Province districts, are cultivated by English-speaking farmers, we have been recently informed, as if with authority, that the "Boers almost alone were cultivating the soil."[1] It is very disconcerting to the student of the question to meet with a statement like this, so entirely incorrect and misleading.

[1] *Oceana*, by J. A. Froude (Longmans and Co.), p. 44.

In 1857 the German Legion, which had been engaged in the English service in the Crimean War, was settled on the eastern border of the Colony; the British and Colonial Governments bearing the expense of the undertaking. There were over 2000 men, with a very large proportion of officers, but, unfortunately, the great majority of the men were unmarried, and therefore without the restraints or the motives to action furnished by the family life. Still, these deficiencies were met by Sir George Grey as far as he could; and many of the Germans then introduced into the Colony have been very successful, while some have risen to posts of distinction.

Another large influx of European population—chiefly English—took place on the discovery of diamonds some sixteen years ago on the banks of the Vaal, and afterwards at what is now called the Diamond Fields, where the rich mines of Kimberley, Dutoit's Pan, and De Beer's are situated. This was a wild unoccupied country when I first passed through it in 1859, fitted for grazing purposes only after rain had fallen, as there were no perennial springs in the neighbourhood. But wells were soon sunk, and water was obtained everywhere, and recently the water of the Vaal River has been brought some twenty miles by piping, to supply the growing wants of this enterprising and intelligent community. Kimberley is a centre of political as well as commercial influence; and its importance has been much increased since the line of railway has been extended to it from the seaports on the south.

Having discovered the component elements of the population, it will now be necessary to bring forward as briefly as possible the salient points of Cape history, and especially of our connection with it, and with South Africa generally. Now, I am always prepared for divergences of opinion, but am totally unprepared to accept misstatement, or ignoring or distortion of historical fact, and then be asked to agree to some conclusion based on such insecure foundation. I wish the truth to be known concerning our past doings in South Africa. We have made mistakes, but we have also done a great work there, which, I find, is little understood.

It has, for instance, been recently asserted by a historian and traveller that—

"The Cape Colony was originally a Dutch Colony."

And again that—

"The Dutch throve and prospered, and continued to thrive and prosper till the close of last century."[1]

That is, till the country came into the hands of the English. Is this true? Was there a Dutch Colony? Was there such prosperity last century? Has there been retrogression since the country came into English hands? No. The very opposite of all this is the truth, as every student of South African affairs is aware. Let me quote a reliable historian. "For nearly a century and a half," that is, up to the coming of the English—

"The Cape was a mere mercantile settlement of the Dutch East India Company, who held a monopoly of trade, and checked and prevented the formation of what is now understood as a colony. It is necessary to bear this in mind when instituting a comparison between the age and progress of the Cape of Good Hope and the remarkable advancement of the Anglo-Saxon communities in America and Australia. The latter, from the outset of their career, enjoyed the inestimable privileges of political freedom and unfettered industrial enterprise; but the early settlers in South Africa found themselves trammelled and repressed by a Government which has been well described as 'in all things political purely despotic, and in all things commercial purely monopolist.'"[2]

While this despotic government was administered by the officers of the Dutch East India Company, the European inhabitants were from the first, as above remarked, of many nationalities; the original mode of obtaining "colonists" being to grant a discharge to such of the company's soldiers or servants as were married, of good character, and Protestants. Their numbers were augmented by political exiles, who were sent to South Africa by the Batavian Government. These "burghers," or vassals, suffered the most grinding oppression at the hands of the Dutch Company, which occupied the Cape for its own advantage, and not for the benefit

[1] *Oceana*, p. 37.
[2] *South Africa, Past and Present.* J. Noble. Longmans and Co.

of those who were still virtually its servants. So hopelessly hard was the oppression of the Company, that colonists, or burghers, were in the habit of escaping from the Cape altogether, as stowaways in ships; others proceeding into the interior of the country so far as to be beyond the reach of their oppressors. Petitions to Holland for redress were mostly unavailing, as they were usually referred back again to the local officers whose conduct was complained of. When all that these poor people wanted was only a fair price for the fruit of their labour, and when their petition was signed by the whole body of the burghers, "not one excepted," their remonstrance, in the eyes of the Company's officers, was nothing but sedition and mutiny; and they were warned that if they presented such papers in the future, severe measures would be provided against them. With no fair market for their industry, industry itself declined. Burghers pushed into the wilderness, with a few cattle, resolved to live on the abundant game rather than be the serfs of the Company. When they came under the English, the small European community at the Cape retained but little of their own European civilisation. Many of them lived in mere huts or hovels, their clothing was mostly the dressed skins of the game which had been killed for food, and their blankets, to protect them from the keen Cape winter nights, were fur-skins stitched like the native kaross. As the number of malcontents increased, while the Dutch Company's officers yielded nothing, but strove to crush opposition by occasionally seizing and summarily transporting the leaders as "useless persons," an open rupture took place, and a "free republic" was proclaimed in the town of Swellendam, where the people proceeded to elect what they called a "National Assembly." A local "Government" was also set up at Graaff-Reinet, then the most northerly European town, the inhabitants having previously expelled their landdrost or magistrate. The central authority at the Cape was paralysed by this determined opposition, and was unable to move a step to put it down.

Such was the actual condition of things at the Cape when it passed into the hands of the English. Be it under-

stood that these malcontents made no opposition to the establishment of the English Government—the people of Graaff-Reinet actually sending a deputation to the Cape to tender their allegiance. The English Government announced to the burghers that all monopoly should cease, and that trade should be free throughout the country. Instruments which had been in use for the public torture of prisoners were removed from the streets by the English, and a more humane system commenced. The prosperity of the Cape Colony dates from this period, and as we have seen, Cape Colonists declare that, for all practical purposes, this ought fairly to be regarded as the date of the establishment of the Cape Colony as a colony.

Let me clear away another misapprehension. The English twice conquered the Dutch at the Cape. It is true that the Prince of Orange, then a refugee in England, requested that the Cape should be handed over to the English; but this was not done. The Company's officers at the Cape had no instructions from their masters, the directors in Holland, and refused to obey the command of an exiled prince; so the place was taken by force. It is amazing how a certain English writer takes sides against his own countrymen, not merely pointing out their wrong-doings—which were a good service—but raising a prejudice against them in the most unwarranted way. I have mentioned the first taking of the Cape. It was given up again by the English in 1803; but did not again revert to the Dutch East India Company. Mr. Froude will please note the fact that the Cape was now a Dutch colony, under the Government of Holland for the period of three years! When the European war broke out again, an English force was sent to the Cape for the same reason as before—to prevent a naval position of supreme importance from falling into the hands of the French. On this occasion our force was opposed not by the Dutch Company, but by the force of the Dutch Government, assisted by Colonial burghers, under General Janssens. After an engagement, in which his army was driven back, the Dutch General and Governor capitulated, the English General cheerfully yielding the most liberal terms

to the Dutch force and to the Colonists. The attacking party was about 4000, and the defenders were 3000 in number. It is asserted, on what evidence I am entirely at a loss to know, that the Cape Colonists yielded in the belief that the occupation by the English would be temporary, and that their country would be given back to them when the struggle was over.[1] I can find no grounds for such an assertion. On the contrary, when the Batavian Government afterwards sent a fleet of some nine vessels to retake the Colony, in the hope that the burghers would assist them by rising against the English, the burghers refused to move, and the entire force of Dutch ships and men fell into the hands of the English authorities at the Cape without any bloodshed. No fair historian would fail to mention a fact of such importance. I commend it to Mr. Froude's special attention. The fact was, the immense benefits flowing from the change of Government were apparent to the Dutch burghers from the beginning. Their country was never "taken from them"; it was really now given to them, as colonists, for the first time, under the law of England; and it became theirs in a sense in which it never had been theirs before. So much for the South African side of the final settlement by which the Cape became an English colony, and the general satisfaction attending it in the Colony itself. One word with reference to the European aspect of the question. The possession of the Cape was, and is, a question of European politics. At the Congress of Vienna a final arrangement was made by which certain other Dutch colonial possessions, as well as the European supremacy at the Cape, were handed over to England by Holland, in return for the sum of £6,000,000 sterling. This transaction was little known at the Cape. It was the European settlement of a question in European politics. It is not true that "the hotter spirits at the Cape resisted this—were called rebels, and were shot and hanged in the usual fashion."[2] I am at a loss to know on what this assertion of Mr. Froude is based. There was no such resistance after the first engagement in the neighbourhood of the Cape; there were no such feelings of resentment,

[1] *Oceana*, p. 38.

[2] *Ibid.*

and there was no hanging connected with this arrangement at all. It is very remarkable that such statements should be persistently put forward, not by our enemies but by our professed friends, in opposition to historical facts which are received as such on all sides in the Cape Colony.

Indeed, I believe I am within the truth when I assert that the Dutch-speaking Cape Colonists have never complained as to their own treatment as subjects of the English Government, except in the one matter of the freeing of their slaves, and the admission of coloured people to civil rights as before the common law. Had there been no coloured people in South Africa, or had England remained a slave-holding Power, there would never have been a breach or a jar between the Cape Colonists and England.

In the early history of the Colony, the Dutch, French, and English races already stood side by side on public questions. The struggle for the freedom of the infant Colonial press was fought out by Scotsmen for the western province, and by Englishmen for the eastern part of the Colony. When the English Government wished to form a penal settlement at the Cape, all the colonists combined in opposition to the measure, held enthusiastic meetings at the Exchange, and the English Government gave way to their united earnestness. It has been repeatedly said that no such gathering took place in Capetown after the time of the convict agitation, till, in September 1884, the loyal Colonists came together, irrespective of race or Colonial parties, to beg the Imperial Government not to desert the country, as they had been doing, but to help them in their peculiar and divided condition, as against the lawlessness which was degrading the Colonists and frightening away capital from the country.

But if there was no complaint whatever against the English Government as to its treatment of the Colonists themselves, why was there disturbance, and why were some Colonists hanged at Slagter's Nek? This affair ought never to be imported into the question of English rule, as such, for the events which led to that local disturbance happened to our officers when carrying out a policy similar to that which

had been laid down, not by the old Dutch Company, but by the enlightened officers of the Dutch Republic, during the brief interval of their administration. We established district courts in the frontier districts, on the lines laid down by General Janssens and Commissary-General de Mist; abuses were taken notice of, and protection to life and property was extended to the then boundary of the Colony. In the ordinary discharge of police duty in the previously neglected districts, the Colonial officers were fired upon by a border desperado. The fire was returned, and the man was killed. At the burial of this person, his brother, in a state of great excitement, called upon all around to assist him in avenging his brother's death, and from that time this man and his family connections set themselves to devise plans of retaliation upon the officers of law and order. One of their nefarious schemes was to induce the neighbouring Kaffirs to assist them against Government. Similar incidents have too frequently been known in other countries where brigandage has been grappled with and put down by a Central Government. Had the Cape Colony remained in the hands of the Dutch Government,—its affairs presided over by such officers as General Janssens and Commissary-General de Mist,—these lawless men must still have met the fate which everywhere awaits open defiance of law, order, and settled Government. The English Government has made mistakes in South Africa, and Englishmen may profitably point these out; but the establishing of order was no mistake. Such firmness, along with much patience and forbearance, is absolutely necessary to the upholding of anything deserving the name of Government; and he who, like Mr. Froude, elevates bandits into heroes that he may decry his own Government, presents an unpleasant illustration of the old proverb, "It's an ill bird that fouls its own nest."

It is quite evident that there is no political reason why Dutch-speaking colonists in South Africa should be opposed to English-speaking colonists. As a matter of fact, their interests are identical. Some time ago, indeed, Dutch-speaking people as such had a real grievance, and were often put to considerable inconvenience when their Magis-

trate and Civil Commissioner was not able to speak to them in Dutch—the only language which they knew. Had our South African Administration been conducted by men of the same stamp as those who had to do with the affairs of India, an abuse such as we describe could never have occurred. In the Cape Colony, however, the feelings of the Dutch-speaking litigant or taxpayer were in many cases further shattered when the Magistrate put up as interpreter a coloured man from the nearest mission station. Of course the man who ought to have felt ashamed was undoubtedly the Magistrate; but instead of that he was quite unabashed in the place of power and full of his own importance. It was held to be the farmer who was "stupid"; while, as a matter of fact, the native or the half-caste interpreter spoke more languages than either of his social superiors. The right to use Dutch in the Cape Houses of Parliament has been secured as French may be used in Canada, and the most important Parliamentary papers are now translated into that language. These steps are necessary while there are members of Parliament who do not know English. Inasmuch as such members cannot well profit by the debates, and as many English members of the Cape Parliament are unable to speak in Dutch, it is highly probable that the Colonial electorate will profit by the experiences of the present Cape Parliament, and at the next elections will select men who, with other qualifications, such as a general knowledge of European and American history, will be able to understand debates in English, and also themselves to join in them.

The leading Cape politicians of Dutch or French extraction freely admit the advisability of using the English language, and openly declare their belief that it is destined to be the language of the country. But the extreme republican party have conceived the idea of imposing the colloquial Dutch of South Africa upon the people of that country, as a written and official language. This is part of their scheme for dominating the general community with the views of the least intelligent portion of the inhabitants, and for making a separate "natie" or nation out of the mixed European materials at the Cape under its own flag. Such

views are harmless enough in theory; for who can interfere with our choice of the language which we ourselves shall speak, and which we shall teach our children? But in practice in South Africa at the present time this movement is divisive, retrogressive, and mischievous. Its tendency is to divide the Dutch-speaking people among themselves; and could it obtain the supremacy, to impose upon the community of the Cape Colony an entirely new language—widely different from the Dutch of Holland hitherto taught in Colonial Government schools. So far different is it, indeed, that one part of the political programme of the anti-progressive party is to translate the Bible into this *patois*. So far as I am aware, this desire for a "Paarl version" of the Scriptures is far from being general, and where it is entertained, it is advocated by men who are much better known for their political antipathies than for their sympathy with Bible Societies, or their anxiety for the right understanding of the Word of God.

The recent progress of education in the Cape Colony has been very gratifying. A fair sprinkling of boys and girls go forward regularly from school to receive a "college" education; and the sons of some of those who can afford it attend an English or Scottish university before completing their education. In a few years the Colonial electors will have a number of educated men in every division, from among whom they can select a Parliamentary representative. In the meantime they have in many cases selected members of their own class, Colonial farmers, who form the majority in the present Cape Assembly. Without the advantage of education, these men, however honest and upright they may be, are naturally suspicious of all ideas which are new to them, however trite they may have become elsewhere in the world. And the Cape Colony at the present moment may be said to be governed by these uninformed legislators. Unfortunately, the attitude of some of those who take a front place in Cape politics at present is not to instruct and lead these men, but to be led by them, and to labour to show how beautifully the views of educated people accord with the crude ideas of uninstructed and isolated farmers, whose want

of education is not their fault but the accident of their birth—an accident which in many cases they are taking care shall not characterise the career of their children. When a "Scab Act" was recently introduced into the Cape Parliament for the prevention of disease among sheep and the deterioration of the wool, it was supported by every intelligent farmer in the House, irrespective of political parties. The uninformed sheep-farmers, on the other hand, were strongly opposed to legislative interference with what some of them regarded as a visitation from Divine Providence. The professional politician veered with the gale, and for the time helped the ignorant majority to prevent the passing of a measure calculated to secure the prosperity of Cape farmers and Cape merchants alike. There is no excuse for these educated politicians, except that which was put forward some years ago by a certain minister of the Dutch Reformed Church — ministering, however, beyond the Cape Colony—who declared that he dared not avow to his people his belief that the world was round. Their respect for his orthodoxy, and his influence as their minister, would go at once, and he would have to leave!

But the most cruel drag upon the progress of the Cape, upon its Legislature, and especially upon the efforts of the most enlightened and most reliable Cape politicians, is the uncertain and vacillating policy of England towards South Africa. This was the real cause of the formation of the Afrikander Bond and its subsequent increase in membership. The people were taught to believe that England was about to abandon South Africa; and the leaders of the movement pleased themselves and their hearers with the idea that they would then form themselves into a Republic under their own flag. The aggressive movements of the French Republic in the neighbouring island of Madagascar, and of Germany on the west coast, rudely disturbed this "Afrikander" dream. But what produced the truest satisfaction to the body of the Cape people, was the revived interest on the part of England in South African affairs. Interference in the internal affairs of the Cape Colony is one thing, practical abandonment of South Africa by England is another. The one course is as

strongly deprecated by the people of the Cape Colony as the other. Therefore the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the Expedition of Sir Charles Warren were more than acquiesced in—they were approved and welcomed at the Cape. But farmers of the Colony, the Free State, and the Transvaal, and settlers in Stellaland, unknown to one another, united in one criticism—"We are glad England has done this; but will she stick to her place as the head of the country?" A well-informed Cape politician, and many minor ones, have assured me that even in the present Cape Parliament, among those benches of silent farmers, there are good men and true, who are anxious for the prosperity of the Colony, and for the continuance and growth of the English power in the country to the north, but who are silent for two reasons—they are without sympathetic leaders, and they distrust the constancy of England. If this is true, one result of a well-considered policy on the part of England, towards Bechuanaland and other native territories, will be a greater amount of out-spokenness on the part of thousands of Cape Colonists, whose prudent reticence is caused by their distrust of England's steadfastness.

It is quite true that the anti-progressive Cape farmer of the antiquated type has no friendly feeling towards the "uitlander" or foreigner. It is just possible that this feeling might be mistaken by the passing visitor or traveller, with his too ready notebook in hand, for an antipathy to Englishmen in particular. I am fearless of contradiction from those who have a right to give an opinion, when I assert that there is no special antipathy to Englishmen, as such, in the Cape Colony. In explanation of the dislike to foreigners which exists, it must be remembered that, till recently, the education of farmers was so meagre that they could not transact their own affairs intelligently in any matter which involved accurate account-keeping. There can be no doubt that the temptation arising out of this fact was, in numerous instances, too great for the travelling trader, or even the village dealer at the store. The Colony is full of stories of sharp practices which certain storekeepers indulged in at the expense of their ignorant customers.

These men were not all English; perhaps not even a majority were so; but all could speak English, and all were "uitlanders." Sometimes farmers would pass through one village to do business in another at a greater distance, where they thought they had found an absolutely honest man. The state of education for some time precluded the farmers from contrasting or comparing the commercial morality of their own sons, as business men, with that of the "uitlanders" of which they complained. But as education makes progress in the country, and farmers' sons enter business, the dislike to "uitlander" storekeepers will certainly break down. Then the dishonesty of the country people, when they found themselves within touch of the many desirable little things contained in a store, was accepted by the dishonest man of business as an excuse for his own more serious misdeeds. No doubt this state of things is to be taken into account, among other reasons, when one considers the want of enterprise and the backward state of the Cape Colony generally. The farmers became discouraged. They might do their best, but they found, when ready to return home, that they still remained indebted in the books at the store. Farmers also complained that in village stores sufficient difference in price was not made between superior and inferior wools. But these are matters which education is changing. Dutch-speaking people are now largely engaging in trade; farmers themselves now know more about business, and are able to look after their own interest, while the railway opens up a wider choice as to the houses with which they may deal. Thus the old-fashioned hatred of the "foreigner," which it will be seen was not without some reason, is destined to disappear, and is indeed even now very much a matter of the past. And it is well known that Scotsmen and Englishmen are preferred to other "uitlanders" or foreigners who, from birth and language, might be supposed to be more likely to find favour in the eyes of the Dutch-speaking Colonists. Inter-marriage is of frequent occurrence between Colonists of Dutch, French, English, and Scottish extraction. Where both the parents are Protestants, the South African house is in no sense divided against itself;

and the Europeans of the future Austral Africa are likely to be second to none in physical power and in general ability.

What could be more absurd and more mischievous than to raise the questions of "Dutch" or "English," as is still done by shallow-pated politicians, in a country whose European population has had such a history? When the interest of all the Colonists is one and the same, no matter what language they may speak, or from what European race they have sprung, of what practical utility is it to be inquisitive about the relative proportions as to numbers of the Dutch-speaking and the English-speaking Colonists of South Africa to-day? It has, however, been publicly stated by a high authority, and is probably near the truth, that there are nine English-speaking people to eleven Dutch-speaking people in the Cape Colony, while in Natal the two peoples are equally balanced. Thus in parts of South Africa under Her Majesty's Government the proportion is as five English to six Dutch. In the independent states, on the other hand, the proportion is as one English-speaking person to six Dutch-speaking people. Another fact which commercial men would not forgive me for omitting—and which statesmen and politicians will estimate aright—is the indebtedness of the Government of the Cape Colony to England to the amount of over twenty millions sterling. But the most restful and satisfying thought in this connection is—that a community hailing from so many different parts of Europe cannot be split up into divisions as to race, even by the most persistent efforts of politicians without policy and without conscience. Dutch, Danish, German, French, English, Irish, and Scottish—no race, as such, shall have the dominance in South Africa; but all Europeans will coalesce in friendliness and intelligent co-operation, and will do so without pressure or effort when they intelligently see that their objects and their interests are one and the same.

Mr. Froude, to whose recent writings on South Africa in *Oceana* I have more than once referred, was himself an actor on the arena of South African politics. In 1874 he took part in a movement to bring about Confederation in South Africa; but the element of haste was fatal to these

well-meant efforts, as to others elsewhere mentioned. What Lord Carnarvon proposed, and Mr. Froude explained and advocated, or something resembling it, will yet take place in the future history of South Africa; but it was unreasonable to press Confederation upon such a community as that of the Europeans at the Cape in 1874, when Responsible Government had only just been obtained in the Colony, and it was at that time a matter of great anxiety how that measure would work. Had Mr. Froude been a Cape Colonist, he too would have dreaded the possible action of the heavy majority of ignorant and prejudiced men within the Colony, and would have still more feared to add at once to that superincumbent mass, by Confederation, the yet denser ignorance of at least one of the Republics to the north—more especially as he informs us that he is only "an imperfect believer in the value of popular suffrage." In short, Mr. Froude wanted the people of the Cape Colony and the States to attempt to pass through all the mazes of a quadrille, to his music, before they had become accustomed to walk alone. They did well to ask for more time to learn to walk as self-governing peoples.

It is well known that the Psalmist in his haste declared that all men were liars. South African judges from the bench have considered it to be their sorrowful duty to point out that the sanctity of an oath did not seem to be recognised by the more ignorant colonists—I do not mention their race, as that had nothing to do with the question. Mr. Froude confines his charge of mendacity to the English colonists at the Cape, with whom as officials he was exclusively brought into contact; for at that time Dutch-speaking people were necessarily excluded from the management of affairs on account of their want of education. This is an old story now; and Mr. Froude must really make an effort to forget and forgive his own personal treatment when working, as he thought, for the good of the Cape Colonists. They did not see matters with Mr. Froude's eyes—they used their own. The English at the Cape are very like their parents and brothers and sisters in England. To attempt to override such people in the old country, or in any colony, is usually an unpleasant as well as a hopeless task; and it was so in

Mr. Froude's experience at the Cape. Had the scene been Australia, and had Mr. Froude attempted to act there as he did in the Cape Colony, his reception would certainly not have been less unpleasant than it was at the Cape. Mr. Froude in *Oceana* has allowed himself to pen a distorted and entirely unreliable report about South Africa, which becomes really mischievous when he most unnecessarily sets race against race. His chapters on South Africa are a blot on a beautifully-written book.

Let me tell the reader, in few words, what the much-condemned English Government has accomplished in South Africa. It found a community of Europeans in serfdom under a very selfish and exclusive mercantile company; to those enthralled men it gave freedom and citizenship, and an honourable place in that Colonial family of which England is the prolific mother. It found them without trade or Colonial industry, except the vineyards of the descendants of the Huguenots; having neither wool of sheep nor of Angora goat, till these wool-bearing animals were imported. In social and political life there was taken first one step of advancement, then another, each in the way of widening and deepening their liberty, till, some years ago, they obtained, perhaps prematurely, the entire management of their own affairs within the boundary of their own colony. It has been asserted by Mr. Froude that the Hottentot races suffered by our setting them free,[1] and that they have died away under our rule. This is not true, as the statistics of Cape population will show to any one. The races, which had been decreasing when we got the Cape, ceased to decrease; even the abject Bushman was affected by the advent of our English rule. Where one Bushman was taken prisoner under the Dutch Company's rule, four were shot down,—a course which would have led to their speedy extermination; under the English rule three prisoners were taken to one Bushman shot.[2] While, however, pointing out the benefits to the natives resulting from English rule as

[1] *Oceana*, p. 39.

[2] Official Reports quoted in Mackenzie's *Ten Years North of Orange River*, p. 510.

opposed to that of the Dutch East India Company, I am always anxious to add that I do not wish to infer from this fact, that an Englishman is more merciful than an educated Dutch-speaking Colonist, but that border quarrels should not be left to the settlement of border men, but be dealt with by a strong Central Government.

It is not enough, however, to ask what we have done for our colonists in South Africa. It is also of the utmost importance to point out what the influence and guidance of England have saved South Africa from. We have seen how the colonists have thriven and made remarkable progress. Indeed, when we consider the position in which we found them, perhaps no community has made greater progress than the colonists at the Cape under the Government of England. Then the freed slaves and serfs were never guilty of riot or excess after they got their freedom; they have steadily increased in number, and form to-day a useful labouring population. But the great question remains, "What would have been the result to white and to black—to slaveholder and slave—if Europeans holding the sentiments of the Southern States of the American Union had commenced their operations in the Cape Colony, with the whole continent of Africa to the north of them to work upon?" No doubt, in the course of time, and without the interference of England, a school of thought and of morals would have arisen in South Africa itself like that of the people of the Northern States of the Union. But when would their voice have been heard? Through what oceans of blood would this cursed slave question have led the Europeans in South Africa—through the blood of blacks continually, and through the blood of the whites themselves when the crisis came, and the system met its inevitable doom? There are few who will join the writer whom I have more than once quoted in his views relating to the freeing of her slaves by England. That crowning act of the conscience and intelligence of a people was not only dictated by philanthropy and morality, but it was the soundest and highest policy, as to England herself, as to her colonists, and as to the enslaved peoples. To most thinking men that lesson is unmistakably taught by the great

American War. President Grant, who was no sentimentalist, declares, in his *Personal Memoirs*, that the South was more benefited by defeat than the North by victory:—

"The South was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilised peoples not brought up under it, and one which degraded labour, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. . . . The labour of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. The whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated 'poor white trash.' . . . The non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbours. Soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. The war was expensive to the South as well as to the North, both in blood and treasure; but it was worth all it cost."[1]

It is true, the ostensible cause of the war on the part of the Southern States was the claimed right to separate; on the part of the North the cause was the inviolable union of the States. But why did the South wish to separate? That they might plant their peculiar institutions in new territories —exactly the same reason as that which induced some of our South African colonists to separate from the Cape Colony, and "trek" into the regions to the north. If, therefore, brother has not shot down brother in South Africa, if father has not found himself opposing son in mortal conflict, as in America, by whose management has the apple of strife been removed from the scene? By the wise forethought and the disinterested policy of England. The freeing of the slaves, and the determination to treat men of all races as citizens before the common law, have been precious seed sown in South Africa by the conscience and genius of England, and destined to bear fruit in the coming generations, and in regions which were far beyond our control at the time the Emancipation Bill became law. The obligations of all races throughout South Africa to the Power that has thus befriended all, will appear more and more as the lapse of time helps us to understand the true bearing and proportion of things.

[1] *Century Magazine*, November 1885.

CHAPTER II

SPREAD OF EUROPEANS IN SOUTH AFRICA—AN UNRECOGNISED LAW

We have already contrasted the case of India with that of South Africa. The one country contains a population of 254 millions, while the total population of Austral Africa up to the Zambesi does not amount to more than four millions of people—those actually under British Government and protection amounting only to two millions. Yet it seems much more easy to govern India with its hundreds of millions than to govern the two millions in South Africa. The explanation of this phenomenon is that we have never till the present hour had a South African policy; whereas we have really set our minds to govern India, have learned its languages and studied its laws, and have largely ruled and held India by the willing help of India itself. Nothing could be more intricate than many Indian problems, or more diverse than the peoples who come under our sway in that mighty empire. But there the great principle is steadily kept in view, of central authority in general questions, with all degrees and shades of local freedom and responsibility in subordinate local affairs; and the mighty machine moves on with much less noise and difficulty than our creaking and jolting South African vehicle.

In Australia the native question has hardly arisen; and the growth and development of the European community have been constantly before the minds of Australian administrators and statesmen. The Island-Continent of the South is well-defined and all under the Queen. In Canada also

the growth and development of the country have been considered; and the Queen's supremacy has been established from the Atlantic to the Pacific. In doing this the interests and rights of the natives in Canada have not been lost sight of.

The law of European expansion has been recognised in its most aggressive form by the United States. Provision is made for it in the prescribed regulations for the government of a Territory till it becomes a full-fledged State of the Union. The blemish in the past would seem to have been the non-recognition of the rights of the Indians. But of recent years the Federal Government of the United States,—at a somewhat late hour, it is true,—has been giving more attention to the interests and the rights of the original occupants of the country, who are still found on their western border. From ocean to ocean the Federal Government most wisely persists in upholding one nationality. In doing this they are beset with great difficulties which they are nobly surmounting. Patriotism in the United States is stimulated by heroic examples in the past histories of the races which compose its mighty community; but American patriotism in practice perpetuates no race-distinction or old-world nationality. It aims at raising, by help of the best blood of Europe, and the stimulus, instruction, and warning of Europe's past history, a new commonwealth and brotherhood of men who shall speak one language and obey one code of Federal laws. The Englishman, Irishman, and Scotsman—the German, Frenchman, and Italian—are known no longer as such, but as American citizens. Into this number and dignity the Americans wisely admitted their former slaves—no longer chattels, but fellow-citizens. Preparation for growth and development, for local self-government and national control, were made by the founders of the States Constitution; and have been—with the one great mistake—nobly carried out in practice, and on a scale unparalleled in the history of the world.

But, alas! in South Africa up to the present moment no provision has been made for the spread of Europeans, or for the necessary protection of natives involved in that movement. The brute-force frontier-man, calling the black his

natural enemy, would know only the advance of conquest. He would seize all the land of the natives, disqualify them from owning an acre of it, and only allow them to remain on it as vassals, in practical servitude on account of their colour. This doctrine is hateful to an English-speaking man, and indeed to every man of European education. *But there is at the present hour no other mode of acquiring fresh territory in South Africa;* so he submits to it with greater or less disgust and compunction. The friends of the natives have too often tried to keep back the advancing wave of Europeans, pointing out as a barrier the boundaries of the native country. Then the British Government, till quite recently, has never recognised the principle of growth of the European race in South Africa. It has simply shut its eyes to the fact or law—for such it is. This is the real secret of the opposition to the Imperial Government in South Africa; and it is not an unreasonable opposition.

Probably steps in the direction of orderly expansion would have been taken at an earlier date by Her Majesty's Government, but for sad misapprehension of the real state of the case. They were misled into believing that the natural expansion of the Europeans in South Africa was caused by race feeling. Capital has been made out of "Dutch antipathies" to the English. "The Boer love of independence" is spoken of as if it were something peculiar to himself. We are told that he does not like to see the smoke of a neighbour's house, and so on. Now when sheep-farms consist of three square miles, as they usually do throughout South Africa, it is not often that neighbours are troubled with the smoke of one another's houses! The dislike of the frontier-man to restraint is not characteristic of Dutch-speaking colonists; but of all borderers, who have the feelings of backwoodsmen in America; and it departs with education and civilisation. The tendency of the whole South African European population, English as well as Dutch, to move northward, is not caused by a "Boer love of independence," as some have imagined, but simply by a desire common to both races, to obtain cheaper and better land, and secure an easier and pleasanter life, from the pastoral farmer's point

of view. Nationality has nothing to do with this movement. The freeing of the slaves quickened it, and developed it, but did not cause it; for it was in full operation in the time of the Dutch East India Company, and formed one of their difficulties.

If the United States were right in regulating the spread of white men westward, and if the Northern States of the Union were right in determining at all hazards to maintain inviolate the Union of the United States, then was the British Government wrong in South Africa, as acting in the highest interests of the European race spreading northward there, when it allowed one swarm after another of its subjects to pass out of the Colony northward, and assume independence on its borders. This was bad policy in the interests, commercial and otherwise, of the Imperial Government itself; it was unjust and short-sighted towards our colonists in South Africa; it was no kindness, but the opposite, towards the communities whose separation secured our sanction; and it has led to endless complications and serious perils in connection with the native races. The crowning act of this short-sightedness was the Sand River Convention, in which precious document our rulers, with light heart, practically gave up for ourselves and for our loyal colonists all right, title, or portion in the northward development of Southern Africa. Happily this folly was not repeated either in the Pretoria Convention or in the Convention of London, in both of which the boundaries of the Transvaal were laid down.

The colonist sees the unoccupied territories: in many cases he knows how well disposed are the natives, provided they are fairly treated, not as enemies but as friends; and he forms the opinion that a General Government ought to smooth the way by which a territory in South Africa might be peacefully opened up and occupied by Europeans as well as by its native owners. But the British Government has had no answer to his questions, or rather one unwise answer—"Ye shall not spread northward." Not long ago a certain chief offered a magnificent territory to the British Government. I have elsewhere related how some time afterwards a

body of respectable colonists and Englishmen, unconnected with politics or speculation, requested the sanction of Her Majesty's Government to settle some five hundred families in the district in question, stating that they regarded as indispensable the sanction of the chief and the British Government. The authorities in Downing Street referred the matter to the High Commissioner. Sir Hercules Robinson opposed the application, declaring that he could not see the difference between the above proposal and filibustering. So much the worse for Her Majesty's Government when thus advised; for the difference is as great as in any other case where the contrast "healthful and baneful," "lawful and unlawful," "right and wrong," could be established. And thus the reasonable, peaceful growth of the country is retarded; and unoccupied lands are really kept from the deserving, and practically made the prizes to be won by freebooting and bloodshed.

The successful Governments of the North form a perfect contrast to the unhappy condition of the numerous fighting Republics of South America. In Canada and in the United States there is the oneness of the General Government, along with the freedom of local self-government. For a time the English Government, acting in South Africa in behalf of the European community, proceeded on the lines afterwards acted on by the Government of the United States, and resolved to use force to ensure that the Europeans in South Africa should become one people and live under one Government. And so when European colonists moved beyond the borders of the Colony, the English Government, acting in the true interest of the South African community, followed these pioneers into Natal and into the Orange River Sovereignty, and in both places asserted the supremacy of the English Government in South Africa.

The country now called Natal had been well-nigh denuded of its population by the terrible slaughter and devastation spread by Tshaka, the Zulu king, who was murdered by his brother in 1828. A few English were the first European occupants of the country. They found natives living in small numbers here and there in fastnesses, leaving one of

the most fertile countries a wilderness. The spreading Cape Colonists, now aggrieved because their slaves had been freed, found their way to Natal and engaged in war with the Zulus who were under Umdigane (Dingaan), the murderer of Tshaka. The Colonists were unsuccessful till Umpanda (Panda), the brother of Dingaan, joined them; when the united forces completely routed Dingaan, who was killed by some of his own men. The Dutch-speaking Colonists now turned their arms against Fako, chief of the Amapondo, living to the south-west of Natal, who complained of their hostility to the Governor at the Cape. Action was taken upon this complaint of the Pondo chief, troops were sent to Natal, and after a trifling resistance, the Colonists of extreme views left Natal for what is now the Transvaal, while the remainder obtained free grants of farms in the beautiful and fruitful districts of Natal, which they and their descendants still occupy. The romantic incidents connected with the early European occupancy of Natal, and the first struggles of the Colonists with the warlike Zulus, the famous ride of the Englishman from Natal to Cape Colony, for help to the English garrison, besieged by the Dutch-speaking Cape Colonists, will assuredly live in the history of South Africa.

The colony of Natal may be said to have been established without cost to the Imperial Exchequer. The Colony is a healthy military station for Imperial troops. Indeed, fever-stricken soldiers could not do better than in the Cape Colony or the uplands of Natal, where the fever and other results of the Indian or Burmese climate would soon leave them.

Natal was for some time regarded as an integral part of the Cape Colony, but was established as a separate colony in 1856 under a Lieutenant-Governor, and since 1879 under a Governor. The Constitution granted in 1856 was modified in 1875, in 1879, and in 1883. The Executive now consists of the Heads of Departments and two members nominated by the Governor from among the Deputies elected to the Legislative Council. The present Natal Legislative Council consists of thirty members, seven of whom are nominated, the rest are elected. For years there has been a party of colonists in Natal who desire that Responsible

Government should be granted to that colony. In 1874 they carried a resolution in their Legislative Council in favour of this course. This decision was afterwards reversed; but the agitation is unremitting on the part of those who desire that the management of the affairs of Natal should be in the hands of the colonists. To most people outside Natal this seems a premature and profitless policy in the present condition of South-east Africa. It may be that certain of the local methods of the Imperial Government might be improved. It is certain that the intelligence, energy, and courage of the European community will find abundant scope in Natal itself and in the adjoining territories, under the reasonable policy which, it is to be hoped, will now be adopted by Her Majesty's Government in South-east Africa.

Although the first Europeans found Natal almost without native inhabitants, such was its renown for fruitfulness, and such its advantages and opportunities under the British Government that a dense native population speedily flocked into the country. A trifling poll-tax was imposed on them by Government, but the richness of the soil and its adaptation for flocks and herds enabled these natives soon to acquire what was to them wealth—women, cattle, and native beer,—with absolutely nothing to do. Refugees from Zululand continually arrived—usually men who were in danger of the sharp spear of the Zulu chief. At first the jurisdiction over these people was committed to certain natives as chiefs; but in 1875 this was changed, and European magistrates were appointed to administer Zulu law and custom in the various districts, presided over by a Native High Court with a European Judge.

We have seen that in the Cape Colony race distinctions are unknown before the law, and that a large proportion of the electors are coloured people. In Natal, however, besides possessing the property qualification, a native must be exempt from (Natal) native law for seven years, and must obtain a certificate to that effect from the Governor of the Colony, before he is entitled to be registered as an elector. For many years the only connection between the Govern-

ment of Natal and its native subjects was the annual payment of the poll-tax by the latter. They were left alone in their pagan life at their kraals, and not even roads were made through those districts in which locations were situated. At one time a fee of £5 was imposed on any native who wished to marry after the Christian manner; but this singularly unwise impost was subsequently repealed.

As the Zulu refugees had usually committed some serious offence in Zululand, and could not return to that country, they were, in the first instance, welcomed to Natal, and were relied on in case of trouble with Zululand; and I am not aware that any cause for distrust has ever been given. But the ease with which they could satisfy all their wants made the Zulus in Natal offensively indolent in the vicinity of energetic colonists. The Zulus had presented to them no inducement to work, and consequently did not work. Coolies were therefore brought from India to work on plantations, while within a few miles of them there would be hundreds of stalwart Zulu men doing positively nothing. Natal has thus been a kind of Zulu elysium, affording these runaways all that they wanted, and no sharp spear. It is an old story now; but it would seem that they got their holdings in Natal on too easy terms. I am not aware that an English labouring man in Natal could become possessed of mealie fields and grazing-ground for stock on the easy terms on which these have been obtained by the "refugees" from Zululand. That such stragglers should actually have been encouraged to coalesce afresh, and should have had tribal laws provided for them, and administered in an English colony by Englishmen, seems to be very questionable policy. It would surely have been only reasonable as well as politic that these refugees should have had to submit to English law in the English colony to which they fled. If simpler forms and modes of procedure had been sanctioned as a temporary measure, these should not have been allowed to become crystallised, but the common law of the Colony should have been kept before the native judge or magistrate as a model to follow.

In such cases, attention has to be given not only to the

difficulty or problem of the hour, but some thought must be bestowed on the morrow. To put all these refugees on locations, and leave them there to buy women who would dig their gardens for them and make their beer, while the men themselves could live the disengaged and brutal life of Zulu warriors, without any of the periodic wars or other usual penalties of that savage life, seemed doubtless a very easy present settlement. But by placing Europeans to administer their laws and customs and not our own in Natal, we have gone a great way towards perpetuating a state of degradation which we should nevertheless all wish might pass away. Then, instead of native servant-girls, Natal European society employs men from these unlovely locations, and trusts them in Colonists' houses in doing the ordinary work of housemaid and nurse-girl. This is an arrangement with nothing to recommend it, and it ought to be discontinued. In other parts of South Africa no class of native servant is more satisfactory than the native nurse-girl.

Natal has thus got on the wrong lines in these and other matters. It is not asserted or implied that in Natal, or anywhere else, men can be made virtuous by Act of Parliament; but wise laws have reference to the future as well as the present. I take it that the object in Natal, as elsewhere where English rule and protection are extended, is gradually and wisely to arrange for the future lifting up of people of all classes and colours to the same standing before the common law, and for the eventual possession by all Her Majesty's subjects of the same civil rights and privileges. The danger to be avoided—and it is a great one—is the adoption of such a policy as will lead to the severance of the community into two camps—the black and the white. Such a course is clearly unstatesmanlike and sure to lead to the gravest mischief. As to society, with its likes and its dislikes, those who are received by it and those who are tabooed, the statesman says nothing; but for the highest purposes of Government he lays his plans so that all shall be citizens, and all shall be under one law, impartially administered.

The future of Natal is one of assured prosperity, with

ordinary care and attention on the part of those who have to do with its affairs. There are those who strongly urge that to Natal should be added the Transkei Territories and Pondoland on the south-west, with Basutoland on the west, and Zululand and Swasiland on the north. Others would administer Native Territories separately, under a High Commissioner, in the first instance, leaving the more permanent method of their Government a question for future consideration. That the Imperial Government should have charge of those territories bordering on Natal for some time to come is certain; and possibly the separate local government of each, where each territory differs from the others, would be most advisable in the meantime. That these countries should be wisely opened up so that unoccupied districts might be legally and peacefully obtained by Natal colonists and their children, and not be the prey of filibusters, is a point on which all will be agreed.

As the Colonists were followed to Natal by the advantages of British rule and protection, so in what was called the Orange River Sovereignty, similar action was taken by Her Majesty's Government, and a British Resident was stationed at Bloemfontein. Persistence in this policy would soon have brought its own reward. Unoccupied countries had been found: in some cases land had been rented from the native occupants—in others the natives had been conquered by the Colonists. There was no longer inducement for the most adventurous to go farther. The work of the General Government, in the interests of all South Africa, ought therefore to have been to introduce education to those distant districts, and to perform in the Free State and the Transvaal what it had done at the beginning of the century, in the quelling of lawlessness and disorder, at Swellendam and at Graaff-Reinet. But, unfortunately, just at this time, an opposite idea occurred to Her Majesty's Government. They would follow the spreading Europeans in South Africa no farther—they would rather abandon them to their fate. Nothing was then known of the interior of the country. It was supposed to be a series of sand-banks inhabited by wild beasts and wilder men. It was thought to be a

country which would never be of any use, and the Boers would probably have to return to the Cape Colony. In any case their adventures must be undertaken at their own risk. This was the beginning of the shrinking or retreating policy of the Imperial Government acting in behalf of the European community in South Africa.

Our Sovereignty was declared beyond the Orange River in 1848; in 1854 it was again withdrawn, and the Sovereignty became the Free State. This was done in spite of the strongly-expressed and genuine opposition of the burghers of the Sovereignty, who sent a respectable and influential deputation to London to protest against the abandonment of the Territory. There was no danger and no huge responsibility in retaining charge of the sheep-walks of the Free State, but the Government of the day had come to a determination, and withstood the prayers of the Deputation, upholding the treaty of Aliwal North, which conveyed to the Free State its independence. I am told that a deep and lasting impression was then made on the minds of some colonists, who were inclined by birth and education to be favourable to Her Majesty's Government, by what they felt they could not but regard as the short-sightedness and the selfishness which guided the Imperial policy of the day.

The abandonment of the Sovereignty was of course a radical mistake; but since that time nothing but goodwill to that country has been displayed by England. This was conspicuously shown in the peaceful clearing out of the Griqua owners of a considerable part of the Free State by Sir George Grey, acting for Her Majesty's Government, and in placing and protecting them in what is now called Griqualand East. Many of the Free State farms were not bought in the first instance, but only rented from their Griqua owners; while other Griquas positively refused to sell their land. But when the arrangement of Sir George Grey was carried through, and a new country given to the Griquas by the Imperial Government, the Free State farmers were able to purchase on easy terms the land thus vacated by their predecessors in the Free State. Mr. Froude seems to

be ignorant of this event in South African history. The right of England to one part of Griqualand (which includes the Diamond Fields) is just the same kind of right that the burghers of the Free State have to the rest of Griqualand, which they named the Free State. In both cases it was obtained from the Griquas. In both cases England has acted generously — she gave the Griquas a new country, and thus enabled them to leave the Free State to the burghers; and when the friends of the Free State pushed its very questionable claims as to the wild district of Kimberley, Her Majesty's Government were induced to yield, and granted £90,000 to the Free State as a *solatium*, with the offer of £15,000 when the first turf of a Free State Railway should be turned—a sum which has yet to be claimed.

About the time of the abandonment of the Orange River Sovereignty, a second and equally fatal step was taken by England towards the destruction of her own influence in Southern Africa, and towards the substitution of the South American for the North American idea of Government. In 1848 a reward of £2000 was offered for the apprehension of a certain British subject named Andries Pretorius, who had opposed the English in Natal and had fled to the Transvaal. The latter country had been evacuated by Moselekatse, and farmers from the Colony were finding their way into it. Four years passed, and in 1852 the same Mr. Pretorius and others were invited to meet two British Commissioners at the Sand River to transact "international" affairs; and a Convention was entered into which has been more than once referred to in these pages. Little or no attention was given to the question in England at the time. The Missionary Societies, and the readers of their literature, were then the only well-informed people as to the countries lying to the north of the Cape Colony. To suppose that the Government knew the nature of the country which they were abandoning is impossible. In ignorance and in carelessness, the Sand River Convention was concluded—an agreement altogether unworthy of England as an Imperial Power, and as acting in behalf of the European population of South Africa.[1]

[1] Dr. Livingstone, in his *Missionary Travels*, calls the Sand River policy

In that Convention England had practically abdicated her leading position in South Africa, and had made it possible for the door to be shut against English commerce in the interior of the country north of the Colony. The boundaries of the Free State were defined; but our Commissioners at the Sand River left the Transvaal lord of the interior, without any boundary whatever except on the South. All other South African colonies and states had boundaries — the Transvaal was the country of the future—the only one reserved for growth! People smiled when they heard that a few Colonial farmers had styled the new territory, "The South African Republic." They pointed out that they were uninstructed, and that at that very time they were not one people at all, but were living in three separate patriarchal communities,—(which were afterwards merged into one). In reality, however, there was nothing to smile at in the grand title; it corresponded well with the grand future which English ignorance and thoughtlessness had opened up for them, to the serious detriment of the Cape Colony, of England, and of South Africa.

It was impossible, however, to be both in and out of South Africa at one and the same time. Our statesmen soon found that they had not been able to divest themselves of the responsibility which, by the Aliwal North and Sand River treaties, they sought to impose upon others; responsibility still clung to them. In their difficulties with the Basuto, the Free State twice asked our interference and assistance, which were granted. The third request was from the Basuto that we should again interfere, to which in like manner we agreed. The President of the Transvaal requested a Commission to settle the western boundary of the Transvaal Republic, and at his desire Governor Keate of Natal was nominated arbitrator, should the Commissioners not agree. Thus, in a left-handed, inconsequent, and hazy manner, the English Government was still supreme in the

"A paroxysm of generalship which might have been good had it not been totally inappropriate to the case. . . . From unfortunate ignorance of the country we had to govern, an able and sagacious governor adopted a policy proper and wise had it been in front of our enemies, but altogether inappropriate for our friends, against whom it has been applied."

country, and tacitly so recognised even among the independent states. On this side of the water most people seemed to think that in some talismanic way the Governor at the Cape was adequately representing the Imperial Government in that country, and meeting our obligations to the native races on our borders in South Africa.

The serious mistake which had been made in allowing the European population in South Africa to separate and to drift, without one wholesome thought of the future of the people as a whole, or of our own exclusion from the best part of the country, at length occurred to English statesmen. We had fled from responsibility in one form—our flight brought responsibility upon us in another form; we came to realise that we were responsible for a disunited European population in South Africa; and more recently it dawned on us that we were responsible also for a policy which would shut ourselves and our commerce out of the interior of the country.

We are all aware that special steps were taken by Her Majesty's Government, during the High Commissionership of Sir Bartle Frere, to repair the error which the English Government had previously made in South Africa, and to reunite the Europeans in that country. This policy was approved by both sides of the House of Commons; and men of both parties attended the banquet given to the new High Commissioner before he left London, to bid him God-speed. If high character, first-class ability, and indomitable perseverance could have secured success, then was success certain to those who sought out and sent Sir Bartle Frere to South Africa. But all these and other high qualities failed to command success in carrying through the policy with which he was charged. The rejoining of the separate parts of the European community was not a work which could be accomplished speedily. Prejudices were deep-rooted, ignorance was great, genuine mischief-makers were everywhere. In any case the operation, to be a successful one, needed time; and it was required that there should be no blundering on the part of subordinates; and unbounded and enthusiastic support from England. Had all these requisites been pres-

ent, some measure of success might have been secured; as it was, all were conspicuously absent. While everything went well, the general English public approved of what was done, or were silent. When unprecedented disaster happened—beyond the range of the personal oversight of the High Commissioner—the censure fell on one devoted head. Sir Bartle Frere was recalled from South Africa, without having once suggested that censure ought in justice to be transferred to other shoulders. He was thus generous, alike to those who employed him and to those whom he employed.

The earnest efforts of Lord Carnarvon to repair the previous mistakes on the part of our Government in South Africa, in letting small European populations "drift" beyond central control, were characterised by a true appreciation of the work to be done, and by sympathy for all the inhabitants of South Africa. But Lord Carnarvon would probably now give longer time to such an effort, and would take into account not only the large native population, but also the peculiar condition of some of the Europeans in South Africa as to education and knowledge of the outside world. But, alas! to the evil of a too hasty advance, were speedily added the baleful consequences of a still more hasty retreat from the country, on the part of the Imperial Government.

It would serve no good purpose to review in detail the events connected with the annexation and retrocession of the Transvaal. It was never the wish of the English people or the English Government to deny to the Transvaal people the right of local self-government. Their leaders knew that that would never be denied to them. The Transvaal rising was not dictated, as was supposed in England, by love of freedom, or preference for republicanism rather than a limited monarchy. It was inspired by men who were planning a policy which should banish the English language and English influence from South Africa. In its deepest springs the Transvaal rising was not a "Boer" movement at all. It took time and effort to make it even popular among the Boers; and probably misconception never played such a part as it did in the stories which were told to the Transvaal

Boer about English policy on the one hand, or in the so-called information which was spread in England about the burghers of the Transvaal on the other. If these burghers had been given at the outset a free Volksraad and the use of their own language, every one of them (except such as were at that time pledged to raise a "trek-party" large enough to conquer the native tribes to the north) would have finally and cheerfully resumed his ordinary peaceful avocations. And it must be said further, in justice to the genuine Transvaal farmer, that he never denounced the English power or the English motive and policy in South Africa as these were denounced in inconsiderate party contests in England —the reports of which were soon translated and circulated in South Africa. The nature of the Transvaal rising was very much as if one part of Canada rose against the rest: or as if a frontier State or Territory rose against the United States of America; and the men who prompted the rising and fanned it into actual conflict and bloodshed have the least right of any class or party in South Africa to style themselves "patriots." Their action was a blow directly dealt against the freedom, progress, and union of Europeans in South Africa. Britain may have been too hasty in entering the Transvaal at all, and too nervous, in first promising the continuance of the Volksraad, and then (frightened at the malicious scheming of a small hostile European clique) in constituting a nominated Legislative Council as in a Crown Colony in place of the promised Volksraad—the elected body to which the people of the Transvaal had been accustomed. There was here a sharp contrast between our policy in the Transvaal, and the action of the victorious North towards the conquered South after the American Civil War, when the past was blotted out, and their state rights were freely accorded to the South, although it was then in the attitude of a conquered country. But men like Mr. Paul Kruger and Mr. Pretorius, who served in the British Legislative Council of the Transvaal, knew well that the promise as to the opening of the Volksraad was only deferred, and that it would be upheld when the excitement and intrigue of adventurers had passed away. Thus the

game of a few in the Transvaal was successfully played at the expense of the many. The exit of the English Government brought no prosperity to the Transvaal as designing men had prophesied it would. The natives—who form the vast majority of the inhabitants—were lost in wonder and in disappointment. The "trek-party" among the Boers could ill conceal their chagrin at the too great success of the Transvaal cause; for now, instead of marching from the Transvaal to the conquest of new territories, with a large force of burghers driven out by the English troops, they were compelled to make some fresh arrangement by which they might still go on occupying their heavily-mortgaged farms. Soon the most stubborn and the most prejudiced were taught the lesson that the absence of the English flag and the presence of their own meant the retrogression of the country. These things are generally conceded at this distance of time; and what I have written is not for the purpose of controversy but for the information of the statesman and the general reader.

But while the Transvaal burghers made a bad choice when they listened to the European agitators, it was equally true that the English Government, in entering the Transvaal and annexing it, rejected, or did not think of, another course less riskful and delicate, and far more efficacious, in connection with the great object in view. We could have accepted offered gifts of native territory more valuable than the Transvaal itself; and with these regions in our possession, and leaving each European state in the exercise of its own unfettered local government, might have sought to obtain and uphold the position of a general government for the general advantage of South Africa. We should have remembered that the General Government of the United States is not supreme within each State, as to the local business of that State. The State Government is supreme within its own borders, as to its own defined local affairs.

What might then have been our position on the border of the Transvaal, is our position to-day without trouble or ill-feeling when we occupy Bechuanaland, Zululand, and Swasiland. With peace on the Transvaal borders and no

further chance of filibustering, the burghers will come to remember that "boer" is the proper and ordinary Dutch word for "farmer," and that nowhere is it a good thing for a farmer to forsake his farming either for hunting or for filibustering.

The condition of natives in the Transvaal would be critical according to the letter of the law—which is as repressive as in the Free State. But the Transvaal law has hitherto been largely inoperative, on account of the disproportion between the number of natives and the number of burghers. Many of the native inhabitants have attained a gratifying amount of civilisation. Jealous of English missionaries, the Transvaal authorities consented that the natives of the Transvaal should be taught by German missionaries, and by men of their own Church and their own kindred from the Cape Colony devoting themselves to this work. Many of them have largely benefited by these efforts, and now form a peaceful and useful part of the population. They are, however, denied citizen-rights, and cannot possess land in their own name under a so-called free and republican Government. Except in one or two instances, the Transvaal Government has not apportioned to them lands of their own, as was promised at the time of the Pretoria Convention. But in some cases the missionary has bought farms in his own or his Society's name for the people attending his ministrations, who in this way get some semblance of security as to their holdings.

The policy of the Transvaal Government as to "foreigners"—that is, Europeans of all nationalities—who may settle in the country, is also repressive. I understand it is necessary for such people to live five years in the country, become land-owners, and pay £25 to Government, before they can become electors of the Transvaal. And it would appear that it has recently been decided by the Volksraad to increase the number of years of probation from five to fifteen. This change is in itself indicative of the continued existence of that jealousy of foreigners, and dread of innovations, which characterise the genuine old-fashioned burgher of the outlying districts. It is an effort to retain power in the hands of

the farming class alone, after a mining population have entered the Transvaal, and adopted the country as their home. In the end intelligence will hold the reins. Repressive enactments of this nature never answer. But Her Majesty's Government, with its experience of the past, will be fully content to leave these matters to the local settlement which awaits them within the State.

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Basutoland was brought under English protection in 1868. A strange impatience seems to have always characterised our administrative work in South Africa—so different from our history in India. We seem to have been dogged by the idea that our normal condition was to be out of, and not in, South Africa. Therefore, if ever we undertook a responsibility, it was at a late hour—almost too late, as in the present instance; and we seemed never to rest until we could devolve the responsibility on some one else. Basutoland is a beautiful hilly country, inhabited by a vigorous, industrious, and prosperous population. There are no better customers of our merchants in South Africa. They not only became satisfied with Imperial rule, but were proud of their position. This was shown by their breach of tribal rules in giving up Langalebalele, who had taken refuge in their country. The taxes were paid, and the revenue exceeded the expenditure. When everything was in good working order —instead of "letting well alone," and allowing time also to do its work—we induced the Cape Colony to accept the responsibility of Basutoland, and it was handed over to the Cape in 1871, with £10,000 of surplus revenue. The Colonial Government accepted Basutoland as a dependency; there was taxation—but no representation. It was the unwise resolve to disarm the Basuto which brought the Colonial Government of the country to a close. Over four millions were spent by the Colony in the effort to disarm this tribe, which proved unsuccessful. Many of the Dutch-speaking colonists declared the war to be an unrighteous one, as the Basuto had done no wrong. In the end Basutoland was handed back to the Imperial Government, its people sullen and demoralised. The careful and steady efforts of

Colonel Sir M. Clarke, the Resident Commissioner, were powerfully aided by the appearance of the Bechuanaland Expedition. At the outset it seemed that the opposite result would follow, and that the Basuto were becoming more and more restless, owing to the idea which was spread among them that the Expedition had reference to Basutoland as well as Bechuanaland. But Basuto men found their way to the camp of the Expedition and to headquarters, and were there assured that the Expedition was not in favour of a class or against a class; but that its work was to put down law-breaking and disobedience throughout South Africa. Thus, in an indirect but no less real manner, the well-directed local efforts of the Resident Commissioner in Basutoland were rendered more efficacious by the exhibition of force by Her Majesty's Government in South Africa. There are difficulties, no doubt, before us in Basutoland, but only such as can be met and overcome by Her Majesty's Government. Confidence must be fully restored in the minds of the people; and this can only be done by perseverance in a helpful and continuous policy by the Imperial Government.

The policy of British retreat in South Africa was not unobserved on the continent of Europe. A German trader wanted protection in a desert region on the south-west coast. The German Government emphasised the trader's request. For the English Government to have granted that request, however, would have been in the teeth of the policy of "letting alone." After giving the English Government ample time to make up its mind on the question, and receiving no satisfactory reply, the German Government itself assumed the Protectorate of Angra Pequena—not probably for the sake of that worthless region, but naturally instigated to much larger ideas by the marvellous conduct of the English Government at this juncture. The European inhabitants of the Colony of all parties were indignant at what had been suffered to take place—as they thought, in sheer carelessness. There was also considerable dissatisfaction in England. But the reply which the Germans give is unanswerable. It is to the effect that the Power which had permitted in South Africa the revolt of subjects, and

the division of the European race there, by the establishment of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal Republic, could not consistently make any objection to the appearance also of a German colony or state. The separated states would have no right to object, nor would the Power which had sanctioned their separate existence. The vacillation of English policy, and our apparent retreat from the country, were further evidenced by the unopposed outrages perpetrated for years by freebooters on native chiefs in Bechuanaland, who had been our allies. This did not escape notice at Berlin by a Power which is on the outlook for Colonial possessions, and is ambitious of a Colonial career. Whether such a career is compatible with the German military system, is an important question of the future. The sand-banks of Angra Pequena were not taken for gold, or for anything else than sand, by Chancellor von Bismarck. But England appeared to be nowhere in South Africa; there was no Power visible except within certain boundaries, and beyond these there was hideous disorder. He who should reach Bechuanaland and arrest wrong-doing and establish law and order, without interfering with one of those colonies or states, would be doing a distinguished action, and one which would speak for itself all the world over, and which would have its own reward in the ownership of countries the inhabitants of which had begged for British administration, and had been refused it. Shut out from Bechuanaland, our commerce and our colonists would have been deprived of that northern outlook which naturally belongs to them, under the Imperial Government.

Perhaps our greatest failure, however, as a governing people, has been in Zululand. In confederating South Africa in a hasty manner, the conquest of Zululand was held to be necessary—otherwise there would be no equality between the condition of those who inhabited the long-settled and peaceful districts of the Cape Colony, and the colonists who lived in proximity to the immense power of Cetywayo. It is true the colonists of Natal had been long accustomed to this neighbour; and it is quite unfair and untrue to say that the Zulu War was "got up" by Natal

colonists. I know of no ground for this assertion. But from the point of view of those who were regarding the affairs of the whole country, this feeling of security on the part of Natal seemed one of the elements of danger. It was as if a man had been seen with his gun at his shoulder for a long time, and a spectator should argue that he would not fire at all because he had already held the gun so long at his shoulder without doing so. It would be quite reasonable for those answerable for the public peace to say in reply, "That is the only man in the company who has a loaded gun at his shoulder. The man has his reasons for not firing at once; but his attitude warns me at least to go up to him and ask for an explanation." I think this illustration correctly and fairly describes the attitude of the confederating High Commissioner when he approached Cetywayo. Even Bishop Colenso was not of opinion that nothing should be done in Zululand in behalf of the general peace of the country; but he thought that the appointment of a suitable Resident would be enough at that time. The Zulu raids into Natal no doubt took place, and at another time little notice would probably have been taken of them. At this crisis, however, it was argued that the invasion of Her Majesty's territory was a daring act of open hostility on the part of the Zulus; and Zululand was invaded. As long as success attended the movement, it was disapproved of in England, chiefly by those who disapprove of all wars. It was called high-handed by others, who were nevertheless not prepared to condemn the policy. But the slaughter of Isandhlana produced a great revulsion of feeling, perfectly natural but utterly distracting and inconclusive from the statesman's point of view. The policy of Her Majesty's Government was worthy or unworthy, wise or unwise, before as after Isandhlana. Military out-manœuvring on the part of the Zulus did not make the cause of the English in Zululand a bad one. But the decision of feeling and not of judgment was, that the Zulus must be chastised on account of their past success; and that then, for no reason that I have ever heard, but simply from sheer disgust, we should evacuate Zululand! And so the slaughter of Ulundi followed that

of Isandhlana. The man who had had his loaded gun so long at his shoulder himself fell into our hands, and we took Cetywayo away with us from Zululand. Contrary to the petitions of the conquered Zulus themselves, and to the earnest advice of colonists, Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had been appointed Special Commissioner for South-east Africa, and thus superseded Sir Bartle Frere in that part of the country, nominated arbitrarily a dozen Zulu headmen, to take charge of a people totally unaccustomed to such a method of government. It was then represented that we had shed much Zulu blood, and given much of our own to introduce civilised government into South Africa, and all for the special benefit of men who, like the Boers, had turned out thankless and even despiteful. It was asked, Why should we have fought the battle of the Boers and have destroyed the Zulu power? And so Cetywayo was brought to London, and afterwards sent back to Zululand; but we did not restore Zululand to Cetywayo. The men were there who had his wives and his cattle, some of whom he would no doubt have had to punish as a Zulu man and a Zulu chief, or fall into utter contempt. His sudden death put an end to all his plans. But there was no end to our deplorable mismanagement of affairs in Zululand. After Ulundi, and with Cetywayo a captive in our hands, the Zulu people looked to us for the government of their country, and they looked in vain. They asked for English magistrates, and we gave them a dozen Zulu headmen. It would have been easy to have granted the request of the Zulus; and would it not have been in accordance with the policy which caused us to enter the country? We could have secured the natives in possession of their fields and grazing-lands, and raised a tax for the expenses of Government. What has been done with such happy results in India could have been done in Zululand, where in the native population there are probably as fine men as to physique as are to be found in any part of the world. There are rich gold mines in Zululand: these might have been opened up. European planters and farmers might have been brought into districts set apart for them, for

Zululand was then a wide country. The territory of Zululand, like that of Basutoland under the Queen, would have done far more than pay for its own Government; and the blood of Zulus and of Englishmen, shed in such profusion at Isandhlana and Ulundi, would at least have secured a peaceful and progressive Zululand. But it must be declared that instead of showing in Zululand our usual instincts as a governing race, we ourselves have been governed by a hesitancy and a meanness which are really contemptible. We refused to establish order in the country. Having broken the military power of the Zulus, we made no provision by which a respectable law-abiding Englishman or colonist could obtain land in the country; and we looked on with folded hands while most valuable lands were being seized by adventurers from the Transvaal, who had accepted service under native chiefs or headmen as in Bechuanaland. We calmly said we were not responsible. But our hypocrisy in saying so was brought out clearly when Germany, naturally thinking that such disturbances meant that Zululand was No-man's-land, proceeded to take possession of the Bay of St. Lucia on the Zululand coast. Like the veritable dog in the manger, we then announced that we were in possession, and that they might not have that which we nevertheless refused to turn to good account for ourselves or others.

In concluding the present chapter, one cannot help exclaiming—How different would have been the past history of South Africa had the Imperial Government steadily recognised its responsibility there as the Supreme Power, especially with reference to Native Territories; and had it recognised and made adequate provision for the inevitable spread of Europeans northward.

CHAPTER III

CAPE POLITICS AND THEIR TRUE SPHERE

In its civil war and subsequent adjustment of affairs the Federal Government of the United States has settled for itself, and for every nation which is able to profit by its experience, several vital problems. Among these solved problems is to be found this, that slavery in a community of Christian freemen is impracticable; and this, that there is no half-way house in a democracy, between holding chattels and recognising fellow-citizens.

It is not unfair or incorrect to say that little is known even in the country districts of the Cape Colony, and less still in the Transvaal, about the American civil war—its causes and its results. The younger colonists are, no doubt, well instructed on these subjects; but the older men, in whose hands the power still lies, know very little about either Europe or America. What they know in too many cases is only what it has pleased their "uitlander" friends and acquaintances to make known to them, which is not unfrequently incorrect and misleading even to grotesqueness. This ignorance alone is the sufficient reason which must be given in explanation of recent retrogressive and dangerous movements with reference to the franchise in the Transvaal and in the Cape Colony.

Although responsible government has been enjoyed at the Cape for some fifteen years, it is not easy to present to the English reader a clear idea of Cape political parties, or of Cape politics. There has been no continuous well-defined policy characteristic of either the one "side" or the other.

Sir Thomas Scanlen would say his was the true "Colonial policy," inasmuch as he desired to hand over populous native territories such as Basutoland, the Transkei, and Pondoland, to the abler management of the Imperial Government, while the Colonial Government should give its undivided attention to the proper conduct of its own Colonial affairs within its own borders. This Colonial school of politicians is willing to give a fair sum—necessarily a small one—from the Colonial customs towards the Administration of Native Territories by the Imperial Government. Mr. Sprigg and Mr. Upington, nothing abashed by their past adverse experiences in native government, would assert that theirs is the true "Colonial" policy, because they would annex territories to the Colony on every side, and would expect Imperial help in fighting those native tribes who might resist their action. Instead of giving Colonial money for Imperial assistance in Bechuanaland, the present Cape Ministry offered to help the Imperial Government out of its supposed difficulties in Bechuanaland, if Her Majesty's Government would pay the Cape Government handsomely for its administrative and other talents. I have related how this was declined—the Imperial Government was not quite satisfied to occupy the humble position assigned to it by Mr. Sprigg and Mr. Upington. The policy of the present Cape Ministry may be summarised thus—"Africa for the (white) Africans, with English men and money to support us, but without the inconvenience of Imperial advice or control." A critic of Sir Thomas Scanlen's party would say that they have passed into the shade of the opposition by losing confidence in their own doctrines and in their own power to commend them to the Cape electors. A critic of the present Ministry would charge them in the past with rashness, even to recklessness, and a contempt for the Imperial Government which, although to some extent justified by our weakness and vacillation, was undue and unbecoming, as well as detrimental to the Colony.

There is a fallacious political doctrine still entertained by one or two Colonial politicians which has already wrought much mischief in South Africa, and would, if not exposed,

work more. It is said that you cannot govern South Africa otherwise than as South Africans wish to be governed. Now what does this mean? Does it mean that the Cape Colony or Free States would resent interference with their local self-government? In that case I would concede the position, and at once grant that the Imperial Government should not thus interfere. The local European Governments of South Africa must fight out their own local political battles, and settle their own local questions in their own way. But then every colony and every state in South Africa is circumscribed by its boundaries. Its local duties and obligations lie within these lines. It has no function for acting outside. For three years no colony or state put down freebooting in Bechuanaland or Zululand, or even attempted the task. Every state and every colony declared that it was the place and duty of the Imperial Government to do this. Thus the benefits and the disadvantages of their local methods and peculiarities would expend themselves within the limits of their own territories; while the actual presence of the Imperial Power, presiding over Native and unoccupied Territories, and affording as far as might be desired a Central Government, would have the tendency to elevate and lead forward the various communities with which it thus came into friendly contact. Such, notwithstanding all shortcomings and inadequacy of method, has been the happy influence of England in the past, and such will be her influence in the future—intensified now, however, by our own grasp of the work to be done, and by the growing intelligence of the colonists themselves. The only real objectors in South Africa would come from two quarters—the inveterate land-jobber, and those who regard the natives as "our natural enemies." But as these people have hitherto declined all share in the expense of a Territorial System of opening up the country, the unreasonableness of their forcing their views, on matters beyond their own line of duty and responsibility, would be apparent to all.

The reader is also aware that there are, or have been, those who would cry "Africa for the Afrikanders," *i.e.* for the Dutch-speaking colonists; and would impose the ideas of two

centuries ago, not only upon the colony or state which is privileged with their immediate presence, but upon the whole of South Africa. And the few English politicians who wished England to leave South Africa altogether, or to have only a coaling station there, were practically playing into the hands of these men, and advocating a surrender to them. Probably no one in England holds these views now; while in South Africa the cry that Africa must be the portion of a few political agitators—a mere section of the Colonial population at its southernmost point—men who know nothing of the history of Europe or of America, and who have themselves no power either to conquer the country or to hold it —needs only to be calmly stated to be given up by all who know anything of the world as it really is, and of its past history. That men who know better should endeavour to mislead the ignorant country people at the Cape with dreams which they know can never be realised, and which are based, as they also know, upon the grossest ignorance, is one of the difficulties of the situation; but it is a difficulty which advancing education will gradually remove.

The present Cape Ministry do not seem to have fully profited by their Basutoland lesson, having recently taken charge by annexation of the large Transkeian Territories, with a numerous native population. The true friends of the Colony regard this adventurous course as calculated seriously to retard real progress, especially in governmental affairs. In seeking to be Imperial it ceases to be symmetrically self-governing; and the best settlement of the difficulty would seem to be that which took place in the case of Basutoland—to hand the Transkei back to the Imperial Government. There can be no doubt that were the Cape Government to follow this course, the material interests of the Colonists would not suffer, while the governmental development and progress of the Colony would be secured by the step. The only alternatives really before the Colony are to hand back the Territory, or to grant to all its residents who desire it and are duly qualified, irrespective of colour, the privileges and the rights of Her Majesty's free and Colonial subjects.

During the session of the Cape Parliament of 1886 poli-

tical parties as such were more clearly defined on matters of opinion, and there was some indication of a distinct cleavage on the ever-present native question. If this should further develop, the Ministerial side would hold the former "Southern" view of the United States, while the Opposition would hold the "Northern" or Abolitionist view. This expresses fairly the two standpoints, making allowance for the difference in locality. This important development and declaration of opinion upon a vital question, took place during a noteworthy debate on the subject of what may be called shortly a "colour franchise." A bill was brought forward by the Ministry, ostensibly for the purpose of granting the franchise to the inhabitants of the Transkei, recently annexed to the Cape Colony. This rich district contains a sprinkling of European settlers, but is chiefly inhabited by natives, some of them warlike Kaffirs, others civilised Griquas and Fingoes. It is startling to find that the provisions of this bill practically turned upon the question of colour, and Mr. Upington and his followers defended this really slave-holding principle, now totally abjured by Englishmen and Americans alike. Through the well-directed efforts of the Opposition, the most objectionable features of the bill were removed in the Lower House. In consequence of this, Mr. Upington went to the Upper House, and spoke against his own bill as thus liberalised, with the result that it was withdrawn. It is feared, however, that it may be again brought forward in an equally if not more objectionable form.[1]

The views which were expressed by Mr. Upington and his followers in this debate deserve the closest attention in this country, as they would seem to be quite opposed to both the

[1] It would seem that the movement for disfranchising the coloured people is making progress this year in the Cape Legislature. An eminent Colonist, in a letter on the subject, refers to a Bill which had been introduced by the Cape Government under the title of a Registration Bill—the provisions of which, he asserts, are such as would disfranchise native voters who have exercised the right of voting for thirty years. He does not hesitate to say that the end in view is to strike at the influence of the English or progressive party in the Colony, through the removal of their native supporters from the list of enfranchised citizens.

spirit and the letter of English institutions. In the debate, Mr. Upington, then Premier of the Cape, fully acknowledged that he thought there should be a difference observed in the matter of the franchise between natives and Europeans, and that what he proposed for the Transkei now might with advantage be brought forward with reference to the Colony itself. The Secretary of the Afrikander Bond, who is a member of the Lower House, made a speech, in which he emphasised the difference between the European and the Afrikander view of the coloured people. The Europeans treated them as equals; the Afrikanders regarded them as born to be their servants, and as their natural enemies.

Mr. Theron's words, as reported in the *Cape Times*, were as follow:—

"The native question was the question of the future. In the Cape Colony there were two classes of whites: the real Colonists—the sons of the soil—and the Europeans who came from abroad; and between these two sections stood the natives. The Colonists had always looked upon the natives as their natural enemies. They did not look on them with contempt, but only as their servants. Europeans, on the contrary, put the blacks on the same level as the whites, and this was distinctly against the views of the Colonists, who had found by experience that that was impossible. Now the hon. member for Namaqualand (Mr. Merriman) wished to give part of the natives the franchise, and if that were done, then soon 380,000 natives would be voters. That was the thin end of the wedge which the hon. gentleman tried to insert. If the natives were to get the franchise, then the result would be very bad for the Colony, and it would set the Europeans against the Colonists in the Colony. The natives stand far beneath the white people, and ought to be kept there."

Mr. Theron had probably no right to make such sweeping assertions, as he will find that there are thousands of Afrikanders who have intelligently and earnestly adopted the "European" view on this vital question. This movement really represents a fight for the supremacy of a dangerous political creed. The thin end of the wedge, in the form of a colour franchise, would be first introduced as regards the Transkei; then the same regulation would be enforced with reference to the Cape Colony itself; and not only would coloured people be excluded, but eventually intelligent and respectable European artisans would be dis-

franchised also, so as to place the practical government of the country more completely in the hands of the narrow-minded reactionaries—the "Southerners" of South Africa. This is no question of race. It is a question of high policy, and it demands the earnest attention of the friends of liberty and progress at the Cape, as well as of Her Majesty's Government and the people of the United Kingdom.

It was pointed out in the debate that the Imperial position claimed by the present Cape Ministry, in attempting to exercise personal or paternal government in the Transkei in behalf of the Cape, was really incompatible with the constitution of the latter as a colony. The Cape could hand back the Transkei to the Imperial Government to be ruled as that Government saw fit; but if it remained annexed to the Colony, it was held that Colonial institutions must be established, and the rights of citizens be enjoyed by those who were duly qualified, without respect of colour. The compromise which was arrived at in the Lower House was to the effect that natives still living under actual tribal control in the Transkei should not have a vote; but that otherwise questions of colour should not be recognised. The Europeans in the Transkei have, of course, lost their opportunity to send representatives to Parliament, owing to the withdrawal of the Ministers' Bill. It would seem that they are holding meetings and signing resolutions requesting to be separated from the Cape Colony, and to be joined to Natal or governed with Basutoland and Pondoland as a Crown Colony. There are very many within the Colony who objected to the annexation to the Cape of this large Native Territory. This party, headed by Sir Thomas Scanlen, were of opinion that it would be best, both for the Transkei and the Colony, if the annexation did not take place. Speaking in London in 1884 before the annexation of the Transkei, Sir Hercules Robinson expressed his own sympathy with the view of Sir Thomas Scanlen. The annexation of the Transkei has, however, since taken place, and has been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government. But if the present Cape Ministry insists upon introducing a measure disfranchising men in the Transkei on the question of

colour, and if the European and other inhabitants of the district petition for the interference of Her Majesty's Government, there can be no doubt that such a request would not be lightly set aside by the Imperial Government, not as wishing to override the Cape Government, but expressly as wishing to remove, without offence, a serious obstacle to the right exercise of that free government which has been granted to Her Majesty's subjects in the Cape Colony irrespective of colour. Of course, if the Cape Colony wish to retain the Transkei, they can do so by not pressing measures which are essentially antagonistic to the fundamental laws of the Colony as they existed by previous royal proclamations at the time when it received responsible government. It is well known throughout South Africa that the enfranchised natives of the Transkei would send Englishmen or educated Afrikanders with "European" opinions to the Cape Parliament, and this is just what the Afrikander Bond people want to prevent. Judging from the past exercise of the franchise in the Cape Colony by the coloured electors, there is not the shadow of a pretext for refusing the franchise to them on account of their colour.

While the tribal allegiance is still strong in a Native Territory, and chief and people are content to go on in the old way, paying, however, an annual tax to the Government, there would seem to be no reason to press new duties or responsibilities upon them—and they might go on in this way for years, under paternal oversight. But when chief and people desire to abandon their tribal system, and give practical testimony to their submission and allegiance to the Queen and the Government of the Cape, not only by paying taxes, but by requesting to be allowed to select a representative in Parliament, the Cape Legislature would deny its highest functions in assuming the government of such a territory if it did not grant the franchise in these circumstances to coloured people who are otherwise fully qualified to exercise it. The principle that such people are "natural enemies" to any section of Her Majesty's subjects in South Africa, or "born to be their slaves," is one com-

pletely antagonistic to both the spirit and the practice of Her Majesty's Government from its earliest entrance upon the government of the Cape to the present time. But the antagonism now is not to England alone; it is to European and American civilisation, and if the question is shirked at the outset in the Cape Colony, the difficulty of meeting it intelligently and with firmness is sure to increase.

There is nothing in the superstition or the customs of these tribes to disqualify them from exercising their rights as subjects of the Queen, when education enables them to do so. In India it would seem to be very different. Very much that is still cherished doctrine there would need to be unlearned by the natives before they could take active part in the constitutional government of the country. But in South Africa we are in contact with the hoariest and simplest ancestor-worship, combined with fetichism, practised by a pastoral and agricultural people whose spoken language is said to take us back to the period when Sanskrit was also a language in daily use. No doubt paternal government is best for a country where these people predominate. To them it represents the kingdom superseding mere tribal control. Local native councils, local territorial government, central control by the Imperial Government, the police and the army chiefly South African; there is no real difficulty in the future management of the country. But in granting privileges or "rights" after the manner of the English constitution, there is nothing whatever in the character of the South African native to deter us from trusting him with the exercise of those rights, but everything to encourage us to do so in a careful and gradual manner. The difficulty, as it seems to me, would arise in connection with refusing them, and not in granting them.

Since these sentences were penned my attention has been directed to Baron von Hübner's carefully-written book, *Through the British Empire*, which I am elsewhere quoting. The Baron correctly states the constitution of the Cape Colony to be—

"Perfect autonomy, the political equality of all the inhabitants, without difference of colour; and lastly, the obligation which hitherto

it has been impossible completely to fulfil, of providing for their own defence" (vol. i. p. 141).

The Baron considers that the admission of the principle of race equality is the first cause of our South African troubles. He says that—

"Experience has shown the impossibility in the long run of governing colonies of mixed population, where the blacks form the large majority, by means of a Responsible or Parliamentary Government. Thus Jamaica has asked, on its own initiative, to be made again a Crown Colony. Natal, on the representation of Lord Wolseley, did the same. Cape Colony, I have been told confidentially by politicians in Capetown, will be obliged sooner or later to follow suit" (vol. i. p. 146).

I am also well aware that such views are sometimes expressed at the Cape, especially in times of great uncertainty and depression—such as obtained there at the date of the Baron's visit in 1883.

It has always been a matter of serious doubt to students of the South African question, whether Responsible Government was not forced upon the Cape Colony prematurely. The lack of education practically disqualified a large number of electors of European descent among the country population. It is well known that the proffered responsibility was only accepted by a majority of one in the previously existing Cape Legislature; while the movement on the part of the Imperial Government seemed to be a portion of a scheme by which British statesmen at that time fully expected to rid themselves of Imperial responsibilities. An education test might have been safely applied in 1871, and might still be applied with advantage, in the Cape Colony. But it is not so apparent to my mind what is to drive us back again to the old system in the Colony, after the dangers of the introductory period of Responsible Government have been overcome, and the electorate is increasing in education and in the experience and exercise of the franchise. Baron von Hübner's objection to the present state of things, however, does not turn upon education, but upon colour. The franchise should be exercised by the whites, but not by the blacks.

This accomplished traveller arranges his argument on

this subject by placing on one side the Christian, the philosopher, and the Utopist; and on the other side the rest of civilised society: and the question is, he says, whether South African natives are, "like ourselves, capable of voting, of being elected, or of sitting in the Houses and on Committees—in short, of protecting their interests by following the parliamentary ways of civilised societies?" He thinks the bare statement of such a doctrine is its own refutation, and vouchsafes no other; being apparently under the impression that although such rights have been conceded at the Cape to the natives, there has been no unfortunate result as yet, for the reason that the natives have not as yet exercised their rights. Were they to do so, the Baron thinks there would be mischief. On this subject the Baron's information has not been so copious and exact as on some other points. It may and does seem incongruous to speak of a Hottentot as a fellow-citizen, or as a free and independent voter. The whole of the incongruity, however, is in our preconceived ideas associated with a name synonymous to us with degradation. We have no definite person before our minds—no exact set of facts belonging to the present which we have ascertained, to support our view. The people who are known by this name form a decent, orderly, and well-conducted portion of the Colonial population, usefully exercising in their villages and in their churches civil and sacred offices. The body of the people are more than a generation removed from the degradation associated in our minds with their name. In point of fact, the natives of the Cape Colony as enfranchised citizens have been actively canvassed, and have shared in every election since Responsible Government was granted in 1871. I am well aware, however, that the associations connected in our minds with the word "Hottentot" would survive any bare statement of historical fact; so I propose to bury this and other similar names with the habits and modes of life which are happily passing away. Comparative philologists already know and use the term "Gariepine" to mean the yellow people living in South Africa, who are possibly allied to the tribes of North Asia; and they know and use the term "Bantu" as includ-

ing all the other tribes in South Africa, seeing that they belong to one family—a family, by the way, which includes philologically the Islanders of the South Seas. When Baron von Hübner asserts that the "degenerate race of Hottentot blood" could not act as citizens under Constitutional Government, I at once give up the hopeless argument as connected with that name; but join issue as to the matter of fact; and assert, without the slightest fear of contradiction, that Gariepine and Bantu people in the Cape Colony have for sixteen years quietly and satisfactorily discharged the duty of electors. Baron von Hübner, therefore, will please to take this into account as a student of the subject. To the Christians and philosophers and Utopists he will please to add a large proportion of Cape politicians, as was shown in the late Transkei discussion, some of whom owe their own seats to the votes of the electors in question. Then, as quoted,[1] Sir Hercules Robinson has also strongly expressed the opinion that the natives of the Cape Colony have exercised the franchise in a most satisfactory manner; and Sir Charles Warren[2] has directed attention to the *pitshos* of the Bechuana, as showing that the business of the tribe was conducted not merely by the chief and headmen, but by the commoners of the tribe also.

It may be well, however, to pursue this interesting question a little further than merely answering this friendly and most intelligent critic. When statesmen propound a theory of government, or of franchise, or of human right, whose application shall be affected by colour alone, are they right or are they wrong? They are wrong from the threshold. It is impossible from reason or from history to establish such a proposition. It contains a sentence of doom—a doom against the majority of the human family; for a man can rise, and excel his fathers, and excel himself when his mind is filled with high ideals, but he can never change the colour of his skin. To attach a penalty, therefore, to the colour of a man is at once to doom him and the race to which he belongs. But is such judgment on his fellows appropriate from the lips of a man? Is it not also

[1] Vol. i. p. 173. [2] Vol. ii. p. 383.

a direct charge of inaptitude made against the Creator? If we turn to the facts of history we find this charge unjust. There are lordly and yielding ones, energetic and easy-going ones, in all families, tribes, kingdoms, and empires of the earth. Brand and disqualify for lying and vice and ignorance; brand indolence and non-productiveness in the world's hive; brand that which a man can with Divine help struggle against and overcome; but in the name of GOD do not brand what a man can never change—the dark colour which he received at birth, as you received your fairer shade.

"The inferior races" is an expression which has had widely different meanings in the history of mankind. Time was when the flaxen-haired and the blue-eyed were serfs and vassals to darker owners, in Southern palaces and villas. Time was when conquerors brought Negroes and Britons alike to Rome as captives and slaves. We have seen in the history of mankind effeteness and decrepitude attack and destroy a nation, and it has decayed morally, mentally, and physically, and passed away from the earth; but its people did not change their colour. Their colour in the meridian of their power and their majesty, was their colour also when their sun went down.

The "inferior races" of each period in the past have always been those who were behind others in high moral attainments: and such are the "inferior races" of to-day. We look with interest on the stone instruments which are discovered in this and in other lands, and which were used by our ancestors, "the inferior races" of a bygone time. Stone implements of the same shape are still in use in the Kalahari and in New Guinea. To-day it is still the Stone Age there. But an empire greater even than that of Rome is overshadowing and uplifting the inferior races of to-day, as in the days of its own barbarism it was itself uplifted by the noble Romans.

Then it must be remembered that the test of colour is perfectly impracticable in operation. In South Africa we have Gariepine people of a lighter hue than many Southern Europeans, not to speak of Asiatics of the type of the Chinese, whose lightness is reached not only by the Gariepine race as a whole, but by some of the Bantu people.

Were a colour test applied in South Africa, the Department in charge of it would have the heaviest work of all. In international affairs in the great world it is already established that nations are not regarded or disregarded on account of their colour. What is the typical colour as between the Norseman and the Negro? Of what colour was that beloved and adored Jewish Teacher who was crucified at Jerusalem by a provincial Roman Governor, dying a death inflicted only on people belonging to "inferior races," and never on one of the superior or "conquering race," when he was sentenced to death?

Then it seems to me that men who propose to raise political issues on the question of colour, do not drive their arguments fairly home. They grant to the coloured person everything else that belongs to manhood, except what in other men they call inherent rights; and yet history tells us that men everywhere, without respect of colour, have claimed those rights, and have shed their blood for them. The Bible is the great magna charta. In our days it is in all hands; and a free press, with its lives of patriots and reformers and liberators, could not be restricted to whites. If your Colour Department could succeed in accomplishing its work, your community would be divided sharply into two camps—the men with rights, and the men without rights—the rulers and the ruled. There could be no interchange—no possible going from the one to the other. You say that God has settled the question for both sides, by their colour. Do you expect any men, of any colour or kindred, to believe that, and go on practising it and teaching it to their children, who learn quite otherwise in schools and in literature? No; it is a deadly delusion. Everywhere it would resolve itself into the old question, which was conclusively settled in the slave-time, in the Southern States of America. Educate a slave and you make him a man. Make him a man and refuse him man's rights,—he will call you tyrant and oppressor, and his rights will be secured in oceans of blood.

But, thank God, the doctrine of which we are speaking, as Mr. Theron of the Afrikander Bond fully recognised, is quite repugnant to all English-speaking men. The air which

we breathe as children is that of true freedom. To a subject of the English Empire, a man is a man and not a chattel. It is this feeling, which is part of himself, and which he seeks not to hide, which makes him sympathetic towards "inferior races;" and this, of course, gives him acceptance with them. Baron von Hübner seems to suppose that if natives had ever exercised the franchise in the Cape Colony, they must have elected some of their own number. They have had more wisdom than to do that. They never elect "a Boer" to represent them, and, for that matter, I question if one of your genuine old-fashioned *menschen* would condescend to represent *schepselen* in a Parliament. But it is different with an Englishman and with an educated South African colonist. He is a cosmopolitan. Some of our best men now in the House of Parliament at the Cape represent constituencies the vast majority of which are natives, and but for these constituencies their abilities would be lost to the Colony. In them the natives know that they have fair, friendly, and able representatives. To their presence we owe it that a disgraceful colour franchise has not been already recommended to the Imperial sanction by the Cape Parliament. Judging by past history at the Cape, and by analogy as to the history of other lands, the coloured and educated elector and the educated and progressive member of Parliament, will together be the political saviours of the Cape Colony.

Clearly enough a country which has such vital problems to settle within its own bounds, is far from being in a position to assume responsibilities of an Imperial nature, for the government of outlying Native Territories.

[While this work was in preparation, Mr. Sprigg visited England, in connection with the Cape contributions to the Colonial Exhibition in London; and while these sheets are passing through the press, Mr. Upington and Mr. Hofmeyr have attended the Colonial Conference, as the representatives of the Cape Colony. Both Mr. Sprigg and Mr. Upington had distinguished themselves as Colonial Ministers under Sir Bartle Frere; and Her Majesty's present advisers probably remembering that assistance to their High Commissioner, Her Majesty has been graciously pleased to bestow on each of them the honour of knighthood (K.C.M.G.), and has thus indicated her regard for an important Colony by decorating its Ministers.]

CHAPTER IV

THE SUM OF THE WHOLE MATTER—IMPERIAL DUTY AND IMPERIAL METHODS

It is time, however, to bring these observations to a practical conclusion. The reader who has accompanied me throughout the experiences recounted in these pages will, I trust, be fully prepared to appreciate the lessons which are to be derived from them.

I.—Imperial Duty.

European Politics and South Africa.

The position of England in South Africa as a European question was settled in 1816. She has been recognised since that time as the Supreme Power in South Africa, although her own suicidal efforts at abdication have rather confused the thoughts of certain Continental Powers on the subject.

England and the Cape.

With reference to Her Majesty's subjects at the Cape—some of whom were slaves, and others serfs or vassals when we entered the country—their freedom from serfdom and from slavery was secured by Imperial enactment and proclamation, and their citizenship declared. This had reference to Dutch-speaking Europeans, to Hottentots, and to the slaves, who were of various races. The growth of the Colony by the annexation of outlying territories, conquered by the help of the Imperial Government, has extended great

advantages to the Cape Colonists in the new territories, and also to the native tribes, who have been thus introduced into the Colony. From one end to the other the country has been subdued by the power of England; but the Imperial Government has conclusively shown its willingness to forget this, in according to the Cape Colony the privileges of self-government. And Cape Colonists can never forget that the blood and the treasure of England have in past years frequently defended and upheld the cause of the Colonists.

England and Natal.

In Natal the Imperial Government still retains the responsibility for the management of affairs. It is surely not too much to expect that the Imperial and Colonial authorities will be able to act in concert as to the internal affairs of that Colony; while a just settlement in Zululand and the adjoining Native Territories will do much to advance and consolidate, under the Imperial rule, that rich and beautiful part of the country.

England and the Free State.

The position of England towards the Free State is defined in the Treaty of Aliwal of 1854, which is still in force. But we have seen that, outside treaties, the attitude of England towards this small independent community has been friendly to an extreme degree, saving it from the otherwise inevitable and disastrous consequences of its repressive native policy. Her Majesty's Government has no wish to interfere with the internal affairs of the Free State; and as to its presence and position as a corporate body in South Africa, Her Majesty's Government has shown every wish to recognise it and promote its interests.

England and the Transvaal.

The position of England towards the Transvaal is equally clear. It interfered once—for the benefit of the Transvaal

and of South Africa—in the internal affairs of that country. It will not do so again. The self-government, or independence, or "freedom," or oligarchical despotism, or whatever it is, which in the Transvaal mind can be obtained only when separate from Her Majesty's Government, is now the portion of the Transvaal, the boundaries of which have been clearly defined and agreed to by the Transvaal Government itself. It is true that the future of South Africa is not in the hands of the Transvaal, as some would have desired; but within its own borders there is a stupendous work before its Government, which will tax all its ability. While not interfering in any way in its internal affairs, Her Majesty's Government will have many opportunities in the future, as a neighbour on its border and as the Supreme Power in the country, of showing practically that it sincerely desires the prosperity of the Transvaal people and Government. The reader will note that, besides their native population, there are about 122,000 Europeans living in the Free State and Transvaal—these being all the Europeans in South Africa who are not under Her Majesty's Government.

England and the New Republic.

In sketching the present political condition of South Africa, I am ashamed to refer to the "New Republic," for the existence of which no one is responsible, of course. The time to have made the necessary arrangements on the eastern border of the Transvaal, was undoubtedly when an Expedition was in the country, and on the western border of the Transvaal. Bechuanaland and Zululand were two parts of one subject. Why was not this done? Who was responsible for this loss of power and opportunity? Was it the Colonial Office in London, or the Commissioner for Zululand (the Governor of Natal), or the High Commissioner of South Africa (the Governor of the Cape)? Who was there to take cognisance of the peace of South Africa for the benefit of the whole country and of England also? Apparently no one. The general peace of South Africa is

at present nobody's business, and every officer I have mentioned would have something to show to have him excused of blame in this matter. The disgrace rests all the same on Her Majesty's Government. Friends of South Africa hoped they had seen the last of recognised "republics" on the borders of our states and colonies in South Africa. The situation of Natal, Zululand, the New Republic, Swasiland, and the Transkei, merit immediate and special attention from every lover of humanity, every friend of peace, and every well-wisher of the Empire.

England and Native Territories.

But the position of England in South Africa has by no means been adequately described by what has been said above. The reader of these pages knows that the South Africa of the future does not lie in those parts already mentioned, great as their value undoubtedly is. The position of England remains to be described in connection with the native tribes and peoples of Trans-Colonial Africa. There can be no question that that position is a unique one, and one of which any European Power might be proud. The natives of those vast and valuable territories, up to the Zambesi, recognise Her Majesty's Government as the Supreme Power in South Africa. They brush aside all finesse, and say that although it has pleased Her Majesty to let some of her people govern themselves, that arrangement does not take away from Her Majesty's supremacy or responsibility in the country. Khame and the other great chiefs in North Bechuanaland ask for our protection, and offer magnificent tracts of country for our use. We had previously, under European pressure, extended our Protectorate so as to include part of Khame's country—those who pitched on the limit having probably no idea of the actual circumstances of the country. At Berlin it is understood that Khame is under our protection. Khame himself was told this by Sir Charles Warren, according to the proclamation of Her Majesty's Government; and yet a large part of Khame's country lies to the north of the Protectorate line. Now what is gained by such shilly-shallying? We

were three years too late in protecting South Bechuanaland —to our own loss as a Government, and to the impoverishment and ruin of many, both black and white—the chief gainers being those men who least deserve a rood of native land, or any favour whatever from Her Majesty's Government. When Khame asks that his country may be protected in time, it has been shown that we say "yes" and we say "no" in the same breath. The chief Lobingula of the Matebele occupies the attitude of a friendly neighbour; but that friendship ought to be more fully developed, and a friendly arrangement effected with him as to the boundaries of his country. The request for protection and administrative help comes from mismanaged and neglected Zululand, the destiny of which has been so long trifled with. Swasiland ought for years, like Basutoland, to have been under a self-supporting Protectorate. According to reliable reports, its people are being overreached in many ways and exasperated, and the natural resources of the country, which ought to belong to a General Government, are passing into the hands of sharp speculators. The English Government must really not always come in when it is too late; chief and people in Swasiland have long needed our protection. The Pondo question is also one which ought to have been settled years ago, in accordance with the wishes of the natives of the country, and of the inhabitants of surrounding districts, and in consultation with the Government of the Cape Colony.

Two Movements of Population.

Before coming to practical suggestions, let me again in a sentence place before the reader the interesting problem which has to be solved. There are two movements of population in South Africa, steady and extensive—the whites moving northward, the blacks moving southward. The "black movement" is the concern of the Local Governments: it is not as yet an Imperial question. We are concerned with the white movement northward. My position is that the peace of South Africa depends upon the regulation of that northern movement. Instead of coming always behind it

and too late, my proposal is that Her Majesty's Government by means of such treaties as have been recently made in Bechuanaland, should precede this advancing wave of white men, regulate its spreading, benefit white men and black men, and secure a revenue for the Imperial Government in the doing of this good work.

As we are resolved to fully consolidate our position at the Cape as an Imperial Naval Power, it is of the utmost importance that we should have a friendly, contented, and prosperous community in the interior of the country. This object will be secured in no way so easily or so cheaply as by assisting them to open up and develop the resources of the country lying to the north.

The colonies and states of South Africa look to Her Majesty's Government for the performance of such work. The time may come when there will be wise and helpful co-operation with it; that time has not yet arrived. What we have at present is a general agreement in South Africa that this work in the meantime should be undertaken and organised by Her Majesty's Government, in furtherance alike of the highest interest of South Africa and of the Empire.

From the economic and commercial point of view, I have to point out that the position of influence in which the native chiefs desire to place Her Majesty's Government is of the very utmost importance to the trading classes of this country, as securing them gradually a new field of operation which English goods at present scarcely reach. I need not dilate upon the consequences to South Africa of the opening up of the northern auriferous area. Let us be prepared for it. The miners will require to be fed. The recent Bechuanaland Expedition has placed hundreds of farms at the disposal of Englishmen—some "compensation" to England from South Africa—the first of the kind in South African history. I do not think the Secretary of State represented the mind of the people of the United Kingdom when he declined the country offered to him by Khame and other native chiefs. I cannot help expressing the conviction that it was an unwise and feeble action, having its explanation probably in uncertainty on account of misleading state-

ments which were then abroad about the country itself. Our position in the northern part of the country is too important in every way to be given up in this unmeaning manner. I speak in the interests of many young Englishmen, Scotsmen, and Irishmen who would be individually glad to occupy and improve some of those three-mile square farms. Some 2000 applications for such farms were made to Sir Charles Warren from Englishmen and Colonists from all parts of South Africa. I have already said, and I here repeat it, that the country between the Cape Colony and the Zambesi and to the north of the Transvaal is more valuable than the Cape Colony itself.

If, however, the action of the Secretary of State, in not accepting the land which Khame and other chiefs offered, is somewhat like the action of a shying horse, which springs away in needless terror from some harmless object on the roadside, I trust that the action of English public opinion will be like that of the patient rider, who, on such an occasion, brings the nervous steed gently back to the object of its fears, till those fears are entirely dissipated.

My position is further strengthened by the terms of a despatch from the Secretary of State in answer to inquiries of President Kruger as to our intention and policy in North Bechuanaland. Notwithstanding our unbusiness-like attitude with reference to Khame's offer, and our hesitancy to do any good with the country offered, President Kruger was informed by Her Majesty's Government that our Protectorate extended to Khame, "and to any neighbouring chiefs who may have claims to it" (4432, 106).

The Northern Boundary.

In proposing that Her Majesty's Government should definitely announce a Protectorate as far north as Khame's territory extends, which is to the River Zambesi, I am influenced by the fact that Her Majesty's Government has already of its own motion, as announced at Berlin, taken that chief under its protection. It is a position unworthy of the Government of Great Britain to say at Berlin that

they will protect Khame and not his people and his country; or that they will protect a small part of his country. It would be expected, on all hands, that if the chief Khame is under the protection of England, the whole of the territory of that chief is under that protection. By this it is not meant that Her Majesty's Government should enter into any boundary disputes in these regions; and I have already shown that statements have been made on this subject which are calculated to mislead and discourage without due cause. But while the Zambesi is the actual boundary of a chief who is now under our protection, and while I am able to emphasise the fact that it has been for many years to my own knowledge the boundary of his country, and that the country belongs to no one else, and is occupied by no one whatever except the vassals of Khame and the hunters who hunt there with his sanction, it must also be remembered that the great Zambesi River is a striking natural boundary, separating Southern from Central Africa. Questions referring to territories north of the Zambesi do not belong to the scope or region of my remarks. I am speaking of the South, the Dominion of Austral Africa, and affirm that the Zambesi is its natural northern boundary. Further, I again assert that, so far as the native owners of the territory are concerned, the supremacy of the Queen is desired up to the Zambesi; and I claim to be a witness who knows what he is speaking about.

An Inclusive Proclamation.

The Zambesi being our northern boundary, we have to announce this by proclamation. It is in connection with this that I mention what President Kruger has been told by the Secretary of State. The "other chiefs" of the Secretary of State's despatch should be addressed in this suggested proclamation, and should be informed that while Her Majesty's protection has been extended over certain territories and chiefs (named in the document), the proclamation includes "such other chiefs and tribes as may hereafter desire and apply for Her Majesty's protection, and

whose application, after due consideration, Her Majesty may be advised to entertain favourably." The reader will see that I am supposing that the time of spasm—of hot and cold fits—has passed away for ever, and that we know our own mind with reference to the future. I am not the advocate of haste or of grabbing, but of calm reasoning and determination upon a certain feasible and beneficial policy. Our northward movement has hitherto resembled the wild convulsions of nature; my proposal would make it like the adding of fresh fields to a farm from the wilderness. The presence of the above sentence concerning "other chiefs" in our proclamation—expressing our fixed friendly meaning and intention—would undoubtedly produce the most favourable and pacific results throughout all the tribes, and very much simplify future events.

Attitude of Colonists.

But some one desires to interrupt me here by saying, Before you go further, is it certain that we shall have the co-operation of the Colonists; that we shall not do them any injustice or even wound their susceptibilities? I may remark that duties have sometimes to be performed in unpleasant circumstances, and that parents have sometimes to perform unpleasant duties, from which they may not shrink, as between different members of their family; but in this case there is no such unpleasantness connected with the discharge of our duty in South Africa. The unpleasantness arises through our shirking it. It has already been shown that England has been called to the discharge of that duty by general consent in South Africa. The attitude of Sir Thomas Scanlen and his party as to co-operation is well understood. Mr. (now Sir Thomas) Upington and Mr. Rhodes in recent public utterances have vied with Sir Charles Warren as to the desirability of wisely and steadily developing Imperial influence in South Africa. Thus the leading politicians on both sides of the Cape Parliament have expressed strongly the opinion that British protection should be extended as far as the Zambesi. The Cape considers

that it has just cause of complaint as to the recent admission of Germany at Angra Pequena. As to wounding Colonial susceptibilities, therefore, we shall certainly do so by our old attitude of inattention and shirking; whereas by issuing the proclamation here recommended, and quietly and steadily pursuing the line of our duty, we shall re-establish the character of our Government, and evoke general and intelligent sympathy among the European population in South Africa. To meet every class of reader, I may as well go a step further, and show the solid foundation of healthy self-interest upon which this approval rests. Her Majesty's Government, if it adopts the course here advocated, will hold the keys of the Austral Africa of the future—the keys to the unoccupied lands and riches of the north. The intimation that Her Majesty's Government is to superintend the peaceful opening up of this country will send a thrill of gratitude and joy throughout the whole European population of South Africa, especially among those colonists—English and Dutch—who have large families growing up, and only one farm. The Government that will place the wide unoccupied lands at the disposal of these men (as well as of young settlers from Britain) will certainly be popular and beloved in South Africa, and with good reason; and we secure this position while upholding fully the just interests of the natives.

The Work before us.

After this digression, to answer a natural inquiry, I return to my subject, and beg the reader's special attention to the work itself which lies before us in South Africa—the work to which Her Majesty's Government has already committed itself. I think there can be but one opinion as to the wisdom, and indeed the necessity, of our undertaking and carrying through that work. Before I venture to make some suggestions as to the method by which Her Majesty's Government might best secure its object, let me warn my reader not to expect a cut and dried scheme, which shall be similar to the method of our government of Canada,

or of India, or of Australia; and this for reasons which the reader has himself already mastered. In South Africa we have neither Canada nor India to deal with.

With our Protectorate extending to the Zambesi, and a proclamation issued of the inclusive nature which I have described, the affairs of Trans-Colonial South Africa assume that position of importance which really belongs to them. The management of such affairs could not possibly be regarded as merely an appanage of one or two Colonial Governorships. To cut up this Imperial work and responsibility, and mix it with the local affairs of one or two colonies, is to remove it from the direct interest and control of British statesmen, and thus to injure and impede the work itself; while we misdirect the thoughts and efforts of Colonial legislators from what is their own appropriate work within their respective colonies. To my mind nothing can be plainer than that, if the new and most promising work (to which we have already committed ourselves) of regulating the growth and development of the European civilisation, and of protecting and governing the natives in South Africa, is to be conducted successfully under the control of Her Majesty's Government, special measures must be devised for the purpose. There are at present no such measures; for, as has been shown already, the work itself is new, and has only recently, and with hesitancy, been seriously contemplated by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, however, anxious to impress on the reader's mind the absolute necessity for the performance of this work, in order to secure the peaceful growth and development and prosperity of the country. As to methods of procedure, there ought to be full discussion; but as to the immediate necessity for a Central or General Power in South Africa, having charge of outlying Native and partially unoccupied Territories, by some method—I hold there cannot be two opinions.

II.—Imperial Methods.

Local Administrators.

Coming to the consideration of the method to be

employed, and guiding ourselves very closely by a consideration of the actual work which has to be performed, we find it evident that Native and partially unoccupied Territories, where tribal rule has broken down, would require local administrators such as we have now in Basutoland and Bechuanaland, and such as we ought to have had in Zululand, Swasiland, Pondoland, and indeed in the Transkei Territory; while more distant localities would call for residents with chiefs before administrators, with their preparatory government staff, would be necessary.

Central Government—the High Commissionership.

But these Local Administrators must have a head—a Central Department—to which they are to report. The Governor of a colony is not such a head. He is, or ought to be, working for his colony, by fair means of course, but still working in sympathy with and for his colony. It is, therefore, not fair to the Administrator of a territory, or to the territory itself, that the business of the territory should be supervised by the Governor of the adjoining colony. Besides, one would think that the Governorship of the Cape Colony or of Natal affords a fair amount of work for any officer. Just as Trans-Colonial work, when forced on the Cape Colony and on Colonial Ministries, has been an injury and an injustice to them in the past, so this combination of offices has been the direct cause of the ruin of eminent men's reputations; they have failed to serve two masters—the Colony as its Governors, and South Africa and England as High Commissioners.

It is, therefore, high time that Her Majesty's Government should resolve to separate the High Commissionership of South Africa from the Governorship of the Cape Colony. The reader of these pages is aware that the question has long been under consideration. Under the proposed new arrangement the High Commissioner would be the supreme officer of the Crown in South Africa, and the Governor of the Cape Colony would be an officer exercising that office only. All affairs which at present come rightly before the High Com-

missioner, or the Special Commissioner for Zululand, would come before the new High Commissioner, and the important business, of which there is a good deal every year, between the Free State and the Transvaal respectively and Her Majesty's Government, and which at present is carried on by correspondence, sometimes with the High Commissioner at Capetown and sometimes with the Governor of Natal as Special Commissioner for Zululand, would be transacted with the new High Commissioner.

Every border question has two sides. These would both come before the High Commissioner to be dealt with by him, and by Her Majesty's Government after his summing up. The beneficial results of this suggested change are obvious enough. Briefly stated, they would be the centralisation of all Imperial or General Government business, which would be most advantageous to all concerned; the development, through exercise, of this healthy central influence; the elevation of the representative of the Queen from being the servant of a section to being the servant of all South Africa; and the commencement of peaceful and regulated colonisation in place of the ever-recurring disturbance and war.

The status of the new High Commissioner is easily seen. He would be, as it were, a part of Downing Street in South Africa; and would be there to transact and to forward the business of the Imperial Government in that country. Before Colonial business reaches the Governor of the Colony, it is in the hands of the Ministry of the Colony, and subject to the Colonial Constitution. Her Majesty's Government have the full right to make their own arrangement as to the after steps to be taken in securing Her Majesty's assent to purely Colonial measures, as well as in obtaining due consideration for Colonial proposals on border matters, or on general questions affecting the welfare of South Africa. At present all business, whether general or Trans-Colonial or Colonial, is transacted by Sir Hercules Robinson—one hand representing the High Commissioner; the other, the Governor of the Cape; while some other member of this overtasked officer tries to represent the Governor of

Bechuanaland. When our proposal is carried into effect, the Governor of the Cape Colony and the Administrator of Bechuanaland would address themselves to the High Commissioner on border or general subjects, and the correspondence would be intelligible and capable of review by Her Majesty's Government; which at present is impossible, as they are addressed by one man only, struggling all the while to be three or more men. Whether, therefore, the proposed Department of Her Majesty's Government in South Africa would receive from, and forward to, the Governor of the Cape, all communications to and from Her Majesty's Government; or whether copies only would be supplied to the High Commissioner, and the originals sent by the Colonial Governor to London; or whether the Cape Colony business proper, which in its transaction had brought up no reference to any Trans-Colonial subject whatever, should, as at present, be forwarded direct to Downing Street by the Governor of the Colony—is purely an Imperial question as to what is desirable, convenient, and necessary, upon which Her Majesty's Imperial Government will be able to decide; and whichever of these courses may be taken, the rights and the privileges of Colonists will be left intact. Difficulty has been raised as to the social standing of the High Commissioner; but this question would seem to be hardly worth discussing here, as it would necessarily be settled by the Commission given to the new High Commissioner. It would belong necessarily to his position and its duties that he should be the highest officer of Her Majesty in South Africa; and he would take social precedence of every local Governor, however important his Governorship might be. This would not imply that the High Commissioner would have any standing as between a Colonial Governor and his Ministers, or that he would have anything whatever to do with their proper Colonial business. The standing of the High Commissioner would be between the Governor and Her Majesty, as her appointed Imperial representative and Commissioner in South Africa.

Nor is it necessary at this stage to encumber our proposition with an answer to the question where our High Commissioner would reside. As the virtue and value of his

office would be accurate local knowledge without local bias, it follows that his residence is not a pressing question at the present time. Provided that he were on the telegraph line, and thus in communication with South African colonies, states, and territories, and with England, his locality would be of no special importance. Indeed, as a distinguished friend has suggested, "Better give him and his staff waggons and tents in the first instance." Joking apart, however, local and petty jealousies are inseparably connected with the mention of localities in such a matter. There are good houses and many conveniences near Capetown; and Washington is practically on the eastern sea-board, and far from the Western States. But the question of residence would only come to be an important political question when the colonies and states had learned to gather round the High Commissioner in some helpful and organised way. When this came to be the case, the residence of the High Commissioner would be of course the political capital of the country, and the claims of Quebec and of Ottawa would be put forward. But this matter calls for no immediate settlement, and I decline to import into a great question of immediate importance to all South Africa the other smaller inquiry as to what locality shall be first or most benefited by the presence of the High Commissioner and his staff.

I do not think that any reader of these pages will have failed to note that, while our great strength and encouragement in Bechuanaland was the friendly approval of the body of the Cape Colonists, our rebuffs, discouragement, and humiliation were brought about by means of the entanglements of Cape politics. There is no doubt that the Bechuanaland Protectorate was ruined in Capetown. The greatest obstacles met by Sir Charles Warren were Capetown obstacles. I need hardly say that I do not mean that these were caused by the people of Capetown, who were enthusiastically in his favour; but by professional politicians—the leaders and would-be leaders of political parties. Why should Imperial affairs be deliberately carried into this vortex? No good is secured in any way commensurate with the mischief which is entailed.

In Sir Hercules Robinson, Her Majesty's Government had an experienced and well-intentioned servant; in Sir Charles Warren, an officer specially qualified for the important work to which he was appointed. Both these officers in England had strongly expressed similar views as to Imperial policy in Native Territories. But through the contamination of local intrigue and politics, Sir Hercules Robinson speedily embarked on a so-called Colonial policy; and when Sir Charles Warren appeared, we know what steps were taken to commit him to the same course. These evil results were caused —not entirely, but largely—by the conjunction of the High Commissionership and the Governorship of the Cape Colony, the close and daily contact of an Imperial Administrator with local politicians and their intrigues. The Imperial officer who was outside their Colonial politics (Sir Charles Warren), secured the general favour and the practical support of the intelligent Colonists in his Imperial work; while official contact with Colonial politicians very seriously detracted from the usefulness and success of Sir Hercules Robinson as an Imperial Administrator. The reader will be able abundantly to verify these statements. It plainly follows, therefore, from an Imperial point of view, and in order to secure the highest service from our officers, with the least possibility of friction and misunderstanding, that the Imperial High Commissionership should be separated from the local and more contracted office of Governor of the Cape Colony.

It ought also to be known that the present union of these offices has been seriously objected to by the Colonists themselves. It is true that some Colonists have unwisely endeavoured to stifle Colonial discussion of this question by appeals to short-sighted selfishness. They hold that the present attitude of the Imperial Government, its present want of policy and of method, its rushing into responsibility and then rushing out of it, combine to work for the special aggrandisement of the Cape Colony. They say that as the responsibilities so eagerly parted with by the Imperial Government are devolved on the Cape Colony, on terms more or less dictated by the Colony, this is a great gain

to it; and they hold that, as Colonists, it would be foolish for them to go out of their way to point out an improvement in Imperial methods, which, while it might be advantageous to England, and to South Africa generally, might not suit local and partisan views. Those who hold this opinion desire the present mixed-up arrangement of offices to continue. Whatever the results to others, they think the Cape ought not to complain of it. A large number of leading Colonists, however, view the question from a higher standpoint, and take a larger and deeper view of what are the real interests of the Cape Colony. They argue that the presence of the Imperial Government in direct Administration of Native Territories is at present absolutely necessary to the peaceful development of the country as a whole. They hold also that the policy of retreat and shirking responsibility, which the others would perpetuate, is the great cause of the unpopularity and distrust of Her Majesty's Imperial Government in South Africa; and for this reason, as it is absolutely necessary that the Supreme Power in the country should be beloved and respected, it is equally indispensable, in order to this, that the Imperial Government should have a defined policy—a specific and beneficial work—and a well-organised Imperial Department to carry it out. These Colonists are not afraid of any loss to the Cape Colony from the growth of Imperial influence and the development of Imperial policy. On the contrary, they hold that the highest prosperity of the Cape Colony, and of South Africa generally, is to be found on these lines. One of the first steps to be taken, according to their view, is to separate the High Commissionership from the Governorship of the Cape Colony.

The disapproval of the present conjunction of offices entertained by many Colonists, of both political parties, has led to the discussion of the question in the Cape Parliament. A member of the present Cape Ministry, speaking in Parliament on the unsatisfactory working of the present system, is reported to have said :—

"The time had arrived to speak out plainly, and to inquire whether this Colony was to be governed in future by the representa-

tive of the Queen acting under the advice of her Ministers, or by a hybrid Government in which the irresponsible rule of the High Commissioner might be pitted against the constitutional rule of the Governor, and in which all the honest efforts of the responsible Ministry, for the good government of the people, might be counteracted and neutralised by the acts of the irresponsible Opposition, in advising the High Commissioner in regard to the affairs on the boundary of this Colony. The question was—Would they have responsible government or the sham of responsible government?"

The Minister who uttered these words, in common with the Ministry to which he belongs, holds the opinion that the Cape Ministers should advise the High Commissioner as well as the Governor of the Cape; and that thus it should have been incompetent for Sir Hercules Robinson to have passed by his Colonial Ministers in order to take advice from members of the Colonial Opposition. This, however, is not the solution which the most intelligent Colonists would seek; they, on the other hand (in the words of the *Cape Times*), "would confine Ministers strictly to their proper business, and the High Commissioner to his own sphere. And this can be done by separating the two offices, and removing the High Commissioner from the temptation of mixing up the trust which he holds from the Crown with the expediencies of Colonial party politics."

It will hardly be necessary to say here that in recommending the separation of the offices now under discussion, I do not for a moment advocate the slightest interference with the Colonial constitution, or with any Colonial officer. What is suggested is, that the Imperial Government should change its own mode of performing its own recognised work, as distinct from the work performed by the Colonial Government within the bounds of the Colony. It is of course cheerfully admitted on all hands that Her Majesty's Government has always had the right to choose its own methods in carrying out its specific work in South Africa; and one cannot help adding that hitherto it has chosen to have no method. With reference to what people call "Colonial susceptibilities"—when they are attempting to throw dust in other people's eyes, and preventing the exercise of common sense as to South African affairs—it might have been a question

whether the imposition of Trans-Colonial duties upon their Colonial Governors was a course calculated to gratify those "Colonial susceptibilities"; but to free their Governor from such extraneous work, in order that he may the more successfully devote himself to their Colonial service, cannot wound the feelings of even the most susceptible Colonist.

I am happy to say that English public opinion has been expressed in favour of this separation of offices with singular unanimity. Indeed had it not been for the engrossing nature of another public question, I have little doubt that the necessary reform in our South African Administration would have been already carried into practice. So far as I know, the only opponent of this reform of any weight is the present holder of the combined offices—Sir Hercules Robinson. The deliverance of an officer of his years and experience is to be received with great respect; but in treating of offices discharged by himself, Sir Hercules, with the best intentions, cannot be regarded as speaking with the weight of an observer, or with the authority of a judge.

I have already mentioned the movement which took place in London in behalf of the severance of the offices under consideration. The resolution come to at that meeting, having been presented to the Secretary of State by a Deputation, was transmitted to Sir Hercules Robinson for his remarks. Sir Hercules advocated the continuance of the present conjunction of offices (4643, 195). On my return to this country I was impressed with the healthy and intelligent tone of public opinion on this question. It seemed to me that matters were ripe for revising our methods in South Africa, and for defining and establishing our policy in that country. It occurred to me that an unpartisan Committee or Commission might be appointed to assist Her Majesty's Government and the Colonial Department in inaugurating a new order of things, and I publicly advocated the adoption of this course. The letter of Sir Hercules Robinson opposing any change in present methods seemed to call for some explanation and reply, and I addressed the remarks which occurred to me on the subject to the Secretary of State (4839, 100), suggesting that a Commission or Committee

might be appointed to consider this important matter. This memorandum was also submitted to the High Commissioner for remarks; and Sir Hercules Robinson again defended the present conjunction of offices as held by him (4890, 28). To this I have replied at greater length and in detail while these sheets are in preparation, addressing my remarks as before to the Secretary of State. I beg to refer the reader who is interested in these matters to the Bluebooks which I have quoted, and am quite content to leave the matter to the public verdict.

Sir Hercules Robinson based his argument in his last communication on what he termed "the settled policy of Her Majesty's Government for many years," and said, "Mr. Mackenzie's scheme, as far as I can understand it, would be a complete reversal" of this policy. I was astounded to find Sir Hercules Robinson speaking thus reverentially of our "settled policy" in South Africa for many years; for I remembered well his utterances on our want of a South African policy on his visit to England in 1884. I quote again from the published report of a speech delivered by Sir Hercules in London before a distinguished audience, after the conclusion of the London Convention with the Transvaal Delegates. And it is to be noted that the Secretary of State, who was present, declared that he cordially agreed with every word of the High Commissioner. Sir Hercules said:—

"Heretofore, as regards border troubles, this country has alternated between doing nothing and fighting. The Native Territories bordering on the settled districts have generally been left severely alone, until by the inevitable clashing of European expansion and native reprisals the position has become intolerable, when force has been employed, and the conquered country annexed to some colony. Now it appears to me that it would be both cheaper and easier to regulate those native movements in their earlier stages. The tribal Governments of the natives upon the borders of the settled districts become weak from their contact with a higher civilisation, and what is wanted is some simple and inexpensive form of Territorial Government, which will provide for the protection and political growth of the tribe, and for the cultivation of the unoccupied lands by Europeans, until the territory becomes ripe for absorption in the Colonial system. Such a transitional scheme of government for border territories could only be carried out

by the paramount Power; but I believe that it could be so carried out without imposing any permanent charge whatever upon the taxpayers of this country. I feel very sanguine that such a frontier policy, if gradually, cautiously, and intelligently developed, would pacify the country, relieve England from her present irritating responsibilities, and contribute an important factor to the advancement of commerce and the progress of the race."

This was a fair sketch of the policy which is advocated in these pages. But it was admittedly new; so that Sir Hercules in 1886, speaking reverently of "a policy of many years' standing," contradicts Sir Hercules of 1884, who was then lamenting the absence of a settled policy. It might also be said that Sir Hercules in 1884, when he recommended the sound policy sketched in the above extract, was contradicting an earlier utterance of Sir Hercules on the same subject in 1882. Addressing the Secretary of State for the Colonies on this subject, Sir Hercules then said:—

"In my opinion, the best policy for both the Cape and the Transvaal to pursue, is to protect a well-defined boundary-line, punish promptly and severely any inroads, and leave independent native tribes outside to settle for themselves their own differences—intervention on our part being strictly limited to friendly mediation when practicable. Shall I instruct Hudson in this sense?" (3381, 54)

I have quoted here the utterances of Sir Hercules Robinson on Imperial "policy" in 1886, in 1884, and in 1882, in order that the reader may appraise at its true value his advocacy of the present, or of any, method of administering Imperial affairs in South Africa.

His utterance of 1884 is the true one: his advice of 1882 and his discovery in 1886 of a "settled policy of many years' standing" are quite at variance with it. Our attitude in South Africa as an Imperial Power was well described by Mr. Gladstone in 1881, and in terms similar to Sir Hercules Robinson's statement of 1884:—

"In 1846 I said there was one problem for which it seemed impossible to find a solution, and that was offered by the state of affairs at the Cape of Good Hope. Since that time we have been striving against a series of difficulties, and endeavouring to stave off the evil days. At last the policy of the late Government was launched for South Africa. Whether it was premature I will not undertake to say; whether it would have succeeded I do not pretend to pronounce.

But I do say that attempts were made to find a remedy for the state of things there, so complicated, unsatisfactory, burdensome, and injurious in their consequences to the people."

It is not true then that we have "a settled South African policy of many years' standing"—unless, indeed, we have recourse to the sinister meanings of the word, "dexterity of management" and "cunning." In the high sense of the word, "the art or manner of governing," "a system of official administration," I have to state that after the closest attention to the subject for more than twenty years, I am not aware of the existence of any settled policy; and that I consider the above description of Mr. Gladstone as entirely accurate. I feel sure the reader of these pages is convinced that the present mongrel method of half doing and half neglecting Imperial duties has been followed too long and at too great cost. It has been the cause of much evil in South Africa, and much loss of influence, as well as of men and of money. I quite agree that if the highest effort of our South African policy is to try how we can slip out of South Africa, we do not need to rearrange or change anything, as the present arrangement seems favourable for ignoring obligation and general shuffling. What we have got now to do in that case is to shut our eyes and our ears, as we have done before, and calmly wait for the next convulsion and the succeeding armed expedition.

Confederation.

When we get as far as a High Commissioner for South Africa, it is no great effort of the mind to see that he would be *in embryo* Governor-General of the whole country. It is only fair and just, in commendation of the proposal, to show that this would naturally and easily be the case. I should not have supposed, however, that serious arguments would be brought forward against the scheme *in embryo* as if my present proposals were intended to be final. To compare anything *in embryo* with something else which is well developed, is to waste effort. To compare our completed arrangements in Canada, with the present proposal at the

very threshold of such organised work in South Africa, is only to mislead and discourage. To speak of "Constitutional Government" implies surely the existence of a "constitution"; and there is none in South Africa; there is at present no cohesion even, of the several parts; and certainly nothing could be more "unconstitutional" than the present method of our administration there. Further, to change this state of things there is no function in South Africa. Each state and colony has its defined boundaries, and its local "constitution" limiting it to those boundaries. The initiative, therefore, belongs to the Imperial Government; and in the proposals which I am making, having for their object the preparatory measures necessary to the building up of a General Government for South Africa, the well understood principles of sound Constitutional Government have been kept fully in view. The real offence to Constitutional Government is offered by those who would confound the Cape Colony with South Africa, and who would add to the functions of the Constitutional Government of a colony the paternal offices of an Imperial Government exercised over "the inferior races."

It is of importance for Her Majesty's Government to move in this matter as soon as possible, for another and a sinister movement is on foot. The alternative course is the speedy union of the Transvaal, Free State, and Cape Colony,—whether under a Republican President or under a nominal English "Protectorate" would seem to be still an open question among the anti-Imperial Afrikanders. Now, the desire for union is a good thing in itself; but everything depends on its terms, and how it is brought about. A union such as the Afrikander Bond people are anxious for, would be a calamity to South Africa. The maxims of anti-progressive people would be supreme everywhere; and they would have constitutional authority to do what they liked, if once joined to a colony having responsible government. The name of the Queen would undoubtedly be connected with laws and customs which would offend against the principles of right and justice. The influence of Englishmen, and of educated Dutch-speaking men, would be quite done to death under

the superincumbent heavy mass of the uneducated and prejudiced majority. English influence in Natal has its own local disproportion and isolation, and could not be put in the balance. The obvious object for Her Majesty's Government to accomplish is to gratify the feeling for union, which really exists, in another and more beneficial way. The real living question in South Africa to-day is, Around what are South Africans to unite? In his recent communications, the High Commissioner does not face this matter at all; and yet it cannot be ignored or avoided. One side has already spoken, and says, Around Afrikanderism and by corporate union. The people in this country and in South Africa, whose views I am now expressing, would say, Unite round the High Commissioner or Governor-General, representing the Imperial Government.[1]

Therefore, while only on the threshold, we are sure we are on the right road for future harmonious working in South Africa. Cheered by this thought we return once more to the Native Territory itself, and very briefly advert to certain matters which in my view are essential to our success.

Land in Native Territories.

In almost every Native Territory in South Africa there are immense tracts which are entirely unoccupied. They are the resort of game till that is cleared off by native and European hunters, after which these regions are vast solitudes, where the traveller passes whole days without meeting a human being. The reader is familiar with the native town, the gardens, the cattle stations, and the hunting stations—these outlying stations developing in process of time into the native farm. Native land is that which natives occupy and use in the ways described. It belongs to the tribe; to chiefs and people. Individual

[1] The present seems an opportune time for Her Majesty's Government to overhaul and readjust our administrative methods in South Africa, which have been outgrown by our position and our work there, as Sir Hercules Robinson has already accomplished the usual term of office at the Cape. The present extension of his term indicates, I hope, the intention of Her Majesty's Government to make the necessary changes before his successor is appointed.

rights to land are recognised, and they are conferred by chief and councillors. The immense extent of available land has usually prevented much strife concerning the possession of land by natives. The men of a tribe at all times held themselves in readiness to defend their town and tribe. There was no exemption from this duty; and if a man wished to go on a journey, or to visit his cattle station or farm, he had to report himself first and obtain the chief's permission. Tributary tribes paid annual tribute to the chief of the country in which they were residing. By agricultural subjects this was paid in corn; by artisan tribes in hoes, axes, etc., made of iron which was dug, smelted, and forged in the country, or in wooden vessels, matting, or other articles of native manufacture. The ordinary commoner or freeman of the tribe paid no such tax. Only when he slaughtered, the breast of the animal went to the chief, and so with the produce of the chase; but a freeman's garden was untaxed in any way. The sale of land was unknown in the circumstances which I have described, when it was practically almost as abundant as the air, and was often more abundant for use than water.

In considering the question of Imperial Administration in such territories, there is really no difficulty at all, if the subject is faced. The principles which I have already laid down on this subject are indispensable to our success. The vast unoccupied solitudes will belong to the Imperial Government; the land occupied and used by the tribe will be tribal land, as distinct from Crown land. In this will be included reasonable provision for pastoral as well as agricultural farming by natives. Hunting-lands, when the game has been killed, will no longer exist as such, and will be reckoned as prairie or Government land. Individual native titles to land will be issued. This will give great confidence to the natives in the stability of their occupation. They know that no white man holds land without a personal title to it, and they will not be assured of their own individual security in ownership until a personal title is granted to them. Such titles would be only fair to

the industrious man, giving him a personal and individual interest in his holding, the boundaries of which were defined. These native titles to land should be neither saleable nor transferable, and this should be plainly printed on them in English and in the native language. This provision is not merely in accordance with native usage, it is necessary as a matter of justice to native owners of land, who are ignorant of our language, our customs, and our courts. By issuing individual titles we bind the men of the tribe to the Imperial Government; by rendering them unsaleable we give their native owners opportunity to become accustomed to the new order of things; and we save the country from the disgrace of upholding by law and by force the fraudulent practices of men who obtain land by preying upon the ignorance of its native owners. In such a country as South Africa, and with its mixed population, the tendency would be to render this non-saleableness of native land only a temporary measure. The best natives will desire the gradual removal of all differentiating legislation, and will desire that their land, like that of the white man, should be in their own power. Worthless natives would share this wish from lower motives. And when the native owners of tribal lands, after the lapse of years of individual tenure under the Imperial Government, formally desired that their land should become saleable, there would probably be no administrative reason why this request should not be granted. The native who then sold his land would never be able to bring forward a charge that he had been swindled by some unprincipled man, whose action had been winked at and upheld by the local government. In this way the real native question would be reduced to a minimum: the natives would have been gradually and without violence separated from their chiefs, and led to look to Her Majesty's Government for the furtherance of their interests as individuals. The industrious would find no barrier to their progress under the Queen. The others would find themselves, as elsewhere, the servants of the community. In such a scheme everything is stable and calculated to go on, because it is founded on justice and right, and takes no

account of a man's race or colour, but only of his actual circumstances and conduct.

The first method of dealing with South African natives, and one persisted in for a long time, was to drive them out of a certain country and parcel their land, occupied or unoccupied, among white men. The natives would come back, but it was now as servants, or as squatters or tenants on the white owner's land. The next course was to grant "locations" for these natives out of Crown lands—the location still remaining the property of Government and not of the tribe. I have elsewhere remarked on the singular philanthropy, shown at a certain stage in the history of the land of a tribe, by Europeans who are usually dealing in speculations for their own enrichment rather than in schemes of benevolence for the benefit of the natives. The fact is, there has been a strong prejudice in the minds of a certain party in the Colony against the recognition of the right of a native man to own land. Through English influence, a native can legally hold land in the Cape Colony; but it is in the teeth of the old prejudice of the Dutch-speaking people. Placing the natives on Government land was a compromise in deference to these views. It left the natives still without land of their own. I need hardly point out the danger of this short-sighted policy, which had the tendency to constitute a servile class—incapable of owning land, but capable of education, and instructed in the Bible and in the history of mankind.

The reader is aware that some of these proposals have been recently adopted in Bechuanaland. Others have been deferred or rejected. It would seem that one must be content that a revolution such as this, in the treatment of native claims to land, should be gradually achieved. The insecurity and injustice of placing natives on Government or Crown lands, where they could at any time be legally dispossessed, has been conceded by the Land Commission of Bechuanaland, and tribal rights have been granted which are termed "inalienable." But no individual native titles have been granted. I believe I am right in saying that no title to a farm has been granted to a native owner in

Bechuanaland. There does not, however, appear to be any valid reason for this refusal to recognise the individual rights of industrious and capable native men. It has somewhat the appearance of a lingering deference to the unjust policy already described. If tribal lands as such are now unsaleable in Bechuanaland, why should not each holding in the lands of the tribe be unsaleable and yet registered in the name of its owner, and a personal title be granted to him? If tribal land has been made unsaleable, the title to the individual holding can be made unsaleable also.

I beg special attention to the interesting condition of the land question in South Africa and in Bechuanaland especially. In this country there is a strong movement in behalf of the rights of those who in South Africa would only be regarded as squatters on some one else's land; whereas, in South Africa, Imperial officials are denying individual rights and titles to people who were found by us indisputably occupying and owning the land. To pretend that the refusal of individual titles is for the benefit of the natives is a position quite untenable.

European Settlers.

I have elsewhere referred to what I consider the best way of securing European and Colonial occupants for the land in Native Territories which will be available for their occupation. The most remunerative way to Her Majesty's Government and to the settler would be that these two parties, the Government and the settler, should deal directly with one another. The next in point of reliability would be that a body of men, forming themselves into a company, should engage that a certain block of farms would be occupied and improved by themselves or by others. Such a company would probably expect to make a profit for themselves by undertaking this responsibility, and the amount which they made in this way would be the measure of the loss to the Government on the one hand, and to the actual farmer on the other. A third course—that which has usually been followed in the Cape Colony—is to expose a block of

farms for sale to the highest bidder at a public auction. It is said that such sales have occasionally been induced by specious representations to Government, made by private parties interested in the locality in question; and in such cases, for one reason or another, the public sale does not realise very much. But even in cases where everything is above-board, the plan is not one to be recommended to Her Majesty's Government in controlling the spread and development of the European population in Native Territories. So much money is paid in to Government for such farms at stated intervals till the amount is completed, so much quit-rent and "divisional" or county taxes are paid annually by the purchaser or his agent, and the land may or may not be occupied. If native stock-holders see an unoccupied block of land, they squat on it, and in some cases pay rent annually for the grazing of their cattle. This saddles the district with squatters, who are responsible only to the agent of the foreign proprietor of this farm. It is amazing how far this is carried in certain districts of the Transvaal. Whilst our officers are being induced to believe that there is a sentiment against living even within three miles of natives, as a matter of fact a large number of farmers in the Transvaal are sharing with natives the grazing-land of the farm on which both parties reside! The native tenants in such cases usually pay heavily for the privilege of grazing, by handing over annually a certain number of cattle or other stock, as the case may be. The same practice obtains largely in the Cape Colony, but not so largely as in districts of the Transvaal.

A fair price for the land, payable by the settler within a considerable interval of time—the possibility of obtaining a loan of money, at a low rate of interest, for the purchase of stock, the making of fences, and the sinking of wells or making of a "dam" or reservoir—would introduce into the country a race of settlers who would take root from the first. This course would be most remunerative to Government and to the settlers; and these are the parties concerning whom I am mainly interested. I have no objection to healthy speculation in its place; but in a native

country, healthy speculation in land must always include the obligation that the land should be occupied. The mere speculator, who is under no such obligation, has acquired for his own personal ends the legal right to stop production and make a wilderness of what ought to be a cultivated estate—while, as he will tell you, he is waiting for his market. In countries which have yet to get a constitution, and which are being occupied under Her Majesty's control, no such power should be reserved to a man. In order to render it impossible to mistake my meaning, let me add that I do not say a rich man may not buy two farms, or twenty, if he will be responsible for their enclosure, occupancy, and improvement. Such an exercise of wealth and skill would be most beneficial to the country.

In cases where a nominal sum is accepted by Government for the farm, every farmer would be liable to turn out suitably equipped to defend the territory. The knowledge of this responsibility, and the training necessary to qualify for it, would be very beneficial. Troublesome neighbours would see that they had not to do with "basadi hela" (only women), as I have heard some very respectable and presentable people called, who could not ride a horse or fire a gun. Of course if you unconditionally sell a man a block of land at a public sale, you are bound to protect him in its occupancy; and the law does not oblige him as a land speculator to assist in the discharge of a Government obligation.

I may state here that I should advocate liberal arrangements as between the Territorial Government and the finder of precious metals, recognising the principle that the prosperity and success of a Government are to be measured by the prosperity and success of the inhabitants of the country.

Defence of Territories.

I have spoken elsewhere as to the defence of Native Territories. It will be easier to manage several such Native Territories than to manage one. Our experiences in India fully illustrate this. The South African tribes have many tribal jealousies, but they unite in willingness to obey the

Queen. It is administrative help which is needed from England. There is already considerable fighting power in South Africa, when needed for the upholding of peace by the Imperial Government. To this would be added the colonists, from the United Kingdom and from the Colony, who entered Native Territories, and obtained farms there on easy terms. Little disturbance and less bloodshed will take place when it becomes known that Her Majesty's Government is itself controlling the government of Native Territories. Judging from the past, what may be called the hammer-and-tongs policy of a certain class of Colonial politicians—the conquest, spoliation, and unending degradation of all coloured people—would require from the outset a considerable standing army of Europeans to uphold it; whereas the course which I advocate will require no such force; as it will be known that overwhelming force is at once available, in the service of peace and order, and at the call of the Imperial Government.

Authorities in Support.

I have much pleasure in laying before the reader the views of Sir Henry Barkly, under whose term of office Responsible Government was introduced into the Cape Colony. The article in the *Contemporary Review* for January 1883 containing the scheme for the government of Native Territories, having been submitted to Sir Henry by the Editor of the Review, he wrote the following letter, which was published with the article:—

"*To the Editor of the* CONTEMPORARY REVIEW.

"SIR—Having had an opportunity of perusing the Rev. Mr. Mackenzie's suggestions for the government of Native Territories in South Africa, I have no hesitation in stating that they appear to me practical and wise.

"They recommend indeed what—in its main features—is no novel or untried experiment. The general principle of encouraging tribes beyond the limit of the Colony to live under the jurisdiction of British Magistrates administering a modified form of Kaffir law, has long been acted on by the Cape Government. It has been in successful operation in Fingoland, for example, for the last fifteen years, and it worked admirably in Basutoland for fully half that period, until interrupted by extraneous causes.

"It is understood to be the intention of the Imperial Government to re-establish the same system of administration in the latter country, and I hope that it will likewise be extended shortly, under the same auspices, to Bechuanaland, where circumstances seem peculiarly favourable for its introduction.

"I see no reason why a similar form of government should not be carried out—without much trouble or expense—throughout the Native Territories of South Africa, especially those inhabited by the less warlike and more industrious branches of the Bantu family.

"Mr. Mackenzie, in his most interesting paper, throws out hints as to the treatment of polygamy; the subdivision of tribal lands; the issue of individual titles thereto; the gradual admission of European settlers, etc., which strike me as most valuable, coming from such a source. They might well form the basis of reforms to be set on foot at once among the Bechuana, with whose social condition he is so intimately acquainted. They would require to be introduced with great caution among tribes less civilised and not so long accustomed to missionary influence.

"With regard to the practicability of carrying out such a system of native government on the large scale which is advocated, under the sole control and guidance of Her Majesty's High Commissioner, I entertain no doubt whatever.

"When about to proceed to the Cape, in 1870, I urged the retention of separate authority over native tribes by the Queen's representative in the event of Responsible Government being adopted; and the result of the experience I gained whilst in South Africa convinced me that there would have been no serious objection to such an arrangement.

"The cordial concurrence of the Cape Government would of course be essential, together with a subvention sufficient to meet the expenses of working a scheme devised mainly for the benefit of the Colony. The High Commissioner would require a special staff for the purpose, including, as Mr. Mackenzie points out, a permanent chief, qualified by long acquaintance with native customs and character, to advise him.

"On the other hand, the Department of the present Secretary for Native Affairs might at once be greatly reduced, and eventually abolished, for there would be no small danger of friction if the two systems of management remained in operation side by side.—I have the honour to be, sir, your obedient servant,

"HENRY BARKLY.

"1 Bina Gardens, *December* 1883."

On the same occasion, and in answer to a similar communication, the late Sir Bartle Frere sent the following communication:—

"The plan for the future government of Bechuanaland and other Native Territories (whose relations to our Government in the colonies of the Cape and Natal are somewhat similar to those of Bechuanaland

at present)—as that plan is given under the heading of 'The Government of South African Territories,' down to the end of the Rev. John Mackenzie's article—is, in my opinion, a scheme not only feasible but easy of execution; and, if fairly and firmly worked out by Her Majesty's Government, it will, I believe, give a reasonable promise of peace, and secure progress to all the neighbours of our South African colonies and to those colonies themselves.

"Time does not admit of my attempting any detailed remarks on Mr. Mackenzie's proposals, which are not new to me, as I had an opportunity of considering most of them when I had the advantage of personal communication with him in South Africa in 1878-79; and I will therefore only add that the cardinal points necessary to the success of *any* scheme for the administration of native affairs in South Africa must, in my opinion, be that the British Government shall be the Supreme Power, and that the principles of any Administration of Native Affairs shall be those of a Christian British Government and not of any barbarian or semi-civilised ruler.

"H. B. E. FRERE."

The approval of the scheme of Territorial Government by Sir Hercules Robinson, and indeed by Her Majesty's Government, was shown by their appointment of myself as Deputy Commissioner.

The important testimony of Sir Charles Warren is frequently found in these pages. I may quote the following sentences from an interesting article by him:—

"The greatest impediment at the present time to the peace of South Africa is the dual position held by the High Commissioner and the Governor of the Cape Colony. . . . The only apparent solution of this difficulty is to at once sever the two positions and allow them to be held by two different functionaries. . . . The simplest method of carrying this out is for the High Commissioner to undertake the government of the whole of the country outside the Cape Colony and the negotiations with the free republics, while the Governor of the Cape Colony restricts his duties entirely to that Colony."[1]

I have been much gratified to find that another independent observer and student of the question has arrived at similar conclusions. I have noticed the presence of Mr. George Baden-Powell in Bechuanaland, and his able report, after inspecting the country as far north as Shoshong. Having visited the Cape Colony, the Free State, Natal, and other parts of South-East Africa, Mr. Baden-Powell strongly holds the opinion that a separate Dominion under the Im-

[1] *Contemporary Review*, January 1886.

perial Government should be established between Natal and the Kei River—the boundary of the Cape Colony proper—and including Basutoland. Bechuanaland and Zululand would be affiliated with this Dominion as "Presidencies." Mr. Baden-Powell holds that the Cape would thus be delivered from the undue pressure of native responsibilities, and Natal would also be left free to work out its own career. The same idea is well upheld in the *Quarterly Review* for October 1885, in an article which I understand is from the pen of Mr. Baden-Powell. We have here brought forward and advocated by an able and trained observer, after personal acquaintance with South Africa, the two leading doctrines of these pages and of my earlier writings—the local self-government of European communities and the general management of Native Territories by the Imperial Government. In so far as they were unoccupied, the Native "Presidencies" of Mr. Baden-Powell would, like the Native Territories of my proposal, afford room for the settlement of Europeans, and thus provide for that spread of the whites which will be entirely beneficial when duly regulated. This policy is thus summarised in the article already referred to:—

"1. Encourage the two English colonies of the Cape and Natal to concentrate all their energies on the development of their own resources, by relieving them, for the time, of all care, expense, anxiety, or responsibility for what may occur in the Native Territories.

"2. Leave the two Boer Republics to work out their several destinies—always remaining ready to welcome them, or portions of them, as additions to the English Empire.

"3. Form a self-supporting, well-administered Native Dominion, somewhat on the model of Ceylon, under the direct control of the Imperial Government, to embrace all districts in which the natives largely preponderate.

"4. Gradually devise some means of common action in affairs common to all South African communities, and so prepare for a future in which all our South African settlements shall be able to bear the burdens and duties of self-government."

In these pages I have spoken of "Downing Street" with that freedom which becomes fair and friendly criticism. I may explain that my fault is certainly not with the men who are permanently there; but with the political changes

by which they are constantly left at a loss what to do. In cases where you have charge of an island—or a continent, for that matter—if it is all in your hands, and you have agreed as to the extent of your duties, the work will go on smoothly, and the change of Government in England will not be felt by the smallest ripple at the antipodes. But when you do not know what you ought to do—when you do not know the bounds of your obligation; when you confess to blowing hot and cold—it is possible to get into a chronic and, for an Englishman, a most unusual condition of mind—that of shirking and putting off. It was lately said, with something like triumph, that there was "continuity" at the Colonial Office. So there has been for some time. I suppose this is what Sir Hercules Robinson recently refers to as a "policy"; but, in all seriousness, this is playing with words. It is a misuse of terms to call our past attitude—or our present method—in South Africa a "policy," unless you add the unpleasant but necessary definition—"the policy of Shirking."

I have been much struck with a passage in Baron von Hübner's interesting volumes, to which I have already referred, and ask the reader's careful attention to it:—

"The chief source and origin of all the evils," says the Baron, "must be sought, it seems to me, in the want of stability in the supreme conduct of South African affairs."[1] "The question, it seems to me," says the author in another passage, "is how to find a dominant and directing idea placed above and outside the oscillations in the domestic politics of the day, and the individual notions of Ministers who come and go. It will be for statesmen in authority to conceive this idea, for Parliament to pronounce upon it, and for the British Government, with the aid of the Governors, and, if necessary, of the local governments, to give it practical shape, and to adapt it to the exigencies of time and place. If it is just, the support of the national instinct will not be wanting. . . . There is nothing unchangeable in politics except principles, so long as it is possible not to deviate from them, which, moreover, one seldom does with impunity. But a man must know what he wants, and must change his mind as little as possible. Were I an Englishman, that is all I should ask of those who preside over the destinies of the country. Every one, and above all Africa, should know that the programme adopted by the English nation is placed, as far as possible, beyond the pale of Ministerial changes and the strife of parties."[2]

[1] *Through the British Empire*, vol. i. p. 148. [2] *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 150.

Baron von Hübner finds that we have three courses before us: To keep and consolidate present possessions; to extend those possessions indefinitely, or to some imaginary or natural limit, paying regard only to the colonies of other European nations; and the third, to evacuate South Africa, holding only a naval station. The last he regards as disastrous. The first he holds to be impossible.

"There are imperious and irresistible necessities—events lying outside your influence and control—which compel you to advance." "It is therefore on the paramount question (of advance) that it seems to me necessary to come to some final and unswerving resolution. One of the most frequent complaints I have heard is that when difficulties arise at such and such a point of this immense territory, it is the custom to smooth them over, according to the needs of the hour and place, instead of dealing with them broadly from the standpoint of the permanent and general interests of the Colony and of the empire. But this would presuppose a system, and it is precisely what is wanted." Baron von Hübner "supposes it will be admitted to be indispensable that the natives should be placed under the exclusive and absolute control of the Imperial Government." "Subject to this important reservation, the autonomy of the white communities will not, I imagine, be interfered with, but will be left to them intact. Let them govern themselves by all means, but not govern the blacks."[1]

"Here, then, are two Powers"—the Imperial and the Colonial—"starting from different points of view, and embracing different horizons; and no one will deny that the statesmen who govern the British Empire is the more extensive of the two—two Powers called to act together in the pursuit of interests rarely identical, often diverse, and sometimes opposed, and to act under circumstances in which the chief part is played by the unknown and the unexpected. Add to this that each of them seeks to throw upon the other the cost, whether permanent or temporary, of undertakings entered upon jointly. It is needless to deduce the awkward consequences of this system. They are self-evident at once, for they constitute the history of English dominion in South Africa. . . . Theoretically it is the duty of the Colony, enjoying as it does perfect autonomy, to provide the means of defence or repression. But experience proves that, left to itself, it is politically, financially, and, in a military sense, incapable of fulfilling this task; that it requires the assistance of the empire; and that the co-operation of these two Powers leads to inextricable complications, and to conflicts which paralyse all action, sometimes at moments when delay means danger. I think, then, that the annexation of black territories to Cape Colony, and the interference of the Colony in the affairs of the savage countries which are adjacent—that is to say, lying outside its frontiers, constitute another cause of the (South African) malady."[2]

[1] *Through the British Empire*, vol. i. pp. 154-155. [2] *Ibid.* vol. i. p. 147.

The reader will not need to have pointed out to him the striking confirmation of the views advocated in these pages, which is afforded by an observer who is at the same time a statesman and diplomatist. I transcribe another passage which I think is specially worthy of attention. The Baron made his visit to South Africa in 1883. Dating from Paris in January 1886, he adds some remarks at the conclusion of his work concerning the events which had transpired in South Africa in the interval, and especially with reference to the Bechuanaland question. After pointing out the inadequacy of the methods for acquiring exact and well-balanced information at the Colonial Office in London, and the consequent disinclination on its part to act at all, although action at the right time would be more beneficial and attended with less risk than hesitating non-intervention, the Baron illustrates his point by quoting the recent history of Bechuanaland. It was absence of intervention at the right time which led to the suppression of all the trade with the interior, and led to the cost of the Bechuanaland Expedition, which he thinks was admirably conducted by Sir Charles Warren. The Baron then goes on to say:—

"This question of Bechuanaland deserves examination also from another point of view. The General's mission was not purely military. He was armed also with certain ill-defined powers as Special Commissioner. In this capacity, regarding himself as an independent agent and not as the subordinate of the High Commissioner, he signalised his conduct of affairs by acts which were wholly at variance with the High Commissioner's views and instructions. A conflict arose between those two officials. How could it be otherwise? The one represented exclusively the empire; the other, as High Commissioner, was in the same position; but by an anomaly which it is difficult to account for, the High Commissioner for South Africa is also Governor of Cape Colony. As such Sir Hercules Robinson was bound to protect the interests of the Colony, or, to put it more correctly, to humour the aspirations of the 'Colonial' party in power. . . . I should add that Sir Charles Warren, at the scene of action, had a mere handful of soldiers with him, and was many hundreds of miles from the capital of the Colony, and that Sir Hercules Robinson was breathing the atmosphere of Capetown. Moreover, agents of inferior rank were then staying in Bechuanaland, or had been sent thither. Each of these brought his own views, or acted according to the instructions of his chief, or the chiefs of his party. Mr. Upington, Prime Minister of the

Cape Colony, and one of the leaders of the Colonial party, had gone thither in person before Sir Charles Warren arrived. Under the pressure of these circumstances the relations between the High Commissioner and the Special Commissioner became more and more embittered. Sir Hercules Robinson, after an exchange of letters and despatches marked by an extreme and much-to-be regretted animosity, annulled all the measures taken by Sir Charles Warren, and the new Home Government, while recognising the merits of the General as a peacemaker in those distant countries, recalled him to England."[1]

In these pages I am making no point for or against persons or Governments—as to who was recalled, or who recalled him. My point is the glaring and unbearable defects of the present system, which are so apparent to Baron von Hübner.

I have yet to quote another ally and friend to the views of this book. Mr. Froude's chapters on South Africa in *Oceana* may be said to consist of an unreasoning onslaught on his own fellow-countrymen and his own Government. I give here the only sentences in Mr. Froude's remarks which seem to me to be worth quoting, as containing any contribution to the solution of the South African difficulty—the peck of grain in the bushel of worthless and bitter chaff. Even here, however, Mr. Froude raises a difficulty which does not really exist. He speaks about "South Africa" governing itself. There is no such corporate or cohesive South Africa. As Mr. Froude is well aware, there are instead separate colonies and states, each with separate local "freedom." It is, therefore, not necessary, nor indeed desirable, as Mr. Froude supposes it would be, in managing the affairs of Native Territories in South Africa, to rescind the self-government which we have granted to the colonists. The colonies and states have their self-government, but they have also their boundary-lines, the Imperial Government having, by the common consent of the Europeans in South Africa, and the strong desire of the natives, the supremacy beyond those boundaries, and in what I regard as the South Africa of the future. With this explanation I have pleasure in quoting Mr. Froude as an advocate of the policy inculcated in these pages:—

[1] *Through the British Empire*, vol. ii. p. 492.

"It is, of course, certain that if we choose, and if we act consistently with conscious resolution, we can govern South Africa as we govern India: we can have a native policy of our own, and distribute equal justice to white men and black under our own magistrates, responsible only to English opinion. Under such a rule the country might be peaceable and fairly prosperous. It is equally certain that if South Africa is to rule itself under a constitutional system, we must cease to impose English views of what is expedient on a people unwilling to act upon them. We cannot force them at once to govern themselves and to govern in the way which we ourselves desire. You can take a horse to the water, but you cannot make him drink; and attempts to combine contradictory methods will lead in the future, as they have led in the past, to confusion and failure. As an imperfect believer in the value of popular suffrage, I incline myself to the first alternative. But it must be one thing or the other. Inconsistency is worse than either."[1]

The number of authorities in support of the views advocated in these pages might be increased by the addition of many influential names, but I have strictly confined my quotations to the published opinions of those who, to their other qualifications, have added that of personal knowledge of South Africa, obtained by residing in that country or by visiting it.

I have already mentioned that when I arrived in this country in the end of 1885 I suggested to others abler and more influential than myself, that what was wanted to complete our South African policy was "a body of practical doctrine" on the subject upon which both political parties in England would agree; and in carrying out which, whatever might be the party changes in England, the permanent officials at Downing Street would know that they were perfectly safe and right. My idea was that a Committee or Commission of eminent public men, whose character and abilities would command respect in England and in South Africa, should be formed to collect information, examine witnesses, and draw up their conclusions as practical Englishmen for the consideration of Parliament. My friends were impressed with the reasonableness of the suggestion; and the permanent officials in Downing Street would, I have no doubt, welcome such an authoritative state-

[1] *Oceana*, p. 52.

ment of our duty and policy in South Africa—as a man, wearied during a long and dark night with a succession of exhausting hot and cold fits, welcomes the first streak of dawn. In South Africa such a statement would of course be of the utmost value. But alas! brief life has indeed been the portion of recent English Governments; and how can people in a boat, battling for their life, give attention to anything beyond life-buoys?

I now address a larger audience and make the same request. The satisfactory settlement of a long misunderstood question is now within our reach. We are called to the peaceful administration of Native Territories—to the control of the spreading European colonisation. This work is at once our duty, our responsibility, and our distinguished privilege; and it is imposed on us because we are believed to be both strong and righteous. In discharging our duty, let us have an intelligible policy, to which we shall steadily adhere. Let the question be thoroughly understood and mastered by the English people themselves; and let them insist upon this policy being carried out, as they did upon retaining the Protectorate of Bechuanaland, and the despatch of Sir Charles Warren's Expedition. The whole question is summed up in one word—Imperial Administration; and by wise and just administration the miserable, wrangling, expensive South Africa which we have known shall become the valuable, prosperous, and peaceful Dominion of Austral Africa.

. . . . . .

I find it pleasant to contemplate the future of South Africa in the light of the policy advocated in these pages—especially when contrasted with the haphazard and costly past. I share the pleasure of the successful digger who has obtained gold or diamonds and is rich; I am in sympathy with the struggling farmer and the upright and intelligent merchant, who are combining to make a new and wild country the home of Christian peace and refinement, as well as prosperity. I can enter into the feelings of the young emigrant who, assured of peace, resolves that in this new land of the South he will, with God's help, build

a home for himself and those whom he loves. I see the wave of Europeans spreading over the land, not in anger and with bloodshed, but with the song of labour and the hymn of praise; the plough and the pickaxe in their hand, and not the rifle or the sword. And those dusky and more ungainly Bantu people, whose language I speak and whose thoughts I know to be human thoughts—I see their misgivings and alarm as the white men increase; but I hear the proclamation of the new law, "The prairie lands are the Queen's, but the cultivated lands remain the possession of their native owners;" and in the deep voices of the men and the higher notes of the women, I hear the rejoicing which this news brings. "In that case," they will say, as Khame said, "the white men are welcome; let them come, and bring rain with them; for we too shall be the children of the Queen, and she will give us sleep." I see this peaceful progress and prosperity of the whole country advancing step by step as it never did before. And I see the time come when for loyalty, intelligence, and resource, Austral Africa will be held in honour throughout the Empire; when, should Imperial need arise, Austral Africans will equal Australasians in physique and in all soldierly qualities — both vieing successfully with the sons of the colder North, their fellow-subjects in Canada and the Mother Country; while the Bantu regiments from Austral Africa would be unsurpassed by any which could be brought into the field from among the millions of India. But like every true vision of the future, mine ends in peace and not in war. Assuredly, as England has abolished duelling, and still retains her honour and her self-respect, so will the savage arbitrament of war be discredited and disused the world over, when the thoughts of the victorious Galilean shall have become the code of the world. Then the contests of men will consist in the noble emulations of literature, art, commerce, and industry; in all of which Austral Africa will have its share. I see these things with the eye of the soul; they will surely come to pass. I pray to be permitted to see some of them with the bodily eye also.

And now, kind reader, we must part, after having seen

and heard much together. Even a guide is often recollected with kindly feelings by the traveller, and that is all which I ask for myself. Although this has been a personal narrative, I have striven to keep questions and not persons before the mind. I have ventured in these pages to assume the high office of teacher in matters which I have studied much, and which I think I understand. I have addressed myself to the humanity and love of justice, the wisdom and conscious strength, of a great nation. I sow in good soil what I know to be good seed; and now leave its fructifying to Him from whom all growth comes.

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