HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 156

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GERMAN OPINION ON NATIONAL POLICY PRIOR TO JULY 1914

PART II

LONDON:
PUBLISHED BY H.M. STATIONERY OFFICE

1920

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EDITORIAL NOTE

In the spring of 1917 the Foreign Office, in connection with the preparation which they were making for the work of the Peace Conference, established a special section whose duty it should be to provide the British Delegates to the Peace Conference with information in the most convenient form—geographical, economic, historical, social, religious and political—respecting the different countries, districts, islands, &c., with which they might have to deal. In addition, volumes were prepared on certain general subjects, mostly of an historical nature, concerning which it appeared that a special study would be useful.

The historical information was compiled by trained writers on historical subjects, who (in most cases) gave their services without any remuneration. For the geographical sections valuable assistance was given by the Intelligence Division (Naval Staff) of the Admiralty; and for the economic sections, by the War Trade Intelligence Department, which had been established by the Foreign Office. Of the maps accompanying the series, some were prepared by the above-mentioned department of the Admiralty, but the bulk of them were the work of the Geographical Section of the General Staff (Military Intelligence Division) of the War Office.

Now that the Conference has nearly completed its task, the Foreign Office, in response to numerous enquiries and requests, has decided to issue the books for public use, believing that they will be useful to students of history, politics, economics and foreign affairs, to publicists generally and to business men and travellers. It is hardly necessary to say that some of the subjects dealt with in the series have not in fact come under discussion at the Peace Conference; but, as the books treating of them contain valuable information, it has been thought advisable to include them.

It must be understood that, although the series of volumes was prepared under the authority, and is now issued with the

sanction, of the Foreign Office, that Office is not to be regarded as guaranteeing the accuracy of every statement which they contain or as identifying itself with all the opinions expressed in the several volumes; the books were not prepared in the Foreign Office itself, but are in the nature of information provided for the Foreign Office and the British Delegation.

The books are now published, with a few exceptions, substantially as they were issued for the use of the Delegates. No attempt has been made to bring them up to date, for, in the first place, such a process would have entailed a great loss of time and a prohibitive expense; and, in the second, the political and other conditions of a great part of Europe and of the Nearer and Middle East are still unsettled and in such a state of flux that any attempt to describe them would have been incorrect or misleading. The books are therefore to be taken as describing, in general, *ante-bellum* conditions, though in a few cases, where it seemed specially desirable, the account has been brought down to a later date.

G. W. PROTHERO,
General Editor and formerly
Director of the Historical Section.

January 1920.

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NOTE BY TRANSLATOR

For the better understanding of the theories and projects of territorial expansion which are advanced in the following German utterances it seems desirable to say that the terms world-policy (*Weltpolitik*), world-power (*Weltmacht*), world-domination or world-rule (*Weltherrschaft*), and Imperialism are used very loosely by Pan-German writers and other representatives of a spirited foreign policy. This fact no doubt explains, in part, a certain confusion of ideas which is found in much English literature devoted to the exposition of German political designs.

It is probable that in advocating the pursuance of "world-policy" the more thoughtful of German writers and politicians merely claim for their country equality of opportunity of colonial expansion and an equal voice in the settlement of general world-problems, territorial and otherwise; and that "world-power" usually connotes to their minds no more than would be implied by the words "world-wide influence," political influence being here presupposed. Much of the literature of Imperialism and Pan-Germanism, however, openly avows aggressive and even spoliatory aims, and even points to the creation of a literal German world-domination as the rightful goal of national policy.

The sense in which the foregoing terms are used by the more moderate Imperialists is indicated in the following passage, taken from *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus, und Kolonialpolitik* (1908), by the late Dr. Ernst Hasse, one of the founders of the Pan-Germanist League:

> The possibilities of and endeavours at expansion are expressed in the forms of world-economy, world-policy, world-power, exclusive dominion (*Alleinherrschaft*), imperialism and colonization. These expressions are unfortunately often

regarded as identical, and yet they are not only different but connote different ideas. . . . . World-economy in the concrete can exist without world-policy, and world-policy can promote world-economy without leading to world-power. World Empires and World States can exist without world-supremacy being aimed at. Great States do not need to be World States, and an Imperium is not bound to lead to world-supremacy. If the word "world" is common to most of these expressions and conceptions, the suggestion of megalomania is not [necessarily] contained therein, as many politico-economical people and political parties try to make out, but it is simply a question of the progress of the relations of one part of the earth to the collective relations of the entire inhabited earth which we usually call "world" (pp. 2, 3).

Certain utterances of Dr. Hasse quoted in the following pages show that this writer, in practice, held extreme views on the question of German territorial expansion.

I. WELTPOLITIK

I. The Doctrine of the State as Power.

For us Germans the existence of the Empire is no longer a matter of dispute, but the manner of its further development is. The latter question is one of our very existence, and since the idea of the destruction of the Empire is not remote from the thought of foreign nations, the question how we order our internal affairs is not a secondary matter for our ability to resist such a danger. Every German, therefore, has to ask himself the question "How can the Empire be best protected?" and to this question there can be only one answer—"By maintaining and increasing its power." The State is power: that is its nature—power before all things, power to secure itself externally, and if necessary to force its will upon the outside world. There is only one standard whereby to judge what should happen or not happen in our Empire. It is, "What will be the effect upon our power?" In the maintenance and extension of its power lie the purpose and end of the Empire. That every one of our people must clearly realize. That in this connection questions of armament take the first place is evident, for it is a fact that the empires most powerful in war are not friendly disposed to us, and that those with the strongest armies are our nearest neighbours.

Professor Dietrich Schäfer, *Was bedeutet dem Deutschen sein Reich?* ["What means their Empire to Germans?"] (1912), pp. 16, 17.

II. Power the Condition of Progress.

In world-history, culture, civilisation, and morality avail nothing unless they are protected and supported by power. Whoever will live must struggle. That holds good alike for the individual, for the class, and for the nation. Because we are a nation of 60 million souls and shall soon be a nation of 70 millions we are entitled to fight for Germany's existence in the world.

Dr. Friedrich Naumann, *Das blaue Buch von Vaterland und Freiheit* ["The Bluebook of the Fatherland and Liberty"] (1913), p. 34.

III. "World-Power or Downfall."

We must sorrowfully admit that the political position of the German Empire in no wise corresponds to the cultural worth of the German nation and the economic importance of Germanism abroad. On the European Continent we find ourselves, in spite of the Triple Alliance, in an almost intolerable position of restraint. Surrounded by enemies intimately allied together—England, France and Russia—every attempt which we make to extend our power meets with the determined resistance of our enemies, who have succeeded in engaging Italy's forces in the Mediterranean in such a way that in the event of war it would be of little use to us. Only Austria remains faithful to us. The same hostile Powers are at work unsettling and weakening Turkey. This State forms a necessary complement to the German-Austrian alliance, and to maintain it strong and efficient is of the greatest importance for us, both in case of war and for the extension of our economic activity in the Near East. The destruction or weakening of Turkey would affect injuriously the strength of our position on the Continent.

While our position as a Continental Power is so disadvantageous, our world-position is menaced to an equal degree; indeed, one can hardly speak any longer of any real world-importance of the German Empire. Although the economic importance of Germanism throughout the world has become very considerable, thanks to the political prestige which our Wars of Unity gained for us, we are nevertheless unable to assert ourselves as a World-Power, and only in a few places in the world can Germanism develop freely and independently, viz., in the colonies which we once acquired with England's acquiescence and still retain to-day. These colonial possessions, however, are in no proportion to our importance as a civilized nation, to our economic requirements, or to our numbers or capacity for development as a nation. Moreover, in the present distribution of political power communication with our oversea possessions can be closed to us any day without our being able to prevent it. When we regard the colonial empires of

England, France, and even little Belgium, we see clearly that in the partition of the earth we received short measure, not without grave fault on our part. . . . .

The dispute about Morocco has shown us clearly what our world-position is. Every attempt to secure an extension of power appropriate to our population and our cultural and economic importance inevitably brings us to the choice between accepting war with our united enemies or bowing to the will of the Triple Entente, in which England at the moment has the decisive word. That such a political position must sooner or later prove intolerable for a great, strongly-armed, and culturally-powerful nation needs no argument. . . .

Sure of our strength and of our cultural worth we Germans must, therefore, strive with all the means at our disposal to acquire the political power which corresponds and belongs to our actual importance. That in such efforts we shall meet with powerful resistance is certain. On the other hand, we must realize clearly that unless we stake our all on becoming a real and influential World-Power we shall not be able to maintain even our present position. If our political power disappears because of fear to use it, our economic importance likewise will soon decrease, our surplus population will benefit foreign nations as before, and in political atrophy our intellectual activity will lose its freshness and power of expansion. Our highest intellectual and moral tasks can be achieved only on the wider stage of world-policy; as simply a European Continental Power and a Colonial Power by England's grace we should fall back into the political insignificance of the years preceding 1866. "World-power or downfall" is the choice forced upon us by our historical development: no other is possible.

General Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Unsere Zukunft: ein Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk* ["Our Future: a Word of Warning to the German People"] (1912 edition), pp. 22–26.

IV. Germany's Call to Weltpolitik.

The German nation must remain behind none of its rivals in the pursuit of great ends. It must have the ambition to prove itself the noblest, most daring, and most free of the peoples of the earth. The old motto of heroes, *αἰὲν ἀριστευεῖν*, must remain its own. It must give powerful expression to its individuality amongst the civilized nations of the world, always endeavouring to create new cultural values, without destroying those of other nations. Without doubt powerful, courageous, and pushing nations like the English, French, and North Americans have set themselves high aims. And not only have they supported their daring political, cultural, and economic schemes of expansion with big words; no, these nations have proved by great deeds, painful sacrifices and continuous effort how serious is their pursuit of these aims. Whoever reflects thereon will not accuse us Germans of national arrogance if we entertain the wish "in commercial intercourse, in the command of the sea, and in the colonisation of extra-European territories to occupy and maintain our place in the sun against better and more fortunate competitors, even in the face of malicious envy and hatred" (Theodor Mommsen), and if we demand that our voice, too, shall be heard in the councils of the nations in the solution of the important oversea problems, and that without us "no great decision shall again be taken" (Emperor William II).

World-policy is in the best traditions of the German people. The spirit of the old Hanseatics must again permeate the German nation. Then the sea-air will everywhere prove its emancipating influence, for the ocean is a great educator. It is certain that if we wish to become and to remain a great nation, a World-Power, we shall have to face serious struggles, but that prospect should not frighten us. There is profound truth in the maxim that man starves in times of peace. Often the tocsin of conflict is needed in order to shake the slothful world once again out of languor and effeminacy. Those who are able to see far and deep recognise that the struggles of nations often prove a blessing for mankind . . . .

In the saddest days of the Germanic Federation, before

the 'sixties and 'seventies of last century, a sagacious and far-seeing man like Friedrich List incited the German nation to bold schemes of economic and political expansion: it had, he said, strength enough; it only needed to have the *courage* to become great. The great patriot was regarded in his day as a phantast. Yet already List's dreams have in large part been fulfilled; and that which is still unrealised can be achieved when daring is truly allied with strength.

Dr. Paul Arndt, *Deutschlands Stellung in der Weltwirtschaft* ["Germany's Position in World-Economy"] (1913), pp. 111, 113–4.

V. Inadequacy of the "Open Door" Policy.

We must shake ourselves free from the unhappy doctrine of the "open door," which still to-day dominates our official policy—we will hope, not from conviction but because of embarrassment. We must break with this doctrine because it represents the lowest form in the scale of expansion, viz., that of toleration; rather restriction to a narrow space, but full domination of this space, to the exclusion of foreign States . . . .

We need land—not only colonies, but need land even when it is inhabited by foreign peoples, in order to be able to shape the future of these peoples according to our needs. For that reason, Away with the doctrine of the "open door," a doctrine of insincerity and weakness, of backwardness, and a relic of the rejected teaching of Manchester! Our programme must be—not merely equality in foreign dependencies, but equality with other World-Powers in the exclusive possession of dependent territories, elbow-room, expansion, land!

Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus, und Kolonialpolitik* ["World-Policy, Imperialism, and Colonial Policy"] (1908), p. 67.

VI. The Substance and Validity of Rights.

No absolute rights can be laid down even for men who share the same ideas in their private and social intercourse. . . . . If sometimes between individuals the duel alone meets the sense of justice, how much more impossible must a universal international law be in the wide-reaching and complicated

relations between nations and States! Each nation evolves its own conceptions of right, each has its particular ideals and aims, which spring with a certain inevitableness from its character and historical life. These various views bear in themselves their living justification, and may well be diametrically opposed to those of other nations, yet no one can say that one nation has a better right than the other. There never has been and never will be a universal law of mankind.

General FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* ["Germany and the Next War"] (1911), p. 27.

Recognised rights must often, of course, be violated by political action. But these, as we have already shown, are never absolute rights; they are of human origin, and therefore imperfect and variable. There are conditions under which they do not correspond to the actual truth of things; in that event *summum jus summa injuria* holds good, and the infraction of the right appears morally justified.

Ibid., p. 49.

Rights are challengeable. It depends altogether upon the question which State has the greatest interests at stake and defends these interests with the greatest resolution. In most cases a political bargain, a compromise, will be attainable in the end. In such a case the business capacity of our diplomacy is in part decisive; for that reason we require for our diplomacy men skilled in affairs, not merely "representatives." With all deference to foreign rights, it must be said, however, that Germany does not possess the colonies which she must have. The increase of our population, the growth of our needs, and the achievements of our people impel us forward. The Empire can still maintain its 70 million inhabitants, but already millions have been forced to emigrate. . . .

Our development calls for recognition. Here exists a natural right: it is not a matter of prestige policy or a policy of adventure. We are not an institution for the preservation of decadent States. Our peace policy, which could not do enough for the conservation of exhausted rulers and rotten nations, is fallacious. Those half-States which maintain an existence only by the help of foreign weapons, money, or knowledge, are in external affairs delivered over helplessly to the power

of fully-developed modern States. In view of the fabulous development of technics, finance, and armaments, they can make little or no advance. . . . . The fate of the Boers, the Malagasies, the Moroccans, and to a certain extent even of the Turks, shows that it is a Utopia to count upon the internal power of existence of half-States. China, Persia and the rest of the Turkish Empire will all go the same way in the end.

MAX KUHN, in the *Leipziger Tageblatt*, January 24, 1913, quoted in *Der deutsche Chauvinismus* ["German Chauvinism"] by Dr O. Nippold (1913), p. 51.

VII. THE SPIRIT OF FOREIGN POLICY.

If we judge all nations of the earth without prejudice, the spirit of the present-day Englishman is undoubtedly by far the most capable of this proud self-discipline. No nation—with the single exception, perhaps, of the Dutch—has to the same degree as the English cultivated the manly virtues of self-control, courage, unenvious appreciation of opponents, respect for the law, fidelity in family life, strong sense of solidarity, love of country, instinct of possession, and national pride. So much has the last become the source and essence of all English statecraft, that in the maintenance of political advantage this nation, with which personal fidelity transcends everything else, pays regard neither to fidelity nor any other moral teaching, excluding naturally those demands of Christianity and those unremitting endeavours of Great Britain to "make the natives happy" which are good-humouredly emphasized in newspapers and public speeches continually by way of concealing the English lust of conquest. Let us have done in Europe with the ridiculous abuse of "perfidious Albion" and learn to appraise this nation more justly. Statecraft is one thing and moral teaching is another. Sensible people, such as the English are, take their stand on the ground of actuality, wait until other people make a beginning with their perfect paradise on earth, and leave the pleasure of solving such questions to public meetings of women of both sexes.

FRITZ BLEY, *Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums* ["The World-Position of Germanism"] (1897), pp. 10, 11.

VIII. Necessity of an Aggressive Foreign Policy.

As the educated classes of our nation, the people with a certain political vision, have gradually recognised that the policy of "saturation" no longer corresponds to our actual position, it is essential that all who are interested in public life should likewise learn to think differently and demand that we shall carry on an active foreign policy—let us say plainly an aggressive policy. Just because we are in the grasp of enemies we must bestir ourselves, if we are not to be choked. Just as other nations publicly discuss their prospects and wishes, so should we; it will, indeed, be advantageous so to do, since the silence of German public opinion and the Government, arising from unclearness and absence of definite purpose, is regarded by foreign countries as evidence of cunning and wiliness, and on all sides intentions are attributed to us of a character which would indeed be disquieting if they existed.

Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), p. 137.

IX. Germany a Disturbing Force in Europe.

We often hear the world-position of Germany pictured by well-meaning nationalists as though we alone were the peaceful lambs, and all other nations ravening wolves, with gnashing teeth and blood-thirsty eyes. Such a picture is simply stupid. One has only to regard Germany for a time as pictured by foreign publications in order to know that we are by no means regarded abroad as the snow-white lambkins of world-history. The truth is that by the Prusso-German victories of 1866 and 1870 a complete dislocation of the equilibrium of Europe took place. Our new Empire put the Habsburg Empire in the shade and overturned the Napoleonic Empire; Berlin became the metropolis of the Western Continent; the earlier divided, oppressed, and ridiculed Germany became the determining Power between Russia and England; weakness was changed into strength, and for other nations new power is always oppressive.

We Germans are the latest revolutionaries of the European

family, the people who have disturbed the sleep of the Continent for the last time in decisive fashion. It was our nation's right before God and man to do this; after long centuries of misery we wished to have at last our own place in the sun. We are glad that we have succeeded in establishing imperial unity and power, but we regard it simply as sentimentality to pretend, after all that we have done, that we have never disturbed a drop of water. Because we wished to be a nation we must openly and gladly bear the consequences resulting from the fulfilment of this wish.

Dr. Friedrich Naumann, *Das blaue Buch von Vaterland und Freiheit* ["The Bluebook of the Fatherland and Liberty"] (1913), pp. 259–60.

X. German World-policy and Sea-Power.

Navigare necesse est, vivere non est necesse, runs the inscription upon the Navigation House at Bremen, and these words of Pliny indicate plainly and concisely that Germany will not be able to maintain her position without territory overseas. We must make our economic sphere independent of Russia, England and America by acquiring territories in temperate countries capable of settlement for the reception of our surplus population, and plantation territories in tropical countries which will exchange their products with our manufactures, so that our nationality shall find in this World-Empire adequate conditions of prosperity. It was the great misfortune of our German history that the separation of the Netherlands from the old Empire prevented us from following this aim at the time when, with the discovery of the sea routes to both of the Indies, world-supremacy was transferred from the Mediterranean and the North Sea to the oceans. That German trade at that time recognised the importance of this aim is proved by the activity of the Welsers in establishing their colony of New Venice in Venezuela. But the Hansa alone was unable to contest world-supremacy with Spain and Portugal or even to enter into competition with these Powers. Holland also was unable alone to maintain the Greater Holland which it had created oversea. Both lacked the Empire as a Continental support.

Fritz Bley, *Die alldeutsche Bewegung und die Niederlande* ["The Pan-German Movement and the Netherlands"] (1897), pp. 8, 9.

World-policy is carried on by all Great Powers and even by States which wish to be Great Powers, and Germany must likewise take part in order not to be out-distanced, and particularly because of her multifarious interests in all parts of the world. These interests are very important and they call for the care and protection of the Empire. For this reason the German Empire must create a powerful fleet. Imperial power, says Emperor William, denotes sea-power. . . . .

The position of a Great Power is to-day unthinkable without an efficient fleet. The tripod of Neptune is the sceptre of the world. It is, however, short-sighted or anti-German to wish to prevent the German Empire from translating its Imperial power effectively into sea-power and intervening actively in world-policy. Whoever wishes to swim against this stream will find that he has got up too late, for Germany is already committed to world-policy, not indeed for the purpose of seeking world-supremacy but in order to secure for herself her rightful position in world-economy. Besides the protection of her national interests, however, Germany has also world-political duties, and when she carries on world-policy she fulfils not only her national duty but her world-historical mission.

PAUL DEHN, *Kommende Weltwirtschaftspolitik* ["Coming Policy of World-Economy"] (1898), pp. 134, 138, 139.

XI. NAVAL POWER AND WORLD-POLICY.

Should the Germans take their place side by side with the Anglo-Saxons in the future as a world-nation, as to-day appears likely, history will judge that the creation of our fleet has decided the question. Should Germany still be repelled, the issue must be decided by a great naval struggle. From the standpoint of world-history or world-policy all great questions of to-day are secondary to the one question: whether the Anglo-German settlement of the share of the two nations in the future development of the world shall be effected peacefully or by war.

Dr. PAUL ROHRBACH, *Die Geschichte der Menschheit* ["The History of Mankind"] (1914), p. 290.

II. WAR AND WELTPOLITIK

XII. World-policy may involve War.

Will German world-policy necessarily lead to world-supremacy, to the establishment of a German world-empire? Yes and no! Every policy which claims this name aims after a certain development of power, a certain exercise of domination. That distinguishes it from Manchesterdom, which is nothing else than the renunciation of the will to action. It is certain that such a German world-policy will lead to supremacy over uncivilized races and races of low civilization. Herein lies not only the surest prospect of great economic gain, but also the only possibility of fulfilling the highest duty of humanity, viz., the elevation of savage into civilized races. The German nation, without doubt the most fit for this duty, has strangely enough been the last of the great nations of the present to face this duty.

German world-policy, if the worst happens, will not have to shrink from the application of force to other civilized nations, since if it demands, and must demand, that there shall be no readjustment of power, no essential alteration of possession as between the great and powerful nations of the earth, without Germany giving her assent, and if this assent is only given in the event of equal advantages being offered to Germany, that means really only the application of the century-old policy of the so-called Concert of the European Great Powers to present-day conditions of world-power. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that this policy, like the mercantile policy of Cromwell or Colbert, may lead to armed settlements as between the Great Powers.

Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus, und Kolonialpolitik* ["World-Policy, Imperialism, and Colonial Policy"] (1908), pp. 57, 58.

XIII. The Prospect of War.

Should we be compelled to fight against a coalition, as French Ministers openly proclaim and an army of newspapers daily preach, we shall, inspired by the greatness of our task, do our duty fully and completely without weakness and without hesitation. In such a struggle there can be no false neutrality —whoever is not for us will be against us.

Heinrich Oberwinder, *Die Weltkrise und die Aufgaben des deutschen Reichs* ["The World Crisis and the Tasks of the German Empire"] (1905), p. 192.

If it is to be acknowledged that the pacific policy of Berlin is chiefly responsible for the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the question nevertheless calls for serious reflection whether, in connection therewith, our world-political interests are always sufficiently protected. It might be critical and even dangerous for Germany if foreign countries were to count in all circumstances upon the calculation that German policy would not deviate from its purely pacific tendency, even when German rights and interests failed to receive such consideration as should be expected in view of our industrious population of 65 millions. . . . .

It is not the empty prophesies of mere superstitious minds that have, for a long time, stamped the year 1913 as a critical year. Rather world-political events and prospects in the aggregate have brought it about that, in spite of the consciousness of the need for a *détente* which prevails for the moment, the time is coming ever nearer which must bring either an immediate or indirect reckoning between the two Anglo-German nations of Europe, or such an honourable *rapprochement* between them as will secure to Germany her legitimate rights and satisfy her present need for world-political expansion.

Arthur Dix, in the *Leipziger Tageblatt*, December 31, 1912, quoted in *Der deutsche Chauvinismus* ["German Chauvinism"] by Dr O. Nippold (1913), p. 50.

The way to Germany's unity and power was not paved with ink-pots, printer's ink and parliamentary resolutions, but was marked by blood, wounds, and deeds of arms. States,

however, are only maintained by the means by which they were created. For that reason it is necessary that we should have a strong army and a powerful fleet. The last Army Bill did not meet this need sufficiently to ensure Germany's victory in the event of war, and universal service is not yet thoroughly applied. The army and navy must be inspired by inner moral values, and as for our people in general, we renounce the policy of cowering and crouching, procrastination, and pondering without daring.

General A. A. KEIM at a Pan-Germanist conference at Erfurt, September, 1912, quoted in *Der deutsche Chauvinismus* ["German Chauvinism"] by Dr O. Nippold (1913), p. 72.

XIV. More Territory to be acquired by War.

Our nation longs for great national aims. Our present policy, however, appears to be restricted to simply maintaining the existing status. But a forward-striving people, such as we are, requires more land for its powers, and if it cannot obtain it peaceably, it must in the end resort to war. The Defence Association (*Wehrverein*) has been created in order to awaken the recognition of this fact.

General A. K. E. VON WROCHEM at a meeting of the *Deutscher Wehrverein* at Danzig, March, 1913, quoted in *Der deutsche Chauvinismus* ["German Chauvinism"] by Dr O. Nippold (1913), p. 84.

XV. Laudation of War.

Public opinion must again be made to recognise the moral justification and political importance of war. Its high importance, as the most powerful advancer of civilization, must be universally acknowledged in proportion to its value. We must recognise that in a really civilised nation, economic and personal interests alone can never be decisive; that not external but moral values are the true values of civilization worth aiming after, and that to make sacrifice and suffer affliction in the interest of a great cause elevates men higher than pleasure and covetous hankering after the sensual delights of this world; in short, that war for the sake of ideal purposes, or for the self-maintenance of a noble people, must not be regarded as barbarism but as the highest expression of true

civilization and as a political necessity in the interest of biological, social and moral progress.

General FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, *Unsere Zukunft: ein Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk* ["Our Future: a Word of Warning to the German People"] (1912), p. 33.

With the increase of her population and productivity, Germany will before long be comparable to an overheated boiler, which threatens to blow up unless somewhere or other a valve is opened in order to give space for the surplus material and intellectual national forces. Security and extension of power—in these words may our international political duties be expressed. In order to be able to judge, however, how the above aim is to be attained, we must understand the means which statecraft has at its disposal, and we must at the same time keep before our eyes the obstacles which have to be overcome in the present world-situation. Moreover, we must be clear that the struggle for high aims, the endeavour after extended activity, in short, war itself is one of the means of the progress of civilization. The intellectual and moral forces, which in the last resort are the things that matter, are not developed and increased in the undisturbed quiet of a safe peace, but in the storm and stress of a great and agitated time, under the influence of an energetic and self-conscious policy which places before the people great common aims, calls for sacrifice, and does not fear danger, when the future and the ideals of a noble people are at stake. Such a policy is the best educator of the nation to patriotic feeling, moral earnestness, and great successes.

Ibid., p. 43.

War, in contrast to peace, does more to arouse national life and to expand national power than any other means known to history. It certainly brings much material and mental distress in its train, but at the same time it evokes the noblest activities of human nature. This is especially so in present-day conditions, when it must be regarded not merely as the affair of Sovereigns and Governments, but as the expression of the united will of a whole nation.

General FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* ["Germany and the Next War"] (1911), p. 21.

Our people must come to recognise that the maintenance of peace never can or may be the aim of a policy. The policy of a great State has positive aims. It will endeavour to obtain these aims by pacific measures so long as it is possible and profitable. It must not only be conscious that in momentous questions, which influence decisively the entire development of a nation, the appeal to arms is a sacred right of the State, but it must keep this conviction fresh in the national consciousness. The inevitableness, the idealism, and the blessing of war, as an indispensable and stimulating law of development, must be continually emphasized.

Ibid., p. 34.

Wherever we open the pages of history we find proofs of the fact that wars, begun at the right moment with manly resolution, have effected the happiest results, both politically and socially. Political weakness has always worked harm, since the statesman lacked the requisite decision to run the risk of a necessary war, since he tried by diplomatic tact to adjust irreconcilable antagonisms, and deceived himself as to the gravity of the situation and the real importance of things. The vicissitudes of our own recent history supply us with the most striking examples of this.

Ibid., p. 39.

The German is not peace-loving and blood-shy because of any rational considerations, nor because he estimates too highly the power and resources of his opponent; for such calculations the great mass even of the educated are much too comfortable and much too little instructed. The chief causes of the love of peace with us are religious and ethical objections, aesthetical considerations, and a general indisposition to everything violent which might disturb our comfort, and, above all, our money making. Against this attitude we have now to protest with all emphasis; it will be a pleasure to us to utter once for all with ruthless frankness that which moves a German heart to its depths. War is the most grandiose expression of a nation's power, an achievement in which millions co-operate, a work of art, whose completion brings into play the greatest and most daring spirits of a nation. War is the greatest and most powerful thing which Providence

has allowed past generations to create as a monument for posterity. . . . .

Not the advocates of war, but its opponents are barbaric and degraded men, arid materialists, shallow voluptuaries, intellectual ciphers, or, as Schopenhauer still better called such people, the manufactured goods of nature.

EDMUND WEBER, *Krieg oder Frieden mit England?* ["War or Peace with England?"] (1913), pp. 49, 51.

XVI. NATIONAL EDUCATION IN HATRED.

Politics on a large scale can only be carried on in general by means of war, and war can only be waged with an army. The army is the nation in arms. A people may be divided into two kinds of men—men who are warlike by nature, like the Samurais, the psychic warrior caste whose courage is instinctive, and the men who acquire courage only with a certain amount of effort. The latter are numerous and perhaps form the majority. The wars of past days were waged by small *élite* armies. To the banners of the Friedländers, Bernhards and Torstensohns flocked only those born warriors to whom fighting was a merry sport. With such people it was possible to fetch the devil's grandmother herself out of hell. To-day, however, we have to do with the majority of peaceable people, poor in temperament, and, alas, we cannot do without them if we have to obtain the ascendancy which we need. We know, however, that these people can be immediately helped by infusing in them a passion, and in our case this passion can only be hatred. In Germany in general the value of this powerful emotion, its biological efficiency, and its creative power have been forgotten, and yet there reigns in the hearts of most men a secret hankering after hatred and its lust of power. . . . .

A hundred years ago when from the palace to the gutter a convulsion of foaming hatred impelled our nation forward, we conquered, for the French had not this stimulus. . . . .

Who does not dare does not win. Without an explosive in the soul daring is inconceivable and nothing politically great can be achieved. Without dangerous qualities of character, no fear can be instilled into men; without subversive

tendencies, there can be no great advance of national destiny. For that reason the German demand of the day is, Propaedeutics of the national soul! The family to the front! The State must follow, first in the school, then in foreign policy. Education to hatred! Education to esteem for hatred! Education to love of hatred! Organization for hatred! Away with immature timidity, with false shame of brutality and fanaticism! The saying of Marinetti applies politically, too: "The more cuffs, the more kisses!" We need not hesitate to proclaim blasphemously, "Now abideth faith, hope and hate, these three, but the greatest of these is hate!"

Medizinalrat Dr. W. Fuchs, Military Staff Surgeon, *Weil wir nicht kriegsbereit sind: eine psychologische Studie* ["Because we are not ready for war: a Psychological Study"], "dedicated to German parents, teachers, and youth" (1914), pp. 8, 9, 13, 14.

III. TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

XVII. Germany no longer a "Saturated State."

However correct from the standpoint of Bismarckian policy the maxim of the "saturation" of Germany appeared, and however justified the belief of our neighbours in the complete sincerity of our assurances to that effect, it would doubtless be insincere or short-sighted if anyone used this maxim, in the sense in which Bismarck advanced and expounded it, at a time when the conditions are so changed that the old method of viewing it must rightly be supplemented by a new one. The reason for this change lies in the fact that in the epoch of Bismarck Germany was a State whose essential interests did not perceptibly extend beyond Europe, while the conditions of our national existence in the epoch of William II have in this respect been fundamentally transformed. Bismarck's tasks and mastery lay in European politics; what we have to follow to-day, however, is world-policy. To speak in this altered situation of Germany's condition of "saturation" is in any case sheer stupidity. It would be equally stupid, none the less, if anyone were to draw the conclusion that the sincerity of Bismarck's assurance that we wished to plunder none of our neighbours no longer held good. Even if we wished, and were able, to annex parts of West Russia and Austria, with Switzerland, Luxemburg and Holland, the particular need for expansion which now exists would not be relieved, since that need cannot be met by the incorporation of adjacent territories nearly related to Germany by nature and the status of their population, however extensive these territories might be.

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern* ["Germany amongst the World-Nations"] (1903), pp. 3, 4.

XVIII. Germany a "Mutilated Torso."

The Germany of to-day, considered geographically, is a mutilated torso of the old Imperial dominion; it comprises only a fraction of the German people. A large number of our German kindred have been incorporated in other States, or live in political independence, like the Dutch, who have developed into a separate nationality, but in language and national customs cannot deny their German ancestry. Germany has been robbed of her natural boundaries; even the source and mouth of the most characteristic of German rivers, the much-sung German Rhine, lie outside the German territory. On the eastern frontier, too, where the strength of the new German Empire grew up in centuries of war against the Slavs, German possessions are menaced. The Slavonic waves are ever dashing more furiously against the coast of that Germanism, which seems to have lost its old victorious strength.

While signs of political weakness are visible here, for centuries the overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign countries, and been lost to our fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even to-day the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living.

This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or corresponds to the greatness of the German people and its intellectual importance.

General Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* ["Germany and the Next War"] (1911), p. 79.

XIX. Germany's Need for Expansion.

We can no longer obtain as a gift new fertile and really valuable colonies such as we need for our rapidly increasing population more urgently than other nations and States, but can only acquire them with a considerable expenditure of money or blood. New territories will no longer be offered to us upon a salver, but only acquired with a full purse or with sword in the hand. We might buy from the Spaniards several groups

of islands for a substantial payment, and probably the Portuguese colonies might be purchasable at a high price. The piece of the Congo cost us our renunciation of any political claims in Morocco. Thus we must pay dearly for every piece of territory; so long as we are not in a position to assert our rights, we are dependent upon England's grace. Hence the alleged weak and faint-hearted policy of the German Government: in the face of these for the present unsurmountable barriers, cautious politicians must hold back the exuberant hot-heads in the people. In general there is so much healthy national ambition in the German Government that it scarcely requires any stimulus from the Pan-Germans. Certainly it cannot be denied that the prestige of the German Empire is no longer what it used to be when we only carried on a Continental policy, in which our strong army in the last resort turned the scales. In colonial policy this bulwark of our European position has naturally proved inadequate in face of England's diplomacy and the protected position of the island empire. We must say as Bismarck said of Prussia in 1857, like the shepherd in Goethe's poem, "I have come down and do not myself know how."

Dr. E. Hartl, *Preussen-Deutschlands diplomatische Niederlagen und deren Folgen in der Geschichte* ["Prusso-Germany's Diplomatic Reverses, and their Consequences in History"] (1912), pp. 67, 68.

We shall only emerge from the misery of the present time when we recognise that political seizures of territory have only a very precarious value and that it will suffice for the vital needs of nations if, as far as possible, the "open door" for trade exists everywhere, together with the possibility of concluding settlement treaties with thinly-populated States. There are certain regions of the earth which cannot be sufficiently developed owing to lack of a labouring population. I count among them, for example, Australia, where there is only one inhabitant to every two square kilometres, and Brazil, where there are two inhabitants to the square kilometre, and indeed South America as a whole, where thirty million square kilometres of territory are inhabited by only 14 million people. If, in future, the German Government should conclude settlement treaties with any South American Republics and there-

with make use of the right to an altogether unpolitical occupation of territory, I would hope that such action would not be regarded in England or America as a violent act of German imperialism, for Germany would only be sending abroad a part of its industrious population in a way which would, indeed, confer upon the German Empire great cultural and commercial advantages, but would bring to it no political gain. Only when Germany is "saturated" in this way will she cease to appear a danger for England.

Rev. O. Umfrid, Stadtpfarrer, at the German-English Conciliation Conference held in London, October 30 to November 1, 1912. Quoted in Ernst Sieper's *Deutschland und England in ihren wirtschaftlichen, politischen, und kulturellen Beziehungen* ["Germany and England in their Economic, Political and Cultural Relations"] (1913), pp. 123–4.

Prince Bülow has repeatedly given the assurance in the Reichstag that in any future distribution of territory, Germany will claim the share that belongs to her. The demand for the "open door" can scarcely be regarded as adequate. The future of nations of equal capacity will be decided by the question of the amount of space which they have at disposal for their independent development. An economic domination exercised entirely in virtue of ownership of capital and exports to foreign markets, without equivalent political power and territorial possession, rests on feet of clay. Germany sees her future restricted by the smallness of her territory, and if that condition is not altered, the strength of her political position and the importance of her special culture for the development of mankind will disappear. We are a peaceful nation, and no one in Germany thinks of challenging the well-acquired rights of other nations, but we cannot agree to an arrangement under which the oversea sources of raw materials and foodstuffs are monopolised in such a way as to obstruct other aspiring Powers in their efforts to attain economic security and independence.

Heinrich Oberwinder, *Die Weltkrise und die Aufgaben des deutschen Reichs* ["The World Crisis and the Tasks of the German Empire"] (1905), p. 188.

A great deficiency of land at home compels us to adopt a programme which runs—"More land, more land with raw materials for our industry, more markets, more spheres of influence in foreign countries which shall not be closed to us by customs barriers and import prohibitions, the keeping together of the German emigrants so that they may be preserved for our national economy either in our colonies or in territories where they will not lose their German character."

Dr. Hugo Böttger, *Die neue Aera der deutschen Kolonialpolitik* ["The New Era of German Colonial Policy"] (1907), p. 14.

We must be quite clear that the relations between the two countries, Germany and England, cannot possibly be permanently or truly influenced at all by little things, like assurances of friendship, speeches, visits, etc., since for both nations their greatest interests are at stake—for Germany her entire future, for England what she has hitherto achieved with wonderful labour and historical consistency, her absolute supremacy at sea. This question is for us a life question, because it is a question of obtaining for the German Empire permanent and practical treatment as an equal World-Power side by side with Great Britain.

Deutschland sei wach!—Betrachtungen über Rüstungsfragen und Weltpolitik ["Germany, awake!—Considerations upon Armament Questions and World-Policy." Published by the Flottenverein] (1912), p. 43.

It cannot really be reasonably required that Germany, with her 69 million people and her world commerce, should allow herself to be treated on the same footing with the 40 millions of France; that she should concede to the 45 million inhabitants of Great Britain the rôle of arbitrator over the States of the Old World and unconditional maritime power; or that, in spite of her continually increasing population, she should renounce any extension of her Colonial power and the acquisition of settlement colonies, while States with a diminishing or insufficient population, like France and England, divide the possession of the Old World with Russia, which for the larger part can only be regarded as an Asiatic Power.

General Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Unsere Zukunft: ein Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk* ["Our Future: a Word of Warning to the German People"] (1912), p. 83.

It must be one of the principal objects of German world-policy to win suitable territory for emigration. The best plan would be the extension of the existing German settlement territory in Central Europe, but should extraordinary good fortune not favour this idea it would be necessary to turn to other territories as near to her as possible, such, for example, as would be available in Asia Minor by the dissolution of the Turkish Empire. There is, however, other free land in the world, though it will come only to those who have the courage to seize it. The need of plantation territories appears to be met, but only when to the German protectorates are reckoned those of the two Netherlands (Holland and Belgium), viz. the Dutch Indies and the great Congo region of Belgium, to the extent of regarding these territories as a common field of enterprise for the States forming the Central European Customs Union.

Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus, und Kolonialpolitik* ["World-Policy, Imperialism, and Colonial Policy"] (1908), pp. 51, 52.

We must be land hungry. We must acquire new territories for settlement, otherwise we shall be a decaying people, a stunted race. We must, out of genuine and pure love, think of the future of our nation and its children, although we are reproached with lust of war and bellicosity. If the German nation were ever to fear war, it would cease to live. It is, therefore, our duty to strengthen our courage, so that if difficult hours come; we shall all stand together united as brothers.

Baron von Vietinghoff-Scheel, at a Pan-Germanist conference at Erfurt, September, 1912, quoted in *Der deutsche Chauvinismus* ["German Chauvinism"] by Dr O. Nippold (1913), p. 72.

XX. Germany's Place in the World.

The enormous expansion of the British world-empire, which since the rivalry of the younger Colonial States from 1880 forward has made tenacious exertions and doubled the extent of its territory by rapid annexations, and the—perhaps to-day greatly exaggerated—danger of the consolidation of

the British Empire in a sort of Customs Alliance, closed against all other countries: these two factors suggest the consideration that a further increase of Greater Britain accords neither with the wish nor the interests of other countries, not even of Germany. Like all other medium-sized countries Germany feels herself compelled to take steps to preserve her existence as a nation and as an economic and cultural unit and her nationality itself, and to protect herself against strangulation and destruction. These measures, so indispensable for us, are directed against England amongst other countries. On the other hand, one may and should think that Germany, for her part, in her efforts at expansion and in her industrial and commercial competition in the world-markets, should not get in the way of the English, for they, too, jostle against us and must do. . . . .

How should and how shall the two peoples and their States stand towards one another? . . . . In a famous diplomatic speech in the Reichstag on January 10, 1885, in which he spoke of a breach of peace between Germany and England as unjustifiable and improbable, Prince Bismarck spoke of the Englishman's natural astonishment that "his land-rat cousins, as we appeared to him, suddenly put out to sea." At the same time he suggested delicately yet plainly that the English Government would do well to "moderate betimes the expression of resentment on the part of English subjects." Even to-day the German, if with unprejudiced eyes he looks about him and backward, will understand how it comes about that he, as a new power in the world and in world-policy, still excites everywhere a certain displeasure. Nevertheless, from the historical consideration of our national development the Englishman must learn, and recognise without astonishment, that we are no longer and can never again be the Germany of old. We must and want to go farther and beyond the past, and whoever wishes to live in peace with us must reconcile himself to this fact. For as it is a question of our very life, an unconditional need of our existence; there can be for us no going back without arrest of growth, mutilation, yes, ruin, and for that reason without a life-and-death struggle. That must be reckoned with everywhere; yet we fear often that there is still an unwillingness in other countries, and in England

amongst them, to recognise this, and to take us at our full value and for what we are.

Professor Erich Marcks, *Deutschland und England in den grossen europäischen Krisen seit der Reformation* ["Germany and England in the Great European Crises since the Reformation"] (1900), pp. 40–1.

XXI. An "Augmenter of the Empire" needed.

The Government's unspeakable dread of serious conflicts could only escape censure at home because the mass of the public was as much in dread as the leading men. That has become different in recent years and particularly during the last few months. A flood of anger rages through the German lands, and it is not easy to see where it will end. Yet the risk is not in reality great. Count Preysing thinks that the French fortresses would be broken through in a week (which is perhaps too optimistic) and England knows only too well that it cannot begin a European war, since in that event the whole of British East India and Egypt would fall away. Russia, moreover, is still incapacitated by the wounds received in Manchuria and is also occupied in Persia, and could be still more occupied without much pains by Austria and Turkey. . . . . When will there come a statesman who will prove an "augmenter of the Empire[1]"?

Dr. A. Wirth, *Die Entscheidung über Marokko* ["The Decision regarding Morocco"] (1911), p. 56.

If any State has reason to provide for the augmentation of its territory it is the German Empire, since its population increases rapidly, its industry requires new markets, and its entire economy needs land for the production of tropical and semi-tropical products of every kind, the provision of which has placed us in an intolerable dependence upon other countries, as, for example, in the case of cotton. . . . .

To the honour of our people let it be said that in thoughtful and politically-educated circles the recognition of the fallacy of the doctrine of Germany's territorial "satiety" ["saturation"] began soon after Bismarck's retirement from office, and

[1] "Mehrer des Reiches," a term applied to certain German Emperors.

has gradually been accepted by public opinion; it is still believed, however, in official circles, so slowly does bureaucracy move, so difficult is it to get it out of the habitual grooves, so lazy is it in thought.

DANIEL FRYMANN, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), pp. 5, 7, 8.

It must be borne in mind that the purposes of acquisitions of over-sea territory are multifarious, varying with the economic and national needs which they are intended to serve; we need at once and unconditionally new industrial markets and territory for the production of industrial raw materials, but also territory suitable for settlement by the Germans for whom the fatherland will one day have no room. This territory must be acquired, opened up, and made secure now, even though any large emigration thereto may not take place for twenty or thirty years, for a colony intended for the reception of large bodies of emigrants cannot be set up at a day's notice; and until the time that it is put to this purpose it can be used in other ways.

Ibid., p. 8.

Since Bismarck's retirement public opinion has undergone a complete transformation, and his maxim as to Germany's territorial "saturation" no longer holds good. Our development and needs show that we have again become hungry—hungry for land, so that German statecraft is faced by tasks which transcend those of Bismarck's time. It is no bad omen for the progressive political education of our, on the whole, unpolitical nation that this transformation of opinion began first and was most complete just in those circles which, after Bismarck's dismissal and death, formed his most faithful disciples. They did not regard themselves as bound by the master's mere words; it was his ideas, his mentality, his will and nature that determined and still determine them. . . . . There are signs that even official circles are at last prepared [*i.e.* at the beginning of 1911] to abandon likewise the doctrine of German "saturation."

Ibid., p. 9.

XXII. Germans the "Salt of the Earth."

We are the most efficient nation in all spheres of knowledge and the fine arts. We are the best colonists, the best seamen, yes, even the best merchants. Nevertheless, we do not obtain our rightful share in the heritage of the world because we do not care to profit by the wholesome teachings of history. Have we not had enough of national shame, national self-humiliation, the desecration of the German spirit by France, Rome, England, Slavs and Huns, of the sacrifice of German territory? Shall we not at last learn in Germany that all the misfortune of our history during the last thousand years has proceeded from the unhappy inclination of the Germans to cosmopolitan chimeras?

That the German Empire forms not the conclusion but the beginning of our national development—this obvious truth is still by no means the common possession of Germans, but is grasped only by a small body of educated people, by which I do not mean pedantic wiseacres but men of heart and intelligence.

Fritz Bley, *Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums* ["The World-Position of Germanism"] (1897), pp. 21, 22.

XXIII. Pan-German Utopias.

The Utopias of the Pan-Germans have little in common with Bismarck's "real politics"; they proceed rather from the spirit—not indeed small but impractical—of the late Göttingen Orientalist Lagarde, who, however, wished to establish his German peasant colonies not in Morocco but in Hungary and the adjacent semi-Asiatic countries.

E. Daniels, in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, September, 1911, p. 583.

XXIV. An Apology for the Pan-Germanists.

It is true that we have in Germany the so-called Pan-Germanists, whose utterances are always cited in the foreign Press as a proof of Germany's monstrous schemes of conquest. But everyone in Germany knows that this small body, though very active, is entirely without influence. They are good

patriots, and for that reason one should not be angry with them; but because of the false ideas of their importance which are intentionally circulated abroad they do incalculable injury to the policy of the German Empire.

Professor HANS DELBRÜCK in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, May, 1911, p. 196.

XXV. THE DEMAND FOR EVACUATED TERRITORY.

Not only does the economic struggle for existence become every day severer at home, but the sale of our goods abroad is becoming ever more difficult, and we cannot ignore the fact that in regard to important raw materials we are dependent upon foreign countries, and that there is a danger that we shall one day be disabled if they choose to inflict that fate upon us as an exporting country. We observe the increase of our population and foresee the day coming when we shall suffer from over-population, so that the surplus will be faced with the necessity of seeking an existence elsewhere. Then we shall find that the present Germany with her colonies will not be adequate to meet the needs so arising, so that we shall have to acquire territory. This necessity frankly recognised, the question arises, where shall we seek this territory, in Europe or oversea?

Any expansion in Europe can only be effected by victorious wars, since neither France nor Russia will be so humane as to cede to us portions of their territory voluntarily; and even if we had conquered and compelled them to make such cessions, we should only receive territories inhabited by people hostile to us, and it is doubtful whether such an increase of territory would improve our position. As yet we are far from having arrived at the hard-hearted stage of national selfishness in which we should require our beaten enemies to cede to us evacuated territory. Nevertheless, nearly fifty years ago an idealist like Lagarde did not shrink from that solution of the Polish question; quite recently [1911] a pamphlet published anonymously, "Grossdeutschland," by [Otto Richard] Tannenberg, fantastically sketched an elaborate policy of evacuation both to the East and West of us in Germany's favour after the victorious conclusion of a European war; while here and

there similar ideas are discussed in German nationalist publications, so that it may be assumed that they are in the air, and have been suggested by the recognition of the fact that desperate efforts will be necessary in order to protect the Germans in Europe from suffocation. . . . . It is perhaps not inexpedient to speak of this idea of evacuation publicly on occasion, so that our opponents may understand that such desperate measures have their advocates in Germany; they will then recognise that a certain caution is desirable on their part, since the *furor teutonicus* must not be excited beyond limits.

DANIEL FRYMANN, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), p. 139.

Any man who has learned to think historically will be aghast at the demand that a territory inhabited by Europeans should be "evacuated," a measure implying the violent disturbance of a development going back many centuries. The thought outrages the feelings of civilized people, and is in conflict with modern international law, which protects the property of private individuals belonging to belligerent States. When, however, the peculiar position of the German nation, tied up as it is in Europe, and liable with a further large increase of population to suffocation unless it obtains more air, is thoroughly considered, it must be admitted that a situation may arise when it must demand depopulated territory from a conquered enemy in the West or East unless we had oversea colonies suitable for settlement or were willing to permit again the emigration of Germans to foreign States.

Ibid., pp. 139–141.

XXVI. THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL PENETRATION.

The policy of "the German idea in the world" should not, according to our wish and will, aim at conquest or violence of any kind. If it did so, it might perhaps be easily made popular for the comprehension of the masses. Since, however, this way is not accessible because of ideal and practical reasons, it must be our task to realize the idea of German expansion, upon

which our capacity to live as a world-nation absolutely depends, by creating first, both on land and water, armaments of such imposing strength that no one would dare to attack us, and by working then under their protection for the attainment of our peaceable aim, which is, while renouncing the subjugation of foreign territories and peoples by war-like means, the permeation of the territories accessible to us with the spirit of our national thought.

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt* ["The German Idea in the World"] (1912), p. 206.

XXVII. Popularity of Imperialism.

The struggles which the Army Bills of the 'eighties occasioned are to-day inconceivable. None of the middle-class parties dare venture any longer to refuse any increase of military strength which the Government declared to be necessary in the interest of the foreign position of the Empire; even the Social Democrats who, bound by their programme, are naturally hostile to such laws, must observe a certain caution and reserve in combating such demands, and do not deny that in the event of a general election over such a question, they would suffer serious defeat. This means nothing else than that the nationalist movement to-day not only appeals to the feelings of the educated, the nobility, or the urban middle classes, but, growing unceasingly, is vigorous amongst the people and, even where it seems to be missing, is only dormant, awaiting the call of events.

At no time and on no occasion has the German Government experienced such angry and passionate attacks as during the Morocco affair, and particularly during the phase of that affair which may be regarded as its decisive settlement. The despatch of two ships of war to Agadir acted upon German nationalism like a *réveille*. It was believed that the Government had at last recognised that Germany could not allow that rich land, which was supposed to be flowing with milk and honey, to fall into the hands of impertinent France, and intended at the last moment to rescue it from French hands. When, however, it was found that the Government only obtained an indifferent settlement of a troublesome affair, and, as we must suppose,

only wished to do so, the nation was disappointed and depressed, and felt that it had been deceived. The conductors of our foreign policy were attacked with a passion which a few years ago would have been inconceivable in similar circumstances and whose extravagance exceeded the limits of healthy common-sense.

J. J. Ruedorffer, *Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart* ["Outlines of World-Policy in the Present"] (1913), pp. 110, 111.

If the German nation is by no means insusceptible to world-policy, it has not in regard thereto the acute instinct which has been schooled by the traditions of centuries. We must first be introduced into Colonial and world-policy, and the Government is compelled to give to its citizens object-lessons and instruction by means of demonstrations. Only by means of repeated diplomatic conflicts and threats of military conflicts will the idea of antagonism of interests and of the necessity of an eventual settlement find entrance in the nation's mind. . . . .

In the year 1903 Morocco was in general merely Hecuba to us; no one troubled about it, and it was only when the Emperor landed in Tangiers in April, 1905, that this exotic land came to have any interest for us. The Conference of Algeciras and the proceedings of Casa Blanca caused the spectre of an Anglo-French coalition war against Germany to appear in the misty distance and awakened active and passionate interest. The Agadir episode of the year 1911 and the threatened English attack, however, have now fully popularised the Morocco question and the idea of a war with England; they have awakened patriotic passion in the sleepiest of Germans and fanned it into a bright flame. While up to a few years ago the ever deepening antagonism between Germany and England occupied the German mind in only a small degree, the aggressive attitude of England in the three great questions of recent years, viz. the Algeciras, Bosnian and Agadir crises, has had the effect of making an Anglo-German settlement indispensable and of causing everyone, down to the last workman in our midst, to speak of war with England with an equanimity, a resignation, and a confidence which a few years ago would hardly have been regarded as possible. One would almost be reminded of the old saying "L'industrie nationale de la Prusse

c'est la guerre," were it not that the results of the elections are a guarantee of the inherent peaceableness and absence of aggressive tendencies in the soul of our people.

Dr. E. Hartl, *Preussen-Deutschlands diplomatische Niederlagen und deren Folgen in der Geschichte* ["Prusso-Germany's Diplomatic Reverses, and their Consequences in History"] (1912), pp. 110, 111.

XXVIII. Colonial Policy is Exploitation.

Our colonial policy is a policy of exploitation, and it cannot be otherwise; if the possibility of exploitation did not exist there would have been no suggestion of a colonial policy. It may be the motive of a few members of the Clerical [Ultramontane] party and other idealists here and there to raise the natives to a higher level of civilization, but for the people who practically carry on colonial policy the only motive, to speak plain German, is exploitation and robbery.

August Bebel, speech in the Reichstag, March, 1906.

IV. GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHER COUNTRIES

(A) GREAT BRITAIN.

XXIX. England the Principal Enemy.

England fears and obstructs every extension of Germany's power, and is prepared rather to favour and concede an excessive increase of the colonial empires of Spain, Italy and the French Republic than give to the German Empire even the smallest scrap of colonial territory. The German Government and people have, however, drawn from the events of the last few years the conclusion that England is the hereditary enemy against whose aggression we must arm ourselves.

Dr. E. Hartl, *Preussen-Deutschlands diplomatische Niederlagen und deren Folgen in der Geschichte* ["Prusso-Germany's Diplomatic Reverses, and their Consequences in History"] (1912), p. 132.

The German nation has unanimously protested against the British interpretation of the Morocco question—a fact of great importance, for our Government now knows that we are as one man behind it if it is determined to go to the length of a war with England. It may be said that this is self-evident when it is a question of the honour and the existence or non-existence of the nation. The question is not so simple, however, when the matter in dispute is small in comparison with the risk of a world-war and the limits of compliance are not fixed. The spectacle of the British fist raised in menace against us was necessary in order to close the ranks of our nation. The Briton could not have done us a greater favour.

Dr. Georg Hartmann, *Krieg oder Frieden mit England?* ["War or Peace with England?"] (1912), pp. 1, 2.

We have been attacked and we have defended ourselves [*apropos* of the Balkan crisis of 1908–9]. Who will compensate us, however, for the injury which we have suffered and which

has been estimated at a milliard kronen? Who will make good the loss to our industry caused by the boycott? The financial sacrifices? The cost of armaments? The loss of wages by our workmen? The sacrifice of time and energy caused for nearly a year by our measures of defence? And who will protect us against a repetition of the same thing? No one but ourselves. And to our means of defence belongs first of all the clear knowledge where our principal enemy [England] is to be found, who he is, why he is our enemy, and with what tools he works.

ALEXANDER VON PEEZ, *England und der Kontinent* (1910), pp. 61, 62.

XXX. BRITISH WORLD-DOMINATION.

The English, who instinctively regard English world-supremacy as identical with the supremacy of civilization, liberty and humanity, assume, with a naïve integrity which is by no means hypocrisy, that the other nations have no reason, and therefore no right, to be dissatisfied with British expansion, since England only expands in the interest of all and her interests are the interests of all. So long as England adheres to free trade, this naïve belief contains a kernel of truth. Germany, for example, has been able to develop her economic interests in England, and in a large part of the English colonies, freely and unhindered; and has reason to be more satisfied with the way in which England has used her political supremacy than with the attitude shown by all other States. Without this moderation of the pressure which English world-domination exercises upon its antagonists, the maintenance of such domination would not have been possible.

J. J. RUEDORFFER, *Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart* ["Outlines of World-Policy in the Present"] (1913), pp. 202–3.

XXXI. WAR WITH ENGLAND INEVITABLE.

On the one hand, it is to be feared that the fighting strength of the fleets hostile to us increases more quickly than that of our own; on the other hand, I believe that the general situation makes war with England inevitable even if our naval force reaches its statutory strength in modern men-of-war in the

shortest possible time. My view, therefore, is that we must first of all lay the solid foundation without which any successful action against the superior forces of the enemy is unthinkable.

General FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* ["Germany and the Next War"] (1911), p. 274.

In the critical times which we shall have to face, the Government of the German Empire must be able to rely upon the unanimity of the whole people if it is to ride the storm. The disclosure of the Anglo-French military agreements removes all further doubt on this point. . . . . We are confronted by a firm phalanx of foes who, at the very least, are determined to prevent any further expansion of Germany's power. With this object, they have done their best, not unsuccessfully, to break up the Triple Alliance, and they will not shrink from a war. The English Ministers have left no doubt on this point. The official statements of the English statesmen have, in spite of all pacific assurances, shown clearly that the paths of English policy lead in the direction which I have indicated. The warning against aggressive intentions issued to Germany, and the assurance that England would support her allies if necessary with the sword, clearly define the limits that Germany may not transgress if she wishes to avoid war with England. . . . . In this position of affairs it would be more than ever foolish to count on any change in English policy. Even English attempts at a *rapprochement* must not blind us as to the real situation. We may at most use them to delay the necessary and inevitable war until we may fairly imagine we have some prospect of success.

Ibid., pp. 330–1.

England understands in a masterly way how in every diplomatic conflict to rattle her sword vigorously in order to give proper emphasis to her words; one need only recall the peace of San Stefano, Fashoda, Dogger Bank and the Agadir episode of last summer. And the question comes up ever again "Why does not Germany answer with the same measures and seek, supported by her trusty sword, to maintain her standpoint in the same way?" The answer must be "Because every

year that an armed conflict is delayed increases the prospects of victory in our favour."

Dr. E. Hartl, *Preussen-Deutschlands diplomatische Niederlagen und deren Folgen in der Geschichte* ["Prusso-Germany's Diplomatic Reverses, and their Consequences in History"] (1912), p. 78.

There are many Germans who hope that the Anglo-German friction will be removed just as the Russo-German friction was, but there are quite as many who think that Germany must demand more than England will be ready to give voluntarily. If it cannot be otherwise, then Germany must assert her demands with the sword. Hence it is that the idea of a war with England has gradually become familiar to the German soul. Hence come also the mistrust and contempt of the Germans for the duplicity of [Lord] Grey, who in Parliament rejected the very thought of war, or its possibility, while in reality the English Cabinet in the summer of 1911 thrice had the intention of falling upon the German fleet.

Ibid., p. 150.

XXXII. Germany's Reckoning with England.

[Speaking of "the German endeavours to obtain territory oversea and the English determination not to permit such acquisition":]

Negotiations are in progress (1912) having for their purpose the alleviation of this antagonism, and England appears to favour the acquisition by us of territory oversea. If England is now trying to relieve the tension she will have good reasons for so doing; we Germans, however, must clearly understand that the relief can only be apparent, and that the conflict continues in fact in all the old severity. For whatever territory England may offer us, it will only be what she thinks she can do without, and where she thinks she need not fear us. In this connection the statement of the Prime Minister, Mr Asquith, that England could not tolerate a settlement of the German Empire on the West Coast of Morocco, as being inconsistent with her interests, should never be forgotten. Such an attitude on England's part is equally contrary to German honour and German interest: we alone have to decide what we require

and we shall not subordinate ourselves to foreign decisions. What in the autumn of 1911 outraged German pride most deeply was the well-founded feeling that the inadequacy of Bethmann-Hollweg and the frivolity of Kiderlen-Wächter led to such subordination. Not only must a repetition of such a shameful proceeding be impossible, but it must be the object of German policy to seek of its own accord the earliest opportunity of compelling England to show her colours again. Should she do it in a way unfriendly to us we must take up the gauntlet, since it is clear that the Anglo-German question will never be decided by Committee-proclamations and visits of friendship, but by blood and iron.

This conflict, whose roots lie solely in English distrust, cannot be otherwise described than as tragical . . . . and the deepest tragedy lies in the fact that, on a cool examination of the facts, no necessary occasion of serious conflict exists. All educated people in Germany love and revere England,—all but her policy; more than is proper the unbalanced and half-educated among us imitate English ways; we entertain no political schemes that can be dangerous to England; her industry and our own have not really injured each other, and it is scarcely to be foreseen when they will do so. In cold blood, therefore, there is no ground for rivalry, still less for enmity, if England would only recognise that while 65 million people—and perhaps at a pinch 75—can live in Old Germany, 80 or 90 millions cannot. Nevertheless, we are told that the world must belong to her 46 millions, and our far larger number is to be excluded from it. In the moment that England recognises the untenableness of this political standpoint, the Anglo-German conflict will disappear and the two Germanic nations will be able, united, to shape the destiny of the world.

Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), pp. 145–7.

Every day teaches England afresh how dangerous it is to play with German fire. The war in South Africa has opened her eyes and shown her a "Mene tekel" written in letters of fire. She knows that she is friendless. That we are not her friend is proved both by the past and the present. The future

will bring the solution of the problem. There is no such thing as hereditary enmity amongst civilized nations, nor should there be. Nevertheless, unless world-history is not world-judgment every antagonism is settled sooner or later. So it was with the German-French war and the war of 1866, the latter a war between brethren. I conceive our relation to England as similar to that to Austria aforetime: the nation of Shakespeare and Milton is intimately related to us, but just as the German nation refused to bear Habsburg domination at home, so it will not allow itself to be obstructed by England in the world at large. It has been baffled by England a hundred times, as it was by Austria before. Will atonement be made to us? Will co-operation be possible? Time, in whose lap lie the issues of war and peace, will alone show. If the latter is possible we shall be satisfied; if war is necessary, we shall be no less happy. Then may the genius of Bismarck watch over a second Königgrätz!

Count Richard Du Moulin-Eckart, *Englands Politik und die Mächte* ["England's Policy and the Powers"] (1901), pp. 79, 80.

XXXIII. British Obstruction of Germany's Colonial Aims.

The endeavour after colonial possessions became for Germany an unavoidable necessity. She wanted land across the seas which she might administer in her own way and use for her own advantage. It has not been possible as yet to use such territory as has been acquired in meeting to any noteworthy extent the existing need for new agricultural settlements. Our colonies also play no important rôle as markets for our home industry or as sources of raw materials. They are yet at the commencement of their development. No longer, however, is their complete abandonment advocated. Although three decades have passed since our first acquisitions of territory, it can already be said that they form a valuable extension of our European position and certainly a fruitful field for further developments. The new way which was thus entered on has, however, led to other difficulties than those which came to light in the territories themselves. The acquisition of colonies created new points of friction with other

Powers and particularly with England. The island Empire dominated enormous territories in all parts of the world. It was satiated, and further colonial acquisitions appeared to many influential sections of its inhabitants as a burden. Then came the German on the scene. England herself might have looked on quietly. Not so her colonies in Africa and Australia, which saw in the new neighbour an inconvenient competitor and called for protests and checks. So far the mother country did not wish to go. Nevertheless, the feeling of weariness engendered by colonial efforts gradually gave way to the view that territory should be appropriated wherever it was available, whether good or bad—for that must be left for the future to decide—in order that the foreigner might not have it. In the course of a quarter of a century Great Britain has extended her colonial Empire by nearly one half, and she continues still to extend it.

Professor DIETRICH SCHÄFER, *Was bedeutet dem Deutschen sein Reich?* ["What means their Empire to Germans?"] (1912), pp. 10, 11.

Wherever the German has planted the Imperial flag upon non-European uncivilized territory, England has either blocked the way or has at least hoisted her flag alongside. It is solely due to the fact that England just before had declared, *apropos* of an international conflict, that the present German South-West Africa did not belong to her sphere of influence that the German flag could be hoisted in Lüderitz Bay. The Union Jack still waves over Walfisch Bay, although that bay is now enclosed by German territory. As soon as the question of the occupation of Samoa arose, John Bull was at once on the spot with a view to preventing Germany from acquiring it. Scarcely had the German flag been raised in the north of New Guinea than the English flag was hoisted on the opposite coast. In order that England should evacuate Heligoland, which was only of use to her as a means of blockading the mouth of the Elbe and Hamburg in case of war, and as a support to the English fleet against the German in its capacity as a coaling and naval station, Germany had to sacrifice Zanzibar, opposite the German coastal territory of East Africa, and to agree to round-off British East Africa. This is the sort of friendly service which England has rendered to Germany. England

would rather that the once most fertile plain of the civilized world, Mesopotamia, should remain a wilderness than sacrifice her monopoly of the waterway to India, though there is here no question of conquest or possession, but only of a trade route for the whole world.

As for Morocco, only because Germany wished to maintain her commercial interests there and to assert the principle of the "open door" for the good of all nations, has England made common cause against her with France, who wishes to keep all for herself.

Dr. Arthur Böhtlingk, *England und Deutschland, oder der europäische Friede* ["England and Germany, or the European Peace"] (1912), pp. 14–16.

XXXIV. The Price of Peace with England.

No one can deny that a pacific settlement with the great Germanic World-Power, Great Britain, would be of the greatest advantage to us and even to England herself. It is doubtless desirable, therefore, to spare no effort in order to attain this end. Nevertheless, we must be quite clear as to the practical difficulties which will have to be overcome if German interests are to be guaranteed, not only for the present but for the future. There are two possibilities of an understanding with England; an understanding may be permanent or only provisional. If a permanent understanding is to be attained, the most essential interests of Germany must be fully assured. Nothing may remain which might obstruct her necessary development. This demand means for England the renunciation of her ascendant position as a World-Power as she claims it to-day, and a practical and not merely theoretical acknowledgment of Germany's claim to occupy an equal position alongside of her. England must give to us in European politics a completely free hand, and approve in advance every extension of Germany's power on the Continent which might find expression in a Central European Federation or in a war with France. She must cease to injure us diplomatically in our efforts to develop our Colonial policy, in so far as they are not made at her expense. She must agree to any transformation of the present territorial status which may be proposed in North

Africa in favour of Italy and Germany. She must undertake not to stand in the way of Austria's interests in the Balkans, nor to cross Germany's economic endeavours in Near Asia, and she must finally make up her mind no longer to oppose, as hitherto, the development of German maritime power and the acquisition by the German Empire of coaling stations.

General Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Unsere Zukunft: ein Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk* ["Our Future: a Word of Warning to the German People"] (1912), pp. 95, 96.

Just as little as the senseless ideas of attacking England would promise success to Germany, just as dangerous would be the reverse for England. Apart altogether from the injury to England's trade, which for the duration of the war would only benefit America, her first cannon shot in Europe would be the signal for insurrection in India and Egypt. Even in the most favourable circumstances she would incur enormous sacrifice, while in the most unfavourable she would have to pay a heavy penalty. Let us hope, however, that friendship with England does not mean for us a dishonourable peace, in which our own claims would be renounced. Germany covets not a yard of English territory, and would gladly guarantee the status of the British Empire for all time. Nevertheless, there is somewhere a delectable little spot in the sun which is as if made to be a German colony, and events will sooner or later point it out to us. Only if England, through envy and jealousy of German expansion, should keep us out of this our assigned acquisition, would these kindred peoples have reasonable cause for fighting each other. . . . . United England and Germany could defy all conceivable antagonists and avert both the Yellow Peril and the otherwise inevitable domination of America.

Karl Bleibtreu, *Deutschland und England* (1909), pp. 236–7.

XXXV. The Policy of "Encirclement."

It should not be forgotten that it is England who has formed against us this coalition—a coalition menacing and unquestionably unnatural, since it does not rest upon community of interests—and has done her best to make our few remaining friends disloyal to us. One cannot believe that our blood

relationship has the slightest weight for England, or that she would be deterred from attacking us by the fact that we have never yet crossed swords. Why should England want to fight us so long as we had not the boldness to build a navy wherewith to protect our coasts and our rapidly growing commerce? That fact has entirely changed the situation. If, as yet, Great Britain has every reason for not proceeding impetuously and for cautiously holding back, we cannot be in any uncertainty that she will seize any favourable opportunity for falling on us by surprise, serving on us a declaration of war simultaneously with the first shells hurled at our coast towns. Even were she disposed to peace, her allies will presumably have little inclination to be encumbered for no purpose with armaments too heavy to be borne long, at least by France. As soon as they believe the proper moment to have arrived England will not be able to hold back. . . . . If it should come to a struggle, we shall meet it with the same consciousness of and will to victory as in 1870, remembering that not numbers in themselves make victory certain, but that victory will reward those who have the longest breath and the last thaler.

H. Frobenius, *Des deutschen Reiches Schicksalstunde* ["The German Empire's Hour of Destiny"], pp. 44–5, 87.

XXXVI. The Isolation of England.

England's unchanging antagonism to Russia makes Central Europe, or, if France keeps aloof from Central Europe, the Triple Alliance Powers, the indicator on the scales. Russia has persuaded herself that without Germany's support she will at least feel uncomfortable on her western frontier and will be unable to follow her historical course, which presses her eastwards. England tries desperately to kindle a European conflagration in order to restrain Russia's activity in the East. Hence the continued machinations of English intriguers in the Balkan territories. . . . . Fortunately German policy has succeeded in bringing Russia and Austria into better relations, and therewith Germany's relation to France has been directly strengthened. If the tension created by the French idea of *revanche* does not disappear, it is urgently to Russia's interests to restrain the French Chauvinists, who would weaken her

good relations with Germany. On the other hand, France has not the slightest occasion to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for England in Egypt and India. . . . . Central Europe does not need England. England, however, needs us. She has always needed us. The difference between the future and the past will simply be this: that the Continental States will henceforth draw their trusty swords only for the defence of their own interests and that they will compel England to pay for every service they render her, and pay immediately and in cash.

FRITZ BLEY, *Die Weltstellung des Deutschtums* ["The World-Position of Germanism"] (1897), p. 16.

The course of events points to a Greater Britain, with 17 per cent. of the surface of the globe and 21 per cent. of its population, as an empire closed to the rest of the world by customs barriers but free fiscally within. It also points to a Pan-America with 22 per cent. of the surface and 7 per cent. of the population of the earth, forming a similar closed empire. As for Russia, which already contains without China 16 per cent. of the earth's surface and 7 per cent. of its population, to picture its ascendant position after North China has been completely subjugated and absorbed makes one dizzy. What can the States of Central Europe do otherwise in view of the oppressive power of these gigantic empires than similarly form themselves—with or without France—into a counter-alliance and join to themselves all the other smaller States which supplement the Central European economic area, and which, owing to their economic antagonism to Russia or England, cannot ally themselves with either of these great empires?

Ibid., p. 19.

XXXVII. BRITISH NAVAL SUPREMACY TO BE DESTROYED.

There can be no doubt that the European Continental Powers must concentrate their attention upon two things—the increase of their navies and simultaneously the ejection of England from certain strategical maritime positions which are far too favourable to her. The German Emperor with statesmanlike insight has long recognised the necessity of the

first of these measures. The best and most desirable thing is, that while maintaining and even further increasing the present great armies, navies shall be created equal in strength to the English. It is scarcely to be expected, however, that the Continental States will be capable of such a gigantic two-fold task. In order, therefore, to make financially possible the creation of really powerful navies it will be necessary, whether we like it or not, to resort to a considerable reduction of the land forces. Naturally no State can do that alone. If, however, all Continental States unite, then their military power would remain precisely proportionately as before, and they would be free to give full attention to oversea countries. The armies would probably have to be reduced to one-half of their present size, but these States would as a result be enabled to carry out the necessary increase of their navies.

L. von Amran, *Englands Land- und Seepolitik und die orientalische Frage* ["England's Land and Sea Policy and the Eastern Question"] (1902), p. 27.

England has asserted a complete supremacy over the ocean routes from any given point in Europe to Southern Asia and East Africa to the exclusion of every other Power. Nay, more, England attempts to keep all the European Powers under her control, in spite of the Suez Canal, and to doom them to impotence just as before through the Rock of Gibraltar. England acts as if the whole earth was intended by God for her people only, and if anyone ventures to make a modest protest she replies at once: "We must secure this or that route because we might otherwise lose a colony"; and on the Continent there are still people who find this logic comprehensible and approve it.

Ibid., p. 31.

It should not be regarded as possible, yet it is a fact, that there was a moment when the German Imperial Chancellor was prepared to accept the friendly overtures of England in the naval agreement, and it is due to the Emperor that it was not done.

Daniel Frymann, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), p. 240.

XXXVIII. British Power to be Destroyed.

World-policy goes its way, creating and solving complications in turn, and so it has come about that the vicissitudes of the past century have brought Germany into unique relations to England. Dynastic ties have both advanced and hindered these relations, but economic factors have entered more and more into the foreground. Otherwise England extracted the benefits of its policy in the preceding centuries without special difficulty. In a word it consummated its world-supremacy. In optimistic mood the high-spirited Treitschke wrote to Gustav Freytag: "The new world tolerates no longer rotten conditions. . . . . I hope still to live to see the collapse of English sea-power, which clearly belonged to last century." He completely misjudged the powerful expansive capacity of this [British] Empire: he saw the end when merely the zenith had been reached. All the more comprehensible, however, was the wish of the fiery herald of our new Empire, this Hutten of our time. For what a course of English hostility against our German development had he seen with his own eyes! The history of his century, to picture which he made his life's work with all the passion of his nature, was bound to awaken in him this wish.

Count Richard Du Moulin-Eckart, *Englands Politik und die Mächte* ["England's Policy and the Powers"] (1901), p. 42.

To make plans for the division of the world before victory has been won is purposeless, but the main lines of a future peace can and must be drawn. In spite of the hatred with which France has followed us for over 40 years, we should like France to exist still as a Great Power. *France*, therefore, will not be curtailed in Europe, and she will retain in the main her North African possessions. Financially, however, she must be severely punished.

Russia's population of 170 millions must in any event be diminished and her capacity for aggression against Central Europe be restricted. This will not be a matter of internal difficulty, since both in the West and South of the present Russian Empire non-Russian nations dwell who would regard separation from the Czardom with satisfaction. Our real enemy,

however, and not only ours but the enemy of European culture in general, which for its own commercial profit was willing to deliver Germany up to Muscovy and to destroy the German idea in the world, is *England*. No peace may be concluded with England until England's power for harm has been for ever destroyed. It is still too early to speak of the ways and means by which this may and will be done, but we know that such ways and means can be found, and the resolution to use them exists. Only then will Germany's future be made secure. Forbearance towards England is treachery to the future of the Fatherland: therefore, Down with English piracy!

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik* ["War and German Policy"] (1914), pp. 99, 100 [1].

XXXIX. Dismemberment of the British Empire Foretold.

In a pamphlet entitled *Die Abrechnung mit England* ["The Settlement with England"], pp. 69 and 72, published in 1900, Dr Karl Eisenhart foretells a war between Germany and Great Britain, to take place about 1931, in which the latter suffers signal defeat. By the terms of peace Great Britain is to cede the following territory: —in Europe, Gibraltar; in Africa, Walfisch Bay, Zanzibar, Witu and the rest of the British territories in North-east Africa and the Niger region; in the South Seas, Tonga and the British portion of New Guinea. She is also to renounce her right of pre-emption in respect of the Portuguese colonies in Africa, as well as her claim to the Fiji Islands. No war indemnities are to be claimed, but Great Britain is to compensate the English companies in the ceded territories after Germany has expropriated them, also to bear the cost of Germany's acquisition from Holland of her portion of New Guinea and from Portugal of the Island of Goa and the Portuguese portion of Timor, Holland receiving 12 million marks and Portugal 16 million marks. Further, Germany is to

[1] "This work was begun several months before the murders of Serajevo and completed just as the first great battles were fought on Lorraine and Belgian soil."

retrocede Gibraltar to Spain, but to annex Morocco and convert it into a colony. Germany is also to place the negro republic of Liberia under her protection.

XL. Continental Alliance against Britain.

The British Empire is a maritime Empire and can only be overcome by naval power. So long as Germany has, both on her Western and Eastern frontiers, powerful neighbours against whom she must be on guard, Great Britain will always be able to outdistance her in maritime power. It is, therefore, a question whether German statesmanship can create such a situation as will remove antagonisms from the combinations of Continental Great Powers and throw these Powers unitedly into the scale on behalf of world-policy. . . . .

In view of the threatened realization of the Anglo-Saxon Confederation Europe will have no other choice but to combine to form a closed customs area. If the transoceanic world is to be united under English leadership, the predominance of the European Continent can be maintained only by the formation of the United States of Europe. Such a United Europe would be able to maintain the leadership of the world, both politically and commercially, for all time. That combination can only be carried through by Germany, and it must therefore become the practical aim of German statescraft. In the Triple Alliance, as it has existed hitherto, there has been created the natural nucleus of such an alliance of States. The task will be to develop it first into a Central European Customs League and then to aim at securing the adhesion of Russia and France. If the Anglo-Saxon world should achieve political union the salvation of the rest of the white nations would have to be sought in a European Alliance of the kind described, representing a single economic area.

Dr. Carl Peters, *England und die Engländer* ["England and the English"] (first published in 1904; edition of 1913, pp. 246–7).

XLI. Mischief-making in British Colonies advocated.

Anxious minds in London speak already of a "German danger" in Australia. In the immediate future they fear

particularly an attack from us on Canada ("the richest land in the world"). I do not see why we should not play the devil, as we are always so painted upon the walls in England. We might make incalculable difficulties for our opponents if we systematically followed the policy of colonizing large areas in Canada, Australia, and other British colonies which possess self-government and a free suffrage. We should thus get Germans in the administration of those colonies, and in this way might exercise a highly dangerous and disintegrating influence upon the entire British Empire. It might perhaps be possible in this way alone to ruin Chamberlain's idea of Imperial Federation. . . . .

What, however, if England should defend herself and overtrump our best trump cards? What have we to oppose to the army of experienced diplomats and intriguers who, as numerous as a swarm of bees, flood the streets of the City of London every morning? Nothing but the cold iron fist, the strongest army that the world has ever seen. It is the only weapon which we have and in which we excel England; and for that reason there can be no peace for us. Peace can only bring advantage to our enemy, who waits for the time when Australia will have introduced universal service, and Canada built a navy, and until the beautiful Chamberlain idea is translated into fact. We are expected to wait quietly until this has been done, and in the meantime agree to everything; for that reason Lord Haldane's visit of conciliation[1], all the sweet peace melodies in Parliament and in the Press, and the deceptive promises of expansion for Germany's colonial empire. . . . .

We shall work without rest in enlightening the people upon the dangers which threaten us from England; we shall not be weary of disclosing the secret activities of English agents and committees; we shall regard it as our most sacred duty to warn the nation without ceasing of the struggle which will and must secure to our Empire world-supremacy [*Weltherrschaft*]. Let the pacifist Press spit at us poison and gall, let the members of the "Conciliation Committee" stamp such an intention as "frivolous" and altogether criminal. We Young Germans are of a different opinion; we incite to war because we believe that we must not only begin it, but can begin it. . . . .

[1] Lord Haldane's visit to Berlin in February, 1912, was made on the invitation of the German Emperor.

What can happen to us at the worst? We should lose our colonies, our trade would be destroyed, and a few milliards would go to the devil. That is bad enough, but not disastrous. England cannot take our bread away with her fleet. We cannot be overthrown from the sea. If, however, we succeed in landing in England only 100,000 men, England will cease to exist. Such an invasion belongs no longer to the sphere of the impossible, as has been shown beyond all doubt by the latest British manœuvres. Let us choose a favourable opportunity and seek the assistance of certain technical inventions, and we shall succeed in landing 100,000 men and more, and that the more easily if beforehand we distribute gold pieces here and there in the British colonies. . . . .

If we succeed in uniting with us not only Austria, but Russia and Turkey—and we will and shall succeed in so doing, since incalculable booty (India, Persia, and Egypt) attracts both the latter Powers—we shall possess an enormous military power concentrated in a consolidated territory which would be in a position to break down the English ring which surrounds us. It may be left to the imagination to picture the character of such an attack directed against England's colonies. I mention only Egypt, India and South Africa as particularly and indeed fatally vulnerable. To capture these three, while protecting our fleet to the utmost, will be the principal aim of ourselves and our allies in the next war.

EDMUND WEBER, *Krieg oder Frieden mit England?* ["War or Peace with England?"] (1913), pp. 43, 44, 45, 47, 48.

XLII. ATTITUDE OF GERMAN PRESS TOWARDS ENGLAND.

The greatest danger for Germany and England lies in the fact that the unconsidered attitude which characterises a large part of the German Press towards the English, and is by no means confined to the unthinking masses, has awakened the idea that we wish to attack them on a favourable opportunity, in order to rob them of their place as the first commercial and Colonial Power in the world and put ourselves in their place. Even granting that German policy entertained such an idea, which is not the case, and would be impossible in view of the

fact that the masses are dominated by Social Democracy, Ultramontanism, and feudalist-demagogic agrarianism, the supreme law of our public attitude towards England should be that of the most absolute and most trustworthy reserve.

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern* ["Germany amongst the World-Nations"] (1903), p. 117.

(B) FRANCE.

XLIII. Speculations upon a War with France.

After France had come to a definite arrangement over Morocco with England in April, 1904, and with Spain in the following autumn, she only needed to bargain with Germany in order to incorporate that country, nor can it be seen why such an understanding between Germany and France could not have been arrived at. In the secret agreement with Spain, the French Government had, indeed, already anticipated the possibility that Germany would receive a Morocco harbour. It must, therefore, have said to itself that the refusal of this German demand might possibly involve a *casus belli*. But a war waged by France against Germany would be a catastrophe for the Republic, since, should it be beaten, it would be bled white, as Bismarck once said, and enfeebled, while if a French General had succeeded in conquering our army, his field marshal's *bâton* would at once have changed into a royal sceptre. A Republic would have to choose between the Scylla of defeat and the Charybdis of a new Emperor. There was reason sufficient for coming to an agreement with Germany, which France knows well would only wage war when challenged by her, since we want no more from the French to-day and would rather conciliate than excite them. Nor would peace have been purchased too dearly by renouncing the Sus territory to Germany, for the lion's part of Morocco would in any case have fallen to France. Not Germany and France stood in the way of such a division of Morocco, but England. . . . .

We have to-day nothing more to demand from France; for us there is no longer any reason why we should wage war with France unless she were to be incited by England to a

struggle with us. It must, therefore, be the duty of German diplomacy, if war with England should no longer be avoidable, to create a *casus belli* in which no essential interest of France is involved.

Axel Ripke, *Deutschland und England in Marokko und Tripolis* (1911), pp. 29, 30, 42.

Let us imagine a very unfavourable yet quite possible case. Suppose that England blockades our harbours and destroys our sea trade. The neighbouring States supply us with a small quantity of foodstuffs either unwillingly or subject to all sorts of difficulties. In that event nothing else would remain to us except to exercise pressure upon France. We should say to her, "Either you put yourself on our side and intervene in our favour or we declare war upon you." *C'est la guerre!* I wish for no great friendship with France, since friendship with us is not esteemed at all there, but is regarded as weakness, and owing to the thought of revenge rooted in the French heart is not desired. France must rather serve us in critical times as a granary, as a pawn. Not only can we, but we must, let that be plainly understood. In that way we should secure peace for ourselves and show all the world what we are and what we are able to do. . . . .

France must in times of peace be to us a friend to be taken in homœopathic doses, but in case of an unjust war with England she must be a friend by compulsion or an enemy. France has deserved no other treatment, and for the rest we are compelled, by the instinct of self-preservation, to resort to such a violent measure.

Baron Kurt zu Putlitz, *Über Deutschlands auswärtige Politik* ["On Germany's Foreign Policy"] (1912), pp. 8, 9, 17, 18.

The way to Waterloo is still known in England. Waterloo and Belle-Alliance are written with golden letters in the English history of war. That, however, will not prevent Albion fighting against us to-day, shoulder to shoulder with France. Bismarck said in the Reichstag in the critical days of the year 1887, "The possibility of a French attack upon us will arrive when France has any reason whatever for believing herself to be superior to us. Then I believe war will be certain. When the

French think they have more soldiers, better artillery, or better alliances, they will strike at once."

COUNT ALEXANDER VON GERSDORFF, *Die Kriegsbereitschaft der englischen Flotte im Jahre* 1911 ["The British Navy's Readiness for War in 1911"], p. 20.

It was, in my opinion, the most serious mistake ever committed by German policy that a final settling of accounts with France was not effected at a time when the international situation was favourable and success might confidently have been expected. There has, indeed, been no lack of opportunities. We have only our policy of peace and renunciation to thank for the fact that we are placed in our present difficult position, and are confronted by the momentous choice between resigning all claim to world-power or asserting this claim against numerically superior enemies.

General FRIEDRICH VON BERNHARDI, *Deutschland und der nächste Krieg* ["Germany and the Next War"] (1911), p. 275.

XLIV. THE ULTIMATE FATE OF FRANCE.

Even if France faithfully observes the Morocco treaty, so that we have no ground for complaint, there will still remain permanent cause for conflict in our relationship to England, whose vassal France is. We must count upon this relationship becoming more acute and creating the prospect of an open quarrel. It will then be the object of our active policy to give France the choice between us and England. In that fateful struggle it will be a case of "Whoever is not for me is against me." War would come at once if France decided against us, and such a war must be a German war of attack. However this war may come, we know what it will mean for us, and France must know it as well. Our diplomatists have forgotten how to "speak German" to foreign countries; and since Bismarck's going the French in particular have never heard a true German word more; no harm can be done, therefore, if they are told from the people that the struggle would be one for existence. We have a big account to settle since May 10, 1871[1].

[1] Date of the signature of the Treaty of Frankfort.

French publicists talk so frankly about the fate of the German Empire, in the event of its succumbing to a joint Anglo-Russo-French attack, that we need not be silent as to the opposite case. The victorious German nation will have to demand that menace from France shall cease for ever: France must be destroyed. We must also demand the cession of just so much French territory as we need to our permanent security, and in so doing reference may be made to what has already been said as to "evacuation." We would, finally, take so much of the French colonial empire as corresponded to our needs, proceeding from the not unjustifiable view that in colonial matters, in view of the circumstances of the two peoples, the French will always in the last resort be the caretakers for the German nation. This is bitter, very bitter, but it is true, and needs no further argument.

DANIEL FRYMANN, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), pp. 151–2.

XLV. THE DISMEMBERMENT OF FRANCE AS A RESULT OF WAR.

The serious diplomatic reverse which we have sustained in the depressing solution of the Morocco question, a reverse which might have been avoided with a little firmness, has at last had the result of destroying absolutely the belief in the possibility of conciliating France. My conviction of the necessity of a decisive armed settlement with the hereditary enemy has already received confirmation. To-day no serious politician can any longer doubt the accuracy of this view, for refusing to recognise which the Government must pay with the bitter disappointment of last year and the renewed necessity for an Army Bill. Only the forcible restriction of France within the really French national territories in the North and North-West can secure us the necessary tranquillity for the future. According to our investigation into their population more than seven French Departments are still German in spite of the present external lingual polish, and do not belong racially to the robber-land which has ever expanded at Germany's expense. This old German national soil forms the valuable prize of a

future victorious war and the just expiation for the injuries which the old German Empire suffered for centuries in impotent wrath, when the Louis' tore these old German territories piece by piece from the motherland.

KURD VON STRANTZ, *Ihr wollt Elsass und Lothringen?—Wir nehmen ganz Lothringen und mehr!* ["You want Alsace and Lorraine?—We shall take all Lorraine and more!"] (1912), p. 68.

I concede to France her natural independence in so far as it can be brought into accord with the German World-Empire of the German Nation at which we aim. Nevertheless, in the event of our victory, France will not fare otherwise in political matters than we should have done in the event of a French victory in 1870; indeed, her fate will perhaps be harder than ours would have been then. In truth, however, that would be no great misfortune. Yes, if only we were barbarians! For the Germans living in France, however, it must be regarded as a piece of good fortune if they are preserved from unnoticed decline, and are enabled by a German victory to participate in the higher destinies of the victorious and united German race.

I conceive of a subjugated France divided into three parts corresponding with the composition of its population, namely: (1) North and north-west; (2) Centre; (3) East and south. (1) The north and north-west, comprising broadly the territories Artois, Picardy and Normandy, would pass, after a longer or shorter time of transition, which would be used in sifting out the races and Germanising these territories, to the *Civitas Germanica;* in other words, would be received into the Imperial Union on completely equal terms. The same would apply to the Walloon portion of Belgium. (2) The district bordering on the centre to the west and south, with a population of about 20 millions, might remain independent and retain its language, republican institutions and self-government, in so far as was compatible with the sovereignty of the Empire and with the character of that district as part of the German economic territory, and with the gradual diffusion of the German language. . . . . (3) The chief mass of the non-Germans lies in the east and south. The fact that these begin and multiply on the frontier of the German Empire prevents us from admitting

these districts, like those of the north, into the Imperial Union after a short time of transition, or allowing them independence like those of the centre and west. Here, instead of preparation for colonisation, German colonisation itself must at once take place.

JOSEF LUDWIG REIMER, *Ein pangermanisches Deutschland* ["A Pan-Germanist Germany"] (1905), pp. 165–7.

XLVI. GERMANY'S MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

Not the Briton, but the Frenchman and the Russian have to fear from us a violent expansion, unless both are willing to recognise our national right to existence and expansion. It is, and remains, a favourable omen for us that, whether with or without Austria, we are able to make our superiority on land felt by the French and the Russians. We shall only be able to do that, however, when we have made not only our navy but our army, the most powerful land weapon the world has ever seen, as strong as possible. With such a strong Germany neither France, Russia nor England will ever risk war, and we shall be able, without resort to arms, to obtain for our descendants by pacific means what is necessary for our national existence.

Dr. GEORG HARTMANN, *Krieg oder Frieden mit England?* ["War or Peace with England?"] (1912), p. 18.

(C) THE LOW COUNTRIES.

XLVII. A WARNING TO BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS.

In my opinion it is time to abandon the policy of tolerance as against the Low German neighbouring States and to apply one of demands—in other words, to follow here, too, an active policy. It must be made clear both to Belgium and Holland that the next war will decide their future. As conditions have become accentuated in Europe they should be frankly told that such small States have forfeited the right to exist, for

only that State can assert a valid claim to independence which is able to maintain its independence with the sword. . . . . We should guarantee to both countries existence as States, but in a restricted form and as part of the German Empire; they would certainly have to expect destruction as States if we were defeated in war. Whatever the present attitude to Germany of the Governments, Parliaments, and Press of both of these small States, it may be anticipated with confidence that if forced to choose between the German Empire on the one hand and England and France on the other, they would choose the latter—in other words, would make the same mistake which Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Nassau made in the Prusso-Austrian struggle of 1866; and they will have no reason for surprise if the consequences are the same. . . . . In the event of annexation they would, as a matter of course, be incorporated in Prussia, which in her treatment of the new provinces would benefit by her experience of the contumacy of the Danish, Polish, and Alsatian populations.

DANIEL FRYMANN, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), pp. 153–5.

(D) AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

XLVIII. GERMAN EXPANSION IN AUSTRIA.

A grandiose settlement of the South-East of Europe would be a thoroughly sound solution [of the population problem] on two conditions—first, the creation of such a relationship between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, in the form of a perpetual alliance, as ensured complete and permanent solidarity of interests between the two States; and second, that the Habsburg Empire assumed an internal form which assured to the Germans therein for all time cultural and political leadership on both sides of the Leitha. Let these two conditions be fulfilled, and no happier solution of the German colonial movement could be found than the settlement of our surplus population in the thinly-peopled parts of the Danube monarchy. At the same time the advance to the Balkans would from the

first be kept in view as soon as these Austrian territories had received sufficient population.

DANIEL FRYMANN, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), p. 142.

XLIX. GERMANY TO DOMINATE AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Austria with fateful want of sagacity underestimated Prussia and her right to exist, and for that reason the war of 1866 was an absolute necessity. Austria had to learn that a State, however old and spacious it may be, which represents no political idea, has no right to despise a State which does incorporate such an idea. Nevertheless, the war of 1866 and the present German Empire are only an episode. Nikolsburg[1] cannot divide territories which are designed by geography and history to come together, though their union may not come for a long time. Austria needs our colonists, and Germany needs Austria for her colonists.

Dr. PAUL ANTON DE LAGARDE, *Deutsche Schriften* ["German Writings"] (3rd edition, 1892), p. 113.

However difficult a satisfactory adjustment of conditions was made by the events which took place in 1866 and 1871, it cannot be impossible to-day, for if it were, the days of the German Empire and of Austria-Hungary would be numbered. The German Empire needs the surety that its frontiers adjacent to Austria shall in no circumstances be those of a hostile State. It needs the large uncultivated and semi-cultivated regions of Transleitha for colonisation. It must regard the abandonment of the Germans settled in the two Leithas as dishonourable. In the interest of self-preservation Germany must take steps to prevent the erection at her door of a Slav empire which might in conjunction with the other Slav empires in the East and with France and Denmark make common cause against her. Austria needs a dominant race, and in Austria only the Germans can be supreme.

Ibid., p. 397.

[1] Where the Preliminaries of Peace ending the Prusso-Austrian war were signed on July 26, 1866.

L. A Union of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The time has come when the two Empires [Germany and Austria-Hungary] should abandon their separation and unite permanently by means of a defensive and offensive alliance. Both are threatened—the Danube Monarchy worse than the German Empire, and it must be clear to both that they have really only one aim and one existence, and that after the subversion of Austria, the Empire would be over-run by the Slavonic world and lose its political independence. Formed into a unity of 120 million people, the two Empires would again become a terrible power; while divided, their enemies treat with each separately and regard each as their inferior. If the unreliable nations of Austria wish to go over to her enemies, it would be easy for them so to do in a commonwealth in which they form the majority; it would be otherwise, however, if they had to fall away from a powerful union. By the constitution of April 16th, 1871, the German Empire is a perpetual alliance of the German princes and free cities. There is nothing to prevent the Habsburg-Lorraine dynasty from joining the alliance subject to reservations going far beyond those relating to Bavaria. The principal reservation which would have to be made would be that of the unrestricted sovereignty of the Habsburg territories in regard to administration, and a certain independence of their army even in time of war. Austria would not send representatives to the Reichstag and would only deliberate jointly in the Federal Council in respect of common affairs. She would have her own diplomatic representation, while the common affair of foreign policy would be carried on by a special Council consisting of the Emperors, the Chancellors, and the Chief Ministers of the two countries.

Dr. K. von Winterstetten, *Berlin-Bagdad: neue Ziele mitteleuropäischer Politik* ["Berlin-Bagdad: new Aims of Central European Policy"] (1913), pp. 23, 24.

LI. The Termination of the Alliance with Austria-Hungary advocated.

Regard for ourselves cannot relieve us of the duty of examining the question whether in certain circumstances the

peace of the world and our own interest might not be better served in future without the continuation of a formal alliance with Austria-Hungary. Because of the unchanging thirst for revenge and prestige of the French nation, France remains Germany's principal political enemy by land, with or without a German-Austrian alliance. There is every reason to believe that in the event of a war with that enemy, we should have to trust to ourselves alone. The new Army Bill amply enables us to do this. Again, in a war with England the German fleet would have to bear the brunt of the struggle. The Austrian fleet, still small, and owing to the unfortunate financial position incapable of rapid increase, could only be of serious account in the Mediterranean in conjunction with the Italian fleet.

The third enemy to be taken into consideration is Russia. It is a widely prevailing idea that in a war with Russia . . . . seeing that Turkey has disappeared for a time or for ever as a serious opponent of Russia, and that Rumania has more and more followed a policy of its own, Austrian help would be the only help which could be given to us. . . . .

Russia, as the protector of the Slavs, must see in Austria a permanent enemy because of the endeavours of the latter Power to expand in the Balkan Peninsula. Should a conflict between Austria and Russia threaten, however, Germany will likewise be threatened so long as she remains Austria's ally. Only for this reason do large influential Russian circles regard Germany with hatred and incite Russia more and more to strengthen her alliance with France, speculate upon a war with Germany as the inevitable event of the future, and even make friends with England, Russia's traditional enemy, in the Triple Entente.

The German-Austrian alliance is the *causa causans* of the Russian hostility against us. The same applies to Rumania, whose King, though a member of the Hohenzollern house, believes himself compelled, entirely because of the Hungarians and much against his own wish, to withdraw more than in the past from Germany. . . .

What would be the situation if the German-Austrian alliance did not exist? What, above all, would be the German-Russian situation? Prussia and Russia have for centuries been united by dynastic ties, common military successes, and great

economic interests which are capable of far greater expansion. We seek no territorial conquests in Russia, and assertions to the contrary are the conscious lies of pan-Slavist newspapers or the "auto-suggestions" regarding German conditions of ill-informed Russian circles.

Government Councillor G., *Der Starke ist am mächtigsten allein* ["The Strong Man is most powerful alone"] (1914), pp. 7–10.

LII. Germany's Claim to Trieste.

If all the Italians together attack us this port can never fall into their hands. . . . . The least that we must require in the South for our trade is an exit on the Adriatic, in order that we may always have a free way to all the ports of the Mediterranean. To possess the mouths of the Danube for this purpose would be still better.

Dr. Paul Anton de Lagarde, *Deutsche Schriften* ["German Writings"] (3rd edition, 1892), p. 29.

(E) THE BALKANS.

LIII. The Balkans to be Open to Germany.

The Balkans must remain open to us; Austria may not tolerate a Serbian State on its Southern frontier; the Balkan question must be solved by the division of the Turkish provinces; neither the re-introduction of Turkish rule nor the setting up of a great Russian satrapy is tolerable—so much is certain. It is incontestable that the establishment of a Slav federal State in the South would make the position of Germany and Austria in any circumstances intolerable and untenable. Permanently enclosed by a ring of enemies, the great German nation would be doomed to complete impotence. Let the question which of the three States, Germany, Austria and Rumania, is worse menaced by the present policy be decided as it will, complete collapse threatens the last two while the first is threatened with exclusion from world-policy and subjection to the arbitrary will of Europe. Or does anyone believe that the iron ring of the Latin and Slav peoples would ever again be broken or that the German people could again arise against the will of

Europe, which has now learnt to know this intolerable rival. The much talked of decisive battle between Germanism and Slavism has, in fact, broken out already—who perceives it?

Dr. Albert Ritter, *Die Kaisermächte und der Balkan* ["The Imperial Powers and the Balkans"] (1914), p. 17.

LIV. The "Drang nach Osten."

The lessons taught by the acquisition of the East Indies by England contain many suggestions for Germany. If it is once recognised that the distant African colonies cannot for a long time offer great advantages for Germany, we must, if the necessity of expansion is not denied—and no statesman can deny it—turn our gaze in another direction. A glance at history shows the way. The prosperity of the old German Empire came from the Levant and the Far East. For the rest, the chief factors were the Danube, the Rhine, Holland and Belgium. No one capable of understanding history can doubt where the territories must be found which will serve in one way or other as German colonies, and where, therefore, the German nation's impulse to expansion will find its goal. It will be in the first place the Danubian and Balkan territories. . . . .

When the Danubian and Balkan territories have passed under the aegis of the German Empire, a new and strong tie will of itself bind the races of the South and North of Germany. It is not difficult to imagine the patriotic energy and enthusiasm which would arise in South Germany if the new Empire once raised with decision and success the banner of Prince Eugen. Economic interest would then go hand in hand with national zeal. The unity of the Empire would rest upon firmer foundations than ever before.

The chief objection would be the attitude of Austria-Hungary, with which we are connected by historical and treaty ties. Nevertheless, this objection will disappear when statecraft extends the basis of the existing Triple Alliance and before all things ensures the closer alliance of Austria-Hungary with Germany. The ground for such a work has already been sufficiently prepared. It would only consist of pressing Austria-Hungary to the Black Sea and covering her rear with the power

of the German Empire. That Austria-Hungary would appreciate these advantages and ally herself by treaty to the Empire as Bavaria has done, cannot be open to doubt. The present position of Austria-Hungary will in the long run be untenable. She must either seek to regain her earlier position in Germany or approach the Black Sea. . . . .

The many little States on the Danube and the Balkans need not necessarily be abolished. They contain much danger both for Austria-Hungary and Germany and are particularly dangerous to themselves. These States exist, however, and it will be sufficient if they are placed under the aegis of Austria-Hungary, closely united with the German Empire as the latter will be.

G. Waldersee, *Was Deutschland braucht* ["What Germany Needs"] (1895), pp. 6, 9, 10, 13.

(F) TURKEY.

LV. The Maintenance of Turkey.

Austria must protect herself against the Slavo-Russian danger. This lies in Europe—on the Russian frontier and in the Balkan peninsula, not in Asia. Everything that might be undertaken in Asia, particularly in the Ottoman portions of that continent, would be superfluous luxury, which might bitterly avenge itself. No anti-Turkish policy, therefore, either in the Balkans or Asiatic Turkey, and particularly not for England's benefit! Rightly understood, Austria's interest points to the maintenance of Turkey, but simultaneously to its neutralization. All schemes for the partition of Turkey, such as Vienna newspaper-diplomats and English statesmen propose, are Utopias. In the present world-situation Turkey cannot be divided or dispensed with. A war of all against all would be the result, and in order to end it Turkey would have to be called to life again.

L. von Amran, *Englands Land- und Seepolitik und die orientalische Frage* ["England's Land and Sea Policy and the Eastern Question"] (1902), p. 20.

LVI. Turkey to be under Germany's Influence.

To bring Germany and Turkey together—that is the essential purpose of the demand made first by List and after him by Moltke, Rodbertus, Lassalle, Roscher, Ernst Hasse, and Alexander von Peez, and which the Englishman Johnston and the Frenchman Leroy Beaulieu regarded as Germany's natural vocation, which to-day is represented by David Treitsch, Rohrbach, Jäckh and Naumann, and which forms the basis of the Pan-German programme. Thus the Imperialistic programme of Germany has long been prepared and acknowledged, and the organisation necessary in order to make the nation familiar with it has long existed actively in the Pan-German League. Why, then, the call for a new prophet? . . . .

An Alliance consisting of Germany, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria and Turkey (Constantinople and Near Asia), taking the form of a defensive and offensive union, gradually developing into an economic unity—this idea can easily be made popular. . . . . The territory of this federation of States is inhabited by about 150 million people, comprising 78 million Germans, 40 million Slavs in six principal races, and 32 million people of other races. The German Empire would have the political leadership of the federation. That would be German Imperialism. Such a federation would hold its own with the greatest of World-Powers.

Dr. Albert Ritter, *Die Kaisermächte und der Balkan* ["The Imperial Powers and the Balkans"] (1914), pp. 18, 20, 24.

LVII. Germany as Turkey's Residuary Legatee.

Our yearly increase of population, amounting to about 600,000 souls (1896), forces emigration upon us, and the largest part of this emigration has hitherto gone to the United States of North America, where it has been almost entirely lost to Germanism, economically and nationally. Hence arises the necessity for directing the stream of our emigration to territories belonging to the German Empire itself. Our present Colonial possessions, however, are only suitable for the reception of a small part of any extensive emigration of Germans, particularly

from agricultural districts. It is therefore necessary to acquire for the German Empire other territories whose climate, soil and geographical position will permit of their settlement and cultivation by German labour.

Decades ago great German economists and thinkers, like Helmuth von Moltke, Friedrich List and Wilhelm Roscher, pointed to the importance of Asia Minor for German emigration and colonisation, and the present troubles in the East are again directing the attention of friends of the fatherland to the value of those territories on the Euphrates and Tigris which by nature are so richly blest but whose economic development has in consequence of various circumstances remained so backward. . . .

We should like again to direct public attention to the possibility which the dissolution of Turkey may offer to the German Empire of acquiring a territory which might become of great economic and political importance for the Empire; neither the population of Anatolia nor the less numerous Arab inhabitants of Mesopotamia and Syria would be likely to cause any special difficulties to German rule, which would be just simply because it was German, and with its introduction a powerful economic development would, without doubt, be given to the country.

If the German people is to be in a position to maintain its position against other nations superior to it in numbers, a larger area for its expansion must be provided.

Deutschlands Ansprüche an das Türkische Erbe ["Germany's Claims to the Turkish Inheritance"], published officially by the Pan-German League (1896), pp. 1, 2.

LVIII. Central Germany and Near Asia.

Mesopotamia would be no real peasant State, but there is room enough for such a State in Near Asia which, without counting Arabia, comprises 1,200,000 square kilometres and has only fifteen million inhabitants, while it could feed one hundred millions. Should these inhabitants be Asiatics, people of yellow or even of black race? Is it not to the interest of Europe that the white man should take this country in hand in good time, so that the frontier between the races should be pressed

eastward instead of westward towards the Bosphorus? Is it not a crime against Europe that England would rather introduce Hindoos, Coolies and Fellaheen in the land of the Two Rivers than allow a part of the territory to go to the Germans? . . .

Berlin-Bagdad—that is our watchword and aim. Many have accepted this watchword, men of all parties, but it should resound like a storm signal through the entire land, so that the nation should at last have a fixed aim and know what it wants and should do. For this watchword would give us the peace which is so dear to us. If the peaceful union of the German Empire, Austria, the North Balkan States and Turkey can lead to a political and economic alliance, and if this work succeeds, the nations of Europe will no longer hack each other to pieces and German power will be unassailable. . . .

By the peaceful work of such a federation of States, Germany and Central Europe will obtain all they need—a compact economic territory with a population of 150 millions, which would be equal to the English, Russian and American agglomerations, since it produces nearly all the necessary raw materials and has in itself great possibilities as a market. The still open settlement-territory of Near Asia can for a long time absorb all the surplus population of Central Europe. The German language would become the language of intercourse in a large new territory without the suppression of the languages of the small nations, whose cultures, leaning on that of Germany, would be able to develop unhindered, like their political autonomy, on their own national soil. Habsburg-Lorraine, the Rumanian Hohenzollern, and the Coburg of Bulgaria would enter into the circle of German princes.

Dr. K. von Winterstetten, *Berlin-Bagdad: neue Ziele mitteleuropäischer Politik* ["Berlin-Bagdad: new Aims of Central European Policy"] (1913), pp. 46, 47, 48, 50.

LIX. The Policy of the "Open Door" in Asiatic Turkey.

In Asiatic Turkey there lies possibly a large future for Germany. As has already been emphasized, however, Germany's political position to Turkey is distinguished from that of all other European Powers by the fact that in complete sincerity

we demand for ourselves not a yard of Turkish territory either in Europe, Asia or Africa, but only have the wish and the interest to find in the Turkish Empire a market for the sale of our goods and a source of raw products for our industry, whereby we wish to make, *vis-à-vis* the nations competing with us, no other claim than that of the conditional "Open door."

Dr. Paul Rohrbach, *Deutschland unter den Weltvölkern* ["Germany amongst the World-Nations"] (1903), pp. 52, 53.

(G) MOROCCO.

LX. The Anglo-French Agreement.

We are richer by a disappointment. That which seemed most unfortunate has happened: France and England, which were antagonists in East Africa, have settled the disputes outstanding between them, by an arrangement by which France receives Morocco, Spain is disregarded, and the German Empire is reduced by both the treaty Powers to the level of Spain, not even being admitted to the negotiations, though France in the late autumn of last year made inquiries in Berlin as to a settlement regarding Morocco, thereby acknowledging that the Morocco question could not be decided without the participation of the German Empire.

A world-political decision of the first magnitude has been taken; a territory of world-political and world-economical importance has been disposed of; the last piece of God's earth which was indispensable to us has been gambled away for ever. This may not be: the German Empire cannot tolerate it: German statesmen cannot expect it of the German nation and its honour; they dare not even take upon themselves such a responsibility before history. Morocco cannot and must not be lost to us. The political world-situation and the necessity that Germany should have a foot-hold in the country places in our hands the means of saving at the last moment what a self-confident and far-seeing statesmanship would never have jeopardised by indecision and procrastination. We must answer with a decisive "No" the question "Is Morocco lost to us?" We must brace ourselves to the political will to assert this "No," and Morocco will be saved. . . .

The present world-situation is so favourable for us that we should sin against the future if we failed to use it. Who are the antagonists with whom we have to do? As Spain does not count, being defenceless, they are France and England. Both are immediately interested in East Asia and may any moment be at war, in spite of their present friendship. England is the less interested, since we do not wish to have the Mediterranean coast. France thinks, indeed, that she has a claim to all Morocco; in the existing political conjuncture she will be glad if we leave to her what we do not want. The question remains —what should be the extent of our occupation of the country? The foregoing considerations will make that clear: we shall not be satisfied with one or even two harbours; we must have the entire Atlantic coast, since we cannot otherwise develop, as we should be dependent upon co-proprietors of the coast.

HEINRICH CLASS, *Marokko verloren?* ["Is Morocco lost?"] (1904), pp. 3, 4, 9.

LXI. THE AGADIR EPISODE.

The despatch of a war-ship to the south of the Atlantic coast of Morocco was greeted in the German Empire by the overwhelming majority of the nation with joyous satisfaction —we might even say with enthusiasm; after long years of inertia and indifference the nation sees in the act the first step towards a policy of resolution as regards foreign Powers, and it is determined to support the Government in such a policy. It is satisfactory in the highest degree to observe how unanimously public opinion endorsed that measure, which was called for by the necessity of protecting important German interests in South Morocco, and it may be expected that in the further treatment of the Morocco question the Imperial Government will be conscious that the support of the nation is behind it.

It can be assumed as extremely probable that the appearance of the little German vessel at Agadir will re-open the Morocco question, so that the negotiations which will arise out of the immediate occasion of the incident, viz. the need of affording protection to the German subjects in South Morocco by reason of the prevailing insecurity, will be extended

to the decisive settlement of the fate of the Shereefian Empire.

HEINRICH CLASS, *West-Marokko Deutsch!* ["West Morocco German!"] (1911), p. 1.

We are of opinion that the situation in Morocco has become quite untenable, and untenable because of the action taken by France. Because of that, and of the German interests which have to be protected, we hold that negotiations should be opened with a view to the partition of the country. In these negotiations it must be clear from the beginning that the German nation wants no conference; no "international forum" should be allowed to decide upon German claims; Germany can negotiate only with the Powers interested. The idea of compensation or satisfaction outside Morocco cannot be entertained. Nor will a harbour on the west coast of Morocco, whether as a trade centre or a naval depot, satisfy us; we must have territory corresponding to Germany's needs—a colony.

Ibid., p. 19.

The news of the arrival of the *Panther* at Agadir fell upon the land like a beautiful spring day and all hearts loudly hailed the new Bismarck; a joyous shout, a cry of relief, "At last!" went forth....Yes, that was the German people of better days; the combatant race of old which was determined not to be unworthy of its sires, and the nation's blessings and proud hopes accompanied the *Berlin* on its journey to Morocco. To many that time will remain unforgettable, since it proved once again that we were still the heirs of the heroes of 1870–71, although their blood only wells up in us in days of national joy or sorrow.

Nevertheless, it was to be otherwise. We had once again to give way to England. Anger raged in the soul of many a German; old pictures of the past rose to his memory; recollections of earlier humiliations and impudent English demands; the ardent longing, after years of hope and doubt, fear and dread, to have done with the eternal policy of surrender and cringing before England—this hope was again disappointed. It had been believed that the great moment had come, in which the German Government would present its account to the Western Powers and, if necessary, sign the discharge only

with a bloody sword; and the blood boiled in many a manly heart when once again the habitual order to surrender was issued from Berlin, the seat of diplomatic sneaking.

Dr. E. Hartl, *Preussen-Deutschlands diplomatische Niederlagen und deren Folgen in der Geschichte* ["Prusso-Germany's Diplomatic Reverses and their Consequences in History"] (1912), pp. 134–5.

LXII. German Claims in Morocco.

How comes it that there is talk now of Germany's reverse? The opponents of the policy of the German Government, in so far as they are pan-Germans, reply "We wanted the Sus territory[1] and we have not got it. We have withdrawn our demands instead of defending them with the sword." That the Sus territory was originally one of the German demands for compensation is a widely prevailing view which hitherto no semi-official contradictions have been able to dispose of.

Axel Ripke, *Deutschland und England in Marokko und Tripolis* (1911), p. 28.

Let the fact be twisted and turned as it may, quite apart from the contentions of the Pan-Germanist League, which has been particularly active on the Morocco question and appears to have good reasons for its action, every serious politician must allow that the ardent jubilation which greeted the Government immediately after the Agadir incident was a response to an act done by that same Government and sprang from the instinctive feeling of liberation from the incubus of the past Morocco policy—from the opinion that a great *coup* was to be attempted, and from the hope that this *coup* would succeed. The call for a German settlement colony in West Morocco resounded loud and generally throughout the Empire, and the valuable Sus, the hinterland of Agadir, appeared to be the aim of German policy. Herren von Bethmann-Hollweg and Kiderlen-Wächter deny that they ever sought to acquire territory

[1] "The region of Morocco which is richest in natural treasures is undoubtedly the South-west, Sus, on the sea between Atlas and Anti-Atlas. It is also richly watered, has fertile soil, and could to a large extent be changed into a Huerta where, besides Southern fruit trees and particularly date palms, earth-nuts could be grown."—Dr. Albert Wirth, *Die Entscheidung über Marokko* ["The Decision regarding Morocco"] (1911), p. 10.

in Morocco, although the French and English Governments quite evidently assumed it, and although German public opinion in general interpreted the appearance of the *Panther* at Agadir in that sense. Disregarding the question whether the Foreign Office originally intended to acquire a piece of Morocco or not, and without entering into the still undecided dispute between the Foreign Office and the Pan-Germanist League on the subject, the issue was sufficient to excite the anger and indignation of every German concerned for the reputation of his country. If we went to Agadir merely in order to make *vis-à-vis* France "acte de presence," and to acquire a piece of the Congo region, it was both psychologically and politically an unparalleled act of shortsightedness, and for our statesmen in authority simply a monstrosity. If we went to Agadir without being clear that the step meant war, unless either France or Germany was to be humiliated, it was a political miscalculation impossible to believe. The abandonment of Morocco to France is a political sin against the future of our nation.

DANIEL FRYMANN, *Wenn ich der Kaiser wär'!—politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten* ["Were I the Emperor!—Political Truths and Necessities"] (1912 and 1914), pp. 13, 14.

LXIII. IN DEFENCE OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT.

A German statesman who established a German-Moroccan colony would weld the two Western Powers inseparably and perhaps convert the Triple Entente into a Triple Alliance. For England, immeasurably embittered, would then perhaps openly join the Franco-Russian Alliance, from which it has hitherto formally kept aloof. The fruits of the Potsdam Agreement would, in that event, be lost to us, because the Russians would be compelled to prefer an English alliance to Germany's friendship.

The German nation will be wise, therefore, if it refuses to embrace the idea of a German-Morocco for which the Pan-Germans want to win its enthusiasm.... If we abandon Morocco to sensitive France we shall be making a great sacrifice in the interest of a good understanding between the Powers, not because we could wish a Mauretanian colony ourselves, but be-

cause of the strengthening of her political and military position which France would gain if she were to dominate the whole of North-West Africa and infuse it more or less with French ideas. But we should never consent to the realization of these high-flown dreams of our restless neighbour unless the French Republic gave us very considerable territorial concessions on the Gulf of Guinea.

E. Daniels, in the *Preussische Jahrbücher*, August, 1911, pp. 397–401.

When the German merchants interested in Morocco wished to compel the German Government to support their economic expansion by political measures, the Government had to face the question whether the importance of these economic interests was so great from the standpoint of the nation at large as to justify Germany in accentuating the difficulty of her situation by acquiring an exposed colony which it would be difficult to defend, and perhaps ultimately facing a war against the *Entente Cordiale*. When, influenced no doubt by the consideration that Morocco would not sink into the sea simply because a French Protectorate was proclaimed over it, and might be had for the cost of war at a later date, the Government answered this question in the negative, and undertook to promote the economic interests of the Germans only within the limits imposed by considerations of general policy, a large part of the German nation regarded its attitude as an inadequate fulfilment of its political duties.

J. J. Ruedorffer, *Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart* ["Outlines of World-Policy in the Present"] (1913), p. 56.

(H) SOUTH AMERICA.

LXIV. The Monroe Doctrine.

We [Germans] least of all have occasion to support any nation, particularly one of the four Great Powers, in the further increase of their world-dominion, without ample assistance in return, as has been wrongly done by the recognition of the Monroe Doctrine at the Hague Conference. It was necessary neither to acknowledge nor reject the doctrine; all that was needful was the reserve of a cautious merchant who never knows

whether a good bargain can be made or not. For many reasons we shall certainly not strive after political annexations in South America, but that we should not do so out of regard for the United States is to renounce a right in respect of the globe which every European State shares with the Yankee, to which the latter has no preferential claim, and which we should only forgo at the proper time in consideration of ample payment. Now, however, the Yankee has pocketed his Monroe Doctrine charter, which may prove to have an incalculable value,—and what has he given to Europe in return? Nothing except a practical example of the greatest immodesty, since he now retains into the bargain the right to a joint voice in all questions of the Old World—the Chinese question in East Africa, the Jewish question in Russia, the Liberian question in Africa, etc.

Dr. Georg Hartmann, *Krieg oder Frieden mit England?* ["War or Peace with England?"] (1912), pp. 32, 33.

One may think of the Monroe Doctrine as he will; should it be maintained, however, it will give to the American States, from North to South, a stability and cohesion which cannot be easily shaken from Europe. Nevertheless, Washington now disregards and makes holes in the Monroe Doctrine, by taking possession of the Hawaiian Islands and retaining Samoa. And why? Because the interests of maritime intercourse are valued more highly than even a powerful tradition like the Monroe Doctrine, because it is desired to assert supremacy over the trade routes with East Asia from Hawaii and to assert from Samoa further strong influence thereupon. Intrinsically Hawaii and Samoa themselves are not worth the risk which Washington undertakes; it is rather their position in the line of trade routes which gives to them importance and calls forth the interest and jealousy of the great States.

Paul Dehn, *Kommende Weltwirtschaftspolitik* ["Coming Policy of World-Economy"] (1898), pp. 103, 104.

Prince Bismarck has described this doctrine as an incredible impertinence. Since that judgment was passed upon this "over-estimation of [North American] claims and under-estimation of the independence of other American and European Powers," the Monroe Doctrine has grown still further, and to-day it really consists in the claim of the United States to supremacy

over all America. This doctrine has merely the importance of such a one-sided demand as is expressed in the well-known demand of the English, "Africa English from the Cape to the Nile," so long as it is not acknowledged as rightful by other States, and therewith has become a part of international law. Of this, however, there was in the past no question.

Dr. Ernst Hasse, *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus, und Kolonialpolitik* ["World-Policy, Imperialism, and Colonial Policy"] (1908), p. 23.

LXV. German Expansion in South America.

Here lies a field for German influence and the increase of German power in the world. South America is the only Continent whose future has not yet been determined, while Asia for the most part falls to Russia and perhaps one day will fall to her altogether, Australia belongs to England, and Africa to several States—particularly France and England—whose re-adjustments of power will influence and decide the fate of various parts of that Continent. In South America, if the supremacy of any of the great mercantile Powers can be recognised at all, Germany is the most powerful factor in commerce and she is also on the way to capture the shipping trade. For this reason it is desirable to make this strong position so secure that it cannot be taken away, and it is indeed time for Germany to defend her place in that Continent, since with the present distribution of political power in the world it cannot be denied that there are now only three real World-Powers, namely, Great Britain, the Russian Empire, and the United States. The German Empire and France take only a secondary place, and in spite of their African and South Sea possessions, can hardly be regarded as World-Powers. If the German Empire would win back its rapidly disappearing second position amongst the leading Powers of the world, it must endeavour to acquire decisive influence where it is still to be had, namely in South America, yet not in the form of acquisitions of territory which would embitter the population as in Kiaochow, but in the formation of a politico-commercial and industrial and, if necessary, also military support for the South American States against the growing covetousness of the United States. To this end the German Empire must be strong enough to oppose

the United States energetically and to take account of the commercial hostility of Great Britain, which already exists sufficiently, and it must therefore seek to ally itself unreservedly with that Power which has practically no interest at all in South America, namely Russia, which would naturally in return be given a free hand in Asia. This policy is all the more to be recommended since Russia is the natural enemy of Great Britain and also of the United States, and since we already, at the time of so clear-sighted a ruler as William I, and the greatest statesman of our history, Bismarck, stood in close friendship, or at least in treaty relationships, with Russia.

Dr. WILHELM SIEVERS, *Südamerika und die deutschen Interessen* ["South America and German Interests"] (1903), pp. 93–95.

It would be an unpardonable act of political folly if we entirely put from us the idea of extending our nationality in South America because the North Americans have been lulled by the dream that the whole of that Continent belongs by divine and human right to them and to them alone. The moral kernel of the Monroe Doctrine perished on the day that the document relating to the annexation of the Philippines was signed by McKinley. Therewith America abandoned the duty which followed from the tacit agreement: "If you will not mix in American affairs, I will not mix in non-American," and gave us the right to oppose this doctrine of Greater America with the Greater German doctrine, "European interests and with them German interests exist in America likewise in case we have the power to maintain them." We shall not forbear to accustom America gradually to this theory....

Comparing the area and population of America and Germany, it is seen that in Germany every inhabitant must be satisfied with $\frac{1}{14}$th of the space enjoyed by an American. It follows that we need foreign territories for colonization fourteen times more necessarily than the North Americans, and for that reason cannot allow ourselves to be simply shut out from the most unpeopled yet richest parts of the earth in South America. South America can be as easily and quickly reached by us on the ocean as by the North Americans, and the small territorial connection between the two halves of the Continent will sooner or later cease entirely by the construction of a Central American

canal. Equal treatment with the Union in South America is the theory which we must set against the Monroe Doctrine and which we must be prepared at the right moment to defend with force....

Only when the question whether Germany will simply fall in with the American order in South America "Hands off!" has been answered negatively shall we be able with a good conscience to systematically promote further emigration to South American territories in the interest of our national future.

Dr. WILHELM WINTZER, *Der Kampf um das Deutschtum—Die Deutschen in tropischen Amerika* ["The Struggle of Germanism—The Germans in Tropical America"] (1900), pp. 78, 79, 82.

V. SCHEMES OF DOMINATION.

LXVI. German Hegemony in Europe.

The strongest Germanic State of the Continent must exercise hegemony therein. The smaller States must sacrifice so much of their independence and language as is necessary to the permanent security of a new imperial unity. The question whether armed force will be necessary is a secondary matter. It is, however, important that the States aiming at hegemony shall dispose of sufficient intellectual, economic and military power in order to be able to achieve and maintain this aim. Which State must this be? It can only be the German Empire, which is in need of more territory. The moral position is so far favourable to the smaller German States concerned that fratricidal military measures by Germany against these States will not be necessary. Everything depends upon Germany obtaining, by the subjugation of France, unconditional hegemony in Central and Western Europe, together with the simultaneous or immediately subsequent incorporation of the German provinces of Austria in some form corresponding to our German racial intentions. The natural pressure of this new German Empire will be so great that, *nolens volens*, the adjacent smaller Germanic States will be compelled to attach themselves to this Empire on such conditions as we may impose. Thus, the present position of the Germans of Europe resembles that of the Germans before the establishment of the Empire, since in this case—just as was the case with Austria formerly—the Anglo-Saxon States cannot for practical reasons be included within any conceivable period.

Josef Ludwig Reimer, *Ein pangermanisches Deutschland* ["A Pan-Germanist Germany"] (1905), pp. 119, 120.

Our Continental power must be founded unshakably by extending the sphere of that power in Europe. It is evident that this involves no thought of a policy of conquest; such a thing would be contrary to the spirit of the time and to our own real

advantage, since we could only acquire in Europe territories whose forced population would always be hostile to us. Nevertheless, it appears necessary to have a final settlement with France and also quite possible to supplement the Triple Alliance by a Central European Confederation of States, each preserving its complete independence, thereby not only greatly improving our military position but obtaining an extended basis for our oversea policy. This Confederation of States must attach itself to the Triple Alliance and the latter must extend its existing character. Its purely defensive provisions have shown themselves to be inadequate to do justice to the interests of all concerned. They must therefore take the wider form of a protective and defensive alliance, subject to a quite definite statement of the interests which shall be regarded as reciprocal. Only when we have reached this goal, and have freed ourselves from the position of restraint which now hinders our free action in every direction, can we think of discharging the second duty which historical conditions impose upon us, namely, the development of our Colonial Empire and the strengthening of our world position. If we would secure to the German character the respect which is due to it, and would win for the German intellect, German work, and German idealism the influence which in view of their cultural importance belongs to them, we must obtain a firm footing in the earth and create everywhere points of support for our cultural mission.

General Friedrich von Bernhardi, *Unsere Zukunft: ein Mahnwort an das deutsche Volk* ["Our Future: a Word of Warning to the German People"] (1912), p. 40.

LXVII. An Empire of Greater Germany.

Never has it happened in history that a nation like the Germans, after such victories as those of 1864-1870, has stood still half-way upon its forward course....Everybody is to-day clear that the German nation goes much too far in its attitude of peaceableness towards the rest of the world—that in its endeavour to protect what it has acquired, it lulls its own citizens into the slumber of the satiated, and abandons its fellow-countrymen abroad to national decay. Nevertheless, we would not recommend a policy of conquest. It would suffice to cede

to neighbouring States their natural development, subject to the one condition that they will honourably respect the property of Germanism in those States. In the case of Holland and Switzerland this condition is fulfilled, but it is not so in Belgium, Austria and Russia....

It appears to us that the agglomeration of all Germans living together in Central Europe in a federal Greater Germany would be possible without any wars of conquest on our side, either on the West or the South, though as a final remedy a repetition of the events of 1866 would have to be considered. We should not need to compel the two Netherlands to enter this Greater German federation. They will come to us of themselves as petitioners when their economic or political independence can no longer be maintained. The same would apply to Switzerland if Italy took from her Ticino and France her French territory. The present State-structure of Austria-Hungary would fall into pieces; its dissolution is imminent as soon as the present ruler passes away. The Germans would go to Austria-Hungary because called thereto. Only a settlement between Western Europe and Russia appears scarcely conceivable without war. Nevertheless, we repeat that we Germans have no interest in accelerating such events. They will, however, come without any effort of ours. May we only be prepared!

Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr 1950 ["Greater Germany and Central Europe about the year 1950"]. Von einem Alldeutschen (1895), pp. 9, 10.

LXVIII. A Central European Customs Union.

The creation of a Central European Customs Union is the greatest task of the present generation. Unfortunately the old plans of Friedrich List have so much passed out of the consciousness of our time that it will be necessary again to create a new foundation of such a Customs Union scheme, and, therefore, to answer the preliminary question,—What States should such a Union comprise? This question is still an open one, and there are as many representatives of the opinion that it should be restricted to the German Empire and Austria-Hungary, as there are of those who contend that it should comprise all Europe with the exception of Russia and Great Britain. It is most likely that

the Union will be confined to the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Belgium and Holland, with, perhaps, Switzerland and Rumania.

Dr. ERNST HASSE, *Weltpolitik, Imperialismus, und Kolonialpolitik* ["World-Policy, Imperialism, and Colonial Policy"] (1908), p. 49.

LXIX. GERMAN DOMINATION ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

The repartition of the Continent is advocated in *Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das Jahr* 1950: *Von einem Alldeutschen* ["Greater Germany and Central Europe about the year 1950: By a Pan-German"] (1895). Of the "natural frontiers" of Germanism in Europe the writer says:

In the North the sea has fixed the natural frontiers of Germanism. Since the completion of the North and Baltic Sea canal, she requires no extension on the Jutland Peninsula. The Danes, therefore, have no need to fear a German desire for expansion. We can leave it to them to decide whether they wish to regard themselves more or less as members of the pan-Germanic family of nations—they will always be welcome to us as friends and no longer dangerous to us as enemies. The natural Western frontier of the German nation leads from the Ardennes and the Vosges over the Jura to Mont Blanc, the "summit of three nations," lying between Germany, France and Italy. We are divided from the Italians by the Monte Rosa, Simplon, St Gothard, Splügen, Septimer, Maloja, Bernina, Stilfser Joch, Ortler, Adamello, Brenta, and the Dolomites.

A glance at the map shows that the lingual territory of the German nation corresponds broadly to these natural Western and Southern boundaries of Germany, but its political territory only partially. To the South-East and to the South, natural limits to the extension of Germanism are not fixed, and for that reason the lingual territory of the Germans has for more than a thousand years continually pressed South-East and North-East. In future it cannot and will not be otherwise than that the national power of the Germans will similarly press forward in the same direction. But where? Who can say that?

The following is the "Pan-German's" scheme for the assertion of German domination in Central Europe:

The Netherlands. When our Low German kinsmen have overcome their childish fear of annexation by Prussia they will understand that the attachment of the Netherlands to Greater Germany is to their own advantage. The Dutch may be guaranteed their justifiable peculiarities. Inasmuch as the kingdom of the Netherlands will enter not only the German Customs Union but the Greater German Federal State as an equal member it will renounce its separate navy, but will retain an independent army corps, with "reserve rights" like those of Bavaria; it will form its own colonial army, and it can remain in possession of its colonies, and even take over the administration of [German] New Guinea and all the German colonies in the South Seas (p. 13).

Belgium. The [racial] convulsions which threaten Belgium will assuredly compel the German Empire to intervene in the country. It will then depend on the attitude of France to Germany whether the Walloon territory will become a French or a German margravate. Only the Flemish portion of Belgium can be admitted into the Greater German Confederation on equal terms with the other States. The Kingdom of Flanders would, like Holland, renounce the maintenance of its own navy; would cede Antwerp to the German Empire as an Imperial fortress and naval station, but would retain its own army corps, subject to "reserve rights" like those of Saxony and Wurtemberg. The Congo State would be administered from Flanders (p. 14).

Luxemburg. Luxemburg will receive from Belgium the German-speaking district of Arlon, and will remain in the German Customs Union, will join the German Empire, but not the Greater German Confederation; it will conclude with Prussia a military convention on the pattern of that with Brunswick, and Luxemburg [town] will become an Imperial fortress (pp. 14, 15).

France. In regard to the question whether the still outstanding antagonisms between Germany and France will have to be decided by a second war, France must recognise that even

in the event of defeat Germany would have to struggle again and again for the reacquisition of Strassburg and Metz, Alsace and Lorraine. On the other hand, we Germans have only to ask ourselves, what should we take from France in addition to an indemnity in the event of victory? We should certainly not take French territory, or at most the fortress of Belfort and its environs: such a gain, however, would not be worth a great war. Should not Germany and France, therefore, come to a pacific settlement—naturally at the expense of others, as statesmen of "real-political" sentiments always do? It has often been pointed out that France with the help of Germany can eject England from Egypt, and if the frontiers of France really need rectification in Europe it could be done by acquiring two regions in the north-east and south-east, viz., the Walloon portion of Belgium and French Switzerland. Should it come to a decisive war between France and the Triple Alliance, however, it would be necessary, in order to keep France quiet, to give the French-speaking district of Flanders (Dunkirk, etc.) to Belgium, the French West African colonies to Germany, and Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and North Africa to Italy (pp. 15,16).

Switzerland. The transference of the French-speaking district of Switzerland as far as Martigny, Freiburg and Biel to France and of Ticino to Italy affects Swiss interests, but no interests of Germany from the standpoint either of peace or war. Germany does not need Switzerland, but the latter needs the protection of the German Empire. It may be left to Switzerland, therefore, to decide whether it will enter the German Customs Union and the Greater German Confederation or the German Empire in its present extent or cut down to its German territory (p. 17).

Italy. Germany can never finally renounce her claim to own Trieste, and Italy can never push forward her northern frontier against Germany's will. Whether Italy will receive Savoy, Nice, Corsica and the ardently coveted possessions of France in North Africa will depend upon whether France keeps the peace, and in the case of war, upon what sort of a peace Germany concludes with France. Ticino will hardly fall to Italy except with the assent of Germany and France, and South Tirol only with the assent of Germany and Austria (p. 18).

Austria-Hungary. The extrusion of Austria from the Germanic Federation in 1866 was not a self-purpose, but only a means to an end, which was to weld the rest of the Federation into a German national State under Prussian leadership capable of existence. Nevertheless, it would be doing a great injustice to the Gotha party[1], and to Bismarck who realised their plans, to regard the German Empire of 1871 and the exclusion therefrom of Austria as the final aim of all German national development. . . . We German Imperialists should not benefit by the disintegration of the present structure of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy; otherwise, when the partition of this territory between Russia and Germany was suggested, Prince Bismarck would not have concluded the Triple Alliance for its protection. No one in Germany wishes to wage war against that monarchy in order to precipitate its collapse, as is believed in certain circles in Austria. We Imperialists would be quite satisfied with the economic and political adhesion of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy to the German Empire in the form, say, of a Customs Alliance, but only subject to the condition that the territorial status of the German nation in Austria and Hungary shall be maintained.

Who would pretend to deny, however, that powerful forces, particularly the Magyars and the Czechs, are working unceasingly for the destruction of the Habsburg monarchy? . . . Should the Magyars and Czechs and their allies succeed in their designs, new State formations would arise, the character of which we could not attempt to prophesy. Should the Austrian political system be maintained substantially as at present, it will have to pay regard to the interests of those whose co-operation has assisted in its preservation. These interests would be served by territorial adjustments somewhat as follows: Galicia and the Bukowina would be detached from the Austrian monarchy and would form the nucleus of Kingdoms of Poland and Ruthenia, to be formed in the main out of Russian territory, Ruthenia being in personal union with Austria under the Habsburg reigning house. Rumania would receive the Ruman-

[1] In the middle of the 19th century the Gotha party in Germany advocated the creation of a German Empire from which Austria should be excluded, in opposition to the Great-German party, which wished to see Austria remain in Germany.

speaking (Wallachian) districts of Hungary and of the Bukowina. The German-inhabited districts of Kronstadt, Hermanstadt, Mediasch, Schätzburg, Regen and Bistritz would be consolidated into a margravate of Transylvania and remain to Austria as an enclave in Rumania, the latter entering the German Customs Union and concluding a military alliance with Austria. Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina and the former kingdom of Serbia would be united in a Greater Serbian (South-Slavic) kingdom, in personal union with Austria; and Austria would exchange South Tirol with Italy for Friuli. The Austrian Empire, consisting of Bohemia, Moravia with Silesia, Austria, Tirol with Vorarlberg and Salz burg, Steiermark, Carinthia, Carinola, with the Coastland, in cluding Trieste and Friuli (all with provisional constitutions) and the margravate of Hungary, which would be put under a dictatorship, would enter the Greater German Confederation and the German Customs Union. It would renounce its own navy in favour of the German Empire, but would maintain its own army, in which only Germans would serve. If the house of Habsburg should not be willing or fit to carry out these difficult transformations the petty German princely houses might be called in instead, as Paul de Lagarde proposes; for Germany has too many princes and Austria too many races (pp. 19, 23–26).

The following are to be the conditions of peace with Russia after Central Europe has triumphed in a war against her.

Russia. Russia will retain the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, but will cede Finland to Sweden, the Baltic Provinces and Poland to Greater Germany, and Bessarabia to either Austria or Rumania. Russia will, however, retain Gallipoli or an island contiguous to the Dardanelles, as well as Afghanistan and Beluchistan, in the event of her having already captured these territories in a war with Italy and England respectively. The Baltic Provinces will become independent duchies—Esthonia, Livonia, Kurland and Lithuania—and under the rule of Protestant Thuringian princes will receive constitutions which, out of regard for the German civilization and the non-German

descent of the majority of their populations, will introduce the bilingual system in legislation and administration, church and school; they will renounce the maintenance of a separate army and navy, receive German garrisons, post, telegraphs and railways, and for the rest will be members of the Greater German Customs Union, but not of the German Empire or Confederation. In order that we may be more secure against the Muscovite giant the more independent and really homogeneous empires we have around us the better. We should therefore establish, in addition to a kingdom of Poland, a kingdom of Ruthenia (pp. 38, 39).

LXX. German World-Domination by War.

The purpose of this writing is exclusively to say openly what, out of regard for the strained situation, is usually hushed up. That principle is here departed from. We shall keep back nothing which is of importance for the honour and greatness of our Fatherland, whatever the consequences may be. Germany's world-domination [*Weltherrschaft*] is the only aim which hovers before us; everything else is of no consequence to us.

Edmund Weber, *Krieg oder Frieden mit England?* ["War or Peace with England?"] (1913), p. 3.

I do not think that there is any necessity to take such pains to shrink from violence, or to act as though we did so. Why always talk of peace? Why give the assurance on every occasion that we entertain no aggressive intentions? Do we really build our war-ships in order simply that "even the strongest naval Power will regard it as a dangerous hazard to attack us"? Do we really not think of extending our territory and seeking an outlet for our surplus population? That is a delightful idea! Are we, then, happy so long as the rest of the world leaves us in peace? Do we regard ourselves as fortunate if England concedes us only a modest little place in the sun? No, gentlemen, we are not modest—only good-for-nothings are modest. We demand elbow-room for the Teutonic race; we demand room for the expansion of our power, room for our rule. We long for a joyful

combat at arms. We are not so senile that peace and quietness appear to us as the things most deserving of pursuit. Oh, no! We rejoice in a struggle with any opponent who is worthy of us. To snatch world-domination from the English appears to us an aim worthy of honourable toil. Why are we Germans in the world at all if not to achieve great deeds? We have sat inactive long enough in a suffocating and corrupt atmosphere, forgetting our glorious past. A thunder-storm is coming upon us; let the lightning flash; it can cost no more than our lives! Sooner or later we must all die; why, then, should we not die decently? Why should we postpone the struggle which must inevitably come sooner or later? No man can hold back the hand of Fate. The time is coming when the world must decide whether it will be English or German, whether it will obey the nation of 45 millions or the nation of 70 millions. There is no other choice.

Ibid., p. 8.

If England believes that we are satisfied with our present position she makes a great mistake. Only the people of the old gang, the "Continentals," the traditional friends of England, are satisfied, though they, it is true, are still at the rudder. Too great confidence should not be built, however, upon the expectation that these men will always retain power. We younger ones, who have learnt from England Imperialism, a good territorial appetite, and, not to forget it, unscrupulousness as well, know nothing of such a modesty, nor do we know any historical and traditional friendships which could influence our decisions in any way, least of all dispose us to friendship with England. Our aim is the creation of a powerful world-embracing [*weltumspannendes*] German Empire, and to this aim everything else must give way. If, in its pursuit, England stands in our way, then let the cannon speak! Why should we have any need to fear?

Ibid., p. 14.

LXXI. Schemes of World Repartition.

Many Pan-Germanist publications go beyond schemes for the extension of Germany's colonial empire and propound elaborate plans for the repartition of

the world. One of the earliest of these publications is a pamphlet which appeared in 1895 with the title "*Germania triumphans—ein Rückblick auf die welthistorischen Ereignisse der Jahre* 1900–1915. Von einem Grösstdeutschen" ["Germany triumphant—a retrospect of the world-historical events of the years 1900–1915. By a 'Greatest German'" (*i.e.* a German who seeks to make Germany the greatest empire in the world in extent of territory)]. The pamphlet, which contained a coloured map of the world as reorganised by Germany, created great interest, and is referred to in many Pan-Germanist publications of later date. It records a sequence of events which led to the repartition of the globe and the assertion by Germany of world-domination.

The writer describes how in 1900 the British Empire, with a population of 350 millions, was converted into "a closed economic area with free trade within and protection against all outside," and how this measure was followed by the creation of corresponding Pan-American and Russo-Asiatic Customs Unions, the effect of which was to create great consternation in Europe.

In no other State of Europe was the excitement so great as in Germany. For decades, nay, for centuries, German energy, industry, and intelligence had generously assisted the economic and intellectual development of oversea countries. Germans had left their Fatherland by the hundred thousand yearly in order to found new homes in foreign lands. Were all these to be lost to the mother country? Now all the many economic and national relationships that existed between them were to be torn asunder by the brutal closure of the gigantic Anglo-Saxon Empires against the outer world, and Germany was to be doomed still to hand over her best human material to her proud Anglo-Saxon cousin, so that the latter might build upon it his economic, national, and political power....

Recent economic events had proved that the preservation of the economic and national power of the German nation could only be accomplished by the extension of its political power. Even the most ardent apostles of peace had learnt that without

the war, long feared but long prepared for, there could be no rest for the economic life of Germany, and that extension of power by war was necessary if this life was not to become extinct.

Thus, at the beginning of the new century that enthusiastic temper broke out in the German nation which gave to it irresistible strength to struggle for its highest national ideals in ardent conflict. Its Emperor also was carried away by this powerful movement of the national spirit....He saw the day of fulfilment approach, and his people and army knew that at the right moment he would lead them in the true Hohenzollern manner to battle and to victory (pp. 4, 5).

The first struggle was one between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy and Turkey on one side, and France and Russia on the other. The Central Powers were successful, but while Germany agreed to respect the territorial *status quo* in case of France, a large cession of territory was required of Russia by the Peace of St Petersburg.

As the chief victor Germany demanded and received the lion's share of the spoil. In the West and South, the Baltic provinces, Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and South Russia, including the Crimea, fell into her hands....Turkey received the whole land between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea as far as the Don and the Volga and the line from Sarepta to Kalatsch. On the other hand, she relinquished to Austria Albania and Macedonia, and to Bulgaria East Rumelia. Of Russian territory, Austria received Bessarabia and she also compelled all the Balkan States to join a federation with her, formed after the pattern of the German Empire, herself receiving the position held by Prussia in the German Federation. ...Bosnia and Herzegovina became Austrian provinces, but Macedonia and Bessarabia were raised to the status of independent States under German Princes. Serbia also received a German Prince, so that all the Federated States of the New Empire, with the exception of Montenegro, were ruled by Princes of German extraction (pp. 10, 11).

Soon after the conclusion of the Peace of St Petersburg Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and Turkey formed

a West European Customs Alliance, which was joined by Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Persia, though with minor influence upon its policy. One of the first results of this measure was a dispute with Great Britain, which arose in the following circumstances:

The outcome of the Customs Union was a political understanding deemed necessary for many decades. As Turkey had joined the Union with all her possessions, Egypt was proclaimed to lie within her borders. Naturally England strongly resisted the withdrawal from her sphere of influence of territory which she had long treated as a dependency....Thereupon the Western Powers not only rejected the English protest against the inclusion of Egypt in the Customs Union, but in a Collective Note demanded the immediate recall therefrom of English troops and officials. England was mightily indignant, but in the end yielded, as she had no desire to measure strength with the fleets of the whole of Europe. Egypt was thereupon declared a Turkish province and the Khedive was made Governor (p. 22).

Later (1912) owing to the hostility shown to European emigration by the States of Central and South America, and the proposal of these States to join the United States in a Pan-American combination for the defence of the Monroe Doctrine, a world-war broke out, the chief combatants being Germany, France, Italy and Asiatic Russia on the one side, and Great Britain, the United States, and some of the Central and South American States on the other. The German combination was successful in this war, one incident of which was the invasion of England by German troops.

One battle, in which the Emperor William II led the allied armies, showed so completely the immense superiority of the Continental Powers to the incompetent English generals, officers, and soldiers, that the English abandoned resistance and in disorderly flight left the way open to London to the foreign Powers. There a peace was dictated by Germany, France and Italy

which destroyed for all time English maritime power and laid the foundation for a new partition of the world (p. 63).

In this partition Germany received Mexico, Guatemala, the British Honduras, all Brazil south of the Amazon, Uruguay, part of Paraguay, Bolivia, Peru, and North Chile; also by exchange the Portuguese possessions in West and East Africa. France received North Brazil, British Guiana, Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador, besides Dutch Guiana, for which Holland received Haiti and San Domingo. The remainder of South America, including the portions of Argentine, Chile, and Paraguay not claimed by Germany, fell to Italy. The British colonial empire was likewise almost wholly divided amongst the three Powers. Gibraltar was returned to Spain, Malta to Italy, and Cyprus to Turkey (pp. 63, 64). Moreover, an "enormous war indemnity" was demanded from England and her navy was divided between Germany, France and Italy.

These measures were imposed on England not only for economical and financial reasons, but in order to prevent her from exercising in future any economical, national, or political influence in the conquered territories. But in order to secure themselves fully against this danger the three Powers gave notice to the defeated enemy that within a year they intended to eject all Englishmen from their newly acquired as well as from their old colonies, and in future to allow no Englishman to take up his residence in any one of their oversea possessions or to acquire land therein (pp. 66, 67).

In the meantime the expansion of Germany in Europe by the appropriation of Russian territory had been perfected. Out of this territory were formed eight federal States, consisting of three duchies, four grand duchies, and the kingdom of Poland. German princes were placed over these States, and they were in consequence dispossessed in Germany, their territories there being incorporated in Prussia.

Thus the German Empire was rounded off at home likewise, and for ever relieved of the incubus of small States. While

formerly the smallest State had a superficial area of only about 316 square kilometres, the smallest had now an area of over 6423 square kilometres. Similarly the least populous State had now 355,000 inhabitants as against 39,000 before the rearrangement....The first Reichstag of the extended German Empire, which met at the end of 1915 in Berlin, took part with all the German princes in a ceremony which will remain as one of the most momentous in world-history. This was the celebration of the quincentenary of Hohenzollern rule in Brandenburg (pp. 76, 77).

An equally ambitious scheme of territorial repartition was published in 1911 by Otto Richard Tannenberg in his book *Grossdeutschland: die Arbeit des 20 Jahrhunderts* ["Greater Germany: the Work of the 20th Century"]. He writes:

France has taken the north-west of Africa from the Mohammedan inheritance; England the north-east, Egypt and the Sudan, with the empire of the Great Mogul at Delhi, in India; while Russia has conquered the north-east of the Black Sea and the Caucasus. Good—it is done! Nevertheless, the representatives of Russia, England and France enjoy the highest prestige at the Court of the Sultan and Calif in Stamboul. The German nation should also enjoy this prestige of the strong, and by means of economic penetration and a protectorate win back to civilisation the Asiatic possessions of Turkey, both for her good and that of the native populations. How should that be done according to English example? Obviously, subject to the full maintenance of Turkey's rights, just as in Egypt. Examples enough exist. The rights of the inhabitants of the country should be respected as far as possible, as England has done so admirably. The territories in question would consist of Asia Minor and Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and North Arabia. This second German world-empire would only be one-third as large as our African empire, but it possesses the advantage that Germans can live in these territories as agriculturists, as the Wurtemberg Templar colonies in Palestine show, while in Africa that is only possible in the more elevated parts on the Congo and the southern parts of South-West Africa....

Germany would obtain in South-eastern Asia a further empire which, next to the British Indies, would form the most valuable colonial possession in the world, viz. the Dutch Indies. These islands belong to the German nation already, though to its Low German branch, the Dutch....

What the future may bring us in the Mongolian States, it would be premature to attempt to decide. Nevertheless, our annexation of Kiaochow shows that Germany would not be surprised if dissolution took place. England is interested in Tibet in the north because of India; Russia in western Mongolia adjacent to Siberia in the south; Japan in eastern Mongolia, lying west of Manchuria. There remains, therefore, China proper, and it will depend upon the European situation to whom the largest part will fall. In order to maintain a just equilibrium Germany will be compelled to add to her sphere of interest as large a piece of territory as possible on the two great Chinese rivers, the Hoang Ho and Yangtse Kiang.

In Australia the conditions of possession are so far determined by European nations that few alterations can be anticipated. The mainland of Australia and New Zealand are English agricultural colonies, and as such will probably remain for all time a safe possession for the English, or at least the Anglo-Saxon nation. Whether these two phrases will for all time remain identical is another matter (pp. 223–5).

South America comprises south of the Amazon river region about five and a half million square kilometres with twelve million inhabitants, of whom eight millions are blacks, Indians, negroes, and half-breeds. Of the four million whites, half a million are German. This great territory will bring us the second possibility of founding an agricultural colony, such as England possesses in Canada, South Africa and Australia, and in its American branch in the United States; and such as Russia possesses in South Siberia and Upper Asia. In my opinion the possibility exists of acquiring for Germany a colonial empire proportionate to her European power and the extent of her population. It will not be possible, however, unless we cease our timid yielding to every pomposity who rattles his tin sword. What will remain if we politely retire before everyone weaker than ourselves as we have done in the last thirty years, so that opposition will become for the German

people a screw without end, since all nations of the earth are weaker than we on land? England alone will remain, for she commands at sea armaments of a kind with which we are not used to fight....

We Germans possess, with our great population, a sufficiency of efficient soldiers who, at the expiration of their service under arms, would be glad to form a large colonial force, if we offered them the prospect, at the expiration of a certain number of years, of an assured career as settlers in the territory to be acquired, just as has been done on a moderate scale already in South Africa. To form such a large colonial force would be an easy matter for the German nation, in view of its population, which is twice as large as that of England and France together, and it would perform for us the same service which England and France require of and receive from their mercenary troops.

The German nation must take possession of Central Africa from the mouth of the Orange river to Lake Chad, and from the Cameroon mountain to the mouth of the Rovuma river; also of Near Asia, the Malay Islands in South-east Asia, and the southern half of South America. It will then possess a colonial empire proportionate to its power.

Sentimental politics are stupid! Humanitarianism is idiocy! In distributing benevolence one should begin with one's own people. Politics and business, right and wrong, are ideas necessary in civil life, but the German nation is always right because it is German [*das deutsche Volk hat immer recht, weil es das deutsche ist*] and numbers a population of 87 millions. Our fathers have left us much to do. In what way shall my plans be realised? (pp. 229, 231).

The author proceeds to lay down the programme of a "German peace" which is to close a great European war in which Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy fight together against France and Russia, Great Britain being neutral.

War should leave the conquered side nothing except its eyes wherewith to weep over its misfortune. Modesty would be for us foolishness (p. 237).

Treaties of peace are concluded (1) between Germany and France at Brussels, (2) between Italy and France

at Nice, (3) between Germany and Russia at Riga, and (4) between Russia and Japan at Irkutsk. The principal conditions are as follows:

(1) France cedes to Germany eastern Departments and portions of Departments having an area of 17,114 square kilometres and a population of 1,192,453, and this territory is to form a German province of West Franconia with Nancy as its capital; the entire territory is to be evacuated by its French inhabitants within a year from the signing of peace; France is to declare her acquiescence in the entrance of Holland, Belgium, Luxemburg and Switzerland into the German Empire and to transpatriate the Walloons of Belgium into the thinly populated French districts. She is also to hand over her navy and all her colonies except Algeria to Germany and to pay to the same a war indemnity of 23 milliards of marks in cash or specie.

(2) Italy receives from France Corsica and the Maritime Alps, an area of 12,460 square kilometres with a population of 555,000.

(3) Russia is to cede to Germany territory in Lithuania and the Baltic provinces to the extent of 202,000 square kilometres and to take over the Slavs, Lithuanians, and Esthonians therein, to agree to the establishment of a new Kingdom of Poland, to consist of the Russian territory in the Vistula basin and Galicia and to form a part of New Austria; to transplant within a year all German settlers now in the western part of the Russian Empire (estimated at a million and a quarter) to the new German provinces; to cede Finland to Sweden; to pay to Germany twelve milliards of marks owing by her to France as loans; and to declare her acceptance of the other treaties concluded by the victorious States.

(4) Russia cedes to Japan her possessions in the Far East.

Further, the Austro-Hungarian Empire is to be reconstituted so as to comprise Hungary, Poland,

Serbia, Bulgaria and Rumania, Germany taking the German portion of the Austrian monarchy and becoming a Continental Empire of 115 million inhabitants.

By a treaty to be concluded between Germany and Great Britain the latter is to agree to the foregoing treaties, to negotiate the payment of the French indemnity and to divide with Germany the French colonies (except that Tunis is to go to Italy), and also the Portuguese colonies; the two countries are to divide China and South America into spheres of influence and are to resist any attempts of the United States to enforce in the latter the Monroe Doctrine, though the United States are to receive large territorial compensation.

The date of this great measure of repartition is given as 1950.

PEACE HANDBOOKS

The following is a complete list of the Handbooks prepared under the General Editorship of Sir George W. Prothero, late Director of the Historical Section of the Foreign Office.

Net Prices are given of all Volumes which have been published to date. Volumes X–XXV will be issued shortly.

*Books marked thus * contain sections on Geography and Economics as well as on History. Those marked thus § contain Geography and History only.*

(A) EUROPE.

Vol. I. Austria-Hungary (1).

New Nos.	Old Nos.		
1	(1)	History of Austria	2*s.* 6*d.*
	(2)	History of Hungary	
	(3)	Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary ...	
2	(4)	Bohemia* and Moravia*	2*s.* 6*d.*
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Vol. III. The Balkan States (1).

New Nos.	Old Nos.		
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16	(46)	Turkey in Europe	3*s*. 0*d*.
17	(16)	Albania*...	2*s*. 0*d*.
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Vol. IV. The Balkan States (2).

19	(20)	Montenegro*	2*s*. 0*d*.
20	(22)	Serbia*	2*s*. 6*d*.
21	(19)	Macedonia	2*s*. 0*d*.
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Vol. VI. France, Italy, Spain, &c.

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